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WHAT IS A PARTNERSHIP.
THE QUEEN vs. ROBSON.
(‘I-own Case reserved, 1885.
English Law Reports, 16 Q. B. D. L37.
The prisoner was tried and convicted on an indictment
framed under 31 &'32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, charging that he, being
a member of a copartnership called the Bedlington Colliery
Young Men’s Christian Association (hereafter called the associ-
ation), feloniously did embezzle three several sums of money
of and belonging to the said copartnership.
The object of the association was, to use the language of
one of its printed rules, “the extension of the Kingdom of the
Lord Jesus'Christ among young men and the development of
their spiritual life and mental powers.” It was composed of
members and associates. The number of members did not
exceed twenty. Any person was eligible for membership
“who gave decided evidence of hi conversion to God,” but,
before he could become a member, he must be proposed and
seconded by two members of the association and elected by
the committee on their being satisfied as to his suitability.
Trustees for the time being in whom -the real property belong-
ing to the association was vested became mem-bers by virtue
of their appointment as trustees. Members were required to
















































































































































CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
I. 
WHAT IS A PARTNERSHIP. 
TIIE QUEEN vs. ROBSON. 
Crown Ca86 reserved, 1885. 
Eugllsh I.aw Reports, 16 Q. B. D. 137. 
The prisoner was trie.d and convicted on an Indictment 
framed under 31 & 32 Viet. c. llG, s. 1, charging that he, being 
a member of a copartnership called the Bedlington Colliery 
Young Men's Christian Association (hereafter called the associ-
ation), feloniously did embezzle three several sums of mone} 
of and belonging to the said copactnersbip. 
The object of the assoC'iation was, to use the language of 
<me of its printed rules, "the extension of the Kingdom of the 
Lord Jesus· Christ among young men and the development of 
their spiritual life and mental powers." It was composed of 
members and associates. The number of members did not 
exceed twenty. Any person was eligible for membership 
"who gave decided evidence of his conversion to God," but, · 
before be could become a member, he must be proposed and 
seconded by two members of the assoriation and elected by 
the committee on their being satisfiejl as to his suitability. 
Trustees for the time being in whom the real property be}ong-
ing to the association was vested became members by Tictuc 
of their appointment as trustees. Members were required to 
. ambscribe three shillings per annum. The affairs of the a.uo-
2 Casss on PARTNERSHIP.
elation were in the hands of a general committee of manage-
ment, consisting of a president, two vice presidents, a treas-
urer, two secretaries, and at least nine members. The
committee had power to suspend or expel any member whose
conduct was found inconsistent in their judgment with the
Christian character. The agencies for the attainment of the
objects of the association were, 1st, the personal efl:‘orts of
the members; 2d, devotional meetings; 3d, social meetings;
4th, classes for Biblical instruction; 5th, the delivering of
addresses and lectures; and, 6th, the diffusion of Christian
and other suitable literature.
Before the first of the offenses charged against the prisoner
was committed, the members of the association proposed to
build and afterward built a hall or place of meeting for the
purposes of the association at a cost of nearly £200, of which
about £40 was still owing. To this building every member
had the right of entry and was entitled to a latch-key.
The prisoner became a member of the association in 1878,
and had continued to be a member up to the time of the trial.
As and being such member he solicited and obtained for the
association from divers persons many sums of money as dona-
tions or subscriptions on account of and for the general pur-
poses of the association, toward the building fund, and toward
the liquidation of the aforesaid debt of £40. Three of these
sums it was that the prisoner was charged with and found
guilty of embezzling.
If the association was a copartnership within the meaning
of 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, the conviction was to stand
affirmed.‘ If it was not the conviction was to.be reversed.
Walton, for the prisoner.
The only question is whether this association is a copartnership. The
terms of the statute clearly show that the copartnerships contemplated
thereby are copartnerships in the ordinary sense of the term, viz., for the
1 31 and 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1, provides that “ if any person being a mem~
ber of any copartnership, or being one of two or more beneficial owners of
any money, goods or effects, etc., shall steal or embezzle any such money,
goods or effects, etc., of or belonging to any such copartnership or to such
joint beneficial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with,
tried, convicted and punished for the same as if such person had not been
or was not a member of such eopartnership or one of such beneficial
owners.”
















































































































































2 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
clation were in the hands of a general committee of manage-
ment, consisting of a president, two Yice presidents, a treas-
urer, two secretaries, and at least nine members. Tb1.? 
committee had power to suspend or expel any member whose 
conduct was found inconsh1tent in their judgment with the 
Christian character. The agencies for the attainment of the 
objects of the association were, 1st, the personal efforts of 
the members; 2d, devotional meetings; 3d, social meetings; 
4th, classes for Biblical instruction; 5th, the delivering or 
addresses and lectures; and, 6th, the diffusion of Christian 
and other suitable literature. 
Before the first of the offenses charged against the prisoner 
was committed, the members of the association proposed to 
build and afterward built a ball or place of meeting for the 
purposes of the association at a ce>st of nearly £200, of which 
about £40 was still <>wing. To this building every member 
bad the right of entry and was entitled to a latch-key. 
The prisoner became a member of the association in 1878, 
nnd had continued to be a member up to the time of the trial. 
As and being such member he soli~ited and obtained for the 
association from divers persons many sums of money as dona-
tions or subscriptions on account of and for the general pur-
poses of the association, toward the building fund, and toward 
the liquidation of the aforesaid debt of £40. Three of these 
sums it was that the prisoner was charged with and found 
guilty of embezzling. 
If the association was a copartnership within the meaning 
of 31 & 32 Viet. c. 11 G, s. 1, the con ,·iction was to stan<l 
.amrmed.1 If it was not the conviction was to .be reversed. 
Walton, for the prisoner. 
The only question is whether this aeaociation is a copartnerabfp. Tb& 
terms of the statute clearly show that the copartnerships contemplated 
thereby are copartnerships in the ordinary sense of the term, viz .• for the 
1 31 and 32 Viet. c. 116, e. l, provides that "if any person being a mem-
ber of any oopartnership, or being one of two or more beneficial owners of 
any money, goods or effects, etc., shall ste&) or embezzle any such money, 
eoods or effects, etc., of or belonging to any such copartnership or to such 
joint beneficial owners, every such person shall be liable to be dealt with, 
tried, convicted and punished foe the same as it such person had not been 
or was not a member of such copartnership or one of such beneficial 
owners." 
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purpose of gain or profit. Lmnnnv, L. J ., in his work on Partnership, p.
1, gives an explanation of the term “partnevship,” which shows that the
necessary idea of a partnership is that it should have for its object the
acquisition and division of gain. He says: “Without attempting to define
the terms ‘partners’ and ‘partnership,’ it will sufiice to point out as
accurately as possible the leading ideas involved in these words. The
terms in question are evidently derived from to part in the sense of to
divide amongst or share; and this at once limits their application, although
not very precisely: for persons may share almost anything imaginable,
and may do so either by agreement or otherwise. But, in order that per-
sons may be partners in the legal acception of the word, it is requisite that
they shall share something by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and
that that which they have agreed to share shall be the profit arising from
some predetermined business engaged in for their common benefit; . . . .
to use the word ‘ partnership’ to denote a society not formed for gain is to
destroy the value of the word, and can only lead to confusion. Nor is it
consistent with modern usage. Lord Hans and older writers use oopart-
nership in the sense of co-ownership, but this is no longer customary, and,
as will be shown hereafter, there are many important differences between
the two.” This is not an association for the purposes of profit or gain.
Inrd COLERIDGE, O. J. The only point reserved is whether this is a. co-
partnership. The prisoner was not indicted as one of several joint bene-
ficial owners.
No counsel appeared for the prosecution.
Lord COLERIDGI-1, O. J. It seems to me that this conviction
cannot be supported. I cannot find any authority throwing
any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Part-
nership, which makes the participation in profits essential to
the English idea of partnership, and states ‘that, although in
former times the word “copartnership” was used in the sense
of “co-ownership,” the modern usage has been to confine the
meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number
of definitions given by writers from all parts of the world ar-.2
appended to the passage, and in all of them the idea involved
appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain.
The association in the present case is not a copartnership in
any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation
for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word
"copartnership” as used in the act according to the meaning
ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text-books on
the subject. This a._..ociation does not come within that
meaning. The only point reserved for us is whether this asso-
ciation is a copartnership within the act. Inasmuch as we
are of opinion that it is not, the conviction must be l‘8\‘0l'S?d.
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purpoae of gain or profit. LtNDLEY, L. J ., in his work on Partnership, p. 
l, gives an explanation of the term "partnership," which showa that the 
neceaaary idea of a partnership is that it should have for ita object the 
acquisition and division of gain. He says: "Without at~mpting to define 
the terms •partners' and 'partnership,' it will suffice to point out as 
accurately ae poeeible the leading ideas involved in these words. The 
terms in question are evidently derived from Co part in the 1:1ense of to 
divide amongst or share; and this at once limits their application, although 
not very precisely: for persona may share almost anything imaginable, 
and may do so either by agreement or otherwise. But, in order that per-
aons may be partllers in the legal e.cception of the word, it is requisite that 
they shall share eomething by virtue of an agreement to that effect, and 
that that which they have agreed to share shall be the profit arising from 
some predetermined busineee engaged in for their oommon benefit; ••.. 
to use the word 'partnership' to denote a society not formed tor gllin is to 
destroy the value of the word, and can only lead to confusion. Nor is it 
consistent with modern usage. Lord HALK and older writers use oopart-
nership in the sense of co-ownership, but this is no longer customary, and, 
as will be shown hereafter, there are many important differences between 
the two." This ia not an aesociation for the purposes of profit or gain. 
Lord CoLERIDG11:, C. J. The only point reserved is whether this ia a co-
partnership. The prisoner wae not indicted as one of several· joint bene-
ficial owners. 
No counsel appeared for the prosecution. 
Lord COLERIDGE, C. J. It seems to me that this conviction 
cannot be supported. I cannot find any authority throwing 
any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Part-
nership, which m'kes the participation in profits essential to 
the English idea of partnership, and states 'that, although in 
former times the word "copai1nership" was used in the sense 
of "co-ownership," the modern usage has been to confine the 
meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number 
of definitions given by writers from all parts of the world ar .. ~ 
appended to the passage, and in all of theo the idea involved 
appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain. 
The association in the present case is not a copartnersbip in 
any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation 
for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word 
·•copartnership" as used in the act acc~mling to the meaning 
ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text·book8 011 
· the subject. This a ... ,ociation d-0es n9t come withi.n that 
meaning. The oaly point reserved for us is whether this asso-
ciation is a copartnership within the act. lnnsmuch as we 
·are of opinion that it is not, foe rnm'i<'tion m11st hf" reYc>rs:•d. 
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DENMAN, J. I am of the same opinion. The word "copart-
nership“ in the act must be construed according to the well-
known legal meaning of the term. If the section had only
mentioned the case of a copartnership I should have thought
it impossible to say that this case was within the statute.
The conclusion to which we come is, in my opinion, much
strengthened by the fact that the section contains another
expression which covers the case of co-ownership where there
is no copartnership. Here we are dealing only with the term
“oopartnership,” for the only question reserved is whether
this association was a copartnership within the section. I am
clearly of the opinion that it was not.
FIELD, HAwK1Ns, and W1LLs, JJ., concurred.
Conviction reversed.
Nora: See Mechem’s Elem. of Pai-tn., § § 3, 7 and cases there cited.
BURT vs. LATHROP.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1883.
_ 52 Mich. 106, 17 N. W. Rep. 716.
Error to Wayne. Plaintiff appeals.
(7. O’. Burt, in pro. per., and John Atkinson, for plaintiff and
appellant.
O’. A. Kent and Julian G. Dickinson, for defendants.
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff sued a large number of defendants
as jointly liable to him for his services as attorney in defend-
ing some patent suits concerning the rights to use certain
hard-rubber material in dentistry. He declared specially and
with the common counts for these services, and also set up
two judgments rendered in Jackson county for the same causes
of action. Upon trial the court below ordered a verdict for
defendants. The counts which <,le.<cril>e the judgments do not
set them cut in such a way as to make out any legal liability
under thtrr '\§*_'\ins‘.t all these defeml-uits, and the proofs are
~ - » _ O
















































































































































CAS.88 ON PARTNEUSHIP. 
DENMAN, J. I am of the same opinion. The word "copart-
nership'' in the act must be construed according to the Well-
known legal meaning of the term. If the section had only 
mentioned the case of a copartnership I should have thought 
it impossible to say that this case was within the statute. 
The conclusion to which we come is, in my opinion, much 
strengthened by the fact that the section contains anothe1· 
t>xpression which covers the case of co-ownership where there 
is no copartnership. Here we are dealing only with the term 
''oopartnership," for the only question reserved is whetht:r 
this association was a copartnership within the section. I am 
clearly of the opinion that it was not. 
FIELD, HAWKINS, and \V1LLs, JJ., concurred. 
Conviction reversed. 
Non: Bee :Mechem'a Elem. or Partn., § § I, 7 and OM8B ~ere oltied. 
BURT vs. LATHROP. 
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1883. 
52 Mich. 106, 17 N. W. Rep. 716. 
Error to Wayne. Plaintiff appeal&. 
<J. C. Burt, in pro. per., and John Atkit&Btm, for plaintiJf and 
nppellant. 
C . .A. Knit and Julian G. Dickinson, for defendants. 
CAMPBEI.L, J. Plaintiff sued a larlZ'e number of defendant:H 
as jointly liable to him for his serviees as attorney in defend-
ing some patent suits concerning the rights to use certaio. 
hard-rubbl'r material in dentistry. Ile declared specially and 
with the common counts for these services, and also set up 
1 wo judgments rendered in Ja<..kson county for the i:1nnw caueas 
of action. Upon trial the eourt hc>low orGl'I't>d a verdict for 
defendants. 'fhe counti-i wliir·h dt>i-wl'ibe tl1P judgment':! do net 
set them cut in such a wa~· as to makP out any legal liability 
und ... ·r thl't' ·1r:·linr.t all tlwse <lt>fpr11h11ts, and the proofs IU"e 
.· 
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not any more definite. It appears affirmatively that no juris-
dict-ion existed to bind more than a part of them, and there
can be nothing claimed for them under the issue as presented.
They may, therefore, be laid aside. The ground for asserting
a claim- against the defendants jointly is that they are claimed
to have become members of an association combined for the
purpose of legal resistance to the claims of apatentee, and
that plaintiff was employed by their officers.
There is no testimony tending to show any immediate per-
sonal employment of plaintiff by the defendants, jointly or
individually, so as to justify this joint action. But it was
claimed that they stood on the footing of partners, bound by
the action of their designated managing members. The testi-
mony indicates that several of the defendants, at variou times,
became members of an association which, so far as pertinent
to this inquiry, required them to pay five dollars each into
the treasury, and to pay such assessments as should be levied
pro rota, .on pain of being left out of the association an_d its
privileges. The officers were to employ counsel, and money
was to be paid on the order of the president and secretary.
We can find in this arrangement nothing analogous to a
partnership. There was no common business, and nothing:
involving profit and loss in a business sense. No one was
empowered to make contracts binding on the subscribers per»
sonally, and no one was to be liable except for assessments.
nor even for those except as he saw fit to pay them to keep
his membership. It was nothing more than a combination
which may have made the parties in some respects responsible
to each other, but which did not, we think. authorize any con-
tract with third persons which should bind any member per-
sonally beyond his assessments. As plaintiff was not only
aware of the articles, but showed that he acted under them
and in furtherance of them in various ways, no question arises
in the nature of’ an equitable estoppel. YVe are not concerned
on this record to consider whether plaintifl’ has any other
adequate means of securing compensation. The only ques-
tion now is whether these defendants are his joint debtors.
We think they are not.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
(The other justices concurred.)
















































































































































BURT vs. LATlllWl'. 5 
not any more definite. It appears affirmatively that no juris-
diction existed to bind more than a part of them, and there 
can be nothing claimed for them under the isirne as presented. 
They may, therefore, be laid aside. TJie ground for asserting 
a claim against the defendants jointly is that they are claimed 
to have become members of an assodation combined for the 
purpose of legal resistance to the claims of a patentee, and 
that plaintiff was employed by their officers. 
There is no testimony tending to show any immediate per-
Ronal employment of plaintiff by the defendants, jointly .or 
individualJy, so ns to 'justify this joint action. But it was 
claimed that they stood on the footing of partners, bound by 
the action of their designated managing nu:'mbers. The testi-
mony indicateN that several of the defr>ndants, at various times, 
became memb<'rs of an association whieh, so far as pertinent 
to this inquir·y, required them to pay five dollarfl Ntcb into 
the treasury, and to pay such assessments as should be levied 
pro rata, on pain of being left out of the association an.d its 
privileges. The officers were to employ counsel, and money 
was to be paid on ihr order of the president and seerptary. 
We can find in this arrangement nothing analogous to a 
partnership. There was no common business, and nothinJ.! 
involving profit and loss in a business ~wnse. No one waH 
empowered to make contraets binding on Hu~ subscribers per· 
sonally, and no one was to be liable ey~·ept for asses1mwnt:i. 
nor even for those except as he saw fit to pay them to keep 
his membership. It was nothing more than a combination 
which ma,v have madt> the pnrtirs in sorn(• l'P!';p1•(·tR rPsponRiblP 
to each other, but whkh did not, we think. authoriiw m1y con-
tract with third persons which should bind any nwmbl'I' pp1·-
sonally beyond bis m~sessments. As plaintiff was not only 
aware of the articles, but showed that he acted under them 
and in furtherance of them in various ways, no question ariseN 
in the nature of an equitable estoppel. ~Yf' arf' not concerned 
on this record to considl'I' wheth<>r plaintiff has any othf'r 
adequate means of securing oompensation. The only que~­
tion n<>w is whether these defendants are his joint debtors. 
We think they are not. 
The judgment must be affirmed with costs. 
(The other justices concurred.) 
Non: See Meohem'e Elem. of Partn., § 7. 
6 Casns on PA R1‘N1~jR$H1P.
DUNHAM vs. LOVEROCK.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1893.
158 Pa. st. 197, 21 Atl. Rep. 900, as Am. st. Rep. ass.
Dunham and Loverock were tenants in common of a lease
hold estate in oil lands. <Dunham drilled a new well in pur-
suance of an agreement with Loverock to that eifect./ Dunham
claimed a balance due to him from Loverock on account of the
welt} In the meantime one Pickett bought Lover-ock’s half of
the property, and lmnham alleged that he and Loverock were
partners, and therefore that Pickett took subject to a settle-
ment of the accounts between Loverock and the firm. The
court below held that there was no partnership and Dunham
appealed. "
Roger Sherman and Samuel Grumbine, for appellant.
George S. Criszrcll and J. W. Lee, for appellee.
Wrnnmms, J. (After stating the facts.) No contract of
pa rtnership,written or oral, is shown, but it is contended that a
partnership resu_lted from the agreement to drill another well
on the leasehold at the common cost of the owners. It must be
remembered that this question is not raised between third per-
sons and the tenants in common, but inter sese. What other
person may have thought, or in what manner they may have
charged goods furnished for the work on the well, is not now
the question; but what was the actual fact as between them.
selves? When the new well was proposed they were simply
tenants in common of the ten acres covered by the lease,
and of the well and machinery thereon. As such they con-
tributed to the cost of operating the well, and divided the
product. The new well was on the same lease. It was to
the interest of each of the cotenants that it should be put
down,.and it was an undertaking which was appropriate to
tenants in common, since it would increase the product of
the common property. In the absence of a distinct agreement
between them that their relations to the property and to each
other should be changed, the presumption is that the old rela-
‘”"“*“~-"-—~— —‘—~—'-.~ .7 ~ W - . .\.___ _
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DUNHAM vs. LOVEROCK. 
Supreme O°ourl of Pennsylvania, 1893. 
1158 Pa. St. 197, 27 Atl. Rep. 900, &I Am. St. Rep. 888. 
Dunham and Lovcrock were tenants in common of a lease-
hold estate in oil lands. (Dunham drilled a new well in pur-
suance of an agl'eement with Loverock to that effect.) Dunham 
claimed a balance due to hlm from Loverock on account of the 
· wel~ In the meantime one Pickett bought Loverock's half of 
the p1-operty, and lhmham alleged that he and Loverock were 
partners, and therefore tha.t Pickett took subject to a se".:tle-
ment of the accounts between Loverock and the tirm. The 
court below held that thel'e was no partnership and Dunham 
appealed. ' 
Roger Sherman and Samuel Grumbine, for appellant. 
George S. Orisrccll and J. W. Lee, for appellee. 
WILLIAMS, J, (After stating the facts.) No contract of 
partnt:>rship, Wl'itten or oral, is shown, but it is contended that it 
partnership resuJted from the agreement to drill another well 
on the leasehold at the common cost of the owners. It must he 
remembered that this question is not raised between third per-
sons and the tenants in common, but inter sese. \Vhat other 
persons may have thought, or in what manner they may have 
charged goods furnished for the work on the well, is not now 
the question; but what was the actual fact as between them-
selvP-s? When the new well was proposed they were simply 
tenants in common of the ten acrt>s covered by the lease, 
and of the well and machinery thereon. As such they con-
tributed to the cost of operating the well, and divided the 
product. The new well was on the same lease. It was to 
the interest of each of the cotenants that it should be put 
down, and it was an undertaking which was approp1iate to 
tenants in <."Ommon, since it wot"1ld increase tte product of 
the common property. In the absence of a distinct agreement 
lJetween them that their relations to the property and to each 
other should be changed, the presumption is that the old re13.-
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iion continued, and that they treated with each other as own-
ers of separate interests in an undivided lease.
It is elementary law that a partnership is created only by 11$
contra ct, express or implied. The burden of showing its exist-.
cnce is on him who alleges it, and this burden the court below
rightly held had not been lifted by the plaintiff. To be sure
there was undivided possession of the lease,but pn_Hy11i}3g;s;-s-
sion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a tenancy in
common. There was contribution to the cost of operating the
well, but this could be compelled between tenants in common
by bill or by account render. There was division of the prod-
uct, but this was in accordance with the rights of the co-ten-
ants. Each had a right to share in the product in proportion
to his interest in the estate. It may be said that there was a'
resulting division of profits, since, if. the product exceeded the
cost of production, there was a profit to each part owner; but it
so it was shown by the settlement of his individual accounts
only, and grew out of the fact that he received from his share
of the product more than it cost him to secure it. '
So it may be said there was a contribution to losses, since
each tenant sustained a loss when the value of his share of tho
produce fell below its cost to him, but this was the individual
loss of each, with which no one else had any cohcern, and to
which no one was bound to contribute. There is, therefore, no
circumstance relating to the business done upon, or the devel-
opment of, the lease not fairly and naturally referable to the
relations the parties sustained to each other as tenants in com-
mon. There is no agreement shown that tenants in common
might not properly make with each other for the development
of the property in which each held a separate title, but an undi-
vided possession. Between persons so situated a partnership
does not result by implication of law. It must be created by
agreement. As we fully agree with the court below that no
such agreement was shown, it is not necessary to consider the
authorities cited by the learned master, and by counsel to their
printed briefs, showing what are the ordinary indie-ia of a part-
nership. There can be no controversy over such questions in
this case, for the plaintifi fails for want of proof sutficient to
furnisha foothold for him on the facts. Tenants in common
may become partners, like other persons, whcre they agree to
















































































































































DUNHAM vs. Lov EROCK. 1 
tion continued, and that they treated with <>ach other as own~ 
ers of separate int.erests in an undivided lease. . 
It is elementary law that a partnership is created only by a\ 
contract, express or implied. The burden of showing its e·xist-/ 
ence is on him who alleges it, and this. burden the court below 
rightly held had not been lifted by the plaintiff. To be su1·e 
there was undivided possession of the lease, but unity of pos!lc·~: 
sion is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a tenancy in 
common. There was contribution to the cost of operating the 
well, but this could be compelled between tenants in common 
bv bill or bv account render. There was division of the prod-. . . 
uct, but this was in accordance with the rights of the co-ten-
ants. F.ach had a right to share in the product in proportion 
to his interest in the estate. It may be said that there was a: 
rt'sulting division of profits, since, if. the product exceeded the 
eost of production, there was a profit to ea<;h part owner; but if 
so it was shown by the settlement of his individual accounts 
only, and grew out of the fact that he received from his share 
of the product more than it cost him to secure it. · 
So it may be said there was a contribution to losses, since 
each tenant sustained a loss when the value of his share of the 
produce fell below its cost to him, but this was the individual 
loss of each, with which no one else bad any concern, and to 
which no one was bound to contribute. There is, the ref ore, no 
circumstance relating to the business done upon, or the devel-
opment of, the lease not fairly and naturally referable to the 
relations the parties sustained to each other as tenants in com· 
mon. There is no agreement shown that tenants in common 
might not properly make with each other for th~ development 
of the property in which each held a separnte title, but an undi-
'"ided possession. Between persons so situated a partnership 
does not result by implication of law. It must be created by 
agreement. As we fully agree with the court below that no 
such agreement was shown, it is not necessary to consider thP 
authorities cited by the learn~d master, and by counsel to their 
printe<i briefs, showing what are the ordinary indfoia of a part-
nership. There can be no controversy over such questions iu 
this case, for the plaintiff fails for want of proof sufficient to 
furnish .a foothold for him on the facts. Tenants in common 
may become partners, like other persons, where they agree to 
assume that relation towards ench other; but the law will not 
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create the relation for them as the consequence of a course of
conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation already
existing between them, which made such a course of conduct
to their common advantage. The plaintiff and defendants,
upon the facts before us, were tenants in common.
Affirmed.
Nora: See Mechem's Elem. of Part.n., §8, and cases there cited. See
also Coope v. Eyre post, p. -.
EATON VS. YVALKER.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1889.
76 Mich. 579, 43 N. \V. Rep.
This action wa brought by Eaton against Walker, Hop-
kins and Livingston, to recover the sum of $3,562.68, alleged
to be due from them. There was no dispute a to the amount.
The defense was that the debt was contracted by and due
from the corporation of Walker, Hopkins & Co., of which the
defendants were the members, but which had become l~i.
Prior to the organization of Walker, Hopkins & Co., the defend-
ant Walker, with others, had carried on a partnership busi-
ness under the firm name of \Valker, Summer & Co. Plaintiff
had had dealings with both concerns. Hopkins and Livingston
had no connection with the business of Walker, Summer &
Co. Defendants had assumed to organize as a corporation
under a statute purporting to authorize such organization, and
had done all that was necessary to comply with the statute.
Defendants Livingston and Hopkins had paid in cash for their
stock, and Walker had turned in the assets of \Valker, Sum-
mer & Co., of which he had become the owner. The court
below found that the plaintiff had dealt with YValkc1', Hopkins
8: Co., as a corporation, and that the debt sued upon was due
from the corporation as such. The plaintiff contended that
the statute under which defendants had assumed to organize
as a corporation was unconstitutional, because it violated the
constitutional provision that “no law shall embrace more than
one object, which shall be embraced in its title.” The Supreme
Court held the statute unconstitutional for this reason.
















































































































































8 0ASB8 Olf' PARTNERSHIP. 
c~nte the relntion for them as the consequence of a course or 
conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation already 
existing between them, which made such a course of conduct 
to their common advnntnge. The plaintiff and defendants, 
upon the facts before us, were tenants in common. 
Affirmed. 
NOT11:: See Machem's Elem. of Partn., § 8, and cases there cited. See 
alao Coope v. Eyre poat, p. -. 
EATON vs. 'WALKER. 
Supreme C01trl of Michigan, 1889. 
76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. Rep. 638. 
This action was brought by Eaton against Walker, Hop· 
kin1 and Livingston, to recover the sum of $3,562.68, alleged 
to be due from them. There was no dispute as to the amount. 
The defense was that the debt was contracted by and due 
from the c~~poration of " ' alkE>r, Hopkins & Co., of which the 
defendants were the members, but which had become i!!§.Olvent. 
Prior to the organization of Walker, Hopkins & Co., the defend· 
ant \Valker, with others, bad carried on a partnership busi· 
ness under the firm name of \Yalker, Summer & Co. Plaintiff 
had had dealings with both concerns. Hopkins and Livingston 
had no connection with the business of \Valker, Summer & 
Co. Defendants had assumed to orguni:i:e as a corporation 
under a statute purporting to authorize i;;uch organization, and 
had done all that was nE>cessary to comply with the statutt .... 
Defendants Livingston and Hopkins had paid in cash for their 
stock, and " ',a.Iker had turned in the assets of \Valker, Sum-
mer & Co., of which be had become the owner. The court 
below found that the plaintiff had dealt with ·walker, Hopkins 
& Co., as a corporation, and that the> dc>bt sued upon was due 
from the corporation as such. The plaintiff contended that 
the statute under which defendants bad assumed to organize 
as a corporation was unconstitutionffl, because it violated th<~ 
constitutional provision that "no law shall embrace more than 
one object, whic-h shall be C'rnbraced in its title." The Supreme 
Court held the statute unconstitutional for this reason. 
Henry M. Duffeeld, for plaintiff and appellant. 
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l D-ickinson, Thurber and Stevenson, and F. H. Canfield, for
defendants.
Louo, J. (After declaring the statute unconstitutional.)
Defendants’ counsel, however, insist that Walker, Hopkins
& Go. were a corporation dc facto, if not de jure. But there
being no valid law of this State under which. the defendants
could legally be incorporated, could they, even colorably,
become a corporation, or have any existence as a corporation
dc facto, or would the plaintiff be estopped from inquiry into
their corporate existence under such circumstances? Two
things are necessary to be shown in order to establish a cor-
poration dc facto, viz.: (1) The existence of a charter or some
law under which a corporation, with the powers assumed,
might lawfully be created; and (2) a user by the party to the
suit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.
Bank 1:3. Stcarns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314. If-the law exists, and
the record exhibits a bona fide attempt to organize under it,
very slight evidence of user beyond thi is all that can be
required. Methodist Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 487. In Haas-
ton vs. Railroad Co., 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430, the court
says: “The estoppel goes to the mere dc facto organization;
not to the question of legal authority to make an organization.
A dc facto corporation, that by regularity of organization might
be one dc jure, can sue and be sued. And a person who con-
tracts with such corporation while it is acting under its do
facto organization——who contracts with it as an organized cor-
poration——is estopped, in a suit on such contract, to deny its
de facto organization at the date of the contract; but this docs
not extend to the question of legal power to organize. Hence,
if an organization is completed where there is no law, or an
unconstitutional law, authorizing an organization as a cor-
poration, the doctrine of estoppel docs not apply.” The same
rule was laid down by implication by this court in Swartzcout
vs. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 393, as follows: “Where there is thus
a corporation de facto, with no want of legislative power to
its due and legal existence; where it is proceeding in the per-
formance of corporate functions, and the public are dealing
with it on the upposition that it is what it professes to be;
and the questions suggested are only whether there has been
exact regularity and strict compliance with the provisions of




















































































































































EA. 1 ON vs. w AL.KE&. 
· Dickmson, Thurber and Btevenscm, and F. H. Canfl.e'ld, for 
defendants. 
LoNG, J. (After decluing the statute unconstitutional.) 
Defendants' counsel, however, insist that Walker, Hopkins 
& Co. were a oorporation de facto, if not de jiire. But there 
being no valid Jaw of this State under which. the defendants 
could legally be incorporated, could they, even colorably, 
hecome a corporation, or have any existence as a corporation 
de facto, or would the plaintiff be estopped from inquiry into 
their corporate existence under such circumstances? Two 
things are necessary to be sb9wn in order to establish a cor-
poration de facto, viz.: (1) The existence of a charter or some 
law under which a corporation, with the powers assumed. 
might lawfully be created; and (2) a user by tile party to the 
snit of the rights claimed to be conferred by such charter or law. 
Bank vs. Stearns, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314. If· the law exists, and 
the record exhibits a bona fide attempt to organize under U, 
very slight evidence of user beyond this is all that can be 
required. Methodist Ohurch vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 487. In Heas· 
'9ra V8. Railroad Oo., 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430, the court 
11ays: "The estoppel goes to the mere de facto organization; 
not to the question of legal authority to make an organization. 
A de facto corporation, that by regularity of organization might 
be one de jure, can sue and be sued. And a person who con-
tracts with su<'h corporation while it is acting under its fie 
faclo organization-who contracts with it as an organized cor· 
poration-is estopped, in a suit on such contract, to deny its 
de facto organization at the date of the contract; but this docs 
not extend to the question of legal power to organize. Hence, 
if an organization is completed where there is no law, or an 
unconstitutional law, authorizing an organization as a cor· 
poration, the dm:trine of t>stop1wl clo<>s not apply." The same 
rule was laid down by implication by this court in Swartzrnuf. 
1'8. Railroad Co., 24 Mich. 393, as follows: "\\'i:ere there is tllus 
a corporation de facto, with no want of leghdative power to 
its dut• nn<l legal existence; where it is proceeding· in the per-
form:mce of corporate fun(•tions, and the public are dealing 
with it on the supposition that it is what it professes to be; 
and the questions suggested are only whether there bas be~n 
exact regularity and strict compliance with the provisions of 
the Jaw relating to incorporation,-it is plainly a dictate, alike! 
2 
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of justice and of public policy, that in controversies between
the de facto corporation and those who have entered into con-
tract relations with it, as corporators or otherwise, such
questions should not be suffered to be raised.” And again it was
said: “But both in reason and on authority the ruling should
be the same where an attempt has been made to organize a
corporation under a general law permitting it. If due author-
ity existed for the organization, and the question is one of
regularity merely, ‘the rule established by law, as well as rea-
son, is that parties, recognizing the existence of corporations
by dealing with them, have no right to object to any irregu-
larity in their organization.’ ” In the present case, however,
there was no law authorizing the parties to file their articles
of association, or to become incorporated; and there could,
under such circumstances, be no corporation dc facto. It can-
not, therefore, in any proper legal sense, be said that the carry-
ing on of the business in the corporate name is evidence of
user which can be considered in aid of their legal corporate
existence.
Counsel for the defendants contend that the case of Bank
-vs. Stone, 38 Mich. 779, is decisive of this case. In that case
the defendants claimed to be incorporated as the Charles Stone
Timber Company. It appeared that the plaintiff transacted
a large amount of business with the defendants, upon the
specific understanding that the concern was contracting as a
corporation, and not otherwise; and this court said: “Now,
the proof that, as matter of fact, the company carried on busi-
ness as a corporation in the name of the Charles Stone Timber
Company when the bank dealt with it, established, prima facie.
that it was a corporation pursuant to law; and certainly the
evidence the bank adduced in regard to the operations of the
company, the attitude it maintained, and the character in
which the two concerns dealt together, showed that the com-
pany was a corporation dc facto, and so acknowledged by the
bank.” In the present case the plaintiff offered evidence to
show that he never knew, or had any information, that the
defendants claimed that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-
poration, but, on the contrary, that Mr. Walker, of that firm,
asked him to continue his business with the firm as he had
carried it on formerly with YValker, Summer & Co.. and that
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of justice and of public policy, that in controversies between 
the de facto corporation and those who have entered into con-
tract relatfons with it, as oorporators or otherwise, such 
questions should not be suffered to be raised." And again it was 
said: "But both in reason and on authority the ruling should 
be the same where an attempt has been made to organize a 
corporation under a general law permitting it. If due author-
ity existed for the organization, and the question is one of 
r~gularity merely, 'the rule established by law, as well as rea-
son, is that parties, recognizing the existence of corporations 
by dealing with them, have no right to object to any irregu-
larity in their organization.'" In the present case, however, . 
there was no law authorizing the parties to file their articles 
-0f association, or to become incorporated; and there ~ould, 
under such circumstances, be no corporation de facto. It can-
not, therefore, in any proper legal sense, be said that the carry-
ing on of the busilless in the corporate name is evidence of 
user which can be considered in aid of their legal corporate 
~xistence. 
Counsel for the defendants contend that the case of Ban.k 
tJB. Stone, 38 Mich. 779, is decisive of this case. In that case 
the defendants claimed to be incorporated as the Charles Stone 
Timber Company. It appeared tqat the plaintiff transacted 
a large amount of business with the defendants, upon the 
Rpecitlc understanding that the concern was contracting as a 
~orporation, and not otherwise; and this court said: "Now, 
the proof that, as matter of fact, the company carried on bmd· 
ness as a corporation in the name of the Charles Stone Timber 
Company when the bank dealt with it, established, prima facie, 
that it was a corporation pursuant to law; and certainly the 
evidence the bank adduced. in regard to the operations of the 
company, the attitude it maintainr.d, and the character in 
• which the two concerns dealt together, showed that the com-
pany was a corporation de facto, and so acknowledged by the 
bank." In the present case the plaintiff offered evidence to 
show that he neve1· knew, or had any information, that the 
defendants claimed that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-
poration, but, on the contrary, that Mr. Walker, of that firm, 
asked him to continue bis business with the firm as he had 
earried it on formerly with Walker, Summer & Co .. and that 
the fi1·m was composed of himself, William Livingston, Jr., 
. EA'roN vs. WALKER. ll
and Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that he always believed and under-
stood that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a firm. This testi-
mony the court below excluded. In addition to this, and upon
this point, this case differs radically from the case of Bank vs.
Stone. The whole facts show that the firm never had any cor-
porate existence, and never was a corporation, even do facto.
It is very evident to us that the facts here presented do not
bring this case within the ruling of the former case. In the
present case, as in that, the name would not indicate that the
firm was a corporation. It gave no clue to the nature of the
company as being corporated or unincorpora.ted,and there is no
pretense of proof that the plaintiff dealt with it as a corpora-
tion, except the fact that defendants were doing business as a
corporation, and had published such fact in two of the Detroit
papers, and mailed circulars to their customers announc-
ing that they had organized as a. corporation under the laws
of the State of Michigan, and also that their letter heads
showed this fact, some of the circulars being mailed to plaint-
iff, and the corporation having also sent by mail statements of
its accounts to plaintifi written upon such letter heads. The
plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of receiving such
circulars, or of ever having seen such announcements in the
public press. Plaintiff also testified that he had no recollection
of ever having received any letter heads containing the infor-
mation that defendants were a corporation; and it appears
that when the account was made -up by defendants showing
their indebtedness to plaintiff, and transmitted to him, it was
upon the letter head of \Valker, Summer & Co., which did not
contain a-ny showing that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-
poration. Plaintifi"s counsel also ofi’ered to show by the testi-
mony of the plaintiff that Mr. Walker solicited the plaintifi
to do business with IValker, Hopkins & 00., stating to him that
it was a partnership composed of Walker, Livingston, and
Mark Hopkins, J r., and that in the faith of that statement
the plaintiff commenced business with them. This testimony
the court excluded. Defendants’ counsel, however, contend
that inasmuch as the trial court found as a fact that Walker,
Hopkins & C0. were a corporation, and that during the time it
continued to do business plaintiff had full knowledge that they
were a corporation, and not a copartnership, and continued to
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and Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that he always believed and. under-
~tood that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a firm. Thie testi-
mony the court below excluded. In addition to this, and upon 
this point, this case differs radically from the case of Bank vs. 
Stone. The whole facts show that the firm never had any cor· 
porate existence, and never was a corporation, even de facto. 
It is very evident to us that the facts here presented do not 
bring this case within the ruling of the former case. In the 
present case, as in that, the name would not indicate that tht> 
firm was a corporation. It gave no clue to the. nature of the 
<'.Ompany as being corporated or unincorporated,and there is no 
pretense of proof that the plaintiff dealt with it as a corpora-
tion, except the fact that defendan_ts were doing business as a 
corporation, and had published such fact in two of the Detroit 
papers, and mailed circulars to their customers announc-
ing that they had organized as a corporation under the laws 
of the State of Michigan, and also that their letter heads 
showed this fact, some of the circulars being mailed to plaint-
iff, and the corporation having also sent by mail statements of 
its accounts to plaintiff written upon such letter beads. The 
plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of receiving such 
circulars, or of ever having seen such announcements in the 
public press. Plaintiff also testified that he had no recollection 
of ever having received any letter heads containing the infor-
mation that defendants were a corporation; and it appears 
that when the account was made ·UP by defendants showing 
their indebtedness to plaintiff, and transmitted to him, it was 
upon the letter head of 'Valker, Summer & Co., which did not 
contain a·ny showing that Walker, Hopkins & Co. were a cor-
poration. Plaintiff's counsel also offered to show by the testi-
mony of the plaintiff that Mr. 'Valker solicited the plaintiff 
to do business with Walker, Hopkins & Co., stating to him that 
it was a partnership composed of Walker, Livingston, and 
Mark Hopkins, Jr., and that in the faith of that statement 
the plaintiff commenced business with them. This testimony 
the court excluded. Defendants' counsel, however, contend 
that inasmuch as the tl'ial court found as a fact that Walker, 
Hopkins & Co. were a corporation1 and that during the time it 
continued to do business plaintiff bad full knowledge that they 
were a corporation, and not a copartnership, and continued to 
do business with them as a corporation, such finding is con-
12 CA5]-L.\ on l'ARTI\'ERs'lllP.
elusive, and will not be disturbed by this court. It would be
true that, if there was any proof to support the finding, this
court would be bound by it, though, upon the facts, it might
not be able to agree with the circuit court in its conclusions.
But the fact is made to appear, by the evidence returned, that
the court excluded the evidence of the plaintiff that he did not
know that they were a corporation, and did not deal with them
as such, but was informed by \\'alker that they were a partner-
ship, and dealt with them in the belief that they were a part-
nership; and yet the court below finds, under the evidence
which defendants were permitted to offer, that plain_tifi' did
deal with them as a corporation, and had full knowledge that
they were such, and bases such finding and conclusion upon
the fact that defendants published the statements in the public
press, and mailed circulars and letter heads to plaintiff which
it is not shown he ever received. Under such circumstances,
the court was in error in excluding the testimony, and we think
there is no proof to sutain the finding. '
It is undoubtedly well settled that a person who has entered
into contract relations with a dc facto corporation cannot, in an
action thereon, deny its corporate character, or set up any
informality in its organization, to defeat the action. The dis-
tinction between such cases and the present one is to my mind
clear. If there had been any law under which defendants had
a right to incorporate, and the offer had been to show a mere
abuse or excess of its corporate powers, or had it appeared that
it was a de fa/cto corporation, and the question related to the
regularity of its organization merely, there could be no doubt
that the plaintifi would be estopped from questioning its cor--
porate existence. But the two things necessary to show a
corporation, even dc facto, do not exist. There is no law under
which the powers they assumed might lawfully be created;
and the mere fact that they assumed to act as such, even in
the full belief that they were legally incorporated, would not
constitute them a corporation de facto.‘
It is admitted upon this record that an indebtedness was due
to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,562.68 at the date of the trial,
July 19, 1888, and plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable
therefor as partners, and in this contention we think he is
right. The defendants were not a corporation. They had asso-
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rluiive, and will not be disturbed by this court. It wooJd be 
true that, if there was any proof to support the finding, this 
c·ourt would be bound by it, though, upon the facts. it might 
not be able to agree with the circuit court in its conclusions. 
But the fact is made to appe~r, by the evidence returned, that 
the court excluded the evidence of the plaintiff that he did not 
know that they wen> a oorporation, and did not deal with them 
as such, but was informed by \Yalker that they were a partner-
ship, and dealt with them in the belief that they were a part-
nership; and y_et thP court below finds, under the evidence 
which defendants were permitted to offer, that plaintiff did 
deal with them as a corporation, and had full knowledge that 
they were such, and bases such finding and conclusion upon 
the fact that defend~nts published the statements in the public 
press, and mailed circulars and letter heads to plaintiff which 
it is not shown he ever received. Under such circumstances, 
the court was in error in excluding the testimony, and we think 
there is no proof to sustain the finding. 
It is undoubtedly well settled that a person who bas entered 
into contract relations with a de facto corporation cannot, in an 
action thereon, deny its corporate character, or set up any 
in(ormality in its organization, to defeat the action. The dis-
tinction between such cases and the present one is to my mind 
clear. If there had been any law under which defendants bad 
a right to incorporate, and the offer bad been to show a mere 
abuse or excess of its corporate powers, or had it appeared that 
it was a de facto corpomtion, and the question related to the 
regularity of its organization merely, there could be no doubt 
that the plaintiff would be estoppf:'d from questioning i1s cor· 
porate exif1tence. But the two things necessary to show a 
corporation, even de facto, do not exist. Th('re is no law under 
which the powers th<>y assumed might lawfully be created; 
and the mere fact that they assum<>d to act as such, even in 
the full belief that they were legally incorporated, would not 
constitute them a corporation de facto .. 
It is admitted upon this record that an indebtedness was du<· 
to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,uG2.G8 at the date of the trial, 
July 19, 1888, and plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable 
therefor as partners, and in this contention we think he is 
right. The defendants were not a corporation. 'rhey had asso-
ciated together, each sharing the profits and losses of the bnsi-
Enos vs. WALKER. . 13
uess equally, according to the money each put in as capital
stock, each holding and owning one-third part of the shares.
The fact that they took counsel and acted in good faith in
organizing under what they were advised was a valid law
doe not relieve them of their liability. It is well settled that
obligors are bound, not by the style which they give to them-
selves, but by the consequences which they incur by reason of
their acts. They have had the benefit of the pluinti1T’s means;
they are indebted to him, as is conceded; but have sought to
shift individual liability to a corporate one. There is no such
corporation, and the mere tact that defendants assumed to
-act as such does not relieve them from personal liability. Under
the circumstances of this case the defendants must be held
liable as partners. The judgment of the court below must be
set aside and vacated, and judgment entered here in favor
of plaintiff for the sum of $3,562.68, with interest from July
27, 1883, being the date when the parties, claiming to be a cor-
poration, made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors,
together with costs of both this and the circuit court.
CAMPBELL and CHAMPLXN, JJ., concurred with Lone, J.
Smmwoon, C. J., and Monsn, J., did not sit.
N 0'1-s: Compare with the two cases following.
Z“ \
I _' L'.'nb:l\fi; \ _
————~—— ,, , v» .
K , w\wr;hs\1Y“O|> )
“ K
FINNEGAN vs. NOERENIIERG. \£1'§-/
Supreme Court of .lIinm'xofa, 1893.
52 Minn. 239, 53 N. W. R81). 1150, 38 Am. St. Rep. 552, 18 L, R. A. 778.
This was an action to recover of the defendant for the debts
of a Building Association upon the ground that the association
had failed to become a corporation and, therefore, the associ-
ates were liable as partners. The court below held the defend-
ant not liable. Plaintiff appealed.
Savage & Purdy, for appellant.
Ankeny <£ I main, tor defendant.
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nese equally, according to the money each put in as capital 
stock, each holding and owning one-third part of the shares. 
The fact that they took counsel and acted in good faith in 
org2.nizing under what they were advised was a valid law 
does not relieve them of tlwir liability. It is well settled that 
obligors are bound, not by the style which they gh·e to them-
selves, but by the consequences which they incur by reason of 
their acts. They have had the benefit of the plaintiff's means; 
they are indebted to him, as is conceded; but have sought to 
shift individual liability to a corporate one. There is no such 
<·orporation, and the mere fact that defendants assumed to • 
·~•<'t as such does not relieve them from pc•rsonn I liability. Unde1· 
the circumstances of this case the defendants must be held 
Hable as partners. The judgment of the court below must bt~ 
set aside and vacated, and judgment entered here in favor 
of plaintiff for the sum of $3,5G2.G8, with interest from July 
27, 1883, being the date when the parties, claiming to be a cor-
poration, made an assignment for the bPn<>fit of their crcditors, 
together with costs of both this and the circuit court. 
CAMPBELL and CHAMPLIN, JJ., concnl'l'ed with LONG, J. 
~HERWOOD, c. J., and l\tORSE, J., did not Mit. 
NOTE: Compare with the two caeea following • 
.. 
FINNEGAN vs. NOEREXBERO. 
Supreme Court of .lfi1111r1wta, 1893. 
52 Minn. 289, ra3 X. W. Rep. 1150, 38 Aw. St. Ul•p. rlii:!, 18 L, R. A. TTR 
This was an action to recover of the defcnclaut for thl' debl~ 
of a Building Al'sociation upon the grnund that the as~odation 
had failed to become a c01·poration and, therefore, the associ-
Hte!!I were liable as partners. The court below held the defend-
ant not liable. Plaintiff appealed. 
Savage & Purdy, for appellant. 
Ankeny & Irwi'fl\ for defendant. 
01L1m,LAN, C. J. .Eight pnson~ · 7gnrrl. arlmowlPdged, and 
14» Gasns on PARTNERSHIP.
caused to be filed and recorded in the oflice of the city clerk
in Minneapolis, articles assuming and purporting to form.
under Laws 1870, c. 29, a corporation, for the purpose, as speci-
fied in them, of “buying,owning,improving,selling,and leasing
of lands, tenements, and hercditamcnts, real, personal, and
mixed estates and property, including the construction and
leasing of a building in the pity of Minneapolis, Minn., as a
hall to aid and carryout the general purposes of the organi-
zation known as the ‘Knights of Labor.’ ” The association
received subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directors
and a board of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot,
erected a building on it, and, when completed, rented different
parts of it to different parties. The plaintiff furnished plumb-
ing for the building during its construction, amounting to
$599.50, for which he brings this action against several sub-
scribers to the stock, as copartners doing business under the
firm name of the “K. of L. Building Association.” The theory
upon which the action is brought is that, the association having
failed to become a corporation, it is in law a partnership, and
the members liable as partners for the debts incurred by it,
It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation
because——First, the act under which it attempted to become
incorporated, to wit, laws 1870, c. 29, is void, because its sub-
ject is not properly expressed in the title; second, the act does
not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or
to transact the business stated in the articles; third, the place
where the business was to be carried on was not distinctly
stated in the articles, and they had, perhaps, some other minor
defects.
It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a dc jure cor-
poration, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an
action in the nature of quo warranto, in behalf of the State;
for,'although an association may not be able to justify itself
when called on by the State to show by what authority it
assumes to be, and act as, a;corporation, it may be so far a
corporation, that, for reasons of public policy, no one but the
State will be permitted to call in question the lawfulness of its
organizationk Such is what is termed a corporation dc facto—
that is, a corporation from the fact of its acting as uch,
though not in law or of right a corporation. What is essential
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c.·auE1ed to be 11.led and recorded in the office of the city clerk 
in Minneapolis, articles assuming and purporting to form. 
under Laws 1870, c. 29, a corporation, for the purpose, as speci-
fied in them, of "buying,owning,improving,selling~and leasing 
of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, real, personal, and 
mixed estates and property, including the construction and 
leasing of a building in the l!ftY of Minneapolis, Minn., as a 
hall to aid and carry-Qnt the general purposes of the organi-
zation known as the 'Knights of Labor.'" The association 
received subscriptions to its capital stock, elected directorK 
and a board of managers, adopted by-laws, bought a lot, 
erected a building on it, and, when completed, rented different 
parts of it to different parties. The plaintiff furnished plumb-
'ing for the building during its construction, amounting to 
'599.50, for which he brings this actio11 against several sub-
scribers to the stock, as copartners doing business under the. 
firm name of the "K. of L. Building Association." The theory 
npon which the action is brought is that, the association having 
failed to become Q. corporation, it is in law a partnership, and 
the members liable as partners for the debts incurred by it_.. 
It is claimed that the association was not an incorporation 
because-First, the act nnder which it attempted to become 
incorporated, to wit, laws 1870, c. 29, is void, because its sub-
ject is not properly exprC'ssed in the title; second, the act doeK . 
not authorize the formation of corporations for the purpose or 
to transact the business stated in the articles; third, the place 
where the business was· to be carried on was not distinctly 
stated in the artides, and they bad, perhaps, some other minor 
defects. 
It is unnecessary to consider whether this was a de jure cor-
poration, so that it could defend against a quo warranto, or an 
action in the nature of quo warranto, in beh::lf of the State; 
for-t- although an ~ssociation may not be able to justify itself 
when called on by the State to show by what authority it 
assumes to be, and act as, a; corporation, it may be so far a 
corporation, that, for reasons of public policy, no one but the 
State will be permitted to call in question the lawfulness of its 
organization ... Such is what is termed a corporation de facto-
that is, a corporation from the fact of its acting as such, 
though not in law or of right a corporation. What is essential 
to constitute a body of men a de facto corporation is stated by 
l
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SELDEN, J., in Methodist, etc., Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482,
as “(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a
corporation with the powers assumed migI.t lawfully be cre-
ated; and (2) a user by the party to the suit of the rights
claimed to be conferred by such charter or law.” This state-
ment was apparently adopted by this court in East Norway
Church vs. F-roislic, 37 Minn. 4-12', 35 N. W’. Rep. 260; but, as it
leaves out of account any attempt to organize under the char-
ter or law, we think the statement of what is essential defect-
ive. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page
145) is more nearly accurate: “When a body of men are acting
as a corporation, under color of apparent organization, in pur-
suance of some charter or enabling act, their authority to act
as a corporation cannot be questioned collaterally.” To give
a body of men assuming to act as a corporation, where there
has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law
authorizing them to become such, the status of a dc facto cor-
poration might open the door to frauds upon the public. It
would certainly be impolitic to permit a number of men to
have the status of a corporation to any extent merely because
there is a law under which they might have become incor-
porated, and they have agreed among themselves to act, and
they have acted, as a corporation. That was the condition in
Johnson rs. Corscr, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799, in which
it was held that what had been done was ineffectual to limit
the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone
far enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely
signed articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity
by filing for record, which the statute required. “Color of
apparent organization under some charter or enabling act”
does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with
what the law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance.
A substantial compliance will make a corporation dc jure. But
there must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization
under the law. There being such apparent attem-pt to perfect
an organization the failure as to some substantial requirement
will prevent the body being a corporation dc jure; but, if there
be user pursuant to such attempted organization, it will not
prevent it being a corporation dc facto. p
(The court then discussed the alleged invalidity of the act
to authorize the formation of such a corporation, and held
















































































































































FINNEGAN VS. N OERENBBRG. 15 
SBLDEN, J., in Methodist, etc., Church vs. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 482, · 
as "(1) the existence of a charter or some law under which a 
corporation with the powers O.!i..3nmed mig:..t lawfully be cre-
ated; and (2) a user by the party to the snit of the rights 
claimed to be conferred by snch charter or law." This state-
ment was apparently adopted by this court i:a. East Norway 
Church vs. Froislie, 37 Minn. 44'Z 35 N. W. Rep. 260; but, as it· 
leaves out of account any attem~t to organize under the char-
ter or law, we think the statement of what is essential defect-
ive. The definition in Taylor on Private Corporations (page 
145) is more nearly accurate: "When a body of men are acting 
as a corporation, under color of apparent organization, in pur-
BU'8nce of BOme charter or enabling act, their authority to act 
as a "COrporation cannot be questioned collaterally." To give 
a body of men assumipg to act as a corporation, where there 
has been no attempt to comply with the provisions of any law 
authorizing them to become such, the status of a de facto cor-
poration might open the door to frauds upon the public. lt 
would certainly be impolitic to permit a number of men to 
have the status of a corporation to any extent merely becaus1!' 
there is a law under which they might have become incor-
porated, and they have agreed among themselves to act, and 
they have acted, as a corporation. That was the condition in 
·Johnson vs. Corser, 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. Rep. 799, in which 
ft was held that what had been done was ineffectual to limit 
the individual liability of the associates. They had not gone 
far enough to become a de facto corporation. They had merely 
signed articles, but had not attempted to give them publicity 
by filing for record, which the statute required. "Color of 
apparent organization under some charter or enabling act" 
does not mean that there shall have been a full compliance with 
what the law requires to be done, nor a substantial compliance. 
A substantial compliance will make a corporation de jure. But 
there must be an apparent attempt to perfect an organization 
under the law. There being such apparent attempt to perfect 
an organization the failure as to some substantial requirement 
will prevent the body being a corporation de jure; but, if there 
be user pursuant to such attempted organization, it will not 
prevent it being a corporation de facto. . 
(The court then discussed the alleged invalidity of the act 
to authorize the formation of such a corporation, and held 
the act valid for that purpose.) 
16 Cases 0N PAnTNEns1=.ur.
The omission to state distinctly in the articles the place
within which the business is to be carried on, though that
rzight be essential to make it a dc jure corporation, would
not prevent it becoming ore dc facto. The foundation for a
dc facto corporation having been laid by the attempt to organ-
ize under the law, the user shown was suflicient.
Judgment aflirmcd.
Noam: Oonipare with the preceding and following cases.
KAISER vs. LAWRENCE SAVINGS BANK.
Supreme Court of fmra, 1881.
66 Iowa 104, 8 N. W. Rep. 772, 41 Am. Rep. 85.
Action by Kaiser against a number of persons, of whom
Hoag alone was served with process to hold them liable as
partners doing business as the Lawrence Savings Bank.
Defense that the bank was a corporation under the laws of
Kansas, and that therefore the defendant was not person-
ally liable. Verdict for plaintiff and Hoag appeals.
Hanna, Fitzgerald ¢£ Hughes, for appellant.
Hoffman, Pick-ler (E Brown, and L. M. Fisher, for appellee.
Amms, C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain
individuals attempted in good faith to become incorporated
under the laws of Kansas for the purpose of doing business
as a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed
corporation. For several years they did business as a savings
bank, under the supposition that they were duly incorporated.
Prior to the time that plaintifi became a creditor of the bank,
the defendant Hoag purchased an interest in the bank, and
remained the owner of such interest from that time forward.
The question presented is whether the shareholders so far com-
plied with the incorporation laws of Kansas as to become
incorporated and secure an exemptiorrfrorn individual liability,
and if they did not strictly become incorporated whether the
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Tlte ombsion to state distinctly in the articles the place 
within which the business is to be carried on, though that 
r~ight be essential to make it a de jure corporation, would 
not prevent it becomi"'g ore d.e facto. The foundation for a 
de facto corporation having been laid by the attempt to organ-
ize under the law, the user shown was sufficient. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Non: Compare with the preceding and following 08888. 
K.\.ISER vs. LA WREN CE SA VIN GS BANK. 
Supreme Court of Towa, 1881. 
A Iowa 104, 8 N. W. Hep. 772, 41 Am. Rep. 815. 
Action by Kaiser against a number of perso:is, of whom 
Hoag alone was served with process to hold them liable B.R 
partners doing business as the Lawrence Savings Bank. 
Defense that the bank was a corporation under the laws of 
Kansas, and that therefore the defendant was not person-
ally liable. Verdict for plaintiff and Hoag appeals. 
Hanna, Fitzgerald & Hughes, for appellant. 
Hoffman, Pickler c:E Brown, and L. M. Fi8her, for appellee. 
ADAMS, C. J. The evidence tends to show that certain 
individuals attempted in good faith to become incorporated 
under the laws of Kansas for the purpose of doing business 
a.s a savings bank, and subscribed for shares in the supposed 
corporation. For several years they did business as a saving'.! 
bank, under the oupposition that they were duly incorporated. 
Prior to the time that plaintiff became a creditor of the bank, 
the defendant !Ioag pqrchased an interest in the bank, and 
rPmained the owner· of such interest from that time forward. 
The question presented is whether the shareholders so far com-
vlied with the incorporation laws of Kansas as to become 
incorporated and s~cure an exemption from inaividual liability, 
and if they did not strictly become incorporated whether the 
, Kusna vs. L.uvasscn SAVINGS BANK. 17
fact that they did business as a corporation, not only with
the general public but with the plaintlif, was sufilcient to
secure to them exemption from individual liability. . .
(The court here considered the statutory requirements and
held that the papers executed and filed by the shareholders
were not such as the statute required.)
The defendant insists, howcver, that in order to establish
the corporate existence of the Lawrence Savings Bank as
against plaintiff it is suflicicnt to show :|uthorit_v to create the
corporation, a bona fidc attcmpt on the part of the corpora-
tors to become incorporated, and the doing of business as a
corporation. In support of this proposition the defendant cites
’l'hc Bufialo (€ Allegheny Railroad Co. v. C'ar_1/, 26 l\'. Y. 77.
In that case the court said, “that if the papers filer‘. are color-
able, but so defective that, in a proceeding on the part of the
State against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet
b_v the acts of user under such organization it becomcs a cor-
poration dc facto, and no advantage can be taken of such defect
in its constitution collaterally by any person." Substantially
the same doctrine was enunciated in Krutz vs. The Paola Town
Co., 20 Kan. 403, and l'apc rs. The Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440, 27
Am. Rcp. 182. It should be observed, however, that in those
cases thc defendant sct up a want of incorporation of the
plaintitt and sought to cscapc liability upon that ground‘ In
the casc at bar thc dcfcndant sets up exemption, averring that
the attempt to become incorporated and the doing of business
under a claim of incorporation were sutticient to create the
exemption. I
It will be seen at once that the principle involved in those
cases is essentially ditto:-cnt from that in thc case at bar.
It is hardly necessary to say that where incorporation has
once taken place no act of forfeiture can be set up in‘ a
collateral action, until forfeiture has been judicially declared
in an action brought for that purpose. Sec Angcll & Ames on
Corporations, Sec. 636, and cases cited. But the principle
involved in those cases is essentially different from that in
the case at bar.
In Hmnphrc!/8 vs. Mooney, 5 Colorado, 282, a creditor of an
assumed corporation sought to hold a member as a partner.
It was held that as his right of action was based upon an

















































































































































KA.ISER VS. LA WREN CE SA. VINGS BA.l(K. 17 
fact that they did business as a corporation, not only with 
the general public but with the plaint:!'f, was suf:cient to 
secure to tlwm exemption from individual liability. 
(The court here considered the statutory requirements and 
held that the papf'rs exe('uted and filed by the shareholders 
WPl'P not suC'h as the fltatntt• required.) 
The defendant imdstfl, however, that in orcler to establish 
the eorporute exi,,.,f1•1u·p of the Law1'PIH'P ~avings Bank _as 
agai,nl'lt plaintiff it is snflidt•nt to show authOl'it~· to c1·eate the 
.. orporation, a bona fidt• att1•mpt on the pnrt of the eorpora-
tori-; to become incorpo1·att•d, and the doing of bm1iness a.s a 
1·orpomtion. In support of this proposition the defendant cites 
1'hl' {~uffalo & A.llegl1<111y Railroad Co. v. Car.11 . 26 N. Y. 77. 
b that case the court f'laid, "that if the papers filel: are color-
able, but so dPfecttve that, in a protet>ding on the part of the 
Rtate against it, it would for that reason be dissolved, yet 
by tl1e aets of user undet' such organization it beconws a cor-
poration de fa<'fo, and no adrnntage can be taken of sneh defect 
in its eonstitution eollaterall.v by any person.'' Substantially 
the ~ame dodrine was enunciated in 11.rutz t 'S. 'l'hc Paola. Town 
Co .• 20 Kan. 40:3, au<l /'aw rs. 'l'ltc Capitol Bank, 20 Knn. 440, 27 
.Am. lfrp. 1~2. It 8ho11ld be observed, however, that in those 
casPK thl' dPft~nda11 t i-;..t up a want of incorporation of the 
plaintiff an<l i-:011~ht to t'!·wapl' liability upon that ground4 In 
the east> at um· tht• d!'f1·11da11t setl-l up exemption, averring that 
the attempt to bt•1·011w itH"orpora ted and the doing of business 
' under a claim of iucorporntion were sufficient to create the 
exemption. 
It will be seen at once that the principle involved in tho:ie 
cases is essentiall~- differf'nt from that in the ease at bar. 
It is bardl.Y necCS!oiHl',Y to say that where incorpoi·ation has 
on· .. e tak<.'n plaee no ad of fo1·fpiture can be set np in' a 
e collateral action, until forfeiture has been judicially declared 
. in an aetion brought for that purpose. See AngPll & Amf's on· 
Corporations, Sec. 636, and cases cited. But the principle 
involved in those cases is eRsentially difff'rent from that in 
the case at bar. 
In Humplir<'.llll vs. Jfooncy, 5 Colorado, 282, a creditor of an 
nssumed 1·orporation sought to hold a member as a partner. 
It was held that as his right of action was based upon an 
express contract «'ith the assumed corporation he was 
3 . 
18 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.
estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doc-
trine of that case is suhst..ntially that relied upon by the
defendant. But it seems to us that it is not sustained by
the weight of authority. The court cited in support of the
decision, Eaton. vs. Aspinurall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Buffalo, etc.,
1R. R. O0. vs. Cary, 26 N. Y. 77, but neither of the cases, it
appears to us, is in point.
-There may, indeed, be certain irregularities, or omissions
to comply with provisions merely directory, which would be
sufiicient to sustain an action brought to declare a forfeiture,
but insuflicient to sustain a collateral action brought to
enforce an individual liability of a member. But where the
attempt at incorporation is under a general law, and there
is a non-compliance with the law in a material respect, there
is, we think, such want of incorporation that exemption from
individual liability is not secured. In lllokelum-ne Hill Min-
iny O0. rs. Il'oo(lbm"y, 14 Cal. 42-1, 73 Am. Dec. 658, the court
said: “There is a broad and obvious distinction between such
acts as are declared to be necessary steps in the process of
incorporation, and such as required of the individuals seek-
ing to become incorporated, but which are not made prerequis-
ites to the assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the
former, any material omission will be fatal to the existence
of the corporation, and may be taken advantage of collaterally
in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly
be called in question.”
Hurt rs. Salisbury/, 55 Mo. 310, was an action brought upon
a promissory note purporting to he executed by the directors
of the North Missouri Central District Stock, Agricultural and
Mechanical Association. The action was brought against the
directors upon the ground that the association was not incor-
porated at the time the note was given, and that the directors
were. therefore. individually liable. It appeared that the asso-
ciation at the time the note was given was fully incorporated
in every respect except that it had failed to file its articles
of incorporation with the secretary of state, as the statutes
required. It was held that the directors were individually
liable.
In B-i_r/clow rs. Gregory, et a.l., 73 Ill. 197, the defendants were
held liable as partners for goods sold to an assumed cor-




















































































































































18 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
estopped to deny that it was in fact a corporation. The doc-
trine of that ca.se ie subsLntially that relied upon by the 
defendant. But it seems to us that it is not fmstained by 
the weight of authority. The court cited in support of the 
decision, Eaton vs. Aspin.icall, 19 N. Y. 121, and Ruffalo, etc., 
-R. R. Co. vs. Cary, 26 N. Y. 77, but neither of the caeee, it 
appears to us, is in point. 
·There may, indeed, be cc>rtain irregularities, or omissions 
to compl_y with pro\'isions merely directory, which would be 
sufficient to sustain an action brought to declare a forfeiture, 
but insufficient to sustain a collaternl action brought to 
enforce an individual liability of a member. llut where the I attempt at incorporation is under a general law, and there is a non-compliance with the law in a material respect, there 
is, we think, such want of incorporation that exemption from 
individual lb1hility is not secured. In ilfokelumne Hill Min-
ittf/ Co. rs. ffoo<lbury, 14 Cal. 424, 73 Am. Dec. 658, the court 
said: "TherP is a broad and ob;fous distinction between such 
aets as are dedared to be nec~ssary steps in the process of 
incorporation, and such as required of the individuals seek-
ing to become incorporat('d, but which are not made prerequis-
ites to the assumption of corporate powers. In respect to the 
former, any material omission will be fatal to the .:xistence 
of the corporation, and may be taken adrnntage of collaterull,v 
in any form in which the fact of incorporation can properly 
be called in question." 
Hurt i·s. Rali.~bury, 55 l\lo. 310, was an action brought upon 
a promis~ory note purporting to be <'Xt><'uted by the director1:1 
of the North l\Iissouri Central District Stock, Agricultural and 
Mechanical .Association. The action was brought against the> 
direetors upon the ground that the association was not incor-
porated at the time the note was given, and that tlie directors 
Wf'l't'. the1·eforP, indh·iduall~· liable. It appeared that the asso-
ciation at the time the note was given was fully incorporated 
in every respect except that it had fail(•d to file its articles 
of incoq>0ration with the io;ecrt>tary of statf>, as the statutes 
reqnirt>d. It was held that the directors were individually~ 
liable. 
In Bif1cl010 t•s. Grrgory, ct al., 73 III. 197, the defendants were 
held liable as part1wrs for ~ornh; Rold to an assumed cor-
poration of which they were mewbc1·s. The defect in the 
KAISER vs. LAWRENCE Savmos BANK. 19
incorporation consisted in a failure to file the articles of incor-
poration with the clerk of the city where the corporation was
to transact its business. _
In that case the court said: “There is a marfifestdifierence
where a corporation is created by a special charter, and there
have been acts of user, and where individuals seek to form
themselves into a corporation under a general law. In the
latter case it is only in pursuance of the provisions of the
statute for such purpose that corporate existence can be
acquired. And there would seem to be a. distinction between
a case where, in a suit between a corporation and a stock-
holder or other individuals, the plea of nul triel corporation
is set up to defeat a liability which he may have contracted
with the other, and the case of a suit against individuals who
claimed exemption from individual liability on the ground of
their having become a corporation formed under the provi-
sions of a general statute. In the latter case a stricter meas-
ure of compliance with statutory requirements will be required
than in the former.” This is a. late decision, and seems to
have been made with a full recognition of the authorities
claimed to hold an adverse doctrine.
See also, Abbottvs. Omaha Smelting 00., 4 Neb. 416, and
Harris vs. McGregor, 29 Cal. 125.
In our opinion, the proprietors of the Lawrence Savings
Bank failed to become incorporated, and there was nothing
in what they did or claimed which can properly be held as
sufiicient to secure them exemption from individual liability.
The judgment, therefore, of_the District Court must be
afiirmcd.
Norm: For other cases upon the question whether the members of a
detectively organized corporation are liable as partners, see Machem’s
















































































































































K.A.ISBR vs. LAWRENCE SA. VINGS BANK. Hi 
incorporation consisted in a failure to tile the articles of incor-
poration with the clerk of the city where the corporation was 
to transact its business. 
In that case the coul't said: "There is a m~i:riifest differenct> 
where a corporation is created by a special charter, and there 
have been acts of user, and where individuals seek to form 
themselves into a col'poration under a general law. In the 
latter case it is only in pursuance of the provisions of the 
statute for such purpose that corporate existence can be 
acquired. And there would seem to be a distinction between 
a case where, in a suit between a corporation and a stock-
holder or other individuals, the plea of nul tiel corporation 
is set up to defeat a liability which he may have contracted 
with the other, and the case of a suit against individuals who 
claimed exemption fl'om individual liability on the ground of 
their having become a corporation formed under the provi-
sions of a general statute. In the latter case a stricter meas-
ure of compliance with statutory requirements will be required 
than in the former." This is a late decision, and seems to 
have been made with a full recognition of the authorities 
claimed to bold an adverse doctrine. 
See also, Abbott vs. Omaha Smelting Co., 4 Neb. 416, and 
Harris vs. JfcGregor, 29 Cal. 125. 
In our opinion, the proprietors of the Lawrence Savings 
Bank failed to become incorporated, and there was nothing 
in what they did or claimed which can properly be held as 
sufficient to secure them exemption from individual liability. 
The judgment, therefore, of. the District Court must be 
affirmed. 
· NoTit: For other cases upon the question whether the members of a 
defective1y organized corporation are liable u partners, see .Mechem's 
Elem. of Parto., §§ 10-11. 
II.
FOR WHAT PURPOSE ORGANIZED.
-_..____<
CHESTER vs. DICKERSON.
Commission of Appeals of New York, 1873.
54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550.
_ Action brought by Chester and other against Dickerson,
Reed, Jones and Dewitt for damages arising from fraud and
deceit in the sale. of'lands. It appeared that in November,
1864, defendants entered into written agreement whereby they
agreed to purchase. lease and take refusals of lands on their
joint account, and that they should sell, lease or work the
lands thus taken. They further agreed that the expenses and
losses, gains and profits, should be shared equally. There
was evidence that this agreement had existed by parol from
September, 1864. Lands were accordingly taken, and Reed
entered into negotiations with plaintiffs, and represented the
lands to be oil-producing. showing the indications of oil, which
it appeared had been produced by petroleum poured on the
lands by one Higgs, through the connivance of Jones. The
plaintiffs purchased the lands on the faith of these represen-
tations and indications, and the purchase money was divided
among the defendants. There ‘was evidence that Reed par-
ticipated in the fraud, but Dickerson was not implicated by
the evidence. Dewitt died pending the action. Plaintiffs
brought suit against defendants, on discovering the fraud.
|_The court charged that the partnership could exist by parol,
and that all of the defendants were liable for the fraud com-
mitted by either in and about the partnership. The plaintifls
obtained a verdict and judgmenfl The general term affirmed



















































































































































FOR WHAT PURPOSE ORGANIZED. 
CHEATER vs. DICKERSON. 
Com.mission of Appeals of New York, 1813. 
54 N. Y. 1, 13 Am. Rep. 550. 
Action brought by Chester and others against Dickerson, 
Reed, Jones and Dewitt for damages arising from fraud and 
df'ceit in th .. sale of.lands. It appeared that in November, 
1864, defendants entered into written agreement whereby they 
ngree>d to pnrehase, lease and take refusals of lands on their· 
joint account. and that they should sell, lease or work thE• 
lands thus taken. They further agreed that the expenses and 
losses, tiains and profits, should be shared equally. There 
was evidence 1 hat this agrC'emen t had existed by parol from 
September, 18f>-!. J,,ands were ac('ordingly taken, and Reed 
entered into nl'gotiations with plaintiffs, and repreRC'nt.ed the 
lands to be oil-producing-. showin~ the indications of oil, which 
it appeared had been prndu<·<'d by petroleum poured on the 
lands by mw Higgs, through the connirnnce of Jon<>s. Tht> 
plaintiffs 1mreha~<>d the landi;; on the faith of these rt°'preseu-
tations and indieations, and the purchase money was divided 
among the d<:>fendants. There "vas evidence that Heed par-
ticipated in the fraud, but Dickerson was not impli<-ated b,v 
the evidence. Dewitt died pending the action. Plaintiff8 
brought suit against defendants, on discovering the fraud. 
LThe court charged that the partnership could exist by parol, 
and that all of the defendants were liable for the fraud com-
mitted by either in and about the partnership. The plaintiffs 
obtained a verdict and ju.dgmen.£ The general term affirmed 
A 
" 
Cnnsrnn vs. DICKERSON. 21
the judgment, and defendants, Dickerson and Reed, appealed
to this court.
James Emott, for appellants.
A. Anthony, for respondents.
Esnn, C. It cannot be questioned that two or more persons
may become partners in buying and selling land. There is
nothing in the nature or essence of a partnership which
requires that it should be confined to ordinar_v trade and com-
merce, or to dealings in personal property. Story on 1'art., sec.
82, 83; Collyer on Part, sec. E}, 51, and note; I)udIe_:/ rs. I.-itHc-
ficld, 21 Me. 418; Sage vs. Sherman, 2 N. Y. 417; Mead rs. Shcp-
a/rd, 5-1 Barb. 474; Pendlcton vs. Wambcrsic, -1 (Branch, (U. S.)
73; Thompson rs. Bowman, 6 Wall (U. S.) 316; Ho.ric vs. Carr,
1 Sumner (U. S. C. G.) 173. N
Kent says: “-\ partnership is a contract of two or more per-
sons to place their money, etfects, labor and skill, or some or
all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and share the loss in certain proportions; and that it
is not essential to a legal partnership that it be confined to
commercial business. It may exist between attoi-nc_vs, con-
veyancers, mechanics, owners of a line 'of stage coaches, arti-
sans or farmers, as well as between merchants and bankers,“
3 Kent’s Com."_’4, 28; and wh_\' may it not exist between deal-
ers and speculators in real estate?
But, as it is claimed that the partnership in this case existed
b_v parol before the execution of the written agrecnie-nt, dated
November 28. 1364. it is necessary to inquire whether a part-
nership. in reference to lands, can be formed and proved by
parol. Upon this question there is considerable conllict in the
authorities. On the one hand it is claimed that a parol agree-
ment for such a partliership would be within the statute of
frauds which provides that no estate or interest in lands shall
be created, assigned or declared, unless by act or operation of
law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the.
party creating, granting. assigning or declaring the same; and
to this effect is the case of Smith rs. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435.
On the other hand it is clainicd that such an agreement is not
aifected by the statute of frauds, for the reason that the real
estate i treated and administered in equity as personal prop-

















































































































































CHESTER VS. DICKERSON. 21 
the judgment, and defendants, Dicke1·son and Reed, appealed 
to this court. 
James Emott, for appel1ants. 
A. Anthony, for respondents. 
EARL, C. It cannot be questioned that two or more persons . 
may become pm·tners in buying and selling land. Tht>re is 
nothing in the nature or e88l'Uce of a partnerRhip which 
require8 that it shonld be confined to Ol'dinary trade and COlll · 
merce, or to dealings in per8onal property. Htor·.v 011 Pm·L se1·. 
82, 83; Coll~1e1· on Part., sec. :;, 51, and note; Dudley rs. Little-
field, 21 :Me. 418; Sage vs. Nlwrman, ~)I", Y. -117; Jlead rs. Slu·p-
llird, 54 Barb. 474; P('ndfoton vs. ffambcrsi<', 4 Craneh, (tr. ~-) 
7;.1; Thompson rs. Bo1nnan, G \\'all (G. S.) :HG; Ho.de V8. Carr, 
1 ~umner ( U. K C. C.) 17:t 
Kent says: ".\ partnl'l'8hip is a contract of two or more pet'· 
sons to plaee their money, l 0 ffects, labor aml skill. or some or 
all of them, in lawful commerce or lmsim•ss, and to di\·ide the 
profit and sharp the losR in certain p1·opm·t ions; and that it 
is not essl·nl ial to a ll'gal pai·t11p1·sliip that it ill' 1·ontined to 
eommerdal ltnsinPss. 1t may exist between ntto1·m·ys, con-
veyauee1·s, lll(•c·hanfrs, owners of a line 'of stage eoac·hes, arti-
sans or far1111·1·s. as well as hf•twl'en me1Thants nnd uankt>t's," 
3 Kent's Con1. :!J., ~8; and wh,,· may it not exist between dt•al· 
ers and s1weulato1·s in n·al estatl'? 
But, as it is daimed that the partnership in this case• existt•11 
by parol lwfort• tl11• ex<'cui ion of the writtPn agreP11H'11 I", da 1 Pcl 
NovPmber :!~. 1~fi -L it is m•cessary to inquil'e wlwthPr a pa1·t-
nership. in I'l'ft•l'Ptl<'e to lan<ls, eirn be fo1·1m·d nnd pl'lH"t•cl hy 
parol. Upon this quPstion there is considp1·ahh• 1·onllil·t iu the 
authorities. On the on(~ hautl it is dairnt•tl that a pa1·ol ag1·ec'-
ment fo1• such a part11p1·sliip would be withi11 the statutt• of 
frauds which 1n·o,·ides that no t•staft• or inter(•st in lands shall 
be created, assigned or dl·t·la1·~l. u11less hy act or opPmtion of 
law, or by a deed or com·pyimce in \\Tiling- suhs1·1·ihed by thP 
party creating, grantin~. n~sig11ing- 01· dl'c·lal'in~ thP l'mme; and 
to this effect is the case of 8111itl1 rs. Burnham, 3 Sumner 435. 
On the other hand it is claimed that suel1 an agrPPnwnt is not 
affected by the statute of frauds, for the J'<•nso11 that tht• real 
estate is treated and adrninh~te1·t><l in equity as pl.'rsonal prop-
Prty for all the purposes of the partnership. A court of equi1y 
22 Osszs on PARTNERSHIP.
having full jurisdictionof all cases between partners touching
the partnership property, it is claimed that it will inquire into,
take an account of, and administer upon all of the partnership
property. whether it be real or personal, and in such cases will
not allow one partner to commit a fraud or a breach of trust
upon his copartner by taking advantage of the statute of
frauds; and to this effect are the followingauthorities: Dale
vs. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Essex vs. Esser, 20 Beavan 449; Bun-
nell rs. Taintor, 4 Conn. 568. A full discussion of the question
is found in Dale rs. Hamilton; and the reasoning and review
of the cases there by Vice Chancellor ‘Wigram are quite sat-
isfactory. The general doctrine is there laid down that “a
partnership agreement between A and B that they shall be
jointly interested in a speculation for buying, improving for
sale and selling lands may be proved without being evidenced
by any writing, signed by or by the authority of the party to
be charged therewith within the statute of frauds; and such an
agreement being proved, A or B may establish his'interest
in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest
being evidenced by any such writing.” I am inclined to think
this doctrine to be founded upon the best reason and the most
authority. But whether it -is or not, it is not very important
to decide in this case. Most of the conflict in the authorities
has arisen in controversies about the title to the real estate
after the dissolution of the partnership or the death of one of
the partners. But suppose two persons, by parol agreement;
enter into a partnership to speculate in lands, how do they
come in conflict with the statute of. frauds? No estate or inter-
est in land has been granted, assigned or declared. \Vhen the
agreement is made no lands are owned by the firm, and neither
party attempts to convey or assign any to the other. The con-
tract is 'a valid one, and in pursuance of this agreement they
go on and buy, improve and sell lands. VVhile they are doing
this, do they not act as partners and bear a partnership rela-
tion to each other? VVithin the meaning of the statute in such
case neither conveys or assigns any land to the other, and
hence 'there is no conflict with the statute. The statute is not
so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in lands;
it is simply aimed at the creation or conveyance of an estate
in lands without a writing. If there was a parol agreement
















































































































































22 OASES ON PART:SEHSHlP. 
haling fall jurisdiction·of all cases between partners touching 
the partnership property, it is claimed that it will inquire into, 
take an account of, and administer· upon all of the partnership 
property, whether it be real or personal, and in such cases will 
not allow one partner to commit n fraud or a breach of trust 
upon his copartner by taking udnmtage of the statnte of 
frauds; and to this effect nr·e the following_autlwrities: Dale 
vs. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369; Essex vs. Bssr.r, 20 Bea van 449; Bun· 
nell i•s. 7'aintor, 4 Conn. 568. A full discussion ·of the question 
is found in Dale i·s. Hamilton; and the reasoning and review 
of the cases there by Vi<'t' Chaneellor '\Yigram are quite sat· 
isfnctory. The general doctrine is there laid down that "a 
partnership agrt.>ement between A and B that thc>y shall be 
jointly interested in a speculation for buying, improving for 
sale and selling lands may be proved without being evideuced 
by any writing, signed by or by the authority of the party to 
be charged therewith within the statute of frauds; and such an 
agreement being provC'd, ~\ or B may establish his · interest 
in land, the subject of the partnership, without such interest 
bPing evidenced by any such writing." I am inclined to think 
this doctrine to be founded up-0n the best reason and the most 
authority. But whether it is or not~ it is not very important 
to decide in this case. Most of the conflict in the authorities 
has arisen in controversies about the title to the real estate 
after the dissolution of the partnership or the death of one of 
the partners. But suppose two persons, by parol agreement; 
enter into a partnership to speculate in lands, how do they 
come in conflict with the statute of. frauds? No estate or inter-
est in land has been gmnted, assigned or declared. "rhen the 
agreement is made no lands are owned by the firm, and neither 
party attempts to convey or assign any to the other. The con· 
tract is ·a valid one, and in pursuance of this agreement they 
go on and buy, improve and sell lands. While they are doing 
this, do they not act as partners and bear a partnership rela-
tion to each other? \Vithin the meaning of the statute in such 
case neither conveys or assigns any land to the other, and 
hence there is no conflict with the statute. 'fhe statute is not 
so broad as to prevent proof by parol of an interest in lands; 
it is simply aimed at the creation or conveyance of an estate 
in lands without a writing. If there was a parol agreement 
'in this case before the written one, it was just like the one 
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embodied in the writing, to wit, a partnership to purchase,
lease and take refusals of land and then sell, lease or work
ithem for the joint benefit of the parties. This is not a con-
troversy about the title to any of the lands taken or owned by
the partners, but it simply relates to the conduct of the defend=
ants while they were acting as partners; and in such a case
the statute of frauds certainly can present no obstacle to
relief.
\\’e then come to the question whether there was sufiicient
proof of the existence of this partnership by parol before the
28th of November. 1864, and I cannot doubt that there was.
Jones distinctly testified that the partnership between all the
defendants did exist as early as September, and that it was
afterwards put into writing. Neither Reed nor Dickerson, in
their testimony, denied this, and neither of them claimed that
they did not become partners until the writing was executed.
There is abundant evidence that Reed was associated with
Jones as early as the later part of September, or the fore part
of October. It does not appear how or by what negotiation
the members of the firm were brought together in partner-
ship, and it does not appear through what agency Dickerson
was induced to join with the others. As to him, all we have
is the evidence of Jones, above referred to, and the writing,
and the fact that he, subsequently, without objection, in the
division of the money received from the plaintiffs, allowed his
share of the sums paid for the services of Higgs, who was
employed to pour oil upon the lands, from some time about
the first of September. Hence we must take it as proved, in
this case, that this partnership existed as early as September.
1864. But it is claimed, on the part of the appellants, that all
the rules of commercial partnerships do not apply to part-
nerships in real estate. They apply to every other kind of part-
nership, and why not to this? This kind of partnership is
formed like every other, for the mutual profit and advantage
of the parties, and there is no reason why it should not be
governed by the same rules. -
In all partnerships one partner is the general agent of all
the partners for the transaction of all the partnership busi-
ness, and_I can perceive no reason for not applying the same
rule of agency to partnerships in real estate. In fact, all the
















































































































































0HESTER VS. DICKERSON. 23 
embodied in the writing, to wit, a partnership to purchaae, 
lease and take refusa}s of land and then sell, lease or work 
ithem for the joint benefit of the parties. 'fhis is not a con-
troversy about the title to an.r of the lands taken or owned by 
the partners, but it simply relates to the conduct of the defend. 
ants while they were acting as partners; and in such a case 
the statute of frauds certainly can present no obstacle to 
relief. 
\Ve then come to the question whether there was sufficient 
proof of the existence of this partnership by parol before the 
28th of November~ 1864, and I cannot doubt that there was. 
Jones distinctly testified that the partners4ip between all tlle 
defendants did exist as early as September, and that it was 
afterwards put into writing. Neither Reed nor Dickerson, in 
their testimony, denied this, and neither of them claimed that 
they did not become partners until the writing was executed. 
'.rhere is abundaQ.t evidence that Reed was associated with 
J<>nes as early as the later part of September, or the fore part 
of October. It does not appear how or by what ne'gotiation 
the members of the firm were brought together in partner-
ship, and it does not appear through what agency Dickerson 
was induced to join with the others. As to him, all we have 
is the evidence of Jones, above referred to, and the writin~, 
and the fact that he, subsequently, without objection, in th1~ 
division of the money received from the plaintiffs, allowed hiH 
share of the sums paid for the services of Higgs, who was 
employed to pour oil upon the lands, from some time about 
the first of September. Hence we must take it as proved, in 
this case, that this partnership existed aa early as September. 
1864. But it is claimed, on the part of the appellants, that all 
the rules of commercial partnerships do not apply to part-
nerships in real estate. They apply to every other kind of pa1't-
nership, and why not to this? This kind of partnership is 
formed like every other, for the mutual p1·ofit and advantage 
of the parties, and there is no reason why it should not be 
gov~!l!ed by the same rules. 
In all partnerships one partner is the general agent of an 
the partners for the transaction of all the partnership busi-
ness, and! can perceive no reason for not applying the same 
rule of agency to partnerships in real estate. In fact,, all the 
powers, duties and rights which usually appertaiD; to partner· 
• 
24 Cases on I’An'rs1~;usu1r.
ships must appertain to partnerships in real estate, except
as they are modified by the character of the property;
and the only difference grows out of the rules of law
in reference to the conveyance and transmission of real
estate. One partner cannot convey the whole title to real
estate unless the whole title is vested in him. Tan Brunt vs.
A pplcgatc, 44 N. Y.‘ 544. But he can enter into an executory
contract to convey, which a court of equity will enforce. While
a contract for the conveyance of land must be in writing. yet
an agent to execute the contract may be appointed by parol.
Willard on Real Estate, 376. .\nd hence, when the partnership
business is to deal in real estate. ouc partner has ample power.
as general agent of the firm, to enter into an executory con-
tract for the sale of real estate. I find no authority holding
that the rules of ordinary commercial partnerships do not
apply to partnerships in real estate. except the case of Pitt-s:
vs. Wuugll, 4 Mass. -1234. It was there held that the law iner-
chant respecting dormant partners did not extend to specu-
lators in land. The learned judge writing the opinion did not
cite any authority for the decision he made, and his reasons
for the conclusions which he reached are not satisfactory.
Dormant partners are held liable for the debts and contracts
of the firm, because they are, in fact, members of the firm, and
share in its profits, and the law will not allow them secretly
to share in the profits of the firm without taking their share
of the risks and bearing their share of the losses, as to third
persons. And there is precisely the same reasons for holding
a dormant partner in a real estate partnership liable to all
persons dealing with the firm. In Patterson rs. I§rcu'.<:tcr, -L
Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. I152. the vice chancellor expressed the opinion
that the law merchant does not apply to partners in buying
and selling land. This case and Pitts rs. ll'uu_r/Ii are com-
mented on by Judge Mitclicll in licnncr rs. Harrison, 19 Barb.
53, and are there shown not to be precise authority for the doc-
trines announccd. It follows, therefore, that the court com-
mitted no error in holding that all the partners were liable for
the frauds committed by either in the transaction and prose-
cution of the partnership enterprise, for it is well settled that
the firm is bound for the fraud committed by one partner in
the course of the transactions and business of the partnership,
















































































































































24 CASES ON PAHT.S.IH<:HllP. 
ships must appt•rtain to parlnerslilps in real estate, except 
as they are modified by the cha1·acter of the 1>roperty; 
and the only difference grows out of the rult-8 of law 
in refert•nce to the com·evanee and transmission of real . . 
estate. One partner cannot <'Oll \"p~· the whole title to real 
(•state unless the whole titlt• is n•sh•<l in him. l"an Brunt v.s. 
Applegate, 44 N. Y. 544. Hut he ('an entn· into an executory 
C'ontract to conve~·, which a court of equity will enforn•. While 
a contract for the conveyanee of land must be in w1·iting. yet 
an agent to exPeute the contmct may be appointed b.v parol. 
lViUard on Real E.~taft'. :~7G. .\nd heiwe, when the partnership 
lrnsiness is to dPal in t·t~al estate. one partner hns ample power, 
as general agent of the firm, to entl•r into an eXP<'Utory con-
tract for the sale of real estatt>. I find no authority holding 
that the rules of ordinary <·ommt•reial partnerships do not 
apply to partnPrRhipR in r1•al t>Htate. 1·x<·t~pt the <'a:-w of Pitt~ 
vs. Wu11gh, 4 )lai-;K. 4:!4. It Wai'\ tht•1·1· lu•ld that the law nu•1·-
chant resp<·<·ting dormant partner!'.! •lifl not PXt<>nd to spl•en-
lators in Jund. The learned jud~e writing the opinion did not 
cite any authority for the deeision he mad<', au<l his reasons 
for the conclusions which ht~ reaehc>d are not satiMfactory. 
Dor·mant partnt:rs are helcl liable fm· the debts and contracts 
of the firm, bf:>l'ause they arl', in fad, 11u•111b<:>rs of th<> firm, and 
share in itl'I profits, and the law will not allow thPm secretly 
to share in tltt-> profits of tlw firm without taking thl'ir share 
of the risks and bPa1·ing thr·ir share of the lossps, as to third 
persons. ..:\nd tlu're is precis<•ly the 1-\HllW r(•a:-;ons for holding 
a dormant parim·1· in a real estate pa1·tnership liable to all 
persons denliu~ with the fi1111. In Pattcr.~on n~. lln·tr~fer, 4 
Edw. (~. Y.) Ch. :i:>:!, the vice chancellor expr<·ssl'd the opinion 
that the law Jll('l'(·lr:.111t does not applJ• to partnPrs in buying 
and sdling land. Tl1is case :rnd Pitts rs. ll'au!Jh are com-
mented on hy Ju,lgP )litcltell in Jfr1111cr rs. Harrison, rn Barb. 
53, and are thPJ'(' shown not to be lH"el'ise authority for the doc-
trines anno111H0 <•1l. It follows, therefore, that the court com-
mitted no error in holding that all the partners were liable for 
the frauds committed hy either in the transaction and prose-
cution of the partnPrf'lhip enterprise, for it is well settled that 
the firm is bound for the fraud committed by one partner in 
the course of the trammctions and business of the partnership, 
even when the other partners ha n~ not the slightest connection 
Wooowonmi vs. .BENNETT. 25
with, or knowledge of, or participation in the fraud. Story
on Part., sec. 108. Collyer on Part, sec. 445; Griswold -vs.
Haven, 25 N. Y. 595, S2 Am. Dec. 380.
[The remainder of the opinion is unimportant]
Judgment affirmed.
Norm: For other cases bearing upon partnerships organized for the
purpose of dealing in land, see Mechem’s Elem. of Pai-tn., § 17 and notes.
WOOD\\'ORTH vs. BENNETT.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1870.
43 N. Y. 273, 3 Am. Rep. 706.
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court affirming a
Judgment allowing a counter claim, in favor of the defendan\
Bennett and against the plaintiff Woodworth for $100. Opiu-
ion states the facts.
G. F. Birknell, for appellant.
Charles Mason, forprespondent. '
CHURCH, C. J . The point in this case is, whether the court
below erred in allowing to the defendant the sum of $100 as
an offset. The facts are substantially as followsz" The plaint-
ifl’, defendant, Stephens and Truesdell, made an agreement
in the naturetof a copartnership, to propose or bid for public
work on_ the Seneca river improvement. The bid was to be
put in in the name of the plaintiff alone, the defendant and
Stephens to become sureties. Truesdell was at the time an
engineer in the employ of the State on the canals. The bid
was made in the name of the plaintiff, in accordance with the
arrangement. Before the work was awarded, the said parties
made an agreement with one Haroun, to withdraw their claim
to the work, and sell their bid to him for $400 (he being a
higher bidder for the same work), which was consummated.
and he gave his note for the amount. It wa then arranged
that the note should be left with the plaintiff for collection.
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with, or knowledge of, or participation in the fraud. Story 
on Part., sec. 108. Collyer on Part., sec. 445; Gt··iswold ·1;s. 
Ha,,;en, 25 N. Y. 595, S2 Am. Dec. 380. 
[The remainder of the opinion is unimportant.] 
Judgment aftlrmed. 
NoTE: For other ca'!es bearing upon partnerships organized for the 
purpoee of dealing in land, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 17 and notes. 
WOOD,VORTH vs. BENNETT. 
Court of Appeal.fl of N~w York, 1810. 
43 N. Y. 273, 3 Am. Rep. 706. 
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court affirming- a 
JUdgment allowing a counter claim, in favor of the defendam 
Bennett and against the plaintiff \Yoodworth for flOO. Opiu-
ion states the facts. 
G. F. JNf'knell, for appellant. 
Olta.rles JI a.~011, for respondPnt. 
CmmcH, C . .J. The point in this case is, whether the com·t 
below erred in allowing to the defendant the sum of $100 as 
an offset. The faets are snb~1antially as follows: The plaint-
iff, defendant, ~tephens and TrnesdPII, ~nnrle an agr«>ement 
in the nature of a copartnership, to propose or bid for public 
wor·k on. the Senera riYer improvement. 'fhe bid was to be 
put in in the name of the plaintiff alone, the defendant and 
Stephens to become snreti<>s. 'frnesclell was at th<.• time an 
engineer in the en1plo.v of the 8tate on tlw eauals. The bid 
was made in the name of the plaintiff, in aceordance with the 
arrangement. Before the work was awarded, the said parties 
made an agreement with one Haroun, to withdraw their claim 
to the work, and sell their bid to him for $-100 (he being a 
higher bidder fo1· the Aame work), which was consummated, 
and he gave his note for the amount. It was then arranged 
that the note shonld be left with the plaintiff for collection. 
and that when collected each of said persons should be entitled 
4 
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to $100. The plaintiff collected the note, paid to Stephens and
Truesdell each $1.00, and promised to pay the defendant, and
apply it on their deal, but never did. It is claimed that it can-
not be allowed, on account of the illegality of the transaction
out of which it arose. To enable the court to apply correct
legal principles, it is necessary to analyze the transaction and
ascertain its true nature and character. .
The original arrangement for a joint interest or copartner-
ship was illegal, and contrary to a positive statute in two
respects. The law of 1854, chapter 329, in substance requires
that every proposal for work shall contain the names of all
persons who are interested, and prohibits any secret agree-
ment or understanding that any person not named shall
become interested in any contract that may be made, and engi-
neers, and all other persons in the employ of the State on the
canals, are also prohibited from becoming interested in any
contract or job on the public works.
In the next place, the transaction with Haroun was contrary
to public policy, and illegal. It is manifest that the object and
purpose of the purchase of the bid was to have it withdrawn
so as to enable Haroun to take the contract upon a higher
bid. This was directly against the interests of the State, and
tended to destroy that honest competition which public bid-
ding is designed to secure; and when, as in this case, it was
done partly for the benefit of an oflicer of the State, whose
duty it was to protect its interests, it was not only contrary
to public policy, but was grossly corrupt.
The supreme court placed its decision in favor of the defend-
ant, upon the ground that as between these parties, the illegal
contract had been fully executed when Haroun paid the money,
and that the plaintiff then became a mere depositary, and held-
the money for the use of the other parties.
It is undoubtedly true that, if the contract or obligation
does not depend upon nor require the enforcement of the unexc-
cuted provisions of the illegal contract, it will be carried out.
It has been laid down as a test, that whether a demand con-
nected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced
at law depends upon whether the party requires any aid from
the illegal transaction to establish the case: Ohitty on Con.
657. So it has been settled that where a party pays money to
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to flOO. The plaintift' collected the note, paid to Stephens and 
Truesdell each $1.00, and promised to pay the defendant, and 
apply it on their dc>al, but never did. It is claimed that it can-
not be allowed, on account of the illegality of the transaction 
out of which it arose. To enable the court to apply correct 
legal principles, it is necessary to analyze the transaction and 
ascertain its true nature and character. 
The original arrangement for a joint interest or copartner-
ship was illegal, and contrary to a positive statute in two 
respects. The la_w of 1854, chapter 3:!9, in substance requires 
that every proposal for work shall contain the names of all 
persons who are interested, and prohibite any secret agree-
ment or unde1·standing that any person not named shall 
become interested in any contract that may be made, and engi-
neers, and all other persons in the employ of the State on the 
canals, are also prohibited from becoming interested in any 
contract or job on the public works. 
In the next place, the transaction with Haroun was contrary 
to public policy, and illegal. It is manifest th.at the object and 
purpose of the purchase of the bid was to have it withdrawn 
so as to enable Haroun to take the contract upon a higher 
bid. 'fhis was dil'ectly against the interests of the State, and 
tended to destroy that honest competition which public bid-
ding is designed to sec.ore; and when, as in this case, it was 
<lone partly for the benefit of an officer of the State, whose 
duty it was to protect its interests, it was not only contrary 
to public policy, but was grossly corrupt. 
The supreme court placed its decision in favor of the defend-
ant, upon the ground that as between these parties, the illegal 
contract bad been fully executed when Haroun paid the money, 
and that the plaintiff then became a mere depositary, and held· 
the money for the use of the other parties. 
It is undoubtedly true that, if the contract or obligation 
does not depend upon nor require the enforcement of the unexe-
cuted provisions of the illegal contract, it will be carried out. 
l t has been laid down as a test, that whether a demand con-
nected with an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced 
at law depends upon whether the party requires any aid from 
the illeg-al transaction to establish the case: Chitty on Con. 
G57. So it has been settled that where a party pays money to 
a third person for the use of another, which, on account of 
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the illegality of the transaction, he was not obliged to pay,
such third person cannot interpose the defense of illegality
[to an action for the money brought by the person for whose
use it was so. paid]. Tenant vs. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3; Mer-
ritt vs. Millard, 4 Keyes, (N. Y.) 208. This principle is based
upon the undoubted right of a. person to waive the illegality,
and pay the money; and that when once paid, either to the
other party directly or to a. third person for his use, it can-
not be recalled; and that the third person, who was in no
way connected with the original transaction, cannot avail
himself of a defense which his principal saw fit to waive.
If the only illegal transaction was the contract with Haroun
for the sale of the bid, these principles might be applicable,
and would probably constitute a good answer to the objection
to this counter claim. The payment of the money by Haroun
completed that contract, and nothing remained unexecuted.
But here the original partnership was illegal; not because of
its purposes and objects, but its composition was prohibited
by law. If a lawful firm should receive "funds from an illegal
trallic or business, it may be that the illegality would be
regarded at an end, and a division of the money enforced by
virtue of the rights of the members under the contract of part-
nership. This is the utmost limit to which the rule can be car-
ried: Brooks vs. Martin, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 70.
In such a case the obligation to divide would not arise out
of the illegal purposes of tl1e.firm, nor would the division carry
out any of those purposes, but the obligation would arise out
of the contract of partnership itself. Here this contract was
illegal. The object of the statute was to enable the State
officers to know with whom they contracted, and also to see
that the statute. prohibiting engineers and other canal oificers
from becoming interested, was not violated, and to prevent
all secret combinations in relation to obtaining work.
The money obtained by this bid belongs to the firm; and the
plaintiff could have been compelled to divide, if the firm had
been lawful, by force of the contract organizing it. In this
case he also agreed to pay the money, and defendant asks the
court to compel him to perform this obligation. The answer
to it is obvious. There is no obligation, because it was incurred
contrary to law. It rests upon the contract of partnership,
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the illegality of the tran~action, he was not obliged to pay, 
such third person canuot interpose the defense of illegality 
[to an action for the money brought by the person for whose 
use it was so. paid]. Tenant vs. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pull. 3; Mer-
ritt vs. Millard, 4 Keyes, (N. Y.) 208. This principle is based 
upon the undoubted right of a person to waive the illegality, 
and pay the money; and that when once paid, either te the 
other party directly or to a thir~ person for his use, it can-
not be recalled; and that the third person, who was in no 
way connected with the original transaction, cannot avail 
himself of a defense which his principal saw tit to waive. 
If the only illegal transaction was the contract with Haroun 
for the sale of the bid, these plinciples might be applicable, 
and would probably constitute a good answer to the objection 
to this counter claim. The payment of the money by Haroun 
completed that contract, and nothing remained µnexecuted. 
But here the original partnership was illegal; not because of 
its purposes and objects, but its composition was prohibited 
by law. If a lawful firm slwuld receive tunds from an illegal 
traffic or business, it may be that the illegality would be 
regarded at an end, and a division of the money enforced by 
virtue of the rights of the members under the contract of part-
nership. This is the utmost limit to which the rule can be car-
ried: Brooks vs. Martin, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 70. 
In such a case the obligation to divide would not arise out 
of the illegal purpoRes of the.firm, nor would the division carry 
out any of those purposes, but the obligation would arise out 
of the contract of partnership itself. Here this contract was 
illegal. The object of the statute was to enable the State 
officers to know with whom they contracted, and also to see 
that the statute. prohibiting engineers and other canal officers 
from becoming interested, was not Yiolated, and to prevent 
all secret combinations in relation to obtaining work. 
The money obtained by this bid belongs to the firm; and the 
p~aintiff could have been compelled to divide, if the firm had 
been lawful, by force of the contract organizing it. In this 
case he also agrE>ed to pay the money, and defendant asks the 
court to compel him to perform this obligation. The answer 
to it is obvious. There is no obligation, because it was incurred 
contrary to law. It rests ,upon the contract of partnership, 
and that is void for illegality. 
28 Cases on PABTNERs‘lllP.
In law there was no‘ partnership, and none of the parties
obtained any rights under the contract creating it: Armstrong
vs. Lewis, 3 Mylne & Keene 45.
The sentiment of "honor among thieves” cannot be enforced
in courts of justice. Suppose the engineer had sued for his
share after an express promise, would any court have tolerated
his claim for a moment in the face of a statute prohibiting him
from being interested? If not, in what respect does the defend-
ant occupy any better position? The first step in his case is
to prove that he was a secret partner and entitled to a share
of this money. The law prohibits secret partners, and he is,
‘therefore, not a partner.
The express promise does not aid the defendant, because the
promise was only to carry out the unexecuted provision of the
contract of partnership to divide the money. The two cases
‘cited by the counsel for the defendant, if they are to be re-
regarded as good law,are distinguishable from this. In the case
of Faiknry rs. Rrnous. 4 Burr. 2060, one of two partners had
paid £3,000 to settle differences in illegal stock-jobbing opera-
tions, and the defendant executed his bond to secure the share
of the other partner. The court overruled the defense recog-
nizing the exploded distinetion between acts malum prohibit-um.
and malum in se, and held that as between those parties the
bond was to secure the plaintiff for money paid, and the pur-
poses of the payment would not be inquired into. A similar
decision was made upon the authority of this case in Pet:-in
vs. Hannay, 3 Term Report 418, Lord I{l<lXYO.\I dissenting. The
distinction between the above cases and this is in the circum-
stance that there the illegal transactions had been closed up
and settled. and the obligations sought to be enforced were
for the money advanced for that purpose. Here it is sought
to consummate the illegal contract by a. new agreement that
it shall be performed. No case has gone this length, and the
two cases above cited have been very much shaken by sub-
sequent decisions, and are, to say the least, questionable
authority, especially the latter: Aubert vs. Jlazc, 2 Bos. & Pu].
370; Zllitchcll rs. Cockburne, 2 H. Blackstone 380; Ea: par-te Dan-
iels, 14 Ves. 190; Lozcry vs. Bourdicu, 2 Douglas 467; B-rozrn. -vs.
Turner, 7 Term Rep. 630; Balding vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines (N. Y.)
147, note a.
The general rule on this subject is laid down in this court,
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In law there was no partnership, and none of the parties 
obtained any rights under the contract creating it: Armstrong 
va. Lewis, 3 M~·lne & Keene 45. 
The sentiment of '·honor among thieves" cannot be enforced 
in courts of justice. Suppose the engineer had sued for his 
share after an express promise, would any court have tolerated 
his claim for a moment in the face of a statute p1·ohibiting him 
from being interested? If not, in what respect does the defend-
ant occupy any better position? The fkst step in his case is 
to prove that he was a secret partner and entitled to a share 
of this money. The law prohlbits sec1·et partners, and he is, 
therefore, not a partner. 
The express promise does not aid the defendant, because the 
promise was only to carry out the unexecute<l provision of the 
·contract of partnership to didde the moneJ·. The two cases 
'cited by the coum1el fo1· the defendant, if thPy are to be re-
regarded as good law, are dh~tinguishable from this. In the case 
of Faikne!f rs. Hf'1w111~. 4 Burr. 206fl, one of two partners had 
paid £3,000 to settle differences in ill(•gal stock-jobbing opera-
tions, and the defendant executed his bond to secure the share 
of the other partner. The court owrruled the d('fense recog--
ni?.ing the exploded distinction between acts malum pt"ohihit11111. 
and rnalum in se, and held that as between those parties tlie 
bond was to secure the plaintiff for money paid, and the pur-
poses of the payment would not be inquired into. A similar 
dcci!-1.ion w;1s made upon the authority of this caRe in Petrir. 
vs. Ha1111a!J~ 3 Term HPport -118, Lord KE'.'i'Yo;-.; clissenting. Tht~ 
distiudion betwl't'n the abon~ cases and this is in the circuni-
stanee that tlwre the illegal transactions lrnd been closed up 
and settled, nnd the obligations sought to he (•nforc<>d were 
for the mmwy ad\'anced for that purpose. llere it is sought 
to con"nmmate the illegal oontract by a new agreement that 
it shall be pt>rformed. No case has gone this lPngth, and the 
two cases abov0 cited ha,·e been very much shaken by sub-
sequent decisions, and are, to say the least, questionable 
authority, especially the latter: Aubert i:s. Jlazc, 2 Bos. & Pul. 
370; M itchcll t;S. Cockburne, 2 H. Blackstone ~~80; Ex pa rte Dan-
iels, 14 VeR. 190; Lou:ry vs. Rourdicu, 2 Douglas 467; Brotrn. ·vs. 
Turner, 7 Term Rep. 630; Belding vs. Pitkin, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 
.147, note a. 
The general rule on this subject is laid down in this court, 
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in Gray vs. Hook, 4 N. Y. 499, by liIULua'r'r, J., as follows:
“The distinction between a void and a valid new contract in
relation to the subject-matter of a former illegal one depends
upon the fact whether the new contract seeks to carry out or
enforce any of the unexecuted provisions of the former con-
tract, or whether it is based upon a. moral obligation growing
out of the execution of an agreement which could not be
enforced by law, and upon the performance of which the law
will raise no implied promise. In the first class of cases, no
change in the form of a contract will avoid the illegality of
the first consideration, while express promises based upon the
last class of considerations may be sustained.”
It is sometimes difficult to apply general rules to particular
caes, but this case comes clearly within the first class men-
tioned in the above rule. It is not from any regard to the
rights of the party setting up this defense that courts refuse
to enforce illegal contracts, but it is for the protection of the
public. The plaintiff in this case is entitled to no sympathy
or favorable consideration. He must have made an afiidavit
that no other person was interested with him in the proposal,
and when he received this money, as between him and the
defendant, the latter was entitled to it; and while we have no
disposition to justify his conduct, his position enables him to
secure the advantage of a decision which we are compelled to
make in obedience to a principle of public policy which is indis-
pensable for the protection of the community against the cor-
rupting influences of illegal transactions. S
The observation of Lord M.\Nsr1nI.n in H olmun vs. Johnson,
1 Cowper 3-13, is applicable here. He said: “The objection
that. a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant (in this case the plaintiff). It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed, but it is founded
in general principles of policy which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and
the plaintiff, by accident, if I may so say.”
Judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs
to abide the event.
' All the judges concurring.
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.
















































































































































WOODWORTH VS. BENNETT. 29 
in Gray vs. Hook, 4 N. Y. 499, by :ML'LLETT, J., as follows: 
"The distinction between a void and a valid new contract in 
relation to the subject-matter of a former illegal one 'depends 
upon the fad whether the new contract seeks to carry out or 
enforce any of the unexecuted provisions of the former con-
tract, or whether it is based upon a moral obligation growing 
out of the exer'.ution of an agreement whkh could not be 
enforced Ly law, aud upon the performance of whieh the law 
will raise no implied promise. In the first class of f'ases, no 
chan~e in the form of a contract will avoid the illc•gality of 
the first considel'ntion, while express promii;ic>s lJased upon the 
last class of considt>ratio1_1s ma~· be sustahwd." 
It is sonwtimes ditlit:nlt to apply general rules to particular 
cases, but this case conws cleal"ly within th~ first class men-
tioned in the above rule. It is not from any regard to the 
rights of the party setting up this defense that co~tt'ts refuse 
to enforce illegal eout rads. hut it is for the proketion of the 
public. The plaintiff in this case is entitled to no s.nnpathy 
or favorable eonsiderntion. He mnst ha,·e made an affidavit 
that no other ppt·son was interested with him in the 1woposal, 
and when he rece>in•d thii-; money, as hetwe<•11 him aud the 
defendant, the lat1Pt' w:is entitled to it; and while we have no 
disposition to jm;tif.v his comh1ct, his position enables him to 
secure the advantag-e of a clPl'ision whil'h we are compPlled co 
make in obPlli<'nee to a p1fodple of pnbli<- polil',Y whi<'h is indis-
JH'n~able for the p1·ot<•dio11 of the community against the cor-
rupting influences of illt>gal transactions. 
The olJsenation of Lord )lAKSfiELD in II ol11wn vs. ,fol111son, 
1 Cowpe1· :~43, is applkahle here. He sairl: ''The ohjt•1·tio11 
that a contract is immoral or illegal as betw<'<'ll plaintiff and 
defendant, soundR at all times n•r.v ill in the mouth of the ' 
defendant (in this tas<' ihe plaintiff). It is not for his sak<'. 
boweYer, that the objedion is ever allowed, hut it is fonndect 
in general prineiples of polie~· which the defendant has the 
advantage of, contrary to tht> real justice, fif-1 lwtween him and 
the plaintiff, by accident, if I mu.v so say." 
Judgment must be ren.'rsed and a new tl'ial 01·dered, costs 
to abide the event. 
All the judges concurring. 
Judgment revprsed and a new trial ordered. 
NOTJ1:: See following case. 
30 Oasns on l’AB'1‘Nl~2RSHlI'q
CRAF'I'Yvs. McCONOUGHY.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1875.
79 Illinois, 346, 22 Am. Rep. 171.
Bill in equity by Mcflonoughy against (‘raft and others for
an account and distribution of the profits of an alleged partner-
ship existing under the contract referred to in the opinion.
'l‘he defense was that the contract was void as in restraint of
trade. and opposed to public policy. Decree below for com-
plainant and defendants appeal.
M. D. H athawag/, Wm. Barge and S. Diron, for defendants.
Jas. K. Eds-all, for complainant. ~
CRAIG, J. (After stating the facts.) Two questions arise
upon the record: First, whether the contract set out in the
bill is void. Second, if illegal and void, will a court of equity.
after it has been executed, require one of the parties to account
to another for a portion of the gains arising under the cou-
tract?
Prior to and up to the time of the execution of the agreement
set out in the bill, the four parties were engaged in the grain
business in the town of Rochelle, each one on his own account.
and in competition with each other, but, after the agreclnent
was executed, all competition ceased. All the warehouses in
the city, and every lot suitable to erect a warehouse upon, were
controlled by the combination. Some were purchased and
others were leased, so that the combinations formed effectually
excluded all opposition in the purchase, sale, storage and ship-
ment of grain in that market.
Secret meetings were held in the night time by the parties to
the contract, at which the price to be paid for grain was :1 greed
upon, rates for storage and shipment fixed, in order that the
public should be kept in ignorance of the plans and operations
of this illegal combination.
'1‘o the public the four houses were held out as competing
firms for business. Secretly they had conspired together. and

















































































































































30 0.ASBS OliT PARl"NERSBir. 
CRAFTYvs. McCONOUGHY. 
Supreme Qourt of Illinois, 1815. 
79 Illinois, 846, 22 Am. Rep. 171. 
P.iJI in equity by ?tfcConoughy against Craft and others for 
an account and distribution of the profits of an allc~ged partnei·-
ship existing under the contract referred to in the opinion. 
The d<'fense was that the contract was ,·oid as in restraint of 
trade and opposed to public policy. Dec1·ee below for com-
plainant and defendants appeal. 
U. D. Hatltm()ay, Wm. Barge and S. Di.IJon, for defendants. 
Jas. K. Edsall, for complainant. 
CRAIG, J. (After stating the facts.) Two qtwstions arise 
npon thP record: First, whether the contract set out in the 
bill is Yoid. Second, if illegal and void, will a court of equity. 
after it has been executed, require one of the partks to account 
1o anotht>r for a portion of the gains arising under the con-
tract? 
Prior to and up to the time of the execution of the> agrt'l'lll<'ll t 
set out in the bill, the four parties were engaged in the ~rain 
busint>ss in the town of Rodwlle, each one on his own aeeonnt, 
and in tompC:'tition with each other, but, after the agreenwut 
was executed, all eornpetition ceased. All the warel1ousc•s ha 
the city, and every lot suitable to erect a warehouse upon, wc>re 
controlled by the combination. Some were purchased and 
others were leased, so 1.bat the combinations formed effectually 
excluded all opposition in the purchase, sale, storage and ship-
ment of grain in that ma1·ket. 
Secret meetings were held in the night time by the parties io 
the contract, at which the price to be paid for grain wa~ ag1•p1~d 
upon, rates for storage and shipment fixPd,. in ort1P1' that tltr~ 
public f!hould be kept in ignorance of tht• plans an<l operations 
of this illegal combination. 
'l'o the public the four houses were held out as competing 
firms for business. Secretly they had l'OnRpil'Pd togt>ther, and 
W(>I'e working in a common ca mw, in tlw sole iu h·l'est of each 
other. 
CRAFT vs. M00021 ouenr. 31
The language used in the contract itself leaves no room for
doubt as to the purpose for which the agreement was entered
into, as a few extracts will show: “Each separate firm shall
conduct their own business as heretofore, as though there was
no partnership in appearance, keep their accounts, pay their
own expenses, ship their own grain, and furnish their own fund
to do business with.” * " ' “Prices and grades to be fixed
from time to time as convenient, and each one to abide by
them. All grain taken in store shall be charged one and one-
half cents per bushel monthly.” ' " " “No grain to be
shipped by any party at less rates than two cents per bushel.”
\Vhilc the agreement, upon its face, would seem to indicate
that the parties had formed a copartnerhip for the purpose
of trading in grain, yet, from. the terms of the contract, and the
other proof in the record, it is apparent that the true object
was to form a secret combination which would stifle all compe-
tition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means,
to control the price of grain, cost of storage, and expense of
shipment. In other words, the four firms, by a shrewd, deep-
laid, secret combination, attempted to control and monopolize
the entire grain trade of the town and surrounding country.
That the effect of this contract was to restrain the trade and
commerce of the country is a proposition that can not be suc-
cessfully denied. -
\"V e understand it to be a well settled rule of law, that an
agreement in general restraint of trade is contrary to public
policy, illegal and void, but an agreement in partial or particu-
lar restraint upon trade has been held good, where the
restraint was only partial, consideration adequate, and the
restraint reasonable.
This subject was ably discussed in the leading case of
Mitchel cs. Re_1/nolds, 1 P. \Villiams 181; see, also, 1 Smith’s
Lead. cases, 172, and notes, and the rule of law established,
which has been followed and adhered to in numerous cases
since. l
In reference to the point, what might be regarded a reason-
able restriction, numerous cases might be cited, but what was
said in Horner vs. Graves, 7 Bing. 743, 20 Eng. Com. L. 330, will
illustrate the principle. Tindal, C. J., said: “We do not see
how a better test can be applied to the question, whether rea-
















































































































































0.&AllT VS • .McOONOUGHY. a1 
The language used in the contract itself leaves no room for 
doubt as to the purpose for which the agreement was entered 
into, as a few extracts will show: "Each separate firm shall 
conduct their own business as heretofore, ns though there was 
no partnership in appearance, keep their accounts, pay their 
own expenses, ship their own grain, and furnish their own fund 
to do business with." • • • "Prices and grades to be fixed 
!from time to time as convenient, and each one to abide by 
them. A II grain taken in store shall be charged one and one- . 
half centR per bushel monthly." • • • "No grain to be 
shipped by any party at less rates than two cents per bushel." 
'Vhile the agreement, upon its face, would seem to indicate 
that the parties had formed a copartnership for the ;purpose 
of trading in grain, yet, from the terms of the contract, and thP 
other proof in the record, it is apparent that the true object 
was to form a se~ret combination which w·ould stifle all compe-
tition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means, 
to control the price of grain, cost of storage, and expense of 
shipment. In other wordi,l, the four firms, by a shrewd, deep· 
laid, secret co;nbination, attempted to control and monopolize 
the entire grain trade of the town and surrounding country. 
That the effect of this contract was to restrain the trade and 
commerce of the country is a proposition that can not be suc-
cessfully denied. . 
'Ve understand it to be a well settled rule of law, that an 
agreement in general restraint of trade is contrary to public 
policy, illegal and void, but an agreement in partial or particu-
lar restraint upon trade has been held good, where the 
restraint was only partial, consideration adequate, and the 
restraint reasonable. 
This subject was ably discussed in the IPading case of 
Mitchel i·s. Re!fTtolds, 1 P. \Villiams 181; seP, also, 1 ~mith's 
Lead. cases, li:!, and notes, and the rule of law established, 
which has bPen followed and adhered to in numerous cases 
since. 
In reference to the point, what might be regarded a reason-
able restriction, numerous cases might be cited, but what was 
said in Horner vs. Graves, 7 Bing. 743, 20 Eng. Com. L. 330, will 
illustrate the principle. Tindal, C. J., said: "We do not see 
h-Ow a better test can be applied to the queHtion, whether rea-
sonable or not. than by considering whether the restraint is 
32 Onsss on PARTNERSHIP.
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the
party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to inter-
fere with the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is
larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of
no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive, and if oppres-
sive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. Whatever is
injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the ground
of public policy.” '
If, therefore, the restraint imposed by the contract in ques-
tion was but partial, as insisted upon by the complainant, as
it was unreasonable, oppressive and injurious to the public,
it cannot be sanctioned in a court of equity.
YVhile these parties were in business, in competition with
each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their
own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and
sale. They could pay as high or low a price for grain as they
saw proper, and as they could make contracts with the _pro-
ducer. So long as competition was free. the interest of the
public was safe. The laws of trade. in connection with the
rigor of competition, was all the guaranty the public required,
but the secret combination created by the contract destroyed
all competition and created a monopoly against which the pub-
lie interest had no protection. Morris Run Coal Co. rs. Barclay
Coal C'o., 68 Penn. St. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159.
It is, however, insisted that, even if the contract was con-
trary to public policy, as it has been executed, a court of equity
will require an account.
The rule is, however, well settled in this State, that a court
of equity will not lend its aid in the division of the profits of
an illegal transaction between associates. Xcusturlt rs. Hall,
58 Ill. 172; Skccls rs. Phillips, 54 Ill. 309; Jerome rs. Bigclozr,
66 Ill. 452.
The complainant and the defendants were equally involved
in the unlawful combination. A court of equity will assist
neither.
The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Decree reversed.
Norm: For other cases upon the efiect of illegality in the purpose, see


















































































































































32 OAS.BS ON PARTNERSHIP. 
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the 
party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to inter-
fere with the interests of the public. \VhateYer restraint is 
larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of 
no benefit to either. It can only be oppressive, and if oppres-
sive, it is, in the eye of the law unreasonable. "·hateYer is 
injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the ground 
of public policy." · 
If, therefore, the restraint imposed by the contract in ques· 
tion was but partial, as insisted upon by the complainant, as 
it was unreasonable, oppressive and injurious to the public, 
it cannot be sanctioned in a court of equity. 
"Thile these parties were in business, in competition with 
each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their 
own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and 
sale. They could p~\y as high or low a priee for grain as they 
saw proper, and as they could make contracts with the .pro-
ducer. So long as competition was free. the interest of the 
public was safe. The laws of trade, in connection with the 
rigor of competition, was all the guarnnty the public required, 
but the secret combination created by the contract destroyell 
all competition and created a monopol~· against whkh the pub-
lic interest bad no protection. ill orri.<J Run Coal Co. i·s. Barclay 
Coal Co., 68 Penn. St. 173, 8 Am. H<~p. l 59. 
It iR, however, insisted that, even if the contract was con-
trary to public policy, as it bas been executed, a court of equity 
will require an account. 
The rule is, however, well settled in thi~ 8tate, that a court 
of equity will not lend its aid in th<' diYision of the profits of 
an illegal transtl<'tion betwN•n a8so<"ia1<'s. Scusta<lt rs. Hall, 
58 Ill. 172; fJl:cels -i;s. Phillips, 54 Ill. 30!l; Jerome vs. Bigc1ou', 
66 Ill. 452. 
The complainant and the defendants were equally involvc>d 
in the unlawful combination. A court of equity will assist 
neither. 
The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded. 
J)ecree reversed. 
Non: For other cases upon the effeot of illegality in the purpoee, eee 





WHO MAY BE PARTNERS.
ADAMS vs. BEALL.
Supreme Court of Maryland, 1887.
67 Md. 53. 1 Am. St. Rep. 379, 8 Atl. Rep. 664.
Appeal from the Baltimore city court.
Albert Ritchie, for appellant.
William Colton, for appellee. '
Romxsox, J. The appellee, while a minor, paid to the appel-
lant $2,900, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner
in the appellant's business. The partnership continued for
more than a year, and, finding it unprofitable, the appellee,
without formally dissolving the partnership, withdrew from
the business. The question in the case is whether the appellee
is entitled to recover of the appellant the money thus paid.
His right to disatlirm the partnership contract, and to avoid
all liabilities under it, including the partnership debts, is not
denied. Being an infant when the contract was made, this
is a privilege to which for his protection he is entitled. But
when he seeks to recover money paid for a consideration which
he has enjoyed or has had the benefit of, this presents quite
another question. The $2,900 was paid to the appellant in
consideration of being admitted as a partner in his business.
He was admitted as a partner, and continued to be a member
of the firm for at least a year. The business was not, it is true,
a successful one, but this, in the absence of fraudulent repre-
sentations on the part of the appellant, cannot afl‘ect the ques-


















































































































































WHO MAY ·BE PARTNERS. 
ADAMS vs. BEALL. 
Supreme Court of Maryland, 1881. 
'11 Md. 53, 1 Am. St. Rep. 3i9, 8 AU. Rep. 664. 
Appeal from the Baltimore city court. 
Albert Ritchie, for appellant. 
lVilliam Colton, for appellee. 
RoRixso~, .J. ThE> appellee, while a minor, paid to the appel-
lant $2,!JOO, as a consideration for being admitted as a partner 
in the appellant's bm~hieHs. The partnership continued for 
more than a year, and, fi~ding it unprofitable, the appellee, 
without formally dissolving the partnership, withdrew from 
the business. The question in the case is whether the appellee 
is entitled to recoyer of the appellant the money thus paid. 
His right to disaffirm the partnersllip contract, and to avoid 
all liabilities under it, including the partnership debts, is not 
denied. Being an infant when the contract was made, this 
is a privilege to which for his protection he is entitled. But 
when he seeks to recover rnom·y paid for a consideration which 
he bas enjoyed or has had the benefit of, this presents quite 
another qu(;>stion. 'l'he $2,900 was paid to the appellant in 
con~ideration of being :tdll'litted as a partner in his business. 
He was admitted as a partner, and continued to be a member 
of the firm for at least n year. The business was not, it is true, 
a successful one, but this, in the nbsence of fraudulent repnt-
sentations on the part of the appellant, cannot affect the ques-
tion. \Ye are dealing with a Mntract between an infant and 
6 
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adult, executed on both sides, and upon the faith of which
money was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has
enjoyed. The privilege of infancy, says Lord hIA.\‘Sl-‘IELD in
Zouch vs. Parsons, 3 Burrows 1804, was intended as a shield
or protection to the infant, and not to be used as the instru-
ment of fraud and injustice to others; and to hold that an
infant has the right, not only to withdraw from a partnership
at his own pleasure, and to subject the adult partner to the
payment of all the partnership debts, but has the right also to
recover money paid by him as a consideration for being admit-
ted into the partnership, would be, it seems to us, to extend
the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it is
founded. ‘P
So longkas Brawner vs. Franklin, 4 Gill (Md.), 463, it was
held that, where an infant advances money upon a contract,
he cannot disaffirm the contract and recover the money ad-
vanced, if he has enjoyed the consideration for which the
money was paid. H olmcs vs. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, is to the same
effect. There the infant paid a sum of money as his share of
the consideration for a lease of premises in which he and his
partner carried on the business of shoemaking. They occupied
the premises from March till June, when the infant dissolved
the partnership, and brought an action to recover back the
money he had paid the lessor for his lease. Gums, C. J., said:
“He may, it is true, avoid the lease; he may escape the burden
of the rent, and avoid the covenants; but that is all he can do.
He cannot, by putting an end to the lease, recover back any
consideration which he has paid for it. The law does not enable
him to do that.”
It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this
case was decided was either overruled, or even questioned, in
(/‘orpe vs. Orcrton, 10 Bing. 252. In the latter case, the plaint-
ilf, while an infant, signed an agreement to enter into part-
nership with the defendant, and to pay him £1,000 for a share
in the business; and to execute, on the first day of January,
a. partnership deed, with the usual covenants. He also paid
£100 as a deposit for the fulfillment of his part of the contract.
The plaintiff afterwards disafiirmed the partnership contract,
and never did in fact become a partner. The suit was brought
to recover of the defendant the £100 paid by the infant -as
a deposit. Tmnan, C. J ., said: The case was distinguishable
?¢,
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adult, executed on both sidet1, and upon the faith of which 
money was paid by the infant for a consideration which he has 
enjoyed. The privilege of infancy, says Lord ~IA!llSFIELD in 
Zouch -vs. Parsons, 3 Burrows 1804, was intended as a shieM 
or protection to the infant, and not to be used as the instru-
ment of fraud and injustice to others; and to bold that an 
infant has the right, not only to withdraw from a partnership 
at his own pleasure, and to subje<'t the adult partner to the 
payment of all the partnership debts, but has the right also to 
recover money paid by him as a consideration for being admit· 
ted into the partnership, would be, it seems to us, to extend 
the privilege beyond any just principles upon which it is 
founded . .,. 
So long as Bratrner vs. Franklin, 4 Gill (Md.), 463, it was 
held that, '\·hl're an infant advances money upon a contract, 
he cannot disaffirm the contract and recover the money ad· 
vanced, if he has enjoyed the consideration for which the 
money was paid. Holmes vs. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, is to the same 
eft'ect. There the infant paid a sum of money as his share of 
the consideration for a lease of premises in which he and his 
partner carried on the business of shoemaking. They occupied 
the premises from ~{arch till June, when the infant dissolvl'd 
the partnership, and brought an action to recover back the 
money he had pnid the lessor for his lense. Gmns, C. J., said: 
"He may, it is true, avoid the lease; he may escape the burden 
of the rent, and avoid the covenantR; but that is all he can do. 
He cannot, by putting an end to the lense, recover back any 
<'Onsideration which he has paid for it. The law does not enable 
him to do that." 
It is a mistake to suppose that the principle on which this 
<·ase was deC'idl'd was eithe~ overruled, or even questioned, in 
Corpe -r:s. 0-r:crton., 10 Bing. ~52. In the latter case, the plaint-
ilJ, while an infant, sig-n<'d an ag-reement to enter into part-
nPrship with the defendant, and to pay him £1,000 for a share 
in tlu:• business; and to execute, on the first day of January, 
a partnership deed, with the usual cownants .. He also paid 
£100 as a dE"posit for the fnlfillmc>nt of his part of the contracr. 
The plaintiff afterwnrds disaffirnw<l the partnership_ contract, 
and never did in fact become a partner. The suit was brought 
to recover of the defendant tlw £100 paid b_y the inf:rnt rniJ 
a deposit. TINDAL, C. J., said: The case was distinguishable 
ADAMS vs. B‘sA1.1.. 85
from Holmes vs. Blogg. In that case the plaintiff and partner
occupied the premises’ from March till June, and the money
was paid for something available, that is, for three months
enjoyment of the premises. “In the present case, the plaintiflf
has paid to Overton £100, for which he has not received the
slightest consideration. The money was paid eitherwith a view
to a present or a future partnership. I understand it as hav-
ing been paid with a view to a future partnership. Now, the
partnership was not to be entered into till January, 1833, and
in the meanwhile the infant has derived no advantage what-
ever from the contract.” Bossnourzr, J.: “We are far from
impeaching Holmes vs. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that
case. ' ' ‘ Here the infant has derived no benefit what-
ever from the contract, the consideration of which has wholly
failed. ‘ ' " The £100 paid here was in the nature of
a deposit. Money paid on a deposit may generally be recovered
back Where the contract goes ofi, and here the contract was
defeated before the infant derived any benefit from it.”
Annsmson and GASELEE, JJ., were of the same opinion. The
plaintiff was allowed to recover the deposit money paid by
him, while an infant, because the partnership contract was
disafiirnied by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to be-
gin. As it was said by Annrmson, J., “Before the contract is
performed, one of the parties revokes it, and reniits the other
to the same situation as if the contract had never been
made.” The distinction between Holmes vs. Blogg, and Corps
vs. Overton is this: In the former the plaintiff was not
allowed to recover the money paid by him while an infant,
because it was paid on a consideration which he had in part
enjoyed, while in the latter the plaintiff was allowed to recover
as upon an entire failure of consideration. .
Passing, then, from these cases, we come to Ea: parto Taylor,
13 De Gex, M. & G. 254, which is a ca se directly in point. There
an infant paid a premium on entering into a partnership, and,
before he came of age, disaflirmed the contract, and, upon the
banki-uptc_v of the firm, attempted to prove for the premium
thus paid. Lord Justice KNIGHT Bauer: said: “In my opinion,
a case of fraud has not been established. That being so, the
matter remains one of a_ contract fairly made, or-as fairly made
as a contract with an infant could be made, a contract upon
















































































































































AD.A.llS vs. B"EALL. 35 
from Holmes VB. Blogg. In that case the plaintiff and partn~r 
occupied the premiseS' from March till June, and the money 
was paid for something available, that is, for three months 
enjoyment of the premises. "In the present case, the plaintiff 
has paid to Overton £100, for which he has not received the 
slightest consideration. The money was paid either with a view 
to a present or a future partnership. I understand it as hav-
ing been paid with a view to a future partnership. Now, the 
partnership was not to be entered into till January, 1833~ and 
in the meanwhile the infant has derived no advantage what-
ever from the contract." BosANQUET, J.: "We are far from 
impeaching Holmes VB. Blogg, as applicable to the facts of that 
case. • • • Here the infant has derived no benefit what-
ever from the contract, the consideration of which has wholly 
failed. • • • The £100 paid here was in the nature of 
a deposit. Money paid on a deposit may generally be recovered 
back where the contract g<>es off, and here the contract was 
defeated before the infant dcrh·ed any benefit from it." 
ALDERSON and GASELEJ<), JJ., were of the same opinion. The 
plaintiff was allowed to reoover the deposit money paid by 
him, while an infant, because the partnership contract was 
disafflrmed by Corpe before the time agreed upon for it to be-
gin. As it was said by ALDERSON, J., "Before the contract is 
performed, one of the parties revokes it, and remits the other 
to the same situation as if the contract had never been 
made." The distinction between Holmes vs. Blogg, and Corpe 
va. Overton is this: In the former the plaintiff was not 
allowed to recover t~e money paid by him while an infant, 
·because it was paid on a consideration which he had in part 
enjoyed, while in the latter the plaintiff wns allowed to recover 
ae upon an entire failure of corn~icleration. 
Passing, then, from these cases, we come to Bx partc Taylor, 
~De Gex, M. & G. 254, which is u case directly in point. There 
llD infant paid a premium on entering into a partne1·ship, and, 
before he came of age, disafflrmed the contract, and, upon the 
bankruptcy of tlie firm, attempted to prove for the premium 
thus paid. Lord Justice K:-<IGHT BnucE said: "In my opinion, 
a case of fraud has not been established. That being so, the 
matter remains one of .a_ contrad fairly made, or as fairly made 
as a contract with an infant could be mad<>, a contract upon 
which the infant acted during his minoritJ, and which during 
36 Cases ‘ox l'ARTNEl{SHlP.
his minority has been in part performed on each side. In such
a state of things, I conceive that, if the bankrupts had con-
tinued solvent, and an action had been brought against them
by the minor, either before or after majority, for the purpose
of recovering the money in question, there must have been
either a nonsuit or a verdict against him." Lord Justice Tun-
Nnn said: “It is clear, an infant cannot be absolutely bound
by a contract entered into during his minority. He must have
the right upon his attaining his majority to elect whether he
will adopt the contract or not. It is, however, a different ques-
tion, whether, if an infant pztys money on the footing of a con-
tract, he can afterwards recover it back. If an infant buys an
article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay
for it; but, if he does pay for it during his minority, he cannot
on attaining his majority recover the money back.”
‘Ye have quoted at length from the preceding cases, because
the question at issue is an important one, and comes before
us for the first time for decision. And while fully recognizing
the privilege which the law accords to minors in regard to con-
tracts made during their minority, yet, in a case like the pres-
ent, where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being
admitted as a partner in the business of the appellant, and he
does become and remains a partner for a given time, he ought
not to be allowed to recover back the money thus paid unless
he was induced to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent
representations of the appellant. Whether an infant can avoid
a. contract and sue thereon during his minority, or must wait
until he arrives at age, is a question about which the decisions
are conflicting. To hold that he cannot disatfirm a voidable
contract until he attains his majority would in many cases
work the greatest injustice to an infant. And where the con-
tract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property,
we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoided,
either before or after his majority. Sta/7'ord vs. Roof, 9 Cow.
626; Shipman vs. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; Willis vs. Turambly, 13
Mass. 204.
The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's first and
second prayers, the judgment must be reversed. Judgment
reversed, and new trial awarded.
Norm: For other cases respecting the rights and liabilities of infant
partners, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 23 and notes.
















































































































































36 CA.SES o.s l'ART.S ~l~SHlP. 
his minority has been in part performed on each side. In such 
a state of things, I eonl'eive that, if the bankrupts had con-
tinued sokent, and an action had been brought against them 
by the minor, either before> 01· after majority, for the purpose 
of recovering the money in question, there mu8t have been 
either a nonsuit or a verdict against him.'' Lord Justice Tua-
NER said: "It is clear, an infant cannot be absolutely bound 
by a contract entered into during his minority. He must have 
the right upon his attaining his majority to elect whether he 
will adopt t lie contract or not. It is, however, a different ques-
tion, whetht:>r, if an inf~mt pay~ mon<>,v on the footing of a con-
tract, be can afterwards recove1· it lmck. If an infant buys an 
article which is not a necessary, he cannot be compelled to pay 
for it; but, if he does pa,v for it during his minority, he cannot 
on attaining his majority recover the money back." 
·we have quoted at length from the precPding cases, because 
the question at issue is an important one, and comes before 
us for the fir:d time for decision. And while fully recognizing 
the privilege which the law accords to minors in regard to con-
tracts made during tht:>ir minority, yet, in a case like the pres-
ent, where money is paid by a minor in consideration of being 
admitted as a partner in the business of the appellant, and he 
does become and remains a partner for a given time, he ought 
not to be allowPd to recover back th_e money thus paid unless 
he was indueed to enter into the partnership by the fraudulent 
reprt:>sentations of the appellant. ·w1wther an infant can avoid 
a contract and sue thereon during bis minority, or must wait 
until he arrives at age, is a question about which the decisions 
are conflicting. To hold that he cannot disaffirm a voidable 
contract until he attains his majority would in many cases 
work the greatest injustice to an infant. And where the con-
tract is of a personal nature, or relating to personal property, 
we see no good reason why such a contract may not be avoidetl, 
either before or after his majority. Stafford t'S. Roof, 9 Cow. 
626; Shipman vs. Horton, 17 Conn. 481; H' illis vs. Tu:ombly, 1:~ 
Mass. 204. 
The court having erred in granting the plaintiff's first an•I 
second prayers, the jud~nwnt mnMt be revel'sed. .Judgment 
reversed, and new trial a warded. 
NOTE: For other caef'e reepectfog the rights and liabilities of infet 
partDers, see Mecbem'e Elem. of P!lrtn., § 23 and notes. 
K ABTMAN vs. 1*‘:-zacusos. 3'?
/
73 Mich. 146. 16 Am. St. Rep. 572, 40 N. \V. Rep. 907, 2 L. R. A. 343.
ARTMAN VI. FERGVSON.
Supreme Court of .-llichigan, 1888.
This action is brought in the circuit court for the
county of Jackson, on the common counts in a-s.~:umpsit, to
recover goods sold and delivered to the defendants, doing busi-
ness at Jackson as Peter Ferguson & Co. The defendants are
husband and wife, and the plaintiff sought to show that, after
their marriage, they formed a copartnership, and carried on
the retail carpet business in the city of Jackson under the firm
name of Peter Ferguson & Co., and that during such time the
goods involved in this suit were sold to them; that Margaret
W. Ferguson was, at the time of the formation of such copart-
nership, possessed of property in her own right, of the value
of $20,000, and furnished the entire capital for the business,
and provided a place to carry on such business; that Peter
Ferguson had no means, and was to and did manage the busi-
ness; that the copartnership continued until after the la.st item
of goods mentioned in the bill of particulars was sold. This
evidence was objected to by defendants’ counsel, on the ground
that it wa not competent for husband and wife to enter into
a copartnership with each other. The circuit" court sustained
the objection, and directed a. verdict for defendants. Plaint-
itfs bring the case to this court by writ of error.
Thomas -A. Wilson, for appellants.
Richard Price and Austin Blair, for appellees.
Lone, J . The only quetion arising is whether the husband
andwife can enter into a. contract of partnership between them-
selves, and thus render themselves jointly liable for the con-
tracts of the firm thus established. At the common law married
women were incapable of forming a partnership, since they were
disabled, generally, to contract orlto engage in trade; and the
husband and wife were wholly incapicitated to contract with
each other. Whatever rights or powers the husband and wife
have to contract with each other, or that the wife may have to
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ARTMAN v& FERCTTSON. 
Supreme Court of Jf irliigan, 1888. 
73 Mich. 146, 16 Am. St. Rep. 572, 40 N. W. Hep. 907, 2 L. R. A. 343. 
This action is brou~ht in the circuit com-t for the 
county of Jnck~on, on the common counts in a.s~ump.'lit, to 
recover goods sold and delivered to the defendants, doing busi-
ness at ,Jackson as Peter Fe1·guson & Co. 1.'he defendants are 
husband and wife, and the plaintiff sought to show that, after 
their marriage, they formed a copartnership, and carried on 
the retail carpet business in the city of Jackson under the firm 
name of Peter Ferguson & Co., and that during such time the 
gQods involved in this suit were sold to them; that Margaret 
W. FPrgnson was, at the time of the formation of such copart-
nership, 1wssessed of :property in her own right, of the value 
of '20iOOO, and furnished the entire capital for the business, 
and provided a plaee to carry on such business; that Peter 
J.i'erguson had no means, and was to and did manage the busi-
ness; that the copartnership continued until after the last item 
of goods mentioned in the bill of pa_rticulars was sold. This 
evidence was objected to by defendant8' counsel, on the ground 
that it was not competent for husband and wife to enter into 
a copartnership with each other. 'rhc circuit court sustained 
1he objection, and directed a verdict for defendants. Plaint-
iffs bring the case to this court by writ of error. 
Thomas A.. Wilson, for appellants. 
Ricllard, Prfoe. and .4.ustin Blair, for appellees. 
LoNo, J. The only question arising is whether the husband 
11.nd wife can enter into a contract of partnersllip betwef>n them-
selves, and thus render themselves jointly liable for the con-
tracts of the firm thus established. At the common law married 
women were incapable of forming a partnership, since tlleywere 
disabled, gen-er-ally, to contrad or' to engage in trade; and the 
husband and wife were wholly incapicitated to contract with 
each other. Whatever rights or powers the husband and wife 
have to contract with each other, or tliat the wife may have to 
enter into a copartner~hip to en rry on trade or business, must 
38 Gasss ox PA BTNERSHIP.
be conferred by our constitution and statutes. There was never
any impediment to the acquisition of property through pur-
chase by a married woman. The difliculty was that at the
common law the ownership passed immediately to the hus-
band by virtue of the marriage relation. Our statute has not
removed all the common-law disabilities of married women.
It has not conferred upon her the power of a fame sole, except
in certain directions. It has only provided that her real and
personal estate acquired before marriage, and all property,
real and personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled
in any manner, shall be and remain her ‘estate, and shall not
be liable for the debts, obligations, and engagements of her
husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged,
conveyed, devised, and bequeathed by her as if she were unmar-
ried; and she may sue and be sued in relation to her sole prop»
erty as if she were unmarried. How. St. §§ 6295-6297. In all
other respects she is a feme covert, and subject to all the
restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation.
A partnership is a contract of two or more competent persons
to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some one or all
of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and bear the loss in certain proportions. That a married
woman may, when she has separate estate, be a copartner with
a person other than her husband, is held in many states under
the married woman’s statutes. But where the statute gives
her no power, or only a limited power, to become a partner.
the rule of the common law provides that she cannot enter a
firm. It has been held by a great preponderance of authori-
ties, even under the broadest statutes, that a married woman
has no capacity to contract a partnership with her husband.
or, in other words, to become a member of a firm in which her
husband is a partner, even in those states in which she may
embark in another partnership; and though she holds herself
out as such partner, and her means give credit to the firm, she
is held not liable for the debts, as she cannot, by acts or declar-
ations, remove her own disabilities. Lord vs. Parker, 3 Allen.
1.27; Bowker vs. Bradford, 140 Mass. 521, 5 N. E. Rep. 480; H aas
vs. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 46 Am. Rep. 607; Payne vs. Thompson,
44 Ohio St. 192; Kaufman vs. Schoe/fcl, 37 Hun 140; Goa: vs.
M illcr, 54 Tex. 16; Mayer vs. Soyster, 30 Md. 402.
















































































































































88 0.A.SBS OX PABTNEHSHIP. 
be conferred by onr constitution and statutes. There was never 
any impediment to the acquisition of pl'operty through pur-
chase by a married woman. 'l'he difficulty was that at the 
common law the ownership pa.ssed immediately to the hus-
band by virtue of the marriage relation. Our statute has not 
removed all the common-law disabilities of married women. 
Jt has not conferred upon her the power of a fcme sole, except 
in certain directions. It has only provided that her real and 
personal estate aequired before marriage, and all property, 
real and personal, to which she may afterwards becom~ entitled 
in any manner, shall be and remain lier 'estate, and shall not 
be liable for the debts, obligations, and engagements of her 
husband, and may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, 
conveyed, deYised, and bequeathed by her as if she were unmar-
ried; and she may sue and be sued in relation to her sole prop-
erty as if she were unmarried. How. St. §§ 6295-6297. In all 
other respects she is a feme covert, nnd subject to all the 
restraints and disabilities consequent upon that relation. 
A partnerahip is a e-0ntract of two or more competent persons 
to place their money, effects, labor, and skill, or some one or all 
of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the 
profit and bear the loss in certain proportions. That a married 
woman may, when she has separate estate, be a copartner with 
a person other than her husband, is held in many states under 
the mar1·ied woman's statutes. But where the statute gives 
her no power, or only a limited power, to become a partner, 
the rule of the common law provides that she cannot enter a 
firm. It has been held by a great preponderance of authori-
ties, even under the broadest statutes, that a married woman 
has no capacity to contract a partnership with her husband, 
or, in other words, to become a member of a firm in which her 
husband is a partner, even in those states in which she ma~· 
embark in another partnership; and though she holds herself 
out as such partner, and her means give credit to the firm, she 
is held not liable for the debts, as she cannot, by acts or declar-
ations, remove her own disabilities. Lord vs. Parker, 3 Allen. 
· l27; Bowket vs. Bradford, 140 :\lass. 521, 5 N. E. Rep. 480; Haa~ 
vs. Shaw, 91 Ind. 381 , 46 Am. Rep. G07; Payne vs. Thompson, 
44 Ohio St. 192; Kaufman vs. Sclweffcl, 37 Hun 140; Oo:IJ vs. 
Miller, 54 Tex. 16; Mayer i·s. Soyster, 30 Md. 402. 
In this State a married worn.en was subject to the com-
c
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mon-law disabilities of coverture until the passage of the
married woman's act of 1855. How. St. §§ 6295-6299. This
act does not touch a wife’s interests in her husband’s
property, and these remain under the restrictions of the
common law, unless they are removed by some other stat-
ute. The wife’s common-law disabilities are only partially
removed by the act, and one who relies on a wife’s con-
tract must show the facts in order that they may appear
whether she had capacity to make it. Edwards vs lllclfnhill,
51 Mich. 161, 16 N. W. Rep. 322. Under our statutes a
wife has no power to contract except in regard to her sepa-
rate property. The constitution and statutes are clear against
her right to make a mere personal obligation unconnected with
property, and not charging it, so that she cannot become per-
sonally bound jointly with her husband, nor as a surety, by
mere personal promise. De Vries vs. Gonklin, 22 Mich. 255;
West vs. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery vs. Lord, 26 Mich. 431.
In Jenna vs. Marble, 37 Mich. 319, Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, speak-
ing with reference to a lease, said: “The language of the statute
is no broader than the equitable rules concerning separate
property laid down in the same words in most of the old decis-
ions. ' ' ' The disabilities of testimony are entirely
inconsistent with the idea that husband and wife may deal
with each other as third persons can. This is impossible, if
they cannot testify concerning these contracts; and when the
law recognizes, as it always has done, the peculiar power of
substantial coercion possessed by husbands over wives, it
would not be proper to infer any legal intent to remove pro-
tection against such influence from any vague provisionswhich
no one supposes were ever actually designed to reach such a
result, and which can only be made to do it by an extended
construction. Any one can readily see the mischiefs of allow-
ing persons thus related to put themselves habitually in'-busi-
ness antagonism, and legislation which can be construed as
permitting it is so radically opposed to the system which is
found embodied in our statutes generally that it should be
plain enough to admit of no other meaning.”
It is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a mar-
ried woman the right to acquire and hold property sep-
arate from her husband, and free from his influence and
















































































































































ARTMAN vs. ll,BRGUSO.N. 39 
mon-law disabilities of coverture pntil the passage of the 
married woman's act of 1855. How. St. § § 6295-6299. This 
act does not touch a wife's interests in her husband's 
property, and these remain under the r~strictioris ()f the 
common law, unless they are removed by some other stat-
ute. The wife's common-law disabilities are only partially 
removed by the act, and one who relies on a wife's oon-
tract must show the facts in order that they may a.ppear 
whether she had capacity to make it. Ed1eards vs M cEnhill, 
51 Mich. 161, 16 N. W. Rep. 322. Under our statutes a 
wife has no power to contract except in regard to her sepa-
rate property. The constitution and statutes are clear against 
her right to make a mere personal obligation unconnected with 
property, and not charging it, so that she cannot become per-
sonally bound jointly with her husband, nor as a surety, by 
mere personal promise. De Vri.u vs. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255; 
West vs. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464; Emery vs. Lord, 26 Mich. 431. 
In Jenne vs. Marble, 37 l\Iich. 319, :Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, speak-
ing with reference to a lease, said: ;'The language of the statute 
is no broader than the equitable rules concerning separate 
property laid down in the same words in most of the old decis· 
ions. • • • The disabilities of testimony are entirely 
inconsistent with the idea that husband and wife may deal 
with each other as third persons can. This is impossible, if 
they cann<>t testify concerning these contracts; and when the 
law recognizes, a.a it always bas done, the peculiar power of 
substantial coercion possessed by husbands over wives, it 
would not be proper to infer any legal intent to remove pro-
tection against such influence from any vague provisions which 
no one supposes were ever actually designed to reach such a 
result, and which can only be made to do it by an extended 
construction. Any one can readily see the mischiefs of ~llow­
ing persons thus related to put themselves habitually in "busi-
ness antagonism, and legislation which can be construed as 
permitting it is so radically opposed to the system which is 
found embodied in our statutes generally that it should be 
plain enough to admit <>f no othe1· meaning." 
It is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a mar-
ried woman the right to acquire and hold property sep-
arate from her husband, a11d free from his influence and 
control, and if she might enter into a business part-
40 Cases on PARTNERSHIP. .
nership with her husband it would subject her property to his
control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation
which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might sub
ject her to an indefinite liability for his engagements. A con-
tract of partnership with her husband is not included within
the power granted by our statute to married women. This
doctrine was laid down in Bassett vs. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3,
17 N. \V. Rep. 217, and we see no reason for departing from it.
The important and sacred relations between man and wife,
which lie at the very foundation of civilized society, are not
to be disturbed and destroyed by contentions which may arise
from such a community of property and a joint power of dis-
posal and a mutual liability for the contracts and obligations
of each other. The judgment of the court below must be
afiirmed. with costs. ‘
The other justices concurred.
No'rn: For other cases to same efieot,see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.,
§ 25. Compare also with following case.
iii
SUAU vs. CAFFE.
(‘om-t of Appeals of New York, 1890.
122 N. Y. 308, 25 N. E. Rep. 488, 9 L. R. A. 598.
On the 29th of January, 188], the defendants, George and
‘Adele Marie Gaffe, then and now husband and wife, executed,
and, on June 1, 1881, recorded in 'the oflice of the clerk of
the city and county of New York a certificate by which
they assumed to form a limited partnership pursuant to the
Revised Statutes, for the purpose of importing and dealing
in'foreign goods, at the city of New York, under the firm
name of George Cafie, which was to continue from Febru-
ary 1, 1881, to February 1, 1886. The husband was the
general and the wife the special partner, she contributing
$25,000. Thereafter, they carried on a. business of the kind
specified at the city of New York, under the firm name
selected, until after the debt to the plaintilf was contracted.
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DE'l'Bhip with her husband it would subject her property to his 
control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation 
which it is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might sub-
ject her to an indefinite liability for his engagements. A con· 
tract of partnership with her husband is not inc.laded within 
the power granted by our statute to married women. This 
doctrine was laid down in Bassett vs. Shepardson, 52 Mich. 3, 
17 N. ,V. Rep. 217, and we see no reason for departing from it. 
The important and sacred relations between man and wife, 
which lie at the very foundation of civilized society, are not 
to be disturbed and destroyed by contentions which may arise 
from such a community of property and a joint power of dis· 
posal and a mutual liability for the contracts and obligations 
of each other. The judgment of the court below must be 
affirmed, with costs. 
The other justices concurred. 
NOTi:: For other cuea to ame etfeot, aee Mechem'• Elem. of Partn.., 
§ 25. Compare also with following case. 
BUA U vs. CAFFE. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 18!l0. 
122 N. Y. 808, 25 N. E. Rep. 488, 9 L. R. A. rl98. 
On the 29th of January, 1881, the defendants, George and 
'.Adele Marie Caffe, then and now husband and wife, executed, 
end, on June 1, 1881, recorded in ·the office of the clerk of 
the city and county of New York a certificate by which 
they assumed to form a limited partne1·ship pursuant to the 
Revised Statutes, for the purpose of importing and dealing 
in· foreign goods, at the city of New York, under the firm 
name of George Caffe, which was to continue from Febru-
ary 1, 1881, to February 1, 1886. The husband was the 
general and the wife the special partner, she contributing 
$25,000. Thereafter, they carried on a business of the kind 
specified at the city of New York, under the firm name 
selected, until after the debt to the plaintiff was contracted. 
Between .May 23, .1882, and December 6, 1883, the plaintiff 
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loaned money to George Caffe on account of which the defend-
ants conceded that there was due the plaintifi January 1, 1884,
$26,799.93, to recover which this action was brought. The
defendants interposed two defenses: (1) That the partner-
ship or business relation, whatever it was, which had existed
between thembefore May 16, 1882, was on that day dissolved
with the knowledge of the plaintiff; (2) that a husband and
wife cannot, under the law of this State, be partners in busi-
ness, and that, although they agree to become so, transact busi-
ness and incur liabilities as such, the wife is not liable to the
creditors of the firm. The first question--an issue of fact—
was contested before a jury, and determined in favor of the
plaintiff. The second question, an issue of law, was decided in
favor of the plaintiff at the circuit, which ruling was atfirmed
at the general ter‘m. From this judgment the defendants
appealed to this court.
William Tharp, for appellants.
Abram Kling, for respondent.
FOLLETT, C. J. But a single question is involved in this
appeal, which is whether a married woman who contracts a
debt with her husband in a business carried on for their joint
benefit, can avoid liability for it on the ground of coverture.
The second section of chapter 90 of the Laws of 1860 provides
that “a married woman may ' ‘ " carry on any trade or
business ' ‘ ' 011_.hflLgJkB_ and separate accoun_t.f’ It is
urged that this language is not broad enough to authorize
married women to engage in business as partners, or jointly
with others, or at least with their husbands, but that the stat-
ute simply confers power on them to contract by themselves
and apart from others. This construction is too narrow, and
fails to express the evident intent of the legislature, which
was not to prescribe the mode in which married women should
carry on their business, but to free them from the restraints
of the common law, and permit them to engage in business
in their own behalf as free from the control of their husbands
as though unmarried. Before this statute, the profits of their
business belonged to their husbands. and the words “sole and
separate account” were intended to convey the idea that the

















































































































































SUAU vs. UAFFK. 
loaned money to George Caffe on account of which the defend-
ants conceded that there was due the plaintiff January 1, 1884, 
~26,799.93, to recover which this action was brought. The 
defendants interposed two defenses: (1) That the partner-
ship or business relation, whatever it was, which bad existed 
between them before May 16, 1882, was on that day dissolved 
with the knowledge of the plaintiff; (2) that a husband and 
wife cannot, under the law of this State, be partners in busi-
ness, and that, although they agree to become so, transact busi-
ness and incur liaLilities as such, the wife is not liable to the 
creditors of the firm. The first question-an issue of fact-
was contested before a jury, and determined in favor of the 
plaintiff. The second question, an issue of law, was decided in 
favor of the plaintiff at the circuit, which ruling was affirmed 
at the general tenn. From this judgment the defendants 
appealed to this court. 
William Tharp, for appellants. 
Abram Kling, for respondent. 
FOLLETT, C. J. Bnt a single question Is involved In this 
appeal, which is whether a married woman who contracts a 
debt with her husband in a business carried on for their joint 
benefit, can avoid liability for it on the ground of coverture. 
The second section of chapter 90 of the Laws of 1860 provides 
that "a married woman may • • • carry on any trade or 
business * * • 011 _hel:_sole_ ~nd separ_ate accoun_~·-" It is 
urged that this language is not broad enough to authorize 
married women t<> engage in business as partners, or jointly 
with others, or at least with their husbands, but that the stat-
ute simply confers power on them to contract by themselves 
abd apart from others. This construction is too narrow, and 
fails to express the evident intent of the legislature, which 
was n<>t to prescribe the m<>de in which married women should 
carry on their business, but to free them from the restraints 
of the common law, and permit them to engage in business 
in their own behalf as free from the control of their husbands 
as though unmarried. Before this statute, the profits of their 
business belonged to their husbands, and the words "sole and 
separate account" ~re intended to convey the idea that the 
beneficial interest of any business in which they might engage 
6 
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belonged to them and not to theirhusbands. Since the enact-
ment of this statute, it has been held that husbands and wives
may legally contract with each other in reference to their sep
ate estates (Owen vs. Oawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Bodine rs. Killeen,
53 N. Y. 93); that they may become agents for each other
(Knapp vs. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277); and tl1at a husband may assign
to his wife a chose in action (SQ:/nwur vs. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178).
In Frccking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, it was held that a wife
could not escape liability on a joint promissory note given by
herself and her husband, in payment for property purchased
by her, by reason of her eoverture, nor by reason of the fact
that she contracted jointly with her husband. In Scott vs. Gon-
way, 58 N. Y. 619, the defendant and her husband were engaged
in running a theater, under the name of “Mrs. F. B. Conway’s
Brooklyn Theater,” pursuant to a contract by which the profits
and losses were to be equally shared between them. To an
.action brought for the recovery of the value of goods sold, the
wife interposed the defense that she was not liable for the
debt, because it was not contracted in any trade or business
carried on for her sole or separate account or benefit, but for
the benefit of a business carried on by herself and husband
for their joint benefit. This defense was overruled in the
supreme court and in the court of appeals. Bitter vs. Rath-
man, 61 N. Y. 512, was an action for an accounting between
partners. The plaintifl', a married woman, had been engaged
in business with the defendant under the name of H. Rath-
man & Co. The trial court found “that the plaintiff, in secret
trust for her husband, was the partner of the defendant,” and
that, “in respect to the public, she was to be regarded as the
real partner,” and ordered an accounting as to the partnership
affairs. GRAY, C., said: “Yet she, having suffered herself to
be regarded by the public as a partner, was liable, as such,
to the creditors of the ostensible firm; and, having thus
exposed herself to such liabilities, if any should be" found to
exist, she had, to any such extent, no right, as against either
the defendant or her husband, to be protected out of the share
which would belong to her in her capacity as trustee for her
husband, at whose instance she undertook the trust.” This
case does not decide that a wife may or may not be a partner
in business with her husband, but it in effect decides that a
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belonged to them and not to their .husbands. Since the enact-
ment of this statute, it has been held that husbands and wives 
may legally contract with each other in reference to their eep-
ate estates (Ou:en vB. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Bodine VB. Killeen, 
53 N. Y. 93); that they moy become agents for each other 
(Knapp us. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277); and that a husband may assig11 
to his wife a chose in action (Seymour VB. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 178). 
In Frecking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, it was held that a wife 
could not escnpe liability on a joint promissory note given by 
herself and her husband, in payment for property purchased 
by her, by reason of her coverture, nor by reason of the fact 
that she contracted jointly with her husband. In Scott"'· Con-. 
way, 58 N. Y. 619, the defendant and her husband were engagied 
in running a theater, under the name of "Mrs. F. B. Conway's 
Brooklyn Theater," pursuant to a contract by which the profits 
and losses were to be equally shared between them. To an 
.action brought for the recovery of the value of goods sold, the 
wife interposed the defense that she was not liable for the 
debt, because it was not contracted in any trade or business 
carried on for her sole or separate account or benefit; but for 
the benefit of a business carried on by her.self and husband 
for their joint benefit. This defense was overruled in th'~ 
supreme court and in the court of appeals. Bitter vs. Rath-
man, 61 N. Y. 512, was an action for an accounting between 
partners. The plaintiff, a married woman, had been engaged 
in business with the defendant under the name of H. Rath-
man & Co. The trial court found "that the plaintiff, in secre-t 
trust for her ~usband, was the partner of the defendant," and 
that, "in respect to the public, she was to be regarded as the 
real partner," and ordered an accounting as to the partnership 
affairs. GRAY, C., said: "Yet she, having suffered herself to 
be regarded by the public as a partner, was liable, as such, 
to the creditors of the ostensible firm; and, having thus 
exposed herself to such liabilities, if any should be found to 
exist, she bad, to any such extent, no right, as against either 
the defendant or her husband, to be protected out of the share 
which would belong to her in her capacity as trustee for her 
husband, at whose instance she undertook the trust." This 
case does not decide that a wife may or may not be a partner 
in business with her husband, but it in effect decides that a 
married woman may be a partner with a third person, 8.lld 
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that her husband may act as her agent in the business of the
firm.
In Noel rs. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74, 12 N. E. Rep. 351, reversing
15 Abb. N. C. 403, an action was brought against the hus-
band and wife on a note signed, “J. P. Kinney & Co.,”
and payable to the plaintiff. The complaint charged that
the defendants were liable, as partners, under the name signed
to the note. The husband made default, but the wife answered
that she was a married woman, and that the note was exc-
cuted by her husband. On the trial, the plaintiff put the note
in evidence, and it appeared that the defendants were hus-
band and wife, and there was evidence that the note was given
for mirrors placed in houses owned by the wife. A motion to
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the note on its
face showed that it was not given in respect to her separate
business, or her estate, was overruled. In considering this
question Daxrowrn, J ., speaking for a unanimous court, said:
“ln the case cited (Freaking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422), she
became :1 joint “contractor with her husband, but she was as
much bound to perform the joint engagement as if the under-
taking had been several, and she did not escape liability
because her joint contractor was her husband. It was not
necessary to inquire, in that case, whether thé one paying
could obtain contribution from the other, nor is it pecessary
to go into that question here. In that case, both undertook
to pay the creditor. Can it make a difference in the measure
of liability that, in one case, the married woman entered in
her own name, and her husband in his name, in the execution
of a joint obligation, and in the other case adopted a name
which represents a joint liablity, which may, in effect, also
be several? Partners are at once principals and agents,—eaeh
represents the other,—and if, in the relation of partnership.
there are obligations which a married woman cannot enforce
against her husband, or the husband against the wife, they
involve no feature of the present action, which asserts only
the obligation of a debtor to discharge her debt, or the obliga-
tion of a promisor to fulfill her promise.”
Partners are the agents of each other, and are jointly and
severally liable for the debts of the firm; these being two
of the essential elements of a contract of partnership. It
being settled that husbands and wives may be the agents
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that her husband may act as her agent in the business of the 
firm. 
In Noel t~s. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74, 12 N. E. Rep. 351, reversing 
15 Abb. N. C. 403, an action was brought against the hus-
band and wife on a note signed, "J. P. Kinney & Co.," 
and payable to the plaintiff. The complaint charged that 
the defendants were liable, as partners, under the name signed 
to the note. The husband made default, but the wife answered 
that she was a married woman, and that the note was exe-
cuted by her husband. On the trial, the plaintiff put the note 
in evidence, and it appeared that the defendants were hus-
band and wife, and there was evidence that the note was given 
for mirrors placed in houses owned by the wife. A motion to 
dismiss the complaint, on the ground that the note on its 
face showed that it was not given in respect to her separate 
business, or her estate, was overruled. In considering this 
question DA~FOilTH, J., speaking for a unanimous court, said: 
"In the case cited (Frecking vs. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422), she 
became a joint 'contractor with her husband, but she was as 
much bound to perforin the joint engagement as if the under-
taking had been several, and she did not escape liability 
because. her joint contractor was her husband. It was not 
necessary to inquire, in that case, whether the one paying 
could obtain contribution from the other, nor is it pecessary 
to go into that question here. In that case, both undertook 
to pay the creditor. Can it make a difference in the measure 
of liability !hat, In one case, the married woman entered in 
her own name, and her husband in his name, in the execution 
of a joint obligation, and in the other case adopted a nam\~ 
which represents a joint liablity, which may, in effect, also 
be several? Partners are at once principals and agents,-each 
represents the other,-and if, in the relation of partnership. 
there are obligations which a married woman cannot enforce 
against her husband, or the husband against the wife, they 
involve no feature of the present action, which asserts only 
the obligation of a debtor to discharge her debt, or the obliga-
tion of a promisor to fulfill her promise." 
Partners are the agents of each other, and are jointly and 
severally liable for the debts of the firm; these being two 
of the essential elements of a contract of partnership. It 
being settled that husbands and wives may be the agents 
of each other, and tb~t they may bind themselves by joint 
44 Cssss on Psnrs 1-;ltSHll'.
contracts entered into with third persons, we see no war-
rant in the statute for exempting them from liability to
creditors for debts incurred by firms of which they are mem-
bers. It has also been so held in Grafi vs. Kinney, 37 Hun
405, which afiirms 15 Abb. N. C. 397; Zimmerman vs. Erhard,
8 Daly, 311, aflirmed 83 N. Y. 74. Opposed to these are
Ohambovet vs. Cagney, 35 N. Y. Super. (‘t. -174; Kaufman vs.
Schoe/Tel, 37 Hun, 140; Fairlce vs. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr.
292; same case, 14 Abb. N. C. 341, was reversed in 38 Hun
220. Upon principle and authority, we think that when a hus-
band and wife assume to carry on a business as partners, and
contract debts in the course of it, the wife cannot escape lia-
bility on the ground of coverture. The judgment should be
affirmed, with costs.
VANN, PARKER and BROWN, JJ., concur.
HAIGHT, Porrnn and BRADLEY, JJ., dissent.
Norm: For other cases to same efleet, see Mechenfs Elem. of Partn.,
§ 25. Compare with preceding case.
WHITTENTON MILLS vs. UPTON.
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1858.
10 Gray 582, 71 Am. Dee. 681.
Petition by a manufacturing corporation to set aside insolv-
ency proceedings instituted against it and VVilliam Mason as
partners, upon Mason’s petition to restrain the assignee ap-
pointed under these proceedings from further meeting with
petitioner’s estate, and to compel the judge of insolvency to
entertain a petition of the corporation for the benefit of the
insolvent laws, respecting insolvent corporations. The opin-
ion states the facts.
Bartlett and Curtis, for the petitioners.
Hoar and Gray, Jr., for the assignees.
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contra.eta entered into with third persons, .we see no war-
rant in the statute for exempting them from liability to 
<'l'editors for debts incurred by firms of which they are mem-
bers. It has also been so held in Graff tJB. Kinney, 37 Hun 
405, which afll.nns 15 Abb. N. 0. 397; Zimmermtm 1'8. Erhard, 
8 Daly, 311, affirmed 83 N. Y. 74. Opposed to these are 
Chambovet vs. Cagnev, 35 N. Y. Super. 0t. 474; Kaufman "'· 
Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140; Fairlee vs. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr. 
292; same case, 14 Abb. N. C. 341, was reversed in 38 Hun 
220. Upon principle and authority, we think that when a hus-
band and wife assume to carry on a business as partners, and 
contract debts in the course of it, the wife cannot escape lia-
bility on the ground of coverture. The judgment should be 
affirmed, with costs. 
v ANN, PARKER and RROWN, JJ., concur. 
HAIGHT, POTTER and BRADLEY, JJ., dissent. 
NOTS: For other cases to same effect, see Meohem'e Elem. of Partn.. 
§ 25. Compare with precediDg ca-. 
WHITTENTON MILLS vs. UPTON. 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1858. 
10 Gray ~2. 71 Am. Dec. 68L 
Petition by a manufacturing corporation to set aside insolv-
ency proceedings instituted against it and \Villiam Mason as 
partners, upon Mason's petition to restrain the assignee ap-
pointed under these proceedings from further meeting with 
petitioner's estate, and to compel the judge of insolveno.y to 
entertain a petition of the corporation for the benefit of the 
insolvent laws, respecting insolvent corporations. The opin-
ion states the facts. 
Bartlett and Curtis, for the petitioners. 
Hoar and Gray, Jr., for the assignees. 
THOMAS, J. This is a petition to this court sitting ln equity. 
Wnrrrmrron Mums vs Urcron. 45
and as such, having by the statute of 1838, c. 163, the juris-
diction and the supervision of all proceedings in insolvency.
The avermcnts of the petition are admitted by the answers
of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts
agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whitten-
ton Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes statedflf
the corporation was capablegin law, of entering into and form-
ing such partnership, and for such ends.
But the petitioners say: (1) That the Whittenton Mills
could not enter into any legal partnership. (2) That if it were
so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the prose-
cution of a business foreign to the purpose for which alone it
was created. (3) That if such legal partnership existed, the
petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon the
petition of Mason, and under the statute of 1838, c. 163, and
the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural
persons, and making no provisions for bodies corporate.
At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion
is the question, was this corporation capable of forming a
partnership, of entering into the contract? This question pre-
sents itself in two forms. The more general one is: “Has a
corporation, as one of its usual, inherent powers, the capacity
to form a contract of copartnersl1ip?” The narrower question,
but for this case the practical and pertinent one is: “Can a
manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorpora-
ted since February, 1S31, and subject to the provisions of the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
enter into a contract or society of copartnership?”
This corporation was created in March, 1836, as a manu-
facturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cot-
ton goods in the town of Taunton, and for that purpose was
invested with all the powers and privileges, and made subject
to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities, set forth in the
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes,
passed on the 4th of November preceding, but not to take effect
till the first of May, 1836: Stats. 1836, c. 19. This charter,
with the provisions of the chapter referred to and made part
of it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of
the corporation. \Vhat powers are granted expressly or by
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and as such, having by the statute of 1838, c. 163, the juris-
diction and the supervision of all proceedings in insolvency. 
The averments of the petition are admitted by the answers 
of the respondents. Nor is there a question upon the facts 
agreed that a copartnership was entered into by the Whitten-
ton :Mills and the said Mason, and for the purposes stated\!.f 
the corporation was capable)n law, of entering into and form-
ing such partnership, and for such ends. 
But the petitioners say: (1) That the \Vhittenton Mille 
could not enter into any legal partnership. (2) That if it were 
so capable, it could not form a copartnership for the pl'ose-
cution of a business foreign to the P!J.rpose for which alone it 
was created. (3) That if such legal partnership existed, the 
petitioners were not liable to be declared insolvent upon tbe 
petition of Mason, and under the statute of 1838, c. 163, and 
the acts in addition thereto; such acts respecting only natural 
persons, and making no provisions for bodies corporate. 
At the threshold of the cause and of its elaborate discussion 
is the question, was this corporation capable of forming a 
partnership, of entering into the contract? This question pre-
sents itself in two forms. The more general one is: "Has a 
corporation, as one of its usual, inherent powers, the capacity 
to form a contract of copartnership?" The narrower question, 
but for this case the practical and pertinent one is: "Can a 
manufacturing corporation in this commonwealth, incorpora-
ted since February, 1831, and subject to the provisions of the 
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, 
enter into a contract or society of copartnership?" 
This corporation was created in March, 1836, as a manu-
facturing corporation, for the purpose of manufacturing cot-
ton goods in the town of 'raunton, and for that purpose was 
invested with all the powers and privileges, and made subject 
to all the duties, restrictions and liabilities, set forth in the 
thirty-eighth and forty-fourth chapters of the revised statutes, 
passed on the 4th of November preceding, but not to take effect 
till the first of May, 1836: Stats. 18:{6, c. 19. This cliarter, 
with the provisions of the chapter referre.d to and made part 
<lf it, is the origin and source of the powers and functions of 
thE" corpor-ation. What powers are granted expressly or by 
implication, because necessary or usual for the purpose.s which 
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the charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no
more.
There is one obvious and important distinction between such
a society as this charter creates and that of a partnership.
An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by
agents authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the
collected will of the society. No member of the corporation
as such can bind the society. In a partnership, each member
binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation
may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be
two principals, the legal person and the natural person, each
having, within the scope of the society's business, full author-
ity to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its
property. ‘
The second section of chapter 38 of the revised statutes,
provides that the business of every such manufacturingcorpora-
tion shall be managed and conducted by the president and
directors thereof, and such other oflicers, agents, and factors
as the company shall think proper to authorize for that pur-
pose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be
carried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner
may manage and conduct the business of the corporation, and
bindit by his acts. In so doing, he does not act as an ofiicer
or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but
as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and each
capable of binding the society by the act of its individual
will.
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there
is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a man-
ufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a contract by which the power to manage the business
of the company, and to bind the corporation by his acts, is
vested in one not a member of the corporation, nor its olficer or
agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing
how the president and directors, and other ofiicers, agents and
factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such, too, is the
sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make
by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the
everal provisions authorizing the stockholders to fix the
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. the charter was given to effect, the corporation has, and no 
more. 
There is one obvious and important dhitinetion betweC'n such 
a soci<'ty as this charter creates and that of a partnership. 
An act of the corporation, done either by direct vote or by 
agt>nts authorized for the purpose, is the manifestation of the 
collected will of the society. No member of the corporation 
as such can bind the society. In a partnership, each membe1· 
. binds the society as a principal. If, then, this corporation 
may enter into partnership with an individual, there would be 
two principals, the legal pt>rson and the natural person, each 
having, within the scope of the society's business, full author-
ity to manage its concerns, including even the disposition of its 
property. · 
The second section of chapter 38 of the revised statutes, 
provides that the business of every such manufacturingcorpora-
tion shall be rnanag-ed and conducted by the president and 
dh·ectors thereof, and such other officers, agents, and facto1"H 
as the company shall think proper to authorize for that pur-
pose. It is plain that the provisions of this section cannot be 
earried into effect where a partnership exists. The partner 
may manage and conduct the busint>ss of the corporation, and 
bind. it by his acts. In so doing, he does not act as an ofticer 
or agent of the corporation by authority received from it, but 
as a principal in a society in which all are equals, and <>i.l<'h 
capable of binding the society by the act of its individual 
will. 
Indeed, in examining this chapter, it will be found that there 
is scarcely a provision for the conduct of the business of a man-
. ufacturing corporation that is not inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a contraet by which the power to manage the busine8s 
of the company, and to bind the corporation by bis acts, js 
vested in ont> not a member of the corporation, nor its officer or 
agent. Such are the third, fourth and fifth sections, providing 
how the president and directors, and other oflicers, agentt'l nnd 
factors of the corporation shall be chosen. Such, too, is thr 
sixth section, which authorizes every such company to make 
by-laws for its own regulation and government. Such are the 
several provisions authorizing the stockholders to fix th•~ 
amount of the capital stock, to increase the same within the 
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limit fixed by law, or to reduce it: Secs. 9, 11, 19. And such
is the provision requiring the president and directors to give
annual notice of the amount of the debts of the corporation, the
means of stating which would not be in their power if another
principal had the power of creating the debts: Sec. 22. Of
the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is
declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corpor-
ation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the
capital stock actually paid in, and which renders the directors,
under whose administration an excess shall occur, liable per-
sonally to the extent of such excess——a provision evidently
based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract
debts is vested in such directors, and that they cannot be
divested of it, and which is wholly inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a power in the corporation toenter into a contract of
partnership by which another principal would be created, hav-
ing equal power to contract debts, and to bind the partnership
and the corporation in solido.
Indeed, the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our
legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporations,
is that the corporation is to manage its affairs separately and
exclusively; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders
and others by otlicers who are the servants of the corporation,
and act in its name and behalf. And the formation of a con-
tract, or the entering into a relation by which the corporation,
or the officers of its appointment, should be divested of that
power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner,
with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely
powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is
wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers
expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a
inchnsistent with that policy. -
The power to form a partnership is not only not among U13
manufacturing corporation under the legislation of the com
monwealth. _
The difliculties would be obviously greater in holding such a
partnership to be valid, when formed and carried on for the
prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from
that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to
see how the corporation should engage in such business, even
when under its own control, still less to enter into copartner-
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limit flxed by law, or to reduce it: Secs. 9, 11, 19. And such 
is the provision requiring the president and directors to give 
annual n-0tice of the amount of the debts of the corporation, the 
means of stating whlch would not be in their power if anothe:r 
principal had the power of creating the debts: Sec. 22. Of 
the same character is the twenty-fifth section, by which it is 
declared that the whole amount of the debts which the corpor-
ation shaJI at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of the 
capital stock actua1Jy paid in, and which renders the directors, 
under wh-0se administration an excess shall o~cur, liable per-
sonally to the extent of such excess-a provision evidently 
based upon the ground that the exclusive power to contract 
debts is vested in such dh•ectors, and that they cannot be 
divested of it, and which is wholly inc-0nsistent with the exist-
• ence of a power in the corporation to.enter into a contract of 
partnership by which another principal would be created, hav-
ing equal power to contract debts, and to bind the partnersliip 
and the corporation in solido. 
Indeed, the effect of all our statutes, the settled policy of our 
legislature, for the regulation of manufacturing corporationi.;i, 
is that tile corporation is to manage its affairs separately and 
exclusively; certain powers to be exercised by the stockholders 
and otllers by otlicers who are the servants of the corporation, 
and act in its name and behalf. And the fommtion of a con-
tract, or the entering into a relation by whick the corporation, 
or the officers of its appointment, should be divested of that 
power, or by which its franchises should be vested in a partner, 
with equal power to direct and control its business, is entirely 
inchnsistent with that policy. 
The power to form a partnership is not only not among the .. 
powers granted expressly or by reasonable implication, but is · 
wholly inconsistent with the scope and tenor of the powers 
expressly conferred, and the duties expressly imposed, upon a 
manufnduring corporation under the legislation of the com 
monweaJth. 
The difficnlties would be obviously greater in holding such a 
partnt'.>rship to be valid, when formed and carried on for th~ 
prosecution of a business other than that, if not foreign from 
that, for which the corporation was created. It is difficult to 
see how the corporation should engage in such business, even 
when under its own control, still Jess to enter into copartner-
ahip with third persons for that purpose. 
48 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP.
By the statute of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argu-
ment, corporations created for the manufacture of woolen and
cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufac-
tures, but this only when four-fifths of the stockholders shall,
by vote at a special meeting, called for the purpose, consent to
the same. This statute furnishes a pretty strong implication
that the power to carry on a ditferent business from that for
which the corporation was chartered did not exist before the
statute was passed.
\Ve are, therefore, all of the opinion that in the formation of
the alleged partnership the corporation exceeded the powers
given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the
contract of copartnership was illegal and void. ' ' ‘
If the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the forma-
tion of the partnership—which is not the fact—it could not
enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal
which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and
prescribing their duties. Whether, if such assent were avail-
able, it could be manifested in any other mode but a vote of the
stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire.
The decision of the question as to the existence of the part-
nership between the Whittenton Mills and William Mason in
the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if ;a
partnership had existed, the petitioners could be subjected to
the provisions of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts
in addition thereto.
The proceedings in insolvency, founded upon the petition of
Mason as the partner of said Wliittenton Mills, under the firm
of XVilliam Mason & C0., were illegal, and must be vacated and
set aside, so far as they afi'ect the estate of the Whittenton
Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for
the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the \Vhit-
tenton Mills to hear the parties, and, good cause being shown,
to issue his warrant thereon. -
Decree accordingly.
Norm: For other oases as to the power of corporations to enter into
















































































































































48 CASES ON P A.RTNERSHIP. 
By the statute of 1852, c. 195, not adverted to in the argu-
ment, corporations created for the manufactu1·e of woolen and 
cotton goods are authorized to carry on certain other manufac-
tures, but this only when four-fifths of the stockholders shall, 
by vote at a special meeting, called for the purpose, consent to 
the same. This statute furnishes a pretty stl"ong implication 
that the power to carl"y on a ditferent business from that for 
which the corporation was chartered did not exist before the 
statute was passed. 
We are, therefore, all of the opinion that in the formation of 
the alleged partnership the corpol"ation exceeded the powers 
given by its charter expressly or by implication, and that the 
contract of copartnership was illegal and void. • • • 
If the assent of all the stockholders were shown to the forma-
tion of the partnership-which is not the fact-it could not 
enlarge the powers of the corporation, or make that legal 
which was inconsistent with the law limiting their powers and 
prescribing their duties. \Vhether, if such assent were avail-
able, it could be manifested in any o(her mode but a vote of the 
stockholders, it is not necessary to inquire. 
The decision of the question as to the existence of the part-
nership between the \Vhittenton :Mills and \Villiam .Mason in 
the negative renders unnecessary the inquiry whether, if :U. 
partnership had existed~ the petitioners could be subjected to 
the provisions of the insolvent law of 1838, c. 163, and the acts 
in addition thereto. 
The proceedings in insolvency, founded upon the petition of 
Mason as the partner of said \Vhittenton Mills, under the firm 
of William ~Jason & Ce., were illegal, and must be vacated and 
set aside, so far as they affect the estate of the \Vhittenton 
Mills. A mandamus must issue to the judge in insolvency for 
the county of Bristol to proceed upon the petition of the Whit-
tenton l\lills to h<'ar the parties, and, good cause being shown, 
to issue his warrant thereon. 
Decree accordingly. 
NoTE: For other oase3 as to the powe~ of oorporatione to enter into 
partnership, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 26. 
I
IV.
WHAT CONTRACTS AND ACTS CREATE PART-
NERSHIP.
1. Of the Conslrilction of C'om'rac’s Generally.
_ ATKINS vs. HUNT.
Supreme Court of N cw H am pshirc, 1843.
14 N. H. 205.
Assmursrr on three promissory notes, all dated in the year
1840, and payable to the plaintiffs, or order, and signed “Farm-
ers’ and Mechanics‘ Company, by Greenleaf Cummings, Agent."
There were numerous defendants,all of whom were defaulted
except two, who severally pleaded the general issue. It was
proved that in the month of August, 1839, the defendants
signed written articles of association in trade, under the name
and style of “The Farmers‘ and Mechanics’ Store.” One of the
articles provided as follows: “If any stockholder wishes to
withdraw from the concern, he may do so, taking the amount
by him paid in, by giving six months’ notice of his intent, to the
executive committee in writing.” It was also provided by the
second by-law that each subscriber should become a partner,
and the defendant was a subscriber of a certain sum; and
article 12 provided that all matters relating to the business of
the company should be decided by a major vote of those pres-
ent at any meeting duly notified, except in relation to certain
specified acts.
It was proved that Greenleaf Cummings, who signed the
notes, was dul_v employed from the first of February, 1840, to
the first ot’ July, 1841, and acted as agent of the company, pro-


















































































































































WHAT CONTRACTS AND ACTS CREATE PART· 
NERSHIP. 
1. Of th1 Construction of C'ontrae's Generally. 
ATKINS vs. HUNT. 
Supreme Court of New Hampsllirc. 1843. 
14 N. H . 205. 
AssuMrs1T on thrc>e promissory notes, a II dated in the year 
1840, and payable to the plaintiffs, or order, and signed "Farm-
erR' and ?\lt>C"hanirs"Company, by Greenleaf Cummings, Agent:' 
There we1·e nunw1·011s deff'ndants,all of whom were dl'faulted 
ex<'ept two, who sevPrally pleaded the general issue. It was 
proved that in the month of .Augnst, 18!l!l, the defendants 
Higned writti•n artidPs of a!'.lsodation in trade, under the name 
and st;vle of "The Fal'mf'rs' and 1\Iechanics' Store." One of the 
articles provided as follows: "If any ~tock holder wishes to 
withdraw from the con<'t•1·11, he may do so, taking the amount 
by him paid in, by gi,·ing six months' notice of his intent, to the 
executive connuith•e in w1·iting.'' It was also provided by the 
second by-law that each suhseriber should become a partner, 
and the defendant was a subscriber of a certain sum; and 
article 12 provided that all matters relating to the business of 
the company should be decid(•d by a major vote of those prel'!-
<'nt at any meeting duly notified, except in relation to certain 
specified acts. 
It was proved that Greenleaf Cummings, who signed the 
notes, was duly employed from the first of F'ebruary, 1840, to 
the first of .July, 1841, and af't<>cl as agent of the rompan.'< pro-
vided it shall appeai· from this case that the company con-
7 
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tinned its legal existence, and that the notes in suit were given
in pursuance of his agency. for goods purchased to be used in
the business of the company. I
A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment
is to be rendered, or it is to be set aside and judgment rendered
for the defendants, according to the opinion of the Court upon
this case.
I/ieerrnore, for the defendants.
Morrison, for the plaintiff.
Gn.c1m1s'r, J . The question before the Court is, whether the
defendants are liable as partners of the Farmers and Mechan-
ics’ Company. The plaintiffs allege that they are thus liable,
because it appears that they subscribed certain articles consti-
tuting that company; that provision was made for the with-
drawal of persons from it; that the business of the company
was to be managed according to the vote of those present, and
that the second by-law provides that each subscriber shall
become a partner. These facts it is said render them liable to
the world as partners for the performance of the contracts
made by their agent, and constitute them actually partners
among themselves.
It is said. on the other hand, that what was done amounted
merely to a proposition to form a partnership; that no money
was paid in, so as to cause them to be atfected by any eventual
profit and loss; that no names were published to the world, as
those of the partners; that the defendants might have with-
drawn at any time, and that consequently they could not be
bound by the acts of the agent of the company. The question
raised by the case is. whether the defendants were actually
members of a partnership. ‘
There is of course an essential difference between a mere
proposition to form a partnership. and its actual constitution.
Persons may take a deep interest in the objects to be accom-
plished by the company; may make donations to aid its prog-
ress; or may sign their names to subscription papers for the
same end, without being liable for debts which other persons
may contract in‘the prosecution of the same purpose. lint a
ditlicult question often arises. as to where the proposition to
make the contract ends. and the contract itself begins. In
Bournc -vs. 1-'rcctli, 9 B. & C. 63:2, 17 Eng. Com. Law 285 a
















































































































































60 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
tinned ite legal existence, and th.at the notes in suit were given 
in pursuance of his agency, for goods pur~hased to be used in 
the business ot the company. 
A verdict was taken for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment 
ls to be rendered, or it is to be set aside and judgment rendered 
for the defendants, according to the 01>inion of the Court upon 
this case. 
Lfrermorf., for the defendants. 
Morrison, for the plaintiff. 
Gn.cnmsT, J. The question before the Court is, whether the 
defendants are liable as partners of the Farmers and :Mechan-
ics' Vompany. The plaintiffs allege that they are thus liable, 
becamw it appears that they subscribed certain articles consti· 
tu ting that company; that provision was made for the with· 
drawal of persons from it; that the business of the company 
was to be managed lH'('Ording to the vote of those present, and 
that the st>eond by-law provides that each subscriber shall 
become a partner. 1'hese facts it is said render them liable to 
the world as partners for the pcr·formance of the contracts 
made by their agent, and constitute them actually partners 
among themselves. 
It is said. on th<' other hand, that what was done amounted 
merely to a proposition to form a part1wri,;hip; that no money 
was paid in, s6 as to cause them to be atl'Pl'ted by any eventual 
profit and loss; that no names were pnuli8he<l to the world, ns 
those of the partneri;;;. that the <lef<>udants might have with· 
dr.nvn at any time~ nnd that conse<pwntly they could not be 
bound by the aets of the agent of thc> company. The question 
rais<'d hv the case is. whether the defendants were uctuallv . . ,.... 
members of a partnership. ' 
There is of course an e~sential dilTerence between a mere 
proposition to form a pill'tnership. and its a ctual constitution. 
Pel'f!ons may take a 1)e('p interest in the objects to bt• a1·1·om· 
plished by tlw comp:my; ma;r mnkP donations to aid itfol prog-
ress; or may sign tht•ir nanws to suhsc1·iption papers for the 
same end, without lwing- liable for dt•lits which other J>r•rsons 
may contract in. thl' pro:oiecution of th(.~ f-lame purpose. But a 
difficult question ~ftPn :irisPs, as to w1wre the propm~ition to 
make thE' contral't 1•111ls. and thP c·nnt rad itself lwgins. In 
Bour11c vs. Prccfh, 9 B. & C. 6:~:!, 17 Eng. Com. Law 285 a 
‘D
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prospectus was issued, stating the conditions upon which
the company was formed; that the concern was to be divided
into twenty shares, to be under the management of a com-
mittee, and ten per cent of the subscriptions to be paid in
by a certain date. It was held that this prospectus imported
only that a company was to be formed, and not that it
was actually formed, and that the signature to the pros-
pectus did not indicate to any person who should read it
that the singer had become a member of a company already
formed. So in a case where all the acts proved and relied
on were equally consistent with the supposition of an
intention on the part of "the defendant to become a part-
ner in a trade or business to be afterward carried on, pro-
vided certain things were done, as with that of an existing
partnership, it was held that he was not a partner: Dickinson
vs. Valpg/, 10 B. & C. 128, 21 Eng. Com. Law 63, per PARKE, J.
And where a prospectus for a company was issued, to be con-
ducted pursuant to the terms of a deed to be drawn up, it was
held that an application for shares, and payment of the first
deposit, did not constitute one a partner who had not other-
wise interfered in the concern: F040 vs. Clifton, 6 Bing. 776,
19 Eng. Com. Law, 347. It was an important element in
that decision, that the deed was not executed by the defend-
ant who was sought to be charged as a partner. In
Howell vs. Brodie, 6 Bing. N. C. 44, 37 Eng. Com. Law
272, the defendant from 1829 until 1833 advanced various
sums, with a view to a partnership in a market about
to be erected; knew that-the money was applied toward the
erection, and was consulted in every stage. In October, 1833,
it was settled by a written agreement that he should have a
seventh share of it; but it was held that he was not liable as a
partner until October, 1833, although profits had been made
but not accounted for to him before that time. Lord C. J.
TINDAL mentions the fact that no account of profits was ren-
dered previous to October, 1833, as being in favor of the
defendant. ."
These cases sufiiciently illustrate and authorize the general
position taken by the defendants, that a mere agreeuu-nt to
constitute a partnership in futuro does not make the contract-
ing parties liable as partners. A partnership is a contract,



















































































































































ATKINS VS. HUNT. 51 
prospectus ·was issued, stating th1~ eonditions upon which 
the company was formed; that the concern was to be divided 
into twenty shares, to be under the management of a com-
mittee, and ten per cent of the subscriptions to be paid in 
by a certain date. It was held that this prospectus imported 
only tba!: a company was to be fornK•d, and not that it 
was actually formed, and that the signature to the pros-
pectus did not indicate to any person who should read it 
·that the svfa.er bad become a nwmber of a company alread.v 
formed. So in a case where all the acts pron>d and relied 
on were equally consistent with the suppoi~dtion of an 
intention on the part af the defendant to l><'l'ome a part-
ner in a trade or business to be afterward carried on, pro-
vided certain things were done, as with that of an existin~ 
partnership, it was held that he was not a partnC'r: llickinsmi 
vs. l'alpy, 10 B. & C. 128, 21 Eng. Com. Law fi3, per PAHKE, J. 
And where a proNpeetus for a company was h~sued, to be con-
ducted pursuant to the terms of n deed to be drawn up, it was 
held that an application for shares, and payment of the first 
deposit, did not constitute one a partner who had not other-
wise interfered in the con<~t>rn: Po;c ts. Clifton, 6 lling. 77(), 
19 Eng. Com. fatw. 347. It was an importnnt eh•ment in 
that decision, that the deed was not cxecuh.•d by the defend-
ant who was sought to be charged as a partner. In 
Howell vs. Brodie, G Bing. N. C. 44, 37 Eng. Com. Law 
272, the defendant from 182!) until 183:J advanced various 
sumR, with a view to a pnrtnership in a markt•t about 
to be erected; knew that ·the money was appJif'd toward Ow 
erection, and was commltl>d in <>n~r.v stage. In Odnber, lS:Ja. 
it was settled by a written agret•nwnt that he should have a 
seventh share of it; but it wns held that he was not liable as a 
partner until October, 1833. ~Hhough profits had he<~n mnde 
but not accounted for to him before thnt time. Lord C . . J. 
TINDAL mentions tlw fact thnt no account of profit~ wm~ 1·en-
dered previous to Oetober, 18:13, as being in fa rnr of the 
defendant. 
ThPse cases Emfficiently illustrate and authorize th<' genPral 
position taken by the defendants, that a m~re ngrP<'llll'JJt to 
constitute a pnrtnf'r1-1hip in f11t11ro dews not fn:lke th<> eontmct-
ing parties liable as partnc>rs. A pnrtiu•rship is a contract, 
imposing certain linblitit>s npon its membe1·s. \Vhetlwr par-
I
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ties have agreed that they will at some future time enter into
such'a contract, is a very different question from the one
whether the_v have actually entered into the contract. But we
are not called upon to make a critical examination of the
numerous cases on the subjeet_of partnership which fall within
one or the other of these categories, further than to recognize
their division into the two classes referred to. Our opinion is
that the defendants are clearly liable as partners, for the acts
of Cummings. There was an association doing business under
a certain name. The defendants signed the articles which con-
stituted this association. the defendants were subscribers, and
a by-law provided that each subscriber should become a part-
ner. The business of the company was to be done in pursu-
ance of a major vote of those present, and an agent was
appointed, who purchased goods for the use of the company.
Here, then, there was not simply an agreement that a partner-
ship should be formed a_t some future day, but an actual exist-
ing reality. a subscription to articles, making a present associa-
tion, and a by-law designating the subscribers as partners. A
right to participate in the profits of a joint concern is one of the
tests of a partnership, where a party has fulfilled all the con-
ditions incumbent on him to perform: Fox vs. Clifton, 6 Bing.
776, 19 Eng. Com. Law 233; s. c., 9 Bing. 115, 23 Eng. Com. Law
273, per T|.\'n.u., C. J. The defendants do not appear to have
failed in this regard, and upon this case they would certainly
be entitled to a share in the profits of the business. It is not
necessary that persons should hold themselves out to the world
as partners, in order to become liable in that capacity. That is
only one mode of charging them, and when that is done it dis-
penses with the ne('essit_v of proving that they actually signed
the articles of partnership. In this case, as the defendants
were partners in fact. the opinion of the Court is that there
should be judgment on the verdict.
Nora: As to contemplated partnerships, see Mechem's Elem. of Part.n.,
§ § 13-14, and cases there cited. '
As to when the contract takes effect, see Id. § 34 and cases cited: also
Karrick vs. Stevens, post, p. 55; Chester vs. Dickerson, ante p. 20.
















































































































































62 OASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
ties have agret>d that tht•_y will at some future time enter into 
such· a contract, is a ,·e1·y different question from the one 
whether the,v have actually ente1·ed into the contract. But we 
are nOt call(•d upon to make a critieal t•xamination of the 
numerous cases on the subject.of partnership which fall within 
one or the other of these categories, further than to recognize 
their dh·ision into the two classes referred to. Our opinion is 
that the defE>nrlants are clearly liable as partners, for the acts 
of Cummings. There was an association doing business under 
a certain name. '!'he defendants signed the articles which con-
stituted this association. the defendants were subscribers, and 
a by-law providt'd that each subscriber should become a part-
ner. The business of the company was to be done in pursu-
ance of a major Yote of those present, and an agent was 
appointed, who purt·hased goods for the use of the company. 
Here1 then, there wns not simply an agreement tlrnt a partner-
i;;hip should he formC'd ~t some future day, but an actual exist-
ing realit~·. a subscription to articles, making a pr<.>sent associa-
tion, and a b;v-law designating the subscribers as partners. A 
right to participate in the profits of a joint concern is one of the 
tests of a pm1nership, where a party bas fulfilled all tile con-
ditions incnmb('nt on him to perform: Fo~ vs. Clifton, 6 Bing. 
776, 19 Eng. Corn. I~aw 233; s. c., 9 Bing. 115, 23 Eng. Com. Law 
:t73, per T1.:\'n.u., C. J. The defendants do _not app<.>.ar to have 
failed in tbi8 r<.>gard, and upon this case they would certainly 
be entitled to a share in the profits of the business. It is not 
necessary that per~wns should hold tlwmselves out to the world 
as partrn•rs, in order to b<>('ome liable in that capacity. That is 
only onP mode of charging them, and when that is done it dis-
penses with the neeessity of proving that th<>y actually sign<.>d 
the articlE>s of partnership. Jn this case, as the d<>fendants 
were partnel's in faet, the opinion of the Court is that there 
should be judgment on the rcrdict. 
NoTE: As to contemplated partnerehipR, eee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., 
§ § 13-14, and cases there cited. · 
As to when the contract takes effect, see Id.§ 34 and cases cited: alao 
Kerrick ve. Stevens, pnst, p. 55; Chester vs. Dickerson, ante p. 20. 
See also Jacobs :vs. Shorey, post p.-. 
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SAILORS vs. NIXON-JONES PRINTING CO.
Appellate Court of Illinois, 1886.
' 20 Ill. App. 509.
Action by the Printing Company against Sailors, \"~Voodward
and Guibout; to recover for printing done for the "Union Mer-
cantile A gency,” under which name it was alleged that defend-
ants were partncrs. Each of defendants owned an interest in
certain books and business of a. commercial agency. and on
January 2, 1885, they agreed to unite their interests as a part-
nership under the name of Union Mercantile Agency. It was
agreed, however, that for two years Sailors was to be relieved
from any participation in the business, and during that time he
was neither to share in the management nor in the profits or
losses of the business. At the expiration of that time, he was
to take an active part. In May, 1885, Guibout ordered the
printing for which the action was brought. Guibout, in his
deposition, testified that he told the plaintiff when the order
was given that the firm consisted of himself, \\'oodward and
Sailors. He also testified that he told Sailors of the order and
that the latter agreed to help pay. This Sailors denied. No
participation by Sailors in the business was shown. Judgment
for plaintiff, and Sailors appealed.
J. D. Hubbard, for appellant;
Flower, Remy cfi Gregory, for appellee.
Moium, J. The contract of January 2, 1895, between \\'ood-
ward and Guibout and appellant, did not constitute appellant
a partner in the business which \\'o0dward and Guibout were
to conduct in St. Louis. True, the word “partnership” is used
to designate the relation of the parties, but the whole agree-
ment shows plainly that Sailors was a joint owner merelv,
and that the business was to be conducted wholly by the
others, and they were to have the entire profits accruing, and
bear all losses that might happen in running the business, till,
at the end of two years, Sailors was to come into a partici-
pation of the business, and thereafter share the profits and
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SAILORS vs. NIXOX-.JO~ER PHl~TI~G CO. 
Appellate Court of Illinois, 1886. 
' 20 Ill • .App. 50J}. 
Action by the Prfoting Company against Sailors, Woodward 
nnd Guibout; to recover for printing done for the "Cnion .l\ler-
cantile Agency," under which name it was alleged that defend-
ants were partners. Each of defendants owned an inte1·est in 
certain books and busi1w~s of a commercial agl·nc.r~ and on 
Janunry 2, 1885, they agret>d to unite their interests as a part-
nerl'lhip under the name of rnion ~lercantile Agency. It was 
. agreed, howe\·er, that for two years ~ail ors was to be relieved 
from any partieipation in the business, and during that time he 
was neither to shm·e in the managemE'nt nor in the profits or 
losses of the busilwss. At the expiration of that time, he was 
to take an aetive part. In ~fa.v, 1885, Uuibout ordned the 
printing for whieh the action was brought. Guibout, in his 
deposition, h•stified that he told the plaintiff when the order 
was given that the firm eonsisted of himself, \\'oo<lward urn] 
fiailors. He a hm tef'!titit•d that he told Hail ors of the order and 
t!iat the latter agreed to help pay. 'rhis 8ailors denied. No 
participation by Sailors in the business was shown. Judgment 
for plaintiff, and Sailors appealed. 
J. D . Hubbard, for appe11ant; 
Floircr, Remy cf Gregory, for appellee. 
Mo1u~, J. The contract of January::!, 1885, betwN•n "'ood-
ward and Guibout and appt>llant, did not com;titute ap1wllant 
a partner in the business whit-h Woodward and Guibout we1·e 
to conduct in St. Louis. True, the word "partnership" is used 
to designate the relation of thf' parties, but the whole agree-
ment shows plainly that Sailors was a joint owner mere)~·. 
and that the business was to be ronduded wholly by tlw 
others, and they were to have the entire profits a<'cruing-, and 
bear all losses that might happen in running the businesf'!, till, 
at the end of two ye~rs, Sailors was to come into a partici-
pation of the business, and thereafter share the profits and 
loHes of the business that should be done. It was a <'ontract 




which bound appellant to become a partner at the end of
two years, but such contract would not make him- liable for
debts contracted before his relation as partner commenced.
The agreement is very explicit that he shall not share the
profits nor be liable for the losses. He retained only his one-
third ownership in the books and good-will of the business,
and had no control over its management and no right beyond
seeing to the preservation of the property. The fact that the
parties to such relation themselves call it a partnership will
not make it so. ¥Vhere the question~of partnership is to be
determined from a contract between the parties to it, the rela-
tion must be found from the terms and provisions of the con-
tract, and even though parties intend to become partners, yet
if they so frame the terms and provisions of their contract as
to leave them without any com-munity of interest in the busi-
ness or profits, they are not partners either in fact or in law:
Parsons on Partnership, 91. A partnership inter se must result
from the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract,
and they cannot be made to assume toward each other a rela-
tion which they have expressly contracted not to assume. The
terms of the agreement, where there is one, flx the real status
of the parties toward each other.
If there is no agreement, then if they deal with each other
as partners, sharing losses and profits, their interest will be
gathered from their acts, and they will be partners inter se.
Gollyer on Partnership, § 2 and note. A mere community
of interest in property will not make the owners partners.
There must be an agreement for a joint v "ture and to share
profits and losses; and in the absence of such a. mutual agree-
ment they are mere tenants in common of the property and
the act of one will not bind the other: Chase vs. Barrett, 4
Paige (N. Y.) 148; Niehofl‘ vs. Dudley, 40 Ill. 406; Smith vs.
K-night, 71 Ill. 149, 22 Am. Rep. 94. 7
As the contract did not make appellant a partner, he could
only be held on the ground that he had held himself out as
one, or authorized or assented to his being so held out. Nixon
says that he knew appellant was a partner when the books
were ordered, but he does not state how he knew it, and it may
well be inferred that he only knew from what Guibout told
him at the time the books were ordered. The question

















































































































































CASBS ON PARTNEKSHIP. 
whish bound appellant to become a partner at the end of 
two year~, but such contract would not make him liable for 
debts contracted before his relation as partner commenced. 
'rhe agreement is very explicit that he shall not share the 
profits nor be liable for the losses. He retained only his one-
third ownership in the books and good-will of the business, 
and had no control oYer its management and no right beyond 
seeing to the preservation of the property. The fact that the 
parties to such relation themselves call it a partnership will 
not make it so. 'Where the question· of par·tnersbip is to be 
· : determined from a contract between the parties to it, the rela· 
~ , tion must be found from the terms and provisions of the ron-
( tract, and even though parties intend to become partners, yet 
/ if they so frame the terms and provisions of their contract as 
< to leave them without any community of interest in the busi-
. ness or profits, they are not partners either in fact or in Ia w: 
Parsons on Partnership, 91. A partnership inter se must .ret)ult 
from the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract, 
and they cannot be made to assume toward each other a rela-
tion which they have expressly contracted not to assume. The 
terms of the agreement, where there is one, fix the real status 
of the parties toward each other. 
If there is no agreement, then if they deal with each other 
as partners, sharing losses and profits, their interest will be 
gathered from their acts, and they will be partners inte1· se. 
Collyer on Partnership, § 2 and note. A mere community 
of interest in property will not make the owners partners. 
There must be an agreement for a joint v -, tore and to share 
profits and losses; and in the absence of such a mutual agree-
ment they are mere tenants in common of the property and 
the act of one will not bind the other: Chase vs. Barrett, 4 
Paige (N. Y.) 148; Niehoff vs. Dudley, 40 Ill. 406; Smith vs. 
·Knight, 71 Ill. 149, 22 Am. Rep. 94. 
As the contract did n-0t make appellant a partner, he could 
only be held on the ground that he had held himself out as 
one, or authorized or assented to his being so held out. Nixon 
says that he knew appellant was a partner when the books 
were ordered, but be does not state how he knew it, and it may 
well be inferred that he only knew from what Guibout told 
him at the time the books were ordered. The question 
whether the appellant bad been, with bis consent, held out as 
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a partner to the plaintifl’, was one of fact for the jury; and it
was important that in determining that question the jury
should be Confined to whatever competent testimony was
before them. The statement in Guibout’sdeposition that he told
Nixon that appellant wasone of the firm without proof that
appellant authorized the statement, wasincompetent, and in
view of all the evidence in the case was calculated to mislead
the jury. A party has a right to insist that irrelevant and
incompetent testimony shall be excluded. Incompetent testi-
mony in a deposition, though not objected to when the deposi-
tion is taken, may be objected to on the trial. The objection
is not as to mere form, it is substantial: Cooke vs. Ornc, 37 Ill.
186; Lockwood vs. Mills, 39 Ill. 602.
Nor did appellant lose his right to have the evidence
excluded by failing to object to it when read from the deposi-
tion. When incompetent testimony gets into the case in the
shape of depositions or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court,
when required, at any stage of the trial, to exclude it or direct
the jury to disregard it: Pittman vs. Gaty, 5 Gilm. 186; Gweenup
1:8. Stoker, 2 Gilm. 688; Wickenakamp vs. Wickenkamp, 77 Ill. 92.
The refusal of the Court to exclude the evidence on appel-
lant’s motion was material error, and, while we are much
inclined to the opinion that there was no legal evidence before
the jury to support a verdict that appellant was jointly liable,
still we prefer to rest the reversal on the error above specified,
and remand the case for such further action as the parties may
desire to take. ’
Reversed and remanded.
Non: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 41. /
./7' ~.-.
_ ._.. .,r _
; , <'_-1"e.Q or \_
mi 3 -iwenslrv Oi]
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KERRICK vs. STEVENS. %*l9A/ .
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884. -
55 Mich. 167; 20 N. W. Rep. 888.
Action by Kerrick against Stevens, Riches and McCormick,
of whom Stevens alone defended.
Judgment below for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

















































































































































KERBICK VS. STEVENS. 65 
a partner to the plaintiff, was one of fact for the jury; and it 
was important that in determining that question the jm·y 
should be confined to whatever competent testimony was 
before them. The statement in Guibout'sdeposition that he told 
·Nixon that appellant was . one of the firm without proof that 
appellant authorized the statement, was incompetent, and in 
view of all the evidence in the case was calculated to mislead 
the jury. A party has a right to insist that irrelevant and 
incompetent testimony shall be excluded. Incompetent testi-
mony in a deposition, though not objected to when the deposi-
tion is taken, may be objected to on the trial. The objection 
is not as to mere form, it is substantial: Cooke vs. Orne, 37 Ill. 
186; Lockwood vs. Mills, 39 Ill. 602. 
Nor did appellant lose bis right to have the evidence 
excluded by failing to object to it when read from the deposi- ,. 
tion. When incompetent testimony gets into the case in the 
shape of depositions or otherwise, it is the duty of the Court, 
when required, at any stage of the trial~ to exclude it or direct 
the jury to disregard it: Pittman vs. Gaty, 5 Gilm. 186; Green rtp 
vs. Stoker, 2 Gilm. 688; Wickenkamp vs. Wickenlwmp, 77 Ill. U:!. 
The refusal of the Court to exclude the evidence on appel-
lant's motion was material error, and, while we are much 
inclined to the opinion that there was no legal eyidence before 
the jury to support a verdict that appellant was jointly liable, 
still we prefer to rest the reversal on the error above specified, 
and remand the case for such further action as the parties may 
'" desire to take. ' 
Reversed and remanded. j , 
, <... 
NOT&: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 41. 
KERRICK vs. S'fEVENS. 
Supreme Oourt of Michigan, 1884. 
IS5 Mich. 167; 20 N. W. Rep. 888. 
Action by Kerrick against Stevens, Riches and McCormick, 
of whom Stevens alone defended. 
Judgment below for the defendants, and plaintiff appeals. · 
The opinion states the facts. 
56 Oxsss on PARTNERSHIP.
N. O. Griswold, for plaintiff.
T. R. Shields and J. C.‘Shields, for defendants.
CAMPBELL, J. Defendants were sued as partners for a debt
incurred by the firm for machinery furnished by plaintiff for
a factory in Hastings. Minnesota. Under the charge of the
court below a verdict was rendered for defendants, which
depended on a denial of the existence of any partnership
liability against Stevens. On the first of March, 1882, the
defendants entered into articles which recited the ownership
by Riches of a patent for folding ladders, in which he agreed
to give the others each one-third interest in Minnesota. Stevens
agreed to furnish $5,000 for the purpose of putting up a fac-
tory in Hastings, and buying machinery and material. and was
not to do any work in the factory unless he chose. Riches was
to assist in putting up and setting in order the factory and
machinery, and McCormick to attend to sales and manufac-
ture. VVhen the factory was completed they were all to be
equal partners. As soon as this was signed the parties began
operations, and bought machinery and property for the pur-
pose of the manufacture, and Riches moved to Hastings from
Michigan for that object. In the latter part of May, or early
in June, Stevens went there, and spent some weeks, as it is
claimed, in looking after the business. He did not furnish
the full amount which he agreed to.
The notes in suit were given for machinery purchased for
the business and put up in the factory, which wasnearly ready
for use. There was testimony that during his visit at Hastings
Stevens was introduced as at partner, said he was a partner,
and acted as a_partner, going twice with one of the witnesses
to St. Paul to purchase property which was in Hastings, as
a site for the factory, and requested the same witness to keep
an eye on the operations of the other partners and report to
him. In October, 1882. being written to on behalf of plaintiff
for payment of this claim, he wrote back a letter treating the
matter as a liability of the partnership, urging plaintiff to take
back the machinery, and promising to arrange the balance sat-
isfactorily. Evidence was also given that Stevens, on the
thirty-first day of July, 1882, sent out various notices that he
would not be liable for any future debts. Defendant was
















































































































































66 CASES O:N PARTNERSHIP. 
N. 0. Grisrcold, for plaintiff. 
T. R. Shields and J. 0. · Shi~lds, for defendants. 
CAMPBEI.J,, J. Defendants were sued aR partners for a debt 
incurred by the firm for machinery furniMhed by plaintiff for 
a factory in Hastings, Minnesota. Under the charge of th~ 
court below a verdict was rendPJ'('d for defendants, which 
depended on a denial of t11e existPn(·e of any partnership 
liability against Stevens. On the first of }larch, 1882, the 
defendants entered into artidPs whieh rt•cited the ownership 
by Riches of a patent for folding lnddt'rs, in whil·h he agrPed 
to give the otherR t'ach one-third interest in Minnesota. Stevens 
agreed to furnish f:l,000 for the purpose of puttin~ up n fac-
tory in HaRtings~ and bu;ring ma('hin<>ry and material. and was 
not to do any work in the factory unl(>RS he chose. Hkhes was 
to assist in putting 11}) and SPtting in oraer the factory an<l 
machine1·y, and l\IcCormkk to attend to sales and manufac-
ture. 'Vhen the factory was compl(•tt'd the.v were all to be 
equal partners. As soon as this was signed the parties began 
operations, and bought machinery and property for the pur-
pose of the manufacture, and Riches mo,·cd to Hastings from 
Michigan for that object. In the latter part of May, or early 
iu June, Stevens went ther<>, and spent some weeks, as it is 
claimed, in looking after the business. He did not furnish 
the full amount which he agrePd to. 
The n-0tes in suit were givPn for mn<'hinery purchased for 
the business and put up in the factory, which was.nearly ready 
for use. There was testimony that during his visit at Hastings 
Stevens was introduced as a pm·tner, said he was a partner, 
and acted as a.. partner, going twice with one of the witnesses 
to St. Paul .to purchase pro1~rty whlch was in Hastings, as 
a site for the factory, and requested the same witness to keep 
an eye on the operations of the other partners and report to 
him. In Octobl'r, 1882, being written to on behalf of plaintiff 
·for payment qf this claim, he wrote back a Jetter treating the 
matter as a liability of the partnership, urging plaintiff to take 
back the machinery, and promising to arrange the balance sat-
isfactorily. Evidence was also given that Stevens, on thP 
thirty-first day of July, 1882, sent out various notices that he 
would not be liable for any future debts. Defendant was 
allowed to introduce some talk after the contract was 
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executed, to the effect that the partnership was not to com-
mence until after the factory was finished. But it was not
claimed that this was for the purpose of changing the agree-
ment. but only to construe it; and Mrs. Stevens spoke of this
as being said both before and after, on the same day.
There are several questions raised on the charges, but one
is sufiicient to decide the case. The court charged that the
written contract did not make the parties partners, but only
provided for a future partnership after the factory should
be put in operation. YVe think it created a partnership from
the beginning. 'It contemplated action to be taken at once
and continuously for the joint benefit.‘ Stevens was to fur-
nish the money in advance, and Riches was to give his time
and attention to putting up the factory and machinery. These
were the capital of the firm to enable it to get into prosperous
operation. It would be an anomaly to have capital paid in
and expended without any partnership existing, and without
any provision for future emergencies or failures. The purpose
must be derived from the nature of the agreement, and not
I from the technical meaning of words as present or future,
standing alone. It was quite proper to use future words as
to the interest to be owned in future property, but this will
not do away with the necessary inference to be drawn from
the immediate action of parties and expenditure of time and
money in such a way as to be practically lost in case of there
being no partnership carried out. \Ve- think the partnership
began at once.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
N own: Compare with preceding cases. /
DURYEA vs. YVHITCOMB.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1858.
31 Vt. 395.
This was an action at law brought by A. & W. E. Duryea
/
0
against Whitcomb, to recover what plaintiffs claimed to be

















































































































































DURYEA. VS. WHITCOHB. 67 
executed, to the effect that the partnership was not to com-
mence until after the factory was finished. But it was not 
claimed that this was for the purpose of changing the agree-
ment, but only to construe it; and Mrs. Stevens spoke of this 
as being said both before and after, on the same day. 
There are several questions raised on the charges, but one 
is sufficient to decide the case. The court charged that the 
written contract did not make the parties partners, but only 
provided for a future partnership after the factory should 
be put in operation. TI'e think it created a partnership from 
the beginning. 1It contemplated action to be taken at once 
and continuously for the joint benefit.. Stevens was to fur-
nish the money in adYance, and Riches was to give his time 
and attention to putting up the factory and machinery. These 
were the capital of the firm to enable it to get into prosperous 
operation. It would be an anomaly to have capital paid in 
and expended without any partnership existing, and without 
any p1·ovision for future emergencies or failures. The purpose 
must he derived from the nature of the agreement, and not 
1 from the technical meaning of words as present or future, 
standing alone. It was quite proper to use future words as 
to the interest to be owned in future property, but this will 
not do away with the necessary inference to be drawn from 
the immediate action of parties and expenditure of time and 
money in suC"h a way as to be practically lost in case of there 
being no partnership carried out. "'e. think the partnersh.ip 
began at once. 
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted. 
The other justices concurred. 
NO'D:: Compare with preceding Case9. 
DURYEA vs. 'VHITCOMB. 
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1858. 
81 Vt. 895. 
This waB an action at law brought by A. & W . E. Duryea 
against Whitcomb, to recover what plaintiffs claimed to be 
their share of a joint enterprise entered into by plaintiffs, 
8 
58 Cssas ox PARTNERSHIP.
defendant and one Lewis. Plaintiffs and Lewis resided in New
York city and Whitcomb in Vermont. The agreement was
that Whitcomb should, on the joint account, buy potatoes in
Vermont and New Hampshire, to be sent to New York and
other markets. Whitcomb was to have a fixed price per bushel
for buying, and the net profits were to be divided in accordance
with the contributions of the parties. The auditor who heard
the case found defendant indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of
$845.45. Defendant claimed that the arrangement constituted
a partnership, and that therefore the aifairs could not be
adjusted in this form of action. The auditor found that the
parties said nothing about partnership and that neither of the
parties supposed they were forming a partnership or intended
to form one. Defendant appealed.
' 0'. 0'. Dewey, and A. Underwood, for defendant.
A. M. Dickey and G. B. Leslie, for plaintifls.
Anms, J. As this is a case where the rights’ of the partners
inter so merely are concerned, where no question as to third
persons is involved, the criterion to determine whether the
contract is one of partnership or not, must be, what did the
parties intend by the contract which they made as between
themselves?
If we regard the agreement itself, as set forth in the audi-
tor’s report, it is clearly a partnership. The agreement was
verbal, but by the finding of the auditor may be considered as
in writing at this time. Giving to the contract, as stated in
the report, the same construction that we should to articles in
writing of the same tenor, it appears to us to have every ingre-
dient of a partnership.
The parties all furnish a share of the capital, Whitcomb one-
half, Lewis one-quarter, the Durycas one-quarter. They jointly
own the property when purchased. It is purchased in order
to be sold again for their joint and mutual benefit, thereby
negating the idea of separate control and disposition of their
interests in the property purchased, and of separate interests
in the proceed. Each is to share in the final profit or loss;
at the close of the season the profits or losses are to be divided,
to Whitcomb one-half, to Lewis a quarter, to the plaintiffs a
quarter. Each is to aid in selling. and to contribute his aid,
















































































































































~8 OASES ON p A.RTX ERSHIP. 
defendant and one Lewis. Plaintiffs and Lewis resided In New 
York city and Whitcomb in Vermont. The agreement was 
that Whitc<>mb should, on the joint account, buy potatoes in 
Vermont and New Hampshire, to be sent to New Y<>rk and 
other markets. \Vhikomb was to have a fixed price per bushel 
for buying, and the net profits were to be divided in accordancP 
with the contributions of the parties. The auditor who heard 
the case found defendant indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of 
is45.45. Defendant claimed that the arrangement constituted 
a partnership, and that therefore the affairs could not be 
adjusted in this form of action. The auditor found that the 
parties said nothing about partnership and that neither of the 
parties supposed they were forming a partnership or intended 
to form one. Defendant appealed. 
· O. C. Dewey, and A. Undencood, for defendant. 
A.. JI. Dickey and C. B. Leslie, for plaintiffs. 
ALDIS, J. As this is a case where the rights of the partners 
inter se merely are concerned, where no question as to third 
persons is involved, the criterion to determine whether the 
eontract is one of partnership or not, must be, what did the 
, parties intend by the contract which they made as between 
themselves? 
l 
If we regard the agreement itself, as set forth in the audi-
tor's report, it is clearly a partnership. The agreement was 
verbal, but by the finding of the auditor may be considered as 
in writing at this time. Giving to the contract, as stated in 
the report, the same construction that we should to articles in 
writing of the same tenor, it appears to ns to have every ingre-
dient of a partnership. 
The parties all furnish a share of the capital, Whitcomb one-
half, Lewis one-quarter, the Duryeas one-quarter. They jointly 
own the property when purchased. It is purchased in order 
to be sold again for their joint and mutual benefit, thereby 
negating the idea of separate control and disposition of their 
interests in the property purchased, and of separate interests 
in the proceeds. Each is to share in the final profit or loss; 
at the close of the season the profits or losses are to be divided, 
to Whitcomb one-half, t<> Lewis a quarter, to the plaintiffs a 
quarter. Each is to aid in selling. and to contribute his ~d, 
~kill, and knowledge to get the highest price. 
Y
Dumas vs. W nircons. 59
The case of Gwiflith vs. Bufium, 22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec.
64 (post, p.——), where the defendants were held to be partners
as between themselves, is not so strong to show a partnership
as this; for there the agreement to share in the losses seems
to have been implied, whilst here it is expressed.
The fact that each was to be accountable for his own sales,
amounts only to this, that each should sell for cash; if either
did not, he was to be accountable for his sale as cash. The
proceeds of the sales by each would belong to them jointly, not
severally. This provision is as consistent with an agreement
for a partnership as with any other: Noyes vs. C-ushman, 25
Vt. 390. So that Whitcomb was to have the control of the
potatoes, and to run them to the best market, taking the
advice of Lewis‘ and the Duryeas on the subject, is, when we
consider where the parties resided, where the potatoes were to
be bought, and to what markets they might be sent, and that
Whitcomb was to buy them, as consistent with a contract of
partnership as with any other. £-
I. This agreement does not belong to the class of cases
where the parties are jointly interested in certain proportions
in the property purchased, but not in the final profits or losses;
where each of the part owners has the power of separate dis-
position of his interest. Such is the case of Coope vs. Eyre, 1
H. Bl. 37 (post, p. 64), a leading illustration of the class.
II. It is not of the class where a party receives a portion of
the profits as a compensation for his labor as an agent or
servant. Each furnished a portion of the capital, each was at
part owner of the property when purchased, and of the pro-
eeeds when sold. Neither could be said to be the servant or
agent of the other. An -agent who receives a share of the
profit as a compensation for his services, is not expected to
share in losses; if there are no profits he loses his labor or
wages, but he loses no more, though there are further losses to
be borne by the partners.
Of this class is Kellogg vs. Griswold, 12 Vt. 291; and Mason
vs. Potter, 26 Vt. T 22.
III. Nor is it a case where a share of the gross or net earn-
ings is to be paid as a compensation for the use of capital, or
as rent; and where the party receiving such compensation has
no interests in the business, the property and the proceeds, but
















































































































































DURYEA. VS. \VHITCOllB. 59 
The case of Griffith vs. Buffum., 22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 
6.J: (post, p.--), where the defendants were held to be partners 
as between themselves, is not so strong to show a partnership 
as this; for there the agreement to share in the losses seems 
to have been implied, whilst here it is expressed. 
The fact that each was to be accountable for his own sales, 
amounts only to this, that each should sell for cash; if either 
did not, he was to be accountable for his sale as cash. The 
proceeds of the sales by each wou1d belong to them jointly, not 
severally. This provision is as consistent with an agreement 
for a partnership as with any other: Noyes vs. Cushman, 25 
Vt. 390. So that "rhitcomb was to have the control of the 
potatoes, and to run them to the best market, taking the 
advice of Lewie· and the Duryeas on the subject, is, when we 
consider where the parties resided, where the potatoes were to 
be bought, and to what markets they might be sent, and that 
Whitcomb was to buy them, as consistent with a contract Qf 
partnership as with any other. 
I. This agreement does not belong to the claBS of cases 
where the parties are jointly interested in certain proportions 
in the propertl purchased, but not in the final profits or losseg; 
where each of the part owners has the power of separate dis-
position of his inteN'st. Such is the case of Coope vs. Eyre, l 
H. Bl. 37 (post, p. 64), a leading illustration of the ~lass. 
II. It is not of the class where a party receives a portion or 
the profits as a compensation for bis labor as an agent 01· 
servant. Each furnished a portion of the capital, each was a 
part owner of the property when purchased, and of the pro-
ceeds when sold. ~either could be said to be the servant or 
agent of the other. An ·agent who receives a share of thP 
profits as a compensation for his services, is not expected to 
share in losses; if there are no profits he loses his labor or 
wages, but he loses no more, though there are further losses to 
be borne by the partners. 
Of this class is Kello,qg fi8. Gri.srrold, 12 Vt. 291; and Mason 
f1B. Potter, 2fl Vt. i22. 
III. Nor is it a ciuw where a share of the gross or net earn-
ings is to be paid as a compensation for the use of capital, or 
as rent; and where the party receiving such compensation bas 
no interests in the business, the property and the proceeds, but 
only a right of action against the other parties. Here the 
60 Cssss on PA itrxsasiil P.
I
parties jointly contributed capital, labor, and skill, were joint
owners of the property from the time of its purchase till the
final division of profits or loss. No severance of their interests
could be had, no ascertainment of their respective shares or
interests could be made till a final accounting. They must
have relied on the property and its proceed to secure to each
his final share, no matter by whom the property might be sold,
or its proceeds held.
Hence the cases of Tobias vs. Blin, 21 Vt. 544; Bowman vs.
Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Ambler vs. Bradley, 6 Vt. 119, do not
apply. Of the same class are Denny rs. Cabot, 6 Met. (Mass)
92; Holmes vs. The Old Colony R. R. 00., 5 Gray (Mass.) 58;
Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, and various
other cases cited by counsel.
1t is said, however, that the auditor finds that the pa.rties did
not intend to form a partnership, and that such intention must
govern.
It is with contracts of partnership as with all other con-
tracts, that as between the parties to them their intention
must govern. Hence an express stipulation in a contract that
the parties thereto shall not thereby become partners, is bind-
ing and of great significance in giving construction to the
instrument, especially if the terms are doubtful or susceptible
of more than one meaning.
1. It is to be noted that in this case there was no such
express stipulation. The auditor's report says, “at the time
of the arrangement in New York, August 20, 1854, nothing
was said about a partnership, and neither of the parties at
that time supposed they were forming a partnership, or
intended to form a partnership.” As nothing was said about
a partnership, the parties could not have stipulated that their
contract should not create one.
2. The report states what was the arrangement of August
20, 1854. That was a contract for a partnership. If their con-
tract was for a partnership by necessary legal construction
(which we have found that it was), and they intended to- make
the contract (and this appears from the report), the legal efl’ect
of their contract could not be varied by their not supposing it
to be what it was. The further statement in the report that
they did not intend to form a partnership seems inconsistent
















































































































































60 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
parties jointly contributed capital, labor, and skill, were joint 
owners of the P.roperty from the time of its purchase till the 
final division of profits or loss. No severance of their interests 
icould be had, no ascertainment of their i·espectlve shares or 
interests could be made till a final accounting. They must 
have relied on the property and its proceeds to secure to each 
his final share, no matter by whom the property might be sold, 
or its proceeds held. 
Hence the cases of Tobias 11s. Blin, 21 Vt. 544; Bowman -vs. 
Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Ambler -rs. Bradley, 6 Vt. 119, do not 
apply. Of the same class are Den1111 t·s. Cabot, 6 Met. (l\Iass.) 
92; Holmes vs. The Old Colo1111 R. R. Co., 5 Gray (Mass.) 58; 
Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, and various 
other cases cited by coµnsel. 
It is said, however, that the auditor finds that the parties did 
not intend to form a partnership, and that such intention must 
gcvern. 
It is with contracts of partnership as with all other con-
tracts, that as between the parties to them their intention 
must govern. Hence an express stipulation in a contract that 
the parties thereto shall not thereby become partners, is bind-
ing and of great significance in giving construction to the 
instrument, especially if the terms are doubtful or susceptible 
of ltlore than one meaning. 
1. It is to be noted that in this case there was no snch 
expres!'I stipulation. The auditor's report says, "at the time 
of the arrangement in New York, August 20, 1854, nothing 
was said about a partnership, and neither of the parties at 
that time supposed they were form!ng a partnership, or 
intended to form a partnership." As nothing was said about 
a partnership, the parties could not have stipulated that their 
contract should not create one. 
2. The report states what was the arrangement of August 
20, 1854. That was a contract for a partnership. If their con-
tract was for a partnership by necessary legal construction 
(which we have found that it was), and they intended to make 
the contract (and this appears from the report), the legal effect 
of their contract oould not be varied by their not supposing it 
to be what it was. The further statement in the report that 
they did not intend to form a partnership seems inconsistent 
with the other facts. One is at a loss to perceive how tht~ 
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auditor could discover such an intention when nothing was
said about a partnership, and when the contract, which they
made, was a partnership. Probably the fair construction of
the report is that the parties were not aware of the legal
extent and obligation of the contract into which they entered.
As the contract imports a partnership, we must hold, in the
absence of any express stipulation and of any other circum-
stances to show the contrary, that they intended to create the
relation which the contract expresses.
IV. The action is book account. The accounts presented
for adjustment are all partnership accounts. None of them
are properly chargeable on book. The case of Green vs. Chap-
man-, 27 Vt. 236, has settled the construction of the statute
of November 18, 1852, viz.: that where there are no items
properly chargeable on book, the action of book account will
not lie for the adjustment of other ite_ms proper for the action
of account. .
The result is that the judgment of the county court is
reversed and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover
his costs.
Norm: See Mechem’s Elem. of Pa:-tn., § 43, as to the etfect of contracts.
See also Jacobs vs. Shorey, post, p. -—.
\_ 7
. _. _’,/)_




King's Bench, Easter Term, 1775.
2 VVID. Bl. 998.
Assuursrr for goods sold and delivered. Motion for new
trial after a verdict for the defendant. '
This was an action brought against Smith alone as a secret
partner with one Robinson, to whom the goods were delivered,























































































































































GRACE vs. SMITH. 61 
auditor could discover such an intention when nothing was 
snid about a partnership, and when the contract, which they 
made, was a partnership. Probably the fair construction of 
the report is that the parties were not aware of the legal 
extent and obligatioq of the contract into which they entered. i. 
As the contract imports a partnership, we must hold, in the ) 
absence of any exprPss stipulation and of an.Y other circum- ' 
E-tances to show the contrary, that they intended to create the 
r·elation which the contract expresses. 
IV. The action is book account. The accounts presented 
for adjustment are all partnership accounts. None of t!iem 
are properly chargeable on book. The ease of Green t:s. (!hap-
man, 27 Vt. 236, has settled the construction of the statute 
of November 18, 185~, viz.: that where there ai·e no items 
properly chargeable on book, the action of book account will 
uot lie for the adjustment of other ite.ms proper for the action 
of account .. 
'l'he result is that the judgment of the county court is 
r<'versed and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover 
his costs. 
NO'l's: See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., § (3, as to the e1fect of contracts. 
Bee also Jacobs vs. Shorey, po11t, p. -. 
• 
! 
S. Of their Effect in C1·eating Partnership. 
GR.\CE YS. ~)IITH. 
King's Bench, Easter 'l'crm, .1715. 
2 Wm. Bl. O!l8. 
AssuMPSIT for goocls soJd and delin•red. ~lotion for new 
trial after a wrdict fo1· the defC'ndant. 
This was an action brought against ~mith nlone afol a st>eret 
partner with one Robinson, to whom the goods wl:'re ch•lin•1·pd, 
and who became bankrupt in 1770. On the :mth of March, 
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1767, Smith and Robinson entered into partnership for seven
years, but in the November afterward, some disputes arising,
they agreed to dissolve the partnership. The articles were
not cancelled, but the dissolution was open and notorious, and
was notified to the public on the 17th of November. 1767. The
terms of the dissolution were that all the stock in trade and
debts due to the partnership should be carried to the account
of Robinson only. Sm-ith was to have back £4,200 which he
brought into the trade, and £1,000 for the profits then accrued
since the commencement of the partnership; that Smith was to
lend Robinson £4,000, part of this £5,200, or let it remain in
his hands for seven years at five per cent interest, and an
annuity of £300 per annum, for the same seven years. For
all which Robinson gave bond to Smith. In June, 1768, Rob-
inson advanced to Smith £600 for two years’ payment of the
annuity and other sums by way of interest, and gratuities, and
other large sums at different times, to enable him to pay the
partnership debts, Smith having agreed to receive all that
was due to the partnership, and to pay its debts, but at the
hazard of Robinson. On the 1st of August, 1768, the demands
of Smith were all liquidated and consolidated into one, viz.,
£5,200 due to hin1- on the dissolution of the partnership, £1,500
for the remaining five years,of the annuity, and £300 for
Smith’s share of a ship; in all £7,000, for which Robinson gave
a bond to Smith. On the 22d of August, 1769, an assignment
was made of all Robinson‘s effects to secure the balance then
due to Smith, which was stated to be £10,000. Soon after the
commission was awarded. ._.
Davy, for the plaintifl’, insisted that the agreement between Robinson
and Smith was either a secret continuance of the old partnership, or asecreta
commencement of a new one, being for the retiring partner to leave his money
in the visible partner’s hands, in order to carry on his trade, and no receive
for it twelve and a half per cent profit, which could not be fairly done unless
it be understood to arise from the profits of the trade; and that he ought
therefore to be considered as a secret partner. And he relied much on the case
of Bloxham do Fourdrinier against Pell & Brooke, tried at the same sittings
(7th of March, 1775) before Lord MANSFIELD in the King’s Bench, as in point.
“ This was also a partnership for seven years between Brooke &: Pell; but
at the end of one year agreed to be dissolved, but; no express dissolution
was had. The agreement recited that Brooke being desirous to have
the profits of the trade to himself, and Pell being desirous to relinquish his
right to the trade and profits, it was agreed that Brooke should give Pell
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1767, Smith and Robinson entered into partn<>1·ship for seven 
years, but in the November afterward, some disputf':. arising, 
they agreed to dissolve the partnership. The articles were 
not cancelled, but the di1n~olution was open and notorious, and 
was notified to the public on th<' 17th of Nonmb<•r. l7G7. The 
terms of the dissolution were that all the stock in trade and 
debts due to the partnership Should be <'lll'l'ied to the Ht'C'OUnt 
of Robinson only. Smith was to have back £4,200 which he 
brougllt into the trade1 and £1,000 for tlw profitl'I tlwn accruf'<l 
since the commencement of the partnership; that Rmitb was to 
lend Robinson £4,000, part of this £5,200, 01· Jet it remain in 
his hands for seven years at five per cc>nt interest, and an 
annuity of £:JOO per annum, for the same seven years. For 
all which Robinson gave bond to Smith. In ,Tun<', 17f)8, Rob-
inson advanced to Smith £600 for two years' payment of the 
annuity and other sums by way of interest, and gratuiti~, and 
other large sums at different times, to enable him to pay the 
partnership debts, Smith having agreed to receive all that 
wa.s due to the partnership, and to pay its debts, but at the 
hazard of Robinson. On the 1st of August~ 1768, the demands 
of Rmith were all liquidated and cons.olidated into one, viz., 
£5,200 due to him on the dissolution of the partnership, £1,500 
for the remaining five ;rears., of the annuity, and £300 for 
Smith's share of a ~hip; in all £7,000, for which Robinnon ga\'P 
a bond to Hmith. On the :!2d of August, 1769, an assignment 
was made of all Hobinson's Pffects to secure the balance then 
due to Smith, which was i;1tated to be £10,000. Soon after the 
commission was awarded. 
Dat'1J, for the plaintiff, insisted that the agreement between Robinson 
and Smith was either a eecret continuance of the old partnership, or a secret 
oommenoement of a new one, bf ing for the retiring partner to leave his money 
in the visible partner's hands, in order to carry on hie trade, and to receive 
for it twelve and a half per cent profit, which could not be fairly done unleSG 
it be understood to arise from the profits of the trade; and that be ought 
therefore to be considered as a secret partner. And he relied much on the case 
of Bloxham & Fourdrinier against Pell & Brooke, tried at the same sittings 
(7th of March,1775) before Lord MAl'fSl"IELD in the King's Bench, ae in point. 
"Ibis was also a partnership for seven years between Brooke & Pell; but 
at the end of one year agreed to be diesolved, but no express dissolution 
was had. The agreement recited that Brooke being desirous to have 
the profits of the trade to himself, and Pell beinl{ desirous to relinquish his 
right to the trade and profi~, it was sgreed that Brooke should give Pell 
a bond for £2,485, which Pell had brought into the trade, with interest at 
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five per cont, which was accordingly done. And it was further agreed
that Brooke should pay to Pell £200 per annum for six years, if Brooke so
long lived, as in lieu of the profits of the trade; and Brooke covenants that
Pell should have free liberty to inspect his books. Brooke became a bank-
rupt before anything was paid to Pell. And this action being brought for a
debt incurred by Brooke in the course of trade, Lord MANSFIELD held that
Pell was a secret partner. This was a device to make more than legal
interest of money, and it it was not a partnership it was a crime. And it
shall not lie in the defendant Pell’s mouth to say, ‘It. is usury and not
a partnership.’ ”
Grose and Adair, for the defendant, argued that the present case is very
distinguishable from that of Bloxham and Pell. Pell was to be paid out of
the profits of the trade, as appears from the covenant to inspect the books,
which also would be useless. His annuity was expressly given, as and in lieu
of those profits. It was contingent in another view, as it depended on the life
of Brooke, by whom those profits were to be made. In our case the annuity
is certain, not casual; it does not depend on carrying on the trade, nor to
cease when that is left off, but is due out of the estate of Robinson. It is
not a necessary dilemma, that it must be either usury or partnership. It
may be, and probably was, a premium for the good will of the trade.
Two thousand guineas i's no uncommon price for turning over the profits
of s trade so beneficial that it appears to have been rated at £1,000 to each
partner in the space of less than eight months. And whether that sum
is agreed to be paid at once, or by seven instalments, it is the same thing.
Besides, whether there be or be not a secret constructive partnership is a
question proper for a jury, who have here decided it on a consideration of
all the circumstances.
DE GREY, G. J. The only question is: VVl1at constitutes a
secret partner‘.' Every man who has a share of the profits of
a trade ought also to bear his share of the loss. And if any
one takes part of the profit he takes a part of that fund on
which the creditor of the trader relies for his payment. If any
one advances or lends money to a trader it is only lent on his
general personal security. It is no specific lien upon the profits
of the trade, and yet the lender is generally interested in those
profits; he relies on them for repayment. And there is no dif-
ferencewhether that money be lent de nova or left behind in trade
by one of the partners who retires. And whether the terms of
that loan be kind or harsh makes also no manner of difference.
I think the true criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed
to share the profits of the trade with Robinson, or whether he
only relied on those profits as a fund of payment; a distinction
not more nice than usually occurs in questions of trade or
usury. The jury have said that this is not payable out of the
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flve per cent, which wu accordingly done. And it wu further agreed 
that Brooke should pay to Pell £200 per annum for six years, if Brooke ao 
· 1ong lived, as in lieu of the profits of the trade; and Brooke covenants that 
Pell should have free liberty to inspect hie books. Brooke became a bank-
rupt before an7thing waa paid to Pell. And this action being brought for a 
debt incurred by Brooke in the ooune or trade, Lord MANSFIELD held that. 
Pell was a aeoret partDer. This was a device to make more than legal 
intei;eet of money, and if it was not a partnership it \Vas a orime.. And it 
shali not lie in the defendant Pell's mouth to say, 'It is usury and not 
a partnership.' " 
Grose and .Adair, for the defendant, argued that the present oase is very 
distinguishable from that of Bloxham and Pell. Pell was to be paid out of 
the profit.a of the trade, as appears from the covenant to inspect the books. 
which else would be useleBB. His annuity was expreBSly given, as and in lieu 
of those pro{lta. U waa contingent in another view, as it depended on the life 
of Brooke, by whom those profits were to be made. In our case the annuity 
is certain, not casual; it does not depend on carrying on the tradt, nor to 
cease when that is left otf, but is due out of the estate of Robinson. It iJI 
not a necessary dilemma, that it must be either usury or partnership. It 
may be, and probably was, a premium for the good will or the trade. 
Two thousand guineas is no uncommon price for turning over the profit.a 
of a trade eo beneficial tbat it appears to have been rated at £1,000 to each 
partner in the spaoe or less than eight months. And whether that sum 
is agreed to be paid at once, or by seven instalments, it is the same thing. 
· Beside&, whether there be or be not a seoret constructive partnership is a 
question proper for a jury, who have here decided it on a oonsideration of 
all the circumetanceL 
DF. GREY, C. J. The on1y question is: What constitutes n 
secret partner? Every man who has a share of the profits oC' 
a trade ought a]so to bear his share of the loss. And if uny · 
one takes part of the profit he takes a part of that fund on 
whieh the creditor of the trader relies for his payment. If any 
one advances or lends money to a trader it is onJy Jent on his 
general persona] security. It is no specific Jien upon thf> profits 
of the trade~ and yet the ]ender is genera1ly interested in those 
profits; lie relies on them for rf>pnyment. And there is no dif- · 
ference wJwther that money be lent de novo or left behind in trade 
by one of the partners who retires. And whetber the terms of 
that lonn be kind or harsh makes a1so no manner of difference. 
J think the true criterion is to inquire whether Smith agreed 
to share the profits of the trade with Hobinson~ or whether be 
on1y relied on those profits as a fund of payment) a distinction 
not more nice than nsual1y occurs in questions of trade or 
usury. The jury have said that this is not payabte out of the 
profits, and I think there is no foundation for granting a new 
tria1. • 
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Govnn, J., same opinion.
BLACKSTONE, J., same opinion. I think the true criterion
(when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether
the profit or premium is certain and defined, or casual, indefi-
nite, and depending on the accidents of trade. In the former
case it is a. loan (whether usurious or not is not material to the
present question), in the latter a partnership. The hazard of
loss and profit is not equal and reciprocal, if the lender can
receive only a limited sum for the profits of his loan, and yet is
made liable to all the losses, all the debts contracted in the
trade, to any amount.
Nsnns, J., same opinion. Rule discharged. _
Norm: Compare with following cases. See also, Mechem's Elem. of
Partn., §§ 5, 6, et. seq.
’)
COOPE vs EYRE.
English Court of Common Pleas, 1778.
1 H. Bl. 37.
Action by Coope and others against Eyre, Atkinson. YVa1ton,
Hattersley, Stephens, and Pugh, to recover the purchase price
for a shipload of oil, purchased in the name of Eyre & Co.
Eyre & Co., composed of Eyre, Atkinson 8: Walton, had become
bankrupt, and did not defend, so that the real defendants were
Hattersley & Co. (Stephens) and Pugh & Co. (Pngh’s son).
These defendants contended that the contract of sale was
made by the plaintiffs with Eyre & Co. only, and that the con-
tract between these defendants and Eyre 8: Co. was not such
as to create a pirtnersliip. Verdict for defendants under
direction of the court (Lord Louonnonouon), and motion made
for a new trial on the ground of misdirection.
Adair, for the motion.
Bond and Le Blane, contra.
Gouno, J. The facts of the present case are shortly these:
The defendants and Eyre & Co. order one Garforth, a broker,
















































































































































64 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
GouLD, J., same opinion. 
BLACKSTONE, J., same opinion. I think the true criterion 
(when money is advanced to a trader) is to consider whether 
the profit or premium is certain and defined, or casual, indefi-
nite, and depending on the accidents of trade. In the forme1· 
case it is a loan (whether usurious or not is not material to the 
present question), in the latte~ a partner&hip. The hazard of 
loss and profit is not equal and reciprocal, if the lender can 
receive only a limited sum for the profits of his loan, and yet is 
made liable to all the losses, all the debts contrncted in the 
trade, to an.v amount. 
NARES, J., same opinion. Rule discharged. 
NOTm: Compare with following cases. See alao, Meohem's Elem. of 
Partn., §§ 5, 6, et. seq. 
COOPE vs EYRE. 
English Court of Common Pleas, 1"/';8. 
1 H. Bl. 37. 
Action by Coope and others against Eyre, Atkinson, Walton, 
Hattersley, Stephens, and Pugh, to r('cover the purC'hase prl<'e 
fot• a shipload of oil, purchased in the name of EyrC' & Co. 
Eyre & Co., composed of Eyre, Atkinson & \Yalton, had become 
bankrupt, and did not defend, so that the real defendants were 
Hattersley & Co. (Stephens) and Pugh & Co. (Pugh's son). 
These defendants contended that the conh."act of sale waii · 
made by the plaintiffs with Eyre & Co. only, :~nd that the con-
tract between these defendants and Eyre & Co. was not such 
as to create a :'l.rtnership. Verdkt for defendant~ under 
direction of the court (Lord I~ouGHBOROUGH), and motion made 
for a new trial on the ground of misdil'ection. 
Adair, for the motion. 
Bond and Le Blanc, contra. 
GouLD, J. The facts of thC' present case are sl10rtly these: 
rrhe defendants and Eyre & Co. order one Garforth, a br·oker, 
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and Pugh & Co., were to have for their respective shares each
one-fourth. The broker buys divers shiploads; and to some of
the vendors, the defendants during the treaty declare it to be
a com-mon concern between them and Eyre & Co., in whose
name the purchases were made. But with respect to the plaint-
iff’s, the purchase was made singly in the name of Eyre & Co.,
without any notification that the defendants had any concern
in it. These purchases were made on speculation, there being
a prospect that oil would rise in price; but it afterwards fell,
and then the defendants contend that they are not liable to
make good the difierence, Eyre & Co. having failed. .
Upon these facts, two questions arise: 1st. Whether the
defendants are partners with Eyre & 00.? 2d. If not, whether
they are to be deemed joint contractors in the purchase for
Eyre & Co. and so liable for the whole?
As to the first, I think they cannot be considered as partners
with Eyre & Co. in this purchase from the plaintiffs. Although
there may be partnerships in many other instances besides
what are merely commercial, as in the case of farms rented
by several persons jointly, and of partnerships of attorneys,
and the like. yet I think the true criterion is as stated_ by Mr.
Justice B1..u'1<s'ro.\'i=:, in the case of Grace rs. Smith (ante, p. 61)
“whether they are concerned in profit and loss," and the same
doctrine is in effect held by Chief Justice DE GREY, _in that
case. This is strongly illustrated by Blo.ra»m- vs. Pell, which
was cited in (lrar-c rs. Smith. [Here follows a statement of
these two cases] It was held in both the cases that the
inequality of the concern as to profit and loss was im-material
to those who dealt with them, however, it might be a regula-
tion between themselves. lhit in the present case there was
no communication between the buyers as to. profit or loss.
Each party was to have a distinct share of the whole, the one
to have no interference with the share of the other, but each
to manage his share as he judged best. The profit or loss of
the one might be more or less than that of the other. In this
light I am of the opinion there is no foundation for the court
to adjudge the present case a partnership; and the jury having
found for the defendants, there is no reason to disturb the ve1'~
dict. [The second question was also answered in the
negative]
























































































































































CooPE v~. EYRE. 65 
and llugh & Co.~ were to have for their respective shares each 
one-fourth. The broker buys divers shiploads; and to some of 
the vendors, the defendants during the treaty declare it to be 
a common cont-ern between them and Ey1·e & Co., in whose 
name the purchases were made. Hut with re~pect to the plaint-
, itf's, the purchase was made singly in the name of Ey1·e & Co., 
without any notification that the defendants had any concern 
in it. These purchases were made on speculation, tl1ere being 
a pr;>spect that oil would rise in price; but it afterwards fell, 
and then the defendants contend that they are not liable to 
make good the difference, Eyre & Co. having failed. 
l7"pon tllese facts, two questions arh1c: 1st. 'Vhethe1· the 
defendants are partners with Eyre & Co.? ~d. If not, whether 
they are to be deemed joint contractors in the purchase for. 
Eyre & Co. and so liable for the whole? 
As to the first, I think they cannot be considered as partners 
with Eyre & Co. in thit-1 purchase from tlw plaintiffs. Although 
there may be partnPrships in many other int-1tances besides 
what are rnprely commercial, as in the case of farms rented 
by several [Wl"8ons jointly, and of partnerships of attorneys, 
and the lik(\ ~·pt I think the true crih•riou is as stated. by Mr. 
Justice TI1.A<'K~TO.'.\'t:, in the case of Grace rs. ffo1ith (ante, p. 61) 
"wbetlwr tlu\V are eonef:>rned in profit and los~,·· and the same 
doctrhw is iu elfrct lu•ld by Chief .lustice DE GnEY, _in that 
ease. This is st1·ongl~· illustrated by R1o:ram vs. Pell, which 
was died in <Jnrc·c rs. Rmith. [Here follows a statement of 
these two e:u.1es.] It was held in both the Ntses that the 
inequality of the c-oneern as to profit and 101-1s was immaterial 
to those who dealt with th<'m, howe\'n, it mi~ht be a regula-
tion between then1~ln•s. Bnt in the 111·ei-;ent case there was .,, 
~ n<> communication betwc•pn the buy<•rs as to profit or loss. 1
1 
Each party was to han· a db1tinet slwre of 1he whol<>, the one 
1
• 
to have no interference with the ~dwre of the otlwr~ but each 1 
to manage his share as he judgPd lwsl. 'fhc profit or loss of , 
the one might be more or less than tlrnt of the other. In this / 
light I am of the opinion there is no foundation for the eourt 
to adjudge the present case a partne1·ship; and the jury having 
found for the defendants, tlwre is no rt>asou to disturb the ver-
dict. ['fhe second qtie8tion was also answered in the 
negative.] 
HEATH, J., said, among o1hPr things: This is a sub-con· 
9 
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tract—by a. sub-contract I mean a contract subordinate to
another contract made or intended to be made between the
contracting parties on one part, or some of them, and :1
stranger. Eyre & Co. are the only purchasers known to the
plaintiffs; entire credit was given to them alone; Pugh, Hat-
tersley and Stephens can be liable only in the event of a con-
cealed partnership, on this principle, “that the act of one part-
ner binds all his copartnersgn account of a communion of
profit and ‘losq In truth the were not partners, inasmuch
as they were on y interested in the purchase of the commodity
and not in the subsequent disposition of it.
Lord Louonnonouon. The first impression on my mind was
against the defendants, but in the course of the trial my opin-
ion changed, and I thought they were not liable as partners; I
still continue to think so, and consequently that the verdict
was proper.
This being an action on a contract of sale, the vendor can
have no remedy against any person with whom he has not con-
tracted, unless there be a partnership, in which case all the
partners are liable as one individual. It has been justly
observed that a secret partnership can be no consideration to
the vendor, though for reasons of policy and general expedi-
ence the law is positive with respect to the secret partner that
when discovered he shall be liable to the whole extent. In
many parts of Europe, limited partnerships are admitted, pro-
vided they be entered on a register, but the law of England is
otherwise, the rule being that if a partner shares in advan-
tages he also shares in all disadvantages. In order to consti-
tute a partnership a communion of profits and loss is essential.
The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary they
should be equal. If the parties be jointly concerned in the
purchase, they must also be jointly concerned in the future
sale, otherwise they are not partners. ' " " Here Eyre
was a mere speculat-or, and the other defendants were to share
in the purchase, but were not jointly interested in any sub-
sequent disposition of the property. Though they may by
other purchases ha.ve concluded themselves as to some par-
ticular vendors, yet in the transaction in question there was
not that communion between them necessary to make them
partners; their agreement was a sub-contract which, as my
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tract-by a sub-contract I meQ.n a contract subordinate to 
another contra.ct made or intended to be made between the 
contracting parties on one part, or some of them, and :1 
stranger. Eyre & Co. are the only purchasers known to the 
plaintiffs; entire credit was given to them alone; Pugh, Hat-
tersley and Stephens can be liable only in the event of a con-
cealed partnership, on this principle, "that the act of one part· 
ner binds all his copartnersf'On account of a com~union of 
profit and loel':l In truth th~ were not partners, masmuch 
p they were Oiily interested in the purchase of the commo<lity 
and not in the subsequent disposition of it. 
Lord LouoHBonouou. The first impression on my mind was 
against the defendants, but in the course of the trial my opin-
ion changed, and I thought they were not liable as partners; I 
still continue to think so, and consequently that the verdict 
was proper. 
This being an action on a contract of sale, tlle vendor can 
have no remedy against any person with whom be bas not con· 
tre.cted, unless there be a partnership, in which case all the 
partners are liable as one individual. It has been justly 
ob~rved that a secret partnership can be no consideration to 
the vendor, though for reasons of policy and general expedi· 
ence the law is poeitive with respect to the secret partner that 
when discovered he sha.11 be liable to the whole extent. In 
many parts of Europe, limited partnerships a.re admitted, pro-
vided they be entered on a register, but the law of England is 
otherwise, the rule being that if a partner shares in advnn· 
tages he also shares in all disndvantages. In order to consti-
tute a partnership a communion of profits and Joss is essential. 
The shares must be joint, though it is not necessary they 
should be equal. If the parties be jointly concerned in the 
purchase, they must also be jointly con<>erned in the future 
snle, otherwise• thf'y are not partners. • • * Here Eyre 
was a mere speculator, and the other def PtHlants were to share 
in the purchase, but were not jointly interest<id in any sub-
sequent disposition of the property. Though they may by 
other purchases have concluded thems(•ln~ as to some par· 
ticular vendors, yet in the transaction in question there was 
not that communion between them necessary to make them · 
partners; their agreement was a sub-contract which, as my 
Brother HEATH observed, muy be executory; it was to share 
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in a purchase to be made. The seller looked to no other
security but Eyre & Co.; to them the credit was given, and





English Court of Common Pleas, 1793.
2 ll. Bl. 235. -
Assumpsit by Waugh against Erasmus Carver, William Car-
ver and Archibald Giesler, as partners. It appeared that the
two Carvers‘ were in business at Gosport, and Giesler at
Plymouth as shipping agents. On February 24, 1790, these
parties entered into a written agreement which provided that
Giesler should remove to Cowes, and that thereafter the two
concerns should cooperate in the transaction of the ship agency
buiness. In consideration of the Carvers’ recommendation and
assistance to support the house at Cowes Giesler was to allow
the Carvers a moiety of the commission on ships putting into
that port, or remaining in the road to the westward, addressed
to him, and a moiety of the discount on the tradesmen’s bills
employed on such ships; he also agreed to advise with the
Carvers, and to pursue such measures as might appear to them
to be to the interest of all concerned. On the other hand, the
Carvers agreed to pay Giesler three-fifths of the proceeds from
all vessels which should come from Cowes to Portsmouth, and
put themselves under the direction of the Carvers uponthc
recommendation of Giesler, one-half per cent on all trademen's
bills, and a certain proportion of warehouse rent, etc. They
were to meet once a year at Gosport to" settle their accounts
and pay over the balance. It was expressly agreed also that
neither should in any way be liable for the losses of the other
or in any way accountable or responsible for the acts of the
other, but that each should “in his own proper person and with
his own goods and effects, respectively, be answerable and

















































































































































WAUGH VS. CARVER. 61 
in a purchase to be made. The seller looked to no other 
security but Eyre & Co.; to them the credit was given, and 
they only were liable. 
\VILSON, J., dissented. 
New trial denied. 
WAUGH vs. CARVER. 
English Oourt of Oom.mon Pleas, 1793. 
9 II. Bl. 23~. 
If 
Assumpsit by Waugh against Erasmus Carver, William Car· 
ver and Archibald Giesler, as partners. It appeared that the 
two Carvers· were in business at Gosport, and Giesler at 
Plymouth as shipping agents. On February 24, 1790, thP.se 
parties entered into a written agreement which provided that 
Giesler should remove to Cowes, and that thereafter the two 
concerns should cooperate in the transacti-On of the ship agency 
business. In consideration of the Carvers' recommendation and 
assistance to support the house at Cowes Giesler was to allow 
the Carvers a moiety of. the commission on ships putting into 
that port, or remaining in the road to the westward, addressed 
to him, and a moiety of the discount on the tradesmen's bills 
employed on· such ships; he also agreed to advise with the 
Carvers, and to pursue such measures as might appear to them 
to be to the interest of all concerned. On the other hand, the 
Carvers agreed to pay Giesler three-fifths of the proceeds from 
all vessels which should come from Cowes to Portsmouth, and 
put themselves under the direction of the Carvers upon the 
recommendation of Giesler, one-half per cent on all trademen's 
bills, and a certain proportion of warehouse rent, etc. They 
were to meet once a year at Gosport to settle their accounts 
and pay over the balance. It was expressly agreed also that 
neither should in any way be liable for the losses of the other 
or in anv wav accountable or responsible for the acts of the . . . 
other, but that each should "in his own proper pe1·son and with 
his own goods and effects, respectively, be answerable and 
accountable for his own losses, acts,· deeds and receipts." 
68 CASES ox PARTNERSHIP.
Plaintiff sold goods, etc., to Giesler in his own name, but not
being paid he sued him and the Carvers as partners. The ques-
tion was whether they were partners on a true construction of
the articles. '
(‘lag/ton and LcBZanc, for the plaintifi’.
Rooke and Lawrence, for the defendants.
Erna, Ch. J . This case has been extremely well argued, and
the discussion of it has enabled me to make up my mind, and
removed the only difficulty I felt, which was whether, by con-
struing this to be a partnership, we should not determine that
if there was an annuity granted out of a banking house to the
widow, for instance, of a deceased partner, it would make her
liable to the debts of the house, and involve her in a bank-
ruptcy. But I think this case will not lead to that conse-
quence.
The definition of a partnership cited from Puifendorf (Lib.
5, cap. 8) is good as between the parties themselves, but not
with respect to the world at large. If the question were
between A and B, whether they were partners or not, it would
be very well to inquire whether they had contributed, and in
what proportions, stock or labor, and on what agreements they
were to divide the profits of that contribution. But in all these
eases a very different question arises, in which the definition
is of little service. The question is, generally, not between
the parties as to what shares they shall divide, but respecting
creditors claiming a satisfaction out of the funds of a particu-
lar houe, who shall be deemed liable in regard to those funds.
Now, a case may be stated in which it is the clear sense of the
parties to the contract that they shall not be partners; that A
is to contribute neither labor nor _money, and, to go still
further, not to receive any profits. But if he will lend his name
as a partner, he becomes, as against all the rest of the world, a
partner, not upon the ground of the real transaction between
them, but upon principles of general policy, to prevent the
frauds to which creditors would be liable if they were to sup-
pose that they lent their money upon the apparent credit of
three or four persons, when in fact they lent it only to two of
them, to whom, without the others, they would have lent noth-


















































































































































Plaintiff sold goods, etc., to (Hesler in his own name, but not 
being paid he sued him and the Carvers as partners. The ques-
tion was whether they were partnel's on a true construction of. 
the articles. 
Cla.!lton and LeBlanc, for the plaintiff. 
Rooke and La·wrenee, for the defendants. 
EYRE, Ch. J. 'rhis case has been extremely well argued, and 
the discussion of it has enabled me to make up my mind, aJM1 
removed the only difficulty I felt, which was whether, by con-
struing this to be a partnership, we should not determine that 
if there was an annuity granted out of a banking house to the 
widow, for instance, of a deceased partner, it would make her 
liable to the debts of the house, and involve her in a bank-
ruptcy. But l think this case will not lead to that conse-
quence. 
The definition of a partnership cited from Puffendorf (Lib. 
5, cap. 8) is good as between the parties themselves, but not 
with respect to the wm·ld at large. If the question were 
between A mid B, whether they were partners or not, it would 
be very WPII to inquire whether they had contributed, and in 
what proportions, stock or labor, and on what agreements they 
were to divide the profits of that contribution. But in all thes~ 
cases a very different question arises, in which the definition 
is of little service. The question is, generally, not between 
the parties as to what shares they shall divide, but respecting 
creditors claiming a satisfaction out of the funds of a particu-
lar house, who shall be deemed liable in regard t0 those funds. 
Now, a case may be stated in which it is the clear sense of the 
parties to the contrnct that they shall not be partners; that A 
is to contrib11te neither labor nor ,money, and, to go still 
further, not to receive any profits. Hut if he will lend his name 
as a partner, he becomes~ as ngainst all the rest of the world, a 
partner, not upon the ground of the real transaction between 
them, but upon principlefl of general polic,v, to prevent the 
frauds to which creditors would be liable if they were to sup-
pose that the~' lent th<'ir money upon the apparent ('.redit of 
three or four persons, when in fact ,they lent it only to two of 
them, to whom~ without the others, they would have lent noth-
ing. The arg11ment gone into, howeve1· proper for the discus-
-
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sion of the question, is irrele.vant to a great part _of the case.
\\'hether these persons were to interfere more or less with their
advice and directions, and many small parts of the agreement,
I lay entirely out of the case; because it is plain upon the con-
struction of the agreement, if it be construed only between the ,
Carvers and Giesler, that they were not nor ever meant to be l
partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without [
risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though there
was a certain degree of control at one house, it was without
idea that either was to be involved in the consequences of the
failure of the other, a11d without understanding themselves
responsible for any circumstances that might happen to the
loss of either. That was the agreement between themselves.
But the question is, whether they have not, by parts of their
agreement, constituted themselves partners in respect to other
persons. The case therefore is reduced to a single point,
whether the Carvers did not entitle themselves, and did not
mean to take a moiety of the profits of Giesler’s house gener-
ally and indefinitely as they should arise, at certain times
agreed upon for the settlement of their accounts. That they
have so done is clear upon the face of the agreement; and upon
the authority of Grace rs. Smith (nntc, p. til), he who takes a
moiety of all the profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law,
be made liable to losses, if losses arise. upon the principle that,
by taking a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a
part of that fund which is the proper security to them for the
payment of their debts. That was the foundation of the deci-
sion in Grace rs. Smith, and I think it stands upon the fair
ground of reason. I cannot agree that this was a mere agency,
in the sense contended for on the part of the defendants, for
there was a risk of profits and loss. -\ ship agent employs
tradesmen to furnish necessaries for the ship; he contracts
with them and is liable to them; he also makes out their bills
in such a way as to determine the charge of commission to the
ship owners. \Vith respect to the commission, indeed, he may
be considered as a mere agent, but as to the agency itselt he
is as much a trader as any other man, and there is as much risk
of profit and loss to the -person with whom he contracts in the
transactions with him as with an_v other trader. lt is true he
will gain nothing but his discount, but that is a profit in the
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EC!on of the queEition, is ir1·elevant to a great part .of the case. 
\Yhethe1• these pt·rsons were to interfPre more 01· less with their 
advice and directions, and many small 1m1-ts of the agreement, 
I lay t>ntirely out of the case; because it js plain upon the con· ' 
i-;truction of the agreement, if it be con st med only between the ) 
Carvers and Giesler, that lht>y were not nor ever meant to bt! I 
partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without ( 
risk of each other, and to be at their own loss. Though there . 
was a certain degree of control at one house, it was without 
idea that eithn was to be invoh·ed in the consequp1u·es of the 
failure of the other, and without understanding themselves 
re8poni.ihle for any circumstances th.at might bapJ!en to the 
loss of either. That was the agrf'ement between themselves. 
But the t]uestion is, whether they lune not, Ly pm·ts of their 
agreement, constitut<>d themsL•lves partners in respect to other 
perl'!oos. 'rlw t·nse therefore h~ red1wPd to a single point, 
whether the Carv<'rs did not entitle th<•miwlveA, and did not 
mean to take a moiE:>ty of the profits of Giesler's bom~e gener-
ally and indeflnitPly as tht·.v should arise, at certain tim<'s 
agreed upon for the iwttlem<'nt of their accounts. That they 
have so <lone i!i! clear upon the face of the ag1·ermt>nt; and upon 
the authority of Grat'<' rs. Smith (a11ir', p. fil.), he who takes a 
moiet.v of nll 1he profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law~ 
be made liable to losses, if losses aris<•. upon the prindple that. 
by taking a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a. 
pnrt of that fund whidt is the propt•r 1wemit_v to tlwm for tlw 
paymt>nt of their dPbh~. That was th<' foundation of the dPd· 
sion in Oracc t\<t. Smith, and I think it stands upon thP fair 
ground of reaRon. I cannot agree that this was a mere ag<>ney, 
in the Nense conten<lPd for on the part of tlw d<•ft>11tlanls, fol' 
tlwre was a rh~k of profit8 and lo~s. .\ ship agt•nt .-mploy:-1 
tradeNmen to fur11iHh 1wcessaries fo1· tlw ship; he '·onfraet~ 
with them and is liable to th<:'m; h<> also makes out their hill:-1 
in such a way as to determine the charge of commisHion to tlw 
ship owners. \Yith respect to the co111mi:-1sion, indt>ed. hi' may 
be considered as a mere agent, bnt as to the a~t·ney itsplf he 
is as much a trader as any other man, and there is as muelt 1·i.~k 
of profit and I08S to the pe1·son with whom he contrads in the 
transactions with him as with :my olhP1· t1wl<·1·. It i8 true he 
will gain nothing but his discount, but that is a 111·otit in the 
trade, and there may be lossc>s to him as well as to the owm•rs. 
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}/
If. therefore, the principle be true that he who takes the gen-
eral profits of a partnership must of necessity be made liable
to the losses in order that he may stand in a just situation with
regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a case clear of
all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these per-
sons were not to be considered as partners, yet they have made
themselves such with regard to their transactions with the rest
of the world. I am therefore of opinion that there ought to be
judgment for the plaintiff.
The other judges concurred.






English House of Lords, 1860. -
8 H. of L. Cas. 268.
This was an action on three bills of exchange, given by one
of the managers of the Stanton Iron Company, for goods sup-
plied to that company. The declaration contained a count in
the usual form as against acceptors on each bill, alleging it to
have been “directed to the defendants by and under the name
of the Stanton Iron Com any;” also counts for goods sold and
delivered, and the monk; ts. The defendants severed in
pleading, each denying the ceptapce of the bills, and, a to
the other counts, pleading never indebted.’ I’
For some time previously to the year 1849, henjamin Smith
and Josiah Timmis Smith carried on business at the Stanton
Iron \\'orks, in l)erbyshire,as iron masters and corn merchants,
under the name of B. Smith & Son. In that year they became
embarrassed in their circumstances, and a meeting of their
creditors took place. Among these were Cox and W'heatcroft.
On the 13th November, 1849, a deed of arrangement was exe
cuted by more than six-sevenths in number and value of the
creditors. The parties to this deed were the Smiths, of the
first part; Francis Sanders, John Thompson, James Haywood,
David Wheatcroft, and Samuel YValker Cox, all of whom were



















































































































































70 CA.BBS ON PARTNERSHIP. 
Jf, therefore, the principle be true that he who takes the gen-
eral profits of a partnership must of necessity be made liable 
to the losses in order that he may stand in a just situation with 
regard to the creditors of the house, then this is a case clear of 
all difficulty. For though with respect to each other these per-
sons were not to be considered as partners, yet they have made 
themselves such with regard to their transactions with the rest 
of the world. I am therefor~ of opinion that there ought to be 
judgment for the plaintiff. 
The Other judges concurred. 
NOT11: See Mechem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 5, 6, et 1tq, 
~'COX vs. BICKMAN. 
Englilh H ou.se of Lords, 1860 • . 
8 H. of L. Cas. 268. 
This was an action on three bills of exchange, given by one 
of the managers of the Stanton Iron Company, for goods sup-
plied to that compa:Qy. The declaration contained a count in 
the 01mal form as against acceptors on each bill, alleging it to 
have been "directed to the defendants by and under the name 
of the Stanton Iron Coi)!nany ;" also counts for goods sold and 
delivered, and the mon~y\cftpts. The defendants severed in 
pleading, each denying the Wc.eptance of the bills, and, as to 
the other counts, pleading never ind~ted.' ' 1 
For some time previously to the year 1849, -Benjamin Smith 
and Josiah Timmis Smith carried on business at the Stanton 
Iron \Vorks, in Derbyshire, as iron masters and com merchants, 
under the name of B. Smith & Son. In that year 1 bey became 
embar~ssed in their circumstances, and a meeting of their 
creditors took place. Among these were Cox and Wheatcroft. 
On the 13th November, 1849, a deed of arrangement was exe-
cuted by more than six-sevenths in number and value of the 
cr~ditors. The parties to this deed were the Smiths, of the 
first part; Francis Sanders, John Thompson, James Haywood, 
David Wheatcroft, and Samuel n~alker Cox, all of whom were 
creditors, of the second part; and the general creditors (includ-
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ing those previously named as trustees), whose names were
also set forth in a schedule, of the third part. The deed
recited a lease from 1846 for twenty-one years to the Smiths;
that they were unable to pay their debts, and that it had been
agreed that there should be an assignment by them to the
parties of the second part, as trustees on behalf of the credit-
ors, to have and hold the premises for the term of the lease,
the machinery, etc., and all the estate,-etc., subject to the pow-
ers and provisions thereinafter contained. The trusts were
then enumerated, and, in substance, they were to carry on the
business under the name or style of “The Stanton Iron Com-
pany,” with power to do whatsoever was necessary for that
purpose, and to pay the net income, after answering all expen-
ses; which net income was always to be deemed the property
of the two Smiths, among the creditors of the Smiths. And
provision was made for the meeting of the creditors, and, at
any such meeting, a majority in value of the creditors present
was to have the power to make rules as to the mode of con-
ducting the business, or to order the discontinuance of it. And
when all the debts had been paid, the trustees were to hold
the trust estates, etc., in trust for the two Smiths. The deed '
contained a covenant by the parties executing it, not to suc
the Smiths for existing debts. Cox never acted as trustee; and
Wheatcroft resigned six weeks after the execution of the deed,
and before the goods for which the bills were given had been
supplied; no new trustee was appointed in the room of either.
The business of the company was carried on by the three
other persons named as “parties of the second part.” In the
course of it goods were supplied by Hickman, who, in March,
April, and June, 1855, drew three bills of exchange in respect
thereof. The first of these bills, which was the same in form
as those afterwards accepted, was in these words:
Q “Grafton Iron Ore Works,'Blisworth,
“£300, 10th March, 1855.
“Four months after date pay to my order, in London, three
hundred pounds, va.lue received. J OHN HICKMAN.”
“To the Stanton Iron Company, near Derby.”
The acceptance was in the following form: “At Messrs.
Smith, Payne & C0., London. Per proc. The Stanton Iron
Oompany..—JAM1=:s Harwoon.” The cause was tried in 1856,

















































































































































Cox vs. HrcKKA.N. '11 
ing those previously nam_ed as trustees), whose names were 
also set forth in a schedule, of the third part. The deed 
recited a lease from 1846 for twenty-one years to the Smiths; 
that they were unable to pay their debts, and that it had been 
agreed that there should be an assignment by them to the 
parties of the second part, as trustees on behalf of the credit-
ors, to have and hold the premises fo~ the term of the lease, 
the machinery, etc., and all the estate, ·etc., subject to the pow· 
ers and provisions t11ereinafter contained. The trusts were 
then enumerated, and, in substance, they were to carry on th•? 
business under the name or style of "The Stanton Iron Cc>m-
pa.ny," with power to do whatsoever was necessary for that 
purpose, and tO pay the net income, after answering all expen-
ses; which net inrome was always to be deemed the property 
of the two Smiths, ~mong the creditors of the sfniths. And 
provision was made for the meeting of the creditors, and, at 
any such meeting, a majority in value of the creditors present 
was to have the power to make rules as to the mode of COIJ-
ducting the business, or to order the discontinuance of it. Al}.d 
when all the debts had been paid, the trustees were to hold 
the trust estates, etc., in trust for the two Smiths. The deed • 
contained a covenant by the parties executing it, not to su" 
the Smiths for existing debts. Cox never acted as trustee; an1l 
Wheatcroft resigned six weeks after the execution of the deed, 
and before the goods for which the bills were given had beeu 
supplied; no new trustee was appointed in the room of either. 
The business of the company was carried on by the three 
other persons named as "parties of the second part." In the 
course of it goods were supplied by Hickman, who, in .March, 
April, and June; 1855, drew three bills of exchange in respect 
thereof. The first of these bills, which was the same in form 
as those afterwards a.ccepted, was in these words: 
"Grafton Iron Ore Works,· Blisworth, 
"£300. 10th March, 1855. 
"Four months after date pay to my order, in London, three 
hundred pounds, value received. JOHN HICKMAN." 
"To the Stanton Iron Company, near Derby." 
The acceptance was in the following form: "At Messr"I. 
Smith, Payne & Cc>., L<>ndon. Per proc. The Stanton Iron 
Company.:-JAMES HAYWOOD." The cause was tried in 1856, 
before the late Lord Chief Justice JEnVIB; when a verdict was 
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found for the defendants; but on motion on leave reserved,
the verdict was entered for the plaintiff (18 C. B. 617). ,
The case was taken to the Exchequer chamber, when three
judges, Justice COLERIDGE, I<]1u.1-1, and CROMPTON, were for
aflirming the judgment of the Com-mon Pleas, and three other
judges, Barons MAIiTIN, Bmuuwmm, and \VATSON, were for
reversing it. [3 C. B. N. S. 523.1 The judgment, therefore,
stood, and was afterwards brought up to this House.
The judges were summoned, and Lord Chief Baron Ponnocx,
Justice \V1onr.\ms, Mr. Justice \\'u.1.1.n1s, Mr. Justice
on Mr Baron CHANNELL, and Mr. Justice Bmcxnunx,
Tlu g al (Sir R. Bcthcll, Jlr. .l[ilIw-ard was with
him), for \V'h
Mr. Wclsby (ll 1'. Bodcn was with him) for Cox.
M1‘. R-olt (Mr. Field was with him) for the respondent in both
cases.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell) proposed the follow-
ing question for the judges: “Are the defendants in this case
liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon?”
Agreed to.
-‘° BLAcKBuriN. J. The defendants in this case are liable as
acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. The ques-
tion entirely depends on the effect of the deed of arrangement.
If the effect of that deed is such that creditors executing it
thereby give authority to those managing the Stanton Iron
Company. to bind them to third persons in the usual course
of business by accepting bills, the defendants have given such
authority. If the effect of the deed is not such that creditors
executing that deed give authority to bind them as to third
persons, the defendants are not shown to have given any such
authority, for they have never acted as trustees; nor does it
appear that they have done any act beyond what was proper
to carry out the arrangement contained in that deed.
The principal object of the deed of arrangement is to divide
the property of the Smiths amongst the creditors according
to the rules observed in bankruptcy; and for this purpose their
property is assigned to trustees. The good will of the busi-


















































































































































72 CA ES ON PAR~XERSHlP. 
found for the defendants; hut on motion on leave reserved, 
the verdict was entered for the plaintiff (18 C. B. 617). 
The case was taken to the Exche<Juer chamber, when three 
judges, Justice COLERIDGE, ERLE, and CROMPTON, were for 
affirming the judgment of the Common Pleas, and three other 
judges, Barons MARTIN, BRAMWELL, and WATSON, were for 
reversing it. [3 C. B. N. S. 523.J 'l'lle judgment, therefore, 
stood, a.nd was afterwards brought up to this House. 
The judges were summoned, and Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK, 
r Justice WIGHTMAN, Mr. Justice \\' 1LLIA:us, Mr. Justice 
1· o.·, Mr. Baron CHANNELL, and Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, 
ded. 
ral (Sir R. B etlt<'ll, Jlr. Millloard was with 
Mr. lVelsby 1  r. Boden wa~ with him) for Cox. 
Mr. Rolt (Mr. Field was with him) for the respondent in both 
cases. 
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell) proposed the follow-
ing question for the judges: "Are the defendants in this case 
liable as acceptors of the bills of ex change declared upon?" 
Agreed to. 
r BLACKB UJlN, J. The defend·ants in this case are liable as 
ac;ceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. The ques-
tion entirely depends on the effect of the deed of anangement. 
If the effect of that deed is such that credi to rs executing it 
thereby give authority to those mauaging the Stanton Iron 
Company, to bind them to third persons in the usual course 
of bus iness by accepting bills, t he de fendants have given such 
~.uthorH.v. If the C'ffect of the deed is not such that creditors 
executing that deed give authority to bind them as to third 
persons, the defendnnts are not shown to have given any such 
nuthority, for they have never acted as trustees; nor does it 
appear that they have done any act beyond what was proper 
to carry out the arrangement contained in that deed. 
The principal object of tbP. deed of arrangement is to divide 
the property of the Smiths amongst the creditors according 
to the rules obsel.'ved in bankruptcy; and fol.' this purpose their 
property is assigned to trustees. The good will of the busi-
ness which had been carried on by 1 be Smiths was part of 
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their joint estate, and those who had the making of the
arrangement appear to have thought it a valuable part of the
joint estate. Instead of disposing of it to third persons, or
suffering it to be lost, the arrangement made was, that the
business should in the future be carried on under a new style,
that of “The Stanton Iron Company,” by the trustees, in the
manner stipulated for in the deed to which the creditors are
parties. The question is, whether the stipulations are such
as to render those creditors, who are parties to the deed, part-
ners in the Stanton Iron Company, so far, at least, as regards
liability to third persons.
Some of the judges in the court below have expressed an
opinion that there is a distinction between the present ques-
tion and that which would have arisen if the question had
been whether the defendants were liable for the considera-
tion ot these bills. I am, however, of opinion that no such
distinction exists. I apprehend that all‘cases as to liability
of partners to contracts are branches of the law of agency,
and that the question always is, évhether the contract entered
[into is within the scope of the authority conferred by those,
who are sought to be charged, upon the persons actually mak-
ing the contracy But I take it that, as matter of law, those
who are partners in a trading firm, do confer upon those who
\are permitted to manage the concern authority to make all
contracts which, in the exigency of the business, are neces-
sary and proper and customary. The prima facile authority
may be restricted by express agreement, but unless those who
deal with the firm have notice of this restriction, they are enti-
tled to hold all who are partners bound by the prima facie
authority conferred on the manager, and that equally whether
the persons sought to be charged were persons to whom the
creditors gave credit, or dormant partners, of whose existence
they were unaware. I think the justice of this rule, as appli-
cable to dormant partners, very questionable, but I do not
think it open to question that it is the rule of law. I think
that where, as in the present case, the accepting of bills is a
necessary and customary part of the business, the authority to
accept them is conferred as much as the authority to contract
the debts for which they are given. It is true the authority is

















































































































































Cox YS. HICKMAN. 73 
their joint estate, and those who bad the making of the 
arrangement appear to have thought it a valuable part of the 
joint estate. Instead of disposing of it to third persons, or 
suffering it to be lost, the arrangement made was, that the 
business should in the future be carried on under a new style, 
that of "The Stanton Iron Company," by the trustees, in the 
manner stipulated for in the deed to which the creditors a1·e 
parties. The question is, whether the stipulations are such 
as to render those creditors, who are parties to the deed, part-
ners in the Stanton Iron Company, so far, at least, as regards 
liability to third persons. 
Some of the judges in the court below have exp1·essed an 
opinion that there is a dh~tinction between the prei;1ent ques-
tion and that which would have arisen if the question had 
been w\ether the defendants were liable for the considera-
tion Qf these bills. I am, however, of opinion that no such 
di~tion exists. I apprehend that an· cases as to liability 
of partners to contracts are branches of the law of agency, 
~d that the question always is, f'bether the contract entered 
(
into is within the scope of the authority conferred by those, 
who a1·e sought to be charged, upon the persons actually mak-
ing the contracy But I take it that, as matter of law, those 
who are partners in a trading firm, do confer upon those who 
\are permitted to manage the concern authority to make all 
~ontracts which, in the exigency of the business, are neces-
sary and proper and customary. The p1·ima facie authority 
may be restricted by express agreement, but unless those who 
deal with the fi1•m have notice of this resfriction, they are enti-
tled to hold all who are partners bound by the prima facie 
authority conferred on the manager, and that equally whether 
the persons sought to be charged were persons to whom the 
creditors gave credit, or dormant partners, of whose existence 
they were unaware. I think the justice of this rule, as appli-
cable to d01mant partners, very questionable, but I do not 
think it open to question that it is the rrtle of law. I think 
that where, as in the present case, the accepting of bills is a 
necessary and customary part of the business, the authority to 
accept them is conferred as mnch as tbe authority to contract 
the debts for which they are given. It is true the authority is 
limited to accepting the bills in the name of the firm, and bind~ 
10 
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only those included in that firm, but all who are partners
are included in the firm.
I think, therefore, as already said, that the question is,
whether the stipulations in the deed are such as to constitute
a partnership quoad third persons, and to determine that ques-
tion we must look to the terms of the deed. The material
stipulations, as it seem-s to me, are the following: [The pro-
visions of the deed are then quoted.] ‘
These, I think, are the whole of the material parts of the
deed. There is no stipulation in the deed, as to who i to pro-
vide for payment of the partnership liabilities in case the
losses should be so great as to exceed the sum of £4,000, which
the trustees were authorized to retain for the purpose of carry-
ing on the business. The parties seem not to have anticipated,
or at all events not to have provided for such a contingency,
which, though a probable one, is often overlooked by those
entering on a trade, but the rule of law is clear enough, that
those who are partners in the concern must bear such liabili-
ties; so that I once more repeat, the question comes round to
whether the stipulatipns are such as to constitute a partner-
ship amongst the creditors. _
Now, on looking at the provisions of the deed, it seems to
me that they are, in substance, such as would be proper if
the creditors constituted themselves a joint stock company,
such as it would have been at common law, and made the
trustees their managing directors, but agreed that the part-
nership should cease as soon as a certain sum, in this case
the amount of their debts, was realized. I find that the busi-
ness is to be carried on by the trustees under the control of
the creditors, who may give what directiors they think fit
as to the management of the business; that the creditors are
to have a voice in nominating fresh trustees in case they are
changed; and that the creditors are to have a right to inspect
the books. And, moreover, I find that the creditors alone are
to have these powers, no similar powers being given to the
Smiths. Then I find also that the trustees are bound to pay
over the net income, after paying all expenses of the concern,
ratably among the creditors. It was suggested at your Lord-
ship’s bar, that there was some distinction between the net
income, after paying all out-goings, and the net profits, but I
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only those included in that firm, but all who are partners 
are included in the firm. 
I think, therefore, as already said, that the question is, 
wh~ther the stipulations in the deed are such as to constitute 
a partnership quoad third persons, and to determine that ques-
tion we must look to the terms of the deed. The material 
stipulations, as it seems to me, are the following: [The pro-
visions of the deed are then quoted.] 
These, I think, are the whole of the material parts of the 
deed. There is no stipulation in the deed, as to who is to pro· 
vide for paym('>nt of the partnership liabilities in . case the 
losses should be so great as to exceed the sum of £4,000, which 
the trustees were a.uthorized to retain for the purpose of carry-
ing on the business. The parties seem not to have anticipated, 
or at all events not to have provided for such a contingency, 
which, though a probable one, is often overlooked by those 
entering on a trade, but the rule of law is clear enough, that 
those who are partners in the concern must bear such liabili-
ties; so that I once more repeat, the question comes round to 
whether the stipulatipns are such as to constttute a partner-
ship amongst 1 he creditors. · 
Now, on looking at the provisions of the deed, it seems to 
me that they are, in substance, such as would be proper if 
the creditors constituted themselves a joint stock company, 
such a.s it would have been at common law, and mnde the 
trustees their managing directors, but agreed that the part-
nership should cease as soon as a certain sum, in this case 
the aroount of their d~bts, was realized. I find that the busi-
ness is to be earried on by the trustees under the control of 
the creditors, who may give what directiors they think tit 
as to the management of the business; that the creditors are 
to have a voice in nominating fresh trustees in case they are 
changed; and that the creditors are to have a right to inspect 
the books. And, moreover, I find that the creditors alone are 
to have these powers, no similar powers being given to the 
Smiths. Then I find also that the trustees are bound to pay 
over the net income, after paying all expenses of the concern, 
ratably among the creditors. It was suggested at your Lord-
1!1hip's bar, that there was some distinction between the net 
income, after paying all out-goings, and the net profits, but I' 
:im unable to understand what that distinction is. 
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The arrangement is that the trading might terminate on the
creditors being paid, which perhaps was the termination which
the persons entering into the arrangement hoped for. In that
case, the deed provides that the property shall be made over
to the Smiths, but by so doing the trade of the Stanton Iron
Company ceases. Whoever the partners in that flrm might be,
they are no longer to carry on the business after the property
is assigned to the Smiths. It might terminate by the concern
being stopped by the creditors whilst it was yet solvent; that
event is anticipated by the deed, and in that case it is provided
that the surplus, after paying all losses, should be divided
amongst the creditors. It might continue for an indefinite
period, neither so productive as to pay the creditors in full,
nor so bad as to be stopped; and whilst it was so continued,
the creditors were to have the net income or profits, and the
control of the management of the concern, and they were only
to have these powers. Does this make them interested in the
property or profits so as to make them partners? That ques-
tion depends on the effect of the deed, and it will be answered
when we have determined the extent of their interest in the
property of the firm. Suppose, a not impossible case, that the
trustees had, as individuals, contracted a joint debt for some
purpose unconnected with the Stanton Iron Company; could
the partnership property of the Stanton Iron Company have
been taken to pay the debt? Or, if the trustees had become
reduced to one person, and he had become a bankrupt, would
the assets of the Stanton Iron Company have passed to his
assignees? Or would the creditors, who are parties to the
deed of arrangement, have been entitled in either case to say
that the property was in equity theirs, and that the trustees,
except in so far as they were creditors, had no beneficial inter-
est in it? That is a question that depends on the construction
of the deed. I think the construction of the deed is such, that
the creditors. parties to the deed, have bargained that they
shall have a hold pver the whole property of the firm, divided
or undivided, and I think this bargain i effectual, and, if so,
that the creditors do take the profits of the concern, so as to
make them their property before they are divided.
The deed does not provide what is to be done in the case
which hasactually happened, viz.: That of the concern prov-
















































































































































Cox vs. HICKMAN. 
The arrangement is tllat the trading might terminate on the 
creditors being paid, which perhaps was the termination which 
the persons entering into the arrangement hoped for. In that 
<'.Use~ the deed provides thnt the property shall be made over 
to the Smiths, but by so doing the trade of the Stanton Iron 
Company ceases. "r110~ver the partners in that firm might be, 
they are no longer to carry on the business after the property 
is assigned to the Smiths. It might terminate by the concem 
being stopped by the creditors whilst it was yet solvent; that 
event is anticipated by the deed, and in that case it is pr.-ovided 
that the sm·plus, after.- paying all losses, should be divided 
amongst the creditors. It might continue for an indefinite 
period, neither so productive as to pay the creditors in full, 
nor so bad as to be stopped; and whilst it was so continued, 
the creditors were to have the net income or profits, and the 
contr.-ol of the management of the concern, and they were only 
to have these powers. Does this make them interested in the 
property or profits so as to make them partners? That ques· 
tion depends on the ~trcct of the deed, and it will be answered 
when we have determined the extent of their interest in th.e 
property of.the firm. Suppose, a not impossible case, that the 
trustees had, as individuals, contracted a joint debt for som1~ 
purpose unconnected with the Stanton Ir.-on Company; could 
the partnership property of the Stanton Iron Company have 
been taken to pay the debt? Or, if the trustees had become 
reduced to one person, and he had become a bankrupt, would 
the assets of the 8tanton Iron Company have passed to his 
assignees? Or would the creditors, who are parties to the 
deed of arrao~em:.-nt, have been entitled in either case to say 
that the property was in equity theirs, and that the trustees, 
except in so far as they were creditors, had no beneficial inter· 
est in it? That is a question that depends on the construction 
of the deed. I think the construction of the deed is such, that 
the creditors, parties to the deed, have bargained that they 
shall have a bold ovP.r the whole property of the firm, divided 
or undivided, and1 I think this bargain is effectual, and, if so, 
that the creditors do take the {>routs of the concern, so as to 
make th~m their property before they are divided. 
The deP.d does not provide what is to be done in the case 
which has ·actnally happened, viz.: That of the concern prov-
ing insolvent; hut the law declares that those who take the 
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profits of a trading_concern as such are liable to the losses,
even if they have stipulated to the contrary. Waugh vs. Career,
Sm-ith’s Lead. Cas. 786 (artte, p. 67), and the notes thereto.
The phrase, taking the profits as such, is not a happy one,
and there is some difiiculty at times in defining what it means,
but I think it means at all events this. It is not p0SSiblur.
according to the common law, to cause a trading concern to be
carried on, on the terms that the advantages of a partnership,
including the ‘participation in profits, and tl1c partnership lien
and security over the assets of the firm, shall belong to those
who have but a limited liability. I am aware of no case or
authority inconsistent with the proposition thus guarded.
Now, it seems to me, that the present defendants have, by the
deed to which they are parties, stipulated that the business
shall bc carried on for their benefit, and under their control;
that they shall be interested in all the property of the firm to
such an extent as to have a partnership lien upon it.
This shows that they are not merely persons permitting the
Smiths or the trustees to carry on the business and relying on
it as a fund for payment, but that they take the profits as such,
and having done so, they are partners as regards third persons.
I agree that the question is one of agency, viz., whether the
defendants authorized the managers of this firm to bind them;
but I think it is an incident attached by law to a participation
in the profits to the above extent, that such authority is given
to those managing the concern. I think, for the reasons I have
given, that this arrangement deed does amount to a stipula-
tion for a participation in the profits as such by the creditors.
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the defendants are
liable as acceptors of the bills of exchange declared upon.
K Lord Cn.-\.\‘won'rn. In this case the judges in the court of
exchequer chamber were equally divided, and unfortunately
the same difference of opinion has existed among the learned
judges who attended this house during the argument at your
lordships’ bar. Except, therefore, from an examination of the
grounds on which their opinions are founded, we can derive no
benefit in this case from their assistance. \Ve cannot say
that in the opinions delivered in this house, there is more
authority in favor of one view of the case than of the other.
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profits of a trading. concern as such are liable to the losses, 
even if they have stipulated to the contrary. Waugh vs. Cart'er, 
~moith's Lead. Cas. 786 (artte, p. 67), and the notes thereto. 
The phrase, taking the profits as such, is not a happy one, 
and there is some difficulty at timC'S in defining what it meanl', 
but I think it means at all events this. It is not possiblP. 
according to the common law, to cause a trading concern to be 
carried on, on the terms thnt the advantages of a partnership, 
mcluding the participation in profits, and the partnership lien 
and security over the assets of the firm, shall belong to tboase 
who have but a limited liability. I am aware of no case or 
authority inconsistent with the pmposition thus guarded. 
Now, it seems to me, that the present defendants have, by the 
deed to which they are parties, stipulated that the business 
aball be carried on for their benefit, and under their control; 
that they shall be interested in all the property of the firm to 
such an extent as to have a partnership lien upon it. 
This sho~s that they are not merely persons permitting the 
Smiths or the trustees to carry on the business and relying on 
ft as a fund for pa~·ment, but that they take the profits as such, 
and having done so, they are partnns as re-g1ll'ds third persons. 
I agree that the question is one of agency, viz., whether the 
defendants authorized the managers of this firm to bind them; 
but I think it is an incident attached by law to a participation 
in the profits to the above extent, that such authority is given 
to thm~e managing the concern. I think, for the reasons I have 
given, that this m·rangement deed does amount to a stipuln-. 
tion for a participation in the profits as such by the creditorti. 
For these reasons, I am of opinion that the defendants are 
liable as acct>ptors of the bills of exchange declared upon. 
K. Lord Cn,\NWOH'l'H. In this case the judges in the court of 
exchequer chamber were equally divided, and unfortunately 
the same difference of opinion has existed among the learned 
judges who attended this house during the argument at your 
lordships' bar. Except, therefore, from an examination of the 
grounds on which their opinions are founded, we can derin• no 
benefit in this case from their assistance. We cannot say 
that in the opinions delivered in this house, there is more 
authority in favor of one view of th.e case than of the other. 
We must not, howeYer, infer that your lordships have not 
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derived material aid from the opinions expressed by the judges.
These opinions have stated the arguments on_ the one side and
the other with great clearness and force, and what.we have to
do now is to decide between them.
In the first place let me say that I concur with those of the
learned judges who are of the opinion that no solid distinction
exists between the liability of either defendant, in an action
on the bills, and in action for goods sold and delivered. If he
would have been liable in an action for goods sold and deliv-
ered, it must be because those who were in fact carrying on the
business of the Stanton Iron Company were carrying it on as
his partners or agents; and, as the bills were accepted, accord-
ing to the usual course of business, for ore supplied by the
plaintiflf, I cannot doubt that if the trade was carried on by
those who managed it as partners or agents of the defendant,
he must be just as liable on the bills as he would have been in
an action for the price of the goods supplied. His partners or
agents would have the same authority to accept bills in the
ordinary course of tradc. as to purchase goods on credit.
The liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is
in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent.
Where two or more persons are engaged, as partners in an
ordinary trade, each of them has an implied authority from the
others to bind all by contracts entered into according to the
usual course of business in that trade. Every partner in trade
is, for the ordinary purposes of the trade, the agent of his
copartners, and all are therefore liable for the ordinary trade
contracts of the others. 1’artners may stipulate among them-
selves that some one of them only shall enter into particular
contracts, or into any contracts, or that as to certain of their
contracts none shall be liable except those by whom they are
actually made; but with such private arrangements third per-
sons, dealing with the firm without notice, have no concern.
The public have a right to assume that every partner has
authority from his copartner to bind the whole firm in con-
tracts made according to the ordinary usages of trade.
This principle applies not only to persons acting openly and
avowedly as partners, but to others who, though not so acting,
are, by secret or private agreement, partners with those who
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dt•rived material aid from the opinions expressed by the judges. 
These opinions have stated the arguments on the one side and 
the other with great clearness and force, uud what.we have to 
do now is to decide between them. 
In the first place let me say that I concm· with those of the 
learned judges who are of the opinion that no solid distinction 
exists between the liability of either defendant, in an action 
on the bills, and in action for goods sold and delivered. If he 
would have been liable in an action for goods sold and deliv· 
ered, it must be because those who were in fa.ct carrying on the 
business of the Stanton Iron Company were carrying it on as 
his partners or ag(•nts; and, as the bills were accepted, accord-
ing to the usual course of bm1iness, for ore supplied by the 
plaintiff, I cannot doubt that if the trade was carried on by 
those who managed it as partners or agents of the defendant, 
he must be just as liable on the bills as he would have been ht 
an action for the price of the goods supJllied. His partners or 
ag(•nts would have the same nnthority to accept bills in th(' 
ordinary courge of trnde, ns to purchase goods on credit. 
The liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner is 
in truth the liability of a principnl for the acts of his agent. 
Where two or more perMOUM arc engaged. as partners in an 
ordinary trade, ea.ch of them has an implied authority from the 
othf'rs to bind all by cont.rncts entered into according to the 
usual course of business in that trade. En~ry paMner in trad~ 
is, for the ordinary pnrposf>s of the trad<', the agent of his 
copartners, and all are thPrefore liable for the ordinary trade 
contracts of the others. Partners may stipulate among them-
seh·es that some one of tlll'm only Rhall enter into particular 
contracts, or into any contracts, or th.at as to ceMain of tl1eir 
contracts none shall be liable except thoS<> b~· whom they are 
actually made; but with sud1 pl'i vate arrang-ements third per-
sons, dealing wi~h the firm without notice, have no concern. 
The public have a right to assume that every partner has 
authority from his copaMner to bind the whole firm in con· 
tracts made according to the ordinary usages of trade. 
This principle applies not only to persons acting openly and 
avowedly as partners, but to others who, though not so acting, 
are, by secret or private agreement, pal'tners with those who 
appear ostensibly to the world as the persons carrying on the 
business. 
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In the case now before the house, the court of common pleas
decided in favor of the respondent that the appellant, by his
execution of the deed of arrangement, became, together with
the other creditors who executed it, a partner with those who
conducted the business of the Stanton Iron Company. The
judges in the court of exchequer chamber were equally divided.
so that the judgment of the court of common pleas was
afljrmed. The sole question for adjudication by your lordships
is, whether this judgment thus aiiirmed was right.
I do not propose to consider in detail all the provisions of
the deed. I think it suflicient to state them generally. In the
first place there is an assignment by Messrs. Sm-ith to certain
trustees, of the mines and all the engines and machinery used
for working them, together with all the stock in trade, and
in fact all their property, upon trust, to carry on the business;
and, after paying its expenses, to divide the net income ratably
amongst the creditors of Messrs. Smith, as often as there shall
be funds in hand sufficient to pay one shilling in the pound;
and, after all the creditors are satisfied, then in trust for
Messrs. Smith.
Up to this point the creditors, though they executed the
deed, are merely passive; and the first question is, what would
have been the consequence to them of tlreir executing the deed
if the trusts had ended there? Would they have become part-
ners in the concern carried on by the trustees merely because
they passively assented to its being carried on upon the terms
that the net income, 11. e., the net profits should be applied in
discharge of their demands? I think not ;' it was argued that
as they would be interested in the profits, therefore they would
be partners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the
test, or one of the tests, whether a person not ostensibly a
partner, is nevertheless, in contemplation of law, a partner, is,
whether he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is, in general, a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidence,
that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried
,on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such a.
claim. But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade
has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. \Vhen
that is the case he is liable to the trade obligations, and
















































































































































78 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
In the case now· before the house, the court of common pleas 
decitled in favor of the respondent that the appellant, by hh1 
execution of the deed of arrangement, became, together with 
the other creditors who executed 1t, a partner with those who 
conducted the business of the Stanton Iron Company. Tht~ 
judges in the con rt of exchequer chamber were equally divided. 
so that the judgment of the court of common pleas was 
aft}rmed. The sole question for adjudication by your lordships 
is, whether this judgment thus affirmed wn's right. 
I do not propose to consider in detnil nil the provisions of 
the deed. I think it suflicient to state them generalJy. In tlu~ 
first place there is an a.ssi~ment by Musrs. Smith to certain 
trustees, of the mines and all the engines and machinery usc1J 
for working them, together with a.II the stock in trade, and 
in fact all their property, upon trust, to carry on the business; 
and, after paying- its expenses, to divide the net income ratably 
amongst the creditors of .Messrs. Smith, as often as there shall 
be funds in h:md sufficient to pay one shilling in the pournl; 
and, after all the creditors are satisfied, then in trust for 
Messrs. Smith. 
Up to this point the creditors, though they executed tlw 
deed, are merely passive; and the first question is, what would 
have been the consequence to them of t~ir executing the deed 
if the trusts had ended there? Would they have become part· 
ners in the concern carried on by the trustees merely becauf'e 
they passively assented to its being carried on upon the terms 
that the net income, i. e., the net profits shodd be applied in 
discharge of their demands? I think n-0t ;'it was argued that 
as they would he interested in the profits, therefore they would 
be partners. But this is a fallacy. It is often said that the 
test, or one of thP te~ts, whether a person not ostensibly a. 
partner, is nevertl1C'less, in contemplation of law, a partner, iR, 
whether he is entitled to partiripate in the profits. This, no 
doubt, is, in general, a sutliciently accurate test; for a right to 
participate in profits affords cogent, of.ten conclusive evidenci>, 
that the trade in which the profits have been made was carried 
,on in part for or on behalf of the person ~ctting up such a 
claim. But the real ground of the liability is, that the trade 
ha's b<>en carried on by persons acting on his behalf. 'Vhen 
that is the case he is liable to the trade obligations, and 
entitled to its profits, or to a share of them. It is not strictly 
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correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact
that the trade.has been carried on on his behalf, it e., that he
stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting
ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made.
Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner, it
seems to me to follow that ‘the mere concurrence of creditors
in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or
trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the
profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them
partners with their debtor, or the trustees. 'The debtor is still
the person solely interested in the profits, save only that he
has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit
of the profits a they accrue, though he has precluded himself
from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge
of his-debts. The trade is not carried on by or on account of
the creditors; though their consent is necessary in such a case,
for without it all the property might be seized by them in exe-
cution. But the trade still remains the trade of the debtor or
his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by or
on behalf of whom it is carried on.
I have hitherto considered the case as it would have stood if
the creditors had been merely passively assenting parties to
‘the carrying on of the trade, on the terms that the profits
should be applied in liquidation of their demand. But I am
aware that in this deed special powers are given to the cred-
itors, which, it was said, showed that they had become part-
ners, even if that had not been the consequence of their con-
currence in the previous trust. The powers may be described
briefly as, first, a power of determining by a majority in value
of their body, that the trade should be discontinued, or, if not
discontinued. then, secondly, a power of making rules and
orders as to its conduct and management.
These powers do not appear to me to alter the case. The
creditors might, by process of law, have obtained possession
of the whole of the property. By the earlier provisions of the




















































































































































Oox vs. H1cKHAN. 79 
correct to say that his right to share in the profits makes him I ( 
liable to the debts of the trade. The correct mode of stating 
the pronosition is to say that the same thing. which entitles : 
him to the one makes him liable to the other, namely, the fact 
that the trade has been carried on on his behalf, ~ e~, that he / 1 
stood in the relation of principal towards the persons acting 1 
ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been ) 
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been 
made. 
Taking this to be the ground of liability as a partner, it ~ · 
seems to me to follow that ·the mere concurrence of creditors { 
in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or \ 
trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the . 
profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them :\ 
partners with their debtor, or the trustees. 'The debtor is still 
the person solely interested in the profits, save only that be 
has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit 
of the profits as they accrue, though be has precluded himself 
from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge 
of bis ·debts. The trade is not carried <>n by or on account of 
the creditors; thoug-b their consent is necessary in such a case, 
for without it all the property might be seized by them in exe-
cution. But the trade still remains the trade of the debtor or 
his trustees; the debtor or the trustees are the persons by or 
on behalf of whom it is carried On. 
I have hitherto considered the case as it would have stood tf 
the creditors had been merely passively assenting parties to 
lthe carrying on of the trade, on the terms that the profits 
should be applied in liquidation of their demands. But I am 
' aware that in this deed special powers are given to the cred-
itors, which, it was said, showed that they bad becoipe part-
ners, even if that bad not been the consequence of their con-
currence in the previous trust. The powers may be described 
briefly as, first, a power of determining by a majority in value 
of their body, that the trade should be discontinued, or, if not 
discontinued, then, secondly, a power of making rules and 
orders as to its conduct and management . 
• 
These powers do not appear to me to alter the case. The 
creditors might, by process of law, have c:>btained possession 
of the whole of the property. By the earlier provisions of the 
deed they consented to abandon that right, and to allow the 
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‘trade to be carried on by the trustees. The effect of these
powers is only to qualify their consent. They stipulate for a
right to withdraw it altogether; or, if not, then to impose terms
as to the mode in which the trust to which they had agreed
should be executed. I do not think that this alters the legal
condition of the creditors. The trade did not become a' trade
carried on for them as principals, because they might have
insisted on taking possession of the stock, and so compelling
the abandonment of the trade, or because they might have pre-
scribed terms on which alone it should be continued. Any
trustee might have refused to act if he considered the terms
prescribed by the creditors to be objectionable. Suppose the
deed had stipulated, not that the creditors might order the dis-
continuance of the trade, or impose terms as to its manage-
ment, but that some third person might do so, if, on inspect-
ing the accounts, he should deem it advisable; it could not be
contended that this would make the creditors partners, if they
were not so already; and I can see no difference between stip-
ulating for such a power to be reserved to a third person, and
reserving it to themselves.
I have, on these grounds, come to the concludon that the
creditors did not. by executing this deed, make themselves
partners in the Stanton Iron Company, and I must add that a
contrary decision would be much to be deprecated. Deeds of
arrangement. like that now before us, are, I believe, of fre-
qucnt occurrence; and it is impossible to imagine that cred-
itors who execute them have any notion that by so doing they
are making themselves liable as partners.
This would be no reason for holding them not to be liable,
if. on strict principles of mercantile law, they are so; but the
very fact that such deeds are so common, and that no such
liability is supposed to attach to them, affords some argument
in favor of the appellant. The deed now before us was exe-
cuted by above a hundred joint creditors; and a mere glance
at their names is sutiicient to show that there was no intention
on their part of doing anything which should involve them in
the obligationsof a partnership. I do not rely on this; but,
at least, it shows the general opinion of the mercantile world
on the subject. I may remark that one of the creditors I see
is the Midland Railway Company, which is a creditor for a
sum only of £39. and to suppose that the directors could imag-


















































































































































80 CAB~ ON PARTNERSHIP. 
'trade to be carried on by the trustees. The effect of these 
powers is only to qualify their consent. They stipulate for a 
right to withdraw it altogether; or, if not, then to impose terms 
at1 to the mode in which the trust to which they had agreed 
should be executed. I do J!Ot think that this alters the legal 
condition of the creditors. The trade did not become a· trade 
curriPd on for them as principals, because they might have 
insi8ted on taking possession of the stock, and so compelling 
the abandonment of the trade, or because they might have pre-
scri111•d terms on which alone it should be continued. Any 
tru8h·e might have refused to act if he considered the terms 
prescribed by the creditors to be objectionable. Suppose the 
deed had stipulated, not that the creditors might order the dis-
continuance of the trade, or impose terms as to its manage-
ment, but that some third person might do so, if, on inspect-
ing the accounts, he should deem it advisable; it could not be 
cont«i>nded that this would make the creditors partners, if they 
were not so already; and I can see no difference between stip-
ulu ting for such a power to be reser\'ed to a thh-d person, and 
res1•rving it to themselves. 
I have, on these grounds, come to the conclusion that the 
crt>ditors did not, by executing this deed, make themselves 
partners in the Stanton ll'on Company, and I must add that a 
contrary decision would be much to be deprecated. Deeds of 
arrangement, like that now before us, are, I believe, of fre-. 
qtwnt occurrence; and it is impossible to imagine that cred· 
itors who execute them have any notion that by so doing they 
arP making thPmselves liable as partners. 
This would be no reason for holding them not to be liablf', 
if. on strict prinriples of mercantile law, they are so; but the 
y{'r.v fact that imrh deeds are so common, and that no such 
liability is 1rnpposed to attach to them, affords some argument 
in favor of the appellant. The deed now before us was exe-
cnt(!d by above a hundred joint creditors; and a mere ~lance 
at their names is sufficient to show that there was no intention 
on their part of doing anything which should involve them in 
tlw obligations · of a partnership. I do not rely on this; but, 
nt lea~t, it showR the general opinion of the mercantile world 
on the subject. I may remark that one of the creditors I see 
is t be .Midland Railway Company, which is a creditor for a 
t'lnm only of £3!1, and to suppose that the directors could imag· 
ine that they were making themselves partners is absurd. 
F
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. The authorities cited in argument did not throw much light
upon the subject. I can find no case in which a person has
been made liable as a dormant or sleeping partner, where the
trade might not fairly be said to have been carried on for him,
together with those ostensibly conducting it, and when, there-
fore, he would stand in the position of principal towards the
ostensible members of the firm as his agents. This was cer-
tainly the case in Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (amte p. 67).
There Messrs. Carver, who were ship agents at Portsmouth,
agreed with Giesler, a ship agent at Plymouth, that if he
would establish himself as a ship agent at Cowes, they would
share between them the profits of their respective agencies
in certain stipulated proportions. \Vhen, therefore, Geisler,
in pursuance of the agreement, did establish himself at Cowes,
and there carry on the business of a ship agent, he, in fact,
carried it on for the benefit of Messrs. Carver as well as of
himself; and the court held that, in these circumstances, the
stipulation which they had entered into that neither party
to the agreement should be answerable for the acts of the
other, was a stipulation which they could not make so as
thereby to affect third persons. Each firm was carrying on
business on account not only of itself but also of the other firm;
this, therefore, made each firm the agent of the other.
The case of Bond 1:8. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, could admit of
no doubt. The question was, whether G. H. Watts and P. H.
\Vatts could sue jointly for business transacted by them as
attorneys. They had agreed to become partners on a stipula-
tion that P. H. W'atts should always receive £300 yearly out
of the first pro-fits as his share, and should not be liable for any
losses. It was argued that this latter stipulation prevented
them from being partners; but the court held the contrary.
Each of them worked for the common benefit of both, and
each of them, therefore, act:-d as agent of the other. The pro-
duce of the labor of each was to be brought into a common
fund, to be afterwards shared according to certain arrange-
ments between themselves. The case was really free from
doubt.
A similar principle explains and justifies the decision of
the Court of Common Pleas in Barry vs. Ncsham, 3 C. B. 641.
The question was, whether the defendant was liable for goods

















































































































































Oox vs. llrnu1AN. 81 
The authorities cited in argument did not throw much light 
upon the subject. I can find no case in which a person has 
been made liable as a dormant or sleeping partner, where the 
trade might not faiuly be said to have been carried on for him, 
together with those ostensibly conducting it, and when, there-
fore, he would stand in the position of principal towards the 
ostensible members of the firm as his agents. This was cer-
tainly the case in Wauoh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (cmte p. 67). 
There Messrs. Carver, who were ship agents at Portsmouth, 
agreed witb Giesler, a ship agent at Plymouth, that if he 
would establish himself as a ship agent at Cowes, they would 
share between them the profits of their respective agencies 
in certain stipulated proportions. \Vhen, therefore, Geisler, 
in pursuance of the agreement, did establish himself at Cowes, 
nnd there ca1Ty on the business of a ship agent, he, in fact, 
curried it on for the benefit of Messrs. Carver as well as of 
himself; and the court held that, in these circumstances, the 
stipulation which they had entered into that neither party 
to the agreement should be answerable for the acts of the 
other, was a stipulation which they could not make so as 
thereby to affect third persons. Each firm was carrying on 
business on account not only of itself but also of the other firm; 
this, therefore, made each firm the agent of the other. 
The case of Bond -vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, could admit of 
no doubt. The question was, whether G. H. \Vatts and P. H. 
\Vatts could sue jointly for business transacted by them as 
attorneys. ThPy had agreed to become partners on a stipula-
tion that P. H. Watts should always receive £300 yearly out 
of the first profits as his sha1-e, and should not be liable for any 
losses. It was argued that this latter stipulation prevented 
them from being partners; but the court held the contrary. 
Each of them worked for the common benefit of both, and 
ea.ch of them, therefore, act~'d as agent of the other. The pro-
duce of the labor of each was to be brought into a common 
fund, to be afterwards shared according to certain arrange-
ments between themselves. The case was really free from 
doubt. 
A similar principle explains and justifies the decision of . 
the Court of Common Pleas in BarnJ vs. Ncslia.m, 3 C. B. 641. 
The question was, whether the 'defendant was liable for goods 
furnished to one Lowthin in the wuy of his business as the 
11 
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printer and publisher of a newspaper. Nesham had sold the
stock and good will of the paper to Lowthin, in consideration
of £1,500, and on a further stipulation, that for seven years
the profits were to be applied as follow: that is to say, Low-
thin was to have the first £150 of the annual profits, then
Nesham was to have them to the extent of £500, if they made
so much, and Lowthin was to have all beyond. It is clear
that Lowthin was conducting the business for the common
benefit of both, subject to their private arrangements as to
the shares they should separately be entitled to; Lowthin
was, therefore, clearly the agent of Nesham.
Owen vs. Body is at most a case in which a dictum may be
found. The Court of Queen’s Bench was quite right in hold-
ing that the creditors were justified in refusing to execute
the deed tendered to them; and that is all which was decided.
None of the other cases cited carried the doctrine farther
than those I have referred to, and I therefore think that in
this case the judgment appealed against ought to be reversed.
' n
K Lord Wm\'sz.m'nALa. These two cases come before your
lordships on appeal from the Exchequer chamber by which
court: a judgment of the court of ‘common pleas was affirmed.
They both involve the same question. The court of common
pleas was unanimous in favor of the plaintiif below. The
court of exchequer chamber, consisting of six learned judges,
and the six learned judges who have given their advice to
your Lordships, have been equally divided. I am of opinion
that the judgment of the court of common pleas was wrong,
and that it ought to be reversed. ~-
' The question is, whether either of the defendants, Cox pr
Wheatcroft, was liable as acceptor of certain bills of exchange,
dated in March, April, and June, 1855, drawn by the plaintifl’
below on the Stanton Iron Company, and accepted by one
James Haywood as per pron that company. And the simple
question will be this, whether Haywood was authorized by
either of the defendants, as a partner in that company, to bind
him by those acceptances.
Haywood must be taken to have been authorized to accept
for them by those who actually carried on business under that
firm. Were the appellants partners in it? The case will depend
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printer and publisher of a newspaper. Nesham had sold the 
stock and good will of the paper to Lowthin, ia considr-ration 
of £1,500, and on a further stipulation, that for seven years 
the profits were to be applied as follows: that is to say, Low-
thin was to have the first £150 of the annual profits, then 
Nesham was to have them to the extent of £500, if they made 
so much, and Lowthin was to have all beyond. It is clear 
that Lowthin was conducting the business for the common 
benefit of both, subject to their private arrangements as to 
the shares they should separately be entitled to; Lowtbin 
was, the ref ore, clearly the agent of N es ham. 
Owen vs. Body is at most a case in which a dictum may be 
found. The Court of Queen's Bench was quite right in hold-
ing that the creditors were justified in refusing to execute 
the deed tendered to them; and that is all which was decided. 
None of the other cases cited carried the doctrine farther 
than those I have referred to, and I therefore think that in 
this oase the judgment appealed against ought to be reversed. 
1\ Lord WENSI,EYDALE. These two cases come before your 
lordships on appeal from the Exchequer chamber by which 
court n judgment of the court of ·common pleas was affirmed. 
They both involve the same question. The court of common 
pleas was unanimous in favor of the plaintiff below. The 
court of exchequer chamber, consisting of six learned judges, 
and the six learned judges who have given their advice to 
your Lordships, have been equally divided. I am of opinion 
that the judgment of the court of common pleas wa.s wmng, 
') 
and that it ought to be reversed. 
· The question is, whether either of the defendants, Cox ,or 
Wheatcroft, was liable as acceptor of ce1·tain bills of exchange, 
dated in March, April, and June, 1855, drawn by tbe plaintiff 
below on the Stanton Iron Company, and ac~ept<'d by one 
James Haywood as per proc that company. And the simple 
question will be this, whether Haywood was authorfaed by 
either of the defendants, as a partner in that company, to bind 
him by those acceptances. 
Haywo~d must be taken to have b<>en authorized to accept 
for them by those who actually carried on business under that 
ftrm. Were the a.ppellants partn<>rs in it? The case will depend 
entirely on the constructioh of the deed of the 13tb November, 
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1849. There is no other evidence affecting either of them. And
the question is, whether the subscription of both, as creditors
of- the Smiths, made them partners in the business carried on
by the trustees in the name of the Stanton Iron Company.
Wheatcroft could not be liable in the character of trustee,
for he had ceased to be such before the bills were drawn, and
the plaintiff knew it.
The terms of the deed have been so fully brought before
your lordships, that I do not consider it necessary to state
them at any length. One of the provisions in the deed was
this authority to the trustees to execute all contracts and
instruments in carrying on the business, which would cer-
tainly authorize the making or accepting bills of exchange.
The question then is, whether this deed makes the creditors
who sign it partners with the trustees, or, what is really the
same thing, agents, to bind them by acceptances on account
of the business.
The law as to partnership is undoubtedly a branch of the
law of principal and agent; and it would tend to simplify and
make more easy of solution the questions which arise on this
subject, if this true principle were more constantly kept in
view. Mr. Justice STORY lays it down in the first section of
his work on Partnership. He says: “Every partner is an
agent of the partnership, and his rights, powers, duties, and
obligations, are in many respects governed by the same rules
and principles as those of an agent; a partner virtually
embraces the character of both a principal and agent.” Pothier
says: “Contractus societatis non secus ac oontractus mandati."
Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2,'Intr0duction.
A man who allows another to carry on trade, whether in
his own name or not, to buy and sell, and to pay over all the
profits to him, is undoubtedly the principal, and the person
so employed is the agent, and the principal is liable for the
agent’s contracts in the course of his employment. So if two
or more agree that they should carry on a trade, and share
the profits of it, each is a principal, and each is an a.gent for
the other, and each is bound by the other’s contract in carry-
ing on the trade, as much as a single principal would be by
the act of an agent, who was to give the whole of the profits
to his employer Hence it becomes a test of the liability of
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1849. There is no other evidence affecting either of them. And 
the question is, whether the subscription of both, as creditors 
of· the Smiths, made them partners in the business carried on 
by the trustees in the name of the Stanton Iron Company. 
Wheatcroft could not be liable in the clmracter of trustee, 
for he had ceased to be such before the bills were drawn, and 
the plaintiff knew it. 
The terms of the deed have been so fully brought before 
y<>ur lordships, that I do not consider it necessary to state 
them at any length. One of the provisions in the deed was 
this authority to the trustees to execute all contracts and 
instruments in carrying on the business, which would cer-
tainly authorize the making or accepting bills of exchange. 
The question then is, whether this deed makes the creditors 
who sign it partners with the trustees, or, what is really the 
same thing, agents, to bind them by acceptances on account 
of the business. 
The law as to partnership is undoubtedly a branch of the 
law of principal and agent; and it would tend to simplify and 
make more easy of BOlntion the questions which arise on this 
subject, if this true principle were more constantly kept in 
view. Mr. Justice STORY lays it down in the first section of 
his work on Partnership. He says: "Every partner is an 
agent of the partnership, and his rights, powers, duties, and 
obligations, are in many respects governed by the same rules 
and principles as those of an agent; a partner virtually 
embraces the character of both a principal and agent." Pothier 
says: "Cofl.tractus societatis non secus ac contractus mandati." 
Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, 'Introduction. 
A man who allows another to carry on trade, whether in 
his own name or not, to buy and sell, and to pay over all the 
profits to him, is undoubtedly the principal, and the person 
eo employed is the agent, and the principal is liable for the 
agent's contracts in the course of his employment. So if two 
or more agree that they should carry on a trade, and shar..:? 
the profits of it, ench is a principal, and each is an agent for 
the other, and each is bound by the other's contract in carry-
ing on the trade, as much as a single principal would be by 
the act of an agent, who was to give the whole of the profits 
~to bis employer. Hence it becomes a test of the liability of 
tone for the contract of anotl,ler, that be is to receive the wbold 
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/
‘for a part of the profits arising from that contract by virtue of
the agreement made at the time of the employment. I believe
this is the true principle of partnership liability. Perhaps the
maxim that he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the
loss, often stated in the earlier cases on this subject, is only
the consequence, not the cause, why a man is made liable as
a partner. i
Can we then collect from the trust deed that each of the
subscribing creditors is a partner with the trustees, and by the
mere signature of the deed constitutes them his agents for
carrying on the business on the account of himself and the
rest of the creditors? 1 think not. It is true that by thisdeed
the creditors will gain an advantage by the trustees carrying
on the trade; for, if it is profitable, they may get their debts
paid; but this is not that sharing of profits which constitutes
the relation of principal, agent, and partner. -
If at creditor were to agree with his debtor to give the latter
time to pay his debt till he got money enough out of his trade
to pay it, I think no one‘ could reasonably contend that he
thereby made him his agent to contract debts in the way of
his trade; nor do I think that it would make any difference
that he stipulated that the debtor should pay the debt out
of the profits of the trade.
' The deed in this case is merely an arrangement by the Smiths
to pay their debts, partly out of the existing funds, and partly
out of the expected profits of their trade; and all of their
effects are placed in the hands of the trustees, as middlemen
between them and their creditors, to effect the object of the
deed, the payment of their debts. These effects are placed
in the hands of the trustees as the property of the Smiths,
to be employed as the deed directs, and to be returned to them
when the trust are satisfied. I think it is impossible to say
that the agreement to receive this debt, so secured, partly out
of the existing assets, partly out of the trade, is such a par-
ticipation of profits as to constitute the relation of principal
and agent between the creditors and trustees. The trustees
are certainly liable, because they actually contract by their
undoubted agent; but the creditors are not, because the
trustees are not their agents. The case of Owen vs. Body, 5
{A & E. 28, on which some reliance was placed, is really no
authority for holding that the creditors by subscription became
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?or a part of the profits arising from that contract by virtue of 
Jthe agreement made at the time of the employment. I believe 
this is the true principle of partnership liability. Perhaps the 
maxim that he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the 
loss, often stated in the earlier cases on this subject, is only 
the consequence, not the cause, why a man is made liable as 
a partner. 
Can we then collect from the trust deed that each of the 
subscribin~ creditors 'is a partner with the trustees, and by the 
mere signature of the deed constitutes them his agents for 
carrying on the busine.ss on the account of himself and the 
rest of the creditors? I think not. It is true that by thi_~d 
the creditors will gain an advantage by the trustees carrying 
on the trade; for, if it is profitable, they may get their debts 
paid; but this is not that sharing of profits which constituteat 
the relation of principal, agent, and partner. · 
If a creditor were to agree with his debtor to give the latter 
time to pay bis debt till he got mouey enough out of his trade 
to pay it, I think no one· could reasonably contend that he 
thereby made him his agent to contract debts in the way of 
his trade; nor do I think that it would make any difference 
that he stipulated that the debtor should pay the debt out ""-..... 
of the profits of the trade. 
'The deed in this case is merely an arrangement by the Smiths 
to pay their debts, partly out of the existing funds, and partly 
out of the expected profits of their trade; and all of thefr 
effects are placed in the bands of the trustees, as middlemen 
between them and their creditors, to effect the object of the 
deed, the payment of their debts. These effects are placed 
in the hands of the trustees as the property of the Smiths, 
to be employed as the deed directs, and to be returned to them 
when the trusts are satisfied. I think it is impossible to sa7 
that the agreement to receive this debt, so secured, partly out 
of the existing assets, partly out of the trade, is such a pat•-
ticipation of profits as to constitute the relation of principal 
and agent between the creditors and trustees. The trustees 
are certainly liable, because they actually contract by theh· 
undoubted agent; but the creditors are not, because the 
(trustees are not their agents. The case of Owen tis. Body, a 
J A. & E. 28, on which some reliance was placed, is really no 
authority for holding that the creditors by subscription became 
O
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actually partners. In the short judgment of Lord Dr-muss,
the expression used is not that the deed imposed such con-
ditions as would have constituted a partnership amongst those
who subscribed it, but as might have had the effect, which is
a much more doubtful expression. It was quite enough for
the decision of that case, that the subscription exposed them
to the peril of being considered partners, of which peril the
opinions of a majority of the judges leave no doubt; and that
prevented the deed from being a fair deed, and good again-st
creditors. So did the provision that the effects which ought
to have been divided equally amongst the creditors, should
be put in peril by being employed in trade.
.The case of J ancs vs. Whitbrearl-, 20 Law J., N. S., C. P. 217,
which was distinguished as authorizing a trader to wind up,
can hardly be supported on the ground of that distinction. It
exposed the creditors signing to perils, though not in the
same degree.
The case of Bond cs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, cited on the
part of the plaintiff, turned entirely upon the special circum-
stances, it being perfectly olear that both the two attorneys,
of whom the plaintiff was assignee, were the parties with
whom the contract was made, independent of the circumstance
of a payment of fixed sums being made to one out of the
profits. It was not that fact that was considered to make them
partners; it was not necessary to decide that point.
I, therefore, advise your lordships to reverse the judgment.
Cnourron and W1r.Lnms, J. J., gave opinions concurring
with BLACKBURN, J., in holding the defendants liable.
CHANNELL, B., YVIGHTMAN, J ., Ponnocx, Ch. B., Lord Chan-
cellor Caurnnnn, Lord Bnouonam and Lord Cnmnmsvonn gave
opinions holding the defendants not liable.
Judgment reversed.

















































































































































Cox va. H1cKllAN. 85 
a<·tually partners. In the short judgment of Lord DENMAN, 
the expression used is not that the deed imposed such con-
ditions as would have constituted a partnership amongst those 
who subscribed it, but as might have had the effect, which is 
a much more doubtful expression. It was quite enough for 
the decision of that case, that the subsc1iption exposed them 
to the peril of be-ing considered partners, of which peril the 
opinions of a majority of the judges leave no doubt; and that 
prevented the deed from being a fair deed, and good against 
creditors. So did the provision that the effects which ought 
to have been divided equally amongst the creditors, should 
be put in peril by be~ng employed in trade. 
,The case of Janes t:s. Wllitbre.a<l, 20 Law J., N. S., C. P. 217, 
which was distinguished as authorizing a trader to wind up, 
can hardly be supported on the ground of that distinction. It 
exposed the creditors signing to perils, though not in the 
l1aJil e degree. 
The ease of Bond vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W. 357, cited on the 
pnrt of the plaintiff, turned entirely upon the special circum-
stances, it being perfectly clear that both the two attorney .. , 
of whom the plaintiff was assignee, were the parties with 
whom the contract was mo.de, independent of the circumstance 
of a payment of fixed sums being made to one out of the 
profits. It was not that fact that was considered to make them 
partners; it was not necessary to decide that point. 
I, therefore, advise your lordships to reverse the judgment. 
CROMPTON and -n'n,LIAMS, J. J., gave opinions concurring 
with BLACKnunN, .J., in holding the defendants liable. 
CHANNELL, B., "\VIGHTMAN, J., POLLOCK, Ch. B., Lord Chan-
cellor CAMPBELL, Lord BnoUGHAM and Lord CHELMSFORD gave 
opinions holding the defendants not liable. 
Judgment reversed. 
Nar.: See Mecbem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 58, ~ 
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BE ECHER vs. BUSH.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881.
45 Mlch., 18s, 40 Am. Rep. 465, 7 N. W. Rep. 785.
Assumrsrr for goods sold and delivered. Defendant brings
error. The opinion states the facts.
H. M. Chem;-er, John Atkinson and J. P. Whittcmore, for
defendant. '
W. B. Jackson and C. I. Walker, for plaintiff.
COOLEY, J. The purpose of the action in the court below
was to charge Beecher as partner with Williams for a bill of
supplies purchased for the Biddle House in Detroit. Thefacts
are all found by special verdict, and are few and simple.
Beecher was owner of the Biddle House, and Williams pro-
posed in writing to “hire the use” of it from day to day, and
open and keep it as a hotel. Beecher accepted his proposals
and Williams went into the house and began business, and in
the course of the business made this purchase. The proposals
are set out in full in the special verdict.
The question is whether by accepting the proposals Beecher
made himself a partner with \Villiams in the hotel business;
and this is to be determined on the face of the writing itself.
It is conceded that Beecher was never held out to the public
as a partner, and that the bill of supplies was purchased on
the sole credit of Williams and charged to him on the books of
the plantiffs below. The case, therefore, is in no way embar-
rassed by any questions of estoppel, for Beecher has done
nothing and suffered nothing to be done which can preclude
him from standing upon his exact legal rights as the contract
fixed them.
Nor do we understand it to be claimed that the parties
intended to form a partnership in the hotel business, or that
they supposed they had done so, or that either has ever
claimed as against the other the rights of a partner. It is per-
fectly clear that many things which are commonly incident to
:1 partnership these parties meant should be wholly excluded
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BEECHER vs. BUSH. 
Supreme Cot1rt of Michigan, 1881. 
4fi Mich., 188, 40 Am. Rep. 465, 7 N. W. Rep. 7~ 
AssUMPSIT for goods sold and delivered. Defendant brings 
error. The opinion states the facts. 
H. M. Cheever, John Atlcinson and J. P. Whittemore, for 
defendant 
W. B. Jackson and 0. I. Walker, for plaintiff. 
CoOl,EY, J. The purpose of the action in the court below 
was to charge Beecher as partner with \Villiams for a bill of 
supplies purchased for the Biddle Romie in Detroit. The facts 
are all found by special verdict, and are few and simple. 
Beecher was owner of the lliddle House, and Williams pro· 
posed in writing to "hire the use" of it from day to day, and 
open and keep it as a hotel. Beecher accepted his proposals 
and \Yilliams went into the house and began business, and in 
the course of the business made this purchase. The proposals 
are set out in full in the special verdict. 
The question is whether by accepting the proposals Beecher 
made himself a partner with \Villiams in the hotel business; 
and this is to be determined on the face of the writing itself. 
It is conceded that Beecher was never held out to the public 
as a partner, and that the bill of supplies was purchased on 
the sole credit of Williams and charged to him on the books of 
the plantiffs below. The case, therefoI"e, is in no way embar-
rassed by any questions of estoppel, for Rwrher has done> 
nothing and suffered nothing to be done which can precludP 
him from standing upon bis exact legal rights as the contrnct 
:fixed them. 
Nor do we understand it to be claimed that the parties 
intended to form a partm~rship in the hotel business, or that 
they supposed thc:>y had done so, or that either has ever 
claimed as against the other the rig·hfa of a partner. It is per-
fc>ctly clear that man.r things which are commonly incident to 
a partnership these parties nwant should be wholly excludell 
from their arrangement. Some of these were of prima1-y 
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importance. It is plain, for example, that Beecher did not
understand that his credit was to be in any way involved in
the business, or that he was to have any interest in the supplies
that should be bought, or any privilege to decide upon them, or
any legal control whatever until proceeds were to be divided,
or any liability to losses if losses were suffered. These are
among the most common incidents to a partnership; and while
some of them, and possibly all of them, may not be necessary
incidents, yet the abence of all is very conclusive that the
parties had no purpose whatever to form a partnership, or to
give to each other the rights and powers, and subject each
other to the obligations of partners. In general this should be
conclusive. If parties intend no partnership the courts should
give efl’ect to their intent, unless omebody has been deceived
by their acting or assuming to act as partners; and any such
case must stand upon its peculiar facts, and upon special
equities.
It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partner-
ship and yet to form one. If they agree upon an arrangement.
which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they
call it something else, or that they even expressly declare that
they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the
legal import of their agreements, and names go for nothing
when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be
inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor
of their intent; otherwise we should “carry the doctrine of con-
structive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the
unwaryz” KENT, C. J., in Post vs. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.)
470, 504.
We have then a case in which the party it is sought to
charge has not held himself out, or sufl"ered himself to be held
out as a partner either to the public at large or to the plaintiff,
and has not intended to form that relation. T He is not, there-
fore, a. partner by estoppel nor by intent; and if he is one at
all, it must be by construction of law. _
What then are the indicia of partnership in this case; the
marks which force that construction upon the court irrespect-
ive of the intent of the parties; that in fact control their intent.
and give to the parties bringing suit rights which they were
not aware of when they sold the supplies?
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Importance. It is plain, for example, that Beecher did not 
understand that his credit was to be in any way involved in 
the business, or that he was to have any interest in the supplies 
that should be bought, or any privilege to decide upon them, or 
any legal control whatever until proceeds were to be divided, 
or any liability to losses if losses were suffered. These are 
among the most common incidents to a partnership; and while 
some of them~ and possibly all pf them, may not be necessary 
incidents, yet the absence of all is very conclusive that the 
parties had no purpose whatever to form a partnership, or to 
give to each other the rights and powers, and subject each 
other to the obligations of partners. In general this should be 
conclusive. If parties intend no partnership the courts should 
give effect to their intent, unless somebody bas been deceived 
by their acting or assuming to act as partners; and any such 
case must stand upon its pecuJiar facts, and upon special 
equities. 
It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partner· 
ship and yet to form one. 1f they agree upon an arrangement 
which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that they 
call it something else, or that they even expressly declare thnt 
they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the 
legal import of their agreements, and names go for nothing 
when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be 
inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor 
of their intent; otherwise we should "carry the doctrine of con· 
strnctive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the 
unwary:i' KENT, C. J., in Post vs. Kimberly, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 
470, 504. 
We have then a ca.se in which the party it is sought to 
charge bas not held himself out, or suffered himself to be held 
out as a partner either to the public at large or to the plaintiff, 
and has not intended to form that relation. He is not, there· 
fore, a partner by estoppel nor by intent; and if he is one at 
all, it must be by construction of law. 
What then are the indida of partnership in this case; thP. 
marks which foree that construction upon the court irrespect-
ive of the intent of the parties; that in fact control their intent, 
and give to the parties bringing suit rights which they wer1~ 
not aware of when they sold the supplies? 
In the elaborate and able brief which has been presented 
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in behalf of the defendants in error, it is conceded that the
fact that Beecher was to receive each day a sum “equal to
one-third of the gross receipts and gross earnings” for the
day would not necessa.rily make him a partner. What is
claimed is that the fact is “cogent evidence” that Beecher
was to participate in the results of the business in a manner
that indicated he was a principal in it, and was not receiving
compensation for the use of property merely. The view of
the law here suggested is undoubtedly correct. There may
_be a participation in the gross returns that would make the
receiver a partner, and there may be one that would not. The
quetion is in what capacity i participation had. Gross returns
are not profits, and may be large when there are no profits,
but it cannot be predicated of either gross returns or profits
that the right to participate is conclusive evidence of partner-
ship. This is settled law both in England and in this country
at this time, as is fully shown by the authorities cited for the
defendants in error. It was recognized in Hinman vs. Littcll,
23 Mich. 484; and in New York, where the doctrine that par-
ticipation in profits proves partnership has been adhered to
most closely, it is admitted there are exceptions: Eager vs.
Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97.
But we quite agree with counsel for defendants in error that
no case ought to turn upon the unimportant and mereverbal
distinction between the statement in the papers that Beecher
was to h-ave a sum “equal to” one-third of the gross receipts
and gross earnings, and a statement that he was to have one-
third of these receipts and earnings. It is perfectly manifest
it was intended he should have one-third of them; that they
should be apportioned to him regularly and daily, and not that
Williams was to appropriate the whole and pay a sum “equal
to” Beecher’s proportion when it should be convenient. VVe
can conceive of cases where the difference in phraseology
might be important, because it might give some insight into
the real intent and purpose of the parties, and throw light
upon the question wheth-er that which was to be received
was to be received’ as partner or only by way of compensa-
tion for something supplied to the other, but the intent in this
ease is too manifest to be put aside by any mere ingenuity in
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in behalf of the defendants in error, it is conceded that the 
fa_ct that Beecher was to receive each day a sum "equal to 
one-third of the gross receipts and gross earnings" for the 
day would not necessa.rily make him a partner. What is 
claimed is thnt the fact is "cogent evidence" that Beecher 
was to participate in the results of the business in a manner 
that indicated he was a principal in it, and was riot receiving 
compensation for the use of property merely. The view of 
the law here suggested is undoubtedly correct. There may 
,be a participation in the gro$8 returns that would make the 
receiver a partner, and there may be one that would not. The 
question is in what capacity is participation bad. Gross returns 
are not profits, and may be large when there are no profits, 
but it cannot be predicated of either gross returns or profits 
that the right to participate is conclusive evidence of partner-
&hip. i'his is settled law both in England and in this country 
at this time, as is fully shown by the authorities cited .for the 
defendants in error. It was recognized in Hin.man vs. Littell, 
23 Mich. 484; and in New York, where the doctrine that par-
ticipation in profits proves partnership has been adhered to 
most closely, it is admitted there are exceptions: Eager vs. 
Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97. 
But we quite agree with counsel for defendants in error that 
no case ought to turn upon the unimportant and mere. verbal 
distinction between the statement in the papers that Beecher 
was to have a sum "equal to" one-third of the gross receipts 
and gross earnings, and a sta.tement that he was to have one-
third of these receipts and earnings. It is perfectly manifest 
it was intended be should have one-third of them; that they 
should be apportioned to him regularly and daily, and not that 
Williams was to appropriate the whole and pay a sum "equal 
to" Beecher's proportion when it should be convenient. "\\r~ 
can conceive of cases where the difference in phraseology 
might be important, because it might give some insight into 
the real intent and purpose of the parties, and throw light 
upon the questi<:m whether that which was to be ~eceived 
was to be received as· partner or only by way of compensa-
tion for something supplied to the other, but the intent in this 
eue is too manifest to be put aside by any mere ingenuity in 
the use of words: Loomis vs. M MB1uJ.lZ, 12 Conn. 69, 79, 30 Am. 
Dee. 596. 
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ln Goa: vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268. 306 (ante P. 70), Lord
CRANWORTH stated very clearly his views of what should be
the test of partnership. “It is often said,” he says, “that the
test, or one of the tests whether a person not ostensibly a part-
ner, is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is
whether he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no
doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidence,
that the trade in which the profits have been made was car-
ried on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such
a claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade
had been ‘carried on by persons acting on his behalf. When
that is the case, he is liable on the trade obligations, and
entitled t-0 its profits, or to a share of them. It is not strictly
correct to say that his right to s are in the profits makes him
liable to the debts of the trade. %The correct mode of stating
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles
him to the one makes him liable to the other) namely, the
fact that the trade has been carried on in his behalf—~i. e., that
he stood in the relation of principal toward the persons act-
ing ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been
made”) There is something understandable by the common
In-ind in this test; there is nothing artificial or arbitrary about
it; it falls in with reason and enables every man to know when
he makes his business arrangements whether he runs the risk
of extraordinary liabilities contracted'without his consent or
approval.
It is said, and we believe justly, in Bnllen vs. Sharp, L. R. 1
0. B. 86, that the decision in Goa: cs. Hickman brought back
the law of England to what it should be, and Mr. Baron Bram-
WELL, referring to what was declared to be law in Waugh vs.
Ga/rver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 2 Smith’s Lead. Cases, 9th Amer. ed. 1178,
(ante, p. 67) expressed the hope “that this notion is overruled,”
adding that it is “one which I believe has caused more injustice
and mischief than any bad law in our books:” p. 128. It is
certainly overruled very conclusively in Great Britain: Kilshaw
vs. Juices, 3 B. & S. 847, 113 Eng. Com.L. 846; Shaw vs. Gault, 16
Irish C. L. R. 357; Holmc vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218; E1:
parte Delhasse, 7 oh. Div. 511. And though in New York, the
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ln Goa: ·vs. Hickman., 8 H. L. Cas. 2G8. 30G (ante p. 70), Lord 
CRA.NWORTH stated very clearly his views of what should be 
the test of partnership. "It is often said," he says, "that th~ 
test, or one of the tests whether a person not ostensibly a part-
ner, is nevertheless in contemplation of law a partner, is 
whether he is entitled to participate in the profits. This, no 
doubt, is in general a sufficiently accurate test; for a right to 
participate in profits affords cogent, often conclusive evidenee, 
that the trade in which the profits have been ID.(lde was car-
ried on in part for or on behalf of the person setting up such 
a claim. But the real ground of the liability is that the trade 
bad been carlied on by persons acti.ng on his behqlf. When 
that is the case, he is liable on the trade obligations, and 
entitled to its profits, or to a sha,re of them. It is not strictly 
correct to say that his iight to s9are in the profits makes him 
liable to the debts of the trade. l The correct mode of stating 
the proposition is to say that the same thing which entitles 
him to the one makes hini liable to the other) namely, the 
faet that the trade has been carried on in his behalf-i. e., that 
be stood in the relation of principal toward the persons act-
ing ostensibly as the traders, by whom the liabilities have been 
incurred, and under whose management the profits have been 
made."/ There is something understanda1ble by the common 
mind in this test; there is nothing artificial or arbitrary about 
it; it falls in with reason and enables every man to know when 
he makes his business arrangements whether he runs the risk 
of extraordinary lia1bilities oontracted ·without bis consent or 
approval. 
It is said, and we believe justly, in Bullen tJS. Sharp, L. R. 1 
C. B. 86, that the decision in Goa: t:s. Hickma.n brought back 
the law of England to what it should be, and :Mr. Baron BRAM-
WELL, referring to what was declared to be law in Waugh t's. 
Garver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 2 Smith's Lead. Cases, 9th Amer. ed. 1178, 
(ante, p. 67) expressed the hope "that this notion is overruled,'' 
adding that it is "one which I believe has caused more injustice 
and mischief than any bad law in our books:" p. 128. It is 
certainly overruled very conclusively in Great Britain: Kilshaw 
tJ3. Ju~a, 3 B. & S. 847, 113 Eng. Com.L. 846; Shaw va. Gault, 16 
. Irish C. L. n. 357; Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218; E:c 
parte Delhasse, 7 Ch. Div. 511. And though in New York, the 
eonrts, hampered BOmewhat by early cases, have not felt them-
12 
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selves at liberty to adopt and follow the decision in Cow vs.
Hickman to the full extent, it would be easy to show that the
American authorities in the main are in harmony with it.
Indeed, that is very well shown in Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H.
276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, where the authorities are collated. It
must be admitted, however, that the attempts at an application
of the test to the complicated facts of particular cases have not
been productive of harmonious results. A few cases may be
mentioned which, in their facts, have a resemblance, more or
less strong, to the one before us.
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 VVend. 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376, was
a case where parties who were severally owners of horses and
stages on difierent parts of one stage line made an arrange-
ment that the fares received by both should be divided between
them in proportions agreed upon. This was held to constitute
them partners, so that a third person injured by the careless-
ness of a driver employed by one might bring suit for the neg-
ligence of aill. But in the somewhat similar case of Eastman
vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, the conclusion of part-
nership or no partnership, it was said, must be drawn as one
of fact. “The real and ultimate question,” says SMITH, J . (p.
289), “in all cases like the present, is one of agency. Did the
person sought to be charged stand in the relation of principal
to the person contracting the debt? Participation in the profits
is not decisive of that question, ‘except so far as it is evidence
of the relation of principal and agent between the persons "ak-
ing the profits and those actually carrying on the business.’
Wliether such relation existed is a question of fact. ‘ ‘ "
There is no sound foundation for an arbitrary rule of law
requiring courts or juries to regard participation in the profits
as a decisive test which will, in all instances, necessitate the
conclusion that the participator is liable for the debts.”
In Farmers’ Ins. Co. vs. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, it appeared
that by arrangement one party furnished the ground and the
material for making brick, and also the fuel, and anotherwas
at the expense of burning the brick. The brick were then to
be divided, the former reoei-ving one-fourth and the latter three-
fourths, and the latter was also to pay the former ten dollars
on each one hundred thousand bricks. This was held to create
a partnership, and Musicr vs. Trumpbour, 5 Wend. 274, and
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selves at liberty to adopt and follow the decision in Oo:D "'· 
Hickman to the full extent, it would be easy to show that the 
American authorities in the main are in harmony with it. 
Indeed, that is very well shown in Eastman t;B. Clark, 53 N. H. 
276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, where the authorities are collated. It 
must be admitted, however, that the attempts-at an application 
of the test to the complicated fa~ts of particular cases have not 
been productive of harmonious results. A few cases may be 
mentioned which, in their facts, have a resemblance, more or 
less strong, to the one before us. 
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 Wend. 175, 31 Am. Dec. 376, was 
a case where parties who were severally owners of horses and 
stages on different parts of one stage line made an arrange-
ment that the fares received by both should be divided between 
them in proportions agreed upon. This was held to constitute 
them partners, so that a third person injured by the careless-
ness of a driver employed by one might bring suit for the neg-
ligence of aJI. But in the somewhat similar case of Eastman 
vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192, the conclusion of part-
nership or no partnership, it was said, must be drawn as one 
of fact. "The real and ultimate question," says SMITH, J. (p. 
289), "in all cases like the present, is one of agency. Did the 
person sought to be charged stand in the relation of principal 
to the person contracting the debt? Participation in the profits 
is not decisive of that question, 'except so far as it is evidence 
of the relation of principal and agent between the persons tak-
ing the profits and those actually carrying on the business.' 
Whether such relation existed is a question of fact. • • • 
There is no sound foundation for an arbitrary rule of law 
requiring courts or juries to regard participation in the profits 
as a decisive test which will, in all instances, necessitate the 
conclusion that the participator is liable for the debts." 
In Farmers' Ins. Co. vs. Ross, 29 Ohio St. 429, it appeared 
that by arrangement one party furnished the ground and the 
material for making brick, and also the fuel, and another . was 
nt the expense of burning the brick. The brick were then to 
b:> divided, the former recei-ving one-fourth and the latter tbree-
fourths, and the latter was also to pay the former ten dollars 
on each one hundred thousand bricks. This was held to create 
a partnership, and Musier vs. Trumpbour, 5 Wend. 274, and 
E1;critt vs. Oltapman., 6 Conn. 347, were relied upon as 
nnthority. 
Bsscnsa vs. Buss. 91
The New York cases might support this decision, but the
case of Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, can
hardly be considered in accord with it. The facts were these:
B had a cloth factory. A agreed with him to furnish a full
supply of wool for two years, B to devote the factory for two
years exclusively to manufacturing and the net proceeds, after
deducting the incidental expenses and costs of sale, were to be
divided in the proportion of 55 per centum to A and 45 per
centum to B, and the cost of manufacture was to be shared
in like proportion. This was held no partnership. Says Hum‘-
INGTON, J.: “This comm-unity of profit is the test to deter»
mine whether the contract be one of partnership; and to con-
stitute it a partner must not only share in the profits, but
share in them as a principal; for the rule is now well estab-
lished that a party who stipulates to receive a sum of money
in proportion to a. given quantum of the profits, as a reward
for his labor, is not chargeable as a partner.” And of the share
set off to B he says it “is not expressed in terms to be for such
compensation; but this is its legal meaning :” pp. 77, 79. Moore
vs. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Bowman vs. Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Price
vs. Alexander, 2 Greene (Ia.), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526, may be
referred to for similar views.-
One of Chief Justice G11-:so.\:’s short but very lucid opinions
is in point here. Between Bronson, a manufacturer, and Dun-
ham, a country merchant, there was an agreement that the
former should furnish wooden handles made to order to the
latter, at a tariff of prices to be paid out of the store, on the
proceeds of the handles; Bronson finding the labor and stufi,
and receiving a further compensation for skill and the rent of
the torehouse, in the form of a commission of fifty per centum
on the net profits of the whole. It was sought to charge Dun-
ham as a partner with Bronson for the price of raw material
the latter had bought. Upon these facts it is said: “Now, it
has been so often and so invariably ruled in England and
America that a commission on profits is not such an interest in
theconcern as constitutes partnership that the point is at rest.
¥Vhat staggers the mind in this instance is the apparent shal-
lowness of the distinction when it is considered that a commis-
sion of fifty per cent is no more nor less than an equal division
of the profits; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction
















































































































































BEECHER vs. llu:m. 91 
'l'he New York cases might support this decision, but the 
case of Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69, 30 Am. Dec. 596, ~an 
bardly be oonsidered in accord with it. The facts were these: 
B had a cloth factory. A agreed with him to furnish a full 
supply of wool for two years, B to devote the factory for twet 
years exclusively to manufacturing and the net proceeds, after 
deducting the incidental expenses and costs of sale, were to be 
divided in the proportion of 55 per centum to A and 45 per 
centum to B, and the cost of manufacture was to be shared 
in like proportion. This was held no partnership. Says Hmn·· 
INGToN, J.: "This community of profit is the test to deter-
mine whether the contract be one of partnership; and to con-
stitute it a partner must not only share in the profits, but 
share in them as a principal; for the rule is now well estab-
lished that a party who stipulates to receive a sum of money 
in proportion to a given quantum of the profits, as a reward 
for his labor, is not chargeable as a partner." And of the share 
set oft' to B he says it "is not expressed in terms to be for such 
compensation; but this is its legal meaning:" pp. 77, 79. Moore 
vB. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Bowman vs. Bailey, 10 Vt. 170, and Price 
VB. Alexander, 2 Greene (Ia.), 427, 52 Am. Dec. 526, may be 
ref erred to for similar views., 
One of Chief Justice GrnsoN's short but very lucid opinions 
is in point here. Between Bronson, a manufacturer, and Dun-
ham, a country merchant: there was an agreement that the 
former should furnish wooden handles made to order to the 
latter, at a tariff of prices to be paid out of the store, on the 
proceeds of the handles; Bronson finding the labor and stuff, 
and receiving a further compensation for skill and the rent of 
the storehouse, in the form of a commission of fifty per centum 
on the net profits of the whole. It was sought to charge Dun-
ham as a partner with Bronson for the price of raw material 
the latter had bought. Upon these factR it is said: "Now, it 
has been so often and so invariably ruled in England awl 
America that a commission on profits is not such an interest in 
the concern as constitutes partnership that the point is at rest. 
\Vhat staggers the mind in this instance is the apparent shal· 
lowness of the distinction when it is considered that a commis-
Nion of fifty per cent is no more nor less than an equal division 
of the profits; but it must not be forgotten that the distinction 
is an arbitra.ry one, resting on nutbority, not principle; and 
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that, whatever be the proportion, the relation produced by a
compensation in the form of a commission is in every instance
the same. But by the terms of the contract Bronson and not
Dunham was to procure and pay for the stud; and they were
not to be partners in that part of the business. This provision,
I admit, would be inoperative against strangers, if the parties
had held themselves out to the public as partners, both in buy-
ing and selling; but assuming for the moment that there was
indeed a partnership in the handles when furnished, and in the
store when stocked with goods, yet it is to be borne in mind
that the handles, as well as the store goods, were to be put into
the concern as separate contributions to the joint stock; and
that, as the stuff for the handles was to be procured by Bron-
son it was consequently to be paid for by him, just as the store
goods were to be procured and paid for by 1)unham, having
been purchased on separate account. There may be a partner-
ship for selling and not for buying; or for buying and not for
selling; or for both buying and selling_,which is the most usual:
as if several put separate quantities of wheat into a common
stock to be ground into flour and sold on joint account; or
agree to buy jointly and divide the article when bought; or
agree to buy and sell on joint account. In the firt case each
would be liable for his own purchases only; but in the second
and third cases, each would be liable for the whole. Now if
there were any partnership in this instance it would be of the
first class; and in any view of the case the defendant would not
be liable:” Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 Pa. St. 255, 262.
Not dissimilar to this is the case of Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met.
82, which was also a case in which one party supplied the raw
materal and another manufactured it, and was to receive one-
third part of the net profits. This proportion, it was found,
was to be received by the manufacturer only as a compensation
for his labor and services; and it was held perfectly competent
to provide for making compensation by such a standard with-
out constituting a partnership. Perrinc vs. H ankinson, 11 N. J.
181, is relied upon as authority, among other cases. The same
doctrine was reiterated in Holmes vs. Old Colony R. R. Co., 5
Gray 58; Bradley vs. White. 10 Met. 303, 43 Am. Dec. 435; and
by DAY, J.., in a careful opinion in Harvey vs. Childs, 28 Ohio
Ht. 319 (post, p. 97) already referred to.
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that, whatever be the. proportion, the relation produced by a 
compensation in the form of a commission is in every instauce 
the same. But by the terms of the contract Bronson and not 
Dunham was to ·procure and pay for the stuff; and they were 
not to be partners in that part of the busineHs. This provision, 
I admit, would be inoperative against strange1"S, if the parti~·s . 
hn.d held themselves out to the public as partners, both in bu.r-. 
ing and selling; but assuming for the moment that there was 
indeed a partnership in the handles when furnished, and in tli•~ 
store when stocked with goods, yet it is to be borne in mind 
that the handles, as well as the store goods, were to be put into 
the concern as E\fparate contributions to the joint stock; and 
that, as the stuff for the handles was to be procUI"ed by Bron-
&t>n it was consequently to be paid for by him, just as the store 
goods were to be procured aild paid for by Dunham, having \ 
been purchasea on separate account. '!'here may be a partnc.•r· 
ship for selling and not for buying; or for buying and not for 
selling; or for both buying and selling, which is the most usuul: 
as if seve1·al put separate quantities of wheat into a common 
stock to be ground into flour and sold on joint account; or 
agree to buy jointly and divide the article when bought; 01· 
agree to buy and sell on joint account. In the first case each 
would be liable for bis own purchases only; but in the second 
and third cases, each would be liable for the whole. Now if 
there were any partl!ership in this instance it would be of the 
ftrst class; and in any view of the case the defendant wouJd not 
be liable:" Dunham vs. Rogers, 1 fa. St. 255, 262. 
Not i:lissimilar to this is the case of Denny vs. Cabot, 6 Met. 
82, which was a1so a case in which one party suppJied the raw 
materal and another manufactured it, and was to receiYe one-
third part of the net profits. This proportion, it wa.s found, 
was to be receivffi by the manufacturer only as a compensation 
for his labor and services; and it was held perfectly competent 
to provide for making compensation by such a standard with-
cmt constitutinfl a partnership. Perrine vs. Hankinson, 11 N .. J. 
181, is relied upon as authority, among other cases. The same 
doctrine was reiterated in Holmes vs. Old Colony R. R. Co., 0 
Gray 58; Bradley/ vs. White, 10 Met. 303, 43 Am. D<'~. 435; and 
by DAY, J .. , in a careful opinion in Harvey vs. Oltilds, 28 Ohio 
St. 319 (post, p. 97) already ref erred to. 
It is needles~ to dtf' Other c·nsf's. 1'h<>y cnnnot all be recon-
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ever took hold of the judicial mind that the question of part
nership or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests
ciled, but enough are cited to show that in so far as the notion‘\
it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper corrective
had been applied. Except when one allows the public or indi-
vidual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partner-
ship when none exist, he is never to be charged as a partner l
unless by contract and with intent he has formed a relation
in which the elements of partnership are to be found. And
what are these? At the very least the following: Community
of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the con-
duct of which the parties are mutually principals of and agents
for each other, with general powers within the scope of the
business, which powers, however, by agreement between the
parties themselves, may he restricted at option, to the extent
even of making one the sole agent of the other and of the
business.
In this case we have the lawful commerce or business,
namely, the keeping of the hotel. We have also in some sense
a community of interest in the proceeds of the business, though
these are so divided that all the profits and all the losses are to
be received and home by one only. But where in the mutual
arrangement does it appear that either of the parties clothed
the other with an agency to act on his behalf in this business?
We speak now of intent merely, and not of any arbitrary impli-
cation of intent which the law, according to some authorities,
may raise irrespective of and perhaps contrary to the intent.
Could Beecher buy for the business a dollar’s worth of provi-
sions? Could he hire a porter or a waiter? Could he discharge
one? Could he say the house shall be kept for fastidious
guests exclusively and charges made in proportion to what they
demand, or on the other hand that the tables shall be plain. and
cheap so as to attract a greater number? Could he persist in
lighting with gas if \Villiams chose something different, or
reject oil if Williams saw fit to use it? Was a servant in the
rhouse at his beck or disposal, or could he turn off a guest that
WVilliams saw fit to receive, or receive one that Williams
.1-ejected as unfit? In short, what one act might he do or
authority exercise which properly pertains to the business of
keeping hotel, except merely the supervision of accounts, and
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ciled, but enough are cited to show that in so far as the notion~ 
ever took hold of the judicial mind that the qne.stion of part 
nership or no partnership was to be settled by arbitrary tests 
it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper corrective · 
had been applied. Except when one allows the public or indi- ) 
vidual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partner- 1 
ship when none exist, he is never to be charged as a partner \ 
unless by contract and with intent he has formed a relation ; 
in which the elements of partnership are to be found. And ·. 
what are these? At the very least the following: Community l 
of interest in some lawful commerce or business, for the con-
duct of which the parties are mutually principals of and agents 
for each other, with general powers within the scope of the 
business, which powers, however, by agreement between the , 
parties themselves, may be restricted at option, to the extent · 
even of making one the sole agent of the other and of the · 
business. 
In this case we have the lawful commerce or business, 
namely, the kPPping of the hotel. We have also in some sense 
a community of interest in the proceeds of the business, though 
these are so divided that all the profits and all the losses are to 
be receh·ed and borne by om• only. But where in the mutual 
arrangement does it appear that either of the parties clothed 
.:the other with an agency to net on his behalf in this business? 
We speak now of intent merely, and not of nny arbitrary impli-
cation of intent which thP law, according to some authoritieii, 
may raise irrespective of and perhaps contrary to the intent. 
Could Beecher buy for thf> business a dollar's worth of provi-
sions? Could he hire a portPr or a waiter'? Could he discharge~ 
one? Could hf> say thP house shall be kept for fastidioue 
gursts exclusively and charges made in proportion to what they 
demand, or on the other hand that the tables shall be plain and 
cheap so as to attract n greater number? Could he persist in 
lighting with gas if 'Villiams chose somPthing different, or 
eject oil if "Willtams saw fit to use it? Was a servant in the 
ousP at his beck or disposal, or could he turn off a guest that 
'\Villiams saw fit to receive, or receive one that Williams 
. l'ejected as unfit? In short. what one act might he do or 
; authority exercise which properly pertains to the business of 
keeping hotel, except merely the supervision of accounts, and 
! this for the purpose of accounting only? And how could he be 
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principal in a business over which he had absolutely no con-
trol? Nor must we forget that this is not a case in which
powers which might otherwise be supposed to exist are taken
away or excluded by express stipulation; but they are powers
which it is plain from their contract the parties did not suppose
would exist, and, therefore, have not deemed it necessary to
exclude.
' On the other hand, what single act are we warranted in
inferring the parties understood Williams was to do for, and
as the agent of, Beecher? Not to furnish supplies surely, for
these it was expressly agreed should be furnished by \Villiams
and paid for daily. Not to contract debts for water and gas
bills and other running expenses, for by the agreement there
were to be no such debts. Nor was this an agreement merely
that expenses incurred for both were to be met without the use
of credit, but it was expressly provided that they were to be the
expenses of one party only, and to be met by him from his own
nieans. There was to be no employment of credit, but it was
the credit of Williams alone that was in the minds of the
parties.
It is dificult to understand how the element of agency could
be more perfectly eliminated from their arrangements than it
actually was. Beecher furnished the use of the hotel and a
clerk to supervise the accounts, and received for so doing onc-
third the gross returns.‘ It was not understood that he was
to intermeddle in any way with the conduct of the business
so long as Williams adhered to the terms of his contract. If
the business was managed badly Beecher might be a loser, but
how could he help himself? He had reserved no right to cor-
rect the mistakes of \Villiams, supply his deficiencies, or over-
rule his judgments. He did, indeed, agree to take and account
for whatever furniture should be brought into the house by
Williams, but the bringing any in was voluntary and so far
was Beecher from undertaking to pay to the sellers the pur-
chase price, that on the contrary the value was to be offset
against the deterioration of that which Beecher supplied; and
it was quite possible that, as between himself and Williams,
there might be nothing to pay. And while Williams was not
compellable to put any in, Beecher, on the other hand, had no
authority to put any in at the cost of Williams.
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principal in a business over which he had absolutely no con-
trol? Nor must we forget that this is not a case in which 
powers which might otherwise be supposed to exist are taken 
away or excluded by exprt'SS stipulation; but they are powers 
which it is plain from their contract the parties did not suppoi.:.<. .. 
would exist, and, therefore, have not deemed it necessary to 
exclude. 
· On the other hand, what single act are we warranted in 
inferring the parties understood \Villinms wa.s to do for, and 
as the agent of, Beecher? Not to furnish supplies surely, for 
these it was expressly agreed should be furnished by \Villiamli 
and paid for daily. Not to contract debts for water and ga.s 
bills and other running expenses, for by the agreement there 
were to be no such debts. Nor was this an agreement merely 
that expenses incurred for both were to be met without th~ use 
of credit, but it was expressly provided that they were to be the 
expenses of one party only, and to be met by him from his own 
u1enns. There was to be no employment of credit, but it was 
the credit of \Villiams alone that was in the minds of tht' 
parties. 
It is difficult to undf'rstand how the element of agency could 
be more perfectly eliminated from their arrangements than it 
actually was. Beecher furnished the use of the hotel and n 
clerk to supervise the accounts, and received for so doing on1•-
third the gross ret\]rns. · It was not understood that be waH 
to intermeddle in any way with the conduct of the businesli 
so long as Williams adhered to the terms of his contract. If 
the business was managed badly Beecher might be a loser, but 
·how could he help himself? He bad reserved no right to cor-
rect the mistakes of 'Villiams, supply his deficiencies, or over-
rule his judgments. Ile did, indeed, agree to take and account 
for whatever furniture should be brought into tbe house by 
Williams, but the bringing any in was voluntary and so far 
was Beecher from undertaking to pay to the sellers the plll"-
chase price, that on the contrary the value was to be offset 
against the deterioration of that which Beechl'r supplied; and 
it was quite possible that, as between himself and William~, 
there might be nothing to pay. And while Williams was not 
compeIJable to put any in, Beecher, on the other hand, had no 
authority to put any in at the cost of 'Williams. 
It is plain, therefore, that if there is any agency in this case 
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for Beecher to act for Williams, or Williams to act for Beecher,
it is an agency implied by law, not only without having
expressed a purpose that an agency shall exist, but in spite of
their plain intent that none shall exist. If, therefore, we shall K
say that agency of each to act for the other, or agency of one
to act for both in the common business, is to be the test of
.partnership, or to be one of the tests, but that the law may l
imply the agency irrespective of the intent, and then imply the
partnership from the agency, we see at once that the test dis- /
appears from all our calculations. To imply something in
order that that something may be the foundation whereupon
to erect an implication of something else is a. mere absurdity.
The test of par; ship must be found in the intent of the
parties themselves. They may say they intend none when
their contract plainly shows the contrary; and in that case the
intent shall control the contradictory assertion; but here the
intent is plain.
We have not overlooked anyone of the circumstances which
on the argument were pointed out as peculiar to this case.
None of them is inconsistent with the intent that Beecher was
to be paid for the use of his building and furniture merely. He
retained possession; but a reason for this appears in the power
he reserved to terminate the arrangement whenever the con-
tract was broken by VVilliams. Being in possession he might
suppose he could eject Williams without suit. He might also
think it important to the reputation of the hotel that no land-
lord should be in debt for supplies or for servants’ wages; and
for that reason require cash payments. It is easy to see that
as lessor he might have had an interest in all the stipulations to
which William’s assent was required.
There is another view of this case that seems to us conclu-
sive. lt is urged on behalf of defendants in error that Beecher
was a dormant partner. Now a- dormant partner is a secret
partner; one who becomes such by aseciet arrangement, while
his associate is held out to the world as sole proprietor and
manager of the business. Was this the case here? Nothing
in the record indicates it. Beecher was in possession of the
hotel, and we must suppose had his clerk there. These were
facts open and patent to the whole world who had occasion to
go there or to deal with Williams. They naturally suggested
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for Beecher to act for 'Williams, or \Vi Ilia ms to act for Beecher, 
it is an agency implied by law, not only without having 
expressed a purpose that an agency shall exist, but in spite or 
their plain intent that none shall exist. If, therefore, we shall { 
say that agency of each to act for the other, or agency of one \ 
to act for both in the common business, is to be the test of . 
,partnership, or to be one of the tests, but that the law may f 
imply the agency irrespective of the intent, and then imply the 
partnership from the agency, we see at once that the test dis- / 
/ 
appears from all our calculations. To imply something in 
order that that something may be the foundation whereupon 
to erect an implieation of something else is a mere absurdity. 
The test of par: ·ship must be found in the intent of the 
parties themselves. They may say they intend none when 
their contract plainly shows the contrary; and in that case the 
intent sbia,)] control the contradictory assertion; but here the 
intent is plain. 
We have not overlooked anyone of the circumstances which 
on the argument were pointed out as peculiar to this case. 
None of them is inconsistent with the intent that Beecher was 
to be paid for the use of his building and furniture meFely. He 
retained possession; but a reason for this appears in the power 
he reserved to terminate the arrangement whenever the con-
tract was broken by 'Villiams. Being in possession he might 
suppose he could eject \Villiams without suit. He might also 
think it important to the reputation of the hotel that no land-
lord should be in debt for supplies or for servants' wages; and 
for that reason require cash payments. It is easy to see that 
as lessor be might have had an interest in all the stipulations to 
which 'William's assent was required. 
There is another view of this case that seems to us conclu-
sive. It is urged on behalf of defendants in error that Beecher 
was a dormant partner. Now a dormant partner is a secret 
partner; one who becomes such by a secret arrangement, while 
his associate is held out to the world as sole proprietor and 
manager of the business. Was this the case here? Nothing 
in the record indicates it. Be€cher wa-s in possession of the 
hotel, and we must suppose ha.d his clerk there. 'fbese were 
· facts open and patent to the whole world who had occasion to 
go there or to deal with Williams. They naturally suggested 
the inquiry what was the arrangement between the pa.rties; 
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and there is nothing in the case to indicate that plaintiffs in
error would not have learned all the details of the arrangement
had they made the necessary inquiries. There is no indication
anywhere of intended secrecy. If, therefore, there was any
partnership at all, it existed because the contract and the
open and public conduct of business under it created one, and
the right of the defendants in error to recover must depend
upon whether they had a right, with the contract before them,
to understand that they were furnishing supplies on the credit
of Beecher. \Vould they have had this right ?. If so, no inter-
ference of Beecher, and no notice to them not to sell to
Williams relying on Beecher’s credit, would have been
of the least avail. If he had said to them, “Gen-
tlemen, by our contract, Mr. Williams furnishes all
the supplies; I do not and cannot control in respect to quality,
quantity, or cost; he alone, by our understanding, is to pay for
them, and I forbid you to sell on my credit;” it would all have
been useless. On their view of the case he was bound by an
iron rule of the law, from which it would have been impossible
to recue his credit until the arrangement with Williams
should in some manner be terminated. And this would have
been the case also even if the arrangement with Williams had
been a secret one, and Beecher had attempted to protect him-
self by disclosing its terms. This is as much as to say that
parties are not at liberty to contract as they please, even when
they propose nothing ~ong and do nothing unfair to any one.
But we cannot bring our minds to this result.
Our conclusion is that Beecher and \Villiams, having never
intended to constitute a partnership, are not as between them-
selves partners. There was to be no common property, no
agency of either to act for the other or for both, no participa-
tion in profits, no sharing of losses. If either had failed to per-
form his part of the agreement, the remedy of the other would
have been a suit at law, and not a bill for an accounting in
equity. If either had died, the obligations he had assumed
would have continued against his representatives. \Ve also
{think there can be no such thing as a partnership as to third
persons when as between the parties themselves there is no
par tnerslnp and the third persons hawe not been misled by con-
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and there is nothing in the case to indicate that plnlntitfa In 
error would not have lenrned all the details of the arrangement 
bad they made the necessary inquiries. There is no indication 
anywhere of intended secrec·y. If, therefore, there was any 
pnrtlwrsbip at all, it existed because the contract and the 
01wn and public conduct of business under it created one, and 
the right of the defendants in error to recover must dep~nd 
upon whether tbPy ~ad a right, with the contract before them, 
to understand that thPy were furnishing supplies on the credit 
of Beecher. \Vould they have had this l'ight'!. If so, no inter-
ference of Beecher, and no notice to them not to sell to 
'Villialll.9 relying on Beecher's credit, would have been 
of the least avail. If he had said to tlwm, "Gen-
tlemPn, by our contract, Mr. Williams furnishes all 
the supplies; I do not nnd cannot control in respect to quality, 
quantity, or cost; he alone, by our understanding, is to pay for 
them, and I forbid ;rou to Hell on my credit;" it would all have 
been useless. On their view of the case he was bound by an 
iron rule of the law, from which it would have been impm1siblc 
to rescue his credit until the arrangement with \Villiams 
should in some manner be terminated. And this would have 
bec>n the case also even if the arrangement with \Villiams had 
been a secret one, nnd Beecher had attempted to protect him-
self by disclosing its terms. This is as much as to say that 
parties are not at libPrly to contract as th.-.v please, even wlwn 
they propose nothing ·on~ and do nothing unfair to any one. 
But we cannot bring our minds to this rei;mlt. 
Our conclusion is that nec>ther and "'illiams, having never 
hit<>ndPd to constitute a pm·tnership, are not as betwPPn them-
seh·es partners. There was to be no common property, no 
ng<'ncy of either to act for the other or for both, no participa-
tion in profits, no sharing of losses. If eitlwr bad failed to per-
form his part of the agreement, the rem('dy of thP other would 
have been a suit at law, and not a bill for an accounting in 
equity. If either had died, the obligations he had assumed_ 
would have continued against his repr('Sl'ntatives. We also ·. 
(think there can be no such thing as a partnership as to third " 
p1•rsons when as between the partit>s thPmseh-es there is no 
( 
pa1-tnership and the third persons have not been misled by con-
cealment of facts or by deceptive appearanc~s. J 
is-__-I-1-
HARVEY vs. UHILDS. 97'
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.
Nora: See Meohenfs Elem. of Pa/rt.n., § 63.
w
HARVEY vs. CHI LDS.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1876..
28 Ohio St. 319; 22 Am. Rep. 387.
Action for money. The case is sufficiently stated in the
opinion of the court.
Maison 1.6 D-irlam, for plaintiff in error.
Brinkerhofi at Diclcqz/, for defendants in error.
DAY, J. The original action was brought by Harvey against
Childs and Potter, to recover $158.40, for seventeen hogs sold
by Harvey to Potter.
Potter is in default. Childs denies his liability. His liability
is claimed solely on the ground that he was a partner of Pot-
ter in the adventure for which the hogs were purchased.
The partnership claimed rests on the following state of
facts: Potter went to Childs, and told him that he had con-
tracted for about two car loads of hogs, to be delivered at
Loudonville the next day, and had not the money to pay for
them. He asked Childs to advance the money and take an
interest in the hogs. Childs refused. Thereupon Potter pro-
posed that if he would let him have the money to enable him
to pay for the hogs he had bought, and others he might have
to buy to make the two car loads, he (Childs) should take
possession of the hogs when carred at Loudonville, as security,
for the money, take them to Pittsburg, sell them, and take his
pay from the proceeds of the sale; that he might have one-
half the net profits of the adventure, and that in no event
should Childs sustain any loss,‘ but the money advanced by
him should be fully paid by Potter in case the amount realized
from the sale of the hogs was insufiicient. Childs accepted the

















































































































































HARVEY VB. CHILDS• 
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new, trial 
ordered. 
NOTK: See .14eohem'• Elem. of Partn., § 63. 
• 
HARVEY vs. CHILDS. 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1816. , 
28 Ohio St. 31!>, 22 Am. Rep. 38T. 
Action for money. The case is sufficiently stated in the 
opinion of the court. 
Matson &; D·irlam, for plaintiff in error. 
Brinkerhoff & Dickey, for defendants in error. 
DAY, J. The original action was brought by Harvey against 
Childs and Potter, to recover $158.40, for sev~nteen hogs sold, 
by Harvey to Potter. 
Potter is in default. Childs denies bis liability. His liability 
is claimed solely on the ground that he was a partner of Pot-
ter in the adventure for "~hich the hogs were purchased. 
The partnership claimed rests on the following state of 
facts: Potter went to Childs, and told him that he had con-
tracted for about two car loads of hogs, to be delivered at 
Loudonville the next day, and had not the money to pay for 
them. He asked Child!!! to a.dvance the money and take au 
interest in the hogs. Childs refused. Thereupon Potter pro-
posed that if he would let him have the money to enable him 
to pay for the hogs be bad bought, and others he might have 
to buy to make the two car loads, he (Childs) should take 
possession of the hogs when carrPd at Loudonville, as security 
for the money, take them to Pittsburg, sell them, and take his 
pay from the proceeds of the sale; that he might have one--
half th~ pet profits of the adventure, and that in no event 
should Childs sustain any loss,- but the money advanced by. , 
bim should be fully paid by Potter in case the amount realized 
from the sa"le of the bogs was insufficient. Childs accepted the 
proposition, and, it being agreed that $2,500 would be enough 
13 
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to pay for the two car loads he advanced that sum to Potter.
Afterward, without the knowledge of Childs, Potter bought
the hogs in question of Harvey, on his own credit, and they
made part of the two car loads of hogs which were taken pos-
session of by Childs, sold in Pittsburg, and the avails of the
sale were appropriated in payment of the money advanced to
him. No profltswere made. The avails of the sale were
insuflicient to pay the amount advanced by-Childs, and Potter
paid him the deficiency, and for his time and expense in the
transaction. _
The question to be considered, then, is, are the defendants,
by co-nstruction of law, to be regarded partners as to the
plaintiff, being a. third person, in the debt incurred to him
by‘ Potter in his own name?
What shall he regarded, as to third persons, a. test of part-
nership between parties who did not consider themselves to
be partners, and who have done nothing to estop them from
denying that they are such has been much discussed by
courts and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be
one of difiicult solution. It is needless to review here the
numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results
is sufllcient.
N0 little difiiculty has been experienced in determining the
meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized as
tests of a partnership in such cases, and in their application
to the varying cases that arise.
The efiort has been to draw a distinct line between cases
where one has a community of interest in the profits of a.
business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled
to receive a sum of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a
sum proportioned to a quantum of profits, or a. share of the
profits as a compensation for services or labor.
Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the idea
of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation of the
liability of one partner for the acts of another is the relation
they sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent.
That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes the true test of a
partnership liability, and rests upon the just foundation that
the joint liability was incurred on the express or implied
authority of the party sought to be charged.
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to pay for the two car loads he advanced that sum to Potter. 
Afterward, without the knowledge of Childs, Potter bought 
the hogs in question of Harvey, on his own credit, and they 
made part of the two car loads of hogs which were taken pod-
session of by Childs, sold in Pittsburg, and the avails of the 
sale were appropriated in payment of the money advanced to 
him. No profits. were made. The avails of the sale were 
insufficient to pay the am<>unt advanced by·Childs, and Potter 
paid him the deficiency, and for his time and expense in the 
transaction. 
The question to be considered, then, ls, are the defendants,· 
by construction of law, to be regarded partners as to the 
plaintiff, being a third person, in the debt incurred to him 
by Potter in his own name? 
Wha.t shall be regarded, as to third persons, a test of part-
nership between parties who did not consider themselves to 
be partners, and who have done nothing to estop them from 
denying that they are such has been much discussed by 
courts and elementary writers, and the problem seems to be 
one of difficult solution. It is needless to review here the 
numerous cases on the subject; a statement of results 
ls sufficient. 
No little difficulty has been experienced in determining the · 
meaning and limits of phrases that have been recognized as 
tests of a partnership in such cases, and in their application 
to the varying cases that arise. 
The effort has been to draw a distinct line between cases 
where one has a community of inte1·est in the pro.fits of a 
business, as distinguished from those where one is entitled. 
to receive a sum of money out of the profits as a creditor, or a 
sum proportioned to a quantum of profits, or a share of the 
profits as a compensation for services or labor. 
Although a partnership may be said to rest upon the idea. 
of a communion of profits, nevertheless the foundation of the 
liability of <>ne partner for the acts of another is the relation 
they sustain to each other, as being each principal and agent. 
That relation, it would seem, then, constitutes the true test of a 
partnership liability, and rests upon the just foundation that 
the joint liability was incurred on the express or implied 
authority of the party sought to be charged. 
But if the relation of principal and agent be regarded as 
_i_i~!
__ _ -w—
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the test of a partnership and coneqnent joint liability, the
question still remains, what shall be deemed sufficient evi-
dence of that relation, or to raise the implication of authority
to incur the liability in question?
To this end numerous tests have been supposed to exist
. . ;
but the best considered and least objectionable is that of am
community of interest in the profits of a business or transac-
tion as a principal or proprietor. Pars. on Part. 71, and note;
(‘oll. on Part, secs. 25, 44. See, also, Story on Part., secs. 36,
38, 60; Berthold cs. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536.
But this test is valuable as a rule chiefly because it evinces
a relation between the parties, where each may reasonably be
presumed to act for himself and as agent for the others, and
to that extent establishes the fact that the liability was in-
curred on the authority of all so participating in the profits.
Participation in the profits of a business, however, cannot be
regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to be
unjustly applied to a case where a debt is incurred by one
who cannot ‘be said to be acting, in the particular transac-
lion, as the agent or on behalf of the party sought to be
charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test of a partner-
ship, at last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties
as principal a-nd agent, to be proved by any competent evi-
dence; for when they sustain that relation, a joint liability may
be said to have been incurred by the authority, or on behalf of
each of the parties so related. The tendency of the more
modern authorities, both English and American, is to this
conclusion.
The case of Cow vs. Hickman, decided by the House of Lords
in 1860, has become a leading case on the subject. 99 E. C. L.
,_,,-17; 8 House of Lords Cases, 268. It is summarized in the sub-
_ sequent case of Bullen vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86, by BLACK-
BURN, J., as follows: “I think that the ratio decidendi is
{that the proposition laid down in Waugh cs. Carver, viz., that
pa participation in the profits of a business does of- itself, by
,operation of l£IW,‘00I1Sfiilli8 a partnership, is not a correct
statement of the law of England; but that the true question
zis, as stated by Lord Cmmwonrn, whether the trade is carried
,on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner,
_,*the participation in the profit being a most important.ele-
















































































































































lI.ABVI::Y VS. CHILDS. 99 
the test of a partnership and consequent joint liability, the 
question still remains, what shall be deemed sufficient evi-
dence of that relation, or to raise the implication of authority 
to incur the liability in question? 
To this end numerous tests have been supposed to exist;./! 
but the best considered and least objectionable is that of a 
community of interest in the profits of a busilwss or transac-
tion as a principal or proprietor. Pars. on Part. 71, and note; 
('oil. on Part., secs. 25, 44. See, also, Story on Part., secs. 36, 
38, 60; Berthold -vs. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536. 
But this test is valuable as a rule chiefly because it evinces-
a relation between the parties, where each may reasonably be 
presumed to act for himself and as agent for the others, and 
to that extent establishes the fact that the liability was in-
curred on the authority of an so participating in the profits. 
Participation in the profits of a business, however, cannot be 
regarded as a rule so universal and unrelenting as to bu 
unjustly applied to a case where a debt is incurred by one 
who cannot ·be said to be acting, in the particular transac-
tion, as the agent or on behalf of the party sought to be 
charged. Therefore, on principle, the true test of a partner-
toihip, at last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties 
as principal and agent, to be proved by any competent evi-
dence; for when they sustain that relation, a joint liability may 
be said to have been incurred by the authority, or on behalf of 
each of the parties so related. The tendency of the more 
modern authorities, both English and American, is to this 
eoncluslon. 
The case of CoaJ vs. Bickman, decided by the House of Lords 
in 1860, has become a leading case ou the subject. !)9 E. C. L. 
,.,141; 8 Honse of J .. ords Cases, 268. It is summarized in the sub-
. sequent case of Bullen vs. Sharp, J,,. R. 1 C. P. 86, by BLACK-
BURN, J., as fo1lows: "I think th.Ht the ratio decidendi is 
\that the proposition laid down in Waugh vs. Carver, viz., that 
. a participation in the profits of H businf'sR does of itself, by 
, operation of law, ·constitute a partnership, is not a correct 
t statement of the law of England; but that the true question 
·is, as stated by Lord CRANWORTH, whether the trade is carried . 
>on on behalf of the person sought to be charged as a partner, 
_.'the participation in the profits being a most impoM:nnt. ele-
1ment in determining the question, but not being in itself deci-
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aive; the test being, in the language of Lord WENSl.EYDALl7,
whether it is such a. participation in the profits as to consti-
tute the relation of principal and agent between the persons
taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business.“
Add. on Cont. 163.
These cases were decided before the passage of the act of
parliament in relation to pa-rtnerships. But, so far as relates
to this question, in a subsequent case, BRAMWELL, J., declared,
in effect, that the act was only declaratory of the common law,
as held in Cow vs. Hickman. Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Ex.
218.
The question was much considered in Eastman vs. Clark, 53
N. H. 276, where the authorities are fully collated and ably
reviewed. The case was decided in 1872. The conclusion
arrived at is stated by Suns, J., as follows: “The real ulti-
mate question in all cases like the present is one of agency.
Did the person sought to be charged stand in the relation of
principal to the person contracting the debt? Participation
in the profits is not decisive of the question; except so far as
it is evidence of the relation of principal and agent between
the persons, taking the profits and'those actually carrying on
the business. Whether such relation actually exists is a que 1.-
ticn of fact. Upon the trial 'of that question, proof of a right
to participate in the profits would be a cogent and often practi-
cally conclusive piece of evidence to establish the existence of
that relation, but there is no sound foundation for an arbitrary-
rule of law requiring courts or jurors to regard participa-
tion in the profits as a decisive test which will in all instances;
necessitate the conclusion that the participator is liable for the
debts.”
In the absence of any known stipulation to the contrary,
every party of a trading firm, within the scope of the joint
busines in contemplation of law, is clothed with implied
authority to enter into simple contracts on behalf of the firm
in furtherance of the business of the partnership, and thereby-
bind each member of the firm. Where, therefore, as in the.
case of Wood vs. Valletta, 7 Ohio St. 172, and in the later case
of Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, money is advanced, to be
used in a trading business, and returned in a year with a
share of the profits made during that time, it may well be
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sive; the test being, in the language of Lorcl WEss1,ETDALID', 
whether it is such a participation in the proftls as to consti-
tute the relation of p1"incipal and agent between the penmnf4 
taking the profits and those actually carrying on the business."" 
Add. on Cont. 163. 
These cases were decided before the passage of the act of 
parliament in relation to pa.rtnerships. But, so far as relates 
to this question, in a subsequent case, BRAMWELL, J., declared,_ 
in effect, that the act was only declaratory of the common law; 
as held in Coz vs. Hickman. Holme VB. Hammond, L. R. T Ex. 
218. 
The question was much considered in Eastman VB. Clark, 5:l' 
N. H. 276, where the authorities are fully collated and abl1 
reviewed. The· case was decided in 1872. The conclusion 
arrived at is stated by SMITH, J., as follows: "The real ulti-
mate question in all cases like the present is one of agency. 
Did the person eought to be charged stand in the relation of · 
principal to the person contracting the dPbt? Participation · 
in the profits is not decisive of the question; except so far as 
it is evidence of the relation of principal and agent between 
the persons, taking the profits and' those actually carrying on 
the business. Whether such relation actually exists is a que j, 
tion of fact. Upon the trial 'or that question, proof of a right 
to participate in the profits would be a cogent and often practi-
cally conclusive piece of evidence to establish the existence of 
that relation, but there is no sound foundation for an arbitrar;r 
imle of law requiring courts or jurors to r<>gard participa-
tion in the profits as a decisive test which will in all instances: 
necessitate the conclusion that the participator is liable for the 
debts." 
In the absence of any known stipulation to the contrary, 
every party of a trading firm, within the scope of the joint 
business in contemplation of law, is clothed with implied 
authority to enter into simple contracts on behalf of the firm 
in furtherance of the business of the partnership, and thereby 
bind each member of the firm. \\'here, therefore, as in the. 
case of Wood vs. Vallette, 7 Ohio St. 172, and in the later case-
()f Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, money is advanced, to be 
used in a trading business, and returned in a'. year with A 
share of the profits made during that time, it may well be 
implied that the business was conducted on behalf and by the 
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authority of the person advancing the money and sharing the
profits, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way,
that he looks for his profits.
But such cases are plainly distinguishable from one where
money is advanced, to be embarked in a single transaction,
where no credit is contemplated. In such case there is no
ground for the implied authority to incur debts. such as exists
in regard to a general trading business. Add. on Cont. 161.
In the case before us it is obvious that it was not contem-
plated in the arrangement between Childs and Potter that
any indebtedness should be incurred in the purchase of hogs
for the contemplated adventure, to which the whole business
was to be confined. There is, then, no ground for the implica-
tion of authority from Childs to incur the debt in question.
On the contrary, such implication is rebutted by the advance-
ment of money to pay for all the hogs that were to come to
his hands. *
Moreover, Childs had no legal interest in any of the hogs
until they were delivered to him at the cars, nor had he any
equitable interest in hogs, before such delivery, that were
bought by Potter and not paid for by money received from
Childs. He had, then, no interest whatever in the hogs bought
of Harvey on credit, when the debt to him was incurred; and
Potter, before delivery to Ghilds, might have sold them- with-
out being liable to Childs. The fact is apparent that it was
the understanding of the parties that Potter had bought for
himself, and, if need be, was in like manner to buy enough
more hogs to make two car loads; and it cannot be doubted
that, until their delivery at least, all the hogs belonged to
Potter alone, and at most were only regarded as his contri-
bution to the enterprise. If so regarded, the case is like that
of ‘Wilson vs. Whitehead, 10 M. & \V. 503, where it was agreed
between three parties that one should edit, another print, and
the other publish a paper, and share equally in the net profits.
The printer was to furnish the paper and charge the firm at
cost prices. It was held that the printer alone was liable to
the person of whom he bought the paper. PARKE, B., said:
“The question is, did the other defendants authorize Whit<--
head to purchase the paper on their account or on his own. It
appears to me, on the true construction of the contract, that
















































































































































HARVEY VS. CHILDS. 101 
authority of the person advancing the mon:.iy and sharing the 
profits, for it is to the continuing trade, in the ordinary way, 
that he looks for his profits. 
But snd1 eases are plainly distinguishable from one where 
money is advanced, to be embarked in a single transaction, 
where no credit is contemplated. In such case there is no 
ground for the implied authorit_y to incur debts. sueb as exists 
in regard to a general trading business. Add. on Cont. 161. 
In the cai;;e before us it is obdon!ol that it was not contem-
plated in the arrangem<'nt bt•t wet'n Childs a.nd Potter that 
any indebtedness should be incurred in the purchase of hogs 
for the contemplated adventure, to which the whole business 
was to be confined. There is, then, no ground for the implica-
tion of authority from Chihh; to inC'ur the debt in questiou. 
On the contrary, such implication is rPbutted by the advance-
ment of money to pay for all the hogs that were to come to 
his bands. 
Mo1"e0w•r, Childs had no legal interest in any of the hogs 
until they were delin·red to him at the cars, nor bad be any 
equitable interest in hogs, before such delivery, that were 
bought by Potter and not paid for by money received from 
Childs. He had, tlwn, no interest whatever in the bogs bought 
of Harvt>y on credit, when the debt to him was incurred; and 
Potter, before delivery to Childs, might hn\'e sold them• witu-
out being lia.ble to Childs. The fact is apparent that it was 
the understunding of the pa1·ti<'s that Potter had bought for 
himself, and, if n<-'ed be, was in like manner to buy enough 
m-ore bogs to make two ear loads; and it cannot be doubtPrl 
that, until their deliwry at least, all the hogs belonged to 
Potter al-0ne, and at most were only rt.•garded as bis oontri-
bution to the enterprise. If so regarded, the case is lil:e thnt 
of Wilson vs. Wltitcllcad, 10 :M. & "'· uO:l, where it was agre<>•l 
between three parties that one should <><lit, another print, and 
the other publish a paper, and share equally in the net profits. 
The printer was to furnish the paper and charge the firni at 
cost prices. It wa.s held that the printer alone was liable to 
the perB<>n of whom be bought the paper. PARKE, B., said: 
·"The question is, did the other defendants autho1·ize Whit1·-
head to purchase the paper on their account or on his own. It 
appeal"B to me, on the true ronstruction of the contract, th:: t 
·the latter was the case. When the paper was in bis possession 
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he was at liberty to have appropriated it to any other purpose.
But the truth is, Potter was the owner of the hogs until
they were sold by Childs, for Childs declined to take any inter-
est in the hogs other than as security for the money advanced
by him to Potter. Looking to the whole matter, it is clear
that the transaction was a loan of money by one party to the
other, on the security afforded by the possession of the hogs.
Childs, therefore, was the mere plcdgee of the hogs, with a.
power of sale by agreement of the parties, and, as such, had
only special property in the hogs. The general property in
the hogs, from first to last, remained in Potter. He was the
owner, and if they had died on‘ the way to market, without
the fault of Childs, the loss would have fallen upon Potter.
both by the. positive agreement of the parties, and the legal
efi’ect of the transaction between them as bailor and bailee.
There was, then, strictly speaking, no mutuality or com-
munity of interest between them in the hogs. Childs had no
interest in them other than as security for a debt, and to
find in half the profits of their sa.le the measure of his reward
for the use of his money, to be paid out of Potter’s property.
(The relation of the parties was that of debtor and creditor,
of bailor and bailee, and not that of partners3 They had no
mutual interest in the hogs in common as principals or pro
prietors, nor was either acting as principal for himself and
agent for the other. If, however, that relation could be said to
exist after the hogs were delivered to Childs, there is no
ground for an inference that the debt to Harvey, previously
contracted by Potter, was incurred upon the authority of
Childs. On the contrary, the facts rebut any implication of
such authority, and are consistent only with the supposition
that the debt was incurred without authority from Childs, who
was doubtless no less surprised to learn of the debt than
Harvey was, after the failure of Potter, to find the existence
of a rule of law under which he had unwittingly given credit
to another and responsible party. We may, in conclusion.
therefore, well adopt in this case the language of Judge Stronr
(Part, sec. 36): “Now, it is incumbent upon those who insist
that a partnership exists between the parties, as to third
persons, by mere operation of law, in opposition to their own

















































































































































102 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
he was at liberty to have appropriated it to any other purpose." 
But the truth is, Potte1· was the owner of the hogs until 
1 hey were sold by Childs, for Childs declined to take any inter-
est in the hogs other than as security for the money advanced 
by him to Potter. Looking to the whole matter, it is clear 
that the transaction was a loan of money by one party to the 
other, on the security afforded by the possession of the bogs. 
0hilds, therefore, was the mere pledgee of the bogs, with a 
power of sale by agreement of the parties, and, as such, had 
only special property in the hogs. The general property in 
the bogs, from first to la.st,, remained in Potter. He was the 
owner, and if they had died on· the way to market, without 
the fault of Childs, the loss would have fallen upon Potter. 
both by the positive agreement of t_he parties, and the legal 
effect of the transaction between them as bailor and bailee. 
There was, then, strictly speaking, no mutuality or com-
munity of interest between them in the bogs. Childs had no 
intrrest in them other than as security for a debt, and to 
find in half the profits of their sa.le the measure of his reward 
for the use of his money, to be paid out of Potter's property. 
(The relation of the parties was that of debtor and creditoT, 
of bailor and bailee, and not that of partne~B) They bad no 
mutual interest in the bogs in common as principals or pro-
prietors, nor was either acting as principal for himself and 
agent for the other. If, however, that relation could be said to 
exist after the bogs were delivered to Childs, there is no 
ground for an inference that the debt to Harvey, previously 
contracted by Potter, was incurred upon the authority of 
Childs. On the contrary, the facts rebut any implication of 
such authority, and are consistent only with the supposition 
that the debt was incurred without authority from Childs, who 
was doubtless no less surprised to learn of the debt than 
Harvey was, after the failure of Potter, to find the existence 
of a rule of law under which he bad unwittingly given credit 
to another and responsible party. We may, in conclusion, 
·therefore, well adopt in this case the language of Judge STonY 
(Part., sec. 36): "Now, it is incumbent upon those who Insist 
that a partnership exists between the parties, as to third 
persons, by mere operation of law, in opposition to their own 
intention, .to establish that in the given case, under all the 
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circumstances, there is such a rule, and that it is strictly
applicable.”
This disposes of the material questions made by the record.
The court of common pleas gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, against both Childs and Potter.
The District Court, on error reversed the judgment as to
Childs. It follows that the judgment of the District Court
must be affirmed.
Judgment accordingly.
NOTE: See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 64, 65.
Q3
MEEHAN vs. VALENTINE.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1892.
145 U. s. 611, as L. ed. ass, 12 Sup. or. Rep. 972.
This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas J.
Meehan, a citizen of Maryland, against John K: Valentine,
executor of \Villiam G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania,
alleging Perry to have been a partner with Lawrence XV. Coun-
selman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Coun-
selman & Co., and counting on promissory notes of various
dates from August 10, 1883, to, November 25, 1884, signed by
that firm, indorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to
about $10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry
was a partner in the firm.
At the trial, the plaintiif put in evidence the following
agreement:
“L. W. Counselman, Albert L. Scott, Office of L. W. Coun-
selman & Co., Oyster and Fruit Packers, corner Philpot and
Will streets. Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880. For and in
consideration of loans made and to be made to us by Wm.
G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten
thousand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of
said loans, we agree to pay to said VVm. G. Perry, in addition
to the interest thereon, one-tenth of the net profits over and
above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the


















































































































































MEEHAN VS. V ALENTINB. \ 103 
there is such a rule, and that it ls stdctly 
This disposes of the material questions made by the record. 
The court of common pleas gave judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, against both Childs and Potter. 
The District Court, on error reversed the judgment as to 
Childs. It follows that the judgment of the District Court 
must be affirmed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
NOT.a: See Mechem'& Eltm. of Partn., §§ 64, 65. 
MEEHAN vs. VALENTINE. 
Supreme Court of the United, States, 189!. 
145 U. S. 611, 86 L. ed. 885, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972. 
This was an action of assumpsit brought by Thomas J. 
Meehan, a citizen of Maryland, against John K: Valentine, 
executor of \Villiam G. Perry, both citizens of Pennsylvania, 
alleging Perry to have been a partner with Lawrence W. Coun· 
selman and Albert L. Scott, under the name of L. W. Coun-
~elman & Co., and counting on promissory notes of various 
dates from August 10, 1883, to.November 25, 1884, signed by 
that firm, indorsed to the plaintiff, and amounting in all to 
about $10,000, with interest. The defendant denied that Perry 
was a partner in the firm. 
At the trial, the plaintiff put in evidence the following 
agreement: 
"L. W. Counselman, Albert L. Scott, Office of L. W. Coun-
selman & Co., Oyster and Fruit Packers, corner Philpot and 
Will streets. Baltimore, Md., March 15, 1880. For and in 
consideration of loans made and to be ma.de to us by Wm. 
G. Perry, of Philadelphia, amounting in all to the sum of ten 
thomiand dollars, for the term of one year from the date of 
eaill loans, we agree to pay to said \Vm. G. Perry, in addition 
fo the interest thereon, one-tenth of the net protits over and 
above the sum of ten thousand dollars on our business for the 
year comm-encing May bt. 1880, and ending May 1st, 1881,-
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i. e., if our net profits for said year’s business exceeds the sum
of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G.
Perry one-tenth of said excess of profits over and above the
said sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agreed
that if our net profits do not exceed the sum of ten thousand
dollars, then he is not to be paid more than the interest on
said loan, the same being added to notes at the time they are
given, which are to date from the time of said loans, and
payable one year from date. L. \V. Counselman & Co.”
Also the following indorsement thereon: “March 2, 1881.
This contract and agreement is to continue one year longer
on the same basis,—~i. e., from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st,
1882. L. W. Counselman & Co.”
Also three further renewals of the agreement from year to
year, the first of which was by letter, dated'March 18, 1882,
from L. W. Counselman & Co. to Perry, with the same head-
ing as the original agreement, and saying: “We hereby renew
the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the
effect that we will guarantee you ten per cent. interest upon
loans amounting to $10,000; and that if the net profits of our
business are over $10,000 for the year commencing May 1.
1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we will in lieu of the ten
per cent. interest give you ten per cent. o'f the profits. We
have two propositions for partnership May lst, and if we
accept either we will then, if you desire, return your loan."
The other renewals, dated April 4, 1883, and March 15, 1884.
were substantially like the original agreement of March 15.
1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rate
of interest was specified as 6 per cent.
‘The plaintiff further offered in evidence six promissor_v
notes, amounting in the aggregate to $10,600, given by the
firm to Perry in the months of March, May, and June, 1884.
The plaintiff also called Scott as a witness, who testified that
the firm was composed of L. W. Couselman and himself; that
it was engaged in “the fruit and vegetable packing and oyster
business” in Baltimore; that Perry was in thestationery busi-
ness in Philadelphia; that the $10,000 mentioned in the agree-
ment was paid by him to the firm, receiving their notes for it.
and remained in the business throughout, no part of it having
been repaid; that from time to time he lent other sums to the
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i. e., if our n(>t profits for said year's business exceeds the sum 
of ten thousand dollars, then we are to pay to said W. G. 
Perry one-tenth of said excess of profits over and above the 
said sum of ten thousand dollars; and it is further agrero 
that if our net profits do not exceed the s.um of ten thousand 
dollars, then be is not to be paid more than the interest on 
said loan, the same being added to notes at the time they are 
given, which are to date from the time of said loans, and 
payable one year from date. L. ,V, Counselman & Co." 
Also the following indorsement thereon: "March 2, 1881. 
This contract and agreement is to continue one year longer 
on the same basis,-i. e., from May 1st, 1881, until May 1st, 
1882. L. W. Counselman & Co." 
Also three further renewals of the agreement from year to 
year, the first of which was by letter, dated · March 18, 1882, · 
from L. W. Counselman & Co. to Pen-y, with the same head-
ing as the original agreement, and saying: "We hereby renew 
the agreement made with you May 1, 1880, which is to the 
etrect that we will guarantee you ten per cent. interest upon 
loans amounting to $10,000; and that if the net profits of our 
business are over fl0,000 for the year commencing May l. . . 
1882, and ending April 30th, 1883, we will in lieu of the ten 
per cent. interest give you ten per cent. o'f the profits. ·we 
have two propositions for partnership May 1st, and if WP 
accept either we will then, if you desire, return yo11r loan." 
The other renewals, datc>d April 4, 1883, and March 15, 188-l. 
were substantially like the original agre<>ment of March 15. 
1880, except that in the agreement of April 4, 1883, the rah~ 
of interest wa.s specified as 6 per cent . 
. The plaintiff further offered in evidence six promissor.v 
notes, amounting in the aggrPgate to $10,600, given by the 
ftrm to Perry in the months of March, l\iay, and June, 1884. 
The plaintiff also called Hcott as a witness, who testified thnt 
the firm was composed of L. W. Couselman and himself; that 
it was engaged in "the fruit and vegetable packing and oysfor 
tmsiness" in Raltimore; thnt Perry was in the stationery busi-
ness in Philadelphia; that the $10,000 mentioned in the agree· 
ment was paid by him to the firm, receiving their notes for it, 
and remained in the business throughout, no pa.rt of it having 
been repaid; that from time to time he lent other sums to th1~ 
Arm, which were repaid; that be was an intimate friend of the 
»*"7'- \_
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witness, and visited him every few weeks; that these visits
were not specially connected with the business, though on such
occasions Perry “usually went down to the place of business
and talked business;” that he annually asked and received
from the firm accounts of profit and loss; that the accounts
showed an annual profit, which varied from year to year,
amounting for the second year to $11,000 or $12,000; that, it
being then found difficult to tell at the end of the year exactly
what the profits would be, it was agreed with Perry that he
should thenceforth receive $1,000 each year, leaving the final
settlement until the whole business was settled up; and that he
received under the agreement about $1,500 the first year, and
$1,000 each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the wit-
ness stated that the firm made an assignment to the plaintiff
for the benefit of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabili-
ties were from $60,000 to $70,000, about half of which was with
collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been
paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than
$2,000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and,
‘in regard to the ‘$10,000 received from Perry, the witness testi-
fied as follows: “Question, Mr. Counselman and yourself did
owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you? Answer.
They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it?
A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. We
owed it to him; of course we owed it to him, if we did not
lose it.”
At the close of the plaintifl?’s evidence, the defendant moved
for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to show
that Perry was liable as a partner. The court so ruled, and
ordered a nonsuit. 29 Fed. Rep. 276. The plaintiff duly ex-
cepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error.
S. Shclabarger and J . M. Wilson, for plaintiff in error.
Samuel Dickson and R. 0. Dale, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered
't-he opinion of the court.
The granting of a nonsuit by the circuit court, because in its
opinion the plaintiff had given no evidence sutficient to main-
tain his action, was in accordance with the law and practice of


















































































































































witness, and visited him every few weeks; that these visits 
were not specially connected with the business, though on such 
occasions Perry "usually went down to the place of busines}} 
and talked business;" that he annually asked and received 
from the firm accounts of profit and loss; that the accounts 
showed an annual profit, which varied from year to year, 
amounting for the second year to ,11,000 or $12,000; that, it 
being then found difficult to tell at the end of the year exactly 
what the profits would be, it was agreed with Perry that be 
should thenceforth receive $1,000 each year, leaving the final 
settlement until the wlwle business was settled up; and that be 
received under the agreement about $1,500 the fi.1·st year, and 
fl,000 each subsequent year. On cross-examination, the wit-
ness stated that the firm made an assignment to the plaintiff 
for the benefit of creditors on April 30, 1885; that their liabili-
ties were from $60,000 to $70,000, about half of which was with 
collateral security, and he did not know whether it had been 
paid out of such security; that the assets realized less than 
f2,000; that, so far as he knew, no dividend had been paid; and, 
"in regard to the ·$10,000 received from Perry, the witness testi-
fied as follows: "Question, Mr. Counselman and yourself did 
owe this $10,000 to the estate of Mr. Perry, did you? Answe1·. 
They had my notes for it. Q. Did you or did you not owe it'? 
A. It was capital he had in the business the same as ours. "'e 
owed it to him; of course we owed it to him, if we did not 
lose it." 
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved 
for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no evidence to show 
that Perry was liable as a partner. The court so ruled, and 
ordered a nonsuit. 29 Fed. Hep. 276. The plaintiff duly ex-
cepted to the ruling, and sued out this writ of error. 
8. Shclabarger and J . .Jf. Wilson, f<>r plaintiff in error. 
Samuel Dick.~on and R. C. Dale, for defendant in error. 
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered 
the opinion of th.e court. 
The granting of a nonsuit by the circuit court, because in its 
opinion the plaintiff hall gi vt>n no evidence sufficient to main-
tain his action, was in accordance with the law and practice of 
Pennsylvania, prevailing in the courts of the United States 
H 
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held within that state, and is subject to the revision of this
court on writ of error. Central Trans. Co. vs. Pullman's Car
C0., 139 U. S. 24, 3840, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478. The real ques-
tion in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence introduced
by the plaintiflf would have been suflicient to sustain a verdict
in his favor.
f The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must
'* have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their
ycommon benefit, each contributing property or services, and
I
l
having a community of interest in the profits. Ward vs.
Thompson, 22 How. 330, 334.
Some of the principles applicable to the question of the lia-
bility of a partner to third persons were stated by Chief Justice
Msnsnsm. in a general way, as follows: “The power of an
agent is limited by the authority given him; and, if he tran-
scends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he
acts no longer as an agent. The same principle applies to part-
ners. One binds the others so far only as he is the agent of the
others.” “A man who shares in the profit, although his name
may not be in the firm, is responsible for all its debts.” “Stipu-
lations [restricting the powers of partners] may bind the part-
ners, but ought not to atfect those to whom they are unknown,
and who trust to the general and well-established commercial
law.” Winsh-ip vs. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 561., 562. And the chief
justice referred to Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (ante p. 67);
Ear part-c Ilamper, 17 Ves. 403, 412; and Gow. Partn. 17.
How far sharing in the profits of a partnership shall make
one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial dis-
cussion, and the various definitions have been approximate
rather than exhaustive.
The rule formerly laid down and long acted on as estab-
lished, was that a man who received a certain share of the
profits as profits, with a lien on the whole profits as security for
his share, was liable as a partner for the debts of the partner-
ship, even if it had been stipulated between him and his co-
partners that he should not be so liable; but that merely
receiving compensation for labor or services, estimated by
a certain proportion of the profits, did not render one
liable as a partner. Story, Partn. c. 4; 3 Kent, Comm. 25, note,
32-34; Ea: pa-rtc Hamper, above cited; Pott vs. E3/ton, 3 O. B.
















































































































































106 CA.BES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
held within that state, and is subject to the revision of this 
court on writ of error. Central Tmns. Co. vs. Pullman's Car 
Co., 139 U. S. 24, 38·40, 11 Sup. Ct. H€p. 478. The real ques-
tion in this case, therefore, is whether the evidence introduced 
by the plaintiff would have been sufficient to sustain a verdict 
in his fayoi-. 
{ The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must 
i have joined together to carry on a trade or adventure for their 
1 common benefit, each contributing property or services, and 
: having a community of interest in th.e profits. Ward 'VB. 
1 Thompson, 22 How. 3:10, 334. 
Some of the principles applicable to the question of the lia-
bility of a partner to third persons were stated by Chief Justice 
MARSHALL in a general way, as follows: "The power of an 
agent is limited by the authority given him; and, if he tran-
scends that authority, the act cannot affect his principal; he 
acts no longer as an agent. The same principle applies to part-
ners. One binds the others so far only as he is the agent of the 
others." ''A man who shares in the profit, although his name 
may not be in the firm, is responsible for all its debts." "Stipu~ 
lations [restricting the powers of partners] may bind the part· 
ners, but ought not to atfec;t those to whom they are unknown, 
and who trust to t~e general and well-established commercial 
law." Winship vs. Bank, 5 Pet. 529, 561., 562. And the chief 
justice referred to Waugh 'VB. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235 (ante p. 67); 
E:c pat·te Hamper, 17 Ves. 403, 412; and Gow. Partn. 17. 
How far sharing in the profits of a partnership shall make 
one liable as a partner has been a subject of much judicial dis-
cussion, and the various definitions have been approximate 
1·athcr than exhaustive. 
The rule formerly laid down and long acted on as estab-
lished, was that a man who received a cer·tain share of the 
profits as profits, with a lien on the whole profits as security for 
his share, was liable as a partner for the debts of the partner-
ship, even if it had been stipulated between him and his co-
partners that be should not be so liable; but that merely 
receiving compensation for labor or services, estimated by 
a certain proportion of the profits, did not render one 
Iiahle as a partner. Story, Partn. c. 4.; 3 Kent, Comm. 25, note, 
32-34; Em pa.1·tc Hamper, above cited; Pott vs. Eyton, 3 C. B. 
a2, ·10; Bostu;ick 'VB. Champion, 11 \Vend. 571, and 18 Wend. 175, 
MJZEHAN V8. VALENTINE. ‘lb?
184, I85; Burckle vs. Eckart, 1 Denio 337, and 3 N. Y. 132; Denny
vs. Cabot, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 82; Fitch vs. Harrington, 13 Gray 468,
474, 74 Am Dec. 641; Bru-ndred vs. Muzzy, 25 N. J. Law, 268,
279, 675. The test was often stated to be whether the person
sought to be charged as a partner took part of the profits as a
principal, or only as an agent. Benjamin vs Porteus, 2 H. Bl.
590, 592; Coll. Partn. (1st Ed.) 14; Smith, Mere. Law, (1st Ed.)
4; Story, Partn. § 55; Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69,'78, 30
Am. Dec. 596; Burcklc vs. Eckhart, 1 Denio, 337, 341; Hallct vs.
Desban, 14 La. Ann. 529.
V Accordingly, this court, at December term, 1860, decided
that a person employed to sell goods under an agreement that
he should receive half the profits, and that they should not be
less than a certain sum, was not a partner with his employer.
“Actual participation in the profits as principal,” said Mr.
Justice CLIFFORD in delivering judgment, “creates a partner-
ship as between the parties and third persons, whatever may
be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dor-
mant partner was not expected to participate in the loss
beyond the amount of the profits,” or “may have expressly
stipulated with his associates against all the usual incidents
to that relation. That rule, however, has no application what-
ever to a case of service or special agency, where the employé
has no power as a partner in the firm and no interest in the
profits, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or
special agent, and is to receive a given sum out of the profits,
or a proportion of the same, as a compensation for his ser-
vices.” Berthold vs. G'oIdsm.i-th, 24 How. 536, 542, 543. See, also,
Seymour vs. Freer, 8 \Vall. 202, 215, 222, 226; Beckwith vs. Talbot,
95 U. S. 289, 293; Edzcarrls vs. Tracy, 62 Pa. St. 374; Burnett vs.
Snyder, s1 N. Y. 550, 555. (Post p_Ul-1.5..)
Mr. Justice Stony, at the beginning of his Commentaries on
Partnership, first published in 1841, said: “Every partner is
an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties, and
obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules
and principles as those of an agent. A partner, indeed, virtu-
ally embraces the character both of a principal and of an agent.
So far as he acts for himself and his own interest in the com-
mon concerns of the partnership, he may properly be deemed
a principal; and so far as he acts for his partners, he may as
















































































































































MEEBA-li vs. v A.LENTINE. l(,'1 
184, 185; Burckle ·vs. Eckart, 1 Denio 337, and 3 N. Y. 132; Denny 
vs. Cabot, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 82; Fitch vs. Harrington, 13 Gray 468, 
474, 74 Am. Dec. 641; Brundred vs. Muzzy, 25 N. J. Law, 268, 
279, 675. The test was often stated to be whether the person 
sought to be charged as a partner took part of the profits as n 
principal, or only as an agent. Benjamin vs PorteWJ, 2 H. BI. 
590, 592; Coll. Partn. (1st Ed.) 14; Smith, Mere. Law, (1st Ed.) 
4; Story, Partn. § 55; Loomis VB. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69,'78, 30 
Am. Dec. 596; Burckle -vs. Eckhart, 1 Denio, 337, 341; H aUet VB. 
De.aban, 14 La. Ann. 529. 
Accordingly, this court, at December term, 1860, decided 
that a person employed to sell goods under an agreement that 
he should receive half the profits, and that they should not be 
less than a certain sum, was not a partner with his employer. 
"Actual participation in the profits as principal," said Mr. 
Justice CLIFFORD in delivering judgment, "creates a partner-
ship as between the parties and third persons, whatever mny 
be their intentions in that behalf, and notwithstanding the dor-
mant partner was not expected to participate in the loss 
'beyond the amount of the profits," or "may have expressly 
stipulated with his associates against all the usual incidents 
to that relation. That rule, however, has no application what· 
ever to a case of service or special agency, where the employe 
has no power as a partner in the firm and no interest in the 
profits, as property, but is simply employed as a servant or 
special ngent, and is to receive a given sum out of the profits, 
or a propo1-tion of the same, as a compensation for his ser-
vices." Berthold VB. Goldsmith, 24 How. 536, 542, 543. See, also, 
Reymour vs. Freer, 8 Wall. 202, 215, 222, 226; Beckwith vs. Talbot, 
95 U.S. 289, 293; Edzcards vs. Tra~t~Ja. St. 374; Burnett vs. 
Rnyder, 81 N. Y. 550, 5l'l5. (Post .) 
Mr. Justice 1.15TORY, at the beginning of his Commentaries 011 
Partnership, first published in 1841, said: "Every par1ner h~ 
an agent of the partnership; and his rights, powers, duties, a~d 
obligations are in many respects governed by the same rules 
nnd principles as those of an agent. A partner, indeed, virtu-
ally embraces the character both of a principal and of an a~ent. 
'F.lo far as he acts for himself nnd his own interest in the com· 
mon concerns of the pa1·tnership, he may properly be <ll'emed 
a principal; and so far as he nets for his partners~ he may ns 
properly be deemed an agent. The principal distinction 
108 CASES on PARTNERSHIP.
between him and :1 mere agent is that he has a community of
interest with the other partners in the whole property and
business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an
agent, as such, has no interest in either. Pothier considers
partnership as but a species of mandate, saying contractus soci-
etatis, non germs ac contractus mandati.” Afterwards, in dis-
cussing the reasons and limits of the rule by which one may be
charged as a partner by reason of having received part of the
profits of the partnership, Mr. Justice Sronv observed that the
rule was justified and the cases in which it had been applied
reconciled, by considering that “a participation in the profits
will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership between
the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other
opposing circumstances ;” but that it is not “to be regarded as
anything more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and
therefore liable to be repelled and overcome by other circum-
stances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them ;”
and therefore that, “if the participation in the profits can be
clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the pre-
sumption of partnership is repelled.” And again: “The true
rule, cw arquo et bono, would seem to be that the agreement and
intention of the parties themselves should govern all the eases.
If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the
profits, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in
favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown
to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were
intended between the parties, then‘ that there should be none
as to third persons, unless where the parties had held them-
selves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated
as a fraud or deceit upon third persons.” Story, Partn. §§ 1,
38, 49. '
Baron PARKE (afterwards Lord Wnnsnnrnnnn) appears to
have taken much the same view of the subject as Mr. Justice
STORY. Both» in the court of exchequer and in the house of
lords he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be
charged as a dormant partner for the acts of the active part-
ners as depending on the law of principal and agent. Beckham
vs. Drake, (1841), 9 Mccs. & \~V. 79, 98; Wilson vs. Whitehead,
(1842), 10 Mccs. & W. 503, 504; Ernest vs. Nicholls, (1857), 6
















































































































































l08 0ASJCS Oli PARTNERSHIP. 
betwtaen him and a mere agent is that he has a community or 
interest with the othE>r p.-irtners in the whole property and 
business and responsibilities of the partnership; whereas an 
agent, as such, has no interest in either. Pothier considers 
partnership as but a species of mandate, saying contract-us soci,. 
etatis, non ~e~ ac contractus mandati." Afterwards, in di~­
<·ussing the reasons and limits of the rule by which one may be 
l'hargf>d as a partner hJ' N>nson of having received part of the 
profits of the partnership, Mr. Justice STORY observed that thP. 
rule was justified and the cases in which it bad been applied 
recondled, by consid<>ring that "a participation in the profits 
will ordinarily estahlish the existence of a partnership between 
the parties in favor of third persons, in the absence of all other 
opposing circumstances;" but that it is not "to be regarded as 
anything more than mere presumptive proof thereof, and 
therefore liable to be repelled and overcome by other circum-
•tances, and not as of itself overcoming or controlling them;:' 
and therefore that: "if the participation in the profits can bP. 
.clearly shown to be in the character of agent, then the pre-
sumption of partnership is repelled." And again: "The true 
rule, e:r mquo et bono, would seem to be that the agreement and 
· intention of the parties themselves should govern all the cases. 
If they intended a partnership in the capital stock, or in the.' 
profits, or in both, then that the same rule should apply in 
favor of third persons, even if the agreement were unknown 
to them. And on the other hand, if no such partnership were 
intended between the parties, then· that there should be none 
ns to third persons, unless where the parties had held them· 
selves out as partners to the public, or their conduct operated 
as a fraud or deceit upon third persons." Story, Partn. §§ 1, 
38, 49. • 
Baron PARKE (afterwards Lord WENSLEYDALE) appears to 
have taken much the same view of the subject as :Mr. Justice 
'STORY. Both in the court of exchequer and in the house of 
lords he was wont to treat the liability of one sought to be 
charged as a dormant partner for the acts of the active part-
ners as depending on the law of principal and agent. BeckJia1n 
f1B. Drake, (1841), 9 Mees. & ,V. 79, 98; Wilson vs. Whitehead, 
,(1842), 10 Mees. & ,V. 503, 504; Erne.<tt vs. Nicholls, (1857), 6 
H. L. Cas. 401, 417; Co:c vs. Hickman, (1860), 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 
MEEHAN' vs. VA.LE1\"1‘11\'E; I09
312, (ante. p. 70)‘. And in C’o:v.vs. Hickman he quoted, the-state-
int-nts_of Story and Pothier from Story, Partn. § 1,, above
cited.
ln that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their property:
to trustees, empowering them to carry on the business, and to
divide the net income ratably among their creditors, (all of
whom became parties to the deed), and to pay any residue
to the debtors, the majority of the creditors being authorized
to make rules for conducting the business or to put an end
to it altogether. The house of lords, differing from the major-
ity of the judges who delivered opinions at various stages of
the case, held that the creditors were not liable as partners:
for debts incurred by the trustees in carrying on the business
under the assignment. The decision was put upon the ground
that the liability of one partner for the acts of his copartner
is in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent;
that a right to participate in the profits, though cogent, is
not conclusive, evidence that the buiness is carried on in
part for the person receiving them; and that the test of his
liability as a partner is whether he has authorized the man»
agers of the business to carry it on in his behalf. C'o:z:'vs. H 12010;
man, 8 H. L. Gas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313, nom. Wheatcroft vs.
Hi-ckrnan, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99. .
This new form of stating the general rule did not at first
prove easier of application than the old one; for in the firt
cae which arose afterwards one judge of three dissented,
(Kilshaw vs. Juices, 3 Best & S. 847;) and in the next case the
unanimous judgment of four judges in the common bench was
reversed by four judges against two in the exchequcr cham-
ber, (Bullen vs. Sharp, 18 G. B. [N. S.] 614, and L. R. 1 C. P.
86). And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the
reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate
and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results from partner-
ship rather than partnership from agency. Kelly, O. B., and
Cleasby, B., in Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218, 227, 233;
Jessel, M. R., in Pooley vs. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458, 476. Such
a test seems to give a. synonym, rather than a definition;
another name for the conclusion, rather than a tatement of
the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. To
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312, (ante. p. 1or. And in Oo:r1 ""· Hie-km.an h.e qu.-O'ted. the--state-
mcn ts. of t:;tory and Pothier from Story, Partn. § 1,. altove 
cited. 
Jn that case, two merchants and copartners, becoming 
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their propert,t 
to trustees, empowering them to carry on the busin.ess, and to 
divide the net income ratably among their creditors, (all of 
whom became parties to the deed), and to pay any residue-
to the debtors, the majority of the creditors being authorized 
to make rnJes for conducting the business or to put an end 
1o it altogether. The house of lords, differing from the major• 
ity of the judges who del.ivered opinions at various stages ef 
the case, held that the creditors were not liable as partnera 
for debts incurred by the trustees in carrying on the busineu 
under the assignment. The decision was put upon the ground 
that the lfobility of one partner for the acts of his copartner 
is in truth the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent; 
that a right to participate in too profits, though cogent, HI. 
not conclusive, evidence that the business is carried on iin 
part for the person receiving them; and that the test of his-
liability as a partner is whether he has authorized the man· 
agers of the business to carry it on in bis behalf. Ooar't7s. Hi.<:'°7 
ma?t, 8 H. L. Cas. 268, 304, 306, 312, 313, nom. Wheatcroft "8• 
Hickman, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 47, 90, 92, 98, 99. 
This new form of stating the general rule did not at inst 
prove easier of application than the old one; for in the first 
case which arose afh•rwards one judge of three dissented,. 
(Kilshaw vs. Jukes, 3 Best & S. 847;) and in the next case the 
unanimous judgment of four judges in the common bench was 
reversed by four judges against two in the exchequer cham-
ber, (Bullen vs. Sliat·p, 18 C. B. [N. S.] 614, and L. R. l C. P. 
86). And, as has been pointed out in later English cases, the 
reference to agency as a test of partnership was unfortunate 
and inconclusive, inasmuch as agency results from partner-
ship rather than ·partnership from agency. Kelly, C. B., and 
CJeasby, B., in Holme vs. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 218, 227, 23.'3; 
Jessel, M. R., in Pooley vs. Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458, 476. Such 
a test seems to give a synonym, rather than a definition; 
another name for the conclusion, rather than a statement of 
the premises from which the conclusion is to be drawn. To 
say that a person is liable as a partner, who stands in the rela~ 
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tion of principal to those by whom the business is actually
carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idea
of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent.
In the case last above cited, Sir George Jessel said: “You
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless
you grasp the notion of the existence of the firm as a separate
entity from the existence of the partners,—~a notion which was
well grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly
understood in the courts of equity.” And in a very recent case
the court of appeals of New York, than which no court has
more steadfastly adhered to the old form of stating the rule,
has held that a partnership, though not strictly a legal entity
a distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly
so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in inter-
preting a commercial contract, Bank vs. Thompson, 121 N. Y.
2S0, 24 N. E. Rep. 473. I
In other respects, however, the rule laid down in Goa: as.
Hick-man has been unhesitatingly accepted in England, as
explaining and modifying the earlier rule. In re English 8.:
Irish Society, 1 Hem. & M. 85, 106, 107; Mollwo vs. Court of
Wards, L. R. 4 P. C. 419, 435; Ross vs. Pa~rIc_1/ns, L. R. 20 Eq. 331,
335; Ear: pm-te Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Em parte Delhasse, 7_
Ch. Div. 511; Badcley vs. Bank, 38 Ch. Div. 238. See, also,
Davis vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 151, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102;
Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Wild rs.
Dwvcnport, 48 N. J . Law, 129, 7 Atl. Rep. 205, 57 Am. Rep. 552;
Scabury vs. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 16 Atl. Rep. 54, and 52
N. J. Law, 413, 21 Atl. Rep. 952; Morgan vs. Farrell, 58 Conn.
413, 20 Atl. Rep. 614. (Post pl-94.)
In the present state of the law upon this subject, it may,
perhaps, be doubted whether any more precise general rule
can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this
opinion, that those persons are partners who contribute either
property or money to carry on a joint business for their com-
mon benefit, and who own and share the profits thereof in cer-
tain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences
follow that the acts of one in conducting the partnership busi-
ness are the acts of all; that each is agent for the firm and for
the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as
profits, and takes part of the fund to which the creditor of
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tion of principal to those by whom the business is actually 
carried on, adds nothing by way of precision, for the very idec.t. 
of partnership includes the relation of principal and agent. 
In the case last above cited, Sir George Jessel said: "You 
cannot grasp the notion of agency, properly speaking, unless 
you grasp the notion of the existence of the firm as a separate 
entity from the existence of the partners,-a notion which was 
well grasped by the old Roman lawyers, and which was partly 
u~derstood in the courts of equity." And in a very recent case 
the court of appeals of New York, than which no court has 
more steadfastly adhered to the old form of stating the rule, 
has held that a partnership, though not strictly a legal entity 
as distinct from the persons composing it, yet being commonly 
so regarded by men of business, might be so treated in inter-
preting a commercial co-ntract, Bank us. Tltompson, 121 N. Y. 
2SO, 24 ~. E. RPp. 4 73. -
In other respects, however, the rule laid down in Oo:c vs. 
Hickman has been unhesitatingly accepted in England, as 
explaining and modifying the earlier rule. In re English & 
lrrsh Society, 1 Hem. & ?ti. 85, 106, 107; Mollwo vs. Court of 
lV ards, L. R. 4 P. C. 4 rn, 4:15; Ross vs. l'arkyns, L. R. 20 Eq. 3:31 ~ 
335; Ex partc Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Ex parte Delhasse, 7. 
Ch. Div. 511; Badelc11 vs. Bank, 38 Cb. Div. 238. See, also, 
Dat:is vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138, 151, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1102; 
Ea.<ttman vs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276, 16 Am. Rep. 192; Wild -rs. 
DQtrenport, 48 N. J. Law, 129, 7 Atl. Rep. 295, 57 Am. E.ep. 552; 
Seabury vs. Bolles, 51 N. J. Law, 103, 16 Atl. Rep. 54, and 52 
N. J. Law, 413, 21 Atl. Rep. 952; Morgan vs. J?arrcll, 58 Conn. 
413; 20 Atl. Rep. 614. (Post~-) 
In the pre>sent state of the law upon this subject, it may, 
perhaps, be doubted whether any more precise general rule 
can be laid down than, as indicated at the beginning of this 
opinion, that those persons are partners who contribute either 
property or money to carry on a joint business for their com-
mon benefit, and who own and share the profits thereof in cer· 
tain proportions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences 
follow that the acts of one in conducting the partnership busi-
ness are the acts of all; that each is agent for the firm and for 
the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as 
profits, and takes part of the fund to which the creditors of 
the partnerl!lhip have a right to look for the payment of their 
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debts; that all are liable as partners upon contracts made by
any of them with third persons within the scope of the part-
nership business; and that even an express stipulation between
them that one shall not be so liable, though good between
themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And par-
ticipating in profits is presumptive, but not conclusive, evi-
dence of partnership. .
In whatever form the rule is expressed, it is universally held
that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by
a certain proportion of the profits of the partnership business,
is not thereby made a partner, in any sense. So an agreement
that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a certain portion of the
profits thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner
with the lessee. Perrinc vs. Hanlcinson, 11 N. J. Law, 215;
H olmcs rs. Railroad (70., 5 Gray, 58; Beecher vs. Bush, 45 Mich.
188, 7 N. VV. Rep. 785; (ante p. 86). And it is now equally well
settled that the receiving of part of the profits of a commer-
cial partnership, in lieu of or in addition to interest, by way
of compensation for a loan of money, has of itself no greater
effect. Wilson vs. Edmonds, 130 U. S. 472, 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep.
563; Richardson vs. Hnghitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267;
Curry vs. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41 Am. Rep. 343; Cassidy vs. Hall,
97 N. Y. 159; Smith cs. Km‘-yht, 71 Ill. 1-.18, 22 Am. Rep. 94;
Williams vs. Scatter, 7 Iowa 435, 446; Smelting Co. vs. Smith,
13 R. I. 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Mollwo as. Court of Wards, and
Badeley vs. Bank, above cited.
In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the per-
son held liable as a partner furnished the whole capital on
which the business was carried on by another, or else con-
tributed part of the capital and took an active part in the man-
agement of the business. Beauregard vs. Case, 91 U. S. 134;
Hackett vs. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 627, 628, 633, 22 N. E. Rep.
-745; Pratt vs. Langdon, 12 Allen, 544, and 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am.
Dec. 61; Rowland vs. Long, 45 Md. 439. And in Mollwo cs. Court
of Wards, above cited, after speaking of a contract of loan and
security, in which no partnership was intended, it was justly
observed: “If cases should occur where any persons, under
the guise of such an arrangement, are really trading as prin-
cipals, and putting forward, as ostensible traders, others who
are really their agents, they must not hope by such devices
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debts; that all are liable as partners upon contracts made by 
any of them with third persons within the scope of the part-
nership business; and that even an exp1-ess stipulation between 
them tllat one shall not be so lia hie, thougb good between 
themselves, is ineffectual as against third persons. And par-
ticipating in pr-0tlts is presumptiYe, but not conclusive, evi-
dence of pa'rtnership. 
In whatever form the rule is expressed, it is universally held 
that an agent or servant, whose compensation is measured by 
a certain proportion of the profits of the partnership business, 
ts not thereby made a partner, in any !'ense. So an agreement 
that the lessor of a hotel shall receive a certain portion of tlH~ 
profits thereof by way of rent does not make him a partner 
with the lessee. Perrine VB. Hankinson~ 11 N. J. Law, 215; 
Holmes t:s. Railroad Co., 5 Gray, 58; Beecher vs. Bush, 45 ~fich . 
188, 7 N. ,V. Rep. 785; (ante p. 86). And it is now equull.v well 
Eiettled that the receiving of part of the profits of a commer-
cial partllership, in lien of or in addition to interest, by way 
of compensation for a loan of money, has of itself no greater 
effect. ·wuson t:a. Edmonds, 130 U. S. 472, 482, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
563; Richa~·d.<Jon vs. H1tghitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267; 
Curry vs. Fo1£ler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41 Am. Rep. :l4:l; Cassidy vs. Hall, 
97 N. Y. 159; Smith vs. Kniyht, 71 Ill. U8, 22 Am. Rep. 94; 
Williams vs. So11tter, 7 Iowa 435, 446; Smelting Co. t's. Smith, 
13 R. I. 27, 43 Am. Rep. 3; Mollwo VB. Court of Wards, and 
Badeley vs. Bank, above cited. 
In some of the cases most relied on by the plaintiff, the per-
son held liable as a partner furnished the whole capital on 
which the business was carried on by another, or else con-
tributed part of the capital and took an active part in the man-
agement of the business. Beauregard vs. Case, 91 U. S. 134; 
Hackett VB. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625, 627, 628, 633, 22 N. E. Rep. 
745.: Pratt rs. Langdhn, 12 Allen, 5H, and 97 Mass. 97, 93 Am. 
Dec. 61; Rowland vs. Long, 45 .Md. 439. And in M ollzco vs. Court 
of Wm·ds, above cited, after speaking of a contract of loan and 
security, in which no partnership was intended, it was justl.v 
observed: "If cases should occur where any persons, under 
the guise of such an arrangement, are really trading as prin- · 
cipals, and putting forward, as ostensible traders, others who 
are really their agents, they must not hope by such devict>~ 
to escape liability; for the law, in cases of this kind, will look 
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at the body and substance of the arrangements. and fasten
responsibility on the parties according to their true and real
character.” L. R. 4 P. C. 438. But in the case at bar no such
clement is found.
Throughout the original agreement, and the renewals there-
of, the sum of $10,000 paid by Perry to the partnership, and
for which they gave him their promissory notes, is spoken of
as a loan, for which the partnership was to pay him legal inter-
est at all events, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly
profits of the partnership business, if those profits should
exceed the sum of $10,000. The manifest intention of the
parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreement, was to
create the relation of debtor and creditor, and not that of part-
ners. Perry’s demanding and receiving accounts and payments
yearly was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There
is nothing in the agreement itself, or in the conduct of the par-
ties, to show that he assumed any other relation. He never
exercised any control over the business. The legal etfect of
the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one
of the partners to his opinion that “it was capital he had in
the business the same as ours; we owed it to him; of course,
we owed it to him if we did not lose it.”
I'pon the whole evidence, a jury would not be justified in
inferring, on the part of Perry, either “actual participation in
the profits as principal,” within the rule as laid down by this
court in Berthold vs. Goldsmith, or that he authorized the busi-
ness to be carried on in part for him or on his behalf, within
the rule as stated in Cow vs. Hickman and the later English
cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perry
never having held himself out as :1 partner to the plaintiff or
to those under whom he claimed, the circuit court rightly
ruled that the action could not be maintained. Pleasants vs.
Font, 22 Wall. 116; Thompson vs. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 689.
Judgment atiirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court
when this case was argued, took no. part in its decision.
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at the body nnd substance of the arrangements, o.nd fute.B 
responsibility on the parties according to their true and real 
diaracter." L. R. 4: P. C. 438. But in the case at bar no •u.da 
clem<"nt is fou11d. 
Through-0ut th.e original agreement, and the renewals there-
of, the sum of $10,000 paid by Perry to the partnership, aad 
for which they gaYe him their promissory notes, is spoken ef 
as a loan, for which the partnership was to pay him legal inter-
~st at all events, and also pay him one tenth of the net yearly 
profits of the partnership business, if those profits should 
exceed the sum of $10,000. The manifest intention <>f ~ 
parties, as apparent upon the face of the agreement, was to 
create the relation of debtor and creditor, and not that of part-
ners. Perry's demanding and receiving accoonts and payments 
yearly was in accordance with his right as a creditor. There 
is nothing in the agreement itself, or in the conduct of the par-
ties, to show that he aBSumed any other relation. He never 
exerdsed any control over the business. 'fbe legal effect of 
the instrument could not be controlled by the testimony of one 
of the partners to his opinion that "it was capital he had in 
the business the same as ours; we owed it to him; of course, 
we owed it to him if we did not lose it." 
l"pon the whole evidence, a jury would not be justified ln 
inferring, on the part of l'erry, either "actual participation in 
the profits as principal,'' within the rule as laid down by this 
court in Bertltold vs. Goldsmith, OI" that he authorized the busi-
Df.'SS to be carried on in part for him or on his behalf, within 
the rule as stated in Oen vs. Hickman. and the later English 
cases. There being no partnership, in any sense, and Perr.r 
never having held himself out as a partnl'r to the plaintiff or 
to those unde1• whom he claimed, the circuit court rightly 
ruled that the action could not be maintained. Pleasants va. 
Pant, 22 'Vall. 116; Thompson vs. Bank, 111 U. S. 529, 4 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. m:m. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Mr. Justice Brown, not having been a member of the court 
when this case was argued, took no part in it& decision. 
N<Yr&: See Mechem'a Elem. of Partn., §§ 661 67, 68. 
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WAVERLY NATIONAL BANK Vs. HALL.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1892.
150 Pa. 466, 30 Am. St. Rep. 823, 24 Atl. Rep. 665.
ASSUMPSIT by the First National Bank of 'Waverly against
Charles L. Crandall, Stephen C. Hall, and George F. Lyon,
copartners doing business as Hall & Lyon, William L. \Vat-
rous and J. B. Floyd, all late copartners doing business as O.
M. Crandall. Defendants obtained judgment. Plaintiff
appeals.
Rodney A. Mcrcur and Edward Overton, for appellant.
D’A. Overton and John 0'. I ngham, for appellees.
HEYDRICK, J . The plaintiff sues upon notes made by C. M.
Crandall, one of the defendants, in his own name, and seeks
to charge the other defendants as partners of br-a.ndall in a
business in which the proceeds of certain other notes,_of which
these were renewals, were used. The evidence relied upon to
establish the alleged partnership is a contract in writing
between Crandall of the one part and the other defendants of
the other part, dated February 24, 1885. If this contract does
not create a partnership as to creditors, it cannot be success-
fully contended that all the evidence in the cause, taken
together, tends to charge anybody but Crandall; and, inasmuch
as all the assignments of error are predicated upon the assump-
tion that such partnership was created by that contract, it is
evident that, if that assumption was unfounded, the plaintiffs
could not have been injured by the rulings complained of; and
hence, though there may have been technical error therein,
the judgment ought not to be disturbed. It is therefore per-
tinent to inquire what were the rightsland liabilities of the
parties under that contract, although the question is not
directly raised by any of the assignments of error.
The whole scope of the contract indicates that a loan of
money to Crandall by the other parties in consideration of a
share of the profits of a business in which he was to embark
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WAVERLY NATIONAL BANK vs. HALL. 
Supreme Court of Pennsyfrania, 1892. 
150 Pa. 466, HO Am. St. Rep. 823, 21 Atl. Rep. 665. 
AssuMPSIT by the First National Dank of Waverly against 
Charles L. Crandall, Stephen C. Hall, and George F. Lyon, 
copartners doing business as Hall & Lyon, William L. \Vat-
rous and J. U. Floyd, all late copartners doing business as 0. 
M. Crandall. Defendants obtained judgment. Plaintift 
appeals. 
Rodney A. Mercur and Edward Overton, for appellant. 
v~.A.. Overton and John 0. Ingham, for appellees. 
HEYDRICK, J. The plaintiff sues upon notes made by 0. M. 
Crandall, one of the defendants, in his own name, and seeks 
to charge the other defendants as partners of (,randall in a 
business in which the proceeds of certain other notes,.of which 
these were renewals, were used. The evidence relied upon to 
E>Rtablish the alleged partnership is a contract in writing 
between Cr·andall of the one part and the other defendants of 
the other part, dated February 24, 1885. If this contract doeR 
not create a partnership as to creditors, it cannot be succe88-
fully contended that all the evidence in the cause, taken 
together, tends to charge anybody but Crandall; and, inasmuch 
as all the assignments of error are predicated upon the assump-
tion that such partnership was created by that contract, it is 
evident that, if that assumption was unfounded, the plaintiffK 
could not have been injnl'('d by the rulings complained of; aml 
hence, though there may have been technical error therein, 
the judgment ought not to be disturbed. It is therefore per-
tinent to inquire what were the rights and liabilities of the 
parties under that contract, although the question is not 
directly raised by any of the assignments of error. 
The whole scope of the contract indicates that a loan or 
money to Crandall by the other parties in consideration of a 
share of the profits of a business in which he was to embark 
was intended, and not a contribution to the capital of a part, 
15 
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nership of which the parties were to be the members. The
parties of the second part covenanted to furnish $8,000 to
Crandall, and not to a firm. They were to furnish it to him-
from time to time, as he might require it, and its payment to
them was to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon the tools,
machinery, furniture. and fixtures of every kind and nature
belonging to or connected with the business in which it was
to be used. Crandall might repay it, at his option, before the
expiration of the full term for which he had the right to
demand it; and, although it was stipulated that the money so
to be furnished should be used in the business contemplated,
the right of entire control of that business was recognized to
be in, and was expressly conceded to, Crandall. And it was
further stipulated that nothing in the writing contained should
be construed to create a partnership between the parties
thereto except as to the profits of the business. These provi-
sions are all consistent with the relation of borrower and
lender, and some of them are inconsistent with any other rela-
tion. It is, therefore, manifest that that relation was intended
to be established; and the next question is whether, in spite of
the intention of the parties, the community of interest in the
profits constituted them a partnership as to creditors. If this
were a Pennsylvania contract, the question would he answered
in the negative by the act of April 6, 1870, (P. L. 56), and by
Hart vs. Kcl-Icy, S3 Pa. St. 286. But, although it was made in
this State, it was to be executed in the state of New York.
Such cases are stated by approved text writers to be an excep-
tion to the general rule that the lea: loci applies in respect to
the nature, obligation, and construction of contracts. That
exception is thus stated by Judge STORY: “But where the con-
tract is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other
place, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed inten-
tion of the parties, that the contract, as to its validity, nature,
obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of
the place of performance." Confl. Laws, § 280. Chancellor
Knxr, after stating the exception in substantially the same
terms, adds that it “is more embarrassed than any other branch
of the subject [the lc.r loci-] by distinctions and jarring decis-
ions.” 2 Comm. 459. But, whatever conflict of authority there
may be in respect to the exception, all agree that matters con-
















































































































































114 CASES ON PARTNERSIIIP. 
nership of which the parties were to be the members. The 
·' parties of the second part covenanted to furnish $3,000 to 
Crandall, and not to a firm. They wer~ to furnish it to him 
from time to time, as he might require it, and its payment to 
them was to be secured by a chattel mortgage upon the tools, 
machinery, furniture. and fixtures of every kind and nature 
belonging to 01· connected with the business in wh1ich it was 
to be used. Crandall might repay it, at his option, before the 
-expiration of the full term for which he had the right to 
demand it; and, although it was stipulated that the money so 
to be furnished should be used in the lmsiness contemplated, 
the right of entire control of that business was recognized to 
be in, and was expressly conced~d to, Crandall. And it was 
further stipulated that nothing in the writing contained should 
be construed to create a partnership between the parti~s 
thereto except as to the profits of the business. These provi-
sions are all consistent with the relation of borrower and 
lender, and some of them are inconsistent with any other rela-
tion. It is, therefore, manifest that that relation was intended 
to be established; and the next question is whether, in spite of 
the intention of the parties, the community of interest in the 
profits constituted them a partnership as to creditors. If this 
were a Pennsylvania contract, the question would be answered 
tn the ne~ative by the act of April 6, 1870, (P. L. 56), and by 
Bart 1:s. Kelley, 83 Pa. St. 28G. llut, although it was made in 
this Rtate, it was to be executed in th(' stnte of New York. 
Such cases are stated by approved text writers to be an excep-
tion to the general rule that the lex loci applies in respect to 
the nature, obligation, and construction of contracts. That 
excrption is thus stated by Judge 8TORY: "But where the con-
tra et is either expressly or tacitly to be performed in any other 
place, the general rule is, in conformity to the presumed inten-
tion of the parties, that the rontract, as to its validity, nature, 
obligation, and interpretation, is to be governed by the law of 
the place of performance."' Confl. Laws, § 280. Chancellor 
KENT, after stating the exception in substantially th:! same 
terms, adds that it "is more embarrassed than any other branch 
of the subject [the lrJJ loci] by distinctions and jarring decis-
ions." 2 Comm. 4!'i9. But, whatever conflict of authol'ity there 
may be in respect to the exc<>ption, all agree that matters con-
nectPd with thr performance of a contract are regulated by 
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the law prevailing at the place of performance. Brown vs.
Ra-ilroatl 00., 83 Pa. St. 316; Scudder 1:8. Bank, 91 U. S. 406.
Under the present contract it is clear there could be no liability
to third persons without a performance as between the parties
to it, and therefore the question of such liability would neces-
sarily be connected with or grow out of such performance, _and
be determinable by the law of New York.
More than a century ago Chief Justice DEGREY, in Grace vs.
Smith, 2 1Vm. Bl. 998, (ante p. 61) laid down the proposition
that “every man that has a share of the profits of a trade ought
also to bear his share of the loss.” In a few years the principle
thus stated became recognized a a part of the law of England}
and so continued until 1.860, when it was overthrown by the
house of lords in Goa: vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Gas. 208, (ante p. 70).
On this side of the Atlantic, and especially in the state of New
York, it was accepted Without question, so far as I ha \'e
observed, as to the soundness of the reasons put forth in sup-
port of it, until it was exploded in England. As early as 1819,
Srnxonn, J ., delivering the opinion of the court in Walden rs.
Sherlmrne, 15 Johns. 409, said: “No principle is better estab-
lished than that every person is deemed to be in partnership
if he is interested in the profits of a trade, and if the advantages
which he derives from the trade are casual and indefinite,
depending on the accidents of trade.” And, although the judg-
ment of the house of lords in Goa: vs. Hickman was soon fol-
lowed by many American courts, the New York court of
appeals declared as late as 1874, in Lcggctt vs. Hg/dc, 58 N. Y.
272, 17 Am. Rep. 244, that the rule remained in that state -is
it had long been. But, while the judgment of the court sus-
tained the rule, the opinion of the learned judge who pro-
nounced it betrayed dissatisfaction with it, and attempted to
‘depend-it on no other principle than that of stare decisis, and
the chief justice dissented from the judgment itself. The ques-
tion came before the court of appeals again in Richardson rs.
Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267. In that case the defend-
ant had entered into a contract in writing with a firm engaged
in the business of manufacturing wagons, by the terms of
which they were to manufacture and deliver wagons to him,
and use their best effort to sell them. He was to advance'$50
on each wagon, to be paid on the first day of each month, and
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the law prevailing at the place of performance. Brou;n vs. 
Ra4lroad Co., 83 Pa. St. 316; Scudder n. Bank, 91 U. S. 406. 
Under the present contract it is clear there could be no liability 
to third persons without a performance as between the partiea 
to it, and therefore the questi-On of such liability would neces-
sarily be connected with or grow out of such performance, .and 
be determinable by the law of New York. 
More than a century ~go Chief Justice DEGREY, in Grace ·vs. 
Smith, 2 \Vm. Bl. 998, (a.nte p. 61) laid dowu the proposition 
that "every man that bas a share of the profits of a trade ought 
also to bear his share of the loss.:' In a few yem·s the principl · ~ 
thus stated became recognized as a part of the law of England~ 
and so continued until l8ti0, when it was over1hrown by the 
house of lords in CoJJ vs. Hickman., 8 H. L. Cas. 2G8, (ante p. 70)_ 
On this side of the Atlantic, anti. especially in the state of NPw 
I 
York, it was accepted without question, so far as I hn \·e 
observed, as to the soundness of the reasons put forth in st~p­
port of it, until it was exploded in England. As early as 1819, 
SPENCER, J., delivering t'he opinion of the court in lr'aldcn rs. 
Sherburne, 15 Johns. 409, said: "No principle is better estr. u-
lisbed than that every person is deemed to be in partnership 
if he is interested in the profits of a trade, and if the advantages 
which he derives from the trade are casual and indefinite, 
depending on the accidents of trade." And, although the jud~­
mcnt of the house of lords in Cox vs. Hi<:kman was soon fol-
lowed by many American courts, the New York court of 
appeals declared as late as 1874, in Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. y_ 
272, 17 Am. Rep. 244, that the rule remained in that state ·1s 
it had long been. Dut, while the judgment of the court suH-
tained the rule, the opinion of the learned judge who pro-
nounced it betrayed dissatisfaction with it, and attempted to 
·depend- it on no other principle than that of stare dccisis, and 
the chief justice difssented from the judgment itself. The qm·.~­
tion came b<>fore the court of appeals again in Richardson f"i'I. 
Hugkitt, 76 N. Y. 55, :J2 Am. Rep. 267. In that case the defen·l-
ant had entered into a contract in ,\rriting with a firm engagerl 
in the business of manufacturing wagons, by the terms or 
which they were to manufacture and deliver wagons to him, 
and use their best (•ffort to sell them. He was to advancc'$ti() 
on each wagon, to be paid on the first day of each month, an;) 
at the time of each advance the firm was to render him an 
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account of sales of wagons during the previous month, and
pay him one quarter of the net profits thereon, with interest
on the advances. This instrument was construed to be a con-
tract for the loan of money, and not to constitute a partner-
ship. This was followed by Curr_1/ rs. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, 41
Am. Rep. 343, in which it appeared that certain persons hav-
ing purchased vacant ground in the city of New York, and
being about to erect buildings thereon, entered into a written
contract with Fowler, by the terms of which he was to advance
$50,000 towards the purchase and erection of the buildings,
in consideration of which they “agreed to share the profits of
the said purchase and buildings with the said Fowler;” and
he wa to be allowed interest on his advances, and be secured
by bond and mortgage on the premises. This contract was
held not to create any other relation than that of borrower
and lender; the same judge who delivered the opinion of the
court in the case last cited saying: “In Richardson cs. H ugh-itl-,
76 N. Y. 55, 32 Am. Rep. 267, it was held by this court that a
person who has no interest in the business of a firm, or in the
capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of the profits
as a compensation for services, or for money loaned for the
benefit of the business, is not a .partner, and cannot be held
liable as such by a creditor of the firm.” This language was
repeated with approval in Cassidy cs. Hall, 97 N. Y. 159. It
is aid, however, in Hackett vs. Stanley, 115 N. Y. 625. 22 N. E.
Rep. 745, that these cases, and others in harmony with them,
do not overrule Lcggctt vs. Hg/dc and its predecessors. But,
while this is aflirmed, it is said in the same case that “excep-
tions to the rule [that participation in profits of a business
renders the participant liable‘ to creditors] are, however, found
in cases where a share in profits is contracted to be paid as
a measure of compensation to employés for services rendered
in the business, or for the use of moneys loaned in aid of the
enterprise." It is not material to inquire how much more of
the rule is left by this exception than was left by Com vs. Hick-
man. It is enough that the present case comes within the let-
ter and the spirit of the exception. The parties who made the
loan, and who are now sought to be hold liable as partners,
had no voice or part in the prosecution of the business, either
as principals or otherwise; nor had they an irrevocable right
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account of sales of wagons during the previous month, and 
pay him one quarter of the net profits thereon, with interest 
on the advances. This instrument was e<>ostrued to be a con· 
tract for the loan of money, and not to constitute a partner-
ship. This was followed by C1trr11 rs. Jr'o1cler, 87 ::s'. Y. 33, 41 
Am. Uep. 343, in which it appeared that certain persons hav-
ing purdmsed vacant ~round in the city of New York, an1l 
being about to ered buildings thereon, entered into a written 
contrnet with Fowln, h~· the terms of which he was to advance 
f50,000 towards the purchase and erection of the buildings, 
in consideration of which they "agreed to share the profits of 
the said purchase and buiJding-s with the said Fowler;" and 
he was to be allowed interest on his ad,·anceR, and be secured 
by bond and mortgage on the premises. This contract was 
held not to create any other rPlntion than that of borrower 
and lender; the same judge who delivered the opinion of the 
court In the case last cited saying: ''In Richardson t:s. Hugh·itt, 
76 N. Y. 55, !l2 Am. Rep. 267, it was hc>ld by this court that a 
person who has no interest in the business of a firm, or in the 
capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of the profits 
as a compensation for services, or for money loaned for thP. 
benefit of thf'! business, is not a .partner, and cannot be held 
liable as such by a creditor of the firm." This language was 
repeated with approval in Cassifl]/ vs. Hall, 91 N. Y. 159. It 
is said~ however, in Hackett vs. StanleJI, 115 N. Y. G25, 22 N. E. 
Rep. 745, that these cases, and others in harmony with them, 
do not overrule Leggett vs. H11de and its predecessors. But, 
while this is affirmed, it is said in the same case that "excep· 
tions to the rule [that participation in profits of a business 
renders the participant liable to creditors] are, however, found 
in cases where a sh.are in profits is contracted to be paid as 
a measure of comJ)(lnsation to employ~s for services rendered 
in the bmiiness, or for the use of mone~·s loaned in aid of the 
enterprisP.'' It is not material to inquire how much more of 
the rule is left by this excPption than was left by Cox vs. Hick-
man. It is enon~h that the present case comes within the let· 
ter and the spirit of thc> exception. 1'he parties who made the 
loan, and who are now sought to be held liable as partners, 
had no voice or part in the prosecution of the business, either 
as principals or othc>rwisc; nor had they an irrevocable right 
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S.'unlcy. The right of control, or any voice in the control,-
an incident of proprietorship,—was denied to them. And the
implication of partnership from community of interest in the
profits was excluded by an express stipulation, the absence of
which in Hackett vs. Stanley was thought to be worthy of notice;
and their right to demand a share of the profits was to ter-
minate upon repayment of the money advanced at the end of
five years, or sooner, at the option of Crandall. In all its
material provisions the contract under consideration is not
distinguishable from that in Curry vs. Fowler, or from those
provisions of the contract in Hackctt vs. Stanley, which it is
there conceded would create no other relation than that of
borrower and lender. For these reasons the defendants as to
whom issue was joined are not liable to -the plaintifi, and
therefore the judgment must be atfirmed.
Norm: See also cases cited in notes to § 50, Mechem’s Elem. of Psrtn.
F
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SPAULDING vs. STUBBING S.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1893.
86 Wis. 255, 39 Am. St. Rep. 888, 56 N. W. Rep. 469.
On August S, 1888, \Vilson H. Stubbings, who lived at Evans-
ton, Ill., but had a store at Marenisco, Mich., entered into
a contract with one John O'Connor, who was engaged in busi-
ness at Eagle River, \Vis., by which Stubbings was to advance
money to O’Connor for use in his business. O’Connor was to
give security for the money, pay Stubbings 10 per cent interest
upon it, and also give him one-half of the profits. Stubbings
supplied money under the contract, and also turned in the
stock of goods a.t Marenisco. On April 10, 1889, the goods
and money so advanced amounted to $14.611.50, and on that day
a new contract was entered into between the parties on sub-
stantially the same terms as the former. O’Connor carried
on the business in his own name until his death in July, 1889,
when his son and administrator, George O’Connor, took charge
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s:anley. The right of co.ntrol, or any voice in the control,-
an incident of proprietorship,-was denied to them. And the 
implication of partnership from community of interest in the 
profits was excluded by an express stipulation, the absence of 
which in Hackett VB. Stanley was thought to be wo11:hy of notice; 
und their right to demand a share of th.c profits was to ter-
minate upon repayment of the money advanced at the end of 
ftve years, or sooner, at the option of Crandall. In all ifa 
material provisions the contract under consideration is not 
distinguishable from that in Curry vs. Fowler, or from those 
provisions of the contract in Hackett vs. Stanley, which it i~ 
there conceded would create no other relation than that of 
borrower and lender. For these reasons the defendants as to 
whom issue was joined .are not liable to the plaintiff, and 
therefore the judgment must be affirmed. 
NarB: Bee also cases cited in notes to § 50, Mechem'1 Elem. of Parln. 
--------
SPAULDING vs. STUBBINGS. 
Supreme Court of Wfaconsin, 1893. 
86 Wis. 255, 39 Am. St. Rep. 888, 56 N. W. Rep. 409. 
On August S, 1888, 'Vilson H. Stubbings, who lived at Evans-
ton, Ill., but bad a store at 'Marenisco, Mich., entered into 
a contract with one .John O'Connor, who was engaged in busi-
ness at Eagle River, 'Vis., by which Stabbings was to advanc1~ 
money to O'Connor for use in his business. O'Connor was to 
give security for the money, pay Stabbings 10 per cent interest 
upon it, and also give him one-half of the profits. Stabbings 
supplied mone>y under the contract, llild also turned in thP 
stock of goods at Marenisco. On April 10, 1889, the goods 
and money so advanced nmounted to $14.611.50, and on that day 
a new contract was entered into between the pa11:ies on sub-
stantially the same terms as the former. O'Connor carried 
on the business in his own name until his death in ,July, 188!), 
when bis son and administrator, George O'Connor, took charge 
of it. Stnbbings knew of and assented to this and continued 
• 
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to advance money for the business. Plaintiff sold goods to
John O'Connor and to George O’Connor for use in the business.
George gave a note for part of these goods. The action was
upon the note and the account, and was brought against
George O'Connor and Stubbings, on the ground that the latter
was a partner.
Plaintiff recovered below and Stubbings appealed.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
Alban ¢€ Barnes (Gabe Bouck, of counsel), for appellant.
Levi J. Billings (M-illcr (£1 1lIcC'ormick, of counsel for
respondent.
Lyon, C. J . (after stating the facts). If defendant Stubbings
is liable in this action, he is so liable because he was a partner
with John 0’Connor, during his lifetime, in the Eagle River
business, and allowed the business to be continued on the same
basis by the administrators of John O’Connor’s estate after
his death. We have no case here for the application of the doc-
trine of estoppel against Stubbings, because he held himself
out to plaintiff as a partner in the business. The plaintiff tes-
tified he was told by John O’Connor, just before his death, that
Stubbings had an interest in the business, and that was all.
If plaintiff was a competent witness to give his testimony
(which counsel for Stubbings den_v), it fails to prove that Stub-
bings held himself out to plaintiff as a partner with O‘Connm-
in the Eagle River business. It does not appear that plaintilf
took the trouble to inquire of Stubbings or any other person
what that interest was, if it existed, or to ascertain whether
the business was continued on the same basis after the death
of John O'Connor; and there is no satisfactory proof that
plaintiff relied upon the fact that Stubbings was a partner
in the business when he gave credit to John O-‘Connor, and,
after his death, to his administrators. Hence, the first and
principal question is, were John O’Connor and Stubbings part-
ners inter so in the Eagle River business before and at the time
of the death of John ()’Connor? Among the numerous defini-
tions of a “partnership” to be found in the treatises on that
subject, many of which definitions are collected in 1 Lindl.
Partn. p. 2, and in 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 828, we think
















































































































































CASES ON PARTNERSllIP. 
to advance money for the business. Plaintiff sold goods to 
.John O'Connor and to George O'Connor for use in the business. 
George gave a note for part of these goods. The action was 
upon the note and the account, and was brought against 
George O'Connor nnd Stubbiugs, on the ground that the latter 
was a partner. 
PJaintiff recovered below and Stubbings appealed. 
Other facts appear in the opinion. 
Alban & Barnes (Gabe Bouck, of counsel), for appellant. 
Levi J. Billings (Millffr & McCorm-ick, of counsel for 
respondent. 
LYON, C. J. (after stating the facts). If d~fendant Stubbings 
is liable in this action, be is so liable because he was a partner 
with John O'Connor, during his lifetime, in the EagJe River 
business~ and allowed the business to be continued on the same 
basis by the administrators of John O'Connor's estate after 
hisdPath. \Ve have no case here for the application of the doC'-
trine of efitoppel against Stubbings, because he held himself 
ont to plaintiff as a partner in the business. T11e plaintiff tes-
tified he was told by John O'Connor, just before his death, that 
Btubbings had an interest in the business, and that was all. 
If plaintiff was a competent witness to give bis testimony 
(whic;h counsel for Stubbings deny), it fails to prove that Stuh-
bings held himself out to plaintiff as a partner with O'Connnl' 
'in the Engle Hiver business. It does not appear that pJaintilI 
took the trouble to inquire of Stubbings or any other pe1·son 
what that interest was, if it existed, or to nscertain whether 
the business was continued on the same basis after the death 
<>f .John O'Connor; and there is no satisfactory proof that 
plaintiff relied upon the fact that Stubbings was a partner 
in the business when he gave credit to John O'Connor, and, 
nf$er his death, to his administrators. Hence, the first aml 
pri'ncipal question is, were John O'Connor and Stubbings part-
ners inter sc in the Eagle River business before and at the time 
of the death of John O'Connor? Among the numerous defini-
tions of a "partnership'~ to be found in the treatises on that 
-subject, many of which definitions are collected in 1 Lindi. 
Partn. p. 2, and in 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 828, we think 
the definition formulated by Mr. nates in his late work on 
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that subject is as accurate and satisfactory as any we have
seen. This definition seems to be preferred by the learned
writer of the article entitled “Partnership” in such encyclo-
pedia. It is as follows: “A partnership is the contract relation
subsisting between persons who have combined their property,
labor, and skill in an enterprise or business, as principals, for
the purpose of joint profit.” 1 Bates, Partn. § 1. It is said by
Mr. Lindley that “ ‘partnership,’ although often called a ‘con-
tract,’ is in truth the result of a contract; the relations which
subsist between persons who have agreed to share the profits
of some business, rather than the agreement to share such
profits.” 1 Lindl. Partn. p. 2. Hence it is not essential to the
existence of a partnership that it be so denominated in the con-
tract of the parties; nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the
parties declare in such contract that they do not intend to
become partners. The real inquiry always is, have the parties
by their contract combined their property, labor, or skill in an
enterprise or business, as principals, for the purpose of joint
profit? If they have done so, they are partners i_n that business
or enterprise, no matter how earnestly they may protest they
are not, or how distant the formation of a partnership was
from their minds. The terms of their contract given, the law
steps in, and declares what their relations are to the enter-
prise or business and to each other.
The learned counsel for Stubbings contends that only the
agreement of April 10, 1889, can be considered in determining
the question of partnership. This alone of the two agreements
above mentioned is set out and relied upon in the complaint
to establish a partnership between Stubbings and John O’Con-
nor. \Vhilc we think the same efifect should be given to both
contracts, construed together, that should be given to the cou-
tract of April 10, 1889, excluding the other, we are willing to
adopt the view of counsel, and confine ourselves to giving con-
struction to the latest contract. That instrument in form fixes
the amount of money loaned by Stubbings to John O’Connor
at the sum of $14,611.50, and binds the latter to repay it in
five years, with 10 per cent interest, payable annually. The
instrument recites that O’Connor is engaged in carrying on a
general merchandise business in Eagle River, and provides
that he shall pay Stubbingsone-half of the net profits of such
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thnt subject is as accurate and satisfactory as any we have 
seen. This definition seems to be preferred by the learned 
writer of the article entitled "Partnership" in such encyclo· 
pedia. It is us follows: ''A partnership is the contract relation 
subsisting between persons who have combined their property, 
labor, and skill in an enterprise or business, as principals, for. 
the purpose of joint profit/' 1 Bates, Partn. § 1. It is said by 
Mr. Lindley that "'partnership,' although often called a 'con· 
tract,' is in truth the result of a contract; the relations which 
subsist between persons who have agreed to share the profits 
of some business, rather than the agreement to share such 
profits." 1 Lindi. Partu. p. 2. Hence it is not essential to thP 
existence of a partnership that it be so denominated in the con· 
tract of the parties; nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the 
parties declare in such contract that they do not intend to 
become partners. The real inquiry always is, have the parties 
by their contract combined their property, labor, or skill in an 
enterpri8e or business, as principals, for the purpose of joint 
profit? Jf they have done so, they are partners \n that busiµess 
or enterprise, no matter bow eamestl.v they may protest they 
nre not, or how diRtant the formation of a partnership was 
from their minds. The terms of their contract given, the law 
steps in, and declares what their relations are to the enter-
prise or business and to <:acl1 other. 
'fhe learned counsel for Stubbings contends that only the 
agreement of April 10, 1889, can be considered in determining 
the question of partnership. This alone of the two agreements 
above mentioned is set out and relied upon in the complaint 
to establish a partnership between Stubbings and John O'Con-
nor. 'Vhile we think the same effect should be given to both 
contracts, con$trued together, that should be given to the con-· 
tract of April 10, 1889, excluding the other, we are willing to 
adopt the view of counsel, and confine ourselves to giving con-
struction to the latest contract. 'l'hat instrument in form fixe~ 
the amount of money loaned by ~tubbing-s to John O'Connor 
at the sum of $14,611.50, and binds the latter to repay it in 
five years, with 10 per cent interest, payable annually. The 
instrument recites that O'Connor is engaged in carrying on a 
general merchandise business in Eagle Hiver, and provides 
that he shall pay Stubbings" one-half of the net profits of such 
business; that O'Connor shall keep correct account books of 
120 Gxsas on PARTNERSHIP.
the business, which shall be open at all times to the inspection
of Stubbings or his agent; and that during five years the stock
of goods in the business shall not be sold in bulk without the
consent of both parties thereto. It will be observed that this
agreement does not specify what Q’Connor. had done or should
do with the $14,611.50, nor the consideration for the stipula-
tion to give Stubbings one-half of the net profits of the busi-
ness. Such share of the profits could not have been given as
additional interest, because the agreement provided for pay-
ing him the highest legal rate of interest in this State, _inde-
pendently of the profits. Neither was it for services in the busi-
ness, for Stubbings did not stipulate to perform services
therein. The conclusion is almost irresistible that it wa
inserted to fix the proportionate share of Stubbings -in the
business. It will also be observed that in the contract
of April 10, Stubbings did not agree to make any-further
loans or advances to O’Connor, neither does it contain
any provision that O’Connor should be responsible therefor
should any fu_rther advances be made. Stubbings made
further advances, however, for the benefit of the busi-
ness, and it does not appear that any time was fixed
for repayment thereof, or that he demanded any voucher
or security therefor. It is not reasonable to believe
that he would thus have parted with his money if he was not
interested with O’Connor in the business, as a principal. More-
over, the letters of Stubbings in evidence show that the propo-
sition to start the business at Eagle River was first made by
him; that he purchased much stock for the store; that he
advised, if he did not dictate, of whom O’Connor should make
purchases, as well as prices and terms; that he arranged for
credits; and that he carefully watched and freely interfered
with all the details of the business, so far as he could obtain
knowledge of those details by persistent requests to the O’Con-
nors to furnish him detailed information thereof. In short,
he exercised an influence in, and assumed a control over, the
management of the business, (which was acquiesced in by the
O’C0nnors) entirely incompatible with the idea that he was
merely a creditor of O’Connor for the amount of his advances
and interest thereon, which can only be atisfactorily
accounted for on the theory that he was handling and directing
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the business, which shall be open at all times to the inspection 
of Stubbings or his agent; and that during five years the stock 
of goods in the business shall not be sold in bulk without the 
consent of both parties thereto. It will be observed that this 
agreement does not specify what O'Connor.bad done or should 
do with the $14,611.50, nor the c~nsideration for the stipula-
tion to give Stubbings one-half of the net profits of the busi-
ness. Such share of the profits could not have been given as 
additional interest, because the agreement provided for pa:y-
ing him the highest legal rate of interest in this State, ,inde-
pendently of the profits. Neither was it for services in the busi-
ness, for Stubbings did not stipulate to perform services 
therein. The conclusion is almost irresistible that it was 
inserted to fix the proportionate share of Stubbings .in the 
business. It will also be observed that in the contract 
ef April 10, Stubbings did not agree to make any · further 
loans or advances to O'Connor, neither does it oontain 
any provision that O'Connor should be responsible therefor 
should any fu_rther advances be made. Stubbings made 
further advances, however, for the benefit of the busi-
ness, and it does not appear that any time was fixed 
for repayment thereof, or that be demanded any voucher 
or security therefor. It is not reasonable to believe 
that he would thus have parted with his money if he was not 
interested with O'Connor in the business, as a p1incipal. l\fore-
over, the letters of Stubbings in evidence show that the propo-
sition to start the business at Eagle Rh·er was first made by 
him; that he purchased much stock for the store; that he 
advised, if he did not dictate, of whom O'Connor should mak~ 
purchases, as well as prices and terms; that be arranged for 
credits; and that he carefully watched and freely interfert><l 
with all the details of the business, so far as he could obtain 
knowledge of those details by persistent requests to the O'Con-
nors to fumish him detailed information thereof. In short, 
he exercisc>d an influence in, nnd assumed a control over, the 
management of the business, (which was acquiesced in by the 
O'Connors) entirely incompatible with the idea that he wal:! 
merely a creditor of O'Connor for the amount of his advanet'!ol 
and interest thereon, which can only be satisfactorily 
accounted for on the theory that he wns handling and directin::r 
hie own business. 'fhe foregoing considerations impel our 
Smutnxxo vs. Srusnmcs. 121
minds to the conclusion that, under the contract of April 10,
Stubbings and John O’Connor combined their property, labor,
and skill in the Eagle River business as principals, and of
course they did so for their joint profit, for the contract gives
each one-half the net profits, This makes them partners in
the business, within the rule above stated. The contract is
strikingly like that under consideration in Roscnfield vs. H aight,
53 Wis. 260, 40 Am. Rep. 770, which this court held created
a partnership relation between the parties to it. The fact that
the business was conducted in the name of John O’Connor, and,
after his death, in the name of the administrator of his estate,
and the further fact that in Stubbings’ letters to each of them
the business was usually referred to as “your business,” are
not significant, for it appears that, for reasons satisfactory to
himself, Stubbings desired that his connection with the busi-
ness should be kept secret. The finding that the business was
continued after the death of John O’Connor in the name of
his administrators, or one of them, with full knowledge and
permission of Stubbings, and was conducted in all respects
as before, without any notice to the contrary or adjustment
of the partnership business, and that Stubbings continued to
make advances to carry it on, are fully ustained by the proofs.
It requires no argument to show that in such case the liability
of Stubbings as a partner is continued. .
The findings of the court are- criticised because they ignore
the note sued upon, and go upon the open account of plaintiff
alone. The note was given for a part of such account, but it
is not a payment thereof. The note was brought into court,
and the defendants are not prejudiced because the findings and
judgment rest upon the original account rather than upon the
note. A computation shows that no interest was allowed on
the account; hence the judgment is more favorable to defend-
ants than it would have been had it been upon the note. The
judgment of the circuit court must be aflirmed.
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minds to the conclusion that, under the contract of April 10, 
Stubbings and Jahn O'Connor combined their property, labor, 
and skill in the Eagle River business as principals, and of 
course they did so for their joint profit, for the contract gives 
each one-half the net profits. This makes them partners in 
the business, within the rule above stated. The contract is 
strikingly like that under consideration in RosenfieW, vs. Haight, 
53 Wis. 260, 40 Am. Rep. 770, which this court held created 
a partnership relation between the parties to it. The fact that 
the business was conducted in the name of John O'Connor, and, 
after his death, in the name of the administrator of his estate, 
and the further fact that in Stubbings' letters to each of them 
the business was usualJy ref erred to as "your business," are 
not sigriificant, for it appears that, for reasons satisfactory tu 
himself, Stubbings desired that his connection with the busi-
ness should be kept secret. The finding that the business was 
continued after the death of John O'Connor in the name of 
his administrators, or one of them, with full knowledge and 
permissi-0n of Stubbings, and was conducted in all respects 
as before, without any notice to the contrary or adjustment 
of the partnership business, and that Stubbings continued to 
make advances to carry it on, are fully sustained by the proof~. 
It requires no argument to show that in such case the liability 
of Stubbings as a partner is continued. 
The findings of the court are. criticised because they ignore 
the note sued upon, and go upon the open account of plaintiff 
alone. The note was given for a part of such account, but it 
is not a payment thereof. The note was brought into court, 
and the defendants are not prejudiced because the findings and 
judgment rest upon the original account rather than upon the 
note. A computation shows that no interest was allowed on 
the account; hence the judgment is more favorable to defend-
ants than it would have been had it been upon the note. 'rhe 
judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed. 
~OTE: Ree also cases cited, M11chem'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 48, 50, notes. 
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MAGOVERN vs. ROBERTSON.
' Court of Appeals of New York, 1889.
116 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589.
This is an action for goods sold and delivered, brought b_v
John P. Mag-overn and others against Mo-nroe Mattison and
others. On the report of a referee, judgment ‘was entered dis-
missing the complaint on the merits, which judgment was
afiirmed by the general term. The plaintiffs appeal. The
facts are as follows: On April 30, 1881, the defendants entered
in_to the following contract: “Memoranda of an agreement
made and entered into this 30th day of April, 1881, by and
between Evolin B. Robertson, of the village of Mayville, Chau-
tauqua county, N. Y., of the first part, and M. Mattison, W. B.
Martin, C. H. Johnson, Oren Stoddard, James Moon, \V. Holt,
A. C. Packard, R. D. Bush, H. D. Stoddard, W. Northrop,'Jr.,
D. H. Matthews, John Northrop, A. M. Rinehart, Jackson A’:
Hollenbeck, XV. H. \Vhite, A. W. Smith, Mark Jones, J. H.
\Vood, J. W. Broadhead, of the town of Busti, said county,
of the second part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration
of the covenants hereinafter expressed the said party of the
first part hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said
parties of the second part to put a stock of dry goods, groceries,
hats, caps, boots and shoes. etc., in what is known as the ‘John
R. Robertson Store Building,’ situated in Busti village, said
stock to be at least of the value of three thousand dollars, to
be replenished from time to time as it runs below that amount;
the said party of the first part to procure the services of John
R. Robertson to manage said store, and devote his time thereto,
to the interests of the business. The parties of the second
part agree to indorse the paper of the said party of the first
part to the amount of $2,000, which sum is to go into the busi-
ness, and the said parties of the second part are to have an
interest at all times in the goods in said store to the amount of
their indorsenient; subject, however, to no liability except such
indorsement. At the end of one year the party of the first part
is to cause an invoice of the goods on hand to be taken in the
















































































































































122 CASES O.N PARTNERSIIIP. 
MAGOVERN vs. ROBERTSON. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1889. 
llCS N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. Rep. 398, 5 L. R. A. 589. 
This is an action for goods sold and delivered, brought by 
John P. Magovern and others against Monroe Mattison and 
others. On the report of a referee, judgment 'was entered dis-
missing the complaint on the merits, which judgment was 
affirmed by th~ general term. The plaintiffs appeal. The 
facts are as follows: On Ap1•il 30, 18Sl, the defendants entered 
~to the following contract: "Memoranda of an agreement 
made and entered into this 30th day of April, 1881, by and 
between Evolin B. Uobertson, of the village of Mayville, Chau-
tauqua county, N. Y., of the fiI"St part, and M. Mattison, W. B. 
Martin, C. H. Johnson~ Oren 8toddard, .James Moon, W. Holt, 
A. C. Packard, R. D. Bush~ H. D. Stoddar:d, W. Northrop; Jr., 
D. H. Matthews, ,John :Northrop, A. M. Rinehart, Jackson & 
Hollenbeck, ·w. II. \Vhite, A. W. Smithi Mark Jones, J. H. 
\Yood, J. ,V, Broadhead, of the town of Busti, said county, 
of the second part, witnesseth, that for and in consideration 
of the coYenants hereinafter expressed the said party of the 
.first part hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said 
parties of the second part to put a stock of dry goods, groceries, 
hats, caps, boots and shoes, etc., in what is known as the 'Johu 
R Robertson Store Building,' situated in Busti village, said 
stock to be at least of the value of three thousand dollars, to 
be replenished from time to time as it runs below that amount; 
the said pm1y of the first part to procure the services of John 
R. Robertson to manage said store, and devote his time thereto, 
to the interests of the business. The pa11:ies of the second 
part agi·ee to indorse the paper of the said party of the fir1:1t 
part to the amount of $2,000, which sum is to go into the busi-
ness, and the said parties of the sPcond part are to bave an 
interest at all times in the goods in said store to the amount of 
their indorsement; subject, however, to no liability except such 
indorscment. At the end of one year the party of the first part 
is to cause an invoice of the goods on hand to be taken in th~ 
presence, if so required, of two of the parties of the second 
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part; and the net profit of said busine, including all com-
missions received for buying hides, butter, cheese, wool, and
other produce," received by said manager, and after deducting
insurance on goods, fuel, lights, additional clerk hire, freights,
and other necessary expenses of the business, to be divided
as follows: Two-thirds of said net profits to belong to the party
of the first part, in consideration of her capital and manage-
ment of said busines through said J. R. Robertson, and the
use of said store building; and the other one-third of said net
profits are to be paid to the said parties of the second part
pro ram, in consideration of their said indorsement and their
general interest in the business. It is further stipulated by
and between the said parties that at any time previous to the
expiration of said year, when a majority of the parties of the
second part shall make a request in writing to that effect, the
party of the first part shall cause an invoice of the stock of
goods on hand to be taken in the presence of two of the parties
of the second part; and if it be ascertained that the business
is sustaining any considerable loss,.and the said parties of the
second part so demand, the party of the first part shall turn
over sufficient amount of said goods to secure said parties of
the second part against any liability on account of said
indorsement, or relieve said parties of the second part from
said indorsement, by causing said indorsed paper to be can-
celed. And it is further agreed by and between the parties
that if, at the end of one year, it be ascertained that there
has been a profit in said business, and the party of the
first part_ so require, the provisions of this agreement
shall extend another year; but if the party of the
first part desires to continue said business without the aid of
said indorsement, then this contract from and after that date
becomes abrogated. Said parties to this contract are to do
what they reasonably can to make said business a success. In
witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands and seals
this 29th day of April, 1881.” Pursuant to this contract, on
the 7th day of May. 1881, Evolin B. Robertson made her prom-
issory note for $2,000, payable to the order of J . R. Robertson
at the First National Bank of Jamestown, which was indorsed
by allof the defendants except David H. Matthews. This note
was discounted by said bank, and the avails thereof credited to
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part; and the net profits of said business, including all com-
missions received for buying hides, butter, cheese, wool, and 
other produce; received by said manager, and after deducting 
insumnce on goods, fuel, lights, additional clerk hire, freights, 
and other necessary expenses of the business, to be divided 
as follows: Two-thirds of Eaid net p1·ofits to belong to the party 
of the first part, in consideration of her capital and manage-
ment of said business through said J. R. Robertson, and the 
use of said store building; and the other one-third of said net 
profits are to be paid to the said parties of the second part 
pro rata, in consideration of their said indorsement and their 
general interest in the business. It is further stipulated by 
and between the said parties that at any time previous to the 
. €Xpiration of said year, when a majority of the parties of the 
second part shall make a request in writing to that effect, the 
party of the first part shall cause an invoice of the stock of 
good~ on hand to be taken in the presence of two of the parties 
of the second part; and if it be ascertained that the business 
is sustaining any considerable loss,.and the said parties of the 
second part so demand, the party of the first part shall turn 
over sufficient amount of said goods to secure said pa1·ties of 
the second part against any liability on account of said 
indorsement, or relieve said partiPs of the second part from 
said indorsement, by causing said indorsed paper to be can-
<'eled. And it is further agreed by and between the parties 
that if, at the end of one year, it be ascertained that there 
has been a profit in said business, and the party of the 
first part . so require, the provisions of this agreement 
shall extend another year; but if the party of the 
first part desires to continue said business without the aid of 
flaid indorsement, tlu•n this contract from and after that date 
becomes abrogated. Said parties to this contract are to do 
what they reasonably can to make said business a success. In 
witness wherrof we have hereunto set our hands and seals 
this 29th day of April, 18~1." Pursuant to this contract, on 
tl~e 7th day of May. 1881, Rvolin n. Hobertson made her prom· 
issory note for $~,000, payable to the order of J. R. Robertson 
at the First National Bank of Jamestown, which was indorsed 
by all.of the defendants except David H. Matthews. This note 
was discounted by said bank, and the avails thereof credited to 
the "Busti Union Store." The note was twice renewed, tho 
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renewals being indorsed by most of the defendants. Between
May 7, 1881, and December 16, 1881, the business established
by the contract was carried on under the name of the “Busti
Union Store,” at the place and under the management as stipu-
lated in the contract. From time to time, goods were pur-
chased with the avails of the discounts, and upon credit. Dur-
ing this time, the plaintifls, who were merchants doing busi-
ness in the city of New York, sold upon credit and delivered to
the Busti Union Store goods of the value and at the agreed
price of $1,217.62, to recover which this action was brought
against the signers of the contract.
Will-iam H. Henderson, for appellants.
A. O. Picka/rd, for respondents.
FOLLETT, C. J . (after stating the facts.) Persons having a.
proprietary interest in a business and in its profits are liable,
as partners, to creditors. .’lIantu.facturi.n-g Co. 1,-s Sears, 45 N. Y.
797; Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 278; Mason vs. Partridge, -1»
Hun-, 621, afiirmed, 66 N. Y. 633; Burnett vs. Snyder, 81 N. Y.
550, 555; Bank vs. H enneesy, 48 N. Y. 545; Berthold v. Goldsmith.
24 How. 536, 541; Haas rs. Root, 16 Hun, 526. 26 Hun, 63".’;
Rosenfield vs. Haight, 53 Wis. 260, 1.0 N. VV. Rep. 378. It is
stipulated in the contract that the parties thereto should (In
what they reasonably could to make the business a success;
that the defendants should have an interest in the goods in the
store equal to the amount of their indorsement; and that at the
end of the year an inventory should be taken in the presence of
two of the defendants, the net profits ascertained, and One-
third of them paid to the defendants, “in consideration of their
said indorsement and their general interest in the business.”
Every one of the signers had a right to require that the assets
of the business should be applied in payment (1) of the debts of
the business; (2) of the sums contributed by each; (3) of the
sum due each for profits earned. An execution creditor of
Mrs. Robertson (the debt not having been contracted in the
business) could not, by a levy upon the goods, have acquired a
lien prior to the equitable lien of the defendants to have had
them applied in payment of the debts of the business, and of
the amount put into the business directly, or by way of their
indorsements. Such being the rights of the parties to the con-
tract, they had a proprietary interest in the business and in its
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renewals being indorsed by most of the defendants. Between 
May 7, 1881, and December 16, 1881, the business established 
by the contract was carried on under the name of the "Busti 
Union Store," at the place and under the management as stipu-
lated in the contract. From time to time, goods were pm·-
chased with the avails of the discounts, and upon credit. Dur· 
ing this time, the plaintiffs, who were merchants doing busi· 
ness in the city of New York, sold upon credit and delivered to 
the Busti Union Store goods of the value and at the agreed 
price of ,1,217.62, to recover which this action was brought 
against the signers of the contract. 
William H. Henderson, for appellantL 
A. 0. Pickard, for respondents. 
FOLLETT, C. J. (after stating the facts.) Persons having a 
proprietary interest in a bnsines~ and in its profits are liable, 
as partners, to creditors. ]fanufactttring Oo. vs Bears, 45 N. Y. 
797; Leggett vs. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272, 278; .llason vs. Partridge, ..t. . 
Hun, 621, affirmed, 66 N. Y. 633; Burt1ett es. Snyder, 81 N. Y. 
550~ 555; Bank vs. Hennessy, 4S N. Y. 545; Bertholilv. Goldsmith, 
24 How. 536, 541; Haas t·s. Root, 16 Hun, 526, 26 Hun, 63:'!; 
Roaenfield vs. Haight, 53 Wis. 260, 10 N. W. Rep. 378. It is 
stipulated in the contract that the parties thereto should do 
what they reasonably could to make the business a succesH; 
that th.e defendants should have an interest in the goods in the 
store equal to the amount of their indorsement; and that at the 
end of the year an im·entory should be taken in the presence of 
two of the defendants, the net profits ascertained, and one-
third of them paid to the defendants, "in consideration of their 
said indorsement and their general interest in the business." 
Every one of the signers had a right to require that the assets 
of the business should be applied in payment (1) of the debts of 
the business; (2) of the sums contributl>d by ench; (3) of the 
sum due each for profits earned. An execution creditor of 
Mrs. Robet·tson (the debt not having been contracted in th•~ 
business) could not, by a levy upon the goods, have acquired a 
lien prior to the e1Jt1itable lien of the defendants to have hnd 
them applied in payment of the debts of the business, and or 
the amount put into the busirn:ss directly, or by way of thl•ir 
indorsements. Such being- the rights of the parties to the con-
tract, they bad a proprietary interest in the business and in its 
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profits, and are liable for the amount due the plaintifis. The
cases holding that a person entitled to a share of the profits of
a business in payment for services rendered, or as a compensa-
tion for money advanced cannot be charged as a partner,
are not in point. The distinction between "the rights and
liabilities of persons so situated, and the rights and lia-
bilities of persons having a proprietary interest in the
assets and profits of a business, has been clearly drawn
by the cases decided in the courts of this state. _ The
case at bar cannot be distinguished, in principle, from Mason
rs. Partridge, supra.
The stipulation in the contract that the defendants should
not be liable beyond their indorsements limits their liability as
between them and Mrs. Robertson; but, under the findings, it
does not exempt the defendants from liability for the plain-
tiff’s claim. It is quite apparent that the defendants knew
that the business which they initiated was conducted under the
name of the “Busti Union Store,” and not under the name and
on the credit of Mrs. Robertson. The judgment should be
reversed, and a new trial granted, with cost to abide the event.
All concur, except BRADLEY and HAIGHT, JJ., not sitting.
Norm: See also cases cited in notes to Mecbem's Elem. of Part:n., § 50.
BURNETT vs. SNYDER.
Court of Appeals of N cw York, 1880.
BIN. Y. 550, 37 Am. Rep. 527.
Action on account. The opinion states the facts. The plain-
tiff had judgment below.
William G. Wilson, for appellant.
Aaron Pennington Whitehead, for respondent.
i Asnnnws, J . The case of Burnett vs. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344,
was an action brought to recover a debt owing by the firm of
.i~‘-trang, Platt & Co., to the plaintiff, and Snyder was made a
















































































































































Bu&NEIT vs. SNYDER. 
profits, and are liable for the amount due the plaintiffs. The 
cases holding that a person entitled to a share of the profits of 
a business in payment for services rendered, or as a compensa.· 
tion for money advanced cannot be charged as a partner, 
are not in point. The distinction between ·the rights and 
liabilities of persons so situated, and the rights and lia~ 
bilities of persons having a proprietary interest in the 
assets and profits of a business, has been clearly drawn 
by the cases decided in the courts of this state .. The 
case at bar cannot be distinguished, in principle, from .Mason 
t~s. Partridge, supra. 
'l'he stipulation in t~e contract that the defendants should 
not be Jiable beyond their indorsements limits their liability as 
between them and Mrs. Robertson; but, under the findings, it 
does not exempt the defendants from liability for the plain-
tiff's claim. It is quite apparent that the defendants knew 
that the business which they initiated was conducted under the 
name of the "Busti Union Rtore," and not under the name and 
on the credit of Mrs. Robertson. The judgment should be 
re\'ersed, an9 a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. 
All concur, except BRADLEY and HAIGHT, JJ., not sitting. 
Norn: See alao caeea cited in notes to Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., § 50. 
BURNETT vs. SNYDER. 
Court of Appeah of New York, 1880. 
81 N. Y. 550, 87 Am. Rep. 527. 
Action on account. The opinion states the facts. The plain-
tiff had judgment below. 
William G. Wilson, for appellant. 
Aaron. Pennington Whitehead, for respondent. 
ANDREWS, J. The case of Burnett vs. Snyder, 76 N. Y. 344:, 
was an action brought to recover a debt owing by the firm of 
.~trang, Platt & Co., to the plaintiff; and Snyder was made a 
defendant upon the allegation that he was a copartner with 
126 CASES ox PAlt'l'XEIlSHIP.
the other defendants in that firm. In that case the plaintifi’, to
sustain the averment that Snyder was a partner, relied upon a
written agreement, made December 31, 1869, between Snyder
and Peter O. Strang and Ammon Platt, two of the members of
the firm of Strung, Platt & Co., executed concurrently with the
creation of the partnership, which recited that it was deemed
expedient that Snyder should have an interest in and become a
copartner in the firm, and which contained a stipulation that
Snyder should be entitled to receive one-third of the profits
earned and received by Peter O. Strang and Ammon Platt from
their interest in the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., and become
liable for and pay to them an amount equal to one-third of any
losses they, or either of them, might sustain by reason of their
connection as copartners, or otherwise with the firm of Strang,
Platt & Co. It was claimed on the part of the plaintifi that
Snyder was a partner by the express terms of the agreement.
and also, that if as between himself and the other members of
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., he was not a partner, he was
a partner to creditors by reason of a right under his agree-
ment to a participation in the profits. The court decided
against the plaintiff upon both propositions, and held that
an agreement between one of several members of a firm and
a third person, that the latter should be a copartner in the
firm did not in law make him a copartner, and that an agree-
ment between one member of a firm and a third person tha-t
the latter should be entitled to a share of the profits received
by the firm, and pay an equivalent share of his losses, was
not such a participation in the profits as to constitute the
person receiving such share a partner as to third persons, or
make him liable for the firm debts.
This ‘action is one of a series of actions ‘commenced by the
plaintiffagainst the successive firms of Strang, Platt Co.,
which firm was first organized in 1863, and reorg:i11i'4i~d',Dc'eem-
‘her 31, 1869, and again in May, 1870, to recover debts icon-
tracted by the several firms to the plaintiff. The debt sought
to be recovered in this action was contracted by the original
firm, which remained as originally constituted until the reor-
,ganiza.tion in Deceniber, 1869, except that Ryley, one-of the
original partners, died in 1867, and his interest was c011-
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the other defendants in that firm. In that case the pin in tiff, to 
sustain the averment that Snyder was a partner, relied upon a 
written agreenwnt, made December 31, 1869, between Snyder 
and Peter 0. Strang and Ammon 1•1att, two of the members of 
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., executed concurrently with tht~ 
creation of the partner~hip, which recited that it was deemed 
expedi<>nt that i;;nyder should han~ an interest in and become a 
copartner in the firm~ and which contained a stipulation that 
Rn;\·dE>r should be entitled to receive one-third of the profits 
eamed and receh·ed by Peter O. ~trang and Ammon Platt from 
their intereBt in the flnn of Strang, Platt & Co., and become 
liable for and pay to them an amount equal to one·third of any 
lossc>s they1 or either of them, might sustain by reason of their 
t>onneetion as copartners, or otherwise with the firm of Strang, 
Platt & Co. It was claimed on the part of the plaintiff that 
Snyder was a partner by the express terms of the agreement. 
und al~o, that if as between himself and the otl1er members of 
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co., he was not a partner, he was 
a partner to creditors by reason of a right under his agr::.·<~­
ment to a participation in the profits. The C<1nrl decided 
against the plaintiff upon both propositions, and held that 
an agreement between one of several members of a firm and 
a third person, that the latter Elhould be a copartner in the 
.firm did not in law make liim a copartner, and that an agree-
ment between one member of a firm and a third person tha.t 
the lattC'r should be entitled to n share of the profits receiv1~d 
by the firm, and pay an equivah>nt share of his losses, was 
not such a participation in the profits as to constitute the 
person rect'iving such share a partner as to third persons, or 
make him liable for the firm debts. 
'rl1is .action is one of a series of actions commenced by the 
plaintiff. against the successiYe firms of Strang, Platt !!- Co., . ) . .. . . 
which firm was first or~:mized in 1SG3, and reorganize!l .Deeem-
'ber :n, 18G9, and again in May, 1870, to recover <lebts con-
tracted by the several firms to the plaintiff. The d('bt sm1gl1t 
to be recovered in .this action was contracted by the original 
firm, which remained as originally constituted until the reo1•-
,gnniza.tion in December, 1869, except that Ryley, one <>f the 
original partne,·s, died in 1SG7, and his interest was ..:on-
tinued by his administmtors. The case above referred to was 
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brought to recover the debt to the plaintiff contracted by the
firmof December, 1869. ,
The referee in this case found as a fact that the defendant
Snyder was a partner in the original firm of Strang, Platt 8
Co. If this finding is not sustained by the evidence, it becomes
the duty of the court to reverse the judgment.
It is not claimed that the judgment can be sustained on
any theory of estoppel. Snyder did not hold himself out as a
partner. The plaintiff, while the debt for which this action
is brought was accruing, was a clerk in the employment of
Strang, Platt & Co., but he did not know, nor did he suppose
during this time that Snyder was a member of the firm, nor
was he informed that he was a partner until 1874, several years
after the final dissolution of the firm. His ignorauce, of course,
is immaterial, if in fact or law Snyder was a partner, but the
duty of establishing that relation, inthe absence of any hold-
ing out by Snyder that he was a partner, is upon the plaintiff.
The original firm of Strang, Platt & Go. was constituted by
written articles of copartnership between Peter O. Strang,
Ammon Platt and George W. Ryley. By this instrument
these persons constituted the firm. Snyder was not a party
to it, and so"far as the written agreement of copartnership
indicates, he was not a partner in the concern. The finding
that Snyder was a partner is based upon the fact, that con-
currently with the formation of the copartnership it was
arranged that Snyder should be jointly interested with Ryley
in his interest in the firm, that is to say, that Snyder should
be entitled to receive one-half of R_vley’s profits, and should
be liable for one-half of his losses. This arrangement, so far
as appears, was not evidenced by any writing executed by the
parties. The draft of an agreement was prepared between
Ryley and Snyder, conforming to the terms of the oral arrange-
ment, but was not produced, and it does not appear to have
been signed. While the negotiation for forming the partner-
ship was going on, Strang, Platt and Ryley expressed a desire
that Snyder should become interested in the proposed busi-
ness. The business contemplated was the wool brokerage and
commission business, and Snyder was a large dealer in Wool
on his own account, and as purchasing agent for mills with
which he was connected. It was at first proposed to Snyder
















































































































































BURNETT VS. SNYDER. 127 
brought to recover the debt to the plaintiff contracted by the 
firm . of December, 1869. 
The referee in this case found as a fact that the defendant 
Snydf'r was a partner in the original firm of Strang, Platt & 
Co. If this finding is not sustained by the evidence, it become9 
the duty of the court to reverse the judgment. 
It is not claimed that the judgment can be sustained on 
any theory of estoppel. Snyder did not hold himself out as a 
partner. The plaintiff, while the debt for which this action 
is brought was accruing, was a clerk in the employment of 
Strang, Platt & Co., but he did not know, nor did he suppose 
during this time that Snyder was a member of the firm, nor 
was he informed that he was a partner until 187 4, several years 
after the final dissolution of the firm. His ignorance, of course, 
is immaterial, if in fact or law Snyder was a partner, but the 
duty of establishing thut relati~n, in . the absence of any hold-
ing out by Snyder that he was a partner, is upon the plaintiff. 
The original 1il-m of 8trang, Platt & Co. was constituted by 
written articles of copartnership b.etw(>en Peter 0. Strang, 
Ammon l'latt nnd George ,V. Ryley. By this instrument 
these persons constituted the ftnn. Snyder was not a party 
to it, and so· far as the written agreement of copartne1·ship 
indicates, he was not a partner in the roncern. The finding 
that 8nyder was a partner is based upon the fact, that con-
currently with the formation of the copartne1·ship it was 
arranged that Snyder shoi.Ild be jointly interested with Ryley 
in bis interest in the firm, that is to say, that Snyder should 
be entitled to receive one-half of Ryley's profits, and shoultl 
be liable for one-half of his losses. This arrangement, so fai· 
RB appears, was not evidenced by any writing <'Xecuted by the 
parti(>s. 'l'he draft of an agreement was prepared between 
R~rle~· nnd Snyder, conforming to the terms of the oral arrange-
ment, but was not produced, and it does not appear to have 
been signed. \VhiJP the negotiation for forming the partne1·-
ship was going on, Strang, Platt and Ryley expressed a desil-e 
that Snyder should become interested in the proposed bu;.;i. 
nE>ss. The business contemplated was the wool brokerage and 
commission business, and Snyder was a large dealer in wu«I 
on bis own account, and as purchasing agent for mills wiih 
which he wns connected. It was at first proposed to Snyd(•r-
that he should become a copartner in the firm. For pm-
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dential reasons, growing out of his rela-tions with third par-
ties, Snyder declined the proposition to become a partner. His
refusal to become a partner had no connection with the ques-
tion of the liability which he would incur to creditors by
becoming a partner. It was then proposed that he should
take a share of ]{yle_v’s interest, and the arrangement was
concluded on that basis. The evidence shows that the agree-
ment finally made, so far as Snyder was concerned, was an
agreement between him and Ryley, made with the knowledge
and concurrence of Strang and Platt, the other members of
the firm, and in this respect the case differs from the former
one. The business of the firm did not require the contribution
of capital and none was contributed by any of the partners.
Snyder aided the firm by purchases and consignments of wool,
but, so far as appears, took no part in the management of the
business. The question arises upon these facts, whether Sny-
der was a. pa.rtner in the firm, or if not a partner as between
himself and the other persons interested, was he such as to
creditors.
In G4-ace vs. Smith, 2 NV. Bl. 998, and Waugh vs. Carver, 2 H.
Bl. 235, the doctrine was declared, and was deemed to be set-
tled by these cases, that a participation in the profits of a
trade made one liable as a partner to third persons by opera-
tion of law, although he was not ostensibly a partner, and
although the partnership relation was excluded by the terms
of the agreement between him and his associates. This doc-
trine was followed in England, and was regarded as the true
test of partnership as to third persons until the case of Cow vs.
HicIcman,8 H. of L. Gas. 301, in which the doctrine was strongly
impugned if not wholly overthrown. It was held in that case
that partnership was a branch of the law of principal and
agent, and that persons who shared the profits of a business»
do not incur the liabilities of partners unless the business is
carried on by them personally, or by others as their real or
ostensible agents. The defendants in that case, who were
creditors of an insolvent firm carrying on business as the
Stanton Iron VVorks, became parties to a deed of assignments
executed by them, and by their debtors, whereb__v the latter
conveyed their property to trustees in trust to carry on the
business theretofore carried on by the debtors in the name of
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dential reasons, growing out of his rela.tions with third par-
ties, Snyder declined the proposition to become a partner. Hie 
refusal to become a partner had no connection with the quet1-
tion of the lia.bility which he would incur to creditors by 
beeorning a partner. It was then proposed that he should 
tuke a share of Uyley's interest, and the arrangement was 
concluded on that basis. 'l'hc evidence shows that the agree-
ment finally made, so far as Snyder was concerned~ was au 
agreement between him and Uyley, made with the knowledge 
and concurrence of Strang and Platt, the other members Clf 
the firm, and in this resp~ct the case ditf ers from the former 
one. The business of the firm did not require the contribution 
of capital :md none was contributed by any of the partners. 
Snyder aided the firm by purchases and consignments of wool, 
but, so far as appears, took no part in the management of the 
business. The question arises upon these facts, whether Sny-
der was a partner in the firm, or if not a partner as between 
himself and the other persons interested, was he such as to 
creditors. 
In Grace vs. Smith, 2 \V. Bl. 998, and Waugh vs. Caner, 2 H. 
Bl. 235, the doctrine was declared, and was deemed to be set-
tled by these cases, that a pa1·ticipation in the profits of a 
trade made one liable as a partner to third persons by opera-
tion of law, although he was not ostensibly a partner, and 
although the partnership relation was excluded by the terms 
of the agreement between him and his associates. This doc-
trine was followed in England, and was regarded as the true 
test of partnersl1ip as to third persons until the case of Oo:c vs. 
Riekman,8 H. of L. Cas. ilOl, in which the doctrine was strongly 
impugned if not wbo11y overthrown. It was held in that case 
that partnership was a branch of the law of principal and 
agent~ nnd that persons who shared the profits of a business. 
do not incur the liabilities of partners unless the business is 
carrit>d on by them personally, or by others as their real or 
ostensible agents. The defendants in that case, who were 
creditors of an insolvent firm carr·ying on business as the 
Stanton Iron Work~, became parties ton deed of assignments 
~xc•cnted b;v them~ and by their debtors, whereb.v the lattel' 
"onve,ved their property to trustees in trust to carry on the 
business theretofore carried on by the debtors in the name of 
the Stanton Iron Company, with power to the trustees to enter 
. . 
.. 
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into contracts relating to the business, and to divide the
net income among the creditors in ratable proportions, and
it was held ‘that the creditors who executed the deed were
not partners in the business, and were not liable on bills
of exchange accepted by one of the trustees in the nam-e
of the company for iron ore purchased and used by them
in the business. But we have in this state adhered
to the general doctrine established by the earlier Eng-
lish cases, and although it proceeds upon reasons which
have not been considered entirely satisfactory, it was
applied by this court in the recent case of Leg;/ett vs. Hyde,
("'18 N. Y. 272; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 244.‘ But the participation
in the profits of a trade which makes a person a partner as
to third persons is a participation in the profits as such under
circumstances which give him a proprietary interest in the
profits before division as principal trader, Em parte, Hamper,
17 Ves. -104; Story on Part., sec. 49; Pars. on Part. 74, and the
right to an account as partner, and a lien on the partnership
assets in preference to individual creditors of the partner.
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 VVcnd. 175, 3 Kent Com. 25; 1
Smith Lead. Gas. 984. It is not every participation in the
profits which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptions
to the rule have been established. See Vanderburgh vs. Hull, 20
\Vend. 70; Burckle vs. Eckhart, 3 Comst. 132; Richardson vs".
Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55; s. c., 32 Am. Rep. 267. The contract of
sub-partnership, which is a contract between one of two part-
ners and a third person by which the latter is to share the
profits, or the profits and losses of the partner with whom the
contract is made, in the firm business, does not constitm e such
a participation in the profits as will make the person con-
tracting with the partner, a partner in the firm, or liable for
the partnership debts. In Em parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252, Lord
Ennox said: “I take it to have been long settled that a man
may become a partner of A, when A and B are partners,
and yet not be a member of that partnership which existed
between A and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a
banker in the city, a Mr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles
Raymond that he should be interested so far as to receive a
share of the profits of the business, and which share he had
a right to draw out of the firm of Raymond & Co. But it wa
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Into contracts relating to the business, and to divide the 
net income among the creditors in ratable proportions, and 
it was held that the creditors who executed the deed were 
not partners in the business, and were not liable on bills 
of exchange accepted by one of the trustees in the name 
of the company for iron ore purchased and used by them 
In the business. But we have in this state adhered 
to the general doctrine established by the earlier Eng-
lish cases, tind 'although it proceeds upon reasons which 
have not been considered entirely satisfacfory, it was 
applied by this court in the recent case of Leggett vs. Hyde, 
58 N. Y. 272; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 244.' But the participation 
in the profits of a trade which makes a person a partner as 
to third p~rsons is a participation in the profits as such under 
circumst:mces which give him a proprietary interest in the 
profits before division as principal trader, E:c parte, Hamper, 
17 Ves. 4-04; Story on Part., sec. 49; Pars. on Part. 74, and the 
right to an account as partner, and a lien on the partnership 
assets in preferPnce to individual creditors of the partner. 
Champion vs. Bostwick, 18 "\Vend. 175, 3 Kent Com. 25; 1 
E;mith Lead. Cas. 984. It is not every participation in the 
profits which will make one a partner. Numerous exceptions 
to the rule have hee>n established. See Vandel"burgh vs. Hull, !.!O 
\Vend. 70; Burckle vs. Ecklimi, 3 Comet. 132; Richardson 118. 
Huglzitt, 7G N. Y. 55; s. c., 32 Am. RPp. 267. The contract of 
sub-partnrrship, which is a contract between one of two part-
ners and a third person by which the latter is to share the 
profits, or thl' profits an~ losses of the partner with whom tlle 
contract is made, in the firm business, does not eonstitut e such 
a participation in the profits as will make the person con-
trarting with the partner, a partner in the firm, or liable for 
the partnership debts. In E:v parte Barrow, 2 Rose 252, Lord 
ELDO:i said: "I take it to have been long settled that a man 
may become a partner of A, wh.en A and B are partners, 
and yet not be a member of that partnership which existt;d 
between A and B. In the case of Sir Charles Raymond, a 
bankE'r in the city, a Mr. Fletcher agreed with Sir Charles 
Raymond that he should be interested so far as to receive n 
ahnre of the profits of the business, and which share he had 
a right to draw out of the firm of Raymond & Co. But it was 
held that he was no partner in_ that partnership: Jwd no 
17 
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demand against it; had no account in it; and that he must be
satisfied with a share of the profits arising and given to Sir
Charles Raymond.” See, also, Bray vs. Fremont, 6 Madd. Ii;
Killock vs. Greg, 4 Russ. 285; Frost vs. Moulto-n, 21 Beav. 596;
Coll. on Part., sec. 27 (6th ed).
It has been said that the English cases only show, that as
between the members of the firm inter sese, the party contract-
ing for the profits of one of the parties is not a partner, and
Mr. Lindley, referring to the subject, remarks, that before
the decision of the house of lords, in Com vs. Hi-ckrnan, a sub-
partner might, perhaps, have been liable to the creditors of the
principal firm, by reason of his participation in the profits.
Lindley on Part., 55. The doubt expressed by this author was
resolved in this court by our former decision.
Applying in this case, to the ostensible agreement made
between Snyder and Ryley, the test of partnership adopted
in Grace vs. Snu'th, as explained in the subsequent cases, Sny-
der did not become, by virtue of that agreement, a partner in
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co. He had no interest in the
profits of the firm as profits, but a right simply to demand
of Ryley that he should account to him for one-third of his
profits, accompanied with an obligation to pay one-third of
his losses. He had no joint proprietorship with the members
of the firm in the profits before division; was not entitled to
an account as partner, and had no lien on the partnership
assets. Tested by the rule in Cox vs. Hickman, Snyder’s posi-
tion is still stronger. Strang, Platt & Co. were not his agents
for carrying on the business of the firm, and he had no power
or right to interfere in its management.
It is claimed that whatever was the form of the arrange-
ment, the intention was that Snyder should be interested as
a partner in the firm, and we are referred to the principle
that courts will look to the substance and not merely to the
form of a transaction to determine its real character. But
form may be substance. It is undisputed that Snyder refused
to become a partner in the firm. The substituted arrange-
ment was one which the law permitted him to make without
involving him in the consequences, or subjecting him to the
responsibilities which flow from a partnership. If the osten-
sible agreement was not the real one, and the secret agree-
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demnnd against it; had no account in it; and that he must be 
satisfied with a share of the profits arising and given to Sir 
Charles Raymond." See, also, Bray vs. Frnmont, 6 Madd. :; ; 
Killock vs. Greg, 4 Russ. 2S5; Frost vs. Moulton, 21 Beav. 596; 
Coll. on Part., sec. 27 (6th ed). 
It has been said that the English cases only show, that ns 
between the members of the firm inter sese, the party contract· 
ing for the profits of one of the parties is not a partner, and 
Mr. Lindley, referring to the subject, remtlt·ks, that before 
the decision of the house of lords, in Cox t:s. Hickman, a sub-
partner might, perhaps, have been liable to the creditors of the 
principal firm, by reason of his participation in the profits. 
Lindley on Part., 55. The doubt expressed by this author was 
resolved in this court by our former decision. 
Applying in this case, to the ostensible agreement made 
between Snyder and Ryley, the test of partnership adopted 
in Grace vs. Smith, as explained in the subsequent cases, Sny-
der did not become, by virtue of that agreement, a partner in 
the firm of Strang, Platt & Co. He had no interest in th(> 
profits of the firm as profits, but a right simply to demand 
of R~·Iey that he should account to him for one-third of his 
profits, accompanied with an obligation to pay one-third of 
his losses. He had no joint proprietorsl.ip with the members 
of the firm in the profits before division; was not entitled to 
an account as partner, and had no lien on the partnership 
assets. Tested by the rule in Co:v i·s. Hickman, Snyder's posi-
tion is still stronger. f.itrang, Platt & Co. were not his agents 
. for carrying on the business of the firm, and he had no power 
or right to interfere in its management. 
It is claimed that whatever was the form of the arrange-
ment, the intention was that Snyder should be interested as 
a partnE>r in the firm, nnd we are referred to the principlt~ 
that courts will look to the substance and not mert>ly to the 
form of a transaction to determine its real character. But 
form may be substance. It is undisputed that Snyder refus~d 
to become a partner in the firm. 'fhe substituted arran~e­
ment was one which the law permitted him to make without 
invoking bim in the consequences, or subjecting him to the 
responsibilities which flow from a partnership. If the osten-
sible agreement was not the real one, and the secret aJ,rrf'e-
ment was that he was to be a partner, clothed with a part-_ 
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ner‘s rights, he could not escape from the responsibilities of
that relation, by showing the ostensible contract. The law
would not countenance the evasion, or permit him, under
cover of the written agreement, to escape from liability as
a general partner. But there is no evidence to show, or from
which it can be inferred, that the ostensible agreement was not
the real one. It may very well be, that the objection which
would naturally exist on the part of the parties for whom Sny-
der was acting as purchasing agent, to his becoming a part-
ner in a concern from which purchases might be made, would
apply to the arrangement actually made, but no question arises
here between Snyder and his principals. The motive which
induced Snyder, by indirection, to become interested in the
business of Strang, Platt & Co., so long as the arrangement
made did not operate as a fraud upon the creditors of the firm,
is not a material circumstance.
The only point here is, whether the actual transaction made
Snyder, in law, a member of the firm or liable for its debts.




Norm: For other cases bearing upon sub-partnerships, see Mochem’s
Elem. of P8.l'1;n., § 30.
JACOBS vs. SHOREY.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1868.
48 N. H. 100. 97 Am. Dec. 586.
Action by Jacobs & Co. against Shorey and one Mathes to
recover upon notes given by Shorey for goods bought of Jacobs
who, at the time, supposed he was selling to Shorey alone.
It was claimed, however,tl1at Shorey and Mathes were partners,
. and that there was a fraudulent understanding between them
that the goods, when obtained, should be disposed of without
paying for them. Matlies had written to one Townsend and
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ner's rights, he could not escape from the responsibilities of 
that relation, by showing the ostensible contract. The law 
wonld not countenance the evasion, or permit him, unde1• 
cover of the written agreement, to escape from liability as 
a general partner. But there is no evidence to show, or from 
which it can be inferred, that the ostensible agreement was not 
the real one. It may very well be, that the objection which 
would naturally exist on the part of the parties fo1· whom Sny-
der was acting as purrhasing agent, to his becoming a part-
ner in a concern from which purchases might be made, would 
apply to the arrangement actually made, but no question arises 
here between Snyder and bis principals. The motive which 
induced Snyder, by indirection, to become interested in the 
busineRs of Strang, Platt & Co., so long as the arrangement 
made did not operate as a fraud upon the creditors of the firm, 
is not a material circumstance. 
'l'he only point here is, whether the actual transaction made 
Snyder, in law, a member of the firm or liable for its d2bts. 
We think it did not, and the judgment should be reversed and a 
new trial granted. 
Judgment reversed. 
All concur. 
NoTe:: For other cases bearing up:>n sub-partnerships, see Mochem's 
Elem. ol Partn., § 30. 
JACOBS Vll. SIIOHEY. 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1868. 
48 N. H. 100, 97 Am. Dec. 586. 
Action by Jacobs & Co. agninst Shorey and one l\lathes to 
recover upon notes given by Shorey for goods bought of Jacobs 
who, at the time, supposed he was selling to Shorey alonl'. 
It was claimed, however, that Sl!orey and Mathes were partners, 
• nnd that there was a fraudulent understanding bC>tween them 
that the goods, when obtained, should be disposed of witbont 
paying for them. Mathes had written to one TownsC'nd and 
others a letter recommending Shorey to credit, and this h'tter 
132 Oasns on PARTNERSHIP.
was claimed to be a part of the fraudulent design. There was
judgment below for plaintiffs.
Hatch, for plaintiff.
Wheeler, Frink (G Haclsctt, for defendants.
Nesurrn, J. To maintain this action it becomes necessary
for the plaintiffs to establish the fact that Mathes shared in
the profits of the sale of the goods from them to Shorey, or
that Mathes and Shorey were partners in that transaction,
upon the ground that where goods are obtained for the use
of a firm by means of the fraud of one of its members, the
other partner, by receiving and participating in the use or
sale of the goods, will be held to have adopted the fraudulent
act of him who obtained them, and will be placed in the same
ii; situation in reference to the rights of the vendors of the goods
as if he had directed his partner to procure the property, or
{had originally concurred with him in the transaction.
In this way partnerships may grow out of transactions or
relations in which the word “partnership” has not been
uttered. If there be such a joinder or union of interest and
action as the law considers as the equivalent of partnership,
or as constituting it, it will give to the persons engaged in it
all the rights, and lay upon them all the responsibilities, and
also give to third parties dealing with them all the remedies
which belong to a partnership: Parsons on Partnership, 9;
Hawkins vs. Appleby, 2 Sand. 421. ' '
In general, conversations, assertions, or admissions, and
acts tending to show that parties are partners, and have that
joint interest in the particular business which makes them
liable as partners, will often have that effect, although such
evidence might be quite insuflicient to prove a partnership, as
between themselves, when no third persons are interested in
the question: Parsons on Part., 122.
, \Vhere there is doubt whether a party purchasing goods
lbought them for himself alone or for the benefit of another
as partner, to prove the latter point evidence may be offered
of acts and declarations subsequent to the sale and delivery
of the property: Hillard on Sales, 82.
So evidence as to the character of the goods purchased, the


















































































































































132 OASES ON PARTHEBBBIP. 
was claimed to be a part of the fraudulent desilfn. There wns 
judgment below for plaintiffs. 
Hatch, for plaintiff. 
Wheeler, Frink ~ Hacl~ctt, for defend~nts. 
NESMITH, J. To maintain this action it becomes necessary 
for the plaintiffs to establish the fact that Mathes shared in 
the profits of the sale of the goods from them to Shorey, or 
that Mathes and Shorey were partners in that transaction, 
upon the ground that where goods are obtained for the nee 
of a firm by means of the fraud of one of its members, the 
~
other partner, by receiving and participating in the use or 
sale of th.e goods, will be held to have adopted the f.raadnlenl 
act of him who obtained them, and will be placed in the same 
j; situation in reference to the rights of the vendors of the goods 
I . 
:\ ns if he had directed his partner to procure the property, or 
~had originally concurred with him in the transaction. 
In this way partnerships may grow out of transactions or 
relations in which the word "partnership" has not been 
uttered. If there be such a joinder or union bf interest and 
action as the law considers as the equfvalent of partnership, 
or as constituting it, it will give to the persons engag~d in it 
nll the rights, and lay upon them all the responsibilities, and 
ulso give to third 1mrties dealing with them all the remedies 
which belong to a partnerahip: Parsons on Partnership, 9; 
Hawkins vs. Appleby, 2 Sand. 421. • 
In general, conversations, assertions, or admissions, and 
acts tending to show that parties are partners, and have thnt 
joint interest in the particular business which makes them 
liable as partners, will often have that effect, although such 
evidence might be quite insufficient to prove a partnership, ns 
between themlilelves, when no third persons are interested in 
the question: Parsons on Part., 122. 
. \Vhere there is doubt whether a party purchasing goods 
\bought them for himself nlone or for the benefit of another 
as partner, to prove the lattt.'r point evidence may be offered 
of arts and declarations subsequent to the sale and delivery 
of the property: Hillard on Sales, 82. 
So evidence as to the clrnracter of the goods purchased, the 
ability or insolYency of the purchaser at the time, or whether 
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an inordinately large quantity of goods was purchased in pro-
portion to the party’s apparent means of payment, or the
credit given, or whether forced sales are made at inadequate
prices, before the expiration of the credit given, or whether
there may have been any secret or fraudulent transfer of the
goods, are all open and legitimate subjects of inquiry, as bear-
ing upon the sale, and the probable intent of the parties there-
to: State vs. Johnson, 33 N. H. 457; Parsons on Part, 128.
Upon -the question whether a. purchase was fraudulently
made by a. vendee in anticipation of his insolvency, evidence
tending to show that he fraudulently purchased other and
similar goods about the same time, by means of similar false
pretenses, may be admitted, having the tendency to show the
fraudulent intent or conspiracy in the case under consid-
eration. Acts and declarations showing a fraudulent purpose,
if connected in point of time, are admissible as throwing light
upon the general object of the party, though they do not relate
to the property or transaction in question: Hills vs. Hart, 18
N. H. 605; Lee vs. Lamprcy, 43 Id. 15; Blake vs. White, 13 Id.
267; An!/ier vs. Ash, 20 1a. 109.
In this case, the main question is, whether the acts of Shorey
were within the scope of a general design to share the profits
of the enterprise with Mathes, or whether the goods were
obtained on his own credit, or for his own private use or pur-
poses, and we think the jury might properly weigh the fact
wh.ether the letter of credit to Townsend and others might
not have been designed as means in obtaining money from the
plaintiff in prosecution of their general -fraudulent purposes.
The false pretense alluded .to in Lee vs. Lamprcy, supra, was
a letter addressed by one of the partners to another, tending
to show fraud and collusion between the parties. Upon the
aforesaid legal principles, the facts stated in the case appear
to be sullicient, with or without the letter, to show a fraudu-
lent purpose in both Mathes and Shorey in procuring the goods
in question, so as to render them liable. as partners: Bradley
vs. Obcur, 10 N. H. 477; Allison rs. Ellattlzew, 3 Johns. The
letter in question may also beproperly used as evidence before
the jury as an act or declaration of one member of a firm. and
properly within the scope of the partnership business, and to
charge the firm, whether honestly or dishonestly transacted
















































































































































JAOOBS va. SHOREY. 133 
an inordinately large quantity of goods was purchased in pro-
portion to the party's apparent means of payment, or the 
credit given, or whether forced sales are made at inadequate · 
prices, before the expiration of the credit given, or whether 
there may have been any secret or fraudulent transfer of the 
goods, are all open and legitimate subjects of inquiry, as bear-
hig npon the sale, and the probable intent of the parties there-
to: State vs. Johnson, 33 N. H. 457; Parsons on Part., 128. 
"l'pon the question whetlwr a purchase was fraudulently 
made by a vendee in anticipation of his insolvency, evidence 
tending to show that he fraudulently purchased other and 
similar goods about Ow same time, by means of similar false 
pretenses, may be admitted, b.avin~ the tendency to sllow the 
fraudulent intent or conspiracy in tlle case under consid-
eration. Acts and declarations showing a fraudulent purpose, 
if connected in point of time, nre admiHHible as throwing light 
upon the general objeet of the party, though tlwy do not relafo 
to the property or transactipn in {]Uestion: Hills ·rs. Hart, lS 
N. H. 605; Lee vs. Lamprey, 43 Id. 15; Blake i~s. White, 13 Id. 
267; Anr1ier vs. Ash, 2G Id. 109. 
In this case, the main question is, whether the acts of Shorey 
were within thC' scope of a general design to share the profits 
of the enterprise with Mathes, or whether the gooc.ls were 
obtained on his own credit, or for his own private use or pur-
poses, and we think the jury might properly weigh tlie fad 
whether the leltPr of credit to 'l'ownsend and others might 
not have been designed as means in obtaining mom·j· from tile 
plaintiff in prosecution of their g{-nernl .fraudulent purpost>s. 
The false pretc•n1ie alludPd .to in Lee i:s. Lamprey, supra., was 
a letter addt·<•ssPcl by one of the partners to another, tendi11~ 
to sh<nv fr<_rnd and collusion bctw(_•en the parties. Upon tlte 
aforesaid ]('gal principles, the facts stated in the case nppea i· 
to be sullicient, with or without the lett<'r, to show a fraudu-
lent purpose in both "'.\In thPs and Rho1·ey in pro cu ring the goods 
in questi-0n, so as to render them lia hie as partners: Bracllcy 
1~8. Obcar, 10 N. H. 477; Allison ·rs. Jfatthcu:, =~ ,Jollns. 2:l5. The 
letter in question may also be properly used as evidence before 
the jury as an act or declaration of one member of a firm. and 
properly within the scope of the partnership business, and to 
charge the firm, whether honestly or dishonc>stly transad(•(l 
or said: Peirce vs. Wood, 23 N. H. 519; Webster vs. Stearn.-;, 44 
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Id. 502. Such evidence may be received as one of a series of
acts, which, all together, indicate a fraudulent design to obtain
the goods without paying for them.
(Residue of opinion omitted.)
Plaintiffs took judgment for the amount of their first note.
Non: See also Mechem's Elem. of Pal-tn., § 204.
FLETCHER vs. PULLEN.
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1889.
' 70 Md. 205, 16 Atl. Rep 881. 14 Am. st. Rep. 355.
Appeal from circuit court, Dorchester county.
Argued before 1\[ILLER, Ronmsox, I nvmo, Srosn, Burns and
McSmannx', JJ.
S. T. M ilbourne, for appellant.
Daniel M. He-nary, Jr., for appellee.
l\l1I.LEn, J . The plaintiffs, who are nurserymen in Milford,
Del., sued Bramble 8: Fletcher, as partners in the same busi-
ness at Cambridge, in this state, for fruit trees sold and deliv-
ered to them in the autumn of 1886. Bramble died before the
trial, and Fletcher defended upon the ground that he was not
a partner. The exceptions relate mainly to the admissibility
of evidence upon the question, not whether Fletcher & Bram-
ble were actually partners inter scse, but whether Fletcher
had held himself out, or had permitted himself to be held out,
as a partner, so as to become responsible to third parties. The
law on this subject, well established by authority, may be
stated thus: “The ground of liability of a person as partner
who is not so in fact is that‘he has held himself out to the
world as such, or has permitted others to do so, and by rea-
son thereof is estopped from denying that he is one as against
those who have in good faith dealt with the firm, or with him
as a member of it. But it must appear that the person dealing
with the firm believed, and had a reasonable right to believe,
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Id. 502. Such evidence may be received as one of a series of 
acts, which, all together, indicate a fraudulent design to obtaiu 
the goods without paying for them.. 
(Residue of opinion omitted.) 
l'luintitrs took judgment for the amount of their first note. 
Non:: See also Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., § 201. 
FLETCHER vs. PULLEN. 
Oourt of Appca'ts of Af aryland, 1889. 
70 :Md. 205, 16 Atl. Rep 887, 14 Am. St. Rep. 8515. 
Appeal from circuit c-0urt, Dorchester county. 
Argued before MILLER, ROBINSO~, IRVING, STONE, IlnYAN and 
MCSHERRY, JJ. 
S. T. Milbou,rne, for appellant. 
Daniel M. Henry, Jr., for appellee. 
M11.LER, J. The plaintiffs, who are nurserymen in Milford, 
Del., sued Bramble & Fletcher, as partners in the same bmi!i-
ness at Cambridge, in tl1is state, for fruit trees sold and deliv-
ered to tlwm in the autumn of 188G. Bramble died before the 
trial, and Fletcher defended upon the ground that he was not 
a partner. The exceptions relntP. mainly to the admissibility 
of evidence upon the question, not whether Fletcher & Bram-
ble were actually partners inter scse, but whether Fletcher 
had held himself out, or had permitted himself to be held out, 
ns a partner, so :is to become responsible to third parties. Tha 
Jaw on this subject, well establif.ihed by authority, mny be 
stated thus: "The ground of liability of a person as partner 
who is not so in fact is that11e has held himself out to the 
worfd as such, or has permitted others to do so, and by rea-
son thereof is estopped from denying that he is one as against 
those who have in good faith dealt with the firm, or with him 
as a member of it. But it must appear that the person dealing 
with the firm believed, and had a reitsonable right to beJiev<', 
that the party he seeks to hold as a partner was a member 
I
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of the firm, and that the credit was to some extent induced
by this belief. It must also appear that the holding out was
by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or with
his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the direct act
of the party, may be inferred from circumstances, such as
from advertisements, shop bills, signs, or cards, and from vari-
ous other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that the
holding out was with his authority, knowledge, or assent; and
whether a defendant has so held himself out, or permitted it
to be done, is in every case a question of fact, and not of law :”
Thomas vs. Green, 30 Md. 1; 1 Lindl. Partn. 45; Thompson vs.
Bank, 111 U. S. 536, 537, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; 5 ¥Vait, Act. &
Def. 113, 114. These general rules apply to the present case.
The evidence shows that there was, in or near Cambridge,
a fruit farm and nursery on about 15 acres of Fletcher’s land,
which Bramble had occupied and managed from the year 1881
to 1887. The plaintiffs then proved that in October and
November, 1886, they received several letters, postal cards,
telegrams, and circulars from Cambridge, signed, “Fletcher &
Bramble,” representing them to be partners, and the envelopes
in which the letters were enclosed were stamped with the same
firm name. These letters contained orders for fruit trees, and
the first of them gave a reference to a Mr. Van Horst, formerly
of Milford, but then residing in Cambridge. The plaintiffs not
knowing the firm, nor by whom the letters were written, wrote
to Van Horst and others, inquiring as to its credit and stand-
ing, and in reply received information to the efl’ect that
Fletcher was entirely responsible, but that Bramble was worth
nothing. Upon this information, and receiving no intimation
.that Fletcher was not a partner, they filled the orders and
delivered the trees, relying upon his credit. Each item of this
testimony was excepted to as it was offered, upon the ground
_ that these letters, circulars,iand envelopes were written and
gotten up by Bramble without Fletcher-’s knowledge or con-
sent. \Ve think, however, they were all admissible, not because
‘the acts and declarations of Bramble would bind Fletcher,
‘as of course they would not, unless he was an actual partner,
lbut for the purpose of showing that the plaintiffs believed,
' and had good reason to believe, that he was a partner, and
that they trusted the supposed firm upon the faith of his
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of the firm, and that the credit was to some extent induced 
by this belief. It must also nppear that the holding out was 
by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority, or with 
his knowledge or assent. This, where it is not the direct act 
of the party, may be inferred from circumstances, such as 
from advertisements, shop bills, signs, or cards, and from vari-
ous other acts from which it is reasonable to infer that the 
holding out was with his authority, knowledge, or assent; and 
whether a defendant has so held himself out, or permitted it 
to be done, is in every case ai question of fact, an~ not of law:" 
Thomas vB. Green, 30 l\1d. 1; 1 Lindi. Partn. 45; Thompson VB. 
Bank, 111 U. S. 536, 537, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; 5 \'Vait, Act. & 
Def. 113, 114. These general rules apply to the present case. 
The evidence shows that there was, in or near Cambridge, 
a fruit farm and nursery on about 15 acres of Fletcher's land, 
which Bramble had occupied and managed from the year 1881 
to 1887. The plaintiffs then proved that in October and 
November, 1886, they received several letters, postal cards, 
telegrams, and circulars from Cambridge, signed, "Fletcher & 
Bramble," representing them to be partners, and the envelopes 
in which the letters were enclosed were stamped with the sam~ 
firm name. These letters contained ordei·s for fruit trees, and 
the first of them gave a reference to a Mr. Van Horst, formerly 
of .~!ilford, but then residing in Cambridge. The plaintiffs not 
knowing the firm, nor by whom the letters were wlitten, wrofo 
to Van Horst and others, inquiring as to its credit and stancl-
in~, and in reply received information to the effect that 
FJetcher was entirely responsible, but that Bramble was worth 
nothing. Upon this information, and receiving no intimation 
.that Fletcher was not a partner, they filled the orders and 
delivered the trees, relying upon his credit. Each item of th.is 
tPstimony was excepted to as it was offered, upon the groun<l 
. thn t these letters, circulai·s, and envelopes were written and 
gotten up by Bmmble with-0ut Fletcher's knowledge or con-
' 
sent. 'Ve think, however, they were all admissible, not because 
the nct8 and declarations of Bramble would bind Fletcher, 
j as of course they would not, unless he was an actual partner, 
I but for the pm·pose of showing that the plaintiffs believed, 
I and had good reason to believe, that be was a partner, and 
: that they trusted the supposed firm upon the faith of his 
j responsibility. To prove this was an important link in the 
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plaintiffs’ case, and evidence tending to prove it was, in our
opinion, admissible.
The plaintiffs then proved that an advertisement signed,
“Fletcher 8: Bramble,” calling attention to their nursery, offer-
ing their trees for sale, and soliciting from the public continu-
ance of confidence and orders, was published in two weekly
.newspapers of Cambridge, where Fletcher lived, for three
months during the year 1884. In one of these papers there
was also a local notice of the advertisement. These were also
prepared, inserted, and paid for by Bramble, without Fletch-
er’s knowledge; but it was proved that during the time of their
publication he was a subscriber to both papers, and they were
regularly sent him. There is also clear proof that he actually
knew of them while they were being published, and never
inserted in either of the papers any denial of the partnership.
held out to the public by Bramble as a partner, with his knowl-
( From all this it was competent for a jury to infer that he was
edge and assent; and we are of opinion the plaintiffs were
' entitled to prove this, thopgh they never saw the_advertise-
r meats, and were not i'nfluen‘c-_edT>y >tliem'in—trusting the firmt
‘ They had already proved they had so trusted it in good faith,
‘and upon good grounds, and we think they had the right to
I resort to these antecedent advertisements, and to this proof,
_for the purpose of showing that Fletcher had been so held
_out to the public with his knowledge and assent. It was evi-
dence to go to the jury upon that subject, and, if unt-o_n;__
tradicted, would have made him a partner, at least as to all
third parties who had trusted the firm in good faith upon thatj
supposition. Having knowledge of these advertisements, it
was his duty to deny the partnership, if he wished to escape
liability. But what was he to do, and how much? \Ve do not
say he was under a legal obligation to publish a repudiation
of the partnership in the same newspapers, or in any other,
though this would seem to be a very obvious and the most
efficient mode of proclaiming such denial, and the fact that
he failed so to do was a circumstance to go to the jury. But
we take it that the rule upon this subject, stated by a very
eminent jurist, is reasonable and just: “If one is held out as
a partner, and he knows it, he is chargeable as one, unless
he docs all that a reasonable and honest man should do, under
















































































































































136 CA.SES ox p A.RTNERSBIP. 
/ plai~tift's' case, nnd evide~ce tending to prove it was, in our 
\ opinion, admissible. 
1'he plaintiffs then proved that an advertisement signed, 
"Fletcher & Bramble," calling attention to their .nursery, off el'· 
ing their trees for sale, and soliciting from the public continu-
ance of confidence and orders, was published in two weekly 
.newspapers of Cambridge, where Fletcher lived, for three 
months during the year 1884. In one of these papers thet'e 
was also a local notice of the advertisement. These were also 
prepared, inserted, and paid for by Bramble, without Fletch· 
er's knowledge; but it was proved that during the time of theh· 
publication he was a subscriber to both papers, and they wne 
regularly sent him. There is also clear proof that be actuaJly 
knew of them while they were being published, and never 
inserted in either of the papers any denial of the partnership. 
( 
From all this it was com1wt..•ut for a jury to infer that he wa~ 
held out to the public by Bramble as a partner, with his knowl-
edge and assent; and we are of opinion the plaintiffs were 
' entitled to prove this, though they never saw the advertise-
r -- - --- - - --- - • - . - - . - - - - ---
m,ents, and were not inflm1nl'ed by them in trusting the firm~-
' They had already proved they had so trusted it in good faith. 
: and upon good grounds, and we think they had the right to 
; resort to these antecedent advertisements, and to this proof, 
. for the purpose of showing that Fletcher hau been so held 
, out to the public with his knowledge and assent. It was evi-
""dence to go to the jury upon that subject, and, if_ UD£~~= _ 
tradicted, would have made him a partner, at least as to all 
third parties who had trusted the firm in good faith upon that--
supposition. Having knowledge of these adYertisc~ments, it 
was his duty to d<:>ny the partnership, if he wished to escape 
liability. But what was he to do, and how much? 'Ve do not 
say he was under a leg-al obligation to publish a repudiation 
of the partnership in the same newspapers, or in any other, 
though this would srem to be a very obYious and the most 
efficient mode of proclaiming such denial, and the fact tliat 
he failed so to do was a circumstance to go to the jury. But 
we take it that the rule upon this subject, stated by a very 
eminent jurist, is rea1mnable and just: "If one is held out as 
a partner, and be knows it, he is chargeable as one, unless 
be does all that a reasonable and honest man should do, under 
similar circumstances, to assert and man if est bis refusal, and 
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thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled.” Pars.
Partn. '134. It follows that the court below was right in
admitting all the evidence otTered_by the plaintiffs, and in
rejecting the defendant’s first prayers. In regard to his sec-
ond, third, and fourth prayers, all that need be said is that the
propositions they contain are all embraced in his fifth prayer.
which the court granted with a single modification, to which
we see no valid objection.
“'0 come now to the rulings excluding certain evidence
offered by the defendant to show and sustain-his denial and
repudiation of the partnership. His own testimony was to
the effect that Bramble was simply his tenant of the land for
the term of six years from 1881; that Bramble had a fruit tree
nursery on the land, but he himself had nothing to do with it,
and never entered into a contract of partnership with Bram-
ble, either written or verbal, in the nursery business, or any
never lent his name, or autho-rized the use of it by Bramble,
with reference to this business, or any other, that he never
gather; that he never held himself out as such partner, and
knew of the letters, circulars, and envelopes written and used
by Bramble until they were produced in court at the trial; that
the advertisements and local notice were inserted without his
knowledge or consent, and he never knew anything about
them until they appeared in the papers; that he never put
himself to the trouble and expense of publishing in these
papers, or in any others, a contradiction of the advertisements,\
but had, on all occasions, to town people and country people,
when the subject was mentioned to him, and often when it
was not, denied the existence of any partnership, and repudi-
ated the advertisements as unauthorized by him. All this was
allowed to go in without objection, but it is to be observed
that he admits he knew of the advertisements wh.ic_h clearly
and publicly proclaimed the partnership, and never published
in any newspaper any denial of it. \Ve have said he was under
no legal obligation to make publication, but that it was his
duty to do all that a reasonable and honest man should do,
under similar circumstances, to manifest his denial. This is
the important question in the case, and it was one solely for
the jury to _determine. On this issue of fact he was entitled to
adduce all the evidence he could, leaving it for the jury to

















































































































































FLETOHER VB. PULLEN. 13'7 
thereby prevent innocent parties from being misled." Para. 
Partn. *134. It follows that the court below was right in 
admitting all the evidence offered. by the plaintiffs, and in 
rejecting the defendant's first prayers. In regard to his sec-
ond, third, and fourth prayers, all that need be said is that th•~ 
propositions they contain are all embraced in his fifth prayer. 
'which the court granted with a single modification, to which 
we see no valid objection. 
We come now to the rulings excluding certain evidence 
offered by the d«:>fendant t-0 show and sustain. his denial anll 
re1mdiation of the partnership. His own testimony was to 
the effect that Bramble was simply his tenant of the land fo1· 
the term of six years from 1881; that Bramble had a fruit tree 
nursery on the land, but he himself had nothing to do with it, 
and never entered into a contract of partnership with Bram-
ble, either written or verbal, in the nursery business, or any 
CT
ther; that 0 be never held himself out as such partner, and 
ever lent bis name, or authorized the use of it by Bramble~ 
with .refeN.•nre to this business, or any other, that he never 
knew of the letters, circulars, and envelopes written and used 
by Bramble until they were pt·oduced in court at the trial; that 
the advertisements and local notice were inserted without his 
knowledge or consent, and he never knew anything abont 
them until they nppeared in the papers; that he never put 
himself to the trouLJe and expense of publishing in tlH•se 
papers, or in any others, a contradiction of the advertisements,' 
but had, on all occasions, to town people nnd co1mtry peopJe, 
when the subjC'ct was mentioned to him, and often when it 
was not, denied the existence of any partnership, and r<>pmli-
atcd the ad\'ertiscments as unauthorized by him. All this was 
allowed to go in without objection, but it is to be obst>rvcd 
that he admits he knew of the advertisements which clcal'ly 
and publicly proclaimed the partnership, and never pnblislwd 
in any newspaper any denial of it. "~e have said be was unde1• 
no legal obligation to make publication, but that it was hi8 
duty to do all that a reasonable and honest man should do, 
under similar ci1·cumstances, to manifest his denial. This is 
the important question in the case, and it was one solely for 
the jury to .determine. On this issue of fact he was entitled to 
adduce all the evidence he could, leaving it for the jury to 
decide whether, upon the whole of it, they thought he had done 
18 
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all that a reasonable and honest man ought to have done.
Under this rule, he was entitled to the benefit of any evidence
in corroboration of his own testimony which tended to prove
the publicity of his denial. Now, in addition to his own gen-
eral evidence on this subject, he offered to prove, (1) by the
editor of one of the papers in which the advertisement and
notice appeared, that, when the witness called upon him to
pay for the same, he refused to do so, repudiated all partner-
ship with Bramble, declared he had nothing to do with Bram-
ble's business, and would have nothing to do with his bills.
(2) By the postmaster of Cambridge, that soon after the pub-
lication of the advertisements witness delivered to Fletcher
certain mail matter addressed to “Fletcher & Bramble,” but
he returned it unopened, and refused to accept the same,-
telling witness he had nothing to do with Bramble’s business,
and was no partner of his. (3) Th.at in July, 1885, he and Bram
ble were sued as partners by the steamboat company before
a magistrate in Cambridge, on a bill for freight; that there
was a crowd at the trial, and he resisted the suit, and refused
to pay the account, on the ground that he had nothing to do
with Bramble’s business; that the magistrate gave judgment
in his favor, and the case was much discussed in the com»
munity, especially by the steamboat agent, who made great
complaint because the. magistrate had decided in his favor.
In our opinion, these items of evidence should have been
admitted. It is not for this court to pass upon their weight
or effect, no matter how slight or inadequate, as a denial of
the partnership publicly proclaimed in the newspapers, we
may deem them to be. This is a matter solely for the jury.
Our duty is simply to determine the question of their admis-
sibility as evidencc, and we think the court erred in rejecting
them. We are also of the opinion that the agreement, or
“lease,” as it is called, between Fletcher and Bramble, for the
land upon which the nursery was carried on, should have been
admitted. lt‘was part of the defendant’s case, to prove that
he was not an actual partner with Bramble. This agreement
was admissible for that purpose, if he could show that by its
true construction it merely created the relation of landlord
and tenant between them. The error in rejecting the items
of evidence referred to requires us to reverse the judgment,
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all that a reasonable and honest man ought to have done. 
Under this rule, he was entitled to the benefit of any evidence 
in corroboration of his own testimony wllith tended to prove 
the publicity of his denial. Now, in addition to his own gen-
eral evidence on this subjt:>ct, he offered to prm·e, (1) by the 
editor of one of the papers in which the advertisement and 
notice appeared, that, when the witness called upon him to 
pay for the same, he refused to do so, repudiated all partner-
ship with Bramble, declared he had nothing to do with Bram· 
ble's business, and would have nothing to do with bis bills. 
(2) By the postmaster of Cambridge, that soon after the pub-
lication of the advertisements witness delivered to Fletcher 
certain mail lnatter addressed to "Fletcher & Bramble," but 
he returned it unopened, and refused to accept the same,-
telling wit.ness he had nothing to do with Bramble's business. 
and was no partner of his. (3) Th.at in .July, 1885, he and Bram 
ble were sued as partn~rs by the steamboat company before 
a magistrate in Cambridge, on a bill for freight; that there 
was a crowd at the trial, and he resisted the suit, and refused 
to pay the arcount, on the ground that he had nothing to do 
with Bramble's business; that the magistrate gave judgment 
in his favor, and the case was much discussed in the com-
munity, especially by tlJe steamboat agent, who made greut 
complaint becnuse the. magistrate had decided in his fa_vor. 
In our opinion, these items of evidence should have been 
admitted. It is not for this court to pass upon their weight 
or effeCt, no matter how slight or inadequate, ns a denial of 
the partnership publicly proclaimed in the newspapers, we 
may deem them to be. This is a matter solely for the jury. 
Our duty is simply to determine the question of their admis-
sibility as evidence, and we think the court erred in rejecting 
them. 'Ye are also of the opinion that the agreement, or 
"lease," as it is called, between Fletcher and Bramble, for the 
land upon which the nursery was carried on, should have been 
admitted. It was part of the defendant's case, to prove that 
he was not an actual partner with Bramble. This agreement 
was admissible for that purpose, ff be could show that by its 
true construction it merely created the relation of landlord 
nnd tenant between them. The error in rejecting the itema 
of evidence referred to requires us to reverse the judgment, 
and award a new trial. But in view of the fact that the court 
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below acting as a jury found for the plaintiff, notwithstand-
ing they had granted the defendant’s fifth prayer, in which
all his own testimony in denial of the partnership was
expressly submitted to the consideration of the judges, we
think each party should be required to pay his own costs,
both in this court and in the court below.
Judgment reversed, each party to pay his own costs in this
court and in the court below, and new trial awarded.
Norm: See also Mechem‘s Elem. of Pai-tu., §§ TO, 71, 72, and cases there
cited. Compare also with the following case.





Suprmnc Court of Connecticut, 1890.
58 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282, 20 Atl. Rep. 614.
Action on two promissory notes. The opinion states the
facts.
C. S. Hamilton, for appellant.
J . W. Ailing and W. H. Williams, for appellee.
Axnnsws, G. J. On the 1st day of March, 1880, William M.
Babbott made and delivered to the firm of Morgan & Herrick,
merchants, then doing business in New York, a note for the
sum of $1,004.56, expressed to be for value received, and pay-
able in 30 days; and on the 8th day of the same month another
note for the sum of $2,205.60, payable in 30 days at the Ansonia
National Bank, Ansonia, Conn. These notes were signed by
Babbott in the name of “Franklin Farrel & Company,” and
were delivered to Morgan & Herrick in payment for certain
goods sold and delivered by them to Babbott on his order there-
for. The plaintifi is now the owner of the notes, and brings
this suit to recover their amount. The complaint alleges that
at the time .the notes bear date Franklin Farrel and the said
William M. Babbott were partners in business under the firm
name of Franklin Farrel & Co. Farrel alone makes defense.
No service of the complaint was made on Babbott. The answer
















































































































































MORGAN VS. -~"'.A.RREL. 139 
below acting as a jury found for the plainti1f, .notwithstand-
ing they had granted the defendant's fifth prayer, w which 
all his own testimony in denial of the partn~rsbip was 
expressly submitted to the consideration of the judges, we 
think each party should be required to pay his own costs, 
both in this court and in the court below. 
Judgment reversed, each party to pay bis own costs in this 
court and in the court below, and new trial awarded. 
NOTE: See also Mechem's Elem. of Parto., §§ iO, 71, 72, and cues there 
cited. Compare also with the following case. 
MORGAN vs. FARREL. 
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1890. 
68 Conn. 413, 18 Am. St. Rep. 282, 20 Atl. Rep. 614. 
Action on two promissory notes. The opinion states the 
facts. 
0. B. Hamilton, for appellant. 
J. lV. Alling nnd lV. H. Williams, for appellee. 
ANnnEws, C. J. On the 1st day of March, 1880, William M. 
Babbott made and delivered to the firm of Morgan & Herrick, 
merchants, then doing business in New York, a note for the 
sum of fl,004.56, expressed to be for value received, and pay-
able in 30 days; and on the 8th day of the same month another 
note for the sum of $2,205.GO, payable in 30 days at the Ansonia 
National Bank, Ansonia, Conn. These notes were signed by 
Bnbbott in the name of "Franklin Farrel & Company," and 
were delivered to Morgan & Herrick in payment for certain 
~oods sold and deliyered by them to Babbott on his order there-
for. The plaintiff is now the owner of the notes, and brings 
tllis suit to recover their amount. 'l'he complaint alleges that 
at the time .the notes bear date Franklin Farrel and the saiu 
\Villiam 1\:1. Bnbbott were partners in business under the firm 
name of Franklin Farrel & Co. Farrel alone makes defense. 
No service of the complaint was made on Babbott. The answer 
is a general denial. Upon the trial evidence was offered from 
M0 Gaszs on PAR'1'NEnsu u».
which the plaintiff claimed to have proved that Farrel and
Babbott were partners as between themselves, or at least that
they were partners as to all third persons, or that Farrel was
liable as a partner to Morgan 8: Herrick, for the reason that
he had permitted Babbott to hold out that Farrel and himself
were partners under such circumstances that he was estopped
to deny that he was a partner. Farrel denied that he was a
partner in either way. The superior court rendered judgment
for the defendant, and the plaintitf has appealed.
An exhaustive definition of partnership is not easy. So far
as the facts in the case present the uestion of partnership,
lit is sufliciently accurate to say tha%1ere is a partnership
ibetwecn two or more persons whenever such a relation exists
fibetween them that each is as to all the others, in respect to
some business, both principal and agenfl If such a relation
exists, they are partners; otherwise not. They a.re partners in
that business in respect to which there is this relation, and
as to any other business they are not partners. Partnership
is but a name for this reciprocalrelation. Story, Partn. § 1;
Lord \Vn.\'sr.nvnAI.n in Cow vs. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 311; (ante
p. 70;) Bullen rs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86; Holme rs. H ammaml,
L. R. 7 Exch. 230; Harvey rs. Childs, 28 Ohio St. 319; (ante
p. 97;) Eastman rs. Clark, 53 N. H. 276; 16 Am. Rep. 192;
Golly. Partn. §§ 139, 412; Stillman vs. Harvey, 47 Conn. 26.
Between the parties themselves this relation of principal and
agent cannot exist, except by their voluntary agreement.
Hazard vs. Hazard, 1 Story 371; Golly. Partn. § 2. In the pres-
ent case, the finding is as explicit as language can make it that
Farrel and Babbott did not intend to become partners. It
says: “No paper was ever signed by or between Farrel and
Babbott alone. N0 conversation ever took place in which it
was stated in words that Farrel and Babbott were partners,
or were to form a partnership. No firm name was ever men-
tioned. No suggestion that either had used, or could use, the
name or the credit of the other. Neither ever understood,
intended, or thought that a partnership existed, or should
exist.” And, in addition to this, there is the express declara-
tion of Babbott to his counsel—apparently after Farrel had
written to him that he, Farrel,-had stopped all work on the
machine—that he did not believe there was any partnership
















































































































































lff CASES ON PAHTNE~HlP. 
which the plaintiff claimed to have proved that Farrel anti 
Babbott were partners as between themselves, or at least tha[ 
they were partners as to all third persons, or that Farrel was 
liable as a partner to Morgan & Herrick, for the reason that 
he had permitted Babbott to hold out that Farrel and himself 
were partners under such circumstances that he was estopped 
to deny that he was a partner. Farrel denied that be was a 
partner in either way. The supe1·ior court rendered judgment 
for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed. 
An exhaustive definition of partnership is not easy. So fur 
as the facts in the case present the -®stion of partnership, 
\it is sufficiently accurate to say tha there is a partnership 
l between two 01· more persons whenever such a relation exists i between them that each is as to all the others, in respect to 
some business, both principal and agenjJ If such a relation 
exists, they are partners; otherwise not. They are partners in 
that business in respect to which there is this relation, am] 
as to any other business they are not partners. Partnership 
is but a name for this reciprocal' relation. Story, Partn. § 1; 
Lord 'VF.~sr-EYDAI.E in Oo:r i:s. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 311; (ante 
p. 70;) Bullen t'S. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86; Holme i·s. Hamm<md, 
L. R. 7 Exch. 2:30; Hart:cy i·s. Cltilds, 28 Ohio St. 319; (ante 
p. 97;) Eastman i:s. Clark, 53 N. II. 276; 1G Am. Rep. 19:!; 
Colly. Partn. §§ 139, 412; Stillman t:s. HatTcy, 47 Conn. 2U. 
Between the parties tbemsel \·.es this relation of principal arnl 
ngent cannot exist, except by their voluntary agreement. 
Ha::m·d vs. Hazard, 1 Story 371; Colly. Partn. § 2. In the pres-
ent casP., the finding is as explicit as language can make it that 
Farrel and Babbott did not intend to become partners. It 
says: "Xo paper was ever signed by or between Farrel anJ 
Babbott alone. No conversation e>er took plaee in which it 
was stated in words that Farrel an<l nabbott were partnerl", 
or were to form a partnership. No firm name was ever men-
tioned. No sugg<•stion that either bad used, or could use, the 
name or the credit of the other. Nc>ither ever undei:stood, 
intended, or thought that a partnership existed, or should 
exist." And, in addition to this, there is the express declara-
tion of Babbott to his counsel-apparently after Farrel had 
written to him that he, FarreJ,.had stopped all work on the 
machine-that he did not believe there was any partnership 
between them. This part of the case is not pressed, and we 
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need not pursue it. A partnership as to third persons some-
times arises by operation of laweven against the intention ofthe
parties;and this happens either because the contract which the
parties have entered into in law makes each the principal and
agent of the other, or because by a course of dealing they have
shown that such was the real relation between them. Such
were the cases of Parker vs. Ganfield, 37 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep.
317 ; and Bank vs. Hine, 49 Conn. 236. It is laid down in Ever-
itt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, that, where the terms of the agree-
ment and the facts are all admitted, whether or not a partner-
ship existed is a question of law for the court to decide. The
plaintifi claims that from the facts found by the superior court
it does appear that Farrel and Babbott were partners
quorul third persons, notwithstanding their intent not to be
partners. The facts from which the partnership is claimed
to arise are mainly the exhibits 1, 2, and 3; and of these exhibit
L’ is the only one important. All the other facts derive their
significance solely from the construction that is to be put on
this exhibit.
Exhibit 2 purports to be no more than an agreement between
(1 he Cook Ice & Refrigerating Company, party of the first part,
gs .-»~
and Franklin Farrel and William M. Babbott, party of the
second part, by which the party of the first part, being the
owner of patents therefor, grants to the party of the second
part the exclusive right to manufacture and sell refrigerating
machines and apparatus for refrigerating, as described in the
patents, throughout the United States for the full term for
which the patents were granted. And, in consideration of
that grant, the party of the second part undertakes and agrees,
with all diligence and dispatch, and without expense or charge
to the party of the first part, to manufacture a refrigerating
machine under the patents, and for the purpose of aiding and
benefiting the business intended in the agreement, to run the
machine for at least two months subsequent to its completion.
The party of the second part also agrees to use its best endeav-
ors to create a public demand for the machines, and to mann-
facture machines to supply any bona fide order therefor; and
agree to pay to the party of the first part an amount equal
to one-half of the gross profits accruing therefrom. There are
other provisions in the agreement, but all having reference
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need not pursue it. A partnership as to third persons some-
times arises by operation of lawevenagainst the intention of the 
parties;and this happens either because the contract which the 
parties have entered into in law makes each the principal and 
agent of the other, or because by a course of dealing they have 
~hown that such was the real relation between them. Such 
were the cases of Parker vs. Canfield, 37 Conn. 250, 9 Am. Rep. 
:n7; and Bank t:s. Hine, 49 Conn. 236. It is laid down in Ever-
itt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347, that, where the terms of the agre~­
ment and the facts are all admitted, whether or not a p:ll'tner-
~bjp existed is a question of law for the court to decide. The 
plaintiff claims that from the facts found by the superior court 
it does appear that Farrel and Babbott were partners 
quoad third persons, notwithstanding their intent not to be 
i,artners. The facts from which the partnership is claimed 
'to arise are mainly the exhibits 1, 2, and 3; and of these exhibit 
:! is the only one important. All the other facts derive tht!ir 
~ignificance solely from the construction that is to be put on 
this exhibit. 
( Exhibit 2 purports to be no more than an agreement between 
the Cook Ice & Refrigerating Company, party of the first part, 
and Franklin Farrel and \Villiam M. Babbott, party of the 
Necond part, by which the party of the first part, being the 
owner of patents the>refor, grants to the party of the secoutl 
J>art the exclusive rig-ht to manufacture and sell refrigerating 
machines and apparatus for refrigerating-, as described in the 
patents, throughout the l:nited States for the full term for 
which the patents were granted. And, in consideration of 
that grant, the party of the second part undertakes and agrees, 
with all diligence and dispntch, a.nd without expense or charge 
to the party of the first part, to manufacture a refrigerating 
machine under the pat<•nts, and for the purpose of aiding and 
benefiting the businrss intended in the agreement, to run the 
machine for at least two months snbseqn<'nt to ~ts completion. 
The party of the second part also agrees to use its best endeav-
ors to create a public demand for the machines, and to man11-
facture machines to supply any bona fide ortler therefor; and 
agrees to pay to the party of the first part an amount eqnal 
to one-half of the gross profits accruing therefrom. There are 
other provisions in the agreement, but all having reference 
to the duties and obligations of the parties thereto. That snch 
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a contract as this does not make the parties—that is, the party
of the first part and the party of the second part—partners,
is settled by abundant authority. It only provides a way in
which the party doing the work is to be paid for its services.
Chase vs. Barrett, 4 Paige 148. The only relation of Farrel and
Babbott that appears by this agreement is that of joint con-
tractors to manufacture refrigerating machines for the Cook
Company. There is no suggestion in it that either is, or is to
be, the agent of the other. It does not attempt to provide in
what way Farrel and Babbott, as between themselves, are to
carry out their joint undertaking. (A community of interest
does not make a partnership) Loomis vs. Marshall, 12 Conn.
77 ; 30 Am. Dec. 596; Porter vs. McClure, 15 Wend. 187. Thus
tenants in common of land are not partners. Calvert vs. Ald-
rich, 99 Mass. 7-1; 96 Am. Dec. 693. In Oliver vs. Gray, 4 Ark.
425, it was holden that two persons, joint owners of a horse,
were not partners in respect to a contract for its keeping.
French vs. Sig/ring, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 357, was a case where two
men owned a race horse, which they entered in a race and
won a. prize. It was held that they were not partners as to
that money. In Hawkins vs. Mclntyre, 45 Vt. 496, the defend-
ant contracted to finish ofif a church for the sum of $4,500.
Afterwards he agreed with the plaintiff that they should work
together in doing the job, each working himself, the work of
each. to ofl'set that of the other, and the expense of materials
and of other work tobe deducted from the amount, and the
balance to be divided between them. It was held that they
were not partners. In the case above cited (Lomnis vs. Mar-
shall, 12 Conn. 77), B was the owner of a satinet factory. A
agreed with B to furnish all the wool that should be needed at
the factory for two years, which B agreed to manufacture into
cloth, the net proceeds of the cloth, after deducting the inci-
dental charges of sale, to be divided, so that A should have 55
per cent and B 45 per cent. It was held that there was not
a partnership as to third persons. It probably could be in-
ferred that Farrel and Babbott were to divide between them-
selves whatever was left, if anything, after paying the Cook
Company. But a partnership, even as to third persons, is not
constituted by the mere fact that two or more persons partici-
pate or are interested in the net proceeds of a business. 1

















































































































































142 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
a contract as this does not mnke the parties-that is, the party 
of the first part and the party of the second part-partners, 
is settled by abundant authority. It only provides a way in 
which the party doing the work is to be paid for its services. 
Ohase i·s. Barrett, 4 Paige 148. The only relation of Farrel and 
Babbott that appears by this agreement is that of joint con-
tractors to manufacture refrigerating machines for the Cook 
Company. There is no suggestion in it that either is, or is to 
be, the agent of the other. It does not attempt to provide in 
what way Farrel and Babbott, as between themselves, are to 
carry out their joint undertaking. C.\ community of inte1·est 
docs not make a partnership) Loomis vs . .Marshall, 12 Conn. 
77; 30 Am. Dec. 596; Porter fJS. McClure, 15 'Vend. 187. Thus 
tenants in common of land are not partners. Calvert vs. Ald· 
t"ich, 99 Mas~. 74; 96 Am. Dec. 693. In Olircr 1:8. Gray, 4 Ark. 
425, it was holden that two persons, joint owners of a horse, 
were not partners in respect to a contract for its keeping. 
French vs. Styring, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 357, was a case where two 
men owned a race horse, which they entered in a race arnl 
won a prize. It was held that they were not partners as to 
that money. In Haickins cs. Mcintyre, 45 Vt. 496, the defend-
ant contracted to finish off a church for the sum of $4,500. 
Afterwards he agreed with the plaintiff that they should work 
together io doing the job, each working himself, the work of 
ca.ch. to offset that of the other, and the expeitse of materials 
and of other work to be deducted from the amonn t, and the 
balance to be divided between them. It was held that they 
were not partners. In the case above cited (Loomis vs. ~llar­
slzall, 1~ Conn. 77), B was the owner of a satin~·t factory. A 
agreed with B to furnish all the wool thnt should be needed at 
th<> factory for two years, which B agreed to manufacture into 
cl-0th, the net proceeds of tlw cloth, after deducting the inci-
dental charges of sale, to be divided, so that A should have 35 
per cent and B 45 per cent. It was held that there was not 
a partnership as to third persons. It probably could be in-
ferl'ed that Farrel and Babbott were to divide between them-
E:elves whatever was left, if anything, aftc>r paying the Cook 
Company. But a partnPrship, even as to third persons, is not 
constituted by the mere fact that two or more persons partici-
pate or are interested in the net procC'eds of a business. 1 
Lindi. Partn. 24; Holrne nt. Hammond, L. R. 7 Exch. 2!10; Loomi11 
Monoan vs. FARREL. 143
vs. Marshall, supra; Ea: parte Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Bullen
vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86. -
Mr. Farrel was a manufacturer of machinery, of long an-J
wide experience. He was at the head of a company in Anso-
nia, in this state, engaged in manufacturing machinery, and
employing four or five hundred hands. \Vork on a refriger-
ating machine was begun promptly at the factory in Ansonia
under the supervision of Mr. Cook, the patentee, and with the
aid of one David Smith and of one Greene, but with no success.
“The machines broke down, and proved so faulty and imperfect
in their nature, and the business in all respects so unsatisfac-
tory, as not to justify or warrant proceeding. Not a dollar's
return in any form was ever received from the business or
venture.” In the language of the finding, it was “only failure
after failure.” On September 22, 1879, Farrel wrote Babbott
that he had stopped all work on the machine until he could see
him. Work did stop at Ansonia at that time, and was never
resumed. About November 1, 1879, the Cook Company gave
Farrel notice to annul the contract with them, as by its terms
they had a right to do, which notice Farrel at once communi-
cated to Babbott. Prior to the stopping of the work on the
machines, no act had been done by Babbott or by Farrel in
which either had assumed to act for or to bind the other.
Everything they had done in carrying out their contract with
the Cook Company had been done by them jointly. There
was no writing, and there was no course of conduct prior to
that time from which any one could be led to believe that these
three men were partners. (It was subsequent to this time that
Babbott commenced and continued in New York the series
of acts from which the plaintiff claims “that the court erred
in not holding, ruling, and deciding that the defendant Farrel
was a partner with the said Babbott as to and ag inst third
parties, especially as to and against the plaintiff); A person
who holds himself out as a partner, or permits others to do
so, is liable as such to third persons, who have given credit
to the firm upon the faith of his connection with it, or who
knew of such holding out. The liability in such cases is pred-
icatcd upon the doctrine of estoppel, and, in order to. charge
a person on that ground, it is not enough to show that he was
represented by others to be a partner, or that his name
















































































































































MORGAN VS. ~'.ARREL. 143 
1'8. Marshall, Bttpra; Ea: parte Tennant, 6 Ch. Div. 303; Bullen 
-vs. Sharp, L. R. 1 C. P. 86. 
Mr. Farrel wns a manufacturer of machinery, of long anJ 
wide experience. He was at the head of a company in Anso-
nia, in this state, engaged in mJnufacturing machinery, and 
employing four or five hundred hands. Work on a refriger-
ating machine was begun promptly at the factory in Ansoni:l 
under the supervisioll of Mr. Cook, tl)e patentee, and with Ute 
aid of one David Smith and of one Greene, but with no success. 
"The machines broke down, and proved so faulty and imperfed 
in their nature, and the business in all respects so unsatisfac-
tory, as not to justify or warrant proceeding. Not a dollar's 
return in any form was ever received from the business or 
venture." In the language of the finding, it was "only fuilure 
after. failure." On September 22, 1879, Far1·el wrote Babbott 
that he had stopped all work on the machine until he could see 
him. ·work did st<>p at Ansonia at that time, and was never 
resumed. About Novemb~r 1, 1879, the Cook Company gan~ 
Farrel notice to annul the contract with them, as by its terms 
they had a right to do, which notice Farrel at once communi-
cated to Babbott. Prior to the stopping of the work on the 
machines, no act had been d<?ne by Babbott or by Farrel iq 
which either had assumed to act for or to bind the other_ 
Everything they had done in carrying out their contract with 
the Cook Company had bet>n done by them jointly. There 
was no writing, and there was no course of conduct prior to 
that time from which any one could be led to believe that thes1• 
three men were partners. {it was subsequent to this time that 
Babbott commenced and continued in New York the seriPs 
of acts from which the plaintiff claims "that the court errPd 
in not holding, ruling, and deciding that the defendant Farrel 
was a partner with the said Babbott as to and a~jinst third 
parties, especially as to and against the plaintiff.'J A person 
who holds himself out as a partner, or permits othe1·s to do 
so, is liable as such to third persons, who have given credit 
to the firm upon the faith of his connection with it, or who 
knew of such holding out. The liability in such cases is pred-
icated upon the doctrine of estoppel, and, in order to. charge 
a person on that ground, it is not enough to show that he was 
represented by others to be a partner, or that his name 
appeared in the firm; it must be shown that he knew that he 
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was being held'out as a partner, and that he assented thereto,
or facts frornvwhich assent can be fairly implied. McBride vs.
Insurance Co., 22 Conn. 259; Buckingham vs. Burgess, 3 McLean,
364. It is always a question of fact whether or not there has
been such a holding out as to estop a party from denying the
partnership. Wood vs. Duke of Argyll, 6 Man. & G. 928; Lake
vs. Same, 6 Q. B. 477. And so the decision of the superior court
is conclusive, unless there is some error in its proceedings.
Upon an examination of this part of the case, we are satisfied
that the result to which the court came was fully required by
the facts. In May, 1879, while the parties were at work at
Ansonia endeavoring to construct a refrigerating machine,
and also were seeking to find or to create a demand for the
machines when they should be ready, one F. L. Babbott, a
brother of \V. M. Babbott, called on a Mr. Blackwell, of Black-
well & Co., warehousemen in Clarkson street, New York, with
reference to furnishing them with a machine, and on the 29th
day of July following, \V. M. Babbott entered into an arrange-
ment with Blackwell & Co., as shown by exhibit 4. It was
explained to Blackwell that the machine was to be built by
Franklin Farrel, of the Farrel Foundry Company at Ansonia,
,Conn. At that time there was no machine or apparatus in
condition to be set up, and, as none was ever completed, noth-
ing was done under that arrangement. “The firstknowledge
that Mr. Farrel had that any use was being made of his name
or credit in any form was about January 1, 1880, when a three
months’ note, dated October 22, 1879, signed ‘Franklin Farrel
& Co.,’ payable at Ansonia National Bank, was brought to his
attention a few days before it fell due by the cashier, who
asked him what he knew about it. Up to that time he had
never learned that there was any claim to a partnership with
him made by Babbott. He knew nothing of Blackwell except
as above stated; never saw him until l-ong after; was never
at Clarkson street, and had no knowledge of any business done
there. IIe had no knowledge of any transaction with Morgan
& Ilerrick, and had never heard of that firm until the notes
in suit matured, and were demanded and protested. He did
not know that Smith was in New York, and could not find or
meet Babbott there.” Such is the finding, and it is added that
he knew nothing of the Delamater Iron \Vog_lg§, or that Bab-
















































































































































H4 CA.8E8 ON PARTlfEB8HIP. 
was being held·out as a partner, and that he aBSented thereto, 
or facts from which assent can be fairly implied. McBride va. 
111sumnce Co., 22 Conn. 259; Bucking"lt.am vs. Burgess, 3 McLean, 
364. It is always a question of fact whether or not there has 
been such a holding out as to est op a party from denying the 
partnership. Wood vs. Duke of Argyll, 6 Man. & G. 928; Lak6 
n. Same, 6 Q. B. 477. And so the decision of the superior court 
is conclusive, unless there is some e1·ror in its proceedings. 
Upon an examination of this part of the case, we are satisfied 
that the result to which the court came was fully required by 
the facts. In ~lay, 1879, while the parties were at work at 
Ansonia endeavoring to construct a refrigerating machine, 
and also were seeking to find or to create a demand for the 
machines when they should be ready, one F. L. Babbott, a 
b1·other of \V. M. Babbott, called on a Mr. Blackwell, of Black-
well & Co., warehousemen in Clarkson street, New York, with 
reference to furnishing them with a machine, and on the 29th 
day of July following, \V. M. Babbott entered into an arrange-
mc>nt with Blackwell & Co., as shown by exhibit 4. It was 
explained to Blackwell that the machine was to be built by 
Franklin Farrel, of the Farrel Foundry Company at Ansonia, 
.Conn. At that time there wa!:J no machine or apparatus in 
condition to be set up, and, as none was ever completed, noth· 
ing was done under that arrangement. "The first. knowledge 
that Mr. Farrel had that any use was being made of his name 
or credit in any form was about January 1, 1880, when a three 
months' note, dated October 22, 1879, signed 'Franklin Farrel 
& Co.,' payable at Ansonia National Bank, was brought to his 
attention a few days before it fell due by the cashier, who 
asked him what he knew about it. Up to that time he had 
m·Yer learned that there was any claim to a partnership with 
him made by nabbott. He knew nothing of Blackwell except 
ns above stated; neYer saw him until long after; was never 
nt Clarkson street, and had no knowledge of any business done 
tlwre. Ile had no knowledge of any transaction with l\Iorgan 
& Herrick, and had nen•r henrd of that firm until the notes 
in i:;uit matured, and were dc·manded and protested. He did 
not know that 8mith was in New York, aml coulc.l not find or 
mt>l't Rabbott there." Such is the finding, and it is added th.at 
be knew nothing of the Delamater Iron Wqrl@, or that Bab-
bott had any dealings with it. It appears, then, that the onl7 
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fact which the defendant knew was that some one had wrong-
fully used his name on that note. It does not appear that at
the time he knew that Babbott was the man. Inferentially
it would seem that he did not know, for it is stated that he
could not find Babbott in the city. But without pausing to
remark on the dearth of knowledge the defendant had of Bab-
bott’s doings, we pass to another feature in this part of the
case.
A party setting up an estoppel by conduct is bound to the
exercise of good faith and due diligence to know' the truth.
Bigelow, Estop. 480; Moore 1:8. Bowman, 47 N.’H. 499; Odlin
rs. Gone, 41 N. H. 465. When Babbott began his operations
with Morgan & Herrick he showed them a copy of the contract
with the Cook Company, and also a letter from Farrel, in
which occurred the words, “I have concluded to go on with
the business,” accompanied with statements that he and Far-
rel were partners. They were told that the goods were to be
used in the manufacture of a refrigerating machine by Frank-
lin Farrel & Co., at Clarkson street, New York city. They
seem not to have been satisfied with the terms of that con-
tract, nor with the statements that were made to them; for
they made inquiries of the Delamater Iron ‘V0-rks, of which
Farrel knew nothing. and of the mercantile agencies of Dun,
Barlow 8:. Co.. and of Bradstreet & Co. From these agencies
they were able to learn nothing as to any firm of Franklin
Farrel & Co., who composed it, or as to its responsibility, or
that there was any such firm at all. If Babbott and Farrel
had been partners. by virtue of the contract with the Cook
Fonipany, they had been such since the 22d day of March, 1879.
The absence of the name of any such firm from these mer-
cantile agencies was a most significant circumstance. These
agencies made known to.1\Iorgan 8: Herrick all about Franklin
Farrel and his responsibility. These agencies could tell,
and presumably did tcll, where Farrel lived, and in what
business he was engaged; that he was a man of large means,
a large manufacturer of machinery, having a large factory
and employing many hands in that kind of work. From this
information, Morgan & Herrick would know that the manu-
facture of a refrigerating machine would be in the exact line
of work Farrel was doing at his own factory in Ansonia, Conn.
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fact which the defendant knew was that some one had wrong-
fully used his name on that note. It does not appear that at 
the time he knew that Babbott was the man. Inferentially 
it would seem that he did not know, for it is stated that he 
could not find 13abbott in the city. But without pausing to 
remark on the dearth of knowledge the defendant had of Bab-
bott's doings, we pass to another feature in this part of the 
case. 
I A party setting up an estoppel by conduct is bound to the 
\ exercise of good faith and due diligence to know' the truth. 
Bigelow, Estop. 480; Moore t'B. Bowman, 47 N. H. 499; Odliti 
t·s. Gove, 41 N. H. 465. \Vhen Babbott began his operations 
with Mcwg:m & Herrick he showed them a copy of the contract 
with the Cook Company, and also a letter from Farrel, in 
which occurred the words, "I have concluded to go on with 
the business," accompanied with statements that he and Far-
rel we>re partners. Tlwy were told that the goods were to be 
use<l in the manufacture of a refrigerating machine by Frank-
lin Farrel & Co., at Clarkson st1·ept, New York city. They 
seem not to haYc been satisfied with the terms of that con-
tract, nor with the stat<'Tnents th.at were made to them; for 
they made inq11iries of the Delama_ter Iron ·wor~~~, of which 
Farrel knew nothing. and of the mercantile agencies of Dun, 
Harlow & Co., and of Bradstreet & Co. From these agenci,~s 
they wne able to learn nothing as to nny firm of Franklin 
Farrel & Co., who comll08ed it, or ns to its responsibility, or 
that there wns nny ~ueh firm at all. If Babbott and Farrel 
had bee>n l>:utnC'rs, by Yirtue of the contract with the Cook 
f'ompan,y, they had be<•n sud1 since the 22d day of l\Iarch, 1879. 
'rhe absence of the name of any such firm from these mer-
cantile agencies was a most significant circumstance. These 
ngencies made known to .'!\lorgan & Herrick all about Franklin 
Farrel and his respomdhility. These agencies could tell, 
and presumably did it'll, where Farrel lh·ed, and in what 
business he was eng.1gPd; that he was a man of large mPans, 
n lar~e mnnufacturer of mnchinPry, haying a large factory 
and employing many bands in that kind of work. F1·om this 
information, l\Iorgan & He:Tick would know that the manu-
facture of a refrigerating machine would be in the exact lim• 
of work Farrel was doing at his own factory in Ansonia, Conn. 
That such a man, haying such facilities, was represented to 
19 
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be carrying on the manufacture of a refrigerating machine
in :1 warehouse in Clarkson street, in the city of New York,
and that he was doing it on credit, would be certain to excite
inquiry in the mind of any prudent man. \Vhy did not Mor-
gan & Herrick inquire further? Mr. Farrel was a manufac-
turer in Connecticut, not in the city of New York. In a\manu-
facturing partnership, the place where it was to be carried
on would be likely to be a controlling feature. For such work
there must be machinery to use, and power to run it, and men
to operate it. All these Mr. Farrel had in Connecticut, and
none of them in New York. The court had judicial knowledge
that Ansonia was easily accessible from New York city by
railway; that there was frequent communication by mail, or
that the telegraph might have been used, and a reply obtained
in half an hour and at trifling expense. 1 Whart. Ev. § 339.
\Vhen so many circumstances called for inquiry, and with all
these means by which inquiries could have been satisfied, and
when none of them were used, we cannot hold that the plaint-
iff’s assignors exercised good faith or due diligence to know
the truth.
On the trial the plaintiff introduced a large number of let-
ters and postal cards which had passed between Farrel and
Babbott, for the purpose of showing that they were partners
in the refrigerating business. The defendant claimed that
these letters, or some of them, had reference to other matters
and not to the refrigerating business, and to show this ofiered
other letters and postals that had passed between them. To
these the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted them solely
for the purpose named. That letters which had passed between
these men might tend to show that they were partners in any
business is very obvious, and that other letters on the same or
a kindred subject might modify or contradict the first ones is
equally obvious. The real relation between the parties could
best be shownby the whole correspondence, not by par-1. of it.
There is no error in the judgment appealed from.
The other judges concurred.
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be carrying on the manufacture of a refrigerating machine 
in a warehouse in Clarkson street, in the city of New York, 
and that he was doing it on credit, would be certain to excite 
inquiry in the mind of any prudent man. " 1hy did not Mor-
gan & Herrick inquire further? Mr. Parrel was a manufac-
turer in Connecticut, not in the city of New York. In a\Dlanu· 
factoring partnership, the place where it was to be carried 
on would be likely to be a controlling feature. For such work 
there must be maehinery to use, and power to run it, and men 
to operate jt. All these Mr. Farrel had in Connectrcut, and 
none of them in New York. The court had judicial knowledge 
that Ansonia was easily uccessible from New York city by 
railway; that there was frequent communication by mail, or 
that the telegraph might have been used, and a reply obtained 
in half an hour and at trifling expense. 1 Whart. Ev. § rum. 
\Vhen so many circumstances called for inquiry, and with nil 
these means by which inquiries could have been satisfied, and 
when none of them were used, we cannot hold that the plaint-
itf's assignors exercised good faith or due diligence tG know 
the truth. 
On the trial the plaintiff introduced a large number of let-
ters and postal cards which had passed between Farrel and 
Babbott, for the purpose of showing that they were partners 
ln the refrigerating business. 'l'he defendant claimed that 
these letters, or some of them, had reference to other matters 
and not to the refrigerating business, and to show this offered 
other letters and postals that had passed between them. To 
these the plaintiff objected; but the court admitted them solely 
for the purpose named. That letters which had passed between 
these men might tend to show that they were partners in any 
business is very obvious, and that otl1er letters on the same or 
a kindred subject might modify or contradict the first ones i:i 
equally obvious. 'l'hc real relation between the parties could 
best be shown by the whoJe correspondence, not by part of it. 
There is no error in the judgment appealed from. 
The other judges concurred. 
NOTE: See al&o Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 35, 50, 70, 71, 72. 
-Is‘,
V.
NATURE OF PAR-TNER’S INTEREST IN
PROPERTY.
BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD.
United States Supreme Court, 1870.
11 Wall. 624, 20 L. Ed. 82.
Bill by the Fourth National Bank of New York against the
New Orleans and Carrollton R. R. 009; Beauregard, Hernan-
dez, Binder and Bonneval, to enforce the transfer claimed to
have been made to it by one Graham, under the circumstances
stated in the opinion. Beauregard had acquired a lease of
the railroad, covenanting not to assign or sublet without the
consent of the directors. May and Graham signed the lease
as sureties for Beauregard. Immediately after obtaining the
lease, Beauregard, May and Graham entered into copartner-
ship for its equipment and management. About a year later
Graham assigned all his interest in the railroad and the part-
nership to complainant. Hernandez, Bender and Bonneval
claimed under a subsequent assignment from May, and denied
that when Graham assigned to complainanthe had anything
to assign, being, as they claimed, merely a trustee for May.‘
The court below dismissed the bill and the Bank appealed.
P. Phillips, for the appellant.
J. A. ¢C- D. Campbell, for defendant.
S'ruo.\'(;, J. The effect of Graham’s assignment to the com-
plainant was, undoubtedly, to dissolve the partnership which
*See Case vs. Beauregard, post, -—, involving further litigation grow-

















































































































































NATURE OF PARTNER'S INTEREST m 
PROPER'l'Y. 
BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD. 
United States Supreme Court, 18'10. 
11 Wall. 624, 20 L. Ed. 82. 
Bill by the Fourtb National Bank of New York against the 
New Orleans and Carrollton R. R. eo<?f Beauregard, Hernalt-
dez, Binder and Bonneval, to enforce the transfer claimed to 
have been made to it by one Graham, under the circumstance:i 
stated in the opinion. Beauregard bad acquired a lease of 
the railroad, covenanting not to assign or soblet without the 
consent of the directors. l\f ay and Graham signed the lease 
as sureties for Beauregard. Immediately after obtaining the 
lease, Beauregard, May and Graham entered into copartner-
sllip for its equipment and management. A bout a year later 
Graham assigned all his interest in the railroad and the part-
nership to complainant. Ilernandez, Bender and Bonneval 
claimed under a subsequent assignment from May, and denied 
that when G1·abam assigned to complainant he bad anything 
to assign, being, as they claimed, merely a trustee for l\lay. • 
The court bel~w dismissed the bill and the llank appealed. 
P. Phillips, for the appeJlant. 
J. A. & D. Campbell, for defendants. 
STno~G, J. The effect of Graham's assignment to the com-
plainant was, undoubtedly, to dissolve the partnership which 
•See Case tis. Beaur~gard, pmit, -, involvi11g further litigation ai;row-
iDg out of the same transactions. 
, 




had existed between Beauregard, May and himself, but it did
not make his assignee a tenant in com-mon with the other two
partners in the property of the firm. It seems to be assumed
on behalf of the complainant, that, in succeeding to Graham’s
rights, the bank acquired an ownership of the effects of the
firm jointly with Beauregard and May, and that, as Graham
had been an equal partner with them, his assignee, of course,
became the owner of one undivided third of the railroad lease
and other property of the firm. But this assumption is based
upon a misapprehension of the effect of the assignment. It
has repeatedly been determined, both in British and American
‘courts, that the property or eifects of a partnership belong to
the firm and not to the partners, each of whom is entitled only
to a share of what may remain after payment of the partner-
ship debts and after a settlement of the accounts between the
partners; consequently that no greater interest can be derived
from‘a voluntary sale of his interest by one partner, or by a
sale of it under execution. West rs. Skip, 1 Ves. 239; Nicoll
rs. Zllumford, 4 Johns. Ch. 522; Doner vs. Stnuficr, 1 Pa. 19$.
In Field rs. Taylor, 4 V es. J r. 396, it was said that “a party
coming into the right of partner” (in any mode, either by pur-
chase from such partner, or as a personal representative or
under an execution or commission of bankruptcy), “comes into
nothing more than an interest in the partnership, which can-
not be tangible, cannot be made available, or be delivered, but
under an account between the partnership and the partner,
and it is an item in the account that enough must be left for
the partnership debts.”
When, therefore, the Bank obtained from Graham the
assignment, which is the foundation of its claim in this suit,
it obtained thereby no ownership of the lease made by the
Railroad Company to Beauregard, and which he agreed to
hold for the benefit of the firm, nor did it obtain any aliquot
part of it, or of any of the effects of the firm. The utmost.
extent of its acquisition was an interest in the surplus, if any,
which might remain after all the debts of the firm should be
paid, and after the liabilities of Graham to his copartners,
as such, should be discharged. It was not in the power of
Graham, by retiring from the firm in violation of the articles
of copartnership, either to introduce another partner or to
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had existed between Beauregard, May and himsc>lf, but it did 
uot make his assignee a tenant in common with the other two 
partners in the property of the firm. It se(>ms to be assumed 
on behalf of the complainant, that, in succe~ding to Graham's 
rights~ tile bank acquired an ownerRhip of the efTt>cts of ~he 
·firm jointly with Beauregard and )lay. and that, as Graham 
had been an equal partner with them, his assignee, of course, 
became the owner of one undivided third of the railroad lease 
and other property of the firm. nut this assumption is based 
upon a misappreh<>nsion of the effect of the assignment. It 
has repeatedly been determined, both in British and American 
·courts, that the property or effects of a partnership belong to 
, 1he firm and not to the partners, each of whom is entitled only 
~ to a share of whnt may N'main after payment of the partner· 
~ ship debts and after a s<.'ttlement of the accounts between the 
partners; consequPntly that no greater iute1·ei;;t can be derived 
from· a voluntary sale of his inh>rest by one partner, or by a 
' sale of it under execution. lf'rst rs. Skip, 1 Yes. 23!>; Nicoll 
1·s. Mumforcl, 4 .Johns. Ch. 5:!2; Doner rs. Stauffer, 1 Pa. 198. 
In Ffold i-.~. 'l'aylor, 4 Ves. Jr. 396, it was said that "a party 
<'Oming into the right of partne1·" (hi any mode, either by pur· 
chase from such partner, or as a personal representative 01· 
under an execution or commission of bankruptcy), "comes into 
nothing more than an interest in the partnership, which can· 
not be tangible, cannot be made available, or be delivered, but 
under an account between the partnership and the partner, 
and it is an item in the account that enough must be left for 
the partnership debts." 
"'hen, therefore, the Ilank obtained from Graham the 
assignment, which is the foundation of its claim in this suit, 
it obtained thereby no ownership of the )case made by the 
Railroad Company to Beauregard, and which he agreed t~> 
hold for the benefit of the firm, nor did it obtain any aliquot 
part of it, or of any of the c•ff t•cts of the firm. The utmo~t 
extent of its acquhdtion was an interest in the surplus, if any, 
which might remain after nil the debts of the firm should be 
paid, and after· the liabilities of Graham to his copartners, 
as such, sl.10uld be diseharged. It was not in the power of 
Graham, by rethfog from the firm in violation of the articles 
of copartnership, either to introduce another partner or to 
deprive the partners who remained of their right to have nil 
BANK vs. CARROLLTON RAILROAD. 149
the partnership property held for partnership purposes. Inci-
dent to the right of the Bank to share in the surplus was a
order to ascertain if theie was any surplus It is true the
words of the assignment were very broad. It purported to
transfer all the estate, right, title and interest in the lease
made by the New Orleans and Carrollton Railro-ad Company
to Beauregard, to which the assignor might be entitled by
virtue of the articles of copartnei-ship, and also all his right
and interest in any _pr0perty and effects of the partnership, and
all debts to him from the partnership or any member thereof.
But no matter what its language, it is clear no more could
pass under it than the right of the assignor; and if, as we have
said, that was not a right to the specific articles of property
Qelonging to the firm, the Bank obtained no such right. \Vc
are not now speaking of the fact that, under his contract with
the Railroad Company, Beauregard had no right to transfer
the lease either to the partnership or to its members. The
Lright to enforce a settlement of the partnership accounts ll]
case does not require us to consider that inability. It is suf-'
ficient that the complainant's right was only an equity to
share in the surplus, if any, of the firm property after settle-
ment of the partnership accounts, and that this is a bill for
such settlement. Manifestly, then, it is incurably defective,
lbecause neither Graham nor May are made parties defendant
It is too plain for discussion that to such a bill all the men
\; 17‘
._,|
. . . 4' '1 '
bers of the firm are indispensable parties, for they are a ;"'t/,»:.':'~’¢
directly aiferted by any decree that can be made. w
How iitteily inipossible it is to ascertain what the Q(]l1ll_)
of the complainant is, with the present state of the record.
will appear more distinctly, if the provisions of the articles
of copartnership be coiisidercd. \\'hen it was formed, Beaii-
regard had obtained from the New Orleans and Carrollton
Railroad Company a lease of its railroad, with all of its rolling
stock and with its corporate privileges, for the term of twenty-
five years. Though the sole lessee, and prohibited by his con-
tract from assigning or underletting, it was, nevertheless.
agreed between him and his copartners that the lease should
be for their common benefit; that May and Graham should
each advance $150,000 to carry on the enterprise of running thr-
road, and that Beauregard should take charge of, manage and




















































































































































BANK VS. CARROLLTON RAILHOAD. 14~ 
the partnership property held for partnership purposes. Incij 
ldent to the right of the Bank to share in the surplus was a right to enforce a settlement of the partnership accounts in 
order to ascertain if there was any surplus. It is true the 
words of the assignment were ve1·y broad. It purpo1·ted to 
transfer all the estate, right, title and interest in the leas:• 
made by the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company 
to Beauregard, to which the assignor might be entitled b.v 
virtue of the a11:icles of copartnership, and also all his right 
and interest in any .property and dTeds of the partnership, ancl 
all debts to him from the partnership or any member thereof . . 
But no matter what its language, it is clear no more could 
i pass under it than the right of the assignor; and if, as we haw 
\said, that was not a right to the speeific articles of propert.v 
belonging to the firm~ the Bank obtained no such right. 'V1~ 
'fire not now speaking of the !net that, under liis contract with 
the Railroad Compan.v, Beauregard had no right to transfer 
the lease Pither to the part11e1·1.:,hip or to its membe1·s. Th<' 
case does not require us to consider that inabiliry. It is suf: 
fici1'nt that the complainant's right was only nn equity to 
share in the surplus, if any, of the firm pro1wrty after sc>ttle· 
ment of the pat'tneri-;hip aeconnts, and that this is a bill for 
such settlem~nt. Manifestly, then, it is incurably defediv~ 
lbecause 1with<'t' Graham nor -'fay are made parties dc>fendan..!J~t ---:-,~ 
It iR too plain for discussion that to such a bill all the men - "' '~. , l•t ~ . . ;, '. 
hers of the firm are indi~pf'n~able parties, for they are a "l-i;/~ • >0 ' 
~C'i(,:''"' ,. direct]~· afft><'t Ptl by any d(•c1·ee that can be made. ~1 ' 
How nttt~rly imposs_ible it is to ascertain· what the eqnily ./ 
of the complainant h1, with the present state of the record. 
will appenr more distindly, if the provisions of the article~ 
of copartnership be con~ide1·ed. ""hen it was formed, Bea11-
1·egar<l had ohtained from the New Ol'leans and Carrollton 
Railroad Company a lease of its railroad, with all of its rolling 
i.tock and with its corporate priYilegPs, for the term of twentJ-
five years. Though the sole lessec.·, and prohibited by his con-
tract from assigning or underletting, it was, nevertheles~. 
agreed between him and his copa1·tners that the lease shonlc1 
he for their c:ommon lJClnetit; that .May and Graham shoulcl 
each advm1ce ~l :j0,000 to carry on the enterprise of running thr· 
road, and that Beauregard should take charge of, manage an<) 
direct the un<tf>rtaking for thC' mutual advantage of the parties, 
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at a fixed annual salary, selecting and appointing his own
assistants. It was agreed that the money advanced, with
eight per cent, interest, should be repaid from the annual prof-
its of the enterprise, and that the remainder of the net profits
should be equally divided between the partners, and that all
losses should be equally borne by them. The contract evi-
dently contemplated that the property of the firm and the
management of its affairs should be in the hands of Beaure-
gard. Books were to be kept, showing not only all money
received and expended, but also all purchases made on account
of the copartncrship; and monthly tatements of amounts
received and expended were required to be furnished by Beau-
regard to May and Graham. lt was also agreed that the part-
nership should continue twenty-five years from the date of the
lease, which was April 12, 1866. Now, it is quite possible
that on settlement of the accounts, Graham may be found
indebted to the firm, or to his copartners, and that the court
would be required thus to decree.
' How can such a decree be made when he is no party to the
record? ()r it might appear that May is a large debtor to the
firm. How can any decree be made against him? How can
anydecree be made that will not prejudice one or the other of
these partners? And yet, whether the Bank complainant has
any interest or not—whether it acquired anything under
Graham‘s assignment—-can be determined only by a final and
conclusive settlement of the partnership accounts between all
the partners, two of whom are not parties to this suit.
It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellant, that even
if May and Graham were necessary parties, the bill should not
have been dismissed, but that the complainant s_hould have
been allowed to bring in new parties by a supplemental bill.
It is, doubtless, the general rule that a bill in chancery will
not be dismissed for want of proper parties; but the rule is
not universally true. It rests upon the supposition that the
fault may be remedied, and the necessary parties supplied.
Vi/‘hen this is impossible, and whenever a decree cannot be
made without prejudice to one not a party, the bill must be
dismissed. Nothing is to be gained by retaining it, when it is
certain that the complainant can never be entitled to a decree
in his favor. Note 5. sec. 541, Story, Eq. I’l.; Shields rs. Bar-
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nt a fixed annual salary, selecting and appointing bis own 
assistants. It was agre-ed that the money advanced, with 
eight per cent, interest, should be repaid from the annual prof~ 
its of the enterprise, and that the remainder of the net profits 
should be equal1y divided between the partners, and that all 
losses should be equal1y borne by them. The contract evi-
dently contemplated that the property of the firm and the 
management of its affairs should be ill the hands of Beaure-
gard. Books were to be kept, showing not only all money 
received and expended, but also all purchases made on account 
of the copartnership; and monthly statements of amounts 
received and expended were required to be furnished by Beau-
regard to May and Graham. It was also agreed that the part-
nership should continue twenty-five years from the date of the 
lease, which was April 12, 18GG. Now, it is quite possible 
that on settlem~nt of the accounts, Graham may be found 
indebted to the firm, or to his copartners, and that the court 
would be re<1uired thus to decree. 
· How can s11d1 a decree be made when be is no party to the 
record? Or it might appear that .!\fay is a large debtor to the 
firm. How can any decree be made against him? How can 
any decree be made that will not prejudice one or the other of 
these partners? And yet, whether the Bank complainant has 
any interest or not-whether it acquired anything under 
Graham·s assignment-can be determined only by a final and 
conclusive settlement of the partnership accounts between all 
the partners, two of whom are not parties to this suit. 
It is argued, however, on behalf of the appellant, that even 
if May and Graham were necessary parties, the bnI should not 
have been dismissed, but that the complainant s!10uld have 
been allowed to bring in new parties by a supplemental bill. 
lt is, doubtless, the general rule that a bill in chancery will 
not be dismissc>d for want of proper parties; but the rule is 
not universally true. It rests upon the supposition that the 
fault may be remedied, and the nc>cessary parties supplied. 
When this is impoRRibJe, and wheneYer a decree cannot be 
made without prejudice to one not a party, the bill must be 
dismissed. Nothing is to be gained by retaining it, when it is 
certain that the complainant can never be entitJc>d to a decree 
"In his favor. Not" n. ~"'~- !>41, Story, Eq. PL; Shields vs. Bar-
1·ow, 17 llow. 130; [G~ TT. R. X. V. 1:-JS]. ln tlw prP~ent case we 
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have seen that no decree for an account can be made, until
all the partners are made parties. But if both May and Gra-
ham had been made parties defendant, the circuit court would
have had no jurisdiction of the case. It is said Graham might
have been made a coplaintiif. Perhaps he might and had
application been made in due season for such an amendment
of the bill, it might have been the duty of the circuit court
to grant it. But no such application was made. The com-
plainants chose to stand upon their case as they presented it.
Possibly they never would have sought to bring in the neces-
sary parties. The defendants could not bring them in. New
parties cannot be brought into a cause by a cross-bill (Shields
vs. Barrow, supra), and had the bill not been dismissed, it must
have been left at the option of the complainants whether the
case should ever be brought to a final decree.
Under these circumstances, there was no reason for retain-
ing the bill.
It is insisted, however, that the court erred in dismissing
the bill, reserving only a right to sue Beauregard, May and
Graham, for a settlement of the partnership between them
prior to the 1-tth and 16th of May, 1367. Yet if the right
acquired by Graham’s assignment was, as the authorities
show, not an ownership of the specific effects of the~partner-
ship, but only a right to share in the surplus remaining after
the settlement of the partnership accounts and the payment
of all debts, as well as the just claims of the several partners,
it is clear there can be in the complaint no equity against the
Railroad Company, or against Hernandez, Binder or Bonneval,
who have succeeded to May’s rights (not his obligations), if
they have not to Graham’s. No fraudulent confederacy is
charged in the bill. At most, according to the coinplainant’s
own showing, they are purchasers of property that belonged
to the firm. There was, therefore, not' only a want of indis-
pensable parties, a want which cannot be supplied without
ousting the jurisdiction of the court, but a misjoinder of the
defendants, a misjoinder apparent upon the face of the bill.
Hence the decree of the circuit court was correct.
The decree of the circuit court is aflirmed.
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have seen that no decree for an accoun~ can be made, until 
all the partners are made parties. But if both May and Gra· 
ham had been made parties defendant, the circuit court would 
have had no jmisdiction of the case. It is said Graham might 
have been made a coplaintiff. Perhaps he might and had 
application been made in due season for such an amendment 
of the bill, it might have been the duty of the circuit court 
to grant it. Bnt no such application was made. The com-
plainants chose to stand upon their case as they presented it. 
Possibly they never woultl have sought to bring in the neces-
sary parties. The defendants could not bring them in. New 
i>arties cannot be brought into a cause by a cross-bill (Shields 
n. Barrow, supra), and had the bill not been dismissed, it must 
have been left at the option of the complainants whether the 
ease should ever be brought to a final decree. 
Under these circumshmees, there was no reason for retain· 
ing the bill. 
It is insisted, however, that the court erred in dismissing 
the bill, reserving only a right to sue Beauregard, May and 
(}raham, for a settlement of the partnership between them 
prior to the Hth and 16th of l\Iay, 1867. Yet if the right 
acquired by Graham's assignment was, as the authorities 
show, not an ownership of the specific effects of the -partner-
ship, but only a right to share in the surplus remaining after 
the settlement of the partnership .accounts and the payment 
of all debts, as well as the just claims of the several partners, 
it is clear there can be in the co\nplaint no equity against the 
Railroad Company, or against Hernandez, Binder or Bonneval, 
who have sucreeded to May's rights (not his obligations), if 
they have not to Graham's. No fraudulent confed~racy is 
charged in the bill. At most, according to the complainant's· 
own showing, they are purchasP.rs of property that belonged 
to the firm. There was, therefore, not· only a want of indis-
pensable parties1 a want which cannot be supplie.d without 
ousting the jurisdiction of the court, but n misjoinder of the 
defendants, n misjoinder apparent upon the face of the bill. 
Hence the decree of the circuit court was correct. 
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed. 
NOT.I!:: See .Mechem'e Elem. or Partn., § 07, et acq. 
152 CASES on PARTNERSHIP-
STA ATS vs. BRISTOW.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1878.
73 N. Y. 264.
Staats brought this action against Bristow, who was the
assignee of Stockbridge & Martin, to establish the title which
plaintiff claimed in the property of that firm now in defend-
ant’s possession. Plaintifi‘ relied upon his purchase at a sher-
iif’s sale.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
Defendant had judgment below.
(7. H. B0-1‘l1lig(l7l and W. W. Niles, for appellant.
John E. Parsons, for respondent.
Fonmm, J. The defendant had the possession of certain
personal property, to which the plaintiff claims that he was
entitled. It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to
show and establish his title. He showed that he was the pur-
chaser at a sheriffs sale. The certificate given by the sheriff
does not say that the plaintiff bought the property itself; it
says that he bought. only, all the right, title, and interest
which Joseph Stockbridge had in it on the 30th November,
1874. The sherifl"s return on the execution upon which he
sold is the same. The execution on which the sale took place
directed a sale of the property of the defendants therein
named, who were the Stockbridge above named, and his
copartner, Martin; but the properly pointed at was what they
owned, or either of them owned, on a day named, to wit: on
the 9th December, 1974; and before that day, to wit: on the
fourth day of that‘ month, the defendants in the execution had
assigned the property to the defendant in this action in trust
for all of their creditors.
So it is apparent that the plaintiff did not buy the property
itself, specifically; but only the interest, right, and title which
Stockbridge had in it. Now the interest which he had in it
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STAATS vs. BRISTOW. 
Court of :Appeals of New 1·ork, 1878. 
78 N. Y. 264. 
Staats brought this action against Bristow, who was the 
assignee of Stockbridge & Martin, to establish the title whieh 
plaintiff claimed in the prop<>rty of that firm now in defen<l-
ant's possession. Plaintiff relied upon his purchase at a sher-
iff's sale. 
Othc>r facts appear in the opinion. 
Defendant had judgment below. 
C. H. Rannigan and W. W. Niles, for appellant. 
Jolin E. Parsons, for respondent. 
Fournn, J. The defendant had the possession of certain 
personal prop<>rty, to which the plaintiff claims that he was 
entitled. It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
show and establish his title. He showed that be was the pur-
chaser at a sheriff's sale. The certificate given by the sheriff 
does not say that the plain1 iff bought the property itself; it 
says that he bought, only, all the rig-ht, title, and interest 
which Josc>ph Rtockhridge hncl in it on the 30th November, 
1874. The sheriff's return on the execution upon which he 
sold is the same. The execution on which the sale took place 
directed a sale of the property of the defendants therein 
named~ who were the Stockbridge above named, and his 
copartn<"r, ~Jartin; but the' l'roperty pointed at was what th<'y 
owned, or either of them ownr-<l, on a day named, to wit: ou 
the !)th December, 1~74; and before that da,r, to wit: on tlu• 
fourth day of that month, the defendants in the execution ha<l 
assigned the property to the defendant in this action in trust 
for all of their creditors. 
So it is apparent that the plaintiff did not buy the propert.v 
itself, specificnllJ'; but only the interest, right, and title whkh 
Stockbridge bad in it. Now the interest which be had in :.t 
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the assets of a copartnership firm of which he was a member.
The interest of a member of such a firm in the assets of it is
the share to which he is entitled by the terms of the copartner-
ship, in the surplus of those assets remaining after all partner-
ship debtsLa_x;e_tully paid. It appears in this case that the firm
was insolvent; that its debts much exceeded its assets; that
there never could arise a surplus. So the interest of Stork-
bridge, as an individual, in this property was nothing; and so
the plaintiff got nothing by his purchase.
The force of these views is resisted by the plaintiff thus:
It is claimed, and rightly, that one partner may sell and trans-
fer the entirety of any particular personal etfects and property
of the partnership for purposes within the scope of the busi-
ness, and can make sale to a creditor of the firm in payment
of a debt due, without the knowledge or consent of another
partner, though the firm be insolvent and thereby a preference
be given to the creditor vendee. Then, it is claimed that the
law may do whatever one partner can do. Let it be granted
that it may, for this occasion, though we do not concede it as
a universal principle. The law has not in this case undertaken
to do that. The attachment, under which it is claimed that the
first step was taken toward doing that, was not against this
property specifically, nor was it against the property of the
firm. It was against the property of Stockbridge. What was
the property of Stockbridge? It was what he owned in indi-
vidual right, and it was his interest in the property of his part-
nership. What that interest was /has already been shown.
So that the law did not undertake to do, nor has it done, more
than to sell for the benefit of a firm creditor the property of
Stockbridge. We speak now of what was done by virtue of{
the attachment alone. The action was against both partners,
and both were brought into court. But if both had not been
brought into court, and judgment had been got, and execution
issued directed-to be levied upon the sole property of the one
served, and upon the joint property of both, the law would
have undertaken to do what we admit one partner can do; and
if this joint property had been levied upon before the assign-
ment to defendant, and had been sold to the plaintiffs in the
execution, or to one of them, and the avails paid over, the
law would have succeeded in doing just what one partner

















































































































































STA.ATS vs. BRISTOW. 153 
the assets of a copartnership firm of which he was a member. 
The interest of a member of such a firm in the assets of it is 
the share to which he is entitled by the terms of the copartner-
ship, in the surplus of those assets remaining after all partnei·-
~i.P deb!!_ ~~e }ully p~_!d. It appears in this case that the firm 
was insolvent; that its debts much exceeded its assets; that 
there never could arise a surplus. So the interest of Stock-
bridge, as an individual, in this property was nothing; and so 
the plaintiff got nothing by his purchase. 
The force of theRe views is resisted by the plain tiff thus: 
It is claimed, and rightly, that one partner may sell and trans-
fer the entirety of any pnrticular personal effects and property 
of the partnership for purposes within the scope of the busi-
ness, and can make sale to a creditor of the firm in payment 
of a debt due, without the knowledge or consent of anotlw1· 
partner, though the firm be insolvent and the1·eby a preference 
be given to the creditor vendee. Then, it is claimed that the 
law may do whatever one partner can do. Let it be granted 
that it may, for this occasion, tl1-0ugh we do not concede it as 
a universal principle. .'l'he law has not in this case undertaken 
to do that. The attachment, under which it is claimed that the 
first step was taken toward doing that, was not against this 
property specifically, nor was it against the property of the 
fjrm. It wns against the property of Stockbridge. 'Vhat was 
the property of Stockbridge? It was what he owned in indi-
vidual right, and it was his interest in the property of his part-
nership. What that int<'rest was })as akeady been show1i. 
{
So that the law did not undertake t6' do, nor has it done, nto1·(• 
than to sell for the benefit of a firm creditor the property of 
Stockbridge. ·we speak now of what was done by virtue of( 
(
the at. taclnnent alone. The action was against both partners, 
and both were broug-bt into court. But if both had not been 
brought into court, and judgment had be<'n got, and execution 
issued <lirected.to be leYied upon the sole property of the one 
I served, and upon the joint property of both, the law woultl have undertaken to do what we admit one partner can do; and 
if this joint property had been levied upon before the assign· 
ment to defendant, and had been sold to the plaintiffs in the 
execution, or to one of them, and the avails paid oYer, the 
law would have succeeded in doing just what one partner 
could have done. The law must seek the end desired by the 
20 
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legal path, just as the single partner must. That path was
not by an attachment against the property of one partner who,
by his personal situation, was obnoxious to that process. That
could issue, but not against joint property; only against indi-
vidual property; and individual property was only the interest
in 0. surplus.
These views do not conflict with Van Brunt vs. Applegate, 4-1
N. Y. 544,- on which the appellant much relies, and we do not
express any opinion upon what was there held.
The judgment appealed from should be aflirmed.
Non-2: For other cases, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 99, 100.
SINDELARE vs. \VALKER. _
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1891.
137 Ill. 43. 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 81 Am. Sis. Rep. 353.
The plaintiff Sindelare and one Hubka had been partners in
the dry goods business, and while so they gave a chattel mort-
gage on their stock to Walker. Sindelare brought this action
against Walker and Hubka (though he discontinued as to the
latter), charging that by collusion between them there had been
0. fraudulent foreclosure of the mortgage by \Valker and a pur-
chase of the stock by Hubka, and that thereby he, the plaintiff,
had been wrongfully deprived of his interest in the goods,
profits and good will of the business.
The court below sustained a demurrer to his declaration, and
he brought error.
Jones d3 Luslc, for plaintiff.
Trumbull, Willits, Robbins d3 Trumbull, for defendant.
“’1LK1>z, J . (After stating the facts.) There is no averment
that the copartnership between plaintiff and Hubka has been
dissolved, or any settlement whatever had of their partnership
affairs. The declaration, therefore, not only fails to show any
individual title or ownership in plaintiff to said property, part-
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legal path, just as the single partner must. That path was 
not by an attachment against the property of one partner who, 
by his personal situation, was obnoxious to that process. That 
could issue, but not against joint property; only against indi-
vidual property; and individual property was only the interest 
in a surplus. 
These views do not conflict with Van Brunt vs .. 4.pplegate, 44: · 
N. Y. 544, on which the appe11ant much relies, and we do nut 
express any opinion upon what was there held. 
'l'he judgment appealed from should be affirmed. 
Nou: For other cases, see Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., §§ 00, 100. 
BINDELARE vs. WALKER. 
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1891. 
137 Ill. 43, 27 N. E. Rep. 59, 81 Am. St. Rep. 8j3. 
The plaintiff Sindelare and one Hubka bad been partners in 
the dry goods business, and while so they gave a chattel mort-
gage on their stock to "'alker. Sindelare brought this action 
against Walker and Hubka (though he discontinued as to the 
latter), charging that by collusion between them there had been 
a fraudulent foreclosure of the mortgage by \Valker and a pur-
chase of the stock by Hubka, and that thereby he, the plaintiff, 
bad been wrongfully dE>prived of his interest in the goods, 
profits and good will of the business. 
The court below sustained a demurrer to his decl~ration, and 
be brought error. 
Jones & Luslc, for plaintifJ. 
'l'rmnbull, Willits, Robbins & Trumbull, for defendant. 
"r1r,mN, J. (After stating the facts.) There is no averment 
that the copartnership between plaintiff nnd Hubka has been 
dissolved, or any settlement wlrntever had of their partnership 
affairs. The declaration, therefore, not only fails to show any 
individual title or ownership in plaintiff to said property, part-
nership business, or the 1>rofits or good will thereof, which 
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he says he lost, but affirmatively discloses a state of facts
from which it appears that he had only a coniinunity of inter-
est therein with his partner, "ho consented to said transfer
and all that was done by defendant. A partner’s right to part-
nership property is an ownership of all the assets of the firm,
subject to the ownership of every other copartner, all the part-
ners holding all of the firm assets subject to the payment of
the partnership debts and liabilities: Parsons on Partnership,
350. Qt is clear, therefore, that the individual interest of one
partner in the firm property and business can only be ascer-
tained by a settlement of the partnership} Bopp vs. F037, 63
Ill. 540; Chandler vs. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 77; Jlcnagh vs. Whitwell,
52 N. Y. 146 ; 11 Am. Rep. 683. This rule applies to the interest
of a partner in the profits or good will of the partnership busi-
ness, as well as to the tangible assets of the firm. Until plaint-
iff’s actual interest in the partnership has been determined,
there can be no ascertainment of his damages: Buckmastor
cs. Gozccn, 81 Ill. 153; Sweet vs. Morrison, 103 N. Y. 235.
\Ve are clearly of the opinion that, on the facts stated in his
declaration, plaintiff has no standing in a court of law. ' '
Allirmed.
Nona: See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., §§ 07, 99, 226.
/
ROBINSON BANK vs. MILLER.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1894.
153 Ill. 244, 46 Am. St. Rep. 883, 27 L. R. A. 449, 38 N. E. Rep. 1078.
This was an action by the Robinson Bank to set aside three
mortgages. The defendants by cross-bill asked for a fore-
closure of these mortgages. The court below set aside one
mortgage and foreclosed the others. John S. Emmons, Frank
O. Miller and John Newton owned undivided interests in a
milling property of four acres. They afterwards, by oral
agreement, entered into partnership to operate the mill under
the firm name of Newton, Emmons & Miller. John S. Enimons
















































































































































ROBINSON BANK VS. MILLER. 1.)5 
he says he lost, but affirmatively discloses a state of facts 
from which it appears that he had only a comi;g_!!_l!ity _of inter- _ 
est therein with his partne.1', ~·ho consented to said transfer 
and all that was done by defendant. A partner's right to part-
nership property is an ownership of all the assets of the fh'ru, 
subject to the ownership of every other copartner, all the part-
ners holding all of the firm assets subje.ct to the payment of 
the partnership debts and liabilities: Parsons on Partnership, 
::mo. (It is clear, therefore, that the individual interest of one 
partner in the firm property and business ean only be aecer- . 
tained by a settlement of the partnership:) Bopp VB. Fo{IJ, G3 
111. 540; Chandler vB. Lincoln, 52 Ill. 77; Jfenagh i:B. Whitwell, 
52 N. Y.146; 11 Am. Hep. 683. 1'his rule applies to the interest 
of a partner in the profits or good will of the partnership busi· 
ness, as well as to the tangible assets of the firm. Until plaint-
iff's actual interest in the partnership has been determine<l, 
there can be no ascertainment of his damages: Buckmaster 
1:8. Gowen, 81 Ill. 153; Succt vs. Morrison, 103 N. Y. 235. 
'Ve are clearly or the opinion that, on the facts stated in his 
declaration, plaintiff has no standing in a court of law. • • 
Aftirmed. 
No-rE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ D7, D9, ~(). 
ROBINSON BANK vs. MILLER. 
Supreme Courl of Illinois, 1894. 
1~3 Ill. 244, 46 Am. St. Rep. 8S3, 27 L. R. A. 449, 88 N. E. Re-p. 10i8. 
This was an action by the Robinson Bank to set aside three 
mo1-tgages. The defendants by cross-bill asked for a fore-
closure of these mortgages. The court below set ruiide one 
mortgage and forecloHl'<l the others. John S. Emmons, Frauk 
0. Miller and John Newton owned undivided interests in n 
milling property of four acres. They afterwards, by oral 
ngreement, entered into partnership to operate the mill under 
the firm name of Newton, Emmons & 'Miller. John S. Emmons 
borrow~d tl ,800 of the Uobinson Bank on a n.ote endorsed by 
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his father and father-in-law, Wiley S. Emmons, and William
W. Walter. The latter had to pay the note and John S.
Emmons gave them a mortgage on his interest in the property
to secure them. John S. Emmons had also previously given a
note for $1,500 for part of the purchase price of his interest,
endorsed by his brother Willis Emmons. The latter had to
pay this note and John S. gave him a mortgage at the same
time that he gave the one to his father and father-in-law. Mil-
ler had also? about the same time given a mortgage upon his
interest to is brother-in-law, Lamport, to secure a note for
$5,500, given to the latter. The firm of Newton, Emmons &
Miller became indebted to the Bank for $21,585.32, and was
insolvent. The Bank desired to obtain the milling property in
part payment, and offered to allow $16.0()0 for it. Newton and
Miller conveyed their interests to the Bank “subject to incum-
brances.-" Emmons also conveyed his interest, and all con-
fessed judgment to the Bank. The Bank claimed precedence
over the three mortgages.
The two given by Emmons were sustained, and the one given
by Miller was defeated by the court below.
The Bank and Lamport appealed.
Callaghan, Jones (6 Lowe, for appellants.
Parker, Crowley ¢t- Bogard, for appellees.
liisonnnrcn, J. The Robinson Bank, one of the appellants
herein, claims that the mill property, including the four acres
of land upon which the mill was located, was partnership prop-
erty belonging to the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller; that
as such it was first liable to be subjected to the payment of the
partnership creditors, including the Bank; that the mort-
gagees, Lamport, \Valtcr, and \Villis and Wiley S. Emmons,
were individual creditors of Miller and John S. Emmons, and
only entitled to such surplus as might arise out of the mill
property after the payment therefrom of the firm debts.
\Vhether real estate upon which a partnership transacts its
business is firm property or the property of the individual
members of the firm is oftentimes a difficult question to deter-
mine, and one upon which the authorities are not altogether
uniform. The mere fact of the use of land by a firm does not
















































































































































166 CA.BBS ON PARTNERSHIP. 
bis father and father-in-law, Wiley B. Emmons, and William 
\V. \\'alter. The latter hnd to pay the note and John 8. 
Emmons gave them a mortgage on his interest in the property 
to secure them. John 8. Emmons had also previously given a 
note for fl,500 for part of the purchase price of bis interest, 
endorsed by his brother \Villis Emmons. The latter bad to 
pay this note and .John 8. gave him a mortgage at the same 
time that he gave the one to his father and father-in-law. .:Mil-
ler had also fl{ nbout the same time given a mortgage upon hi~ 
interest to 'his brother-in-law, Lamport, to secure a note for 
,!'>,500, given to the latter. 'l,he firm of Newton, Emmons & 
Miller became indebted to the Bank for $21,585.32, and was 
insolvent. The Bank d~sired to obtain the milling property in 
part payment, nod offered to allow $16.000 for it. Newton and 
Miller conveyed their interests to the Bank "subject to incum-
brances/' Emmons also conveyed his interest, and all oon-
fessed judgment to the Bank. The Bank claimed precedence 
over the three mortgages. 
The two given by Emmons were sustained, and the one given 
by Miller was d(>feated by the court below. 
The Bank and Lamport appealed. 
Callaghan, Jones & Lowe, for appellants. 
Parker, Orozrlcy & Bogard, for appelleee. 
l\IAGnuo1m, J. The HobinS<>n Bank, one of the appellants 
herein, claims that the mill property~ including the four acres 
of land upon which the mill was located, was partne1·ship prop-
erty bc>longing to the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller; that 
as such it was first liable to be subjected to the payment of the 
partnership creditors, including the Hank; tl\a t the mort-
gagees, I~amport, 'Valter, and "~illis and 'Vill'Y S. Emmons, 
were individual crf>ditors of Miller and John S. Emmons, and 
only entitled to such surplus as might arise out of the miU 
property after the paym(_•nt therefrom of the firm debts. 
\Vhether real estate upon which a partnership transacts it~ 
business is firm property or the property of the individual 
members of the firm is oftentimes a difficult question to deter-
mine, and one upon which the autbo1·ities are not altogethe1• 
uniform. The mere fact of the use of land by a firm does not 
make it partnership p1·operty. Gocpper vs. Kinsinger, 39 Ohio 
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St. 429; Hatchett vs. Blanton, 72 Ala. 423. Nor is real estate
necessarily the individual property of the members of a firm
because the title is held by one member, or by the several mem-
bers in undivided interests. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280. Whether
real estate is partnership or individual property depends
largely upon the intention of the partners. That intention
may be expressed in the deed conveying the land, or in the
articles of partnership; but when it is not so expressed the
circumstances usually relied upon to determine the question
are the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to
which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered in the
accounts upon the books of the firm. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280;
2 Lindl. Partn. marg. p. 649; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 945,
and cases in note. Where real estate is bought with partner-
ship funds for partnership purposes, and is applied to part-
nership uses, or entered and carried in the accounts of
/the firm as a partnership asset, it is deemed to be firm
I
K
property; and in such case it makes no difference, ll] a
court of equity, whether the title is vested in all the partners,
as tenants in common, or in one of themt, or in a stranger.
T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) § 265; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281; Johnson
vs. Clark, 18 Kan. 157; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 948, and
cases cited. If the real estate is purchased with partnership
funds, the party holding the legal title will be regarded as
holding it subject to a resulting trust in favor of the firm fur-
nishing the money. In such case no agreement is necessary,
and the statute of frauds has no application. Parker vs.
Bowles, 57 N. H. 491; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281.
In the case at bar the land was not purchased with partner-
ship funds. The undivided onelthird interest bought by John
S. Emmons was paid for by him with his own individual
money. Miller also paid for the one undivided one-third inter-
est, purchased by him with his individual funds. None of the
money of the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller was contribu-
ted towards the purchase of the one-third interest held by
Newton. Indeed, the proof shows that the firm of Newton,
Emmons & Miller was formed by an oral agreement after
Emmons and Miller had bought their interests. Each partner
here held the title to an undivided one-third part of the prop-
erty. No entries were made upon the books of the firm show-
















































































































































BOBUISON BANK. vs. MILLER. 16'1 
St. 429; Hatchett vs. Blanton, 72 Ala. ~3. Nor is real estate 
necessarily the individual property of the members of a firm 
because the title is held by one member, or by the several mem-
bers in undivided interests. 1 Bates, Partn. § 280. 'Vhether 
real estate is partnership or indi\'idual property depends 
largely upon the in"tention of the partners. That intention 
may be expressed in the deed com·eying the land, or in the 
articles of purtnership; but when it is not so expressed the 
circumstances usually relied upon to determine the questioµ 
are the ownership of the funds paid for the land, the uses to 
which it is put, and the manner in which it is entered in the 
accounts upon the books of the firm. l Hates, I>artn. § 280; 
2 Lindi. J>artn. marg. p. 649; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 94;), 
and cases in note. Where real estate is bought with partner-
ship funds for partnership purposes, and is applied to part-
) ner~hip uses, or entered and carried in the accounts of 
the firm as a partnership aEset, it is deemed to be firm 
/ property; and in such case it makes no difference, in a 
court of equity, whether the title is n•sted in all the partners, 
as tenants in common, or in one of them~ or in a stranger. 
T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) § 2(i5; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281; Johnson. 
t'B. Clark, 18 Kan. 157; 17 Am. & Eng. Em;. Law, p. 948, antl 
cases cited. If the real estate is purchased with partnership 
funds, the party holding the legal title will be regarded as 
holding it subject to a resulti6g trust in favor of the firm fur-
nh~hing the mon••y. In such case no agrePment is necessary, 
and the statute of frauds has no application. Parker vs. 
Botcles, 57 N. H. 491; 1 Bates, Partn. § 281. 
( In the case at bar the land was not purchased with partner-
ship funds."' The undivided one"-third interest bought by John 
S. Emmons was paid for by him with his own individual 
money. Miller also paicl for the one undivided one-third inter-
est, purchased by him with his individual funds. None of the 
money of the firm of Newton, Emmons & Miller was contribn-
ted towards the purchase of the one-third interest held by 
Xewton. Indeed, the proof shows that the firm of Newton, 
Emmons & Miller was · formed by an oral agreement after 
Emmons and ~filler had bou~ht their interests. Each partner 
here held the title to an undivirled one-third part of the prop-
erty. No entries were made upon the books of the firm show-
ing that the real estate was treated as firm assets. The evi-
158 Cxsns on PARTNERSHIP.
\
deuce, however, does show that the property was bought for
the purpose of being used in the milling business, and that
after its purchase it was used for firm purposes, and that the
firm gave its notes to pay for repairs, and for placing new
machinery in the mill upon the premises. Under these circum-
stances, was the land partnership property, or the individual
property of the partners, holding as tenants in common? lt
cannot be said that the land is firm property, upon the theory
of a resulting trust, because the ‘money of the firm was not
used to buy the property. Such a trust might exist in favor of
the firm. regarding it as a person, if the partners had taken the
legal title, and the firm had advanced the purchase money.
The trust must arise at the time of the execution of the con-
veyance, and when the title vests in the grantee. Such could
not have been the case here, under the fact stated. Van Bus-
kirk rs. Van Baskirk, 148 lll. 9, 35 N. E. 383. In view of the
fact that the land was bought with individual, and not partner-
ship, funds, and was conveyed in undivided interests to the
several partners, and in the absence of any agreement that it
should be regarded as firm property, docs the conduct of the
parties in afteryvards fogmingma _}1<'1!jt[_1_€j_I'§l1_,ip",j;1ng1L using the
property for partnershmB1l'pose~mpro\'-
ing the mill at the expen the firm, make the land fillll
. se of ' -
p~ pet-ty,inacouofequity_? A.i<’:.‘;fl-tire answer to jgs
f
uestion is ound'1TFmany of the authorit_i§s,_as will bepseen by
;~eT)W)\\'ingi Alca-andcr vs. Kim-bro, 49 Miss.
,‘ 529; ~a. Ann. 107; Reynolds vs. Ruckman,
215 Mich. 80; Parker vs. Bowles, 57 N. H. -191; Thompson cs. Bow-
man, 6 \Vall. 316; Frink rs. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Wlmatlcg/'8
Heirs vs. Calho1m,]2 Leigh 264, 37 Am. Dec. 654;Sikcs rs. Work,
ti Gray, 433; Gordon rs. Gordon, 49 Mich. 501, 13 N. IV. 834;
lfoody rs. Ratlilmrn, 7 Minn. 89 (Gil. 58); Paige vs. Paige, 71
Iowa, 818, 32 N. W. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 799 (post, p. 170). T. Pars.
Partn. (4th Ed.) § 266; Hatclzctt rs. Blanton, supra.
I The general doctrine of all these cases is that a purchase
l of the land with partnership funds is necessary to make it
l firm property. T. Parsons, in his work on Partnership (4th
1-1d,), says: “Although it [real estate] be held in the joint
name of two or more persons, if there be no proof that it was
purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes,


















































































































































158 CA.BES ON PARTNERSilIP. 
deuce, however, does show that the property was bought for 
the purpose of being used in the milling business, and that 
after its purchase it was used for firm purposes, and that the 
firm gave its notes to pay for repairs, and for placing new 
machinery in the mill upon the premises. Under these circum-
stances, was the land partnership pl'operty, or the individuul 
property of the partners, holding as tenants in common? It 
cannot br. said that the land is firm propel'ty, upon the theory 
of a resulting trust, because the ·money of the firm was not 
used to boy the property. Such a trust might exist in favor of 
the firm, regarding it as a person, if the p~ll'tners had taken the 
legal title, and the firm had advanced the purchase money. 
The trust must arise at the time of the execution of the cou-
ve~·ance, and when the title yests in the grantee. Such could 
not have been the case hE're, under the facts stated. Van Bus-
kirk t'B. Van Buskirk, 148 Jll. 9, 35 N. E. a83. In view of the 
fact that the land was bought with individual, and not partner-
ship, funds, and was conveyed in undivided interests to the 
several partners, and in the absence of any agreement that it 
should be regarded as firm property, docs the con<!~~~ of the 
\ 
~rties in aft~wards forn:i_i!!g __ ~_J!!'H'.t!l_~!~- ~ 11nL ~sing th<.: 
£!Operty for partnership purposes a ·rin and improY-
ing the mill at the expense of the firm, make the Jancffirn1 
~rty, in a court of e~? A negativ_e-a~swer to _t!!..i_s 
. ~tion is found m many of the authoritiesl as wi111>~-~~~n by 
; .r.tl~e to the l'ollowmg: AlcJ'ander t;S. J(i1i;b1-:o, 49 Miss. 
: 529; 'l'heriot vr. llI icl1ct, 28 La. Ann. 107; Reynolds t;s. Ruckman, 
;15 Mich. 80; Parker ·r.;s. Rou:lcs, 57 N. H. 4!)1; Tl!om.pson 1:8. Bour 
rnari, G 'Vall. 316; Frink vs. Branch, 16 Conn. 260; Wlleatley's 
fl cirs vs. Callwun, 12 Leigh 2fi4, 37 Am. Dec. 654; Sikes t-.~. lV ark, 
Ii Gray, 433; Gorclon t:s. Gordon, 49 Mich. 501, 13 N. "r· 834; 
lfoodv 1:8. Rathburn, 7 l\finn. 89 (Gil. 58); Paige vs. Pa£gc, 71 
Iowa, 318, 32 N. W. 360, 60 Am. Rep. 7!>9 (post, p. 170). T. Pars. 
Partn. (4th Ed.) § 266; Hatcllctt 1:8. Blanton, supra. 
{ The general doctrine of all these cases is that a purchase 
I of the land with partnership funds is necesl'ary to make it 
\ firm property. T. Parsons, in his work on PartnerRhip (4th 
· Ed.), says: "Although it [real estate] be lwld in the joint 
name of two or more persons, if the.re be no proof that it wns 
purchased with partnership funds for partnership purpos<'~. 









Romsson BANK vs. MILLER. 159
ants in common. ' ' ' So, if not paid for by partnership
funds, then it is probably his property who does pay for it,
whatever use he permits to be made of it.” Sections 265, 266.
In Hatchctt vs. Blanton, supra, the supreme court of Alabama
says: “Steering clear of all "cases of fraud, or of the use by one
partner, without the approbation of his associates, of partner-
ship funds in the acquisition of real estate, the two facts must
concur to constitute real estate partnership property—acqui-
sition with partnership funds, or on partnership credit, and
for the uses of the partnership.” In Thompson vs. Bowman,
absence of proof of its purchase with partnership funds for
partnership purposes, real property standing in the names of
several persons is deemed to be held by them as joint tenants
or as tenants in common.” Bachan vs. Sumner, 2 Barb.
Ch. 165, 47 Am. Dec. 350. The theory of some of the
cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not
partnership, funds, cannot be converted into firm prop-
erty by a verbal agreement between the partners, because
no trust can be created in lands, unless by writing,
in view of the statute of frauds, except such as results by impli-
cation of law. Parker vs. Bowles, supra. There are cases which
hold that, even though the land was originally bought by the
several partners with their individual funds, and deeded to
them as tenants in common, yet it will be regarded in equity
as firm property where it is improved out of partnership funds
for firm purposes, and actually used for such purposes,
or where the firm puts valuable and permanent improve-
ments upon it for firm purposes, and which are essential
to the firm. In some instances the land is held to be
the property of the partners, and the improvements to be the:
property of the firm. 1 Bates, Partn. §§ 2s1, 2s2. The use of l
the property is not conclusive of its character as real estate I
or personality, but is only evidence of the intention of the
parties. Id. § 285. \Vhen the intention of the partners to con-
vert the land into firm property is inferred from circumstances,
the circumstances must be such as do not admit of any other
equally reasonable and satisfactory explanation. T. Pars.
Partn. § 267. And, where it is sought to show a conversion of
the land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such
agreement must be clear and explicit. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc.

















































































































































ROBINSON BANK VS. llILLER. 159 
ants in common. • • • So, if not paid for by partnersh:1.> 
funds, then it is probably llis property who does pay for H, 
whatever use he permits to be made of it." Sections 265~ 2C>G. 
In Hatchett vs. Blanton, supra, the supreme court of Alabama 
says: "Steering clE>ar of all ·cases of fraud, or of the use by one 
partner, without the approbation of his associates, of partner-
ship funds in the acquisition of real estate, the two facts must 
concur to constitute real estate partnership property-acqui-
sition with partnership funds, or on partnership credit, anll 
for the uses of the partnership." In Thompson vs. Botcma11, -1 
supra, the supreme court of the United States say: "In thD 1 
absence of proof of its purchase with partnership funds for 
partnership purposes, real property standing in the names of 
several persons is deemed to be held by them as joint tenants 
or as tenants in common." B11.chan vs. Smnncr, 2 Barb. 
Ch. 165, 47 Am. Dec. 350. The theory of some of the 
cases is that real estate bought with separate, and not 
partnership, funds, cannot be converted into firm prop-
erty by a verbal agreement between the partners, b2cause 
no trust can be created in lands, unless by writing, 
in view of the statute of frauds, except such as results by impli· 
cation of law. Parker vs. Boicles, supra. 1.'here are cases which 
hold that, even though the lnnd was originally bought by the 
several pa1·tners with their individual funds, and deeded to 
them as tenants in common, yet it will be regarded in equity 
ns firm property where it is improved out of partnership funds 
for firm purposes, nnd actually used for such purposes, 
or where the firm puts valuable and permanent improve-
ments upon it for firm purposes, and which are essential 
to the firm. In some instanc2s the land is held to be 
the property of the partners, nnd the improvements to be the · 
property of the firm. 1 Bates, Pnrtn. §§ 281, 282. The use of 1 I the property is not conclusive of its character as real estate I or personality, but is only evidence of the intention of the 
parties. Id. § 285. \Vhen the intention of the partners to con-
( vert the land into firm property is iiif erred from circumstances, 
the circumstances must be such as do not admit of any other 
\ eqnalJy reasonable and satisfactory explanation. T. Puri;. 
1 Partn. § 2117. And, where it ia sought to show a conversion of 
I the land into personalty by agreement of the partners, such 
\ agreement must be clear and explicit. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. 
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Law, p. 954, and cases cited. In Alkire vs. Kahle, 123 lll. 496,
17 N. E. 693, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540, land was conveyed during the
existence of the partnership to “Cato Abbott and Henry Rob-
inson, composing the firm of Abbott & Robinson”; and it was
held not to be partnership-‘property, because it was not shown
to have been either purchased with partnership funds, or used
for partnership purposes; but we do not regard that case as
holding that the mere use of the land for partnership purposes
constitutes it firm property. In Mauck 1:3. Mauclc, 54 Ill. 281,
land which had been bought and held for firm purposes was
said to be firm property, and to partake of the character of
personalty; but in that case a part of the business of the firm
was to buy and sell real estate, and, although the land was
said to belong to the firm, it does not appear that it was not
purchased with partnership funds. In Faulds vs. Yates, 57 Ill.
416, 11 Am. Rep. 24, the land was bought for the use of the
partnership, but after the partnership was formed, and with
the money of two of the partners. In Bopp rs. Fox, 63 Ill. 540,
land, bought by four partners with their individual funds, and
conveyed to them in their individual names, was held to be
partnership property, because, two weeks before the purchase,
the four purchasers made, not a mere executory agreement to
form a partnership at a future time, but a “present, verbal
agreement of partnership,” and then afterwards bought the
land, and began the erection of a mill for the purpose of carry-
ing on the milling business as a firm “already formed under
the verbal agreement.” It was there held that the essential
question was whether the purchase money “was paid as part-
nership money for a partnership purpose,” and we said, “W1:
consider this was essentially a purchase with partnership
funds for partnership purposes.”
The weight of authority seems to us to upport the position
that where persons who afterwards become partners buy land
in their individual names and with their individual funds,
before the making of a partnership agreement, the land
will be regarded as the individual property of the part-
ners, in the absence of a clear and explicit agreement I
subsequently entered into by them to make it firm property, |
or in the absence of controlling circumstances which indi-
cate an intention to convert it into firm» assets. \Ve do not
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J,nw, p. 954, and cases cited. In Alkire vs. Kah.le, 123 Ill. 400, 
l 7 N. E. fj!);l, 5 Am. St. Rep. 540, land was conveyed during the 
existence of the partnership to "Cato Abbott and Henry Rob-
inson, composing the firm of Abbott & Robinson"; and it was 
hPld not to be partnf"rship:property, because it was not shown 
to have been either purchnsed with partnership funds, or used 
for partnership purposes; but we do not regard that case as 
holding that tlw mere use of the land for partnership purposes 
constitutes it firm property. In Mauck t:8. !Jlauck, 54 Ill. 281, 
land which had been bought and held for firm purposes was 
said to be firm property, and to partake of the character of 
personalty; but in that case a part of the business of the firm 
was to buy and sell real estate, and, although the land was 
said to belong to 1he firm, it does not appear that it was not 
purchased with partnership funds. In Faulds t'8. Yates, 57 Ill. 
4Hi, 11 Am. HPp. 24, tlfe land was bought for the use of the 
partnPrship, but after the partnership was formed, and with 
the money of two of the partners. In Bopp i·s. Fox, 63 Ill. 540, 
land, bought by four partners with their individual funds, and 
conn•yed to them in tlieir individual names, was held to be 
partnership property, because, two weeks before the purchasP., 
th<> four purchasers made, not a mere executory agreement to 
form a partnership at a future time, but a "present, verbal 
ngr<>ement of partnership," and then afterwards bought the 
land, and began the erection of a mill for the purpose of carry-
ing on the milling business as a firm "already formed under 
the verbal agr<'ement." It was there held that the essential 
qnPstion was whether the purchase money "was paid as part-
nership money for a partnership purpose," and we said, "We 
consider this was -essentially a pu~chase with partnership 
funds. for partnership purposes." 
The weight of authority seems to us to support the position 
that where persons who afterwards become partners buy land 
in their individual names and with their individual funds, 
before the making of a partnership agreement, the land 
will be regardpd as the · indivi<luul property of the part-
ners, in the absC'nce of a clear and explicit agreement 
snh~equently entc•red into by them to make it firm prop~rty, 
1 or in the absence of controlling circumstances which indi-
' I cate an intention to convert it into firm assets. 'Ve do not 
t llink that an application of this rule to the facts of the present , 
(iii
{T ~
. \ ...- .
case shows the real estate here in controversy to be firm prop-
erty. The testimony proves affirmatively that there was no
agreement, written or verbal, to put the land into the firm as a
firm asset, and that it was treated by the parties as individual
property. John S. Emmons insured his interest separately.
\Vhen he gave his note for $1,500, signed by his brother as
surety, in part payment of the purchase money for the land, he
promised his brother that he would give him a mortgage on his
one-third interest -when the master’s certificate, issued to him
at the sale, should ripen into a deed; and the mortgage after-
wards made was given as soon as the master‘s deed was ob-
tained. Four months after the purchase, when he borrowed
$1,800 of the bank upon his note, signed by his father and
father-in-law as sureties. he stated to the bank that he intended
‘to mortgage his interest to his siireties to secure them. About
lthis time, Newton, Emmons 8: Miller paid $5,400 in cash for im-
proving the mill; but this amount was contributed by the part-
ners, not out of partnership funds, but by the contribution of
Vlll€‘ll'l11(ll\'ldll£ll moneys, each. paying one-third. The one-third
so paid by John S. Emmons was the $1,800 borrowed on his
note. The bank itself, in procuring deeds from the partners in
September, 1884. dealt with them as owners of separate inter-
ests. Each member of a partnership has a superior lien on the
partiiership property for the payment of the firm debts. This
equitable lien of the partners is worked out for the benefit of
the firm creditors. Hapgood vs. Oornircll, 48 Ill. 65, 05 Am.
Dec. 516. Hence, partnership property must be first applied to
the payment of partnership debts; and the true interest of each
partner in such property is the balance found to be due to hiin
after the payment of the firm debts, and the settlement of ac-
counts between the partners. Bopp rs. For, supra. In equity,
real estate stands on the same footing in this respect as per-
sonal property. Alkire rs. Kalilc, supra. It results that there
can be no dower interest in real estate owned by a partnership
until all the partnership debts are paid and the partnership
accounts are adjusted. Troirbi-id_qc rs. Cross, 117 Ill. 109, 7
N. E. 347. If the land in controversy was firm property in Sep-
wives of Newton, Emmons, and Miller; and yet their wives
were required by the bank to sign the deeds to its trustee,
itember, 1884, there were no dower interests at that time in the
\Voo4iwoi-th, and one of them was paid $200 for her signature.
. JP ~
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I cnse shows the real estate here in controversy to be firm prop-
\ erty. 'l'h.e testimony proves affirmatively that there was no 
agreement, written or ve1·bal, to put the land into the firm as a 
firm asset, and that it was treated by the parlies as individual 
property. John S. Emmons insured his interest separately. 
\Vhen he gave his note for $1,500, signed by bis brother as 
surety, in part payrnE>nt of the purch.ase money for the land, be 
promised his brother that he would give him a mortgage on his 
one-third interest when the master's certificate, issued to him 
at the sale, should ripen into a deed; and the mortgage after-
wards made was given as soon as the master's deed was ob-
tnined. Four months after the purchase, when he borrowed 
$1,800 of the bank upon his note, signed by his father antl 
father-in-law as sureties, he stated to the bank that he inknded 
to mortga~e his interest to his sureties to secure them. About 
\ 
\this time, Newton, Emmons & l\liller paid $5,400 in cash for im-
pl'oving the mill; but this amount was contl'ibuted by the part-
'
ners, not ont of partnership funds, but by the contribution of 
their incliYidual moneys, each paying one-third. 'fhe one-third 
so paid by John S. Emmons was the $1,800 borrowed on his 
note. The bnnk itself, in pl'ocuring deeds from the pa1·tners in 
Heptembel', 1S84, dealt with them ns owners of separate inter-
<•sts. Each member of a partnership has a i,:iuperior li<'n on the 
pnrtnership property for the payment of the Ihm dPbts. This 
<•quitnb1e lien of the partners is worked out for the benefit of 
the fit'm creditors. Hapgood vs. Con11rcll, 48 Ill. (if>, !)5 Am. 
Dec. ilHL Henee, partiwrship property must be first applied to 
thl' payment of partnership dPhts; :rnd the true interest of each 
partner in such property is the balance found to be due to him 
aftel' the payment of the firm debts, and the sPttlement of ac-
counts between the partners. Bopp rs. Fo.v, supra. In equity, 
real estate stands on the same footing in this respect as per-
sonal property. Alkire rs. Kaltlc, supra. It rf'sults that there 
can be no down interc>st in real estate owned by a partnership 
until all the partrwrship debts are paid nnd the partnership 
accounts are adjusted. 1'rou:bdd.'fc i·s. Cro.r~s, 117 Ill. 10!), 7 
N. E. ~47. If the land in contl'on~rsy was firm property in Rl·p-
~
tember, 1884, there w<>re no dower. interests at that time in the 
wives of Newton, Emmons, nnd ~liller; and yet their wives 
w<'re f'pquired by the hunk to sign the deeds to its trustc>e, 
\Voo..'lworth, and one of them was paid $~00 fol' her signature. 
21 
162 CASES on Plurrssnsnlr.
There is no question about the bona fide character of the mort-
gages to Willis Emmons and ‘Wiley S. Emmons and W. W’.
Walter. They paid the judgments upon the notes of John S.
Emmons, upon which they were sureties, and those notes were
given for borrowed money expended in the purchase and im-
provement of the mill property. We think the mortgages have
been properly sustained as resting upon an undivided one-third
interest in the land, which must be regarded, under all the cir-
cumstances of this case, as the separate property of John S.
Emmons.
But, even if the interest held by John S. Emmons was firm
property, there is nothing to show that the holders of the mort-
gages thereon had notice, or reasonable ground for believing,
that it was firm property. The record title was in John S.
Emmons, and all the circumstances coming to their knowledge,
as heretofore stated, were calculated to create the impression
that his real interest was that indicated by the record. Facts
showing a partnership in the milling and grain business were
/' not necessarily notice of a partnership in the land. Now, it is
well settled that a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of firm
\property, from one of the partners holding the legal title, with-
out notice of its partnership character, w1ll hold 1t free from
partnership claims. T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) §§ 277, 278; 1
Bates, Partn. § 291; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Metc. (Mass) 562; Colly.
Partn. (Perk. Ed.) § 135. When a firm and its members are
insolvent, and the firm has been dissolved, an equity exists in
favor of the creditors of the firm in respect of the lands pur-
chased with partncrship funds, which is superior to that of the
{ creditors of the individual partners; but there may be cases
' where an equal or superior equity may be created in favor of a
creditor of an individual member of the firm, as where one has
furnished to one of the members the capital upon which the
business was commenced. Reeves vs. Ayers, 38 lll. 418. By
signing the note for $1,500 as surety, Willis Emmons enabled
John S. Emmons to purchase an interest in the mill property,
and, if that interest was a partnership asset, he thereby aided
in procuring a part of the firm capital. In addition to what
has been said, we think the evidence shows that the officers of
the bank, if they did not actually make an agreement to that
effect, gave John S. Emmons to understand that the’ hank
















































































































































16i OASES ON p AKTNERSIIIP. 
There is no question about the bona fide character of the mort-
gages to \Villis Emmons and \Viley S. Emmons and W. W. 
Walter. They paid the judgments upon the notes of John S. 
Emmons, upon which they were sureties, and those notes were 
given for borrowed money expended in the purchase and im-
provement of the mill property. We think the mortgages have 
been properly sustained as resting upon an undivided one-third 
Interest in the land, which mast be regarqed, under all the cir-
cumstances of this case, as the separate property of John S. 
Emmons. 
I But, even if the interost held by John S. Emmons was firm property, thel'e is nothing to show that the holders of the m01-t-gages thereon had notice, or reasonable ground for believing, 
that it was firm property. The record title was in John S. 
Emmons, and all the circumstances coming to their knowledge, 
as heretofore stated, W<'re calculated to create the impression 
that his real interest was tliat indicated by the record. Facts 
showing a partnership in the milling and grain business were 
/ not necessarily notice of a partner~hip in the land. Now, it is 
well settled that a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of firm 
\ property, from one of the partners holding the legal title, with-
\ out notice of its partnership character, will hold it free from 
partnership claims. T. Pars. Partn. (4th Ed.) §§ 277~ 278; 1 
Bates, Partn. § 291; Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 562; Colly. 
Partn. (Perk. Ed.) § 135. '\\''hen a firm and its members arc 
lnsoln>nt, and the firm has been dissolved, an equity exists in 
favor of the creditors of the firm in respect of the lands pur-
chased with partnership funds, which is superior to that of the 
creditors of the individual partners; but there may be cases 
• where an equal or i!uperior equity may be created in favor of a 
creditor of an individual member of the firm, as where one has 
furnished to one of the members the capital upon which tlu~ 
bm~iness was commenced. Reeves t:s. Ayers, 38 JJI. 418. By 
signing the note for $1,500 as surdy, Willis Emmons enabled 
John S. Emmons to purchas~ an interest in the mill property, 
and, if that interest was a partnership asset, he thereby aided 
in procuring a part of the firm capital. In addition to what 
has been said, we think the evidence shows that the offirers of 
the bank, if they did not actually make an agreement to that 
effect, gave .Jolm S. Emmons to understand that the· bank 
would protect the morlgages on bis interest if he and his wife 
Q
, Roamson BANK vs. MILLER. 163
would sign the deed to the bank. The consideration of that
deed was just the amount of the "two mortgages, and four wit-
nesses swear that one of the ofiicers of the bank promised to
take care of the mortgages. \Vhen a person, by his words or
{ conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the existence
of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that
belief so as to change his previous position, the former will be
estopped to aver against the latter a different state of things.
Casler vs. Byers, 129 Ill. 657, 22 N. E. 507.
As to the mortgage made by the appellant Miller to Lani-
port, the lower courts have found that that mortgage was not
made in good faith, and was not given to secure a bona. fide
indebtedness. It is claimed that the note for $5,500, secured
thereby, was given for money loaned to Miller by his wife and
by his brother-in-law, Lamport. It is true, that the fact of the
relationship between the parties is no proof of fraud, although
it may be a circumstance to excite suspicion. W/ightman rs.
Hart, 37 Ill. 123. But we are not satisfied from the evidence
that the money alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Miller was not
the money of Miller himself. If any funds were loaned to him
by Lamport, it is not possible to fix their exact amount separ-
ately from those alleged to have been borrowed of Mrs. Miller.
' The witnesses contradict each other as to amounts, and a to
the times and places of payment. There is refusal to answer
questions, and failure to explain matters needing explanation.
VVe have examined all the testimony, a contained in the origi-
nal record, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in
the conclusion reached by it in regard to this mortgage, or that
the appellate court has erred in agreeing with the circuit court.
It is true that the deed from Miller and Newton to the bank
contains the words, “subject to incumbrances,” but we think
the reference here is to incumbrances which are made in good
faith. The facts about the mortgage were not known when
the deed was executed. There is some conflict in the evidence
as to whether the parties intended to refer to the Lamport
mortgage, or to certain liens claimed to exist in favor of cred-
itors who had furnished machinery for the mill. But even if
the words refer to the Lamport mortgage alone, it is not certain
from the testimony that the amount of that mortgage was a
part of the consideration for the execution of the deed. The

















































































































































• ROBINSON BANK VS. MILLER. 163 
would sign the deed to the bank. The consideration of that 
deed was just the amount of the two mortgages, and four wit-
nesses swear that one of the officers of the bank promised to 
take care of the mortgages. \Vhen a person, by his words or 
I, conduct, voluntarily causes another to beli.eve in th.e existence 
1 of a certain state of things, and induces him to act upon that 
I belief so as to change his previous positi<>n, the former will be 
I estopped to aver ngainst the latter a different state of tl.ingts. 
Caslervs. JJyers, 129 111. 657, 22 N. E. 507. 
As to the mortgage made by the appellant Miller to Lam-
port, the lower courts have found that that mortgage was not 
made in aood faith, and was not given to secure a bona fide 
indebtedness. Jt is claimed that the note for $5,500, secured 
thereby, was given for money loaned to Miller by his wife and 
by his brother-in-Jaw, Lamport. It is true, that the fact cf the 
relationship between the parties is no proof of fraud, although 
it may be a circumstance to excite suspicion. W·iglttman t"d. 
Hart, 37 Ill. 123. But we are not satisfied from the evidence 
that the money alleged to have belonged to Mrs. Miller was not 
the money of Miller himself. If any funds were loaned to him 
by T ..amport, it is not possible to fix their exact amount scpar· 
ately from those alleged to have been borrowed of Mrs. ~tiller. 
- The witnesses contradict each other as to amounts, and ruJ to 
the times and places of payment. There is refusal t<> answer 
queetions, and failure to explain matters needing explanation. 
\Ve have examined all the testimony, as contained in the origi-
nal record, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in 
the conclusion reached by it in regard to this mortgage, or that 
the appellate court bas erred in agreeing with the circuit court. 
It is true that the deed from Miller and Newton to tl1e bank 
contains the words, "subject to incumbrances," but we think 
the reference here is to incumbrances which are made in good 
faith. The facts about the mortgage were not known when 
the deed was executed. There is some conflict in the evidence 
os to whether the parties intended to refer to the Lamport 
mortgage, or to certain liens claimed to exist in favor of cred-
itors who had furnished mn<'hinery for the mill. But even 1f 
the words refer to the Lamport mortgage alone, it is not certain 
from the testimony that the amount of that mortgage was a 
part of the consideration for the execution of the deed. The 
grantee in a deed, who plll·chases subject to an incumbrance to 
164 Cases ox PARTNERSHIP.
* u
secure indebtedness, may not be under obligations to pay such
indebtedness, if its amount is not included in, and does not
form a part of, the consideration of the conveyance. Drury vs.
Holden, 121 Ill. 130, 13 N. E. 547. The amount named as the
consideration in the deed was simply the agreed value of New-
ton’s interest, and did not include any part of this mortgage.
The amount of the actual consideration agreed to be paid by
the bank for the deed of l\Iiller‘s interest, to wit, $5,333.33 (one-
third of $10,000), was paid by a credit of that amount on the
firm indebtedness of $21,585.23 due from Newton, Emmons &:
‘Miller to the bank. The judgment of the appellate court and
the decree of the circuit court are affirmed. Aflirmed.
NOTE: See also l\1echem's Elem. of Pa.rt.n., 55 106, 107, 109; also the ex-
haustive note in 27 L. R. A. 449.
SHANKS vs. KLEIN.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1881.
104 U. S. 18, 26 L. Ed. 635.
This was a bill in chancery filed by John A. Klein and others
against David C. Shanks, executor of the last will and testa-
ment of Joseph H. Johnston.
The substance of the bill is that in the lifetime of Johnston
there existed between him and Shepperd Brown a partnership,
the style of which was Brown & Johnston; that their principal
place of business was at Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi,
where they had a banking house; that they had branches and
connections with other men in business at other places. among
which was New Orleans; that the_v dealt largely in the pur-
chase and sale of real estate, of which they had a large amount
in value on hand at the outbreak of the recent civil war; that
this real estate was in different parcels and localities, and was
bought and paid for by partnership money, and held as part-
nership property for the general uses of the partnership busi-
ness; and that early in the war, namely, in 1863, Johnston died
in the State of Virginia, where he then resided, leaving a will

















































































































































164 0ASE8 ON PAUTNEBSBIP. 
secure indebtedness, may not be under obligations to pay such 
indebtedness, if its amount is not included in, and does not 
form a part of, the consideration of the conveyance. Drury vs. 
Holden, 121 111. 130, 13 N. E. 547. The amount named as the 
consideration in the deed was simply the agreed value of New-
ton's interest and did not include any part of this mortgage. 
The amount of the actual consideration agreed to be paid by 
the bank for the deed of :Miller's intPrest, to wit, $ti,333.33 (one-
third of $Hi,OOO), was paid by a credit of that amount on the 
fl.rm indebtedness of $21,585.23 due from Newton, Emmons & 
·MiHer to the bank. The judgment of the appelJate court and 
the decree of the circuit court are affirmed. Affirmed. 
NOTE: See also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ff 106, 107, 109; also the ex-
haustive note in 27 L. R. A. 44.9, 
SHANKS vs. KLEIN. 
Supreme Court of the T,'nitcd States, 1881. 
104 U. S. 18, 26 I,. Ed. 635. 
This was a biJl in chancery ft led by John A. Klein and others 
against David C. Shanks, exPcutor of the last will and testa-
ment of Joseph H. Johnston. 
The substancf.' of the bill is that in the lifetime of Johnston 
there existed betwe<>n him and Shepperd B1·own a partnership. 
the style of wh!ch was Brown & Johnston; that their principal 
place of business was at Vicksburg, in the State of Mississippi, 
where they had a banking house; that they had branches and 
connections with other men in business at other places, among 
which waA Kew Orleans; that they dealt largely in the pur-
chase and sale of real estate, of which they had a large amount 
in Yalue on hand at the outbr<>ak of the recent civil war; that 
1his real estnte was in differPnt parcels and localities, and was 
bought and paid for by partnership money, and lwld as part-
nership propf.'rty for the general usf's of the partnership bnsi-
m~ss; and that early in the war, namely, in lRG~. Johnston died 
in the State of Virginia, where he then resined, leaving a will 
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norship, became vested in Shanks, who was appointed his
executor. '
It seems that both Brown and Johnston were absent from
Mississippi and from New Orleans during the war—the one
being in Virginia and the other in Georgia. Upon the cessa-
tion of hostilities, Brown returned to New‘ Orleans, and visited
Vicksburg to look after the business of the firm of Brown &
Johnston, and the other firms with which that was connected.
Finding that suits had been commenced by creditors of the firm
against him as surviving partner, and, in some instances,
attachments levied, he became satisfied that unless he adopted
some mode of disposing of the partnership property and apply-
ing its proceeds to the payment of the debts in their just order,
the whole would be wasted or a few active creditors would
absorb it all. Under these circumstances, acting by advice of
counsel, he executed a deed conveying all the property of the
firm of Brown & Johnston to John A. Klein, in trust for the
creditors of that partnership, and providing that the surplus,
if any, should be for the use of the partners and their heirs or
devisees. Klein accepted the trust, and pursuant thereto paid
debts with the lands, or with the pI'uC68dS of the sale of them.
There is an allegation that Shanks, while acting as executor,
and about the time the deed of trust was made, had an inter-
view with Brown, and, being fully informed of the condition
of the atfairs of the partnership, expressed his approval of
what Brown intended to do. This is denied in the answer.
and some testimony is taken on the subject. Other questions
of had faith on the part of Brown are raised. But in the view
which we take of the case the record establishes that Brown
acted in good faith, and did the best that could be done for
the creditors of the paI'tn(>1'ship and for those interested in
its property.
It appears that after all this property had been sold to pur-
chasers in good faith. Shanks, as executor of Jol1nston’s will,
instituted actions of ejectment against them. They thereupon
filed this bill to enjoin him from further prosecuting the
actions, and compel him to convey the legal title to the real
estate which came to him by the will of his testator. A

















































































































































SHANKS vs. KLElN. 165 
n<·rship, became vested in Shanks, who was appoint~d Qis 
executor. 
It seems that both Br~wn and J ohm1ton were absent from 
.Mississippi and from New Orleans dur-ing the war-the one 
being in Virginia and the other in Georgia. Upon the cessa-
tion of hostilities, llrown returned to .New, Orleans, and visited 
Vicksburg to look aft(~r the busiiwss of the firm of Ilrown & 
Johnston, and the other firms with whicli that was connC'cted. 
Finding that suits had been commenced by creditors of the firm 
against llim as surviving partne1·, and, in some instancl's, 
nttachm<:nts levied, he becnme satisfied that unless he adoptt!d 
some mode of di~posing of the partnership property and apply-
ing its proceeds to the payment of the debts in their just order, 
the whole would be wasted or a few active creditors would 
absorb it all. Fnder tlu-'SP ei1·cumstancfls, acting by advice of 
. <-otmsel, he exN·uted a deed conYeying all the prope1·ty of the 
firm of Brown & Johnston to .John A. Klc>in, in trust for the 
credito1·s of that partnership, and providing tltat the surplus, 
if any, should be for the use of the partm•rs and their heirs or 
devisees. Kl(-'in accepted the trust, and pursuant thereto pai1l 
debts with the lands, or with the pr\1Ceeds of the sale of them. 
Ther<> is an allegation that Shanks, while acting as executor, 
and about th<-' time the d(•ed of trust was madl>, had an intm·· 
view with Brown, and, being fully inform('d of the condition 
of the affairs of the partn('t·ship, ('XJW(•ss(•d his approval of 
what Brown intended to do. This is denie<l· in the answer. 
Hnrl some testimony is taken on the subject. Other questionl'l 
of bad faith on the part of Brown are raised. But in the view 
which we tak1._• of the case the rt>1«>rd establishes that Brown 
acted in good faith, and did the best that could be done for 
the creditors of the partlwrship and for those interested iD 
its property. 
It appears that after all this property had bec>n sold to pur-
chasers in good faith, ~lrnnks, as <>xecntor of ;Johnston's will, 
instituted a<'tions of ejectnwnt against tlu-'m. They thereupon 
filed this bill to C'njoin him from further prosecuting the 
actions, aud compel him to convey the legal title to the real 
t>state which <'ame to him by the will of his testator. A 
deeree was l'E>nd<-'red in conformity with the prayer of the l>ill, 
and Shanks appPalrd. 
166 Cssns on Panrmznsntr.
W. B. Pitt-man, and J. Z. George, for appellant.
E. D. Clark, for appellees.
Mn.1.nn, J. (After stating the facts as above). Being satis-
fied, as already stated, of the fairness and honesty of the pro-
ceedings of Brown and Klein and of the purchasers from
them, and waiving as of no consequence, in regard to the
principal point in the case, the allegation of Shank’s concur-
ence in or ratification of Brown’s action, we proceed to con-
sider the question as to the power or authority of Brown, the
surviving partner, to bind Shanks by the conveyance to Klein,
and by the sales thereunder made.
There is no doubt that in the present case all the real estate
which is the subject of this controversy is to be treated as
partnership property, bought and held for partnership pur-
poses within the rule of equity on that subject. Nor is it denied
by the counsel who have so ably argued the case for the appel-
lant that the equity of the creditors of the partnership to have
their debts paid out of this property is superior to that of the
devisee, Johnston. Their contention is that this right could
only be ‘enforced by proceedings in a court of justice, and that
no power existed in Brown, the surviving partner, to convey
the legal title vested in Shanks by the will of Johnston, nor
even to make a contract for the sale of the real estate which a
court will enforce against Shanks as the holder of that title.
Counsel for the appellees, while conceding that neither the
deed of Brown to Klein, nor of Klein to his vendees, conveyed
the legal title of the undivided moiety which was originally in
Johnston, maintain that Brown, as surviving partner, had, for
the purpose of paying the debts of the partnership, power to
sell and transfer the equitable interest or right of the partner-
ship, and of both partners, in the real estate, that the trust
deed which he made to Klein was effectual for that purpose,
and that by Kit-in’s sales to the other appellees they became
invested with this equitable title and the right to compel
Shanks to convey the legal title.
One of the learned counsel for the appellant concedes that
at the present day the doctrine of the English court of chan-
cery “extends to the treating of the realty as personalty for

















































































































































166 OASES OB P.A.RTNERSHIP. 
lV. B. Pittman, and J. Z. George, for appellant. 
E. D. Ola·,.k, for appellees. 
Mn.LEn, J. (After stating the facts as above). Being sntil!'-
fted, as alr~ady stated, of the fairness and honesty of the pro-
ceedings of Brown and Klein and of the purchasers from 
them, and wafring as of no consequence, in regard to the 
principal point in the case, the allegation of Shank's concur-
ence in or ratiVcation of Brown's action, we proceed to con-
sider the queRtion as to the power or authority of Brown, the 
surviving partner, to bind Shanks by the conveyance to Klein, 
and by the sales thereunder made. 
There is no doubt that in the presC'nt case all the real estate 
which is the subject of this coutl'oversy is to be treated as 
partnership prope1·ty, bought and held for partnership pur· 
pol'es within the rnl<' of equity on that subject. Nor is it denied 
by the counsel who have so ably argued the case for the appel-
lant that the <'qnity of the creditors of the partnership to have 
their d<.•bts paid out of this property is superior to that of the 
de,·isee, Johnston. 'rheir contention is that this right could 
onl,v be enfor~ed by proce<.>dings in a court of justice, and that 
-no power exist<>d in Brown, the surviving partner, to convey 
the> k·gnl title vested in Shanks by the will of Johnston, nor 
even to make a contract for the sale of the real estate which a 
court will enfo1:ee against Shanks as the holder of that title. 
Counsel for the appe11ees, while conceding that neither the 
deed of Brown to Klein, nor of Klein to his vendees, conveyed 
the l<.>gal title of the undividl'd moiety which was originally in 
.T ohnston, maintain that Brown, as surviving partner, had, for 
the purpose of pa~·ing the debts of the partnership, power to 
sell and transft'l' the equitable interest or right of the partner-
ship, and of both partners, in the real estate, that the trust 
deed which he made to Klein was effectual for that purpose, 
nnd that by Klt-in's sales to the other appellees they became 
invested with this ecp1itahlc title and the right to compel 
Shanks to convc>y the lPgnJ title. 
One of the learned coun~el for the appellant concedes that 
at the present day the doctrine of the English court of chnn· 
( cery "extends to the treating of the realty as personalty for 
all purposes, and gives the personal representatives of the 
v
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deceased partner the land as personalty, to the exclusion of
the heir,” and that the principle has “acquired a firm foot-
hold in English equity jurisprudence, that partneship real
estate is in fact in all cases, and to all intents and purposes,
personalty.” He maintains, however, that the principle has
not been carried so far in the courts of America; that the
extent of the doctrine is that the creditors of the partnership
and the surviving partner have a lien on the real estate of
the partnership for debts due by the firm, and for any balance
found due to either partner on a final settlement of the part-
nership transactions; and that the right of the surviving
partner, and of the creditors through him, is no more than a
lien, which cannot be asserted by a sale, as if the property were
personal, but to the enforcement of which a resort to a court
of equity is necessary.
We think that the error which lies at the foundation of this
argument is in the assumption that the equitable right of the
surviving partner and the creditors is nothing but a lien.
It is not necessary to decide here that it is not a lien in the
strict sense of that word, for if it be a lien in any sense it is
also something more.
It is an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. It
is an interest in the property which courts of chancery will
recognize and support. What is that right? Not only that
the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so~
situated is appropriated to the satisfaction of the partnership
debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be
treated as personal property of the partnership, and like other
personal property pass under the control of the surviving part-
ner. This control extends to the right to sell it, or so much of
it as may be necessary to pay the partnership debts, or to
satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner.
It is beyond question that such is the doctrine of the Eng-
lish court of chancery, as stated by counsel for appellant.
As this result was reached in that court without the aid of any
statute, it is authority of very great weight in the inquiryas
to the true equity doctrine on the subject.
\Ve think, also, that the preponderance of authority in the
American courts is on the same side of the question.
In the case of D yer vs. Clark, 5 Metc. (Mass) 562, 39 Am. Dec.
















































































































































SHANKS vs. KLElN. 1G7 
1 deceased partner the land as personalty, to the exclusion of 
the heir," and that the principle has "acquired a firm foot-
hold in English equity jurisprudence, that partnesbip real 
estate is in fact in all cases, and to all intents and purposes, 
personalty." He maintains, however, that the principle baa 
not been carried so far in the courts of America; that the 
. extent of the doctrine is that the creditors of the partnership 
und the surviving partner have a lien on the real estate of 
the partnership for debts rlue by the firm, and for any balance 
found due to either partner on a final settlement of the part-
nership transactions; and that the right of the surviving 
partner, and of the creditors through him, is no more than a 
lien, which cannot be asserted by a sale, as if the property were 
personal, but to the enforcement of which a resort to a court 
of equity is necessary. 
We think that the error which lies at the foundation of this 
argument is in the assumption that the equitable right of the 
surYiving partner and the creditors is nothing but a lien. 
It is not necessary to decide here that it is not a lien in the 
strict sense of that word, for if it be a lien in any sense it is 
also something more. 
It is an equitable right accompanied by an equitable title. lt 
is an interest in tlte property which courts of chancery will 
recognize and support. 'Vhat is that right? Not only that 
the court will, when necessary, see that the real estate so· 
situated is appropriritC'd to the satisfaction of the partnership 
debts, but that for that purpose, and to that extent, it shall be 
trc>ated as personal property of the partnership, and like other 
personal property pass under the control of the surviving part-
ner. This control extends to the right to sell it, or so much of ! 
it as may be necessary to pay the partnership debts, or to 
satisfy the just claims of the surviving partner. 
It is beyond question that such is the doctrine of the Eng-
liE1h ·court of chancery, ns stated by counsel for appellant. 
As this result was reached in that court without the aid of any 
statute, it is nutbority of very great weight in the inquiry as 
to the true equity doctrine on the subject. 
'Ye think, also, that the preponderance of authority in the 
American courts is on the same side of the question. 
In the case of Dyer vs. Clark, 5 Mete. {Mass.) 5G2, 30 Am. Dec. 
697, that eminent jurist, ChiP.f Justice SHAW, while using the 
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word “lien” in reference to the rights now in controversy, asks,
“\Vhat are the true equitable rights of the partners as result-
ing from their presumed intentions in such real estate? Is
not the share of each pledged to the other, and has not each
an equitable lien on the estate, requiring that it shall be held
and appropriated, first, to pay the joint debts, then to repay
the partner who advanced the capital, before it shall be
applied to the separate use of either of the partners? The
creditors have an interest indirectly in the same appropriation;
not because they have any lien, legal or equitable (2 Story, Eq.,
§ 1253), upon the property itself; but on the equitable principle
that the real estate so held shall be deemed to constitute a
part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid before it
can be legally or honestly diverted to the private use of the
parties. Suppose this trust is not implied, what would be the
condition of the parties?” etc. “But treating it as a trust, the
rights of all the parties will be preserved.” It is clear that in
the view thus announced the right of the creditors is something
more than an ordinary lien.
In Delmonico vs. Guillaume, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 366, where
the precise question arose which we have in the present case,
the vice-chancellor held that “Peter A. Delmonico, as the sur-
viving partner, became entitled to the Brooklyn farm, and as
between himself and the heir of John he had an absolute right
to dispose of it, for the payment of the debts of the firm, in the
same manner as if it had been personal estate.”
In so deciding he followed the English authorities, and cited
Fereday rs. Wi_l/htiriek, 1 Russ. & M. 45; Phillips vs. Phillips, 1
Myl. & K. 649; Broom vs. Broom, 3 Ib. 443; Cookson vs. Cookson,
8 Sim. 529; Torrnshend vs. Dcra]/nes, 11 Ib. 493, note.
In ztndrrirs’ Heirs vs. Brozrn’s Adm’r, 21 Ala. 437, the
supreme court said that, “inasmuch as the real estate is con-
sidered as personal for the purpose of paying the debts of the
firm, and the surviving partner is charged with the duty of
paying these debts, it must of necessity follow that he has the
right in equity to dispose of the real estate for this purpose,
ft ? it would never do to charge him with the duty of paying
the debts and at the same time take from him the means of
doing it. Therefore, although he cannot by his deed pass the
legal title which descended to the heir of the deceased partner,
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word "lien" in reference to the rights now in controversy, asks, 
"'Vhnt are the true equitable rights of the partners a~ result-
ing from their presumed intentions in such real estate? Is 
not the share of each pledgl'd to the other, and has not eac11 
an equitable lien on tlw ei:;iate, requiring thnt it shall be held 
and appropriated, first, to pay the joint debts, tlien to repay 
the partner who adrnn{'cd the capital, before it shall be 
upplied to the separate u~e of eith<>r of the partners? The 
creditors have an interC'st indirectly in the same appropriation; 
not because th(·y have any lien, legal or equitable t!! Story, Eq., 
I 1:!53), upon the property its(' If; but on the equitable principli~ 
that the real estate so held shall be deemed to constitute a 
part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid before i't 
can be le~ally 01· honestly diverted to the pl'ivate use of the 
parties. ~uppose this trust is not implied, what would be the 
condition of the partiC's?" etc. ''But treating it as a trust, the 
rights of all the parties will be preserYed." It is dear that in 
the view thus announced the right of the creditors is something 
more than an ordinary lien. 
In Delmonico vs. Guillaume, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) Ch. 366, where 
the precise question arose which we have in the present case, 
the vice-chancl•llor held that "Peter A. Dc>lmonko, as the sur· 
viving partner, became t'ntitled to the Brooklyn farm, and as 
between himself and the heir of John he had an absolute right 
to dispose of it, for the payment of the debts of the firm, in the 
same manner as if it had been personal eRtate." 
In so decicl!ni:r be followed the English authorities, and cited 
Fereday 1:s. lViyht1rick, 1 Rm~s. & :M. 45; Phillips vs. Phillips, 1 
Myl. & K. 649; Broom vs. Brnom, 3 lb. 44~; Cookson vs. Cookson, 
8 Sim. 5:.!9; Townshend vs. Dcra!fne.'I, 11 lb. 4HR, note. 
In .1ndrcirs' Hr:ir.'t i:s. Rrown's Adin'r, 21 Ala. 437, tbt~ 
supreme> court said that, "inn~mnch as the real estate is con-
sidered as personal for the purpose of paying the debts of the 
firm, and the survivitig 1iartner is ('barged with the duty '>f 
paying these dt>bts, it must of necesRity follow that he has the 
right in equity to dispose of the real estate for this purpos4>7 
fc ~ it would never do to chargl' him with the duty of paying 
the debts nnd at the s::m~, time take from him the me:ms of 
doing it. Tllerpfore, although he rannot by his deed pass the 
legal title which d<'Rcend<'d to the heir of the deceased partner, 
yet as the heir holds tlw tiiJn in truf:t to pay the debts and the 
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survivor is charged with this duty, his deed will convey the
equity to the purchaser, and through it he may call on the
heir for the legal title and compel him to convey it.”
In Dupuy vs. Learemcorth, 17 Cal. 262, Chief Justice FIELD,
in the name of the court, said: “In the view of equity it is
immaterial in whose name the legal title of the property
stands-—whether in the individual name of the copartner,
or in the joint names of all; it is first subject to the payment
of the partnership debts, and is then to be distributed among
the copartners according to their respective rights. The
possessor of the legal title in such case holds the property in
trust for the purposes of the copartnership. Each partner has
an equitable interest in the property until such purposes are
accomplished. Upon dissolution of the copartnership by the
death of one of its members, the surviving partner, who is
charged with the duty of paying the debts, can dispose of this
equitable interest, and the purchaser can compel the heirs-at-
law of the deceased partner to perfect the purchase by
conveyance of the legal title.”
If the case could be held to be one which should be governed
by the decisions of the courts of Mississippi, because the prin-
ciple is to be regarded as a rule of property, which we neither
admit or deny, the result would still be the same.
In one of the earliest cases on that subject in the high court
of errors and appeals of that state, Markham vs. Merritt, 8
Miss. 437, 40 Am. Dec. 76, Chief Justice SHARKEY, in delivering
the opinion of the court, concurs in the general doctrine that
“when land is held by a firm, and is essential to the purposes
and objects of the partnership, then it is regarded a a part of
the joint stock, and will be regarded in equity as a chattel.” A
careful examination of the Mississippi cases cited by counsel
has disclosed nothing in contravention of this doctrine, or in
denial of the authority of the surviving partner to dispose of
such property for the payment of the debts of the partnership.
‘Ne are of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers from
, Klein acquired the equitable title of the real estate conveyed to
him by Brown, that they had a right to the aid of a court oi’
chancery to compel Shanks to convey the legal title to the undi-
l vided half of the land, vested in him by the will of Johnston.
Decree affirmed.
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survivor is charged with this duty, his deed will convey the 
equity to the purchaser, and through it he may call on the 
heir for the legal title and compel him to convey it." 
In Dupuy vs. Leai·entc01·th, 17 Cal. 2G2, Chief Justice F1Er.D, 
in the name of thE! court, said: "In the view of equity it is 
immaterial in whose name the legal title of the property 
stands-whether in the individual name of the copartner~ 
or in the joint names of all; it is first subject to the payment 
of the partnership debts, and is then to be distributed among 
the copartners nccordin~ to their respective rights. The 
possf'ssor of the legal title in such case holds the property in 
trust fo.r the purposes of the copartnership. Each partner has 
nn equitable intrrest in the property until such purposes are 
accomplished. Upon dissolution of the copartnership by the 
death of one of i1s memb('rs, the survi\'ing partner, who is 
charged with the duty of paying the debts, can dispose of this 
equitable interest, and the purchaser can compel the heirs-at-
Iaw of the dt>ceased partner to perfect the purchase by 
conveyance of the legal title/' 
If the case could be held to be one which should be governed 
by the decisions of the courts of Mississippi, because the prin-
ciple is to be regarded as a rule of property, which we neither 
admit or deny, the result would still be the same. 
In one of the earliest cases on that subject in the high court 
of errors and appf'als of that statE>, Marklta11i vs. Merritt, 8 
Miss. 437, 40 .Am. Dec. 76, Chi<."f Justice SHARKEY, in delivering 
the opinion of the court, concurs in the general doctrine that 
"when land is held by a firm, and is es~ential to the purposes 
and objects of the partnership, then it is regarded as a part of 
the joint stock, and will be regarded in equity as a chattel." A 
careful examination of the Mississippi cases cited by counsel 
has disclosed nothing in contravention of this doctrine, or in 
denial of the authority of the surviving partner to dispose of 
such property for the payment of the debts of the partnership. 
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the purchasers from 
Klein acquired the equitable title of the real estate conveved to 
him by Brown, that they had a right to the aid of a court of 
. <'hancery to compel ShankEI to convey the legal title to the undi-
\ vided half of the land, vested in him by the will of Johnston. 
Decree affirmed. 
NOTE-See also Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., ~§ 105, 111. 
22 
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PAIGE vs. PAIGE. '
Supreme Court of Iowa-, 1887.
71 Iowa 818, 32 N. W. Rep. 360, so Am. Rep. 799.
On February 2, 1880, Simon B. and John A. Paige, being in
partnership, under the firm name of S. B. & J. A. Paige, bought
certain mill property with partnership funds but took the title
in their individual names. On February 6, 1880, they united
with R. F. Paige and E. W. Dixon to form a new firm to be
known as Paige, Dixon & Go. The partnership articles pro-
vided that one-fourth interest in the milling property should
be conveyed to each of the new partners upon their paying an
agreed sum. The new firm took possession of the property,
operated and improved it. In August, 1881, R. F. Paige died
and S. B. and J. A. Paige acquired his interest in the property,
the business being continued under the former name. until the
death of S. B. Paige. At his death, the firm and all members
thereof were insolvent. The widow of S. B. Paige claimed
dower in the milling property. The heirs of S. B. Paige, his
administrator, J . A. Paige, Dixon, and Brown, a creditor, were
all made parties. The widow’s claim being denied, she and the
administrator appealed.
Bills di’- Block, for appellant.
Dacison <(- Lane and Stewart ct? White, for appellees.
Rornnocx, J. (After stating the facts.) The parol evidence
in the case shows quite conclusively that, at the time the con-
veyance of the property was made, S. B. Paige stated that the
purchase was made by the partnership of S. B. & J. A. Paige,
and the property belonged to the partnership, and he desired
the deed to be made in the name of the partnership; but that,
under the advice of counsel, it was made in the individual
names of the members of the firm, so that, if the property
should be subsequently sold. it would not be necessary to prove
who were the proper parties to join in a conveyance.
This evidence, and all of the other parol evidence tending to
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PAIGE vs. PAIGE. 
Supreme Court of Iowa., 1887. 
'71 Iowa 818, 82 N. W. Rep. 860, 60 Am. Rep. 799. 
On February 2, 1880, Simon B. and John A. Paige, being in 
partnership, under the firm name of S. B. & J. A. Paige, bought 
certain mill property with partnership funds but took the title 
in their individual names. On February G, 1880, they united 
with R. F. Paige nnd E. ,V. Dixon to form a new firm to be 
known ns Paige, Dixon & Co. 'l'he partnership articles pro-
vided that one·fourth interest in the milling property should 
be conveyed to each of the new partners upon their paying an 
agreed sum. The new firm took possession of the property, 
operated and improved it. In August, 1881, R. F. Paige died 
and S. B. and ~T. A. Paige acquired his interest in the property, 
the business being continued under the former name, until tho 
death of S. B. Paige. At his death, the firm and all members 
thereof Wf're iusol'Verit. The widow of S. B. Paige claimed 
dower in the milling proper1y. Tbe heirs of S. B. Paige, his 
administrator, J. A. Paige, Dixon, and Brown, a creditor, were 
all made partiPs. The widow's claim beii:ig denied, she and the 
administrator appealed. 
Bills & Block, for appellant. 
Dadson & Lane and Stewart & White, for nppellees. 
RoTanocK, .J. (After stating the facts.) The parol evidence 
in the case shows quite conclusively that, at the time the con-
veyance of the property was made, S. B. Paige stated that the 
purchase was made by the partnership of S. B. & J. A. Paige, 
and the property belonged to the partnership, and be desired 
the deed to be made in the name of the partnership; but that, 
under the ndvice of counsel, it was made in the individual 
names of the members of the firm, so that, if the property 
Rhould be 1ubsequently sold, it would not be necessary to prove 
who were the prop2r parties to join in a conveyance. 
This evidence, and all of the other parol evidence tending to 
~how tltat the property was purchased and paid for by the part· 
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nership, is objected to by counsel for the plaintifi upon the
ground that a written conveyance of real estate cannot be
varied by parol. It is insisted that such evidence is incom-
petent, under the statute, which provides that “conveyances to
two or more, in their own right, create a tenancy in common,
unless a contrary intent is expressed.” Code, § 1939. And
the following provisions of the code are also relied upon: Sec-
tion 1934: “Declarations or creations of trust or power, in
relation to real estate, must be executed in the same manner
as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to
trusts resulting from the operation or construction of law.”
Sections 3663 and 3664 provide that no evidence of any con-
tract for the creation or transfer of any interest in lands
(except leases for a term not exceeding one year) shall be com-
petent, “unless in writing, signed by the party to be charged.”
Appellant concedes that, if the property had been paid for
with partnership money, and one of the partners had taken the
title to the whole, there would be a resulting trust for the
benefit of the firm. But it is claimed that, as each received the
legal title to just the share he was equitably entitled to, there
can be no resulting trust. The evidence in the case shows
quite satisfactorily that payment for the property was made,
not with the money of each individual partner, but with the
undivided money of the partnership. It seems to us it is
wholly immaterial whether the conveyance was made to one or
both the partners. The law recognize the partnership as a
person distinct from the individual members of the firm, and,
this person or partnership, having paid its money for the prop-
erty, there" was a resulting trust in its favor, no matter in
whose name the title was taken.
In the notes to Coics rs. Coles. 1 Amer. Lead. Cas. (Hare & \V.)
487, it is said: “If land is bought with partnership funds,and is
brought into the business of the firm and used for its purposes,
it will be considered as partnership stock, in whose name soever
the legal title may he unless there be distinct evidence of an inten-
tion to hold it separately, such as an express agreement in the
articles of copartnership, or at the time of the purchase, or the
fact that the price is charged to the partners respectively in
their several accounts with the firm; for such arrangements
would operate as a division and distribution of so much of the
















































































































































PAIGE vs. PAIGE. 171 
nership, is objected to by counsel for the plaintiff upon the 
ground that a written conveyance of real estate cannot be 
varied by parol. Jt is insisted that such evidence is incom-
petent, under the statute, which provides that "conveyances to 
two or more, in their own right, create a tenancy in common .• 
unless a contrary intent is expressed." Code, § 1939. And 
the following provisions of the code are also relied upon: Sec-
tion 1934: "Declarations or creations of tru~t or power, in 
relation to real estate, must be executed in the same manner 
as deeds of conveyance; but this provision does not apply to 
trusts resulting from the operation or construction of la.w." 
Sections 3663 nnd 3664 provide that no evidence of any con-
tract for the creation or tt:msfer of any interest in lands 
(except leases for n term not exceeding one year) shall be com" 
pctent, "unless in writing, signed by the party to be charged." 
Appellant concedes that, if the property had been paid for 
with partnership money, and one of the partners had taken the 
title to the whole, there would be a resulting trust for the 
benefit of the firm. Uut it is claimed that, as each received the 
legal title to jnst the share he was equitably entitled to, there 
can be no resulting trust. The evidence in the case shows 
quite satisfactorily that payment for the property was made, 
\
not with the money of each individual partner, but with the 
undivided money of the partnership. It seems to us it is 
wholly immaterial whether the conveyance was made to one or 
both the partners. The law recognizes the partnership as u 
person distinct from the individual members of the firm, and, 
this person or partnership, liaving paid its money for the prop-
erty, there· was a resulting trust in its favor, no matter in 
whose name the title was ta ken. 
In the notes to Cnlcs 1:s. Coles, 1 Amer. Lead. Cas. (Ilare & ,V.) 
487, it is said: "If land is bought with partnership funds, and is 
brought into the business of the firm and used for its purposes, 
It will be considered as partnership stock, in whose name ,<Joevcr 
tlze legal title may be unless tltere be distinct evidence of an intc1i-
t fon to Tiold it separately, such as an express agreement in the 
articles of copartnership, or at the time of the purchase, or the 
fa.ct that the price is charged to the partners respectively in 
their several accounts with the firm; for such arrangements 
would operate as a divi~ion and distribution of so much of the 
funds, and each would take his share divested of any im:plicd 
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trust; but the mere circumstances that the conveyance was to
them expressly as tenants in common, would not, of itself, be
suflicient to rebut the trust.”
In 2 Story, Eq. § 1207, it is said: “Where real estate is pur-
rhased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account,
it is wholly immaterial, in view of a court of equity, in whose
name or names the purchase is made and the conveyance taken—-
whether in the name of one partner, or of all partners; whether
in the name of a stranger alone, or a stranger jointly with one
partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in
Whom it may, it is in equity deemed partnership property, not
subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the
ccstuis que trust -therefor.”
This court has frequently held that where land is purchased
with partnership funds, and intended to be used for partner-
ship purposes, it is to be treated as personal assets of the part-
nership. Evans es. Hawlcy, 35 Iowa 83; Hewitt vs. Rankin, 41
Iowa 35; and other cases. In such case the trust is not an
express one, but is implied or results from the operation or con-
struction of the law, and is within the exception named in sec-
tion 1934 of the code, and such a trust may be shown by parol
evidence. York vs. Clemens, 4-1 Iowa. 95; Cotton vs. Wood, 25
Iowa 43; Fairchild rs. Fair-child, 64 N. Y. 471.
The cases of Hale vs. Henrie, 2 VVatts, 143, 27 Am. Dec. 289;
Kramer es. Arthurs, 7 Pa. St. 165, and Itidgwarg/’s Appeal, 15 Pa.
St. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586, hold that, “where partners intend
to bring real estate into the partnership, their intention must
be manifested by deed or writing placed on record, that pur-
chasers and creditors may not be deceived. This rule is doubt-
less correct, so far as the rights of innocent purchasers without
notice are involved; but this court is committed to the doctrine
above announced, that a purchase of real property with part-
nership funds, and investing the title in a person or persons
other than the partnership, creates a resulting trust in favor of
the partnership, and the facts necessary to establish the trust
may be shown by parol.
The evidence that the property involved in this case was paid
for by the firm of S. B. & J. A. Paige is clear and satisfactory.
It consists of the declaration of S. B. Paige, made when the
deed was executed, and the recitals in the articles of partner-
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tru.st; but the mere circumstances that the conveyance was to 
them e:r.pressly as tenants in common, would not, of itself, be 
sufficient to rebut the trust." 
In 2 Story, Eq. § 1~07, it is said: "Where real estate is pur-
':hased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account, 
· It is wholly immaterial, in view of a court of equity, in who.~c 
name or names tTte purchase is made and the com:eyance taken-
whether in the name of one partner, or of all partners; whethn 
in the name of a stranger alone, or a stranger jointly with ODf' 
partner. In all these cases, let the legal title be vested in 
whom it may, it is in E>quity deemed partnership property, not 
subject to survivorship, and the partners are deemed the 
cestuis que trust therefor." 
This court has frequently held that where land is purchased 
with partnership funds, and intended to be used for partner-
ship purposes, it is to be treated as personal assets of the part-
nership. Bvans 1;s. Hawley, 35 Iowa 83; Hewitt vs. Rankin, 41 
Iowa 35; and other cases. In such case the trust is not an 
express one, but is implied or results from the operation or con-
struction of the law, and is within the exception named in sec-
tion l!l3! of the code, and such a trust may be shown by parol 
evidence. York vs. Clemens, 41 Iowa 95; Cotton vs. Wood, 25 
Iowa 43; Fairchild n. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471. 
The cases of llale vs. Henrie, 2 'Vatts, 143, 27 Am. Dec. 289; 
ilramer 1.1s. Arthurs, 7 Pa. St. 165, and Ridgwffy's Appeal, 15 Pa. 
St. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586, hold that, "where partners intend 
to bring l'(~al estnt~ into the partnership, their intention must 
be manifested by deed or writing placed on ree-0rd, that pur-
chasers and creditors may not be deceived. This rule is doubt-
less corred, so far as the rights of innocent purchasers without 
notice are in>olved.; but this court is committed to the doctrine 
obove announced, that a purrhase of rc.>al property with part-
nership funds, and investing the title in a person or persons 
other than the partnership, creates a resulting trust in favor of 
the partnership, and the facts necessary to establish the trust 
may be shown by parol. 
The evid<>nce that the property involved in this case was paid 
for by the firm of S. H. & .J. A. Paige is clear and satisfactory. 
It consists of the declarn t ion of S. B. Paige, made when the 
deed was executed, and the rPcitals in the articles of partner-
ship entered into within a few days after the deed was made, 
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and the subsequent acts of both of the grantees in the deed in
the management and use made of the property.
2. The defendant Brown is a creditor of the firm of Paige,
Dixon & Co., and attached the property in controversy in an
action upon his claim. His counsel submitted an argument in
the cause, the drift of which seems to be a claim. that he, as a
creditor of that firm, is entitled to a preference over the cred-
itors of the firm of S. B. & J . A. Paige in the property in contro-
versy. It would be improper to determine that question in
this appeal.
3. The administrator of S. B. Paige appealed, and claims
that the debts against the estate were contracted while the
title to the property was in decedent, and on the faith and
credit of the same. He insists that the equities of these indi-
vidual creditors should not be ignored for the benefit of the
firm creditors. But, as the property in controversy is assets
of the partnership, it is first liable to the payment of the part-
nership debts, and a creditor of one of the firm has no claim
thereon until such debts are paid. Evans vs. H awley, 35
Iowa 83.
_ We unite in the conclusion that, as it is conceded that both
of the partnerships and all of the surviving members thereof
are insolvent, the plaintiff is not entitled to a dower interest
in the property in dispute. Aflirmed.
















































































































































PAIGE VS. PAIGE. 173 
and the subsequent acts of both of the grantees in the deed in 
the management and use made of the property. 
2. The defendant Brown is a creditor of the firm of Paige, 
Dixon & Co., and attached the property in controversy in an 
action upon his claim. His counsel submitted an argument in 
the cause, the drift of which seems to be a claim. that he, as a 
creditor of that firm, is entitled to a preference over the cred-
itors of the firm of S. B. & J. A. Paige in the property in contro-
versy. It would be improper to determine that question in 
this appeal. 
3. The administrator of S. B. Paige appealed, and claims 
that the debts against the estate were contracted while the 
title to the property was in decedent, and on the faith and 
credit of the same. He insists that the equities of these indi-
vidual creditors should not be ignored for the benefit of the 
firm creditors. But, as the property in controversy is assets 
of the partnership, it is first liable to the payment of the part-
nership debts, and a creditor of one of the firm has no clainJ 
thereon until such debts are paid. Evans vs. Hawley, 3!i 
Iowa 83. 
I We unite in the conclusion that, as it is conceded that both of the partnerships and all of the surviving members thereof 
are insolvent, the plaintiff is not entitled to a dower interest 
in the property in dispute. Affirmed. 
Nom-Bee also Mechem's Elem. of Partn., ~§ 105, 109. 
i we
VI.
THE FIRM NAME AND GOOD WILL.
“'ILLlAl\IS vs. FARRAND._
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1891.
SS Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161.
Bill by VVm. C. Williams, Alanson Sheley, and Alanson
Sheley Brooks, against Jacob S. Farrand, Richard P. Williams.
Harvey S. Clark, and Jacob S. Farrand, Jr., to restrain defend-
ants from using any combination of the names Farrand and
\Villiams, as a part of the firm name of defendants, and from-
in any way interfering with the complainants’ use and enjoy-
ment of the business formerly belonging to “Farrand, Williams
& Co.,” of which firm complainants claim to be the successors.
The facts appear in the opinion.
The court below dismissed the bill, and complainants appeal.
William H. Wells (Bowen, Douglas 4? Whiting and Ashley
Pond, of counsel), for appellants.
Moore £5 Canficld (H cnry H. Swan and F. H. Ca-nfield, of coun-
sol), for appellees.
McGnA'rn, J. Complainants and defendants had been for
some years engaged as wholesale druggists on Larned street
east, in the city of Detroit, as copartners, under the name and
style of Farrand, Williams 8: Co. There were no articles of
copartnership, and no term fixed for which the partnership
was to continue. Prior to the taking of the annual inventory
in January, 1890, defendant, Jacob S. Farrand, expressed to
com-plainant Sheley a desire to dissolve the copartncrship. Mr.

















































































































































TIIE FIRM NAME AND GOOD WILL. 
WILLIAMS vs. FARRAND. 
Supreme Courl of Michigan, 1891. 
88 Mich. 473, 50 N. W. Rep. 446, 14 L. R. A. 161. 
nm by Wm. C. Williams, Alanson Sheley, and Alanson 
Sheley Brooks, against Jacob S. Farrand, Richard P. WilJiams. 
Harvey S. Clark, and Jarob S. Farrand, Jr., to restrain defend-
ants from using any combination of tlle names Farrand and 
\ViJliams, as a. part of the firm name of defendants, and from 
in any way interfering with the complainants' use and enjoy-
ment of the business formerly belonging to "Farrand, 'VilliamR 
& Co.," of which firm complainants claim to be the successors. 
The facts appear in the opinion. 
1.'he court below dismissed the bill, and complainants appeal. 
William H. Wells (Bou;en, Douglas & Whiting and Aslzky 
Pond, of counsel), for appellants. 
Moore & Canfield (Hcni·y H. Swan and F. H. Ca.nficld, of coun-
sel); for appellees. 
1\lcGRATII, J. Complainants and defendants had been for 
F.ome years engaged as wholesale druggists on Lamed street 
east, in the city of Detroit, as copartncrs, under the name and 
style of Farrand, Williams & Co. There were no articles of 
copartnership, and no term fixed for which the partnership 
was to continue. Prior to the taking of the annual inventory 
in January, 1890, defendant, Jacob S. Farrand, expressed to 
complainant Sheley a desire to dissolve the copartnership. Mr. 
Sheley declined to say anything uBtil the annual inventory 
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should be taken, and the business of the year settled up. On
the 25th of January, 1890, after the completion of the inven-
tory, defendants made a proposition in writing to “pay Messrs.
Sheley & Brooks, for their interest in the firm of Farrand, Wil-
liams & Co., the amount of their interest being fifty thou-
sand dollars ($50,000), the sum- of sixty thousand dollars
($60,000), or they will take for their interest, the amount being
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), the sum of one hun-
dred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), the same to be
paid in cash, or in notes acceptable to the parties who sell, one
week from today, Saturday, the first day of February next.
The store to be leased to the party purchasing for a term of
five years, at a rent of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) a year,
and the warehouse to be rented to the party purchasing, at a
net rental of 6 per cent a year on the cost of their interest
therein.” On the following Monday Mr. Sheley accepted
defendants’ offer to sell, and on the first day of February fol-
lowing a bill of sale was prepared, reciting, among other
things, that defendants, in consideration of the sum of $120,-
000, paid to them by Alanson Sheley, party of the second part,
“have bargained and sold unto the said party of the second
part all our right, title, and interest to the within-mentioned
resources of said firm, including the good will attendant upon
the business.” This bill of sale was not executed, objection
being made to the clause, “including the good will attendant
upon the business;” and a new instrum-ent was prepared,
reciting that defendants, parties of the first part, “for and in
consideration of the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand
dollars, to them paid by Alanson Sheley, of the second part,
have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant and
convey, unto the said party of the second part, his executors,
administrators, or assigns, all our right, title, and interest in
the firm of Farrand, Williams & Company.” This instrument
was executed, the insurance policies were assigned by Far-
rand, “’illiams & Co. to \Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, and an
agreement to assume and pay all the debts of the old firm was
executed by Williams, Sheley & Brooks, and delivered to
defendants. Defendants afterwards formed a copartnership
under the firm name of Farrand, Williams & Clark, and opened
a wholesale drug establishment at No. 32 \Voodward avenue.
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should be taken, and the business of the year settled op. On · 
the 25th of Janu.ary, 1890, after the completion of the inven-
tory, defendants made a proposition in writing to "pay Messrs. 
Sheley & Brooks, for their interest in the firm of Farrand, \Vil-
liams & Co., the amount of their interest being fifty thou-
snnd dollars ($50,000), the sum of sixty thousand dollars 
(f60,000), or they will take for their interest, the amount being 
one hundred thousand dollars ('100,000), the sum of one hun-
dred and twenty thousand dollars ($120,000), the same to be 
paid in cash, or in notes acceptable to the parties who sell, one 
week from today, Saturday, the first day of Febi-uary next. 
The store to be leased to the party purchasing for a term of 
five years, at a rent of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) a year, 
and the warehouse to be rented to the party purchasing, at a 
net rental <>f 6 per cent a year on the cost of their interest 
therein." On the foJlowing Monday Mr. Sheley accepted 
defendants' offer to sell, and on the first day of February fol-
lowing a bill of sale was prepared, reciting, among other 
things, that defendants, in consideration of the sum of $120,-
000, paid to them by Alanson Sheley, party of the second part, 
"have bargained and sold unto the said party of the second 
part all our right, title, and interest to the within-m:.>ntioned 
resources of said firm, including the good will attendant upon 
the business." This bill of sale was not executed, objection 
being made to the clause, "including the good will attendant 
upon the business;" and a new instrument was prepared, 
reciting that defendants, parties of the first part, "for and in 
consideration of the sum of one hundred and twenty thopsand 
dolJars, to them paid by Alanson Sheley, of the second part, 
have bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant and 
convey, unto the said party of the second part, his executors, 
administrators, or assig-ns, all our right, title, and interest in 
the firm of Farrand, Williams & Company." This instrument 
wa3 executed, the insurance policies were assigned by Far-
rand, ·wmiams & Co. to 'Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, and an 
agreement to assume and pay all the debts of the old firm wa~ 
executed by ·wmiams, Sheley & Brooks, and delivered to 
defendants. Defendants afterwards formed a copartnership 
under the firm name of Fari-and, 'Villiams & Clark, and opened 
a wholesale drug establishment at No. 32 Woodward avenue. 
Complainants adopted the name and style of Williams, Sheley 
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& Brooks, posted their firm name, as successor to Farrand,
\Villiams & Co., over their place of business; had the words
“\Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, Successors to” printed in red ink
over the words “Farrand, Williams & Co.” wherever the latter
appeared upon letter heads, bill heads, labels, and on other
stationery; advertised themselves in the newspapers and trade
journals as Williams, Sheley & Brooks, successors to Farrand,
\Villiams & Co.; and sent out circulars to the trade containing
not only their firm name, but the names of the individual mem-
bers of the new firm. Defendants also extensively advertised
the new enterprise through the same mediums, calling special
attention to the names of the members of the new firm, their
long connection with the drug business, and the dissolution of
the old firm, and soliciting trade.
The complainants contend that the asignment by defend-
ants of all interest in the business carried with it the good
will of the business, and, having purchased the good will of
that business, they are entitled to the exclusive use of the old
firm name; that, while defendants have the right to engage in
the same line of business, they have not the right to such a
collocation of their own names as will produce confusion,
attract customers, and secure orders, letters, and goods
intended for the old firm; that defendants have no right to
simulate their labels, to solicit their customers, or entice away
their employés. “Good will” has been defined by this court
to be “the favor which the management of a business has won
from the public, and the probability that old customers will
continue their patronage.” Chittcndcn vs. Whitbcck, 50 Mich.
401, 15 N. \V. Rep. 526. Lord ELDON, in Cruttwcll rs. Lye, 17
Vcs. 335, defined it as simply the probability that old custom-
1-rs will resort to the old place.
The following propositions must be regarded as established
by the clear weight of authority:
1. Though a retiring partner may have assigned his interest
in the partnership business, including the good will thereof,
to his copartner, he may, in the absence of an express agree-
ment to the contrary, engage in the same line of business in
the same locality, and in his own name.
2. He may, by newspaper advertisements, cards, and gen-
eral circulars, invite the general public to trade with him, and
through the same mediums advertise his long connection with
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& Drooks, posted their firm name, as successor to Farrand, 
Williams & Co., over their place of business; had the words 
"'Villiams, Sheley & Brooks, Successors to" printed in red ink 
over the words ''Farrand, \Villiams & Co." wherever the latter 
appeared upon letter heads, bill heads, labels, and on other 
tttationery; advertised themselves in the newspapers and trade · 
journals as \Villiams, ShelPy & Brooks, successors to Farrand, 
\Vil Iiams & Co.; and sent out circulars to the trade containing 
not only their firm name, but the names of the individual mem-
bers of the new firm. Defendants also extensively advertised 
the new enterprise through the same mediums, calling special 
attention to the names of the ml'mbers of the new firm, their 
long connection with the drug business, and the dissolution of 
the old firm, and soliciting trade. 
'l'he complainants contend that the assignment by defend· 
ants of nil interest in the business carried with it the good 
will of the business, and, having purchased the good will of 
that business, they are entitled to the exclush•e use of the old 
firm name; that, while defpndants have the right to engage in 
the same line of business, they have not the right to such a 
<'ollocation of their own names as will produce confusion, 
nttract customers, and secure orders, letters, and goods 
intended for the old firm; that defendants have no right to 
simulate their labpls, to solicit their customers, or entice away 
thPir emplo.n~s. "Good will" has been defined by this court 
to be "the favor which the management of a business bas won 
from the public, and the probability that old customers will 
<·ontinue their patronage." Chittenden vs. Whitbeck, 50 Mich. 
401, 15 N. \V. Rep. 526. Lord ELDON, in Cruttlccll -r:s. Lye, 17 
Ves. 335, defined it as simply the probability that old custom-
NS will resort to the old place. 
The following propositions must be regarded as established 
hy the clear weight of authority: 
1. Though a retiring partner may have assigned his interest 
in the partnership business, including the good will therwf, 
to bis copartner, he may, in the nbsenct~ of an express ntree-
nwnt to the contrary, engage in the same line of business in 
the same locality, and in his own name. 
2. He may, by newspaper advertisements, cards, and gen· 
cral circulars, invite the gen2ral 1rnblic to trade with him, and 
1 hrough the same mc>diums advertise his long connection with 
the old business, and his retirement therefrom. 
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3. He will not be allowed, however, to use his own name,
or to advertise his business, in such a way as to lead the pub-
lic to suppose that he is continuing the old business; hence,
will not be allowed to advertise himself as its successor.
4. The purchaser will not, in the absence of an express agree-
ment, be allowed to continue the business in the name of the
old firm.
5. That no man has a right to sell or advertise his own busi-
nes or goods.as those of another, and so mislead the public,
and injure such other person.
In .lI_1/ers vs. Buggy 00., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and
‘Z0 N. W. Rep. 545, A, B and C had been carrying on business
as copartners at Kalamazoo, under the name and style of “The
Kalamazoo YVagon Company.” A, B and C sold to complain-
ant “all their interest in the property, money, assets, and good
will,” etc., in and to their business. After such sale complain-
ant’s assignors formed a corporation under the name of “The
Kalamazoo Buggy Com-pany;” pitched their plant in the same
locality; commenced the manufacture of the same class of
goods; issued circulars to the trade, with descriptive cuts of
the same character and appearance as those contained in com-
plainant’s circulars, and advertised their place of business as
being in the same locality. In that case the name of “The
Kalamazoo \Vagon Company” was an assumed name. The
only distinctive feature in the name adopted by defendants was
the use of a word of similar meaning to that for which it had
been substituted. The defendants were not using their own
names. It was a pure case of piracy, and the facts clearly
indicated an intention to deceive the public. As was said in
Burgess es. Burgess, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 896: “Where a person
is selling goods under a particular name, and another person,
not having that name, is using it, it may be presumed that
he so uses it to represent the goods sold by him as the goods
of the person whose name he uses; but where the defendant
sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plain-
tiff has the same name, it does not follow that defendant is sell-
ing his goods as the goods of the plaintiff.” In Lee vs. Haley,
L. R. 5 Ch. App. 155, plaintiff had been doing business at No.
22 Pall Mall, under the artificial name of “Guinea Coal Com-
pany.” Defendant, who had been their manager, set up a.
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3. He will not be allowed, however, to use his o'Yn name, 
Qr to advertise his business, in such a way as to lead the pub-
lic to suppose that be is continuing the old businefls; hence, 
will not be allowed to advertise himself as its successor. 
4. The purchaser will not, in the absence of an express agree-
ment, be allowed to continue the business in the name of the 
old firm. 
5. That no man bas a right to sell or advertise his own busi-
ness or goods.as those of another, and so mislead the public, 
and injure such other iw.rson. 
In Myers vs. Buggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. \V. Uep. 961, and 
!!o N. \V. Rep. 54u, A, Band Chad been carrying on business 
ns copartners at Kalamazoo, under the name and style of "The 
Kalamazoo "'agon Company." A, B and C sold to complain-
ant "all their int<>rest in the property, money, assets, and good 
will," etc., in and to their business. After such sale complain-
ant's assignors formed a corporation under the name of "The 
Kalamazoo Buggy Company;" pitched their plant in the same 
locality; commPnet>d the manufacture of the same class of 
goods; issued circulars to the trade, with descriptive cuts of 
the same character and nppearance as those contained in com-
plainant's cireulars, and advertised their place of business as 
being in the samP lotality. In that case the name of "The 
Kalamazoo "'agon Company" was an assnmPd name. The 
only distinctive frntnre in the name adopted by defendants wa~ 
the usP of a word of i;iirnilar meaning to that for wltieh it had 
been suh~tituted. The def(•ndants WPI'(' not u1:1ing their own 
nanws. It was a pure case of piracy, and the facts clearly 
indicated an intention to cle'<'eive the pnhlic. As was said in 
Burgess vs. Burgrs.~. :l D:> O<>x, M. & G. 8!)6: "\Vhere a person 
is selling goods under a particular name, and another person, 
not having that namP, is using it, it mny be presumed that 
be so m~es it to l'PJH'PRC>nt the goods l'lold by him as the goods 
of the p?rson whose name he uses; but wh<•re the defendant 
sells goods under his own name, and it happens that the plain· 
tiff has the same name, it doc>s not follow that defendant is sell-
ing bis goods as the goods of the plaintiff." In /,,ee vs. Haley, 
L. R. 5 Cb. App. 155, plaintiff had been doing businpss at No. 
22 Pall Mall, und<>r the artifieinl name of "Guinea Coal Com-
pany." Defendant, who had been their manager, set up a 
rival bmiliness under the name of "Pall Mall Guinea Coal Com-
23 
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pany,” at 46 Pall Mall. His envelopes and business cards were
printed in such a way as to resemble the plaintiflf’. In Glenny
vs. Smith, 2 Drew & S. 476, defendant had been in plaintiff's
employ, and started in business on his own account. Over his
shop he had his own name, Frank P. Smith, printed in large,
black letters on a white ground, but on the brass plates in the
windows of his shop he had engraved the word “from,” in
small letters, and the words “Thrasher & Glenny” (the name
of plaintiff’s firm) in large letters. He had an awning, also,
in front of his shop, which, when let down, would cover his
own name, and expose only the name of plaintifi’s firm. The
court held that defendant was deceiving the public, and an
injunction was issued. Croft vs. Day, 7 Bcav. 84; Levy vs.
Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 438; Turton vs. Turton, 42 Ch. Div. 128;
Hookham vs. Pottage, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91; Mcneely vs. Mcncely,
62 N. Y. 431; Fullwood vs. Fullwood, 9 Ch. Div. 176.
6. That when an express contract has been made to remain
out of business, or for the use by a purchaser of _a fictitious
name, or a trade name, or a trade mark, the courts will enjoin
the continued violation of suchpagreement. In G-row vs. Selig-
man, 47 Mich. 607, 11 N. W. Rep. 404, defendant had carried
on the clothing business at Bay City, under the name and style
of “Little Jake,” and sold out to complainant, and expressly
conveyed the right to use the name and style of “Little Jake,”
and agreed that he would not again engage in that business
at Bay City, and defendant was enjoined from violating his
agreement. In Shackle vs. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, defendant agreed
that he would not, for the space of 10 years, carry on or per-
mit any other person to carry on the same business in Middle-
sex, London; or \Vestminster, and that he would use his best
endeavors to assist plaintifl’, and procure customers for him.
In Hitchcock vs. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, Coker had agreed to
enter the services of the plaintifi’, and that he would not at
any time thereafter engage in the business in which his
employer was engaged. To the same effect are Bcal vs. Chase,
31 Mich. 490; Doty vs. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Burckhardt 1:3,
Burckhardt, 36 Ohio St. 261; Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div.
752; Tode vs. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N’. E. Rep. 469.
7. That an assignment of all the stock, property, and efl’eets
of a business, or the exclusive right to manufacture a given
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pany," at 46 Pall Mall. His envelopes and business cards were 
printed in such a way as to resemble the plaintiff's. In Glenny 
vs. Smith, 2 Drew & S. 476, defondant had been in plaintiff's 
employ, and started in business on his own account. Over his 
shop he had his own name, F1·ank P. Smith, printed in large, 
black letters on a white ground, but on the brass plates in the 
windows of bis shop he had engraved the word "from," in 
small letters, and the words "Thrasher & Glenny" (the name 
of plaintiff's firm) in large letters. He bad an awning, also, 
in front of bis shop, which, when let down, would cover his 
own name, and expose only the name of plaintiff's firm. The 
• court held that defendant was deceiving the public, and an 
injunction was issued. Croft vs. Day, 7 Beav. 84; Levy vs. 
Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 438; Tu1"ton vs. 7'urton, 42 Ch. Div. 128; 
Hookltam vs. Pottage, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91; Mcneely vs. Mcneely, 
62 N. Y. 431; Fttllwood vs. Fulltcood, 9 Ch. Div. 176. 
6. That when an express contract has been made to remain 
out of business, or for the use by a purchaser of .a fictitious 
name, or a trade name, or a trade mark, the courts will enjoin 
the continued violation of such. agreement. In Grow vs. Selig· 
man, 47 Mich. 607, 11 N. W. Rep. 404, defendant had carried 
on the clothing business at Bay City, und2r the name and style 
of "Little Jake," and sold out to complainant, and expressly 
conveyed the right to use the name and style of "Little Jake," 
and agreed that he would not again engage in that business 
at Bay City, and defendant was enjoined from violating his 
agreement. In Shackle vs. Baker, 14 Ves. 468, defendant agreed 
that he would not, for the space of 10 years, carry on or per-
mit any other person to carry on the same business in l\!iddle-
sex, London; or "~estminster, and that he would use his best 
endeavors to assist plaintiff, and procure customers for him. 
In Hitcltcock i·s. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438, Coker had agreed to 
enter the services of the plaintiff, and that he would not at 
eny time thereafter engage in the business in which his 
employer was engaged. To the same effect are Beal vs. Cllasc, 
81 Mich. 490; Doty vs .. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Burcklia.rdt n. 
Burckhardt, 36 Ohio St. 261; "Vernon vs. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div. 
752; Tode vs. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N. E. Rep. 4C9. 
7. That an assignment of all the stock, property, and effects 
of a business, or the exclush·e right to manufacture a giYeu 
article, carries with it the e.Kclusive right to use a fictitious 
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name in which such business has been carried on, and such
trade marks and trade names as have been in use in such
business. These incidents attach to the business or right of
manufacture, and pass with it. Courts have uniformly held
that a trade mark has no separate existence; that there is
no property in words, as detached from the thing to which
they are applied; and that a conveyance of the thing to which
it is attached carries with it the name. Diwon Co. rs. Guggen-
heim, 2 Brewst. 321; Lockwood vs. Bostwiek, 2 Daly 521; Dor-
ingcr rs. Plate, 29 Cal. 292. In Gage vs. Publishing Co., 11 Ont.
App. 402, Gage and Beatty were copartners, and, among other
things, were engaged in publishing “Beatty’s Headline Copy
Books.” Beatty sold out to Gage all his interest in the busi-
ness, and engaged in the drug business. Gage continued for
some years the sale of the copy books, when Beatty licensed
defendant to publish “Beatty’s New and Improved Headline
Copy Books.” In Howie rs. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592, 10 N. E.
Rep. 713, Hoxie and Chaney were copartners, engaged in the
manufacture of soaps, two brands of which were known a
“Hoxie’s Mineral Soap” and “Hoxie’s Pumice Soap.” These
were simply trade names, by whichlthe articles were known,
and the right to use them passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Cement Co. vs. Le Page, 147 Mass. 206, 17 N.
E. Rep. 304, Brooks and Le Page, as copartners, sold to plain-
tiflf the good will of their business, and the right to use their
trade marks. They were engaged in the manufacture of glues.
Their light glues they named “Le Page’s Liquid Glues.” The
court held that the right to use the name by which the articles
were known to the trade passed with the right to manufacture
the articles. In Merry rs. H oopes, 111 N. Y. 415, 18 N. E. Rep.
714, the parties were formerly partners. Hoopes sold to Merry,
but afterwards undertook to use, certain trade marks, viz., the
“Lion Brand and “Phoenix Brand,” but the court held that
these trade marks passed to the assignee. In Hall rs. Barrows,
4 De Gex, J. & S. 150, the firm had marked the chief part of
their output of iron with the initial letters of their partner-
ship name, “B., B. & H.,” surmounted by a crown, and the
court held the letters and crown had become a trade mark,
and, as such, should be included as a subject of value. Brown
Trade Marks, 358; Millingfon rs. Farr, 3 Mylne & C. 338-352;
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name in which such Qusiness has been carried on, and such 
trade marks and trade names as have been in use in such 
business. These incidents attach t<> the business or right of 
manufacture, and pass with it. Courts have uniformly. held 
that a trade mark bas nQ separate existence; that thPre is 
no property in words, as detached from the thing to which 
they are applied; and that a conveyance of the thing to which 
it is attached carries with it the name. Di.J:on Co. i·s. Guygcn-
licim, 2 Brewst. 321; Locku;ood 1:s. Boshcick, 2 Daly 521; Dcr-
lnger vs. l'latc, 29 CaJ. 2!.>2. In Gage vs. fublislting Co., 11 Ont. 
'App. 402, Gage and Beatty were copartners~ and, among other 
things, were engaged in publishing "Beatty's Headline Copy 
nooks." Beatty sold out to Gage all his interest in the busi-
ness, and engaged in the drug business. Gage continued for 
som~ years the sale of the copy books, when Beatty licensed 
defendant to publish "Beatty's New and Improved Headline 
Copy Books." In Hoxie t·s. Chancy, 143 M.ass. 592, 10 N. E. 
Rep. 713, Hoxie and Chaney were copartners, engaged in the 
manufacture of soaps, two brands of which were known as 
"Roxie's Mineral Soap" and "Roxie's Pumice Soap." These 
were simply trade names, by which ,the articles were known, 
and the right to use them passed with the right to manufacture 
the articles. In Ccnicnt Co. vs. Le Page, 147 Mass. 206, 17 N. 
E. Rep. 304, Brooks and Le Page, as copartners, sold to plain-
tiff the good will of their business, and the right to use ·their 
trade marks. They were engaged in the manufacture of glues. 
Their light glues they named "Le Page's Liquid Glues." The 
court held that the right to use the name by which the articles 
were known to the trade passed with the right to manufacture 
the articles. In Me1·ry vs. Hoopes, 111 N. Y. 415, 18 N. E. Rep. 
714, the parties wr.re formerly partners. Hoopes sold to Merry, 
but afterwards underto-ok to use, certain trade marks, viz., the 
"Lion Brand and "Pba>nix Brand," but the court held tha.t -
these trade marks passed to the assignee. In Hall i·s. Barroics, 
4 De Gex, J. & S. 150, the firm had marked the chief part of 
their output of iron with tlie initial letters of their partner-
ship name, "B., B. & H.," surmounted by a crown, and the 
court held the letters and crown had become a trnde mark, 
and, as such, should be included as a subject of value. Broron 
Trade Marks, 358; Millington t"S. Fo:r, 3 Mylne & C. 338-352; 
J(yers vs. B-uggy Co., 54 Mich. 215, 19 N. W. Rep. 961, and 20 
.. 
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N. W. Rep. 545; Sohicr vs. Johnson, 111 Mass. 242; Sh ipwright
vs. Clements, 19 Wkly Rep. 599 ; Rogers vs. Ta-intor, 97 Mass. 291.
8. A corporate name is regarded as in the nature of a trade
mark. even though composed of individual names, and its simu-
lation may be restrained. After adoption it follows the cor-
poration. Statutes providing for the organization of corpora-
tions usually prohibit the adoption of the same name by two
companies. Holmes vs. .-‘Manufacturing Co., 37 Conn. 278.
These propositions are sustained by a long line of authorities,
but in none of the cases cited does the question hinge upon a
grant of good will. Complainants insist, however, that a grant
of good will may be implied, and, when express or implied, it
imposes certain restraints upon the vendors, viz.: (1) That
they cannot afterwards personally solicit customers of the old
firm, and (2) that they are restricted in the use that may be
made of their own names.
I. The doctrine that a retiring partner who has conveyed his
interest in an established business, whether the good will be
‘included or not, cannot personally solicit the customers of the
;old firm, has no support in principle. A retiring partner con-
lveys, in addition to his interest in the tangible effects, simply
,the advantages that an established business possesses over a.
new enterprise. The old business is an assured success, the
‘new an experiment. The old business is a going business, and
produces its accustomed profits on the day after the transfer.
It is capital already invested and earning profits. The continu-
ing partner gets these advantages. The new business must be
‘built up. The capital taken out of the old concern will earn
nothing for months, and in all probability the first year’s busi-
ness will show loss instead of profit. For a time at least it is
capital awaiting investment, or invested but earning noth-
ing. The retiring partner takes these chances or disad-
vantages. He does not agree that the benefit derived from his
connection with that business shall continue. He does not
agree that the old business shall continue to have the benefit
of his name, reputation, or service; nor does he guaranty the
continuance of that patronage which may have been attracted
by his name or reputation. He does not pledge a continuance
of conditions. He takes out of the business an element that
has contributed to the success of that business. He sells only
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N. W. Rep. 545; Sohicr vs. Johnson, 111 Mass. 242; Shipwrighl 
vs. Clements, 19 'Vkly Rep. 5!)!); Rogers vs. Ta.intor, 97 Mass. 291. 
8. A corporate name is regarded as in the nature of a trade 
mark~ even though composed of individual names, and its simu· 
lntion may be restrained. After adoption it follows the cor-
poration. Statutes providing for the organization of corpora-
tions usually prohibit the adoption of the same name by two 
companies. Holmes vs. Manufacturing Oo., 37 Conn. 278. 
These propositions are sustained by a long line of authorities, 
but in nont~ of the cases cited does the question hinge upon a 
grant of good will. Complainants insist, however, that a grant 
of good will may be implied, and, when express or implied, it 
imposes certain restraints upon the vendors, viz.: (1) That 
they cannot afterwards personally solicit customers of the old 
firm, and (2) that they are restricted in the use that may be 
made of their own names. 
I. The doctrine that n rt>tiring partner who has conveyed his 
interest in an established bnsinei,is, whether the good will be 
included or not, cannot personally solicit the customers of the 
; old firm, has no support in principle. A retiring partner con-
j veys, in addition to his interPst in the tangible effects, simply 
1 
the advantages that an established business possesses over n 
new enterprise. 'l'he old bmdness is an assured success, the 
:new an experiment. The old business is a going business, and 
'produces its nccustomed profits on the day after the transfer. 
It is capital already in•ested and earning profits. 'fhe continu-
ing partner ~ets these advantages. The new business must be 
·built up. 'l'he capital taken out of the old concern will earn 
nothing for months, and in all probability the first year's busi-
ness will show loss instead of profit. For a time at least it is 
capital awaiting investment, or invested but earning noth-
ing. The retiring partner takes these chances or disad-
. vantages. He does not agree that the bt>nefit derived from bis 
connection with that business shall continue. He does not 
agree that the old business shall continue to have the benefit 
of his name, 1·pputation, or service; nor does he guaranty the 
contimrnn<'<' of that patronage which may have been attracted 
by his name or reputation. Tfo do<'s not pledge a continuance 
of conditions. Ile takes out of the business an element that 
has contributed to the success of that business. He sells only 
those advantages and incidents which attach to the property 
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and location, rather than those which attach to the person of
the vendor. T. Pars. Partn. 409. He sells only so much of the
custom as will continue in spite of his retirement and activity.
He sells probabilities, not assurances. It is urged that by the
solicitation of the customers of the old firm he is endeavoring
to impair the value of that which he has sold, but every act of
his in the direction of the establishment of the new business
tends to divert the customers of the old firm. The right to
enter into the same line of business in the same locality—next
door, if you please—to advertise his former connection with
the old business, and to solicit generally the patronage of the.
public, is conceded by the clear weight of authority. The exer-
cise of these rights necessarily involves the diversion of cus-
tom to the new firm. Does not the right to again engage in the
same line of business include all of the incidents of that right?
Upon what principle is the line arbitrarily drawn at the per-
sonal solicitation of the customers of the old firm? - The right
to engage in business in his own name attaches to the retiring
partner, and, unless expressly so agreed, there is no restraint
upon that right. ln the present case, Jacob S. Farrand had
been at the head of the old house for half a century. IIis
name could not be subsequently used in the same line of busi-
ness without attracting the attention of the entire trade, nor
without affecting the probabilities of a. continuance of the
patronage of the old house. He gave no hint that he did not
intend to again engage in business. All of the circumstances
pointed in the direction of a new business. The retirement
was not of Jacob S. Farrand alone, but of his son-in-law and
Mr. Clark also. The proposition made to complainants was
not only to sell but to buy. In Ginesi vs. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div.
596, the court went so far as to insist that a retiring partner
had no right to deal with the customers of the old firm; but
that rule would operate as a restriction upon the public, and
the case is without support in that respect. In Lalmucherc vs.
Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, the court say that a. retiring partner
who sells the good-will of a business is entitled to engage in a
similar business, may publish any advertisement he pleases in
the papers, stating that he is carrying on such a business; he
may publish circulars to all the world, and say that he is carry-
ing on such a business; but he is not entitled, by private letter,
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and location, rather than those which attach to the person of 
the vendor. T. Pars. Partn. 409. He sells only so much of the 
custom as will continue in spite of his retirement and activity. 
He sells probabilities, not aisimranees. It is urged that by the 
solicitation of the customers of the old firm he is endeavoring 
to impair the vnlue of that whieh he has sold, but C\"ery act ()f 
bis in the dirl'Clion of the establi~hnwnt of the new business 
tends to diYert the customers of the old firm. The right to 
enter into the same line of bui-:inPS8 in the same locality-next 
door, if you please-to adve1·tise his former connection with 
the old lrnsinC'ss, and to goJicit generally the patronage of the 
public, is conceded by the clt•ar weight of authority. The exel'· 
cise of these rights Iiecessal'ily involves the diversion of ens-
) 
tom to the new firm. Does not the right to again engage in the 
1.mrne line of bn8iJH·~s include all of tlw inddents of that right? 
Upon what principle is the line arbitrarily drawn at the per· 
sonal solidtation of the customers of the old firm? . The right 
to engage in but;iness in his own name attaclll's to the retiring 
partner, and, unless expr<'"sl.v so agreed, there is no restraint 
upon that right. Jn the present case, Jacob S. Farrand h:Hl 
been at the head of the old house for half a C<'ntury. His 
name could not be snbsequt·ntl~· used in the same line of busi-
ness without attracting the attention of tile entire trade, nor 
without affecting the probabilities of a continuance of the 
patronnge of the old house. He gave no hint that lw did not 
intend to again ''ngage in businl'ss. A II of the circurnstanct~~ 
pointed in the dirt•etion of a new business. The retirement 
was not of Jacob R Fai·rand nlone, but of bis son-in-law and 
Mr. Clark also. The proposition made to complainants was 
not only to sell hut to buy. In Ginesi tw. Cooper, 14 Ch. DiL 
596, the court went so fat• as to insist that a retiring partner 
had no right to deal with the custonwrs of the old firm; but 
that rule would op<>rate as a rl'stridion upon the public, and 
the case is without support in that respect. In Labouclierc !:.~. 
Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 822, the court say that a retiring partner 
who sells the good-will of a business is entitled to engage in a 
similar business, may publish any advertisement he pleases in 
the papers, stating that he is carrying on such a business; he 
may publish circulars to all the world, and say that he is carr,f· 
Ing on such a business; but he is not entitled, by private lettt~r, 
or by visit by himself or agent, to solicit the custouwrs or the 
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old firm. But in Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. Div. 145, Labou-
rlwrc cs. Dawson is expressly overruled. The court say: “The
case of the plaintiff is founded on contract, and the question is,
what are his rights under the contract? There is no express
covenant not to solicit the customers of the old business, but
it is said that such a covenant is to be implied. I have a great
objection to straining words so as to make them imply a con-
tract as to a point upon which the parties have said nothing,
particularly when it is a point which was in their contempla-
tion. It is said that there was a sale of good will. I think
that there was, taking good-will as defined by Lord Euaox in
O'ruttu:cll vs. Lye, 17 Ves. 335. The purchaser has a right to the
place and a right to get in the old bills; so the purchaser gets
the good will as defined by Lord Ennox. But the term ‘good
will’ is not used; and when a contract is sought to be implied
we must not substitute one word for another.. But suppose
the word did occur, what is the effect of the sale of ‘good-will.‘
It does not, per se, prevent the vendor from carrying on the
same class of business.” Vernon rs. H allam, 34 Ch. Div. 752,
held that a covenant by a vendor of a business, including the
good-will thereof, that he would not for a term of years carry
on the business of a manufacturer, either by himself or jointly
with any other person, under the name or style of J. II. or H.
Bros. (the name of the business which he had sold), is not a
convenant that the vendor would not carry on business as a.
manufacturer, but against using a particular name or style in
trade, and the injunction was granted to restrain a breach of
that covenant. The court say: “\'Vhere a vendor sells his
business, and commences a similar business in the same
locality, and solicits customers of the old house to deal with
him, the court, following the decision in Pearson vs. Pearson»,
and being of the opinion that the case of Labouchcrc rs. Dawson
had been overruled by the decision in that case, refused to
grant an injunction to restrain such solicitation.” Lcggott vs.
Barrett, 15 Ch. Div. 306, Gincsi rs. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div. 596. and a
number of other cases cited, follow Labouchcrc rs. Dawson.
The correct rule is, we think, laid down in Cottrell rs. Mann-
facturing Co., 54 Conn. 138, 6 Atl. Rep. 791. The court say:
“Cottrell did not require Babcock to agree, and the latter did
not agree, to abstain from the manufacture of printing-presses.
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old firm. Dnt In Pearson. vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. Div. 145, La1Jou-
d1crc 1:s. Dau;son is expressly overruled. The court say: "The 
case of the plaintiff is founded on contract, and the question is, 
what are his rights under the contract? There h no express 
covenant not to solicit the customers of the old business, bnt 
it is said that such a covenant is to be implied. I have a great 
objection to straining words so as to make them imply a con-
tract as to a point upon which the parties ht. rn said nothing, 
particularly when it is a point which was in their contempla-
tion. It is said that there was a sale of good will. I think 
that there was, taking good-will as defined by Lord ELDO~ b 
Orutticell vs. Lye, 17 Ves. 335. The purclwser has a right to the 
place and n ri~ht to get in the old bills; so the purchaser gets 
the good will as defint•d by Lord ELoo~. But the t~nn 'good 
will' is not used; and when a contract is sought to be implied 
we must not substitute one word for another .. But suppose 
the word did occur, what is the effect of the sale of 'good-will.' 
It docs not, per se, prevent the vendor from carrying on the 
same class of business." Vernon 1:8. Hallam, 34 Ch. Div. 752~ 
held that a covenant by a vendor of a business, including the 
good-will thereof~ that he would not for n term of years carry 
on the business of a manufacturer, either by himself or jointly 
with any other person, under the name or style of J. II. or H. 
Bros. (the name of the business which he had sold), is not a 
convenant that the vendor would not carry on business ns a. 
manufacturer, but against using n particular name or style in 
trade~ and the injunction was granted to restrain n breach of 
that covenant. The court say: "Wh2re a Yendor sells his 
business~ and commences a similar business in the same 
locality, and solicits customers of the old house to deal with 
him, the court, following the decision in Pca1·son 'VS. Pearson, 
nnd being of the opinion that the case of Labo1tcllcrc i·s. Dau;son 
had been overruled by the decision in that case, refused to 
grant an injunction to restrain such solicitation." Lcr!!Jott t:JJ. 
Barrett, 15 Ch. Div. 300, Gincsi t'8. Cooper, 14 Ch. Div. {)!)(),and a 
numb_e-r of other cases cited, follow Laboucl1crc i·s. Dau:son. 
The correct rule is, we think, laid down in Cottrell rs . .Mmm-
facturing Co., 54 Conn. 138, G Atl. Rep. 7!>1. The court sa.r: 
"Cottrell did not require Babcock to agree, and the latter did 
not agree, to abstain from the manufacture of printing-presses. 
By purchasing the good-will merely Cottrell secured the right 
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to conduct the old business at the old stand, with the proba-
bility in his favor that old customers would continue to go
there. If he desired more, he should have secured it by posi-
tive agreement. The matter of good will was in his .mind.
Presumptively he obtained all that he desired. At any rate,
the express contract is the measure of his right; and since that
conveys a good will in terms, but says no more, the court will
not upon inference deny to the vendor the possibility of suc-
cessful competition by all lawful means with the vendee in
the s_ame business. No restraint upon trade may rest upon
inference. Therefore, in the absence of any express stipulation
to the contrary, Babcock might lawfully establish a similar
business at the next door, and by advertisement, circular, card,
and personal solicitation invite all the world, including the old
customers of Cottrell & Babcock, to come there and purchase
of him; being very careful always when addressing individuals
or the public, either through the eye or the ear, not to lead
any one to believe that the presses which he offered for sale
were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or that he was the suc-
cessor to the business of Cottrell & Babcock, or that Cottrell
was not carrying on the business formerly conducted by that
firm. That he may do this by advertisements and general cir-
culars courts are substantially agreed, we think. But some
have drawn the line here and barred personal solicitation.
They permit the vendor of a good will to establish a like
business at the next door, and by the potential instrumen-
talities of the newspapers and general circulars ask old cus-
tomers to buy at the new place, and withhold from him only
the instrumentality of highest power, viz., personal solicita-
tion. To deny him the use of the newspapers and gen-
eral circulars is to make successful business impossible, and
therefore is to impose an absolute restraint upon the right
to trade. This the courts could not do, except upon express
agreement. But possibly the old customers might not sec
these; and in some cases, the courts have undertaken to pre-
serve this possibility for the advantage of the vendor, and
found a legal principle upon it. Other courts have been of
the opinion that no legal principle can be made to rest upon
this distinction; that to deny the vendor personal access to old
customers even would put him at such disadvantage in com-
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to conduct the old business at the old stand, with the proba-
bility in his favor that old customers would continue to go 
there. If he desired more, he should have secured it by posi-
tive agr~ment. The matter of good will was in bis .mind. 
Presumptively be obtai~ed all that be desired. At any rate, 
the express contract is the measure of bis right; and since that 
conveys a good will in terms, but says no more, the court will 
not upon inference deny to the vendor the possibility of suc-
cessful competition by all lawful means with the vendee in 
the same business. No restraint upon trade may rest up<>n 
infer~nce. Therefore, in the absence of any express stipulation 
to the contrary, Babcock might lawfully establish a similar 
business at tbe next door, and by advertisement, circular, card, 
and personal solicitation invite all the world, including the old 
customers of Cottrell & Babcock, to come there and purchase 
of him; being very careful always when addre2sing individuals 
or the public, either through the eye or the ear, not to lead 
any one to believe that the presses which he offered for sale 
were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or that he was the suc-
cessor to the business of Cottrell & Babcock, or that Cottrell 
was not carrying on the business formerly conducted by that 
firm. That he may do this by advertisements and general cir-
culars courts are substantially agreed, we think. But some 
have drawn the line here and barred p<:'rsonal solicitation. 
They permit the vendor of a good will to establish a like 
business at the next door, and by the potential instrumen-
talities of the newspapers and general circulars ask· old cus· 
tomers to buy at the new place, and withhold from him only 
the instrumentality of highest power, viz., personal solicita-
tion. To deny him the use of the newspnpers and gen-
eral circulars is to make succe~sful business impossible, and 
therefore is to impose an absolute restraint upon the right 
to trade. This the courts could not do, except upon express 
a~reement. llut possibly the old customers might . not sec 
these; and in some cases, the courts have undertaken to pre-
serve this possibility for the advantage of the vendor, and 
founcl a legal principle upon it. Other courts have been df 
the opinion that no legal principle can be made to rest upon 
this distinction; that to deny the vendor personal access to old 
customers even would put him at such disadvantage in com-
petition as to ·endanger bis success; that they ought not 
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K
upon inference to bar him from trade, either totally or par-
tially; and that all restraint of that nature must come from
his positive agreement. And such, we think, is the present
tendency of the law.”
Good will may be said to be those intangible advantages
or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is
concerned, and attach to the thing conveyed. \Vhere it con-
sists of the advantages of location, it follows an assignment
of the lease of that location. Again, it may not depend
at all upon location, as in the case of a newspaper, and it
would follow an assignment of all interest in the plant, prop-
erty, effects, and business. A partnership name may become
impersonal, after the death of the partners, and it is then
treated like a fictitious or corporate name. A surname may
become impersonal when it is attachcdto an article of manu-
facture, and becomes the name by which such article is known
in the market, and the right to use the name may in conse
quencc follow a grant of the right to manufacture that article,
or a sale of the business of manufacturing such article;
and where the right to manufacture is exclusive, the right to
the use of the name as applied to that article becomes likewise
exclusive. It appears, however, that in the first bill of sale
which was prepared the words, “including the good-will
attendant upon said business,” were inserted, but were
objected to, stricken out, and a new bill of sale prepared,
omitting any reference to good will. But it is sa.id that this
clause was objected to because, in the opinion of the objector,
it might preclude him from engaging in the same business,
whereas, under the law, he would have such a right had the
clause remained. The only use, however, which complain-
ants now propose to make of the clause, treated as a
part of the instrument, is to restrict that right to engage in
business by taking away one of its incidents. Adopting the
language used in Churton vs. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, with
reference to the right of plaintiff to continue the use of the old
firm name, “I think the defendant is fully entitled to the benefit
of the observation that it was proposed to him to insert such a
provision, and that he refused it. I think, therefore, that this
case goes a step higher than the authorities, and the defendant
is entitled to put his case in the highest possible form with
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upon inference to bar him from trade, eitber totally or par-
tially; and that all restraint of that nature must come from 
his positive agreement. And such, we think, is the present 
tendency of the law." 
i Good will may be said to be those intangible advantages 
or incidents which are impersonal, so far as the grantor is 
concerned, and attach to the thing conveyed. 'Vhere it con-
sists of the advantages of lO<'ation, it follows an assignment 
of the lease of that location. Again, it may not depend 
at all upon location, as in the r.ase of a newspaper, and it 
would follow an assi~nment of all interest in the plant, prop· 
erty, effects, and business. A partnership name may become 
impe1•sonal, after the death of the partners, and it is then 
treated like a fictitious or corporate name. A surname may 
become impersonal when it is attached. to an article of manu-
facture, and becomes the name by which such article is known 
in the market, and the right to use the name may in conse-
quence follow a grant of the right to manufacture that artirle, 
or a sale of the business of manufacturing such article; 
and where the right to manufacture is exclusive, the right to 
the use of the name as applied to that article becomes likewise 
exclusive. It appears, however, that iii the first bill of sale 
which was prepared the words, "including the ·good-will 
attendant upon said business," were inserted, but were 
objected to, stricken out, and a new bill of sale prepared, 
omitting any reference to good will. But it is said that this 
clause was obj«:>cted to because, in the opinion of the objector, 
it might preclude him from engaging in the same business, 
whereasi under the law, be would have such a right had the 
clause remained. The only use, however, which complain-
ants now propose to make of the clause, treated as a 
part of the instrument, is to restrict that right to engage in 
business by taking away one of its incidents. Adopting the 
language used in Olmrton vs. Douglas, Johns. Eng. Cb. 174, with 
reference to the right of plaintiff to continue the use of the old 
firm name, "I think the defendant is fully entitled to the benefit 
of the obsC'rvation that it was proposed to him to insert such a 
provision, and that be refused it. I think, therefore, tbat this 
case goes a step higher than the authorities, and the defendant 
is entitled to put his <'ase in the highest possible form with 
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II. The next question relates to the use by defendants of the
firm name of Farrand, \Yillia.ms & Clark. It is clear that
complainants have no right to continue their busines under
the old firm name. The rule that upon a dissolution of a firm
neither partner has the right to use the firm name, as well as
the other rule that a retiring partner has no right to use the old ,
firm name, are both subject to the exception that a person has,
the right to use his own name unless he has expressly cove- I
nanted otherwise. In case A B should sell out his business
to C D, in the absence of a grant to C D of the right to use
the name of A B, or an agreement to the contrary, is there
any doubt but that A B would have the right to engage in the
same line of business in his own name? In that case, such at
probability would naturally suggest itself to C D, and, if he
desired to get the advantage of A B’s abstinence from busi-
ness, he would insist upon an agreement to that effect. In the
present case, Mr. Farrand’s name had been at the head ‘of the
firm name for nearly half a century and the name of another of
the retiring members corresponded with. the only other sur-
name used in the old firm name. It must have been evident to
complainants that in any event the name of the new firm would
be similar to that of the old firm. If complainants desired any
protection against such a use of the names of the retiring mem-
bers, they should have inserted a provision to that effect in the
bill of sale. The right to continue the use of a firm name, as
well as a restriction upon the use by a retiring partner of his
own name, are proper subjects of bargain, sale, and agreement.
Here neither have been purchased. Complainants have pur-
chased the business of the old firm. They have the right to
advertise themselves as succeeding to and continuing that
business. The exercise of such a_ right does not conflict with
any right reserved by defendants. Complainants, by such a
holding out, commit no fraud, misrepresentation, or deception.
They publish the truth only. Defendants have the right to use
their own names, or any collocation of their own names. They
have not adopted the old firm name, although it would have
been appropriate. They have adopted no fictitious name.
There is no‘ deception in the use of the name adopted by them.
The business of the old firm is a separate and distinct business.
Defendants have no right to advertise their business as a con-
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II. The next question relates to the use by defendants of the 
firm name of Ii'arrand, 'Villiams & Clark. It is clear that 
complainants have no right to continue their business under 
the old flrm name. The rule that upon a dissolution of a firm 
neither partner has the right to use the firm name, as well as 
the other rule that a retiring partner has no right to use the old . 
firm name, are both subject to the exception that a person bas 1 
the right to use his own name unless he has expressly con•- I 
nanted otherwise. Jn case A B should sell out his business 
to C D, i:p the absence of a grant to C D of the right to use 
the name of A B, or an agrePment to the contrary, is there 
any doubt but that AB would have the right to engage in the 
samP line of business in his own name? In that case, such :t 
probability would naturally suggest itself to C D, and, if he 
desired to get the advantage of .:\ B's abstinence from busi-
ness, he would insist upon an agreement to that effect. In the 
present case, l\Ir. Farrand's name bad been at the head ·of the 
firm name for nc>arly half a century and the name of another of 
the retiring members corl'esponded with the only other sur-
name used in the old firm name. It must have been evident to 
complainants that in any eYent the name of the new firm would 
. be similar to that of the old firm. If complainants desir'ed any 
\ protection against such a use of the names of the retiring mem-
. bers, they should luive inserted a provision to that effect in the 
) bill of sale. The right to continue the use of a firm name, ~s 
well us a restriction upon the use by a retiring partner of his 
own name, nre proper subjects of bargain, sale, and agreement. 
Here neitl1er han~ been purchased. Complainants have pur-
chased the businC'ss of the old firm. They have the right to 
advertise themselvc>s as succeeding to and continuing that 
business. The exel'eise of such a. right doe-s not eontlict with 
any right reserved by defendants. Complainants, by such a. 
holding out~ commit no fraud, misrepresentation, or deception. 
They publish the truth only. Defendants ha Ye the right to use -
their own names, or any collocation of their own names. The.v , 
have not adopte4 the old firm name, although it would have 
heen appropriate. They have adopted no fictitious name. 
There is no deception in the use of the name adopted by them. 
The business of the old firn1 is a separate and distinct bnsirwss. 
Defendants hnve no right to advel'tise their business as a con· 
tinuation of the old firm business. They are subject to the 
24 
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rule already laid down, that no man has the right to sell or
advertise his own goods or business as that of another, and so
mislead the public and injure such other person. In Lathrop
rs. Lathrop, 47 How. Pr. 532, after dissolution J. Lathrop
formed a copartnership with one Tisdale, and adopted the
name of J. Lathrop & Co., which was the style of the old
firm. Held that, in the absence of any covenant with his late
partner, he might legally do so. In Reeves vs. Dcnicke, 12 Abb.
Pr. (N. S.) 92, the court say: “In this case, the firm name was
not sold or transferred to defendants as constituting a partof
the partnership property; nor did the sale, in terms or by neces-
sary implication, include the good will; and it is therefore
unnecessary to determine whether the partnership name was
a. part of such good will. There was no restraint upon a retir-
ing partner holding him from engaging in a imiliar business,
and he violated no obligation by forming a new firm under his
own name, and transacting a business in all respects like that
he had released to them. It is quite clear that defendants
acquired no right to continue the use of the p'artnership name
of the old firm. If the good reputation of that firm was
'\ intended to pass and become a part of defendant’s new firm, it
lshould have been provided for in the conveyance. That it was
inot intended it should pass is evident from the omission to
include it.” Seed Co. cs. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N. VV. Rep. 866;
Bassctt vs. Percival, 5 Allen 345; Machine Co. vs. McGowan, 22
Ohio St. 370. In Tm-ton rs. Turrton, 42 Ch. Div. 128, although
there were no contract relations between the parties, the court
say: “No man can have the right to represent his goods as the
goods of another; therefore, if a man uses his own name, that_
is no prima facic case, but if he, besides using his own name,
does other things which show that he is intending to represent,
and is in point of fact making his goods represent, the goods of
another, then he is to be prohibited; but not otherwise.” In
H ookhaan cs. Pottagc, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91, plaintiff and defend-
ant had been copartners as Hookham & Pottage. Plaintiff
succeeded to the business, and defendant afterwards set up
a shop only a few doors away, and printed over the door the
words, “Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage.” The court
held that “defendant had a right to state that he was formerly
manager, and afterwards a partner, in the firm of Hookham 8:
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rule already laid down, that no man has the right to eelJ or 
advertise his own goods or business as that of another, and so 
mislead the public and injure such othc>r person. In Lathrop 
n. Lathrop, 47 How. Pr. 532, after dissolution J. Lathrop 
formed a. capartnership with one Tisdale, and adopted th" 
nnmc of .T. Lathrop & Co., which was the style of the oltl 
firm. Held that, in the absence of any covenant with his late 
partner, he might legally do so. In Rcer;es vs. Denicke, 12 Abb. 
Pr. (N. S.) !l2, the court say: "In this case, the firm name was 
not sold or transferred to defendants as constituting a part.of 
the partnership property; nor did the sale, in terms or by neces· 
sary implication, include the good will; and it is therefore 
unnecessary to determine whether the partnership name was 
a part of such good will. There was no restraint upon a retir-
ing partner holding him from engaging in a similiar business, 
and he violated no obligation by forming a new firm under his 
own name, and transacting a business in all respects like that 
he had released to them. It is quite clear that defendants 
acquired no right to continue the use of the partnership namf> 
, of the old firm. If the good reputation of that firm was 
•1 intended to pass and become a part of defendant's new firm, it 
l should have been proYided for in the conveyance. That it was 
, not intended it should pass is evident from the omission to 
include it." Seed Co. vs. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N. W. Rep. 866; 
Bassett vs. Pcrcii:al, 5 Allen 345; Machine Co. i:s. McGowan, 22 
Ohio St. 370. In Turton i·s. 'Turton, 42 Ch. Div. 128, although 
there were no contract relations between the parties, the court 
say: "No man can have the ri~ht to represent bis goods as the 
goods of another; tJi.erefore, if a man uses his own name, that. 
is no prima facie c.'lse, but if he, besides using his own name, 
does other things which show that he is intending to represent, 
ond is in point of fact making his goods represent, the goods of 
another, then he is to be prohibited; but not otherwise." In 
H ookl!aan t:s. J>ottaue, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 91, plaintiff and defend· 
nnt had been copartners as Hookham & Pottage. Plaintiff 
succeeded to the business, and defendant afterwards set up 
a shop only a few doors away, and printed over the door the 
words, "Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage." The court 
held that '"defendant had a right to state that he was formerly 
manag-er, and afterwards a. partner, in the fl.rm of Hookbam & 
Potiag-c>, and that he had a right to avail himself by the state-
Q
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ment of that fact of the reputation whichl he had so acquired,
but that he had no right to make that statement, or to avail
himself of that reputation, in such a way as was calculated to
represent to the world that the business which he was carry-
ing on was the business of Hookham 8: Pottage, or that Hook-
ham had any interest in it.” In Mcnecly vs. Men-cel_1/, (52 N. Y.
431, the court say: “lf defendants were using the name with
the intention of holding themselves out as the successors of
Andrew Meenely, and as the proprietors of the old established
foundry which was being conducted by plaintiffs, and thus
enticing away customers, and if with that intention they used
the namein a such a way as to make it appear that of the
plaintifi°'s firm, or resorted to any artifice to induce the belief
that defendants’ establishment was the same as that of plain-
tifis, and, perhaps if without any fraudulent intent, they had
done acts calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of
the establishment, and produce injury beyond that which
resulted from similarity in name, then the court would enjoin
them, not from the use of the name, but from using it in such a
way as would deceive the public. “ ' ' Every man has the
absolute right to use his own name in his own business, even
though he may thereby interfere with or injure the business
of another, bearing the same name, provided he does not resort
to any artifice or contrivance for the purpose of producing the
impression that the establishments are identical, or do any-
thing calculated to mislead.” In Fullwood vs. Fullwood, 9 Ch.
Div. 176, R. J . Fullwood carried on business as manufacturer
of annatto at 24 Somerset place, Hoxton, from 1785 to 1832.
Plaintiff and three brothers, one of whom was the defendant,
succeeded to the business, but ultimately the right to carry on
the business vested in the plaintiff. Defendants, -Mathew
Fullwood, and another brother formed a copartnership in the
name of E. Fullwood & Co., and issued and distributed in vari-
ous ways cards containing the following: “Established over
85 years. E. Fullwood & Co. (late of Somerset place, Hoxton).
Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto.” They
also placed around the bottles containing the annatto a wrap-
per rescmbling that which plaintiff used. The court say:
“Defendants are entitled to carry on their business under the
firm name which they have adopted, if they are so minded, pro-
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ment of that fact of the reputation which he had so acquired, 
but that he had no right to make that statement, or to avail 
himself of that reputation, in such a way as was calculated to 
re.present to the world that the business which he was carry· 
ing on was the business of Hookham & Pottage, or that Hook-
ham had any interest in it." In Meneely vs. Meneely, 62 N. Y. 
431, the court say: "If defendants were using the name with 
the intention of holding themselves out as the successors of 
Andrew Meenely, and as the proprietors of the old established 
found1·y which was being conducted by plaintiffs, and thus 
enticing away customers, and if with that intention they used 
the nnme .in a such n way as to make it appear tllat of the 
plaintiff's firm, or resorted to any artifice to induce the belief 
that defendants' establishment was the same as that of plain-
tiffs, and, perhaps if without any fraudulent intent, they had 
done acts calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of 
the establishment, and produce injury beyond that which 
resulted from simiJarity in name, then the court would enjoin 
them, not from the use of the name, but from using it in such a 
way as would deceive the public. • • • Every man has the 
absolute right to use his own name in his e>wn business, even 
though he may thereby interfere with or injure the business 
of another, bearing the same name, provided he does not resort 
to any artitice 01· contrivance for the purpose of producing the 
impression that the establish1:llents are identical, or do any-
thing calculated to mislead." In Fullrrood i;s. Fullwood, !} Ch. 
Div. 176, R. J. Fullwood carrie.d on business as manufacturer 
of annatto at 24 Somerset place, Roxton, from 1785 to 1832. 
Plaintiff and three· brothers,- one of whom was the defendant, 
succeeded to the business, but ultimntely the right to carry on 
the business vested in the plaintiff. Defendants, Mathew 
}l,ullwood, and another brother formed a copartnership in the 
nam~ of E. Fullwood & Co., and issued and distributed in vari-
ous ways cards containing the following : "Established over 
85 years. E. Fullwood & Co. (late of Somerset place, Hoxton). 
Original Manufacturers of Liquid and Cake Annatto." They 
also placed around the bottles containing the annatto a. wrap-
per resembling that which plaintiff used. The court say: 
"Defendants are entitled to carry on their business under the 
firm name which they have adopted, if they are so miiufrd, pro-
vided they do not represent themsel \'es to be carrying on th~ 
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business which has descended to plaintiff.” In Blninger rs.
Clark, 60 Barb. 113, the defendant wrongfully advertised him-
self as successor to the old firm, and made such a use of his own
name as to indicate a. fraudulent intent. Hegeman vs. Hege-
man, 8 Daly 1; Levy vs. Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 436. In Churton rs.
Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 887, plaintiff and
defendant had carried on the business as stuff manufacturers
at Bradford, in a building owned by defendant, and known as
“Hall Ings,” under the name and style of John Douglas & Co.
Defendant sold out to plaintiff all his share, right, and title in
the business, including the good will, and executed to plaintiflf
a seven-years lease of the premises occupied by .the firm.
VVithin a short period defendant set up in the same line of
business, next door to plaintiff, in a part of the same building,
known as “Hall Ings,” adopting the old firm name of John
Douglas & Go. The court held that defendant, by the use of
the old flrm name, and the surroundings, would be
obtaining the custom of the old firm, by inducing the belief
that his was a continuation of the old establishment. The
court say: “The authorities, I think, are conclusive upon
this point that the mere expression of parting with or selling
the good will, does not imply a contract on the part of the per-
son parting with that good will not to set up again in a
similar business; but I use the expression ‘similar’ to avoid
including the case of the vendor seeking to carry on the identi-
cal business. He does not contract that he will not carry on
an exactly similar business, with all the advantage which he
might acquire from his industry and labor, and from the regard
people may have for him, and that in a place next door, if you
like, to the very place where the former business was carried
on. It is settled that it is the fault of those who wish any pro-
tection against such a class that they do not take care to insert
the provision to that effect in the deed.”
The same principle obtains with reference to trade marks.
One may have a right in his own name as a trade mark, but he
cannot have such a right as against another person of the same
name, unless the defendant use a form of stamp or label so like
that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant’s
goods are of the plaintiffs manufacture. Sykes rs. Sykes, 3
Barn. & C. 541; Holloway rs. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Rogers
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business which has descended to plaintiff." In Bininger n. 
Clark, 60 Barb. 113, the defendant wrongfully adve1·tised him-
self as successor to the old firm, and made such a use of his own 
name as to indicate a fraudulent intent. Hegeman vs. Hege-
man, 8 Daly 1; Levy vs. Walker, 10 Ch. Div. 436. In Clturton i:11. 
Douglas, Johns. Eng. Ch. 174, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 887, plaintiff and 
defendant had carriecl on the business as stuff manufacturt"rs 
at Bradford, in a building owned by defendant, and known as 
"Hall lngs," under the name and style of John Douglas & Co. 
Defendant sold out to plaintiff all his share, right, and title in 
the business, including the good will, and executed to plaintiff 
a seyen-years lease of the p1·emises occupiecl by . the fi.1·m. 
Within a sb.ort period defendant set up in the same line of 
business, next door to p1aintiff, in a part of the same building, 
known as "Hall Ings," adopting the old firm name of John 
Douglas & Co. The court held that defendant, by the use of 
the old firm name, and the surroundings, would be 
obtaining the custom of the old firm, by inducing the belief 
that his was a continuation of the old establishment. The 
court say: "The authorities, I think, are conclusive upon 
this point that the mere expression of parting with or selling 
the good will, does not imply a contract on the part of the per-
son parting with that good will not to set up again in a 
similar business; but I use the expression 'similar' to avoid 
including the case of the vendor seeking to carry on the identi-
cal business. He does not contract that he will not carry on 
an exactly similar business, with all the advantage wh.ic:h h.-. 
might acquire from his industry and labor, and from the regartl 
people may have for him, and that in a place next door, if you 
like, to the very place where the former business was carried 
on. It is settled tllat it is the fault of those who wish any pro-
tection against such a c]ass that they do not take care to insert 
the provision to that effect in the deed." 
The same principle obtains with reference to trade marks. 
One may have a right in his own name as a trade mark, but he 
cannot have such a right as against another person of the same 
name, unless the defendant use a form of stamp or label so like 
that used by the plaintiff as to represent that the defendant's 
goods are of the plaintiff's manufacture. S!Jkes 1·s. S;11kcs, 3 
Barn. & C. 541; H ollou:a11 vs. H ollowa!J, 13 Bea v. 209; Rogers 
vs. Taintor, 97 Mass. 291; Gilmain vs. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139; 
J
WILLIAMS vs. FARBAND. 189
Good;/ear’s India Rubber Glove .l[anuf’g C0. vs. Goodyear Rubber
00., 128 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. The tests applied by
all the authorities in this class of cases are: Is a corporate
or trade or fictitious name simulated? Is the name assumed
or adopted false in fact? Is it used in connection with locality
or other representations, so as to convey the impression that
the business is a continuation of the old business? Defend-
ants are not responsible for the blunders made by clerks, postal
clerks, mail carriers, telephone employés, or newspaper report-
ers. In Meneely vs. Menecly, the court say: “Where the only
confusion created is that which results from the similarity
of names, the court will not interfere.” In Turton vs. Turton
it is said that “defendants are not responsible for the blunders
made by the business communityin not distinguishing between
John Turton & Sons and Thomas Turton & Sons.” See, also,
Richardson <5 Boynton Co. vs. Richardson di Morgan C0., 8 N. Y.
Supp. 52; Good;/ear’s India Rubber Glove Manufg O0. vs. Good-
year Rubber 00., 128 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. 166.
Any collocation of the names of Farrand and W'illiams
would create some confusion. Defendant Clark had been con-
nected with the old business for thirty years, and Williams,
the son-in-law of Mr. Farrand, for twenty-one years. Defend-
ants are using their own names only. They went into busi-
ness on \Voodward avenue, several blocks from the old stand.
In every letter-head, bill-head, card, or advertisement in which
their firm name appears they give the individual names of the
members of the firm, the new place of business, and in no case
have they represented that they are successors to the old firm.
The bill-heads used by the old firm had a cut of the old stand
on the left-hand upper corner, about three inches square.
Those of the new firm contain no cut, and less than half of_the
amount of matter. It would be exceedingly difficult to pre-
pare two bill-heads more unlike. The letter-heads of the old
firm contained two cuts,—one of the old stand, at the left
hand, and one of the Peninsular White Lead & Color ¥Vorks,
on the right. The dissimilarity is marked. The envelopes
used by the old firm contain eight printed lines on the upper
left-hand corner, occupying an inch and three-quarters of
space. Those used by the new firm contain five lines, occupy-
ing about three-quarters of an inch in space. There has been
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Goodyear's India Rubber Glove Jlanuf'g Co. vs. Goodyear Rubber 
Co., 1~8 U. S. 598, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 166. The tests applied by 
all the authorities in this class of cases are: Is a corporate 
or trade or fictitious name simulated? Is the name assumed 
or adopted false in fact? Is it used in connection with locality 
or other representations, so as to convey the impression that 
the business is a continuation of the old business? Defend-
ants are not responsible for the blunders made by clerks, postal 
clerks, mail carriers, telephone employes, or newspaper report-
ers. In Meneely vs. Meneely, the court say: "\Vbere the only 
confusion crPated is that which results from the similarity 
of names, the court will not interfere." In Turton vs. Tw·to~ 
it is said that "defendants are not responsible for the blunders -
made by the business communityin not di~tin~uishing between 
John Turton & Sons anrl Tboma.s Turton & Sons." See, also, 
Ricltat·dson & Boynton Co. vs. Ricltardson cf Jforgan Co., 8 N. Y. 
Supp. 52; Goodyear's India Rub1wr Glove ,l/ anuf'g Co. vs. Good-
year Rubber Co., 128 U. R 598, !) Sup. Ct. 166. 
Any coJloeation of the names of Farrand and Williams 
would create some confm~ion. Defendant Clark had been con-
nected with the old business for thirty years, and Williams, 
the son-in-law of Mr. Farrand, for twenty-one years. Defend-
ants are using their own names only. They went into busi-
ne~R on "\Voodward avenue, several blocks from the old stand. 
In c•very letter-head, bill-Jwad, card, or advertisement in which 
their firm name appears they give the indh·idual names of the 
members of the firm, the new place of business, and in no ca,se 
have they represented that thl'y are stH'Cl'ssors to the old firm. 
The bill-beads used by the old firm had a cut of the old stand 
on the left-hand upper corner, about three inchc>s square. 
Those of the new firm contain no cut, and Jess than half of .the 
amount of matter. It would be exceedingly difficult to pre-
pare two bill-beads more unlike. The letter-heads of the old 
firm contained two cuts,-one of the old stand, at the left 
band, and one of the Peninsular 'White J .. ead & Color '\Yorks, 
on the right. The dissimila.rity is marked. The envelopes 
used by the old firm contnin eight p1inted lines on the upper 
left-hand corner, occupying an ineh and three-quarters of 
space. Those used by the new firm contain five lines, occupy-
ing about three-quarters of an inch in Kpace. There bas been 
no attempt at imitation in words or type. On March 15th 
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they announced, through circulars distributed generally, that
they had engaged in business at 32 and 34 Woodward avenue;
that they expected to have their new store ready for occu-
pancy in a few days; and that the work of getting a new stock
of goods would be pushed as fast as possible. On April 7th
they issued another circular, announcing that they were now
prepared to fill orders, and hoping that the friendly acquaint-
ance of many years would be continued. An advertisement
is produced, wherein defendants say: “Though it may seem
paradoxical, it is nevertheless true, that the wholesale drug-
house of Farrand, Williams & Clark is both the oldest and the
newest representative of this important commercial industry
in Detroit.” But in the same advertisement they announce
the dissolution of the old firm, their retirement from said firm,
and the formation and business location of the new firm. It
is difficult to imagine how such an advertisement would mis-
lead the public. It contains no false colors. Bo-th parties
advertised extensively in the city and State papers and in the
itrade journals; complainants giving the names _of their indi-
vidual members, and their new firm name, and advertising
themselves as the successors to Farrand, Williams & Co.; and
ldefendants giving the names of their individual members, and
‘the name and business location of the new firm. Co-mplain-
ants sent out circulars to the trade generally, informing it of
lithe dissolution of the old firm, the fact that they were the suc-
jcessors, and giving their firm name; and defendants sent out
‘circulars announcing their withdrawal and the formation of
a new firm. There is no doubt but that the dissolution of this
firm, the fact that complainants had bought out the interests
of defendants, the name adopted by complainants, the forma-
tion of the new firm, the names of itsmembers, and the defend-
ants’ firm name, have been most extensively advertised by both
parties, not only in the city, but throughout the State and
Union. Nearly fifty letter have been received by the old firm,
since the dissolution, addressed to Farrand & Williams; Far-
rand & \Villiams Paint Co.; Farrand & Williams Drug Co.;
Farrand, Sheley & Brooks; Farrand, \Villiams & Sheley; Far-
rand, YVilliams, Sheley & Co.; Farrand, Williams & Brooks;
Farrand & Co.; Williams, Farrand & Co.; Farrand, Sheley &
Brooks; Williams & Farrand; YVilliams, Farrand 8:. Co.; and
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they announced, through circulars distributed generally, that 
they had engaged in business at 32 and 34 Woodward avenue; 
that they exp~cted to have their new store ready for occu-
pancy in a few days; and that the work of getting a new stock 
of goods would be pushed as fast as possible. On Apl'il 7th 
they issued another circular, announcing that they were now 
prepared to fill orders, and hoping that the friendly acquaint-
ance o.f many years would be continued. An advertisement 
is produced, wherein defendants say: ''Though it may seem 
paradoxical, it is nevertheless true, that the wholesale drng-
house of Farrand, Williams & Clark is both the oldest and the 
newest representative of this important commercial industry 
in Detroit." But in the same advertisement .they announce 
the dissolution of the old firm, their retirement from said firm, 
and the formation and business location of the new firm. It 
is difficult to imagine bow such an advertisement would mis-
lead the public. It contains no false colors. Bo.th parties 
ndverlised extensively in the city and State papers and in the 
;trade journals; complainants giving the names .of their indi-
vidual members, and their new firm name, and advertising 
themselves as t°he successors to Farrand, Williams & Co.; and 
!defendants giving the names of their individual members, a.nd 
·the name and business location of the new firm. Complain-
jants sent out circulars to the trade generally, informing it of 
,the di!isolution of the old firm, the fact that they were the suc-
1 
;cessors, and giving their firm name; and defendants sent out 
'circulars announcing their withdrawal and the formation of 
a new firm. There is no doubt but that the dissolution of this 
firm, the fact that complainants had bought out the interests 
(if defendants, the name adopted by complainants, the forma-
tion of the new firm, the names of its 'members, and the defend-
ants' firm name, have been most extensively advertised by both 
parties, not only in the city, but throughout the State antl 
Union. Nearly fifty letter have been received by the old firm, 
since the dissolution, addressed to Farrand & 'Villiams; Far-
rand & 'Villiams Paint Co.; Farrand & \Villiams Drug Co.; 
Farrand, Sheley & Brooks; Farrand, 'Villiams & Sheley; Far-
rand, Williams, Sheley & Co.; Farrand, l\'illia.ms & Brooks; 
Ji"arrand & Co.; Williams, J.i"'arrand & Co.; Farr.Ind, Sheley & 
}kooks; "rmiams & Farrand; Williams, Farrand & Co.; and 
Williams & Co. It cannot be said that any a.ct of def endan.ts 
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is responsible for these blunders. Confusion is inseparable
from the dissolution of an old firm and the composition of two
firms from its membership,especiallywhen the name of but one
of those who remained has appeared in the firm name, and the
new firm is composed of one whose name for nearly half a cen-
tury has stood at the head of the firm name, and the surname
of another retiring member is the same as the only other name
used in the old firm name. It appears that at the outset
defendant Clark, by mistake opened two or three letters
addressed “Farrand, Williams & Co.,” but in every other
instance defendants refused to receive mail directed to Far-
rand, Williams & Co., unless directed to defendants’ street and
number; that in a single instance Clark inadvertently signed
a letter “Farrand, Williams & Co.;” that two checks were sent
to defendants in payment for good bought from them, which
were payable to the order of Farrand, Williams & Co., and Mr.
Farrand indorsed them Farrand, YVillia1ns & Co., and guaran-
teed the indorsement; that in four instances merchandise or
articles not marked, but intended for defendants, were deliv-
ered to complainants, and afterwards taken away; that in two
instances complainants were notified by freight agents that
freight awaited delivery; that in both the goods were mani-
fested to Farrand, Williams 8:. Co., but marked, and were. after-
wards delivered, to Farrand, Williams & Clark, for whom they
were intended; that complainants were notified that a sample
box of glassware had been shipped to them, but they had not
received it; that defendants received a sample box of glass-
ware from the same house, which was billed to Farrand, Wil-
liams & Clark, and the latter were notified of the shipment by
the assignors; that imilar boxes of samples had been sent to
other drug-houses at Detroit; that in one or two instances
merchandise had been delivered to defendants which was
intended for complainants; that in a single instance a customer
at Port Huron, who knew of the dissolution, intending to call
up the old house by telephone, asked for Farrand & Williams,
was given Farrand, Williams & Clark, and told that it was
Farrand, Williams & Clark, asked the price of oil, and ordered
one barrel; that 112 letters, telegrams, receipts, or bills were
received by complainants directed to Farrand, Williams & Co.,
which were intended for defendants; that of these thirty-five
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Is responsible for these blunders. Confusion is inseparable 
from the dissolution of an old firm and the composition of two 
ftrms from its membership,especiallywhen the name of but one 
of those who remafaed has appeared in the firm n.ame, and the 
new firm is composed of one whose name for nearly half a cen-
tury has stood at the head of the firm name, and the surname 
of another retiring member is the same as the only other name 
used in the old firm name. It appears that at the outset 
defendant Clark, by mistake opened two or tb!"ee letters 
addressed "Farrand, Williams & Co.," but in every other 
instance defendants refused to receive mail directed to Far-
rand, Williams & Co., unless directed to defendants' street and 
number; that in a single instance Clark inadvertently signed 
a letter "Farrand, 'Williams & Co.;" that two checks were sent 
to defendants in payment for goods bought from them, which 
were payable to the order of Farrand, "\Villiams & Co., and Mr. 
Farrand indorsed them Farrand, Williams & Co., and guaran-
teed the indorsement; that in four instances merchandise or 
articles not marked, but intended for defendants, were deliv-
ered to complainants, and afterwards taken away; that in two 
instances complainants were notified by freight agents that 
freight awaited delivery; that in both the goods were mani-
fested to Farrand, Williams & Co., but marked, and were. after-
wards delivered, to Farrand, \Villiarus & Clark, for whom they 
were intended; that complainants were notified that a sample 
box of glassware had been shipped to them, but they had n<>t 
received it; that defendants received a sample box of glass-
ware from the same house, which was billed to Farrand, Wil-
liams & Clark, and the latter were notified of the shipment by 
the assignors; that similar boxes of samples had been sent to 
other drug-houses at Detroit; that in one or two instances 
merchandise had been delivered to defendants which was 
intended for complainants; that in a single instance a customer 
nt Port Huron, who knew of the dissolution, intending to call 
up the old house by telephone, asked for Farrand & Williams, 
was given Farrand, 'Villiams & Clark, and told that it was 
Farrand, Williams & Clark, asked the price of oil, and ordered 
one barrel; that 112 letters, telegrams, receipts, or bills were 
received by complainants directed to Farrand, Williams & Co., 
which were intended for defendants; that of these thirty-five 
were directed on the inside to Farrand, 'Villiams & Clark; that 
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all of the letters so received were from business houses from
which defendants were buying goods, and none were from
customers of either house. These proofs do not tend to show
any appropriation by defendants of the old firm name, or any
attempt to secure the correspondence addressed to the old
firm, or that the customers have been deceived or misled, or
that defendants have practiced any fraud, concealment, or
deception. .
Complaint is made in the bill that defendants have enticed
away certain of complainants’ salesmen, but this charge is
not made out by the proofs. It is also charged that defend-
ants have simulated certain trade marks and labels used by
the old firm, but no instance of piracy has been established.
Complainants have, under the authorities cited, an undoubted
right to protection in the proprietary rights acquired by the
old firm, and in the use of such trade marks as were in use by
the old firm, and defendants have no right to so imitate the
labels in use by the old firm as to convey the belief that the
goods labeled are from the old house. The use, however, of
the words, “Sold by Farrand, Williams & Co.,” or “Prepared
by Farrand, Williams & Co.,” upon a label, will not be pro-
tected as a trade mark or trade-name, and the right to use that
name in that connection did not pass under the bill of sale.
The decree of the court below must be aflirmed as of February
27, 1891, and the bill dismissed, with costs to defendants.
Monsn and GRANT, JJ., concurred with MCGRATH, J.
Loxc, J., did not sit.
CnAmrI.1.\z, C. J . dissented.
\'
No"rs.—For other cases, see Mechem’s Elem. of Pa:tn., §§ 86, 87, 88,
69.
Compare also with the two cases following.
jam
SNYDER MANUFACTURING CO. vs. SNYDER.
S1é€1‘C11l6 Court of Ohio, 1896.
5|; Ohio si.i=Q=h3 N. E. Rep. 32:», 31 L. R. A. 657.
The action below was brought by Andrew G. Snyder and
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all of the letters so received were from business houses from 
which defendants were buying goods, and none were from 
customers of either house. These proofs do not tend to show 
any appropriation by defendants of the old firm name, or any 
attempt to secure the correspondence addressed to the old 
firm., or that the customers have been deceived ~r misled, or 
that defendants have practiced any fraud, concealment, or 
deception. 
Complaint is made in the bill that defendant~ have enticed 
away certain of complainants' salesmen, but this charge is 
not made out by the proofs. It is also charged that defend-
ants have simulated certain trade marks and labels used by 
the old firm, but no instance of piracy bas been established. 
Complainants have, under the authorities cited, an undoubted 
right to protection in the proprietary rights acquired by the 
old firm, and in the use of such trade marks as were in use by 
the old firm, and defendants have no right to so imitate the 
labels in use by the old firm as to convey the belief that the 
goods labeled are from the old house. The use, however, of 
the words, "Sold by Farrand, Williams & Co.," or "Prepared 
by Farrand, Williams & Co.," upon a label, will not be pro-
tected as a trade mark or trade-name, and the right to use that 
name in that connection did not pass under the bill of sale. 
The decree of the court below must be affirmed as of February 
27, 1891, and the bill dismissed, with costs to defendants. 
MORSE and GRANT, JJ., concurred with McGRATH, J. 
Lmm, J., did not sit. 
CHAMPJ.IY, c. J. dissented. 
t 
Nom.-Fo'i' other cases, eQe Mechem's Elem. of Pa:tn., ~ 86, 87, 88, 
89. 
Compare also with the two cases following. 
SNYDER MANUF ACTURI~G CO. vs. SNYDER. 
sw::eme Coztrt of Ohio, 1896. 
S'fOhio St.~3 N. E. Rep. 325, 31 L. R. A. 657. 
The action below was brought by Andrew G. Snyder and 
William A. Snyder, against the Snyder Manufacturing Com-
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pany, to enjoin the use by the defendant of the name “Snyder
Manufacturing Company,” and especially the use of the word
“Snyder” in that name. The plaintiffs, who are now, and for
several years past have been, engaged in business as manufac-
turers of certain kinds of goods at the city of Piqua, in this
state, for many years before carried on the same kind of a busi-
ness at Ashtabula, also in this state, and by their skill and
attention to business established a valuable reputation in their
business, which was carried on under the name of Snyder 8;
Son. Then, on the 7th day of September, 1887, they and two
other persons formed-a copartnership with \V. H. Bradley, who
was the owner of a manufactory at Ashtabula, employed in
the manufacture of goods similar to those made by the plain-
tifl's, for the purpose of combining the business of-the parties,
and thereafter continuing the same as one concern. By the
terms of the partnership agreement, Bradley was to, and did,
contribute one-half of the capital, and, in addition thereto,
furnish the use of his manufactory without charge, and expend
at least $3,000 in putting the same in repair, as an ofiset to
which the plaintiffs were to, and did, put in the good will of
their business, and they and their two associates were to, and
did, contribute the other half of the capital, and devote their
time and skill to the manufacture of goods and the general
management of the business of the partnership; Bradley not
being required to give any time_or attention thereto. This
copartnership, which carried on its business under the firm
name of Snyder Manufacturing Company, continued for a
period of three years, acquiring under that name an extensive
and profitable business, and a good reputation; and at its
termination, the parties being unable to effect a satisfactory
settlement, the plaintiffs, to obtain a settlement of its affairs,
commenced an action, in which a receiver was appointed at
their instance. who took possession of the partnership effects.
and afterwards, under an order of the court so directing him,
sold the same, with the good will of the firm, at public sale.
The order of sale contained an express provision that the pur-
chaser should have the right to carry on the business as the
successor of the firm, and was so made without objection
from any of the partners, all of whom were parties to the
action. The plaintiffs and Bradley were competing bidders
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pany, to enjoin the use by the defendant of the name "Snyder 
Manufacturing Compan·y," and especially the use of the word 
"Snyder" in that name. The plaintiffs, who are now, and for 
several years past have been, engaged in business as manufac-
turers of certain kinds of go-0ds at the city of Piqua, in this 
state, for many years before carried on tbe same kind of a busi-
ness at Ashtabula, also in this state, and by their skill and 
attention to business established a valuable reputation in their 
business, whiGh was carried on under the name of Snyder & 
Son. Then, on the 7th day of September, 1887, they and two 
othe1· persons formed·a copartnership with \V. H. Bradley, who 
was the owner of a manufactory at Ashtabula, employed in 
the manµfactnre of goods similar to those made by the plain-
tiffs, for the purpose of combining the business of the parties, 
and thereafter continuing the same as one concern. Dy the 
tt•1·ms of the partnership agreement, Bradley was to, and did, 
contribute one-half of the capital, and, in addition thereto, 
furnish the use of his manufactory without charge, and expend 
at least $3,000 in putting the same in repair, as an offset to 
which the plaintiffs were to, and did, put in the good will of 
their business, and the.v and their two associa trs were to, and 
did, contribute th!.> other half of the capital, and devote their 
time and skill to the manufacture of goods and the general 
management of the hushwss of the partnership; Bradley not 
being required to give any time. or attention thereto. This 
copal'tnership, whkh carried on its hnsiness under the firm 
nnme of 8n~·der ~fnnufaeturing Company, continued for u 
period of thrPe years, acquiring under that name aTh extensive 
nnd profitable business, and a good reputation; :llld at its 
termination, the pnrties bein:.t unable to effect a satisfactory 
settlement~ the pl:.iintiffs, to obtain a s£>ttlement of its affairs, 
commenced an action, in which a receiver was appoint<'d at 
11H~ir instance. who took pos:;;ession of the partnership effectR, 
and afterwards, under an order of the court so directing him, 
sold the same, wHh the good will of the firm, at public sale. 
The order of sale contaim•d an Pxpress provision that the pur-
clinser should have the ri~ht to carry on the business as the 
successor of the firm, and was so made wi1 hout ohjeetion 
from any of the partners. all of whom were parties to the 
nction. The pJaintiffs and BrndlPy were compPtin~ bidders 
a.t the saJe, when the latter, bidding more than his com-
25 
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i
petitors for the assets and good will of the firm, and being the
highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser. The sale was
duly confirmed by the court, and the property transferred to
Bradley, who shortly thereafter, with other persons, organized
a. corporation under the laws of this state, with the name of the
“Snyder Manufacturing Company,” for the purpose of con-
tinuing the business at the manufactory which had been oper-
ated by the firm; and the partnership effects and good will
that Bradley "had purchased were transferred, with the manu-
facturing plant, to the corporation, which. ha since, in its
corporate name, been doing business of like character to that
formerly done by the copartnership, and claiming to be its
successor. That manner of conducting it business by the
corporation was enjoined by the judgment which it is sought
here to have reversed; and whether there should be a reversal
or not, it is conceded, depends on the effect of Bradley’s pur-
chase of the assets, including the good-will of the partnership,
and their transfer by him to the defendant corporation. Did
the defendant in that way acquire the right to carry on a busi-
ness in the name adopted by it, like that which had been done
by the previously existing partnership, and as its successor?
Burke <£ Ingersolls and A. A. Thayer, for plaintiff in error.
Theodore Hall and Dickey, Carr xfi Goff, for defendants in
error.
W1LLIAMs, J . (after stating the facts.) \Vithout attempting
an accurate or exhaustive definition of the good will of a busi-
ness, it may be said that it practically consists of that favor-
able disposition or inclination of persons to extend their
patronage to the business on account of the reputation it has
established; and, as the business is always associated with
the name under which it is conducted, the name becomes a.
part, and often an important part, of its good will. The good
will of a copartnership is regarded in law as property, consti-
tuting a part of its assets, and having a salable value in con-
nection with its tangible property, sometimes exceeding all
its other assets, because of the advantages afi'orded a pur-
chaser of retaining an established custom, and enlarging
it. As a general rule, when it become necessary to sell the
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petitors for the assets and good will of the firm, and being the 
highest bidder therefor, became the purchaser. The sale was 
duly confirmed by the court, and the property transferred to 
Bradley, who shortly thereafter, with other persons, organized 
a corporation under the laws of this state, with the name of the 
"Snyder Manufacturing Company," for the purpose of con-
tinuing the business at the manufactory which had been oper-
ated by the firm; and the partnership effects and good will 
that Bradley had purchased were transferred, with the manu-
facturing plant, to the corporation, which. bas since, in its 
corporate name, been doing business of like character to that 
formerly done by the copartnership, and claiming to be its 
successor. That manner of conducting its business by the 
corporation was enjoined by the judgment which it is sought 
here to have reversed; and whether there should be a reversal 
or not, it is c-Ollceded, depends on the effect of Bradley's pur-
chase of the assets, including the good-will of the partnership, 
and their transfer by him to the defendant corporation. Did 
the defendant in that way acquire the right to carry on a busi-
ness in the name adopted by it, like that which had been done 
by the previously existing partnership, and as its successor? 
Burke~ Ingersolls and A. A. Thayer, for plaintiff in error. 
Theodore Hall and Dickey, Carr ~ Goff, for defendants in 
error. 
WILLIAMS, J. (after stating the facts.) 'Vitbout attempting 
un accurate or exhaustive definition of the good will of a busi-
ness, it may be said that it practically consists of that favor· 
able disposition or inclination of persons to extend their 
patronage to the business on account of the reputation it has 
established; and, as the business is always associated with 
1 the name under which it is conducted, the name becomes n. 
\ part, and often an important part, of its good will. The good 
\will of a copartnership is regarded in law as property, consti-
'tuting a part of its assets, and having a salable value in con-
nection with its tangible property, sometimes exceeding all 
its other assets, because of the advantages afforded a pur-
chaser of retaining an established custom, and enlarging 
it. As a general rule, when it herome necessary to sell the 
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with, and as a part of, them, and ordinarily it passes by a
sale of them, though not expressly mentioned. It is well set-
tled that, when a partner sells his interest in the business to a
copartner, without a reservation or exception of the good will,
the purchaser is entitled, not only to continue the business in
the name of the firm, and as its successor, but he may prevent
the selling partner or other person from carrying on business
in that way; and no good reason -is apparent why the same
result should not attend a purchase of the entire assets and
good will of the firm, by one of the partners, at a sale thereof,
made under an order of court, in a proceeding to which the
partners were parties, especially if the sale be so made at their
instance and for their benefit. Indeed, the authorities appear
to go further, and maintain that, upon the dissolution of a
copartnership, there b-cing no agreement betwcenits members
to the contrary, the court, having the parties before it, may
order the good will to be sold or disposed of as may be deemed
most advantageous to the partners; and that the purchaser at
such sale, though a stranger to the firm, may lawfully continue
the use of the firm name in carrying on the business thereafter.
And that seems but the lo-gical result of the rule that the rights
mentioned belong to a partner who becomes a purchaser at
such sale; for, in order to insure a fair sale, all bidders should
stand upon an equality, which -would not be so if the rights
acquired at the sale were to.be varied or made to depend upon
the relation which the purchaser had sustained to the partner-
ship, or other individual circumstance. The salable value of
the good will is whatever it is worth in the market when open
to untrammeled competition; and when brought to that test
for the benefit of the partners, it is not for them to assert that
the purchaser obtained less than they authorized to be sold or
induced him to believe he was buying. _
It is contended that Bradley did not become the owner of
the good will of the late firm of which he was a member, by
his purchase at the receiver’s sale, because (1) the good will of
the plaintiffs was put into the firm as an offset to the use of
Bradley’s manufactory, and only for the period agreed upon for
the duration of the partnership, and therefore, at the expira-
tion of that period, the plaintiffs were reinvested with their
good will, as was Bradley with the possession of his property;
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with, and as n part of, them, and ordinarily it passes by a 
t>ale of them, though not expressly mentioned. It is well set· 
tied that, when a partner sells his interest hi the business to a 
copartner, without a reservation or exception of the good will, 
the purchaser is entitled, not only to continue the business in 
the name of the firm, and as its Emcc-E>ssor, but he may prevent 
the selling partner or other person from carrying on business 
in that way; and no good reason is appa.rent why the same 
result should not attend a purchl!se of the entire a.ssets and 
good will of the fl.rm, by one of the partners, at a sale thereof, 
made under an order of court, in a proceeding to which the 
partners were parties, especially if the sale be so made at their 
instance and for their benefit. Indeed, the authorities appear 
to go further, and maintain that, upon the dissolution of a 
c<>partnership, there being no agreement between .its members 
to the contrary, the court, having the parties before it, may 
order the good will to be sold or disposed of as may be deemed 
most advantageous to the partners; and that the purchaser at 
such sale, though a stranger to the firm, may lawfully continue 
the use of the firm name in carrying on the business thereafter. 
And that seems but the logical result of the rule that the rights 
menti-Oned belong to a partner who becomes a purchaser at 
such sale; for, in order to insure a fair sale, all bidders should 
stand upon an equality, which ·would not be so if the rights . 
acquired at the sale were to.be varied or made to depend upon 
the relation which the purchaser had sustained to the partner-
ship, or other individual circumstance. The salable value of 
the good will is whatever it is worth in the market when open 
to untramm~led comp<'tition; and when brought to that test 
for the benefit of the partners~ it is not for them to assert that 
the purchaser obtained less than they authorized to be sold or 
induced him to believe be was buying. 
It is contended that Bradley did not become the owner Df 
the good will of the late firm of which he was a member, by 
ltis purchase at the receiver's sale, because (1) the good will of 
the plaintiffs was put into the firm as an offset to the use of 
Rradley's manufactory, and only for the period agreed upon for 
the duration of the partnership, and therefore, at the expita-
tion of that period, the plaintiffs were reinvested with their 
good will, as was Bradley with the possession of his property; 
(2) the order of the court under which the sale was made 
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expressly excludes any right on the part of the purchaser to
make use of the firm name; and (3) the good will ceased upon
the termination of the partnership, and consequently could
not be sold.
1. With respect to the first of these propositions, it may be
observed that what the order of the court directed to be sold,
and what the receiver, under its authority, ‘in fact sold, was,
not the good will or property of the plaintiffs, but those belong-
ing to the firm. The plaintiffs’ business and its good will, as
they existed at the formation of the partnership, were absorbed
and merged into those of the firm, and went to make up its
assets, and, in so far as they did so, became the property of the
firm, subject to sale under the order with its other effects, and
with them vested in the purchaser. Conceding, however, that
the plaintiffs, at the expiration of the partnership into which
they h-ad entered with Bradley, were restored to the good will
‘which belonged to their business when the partnership was
iformed, and were entitled to resume that business under the
name they had formerly used, it is not perceived how that
could operate to vest in them any part of the good will of the
Ifirm, or prevent its vesting in Bradley under the receiver’s
sale.
2. The order under which the sale was made, directs the
receiver to sell all of the property of the firm “as a whole,
‘including the good will,” and provides that “the purchaser
shall have the right to carry on the business as successor to
the Snyder Manufacturing Company,” but states that “the
court does not pass upon or make any order whatever as to
what name said purchaser would have the right to use in car-
rying on said business.” The last clause of the order is relied
upon a.s excluding any right, on the part of the purchaser
under it, to employ the name of the firm in any business he
might choose to carry on after the purchase, and as further
excluding any authority to do such business -as the successor
of the firm. But it is obvious the clause has not that operation.
Instead of being an adjudication abridging the rights of the
purchaser with regard to the use of the firm name, its design
was to leave the determination of those rights, in any contro-
versy that in-ight thereafter arise concerning them, unaileeted
by the order. And, as a partner who purchases the property
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t'xprc-ssly excludes any right on the part of the purchaser to 
m:tke use of the firm name; and (3) the good will ceased upon 
the termination of the partnership, and consequently could 
not be sold. 
1. ·with rPspect to the first of th<>se propositions, it may be 
obsern"Cl that what the order of the court directed to be sold, 
and what the receiver, under its authority, in fact sold, was, 
not the good will or property of the plaintiffs, but those belong· 
ing to th.e firm. The plaintiffs' business and its good will, as 
they existed at the formation of the partnership, were absorbed 
and merged into those of the firm, and went to make up its 
nssets, and, in so far as they did so, became the property of the 
firm, subject to sale und·er the order with its other effects, and 
with them Yested in the purchaser. Conceding, however, that 
1 he plaintiffs, at the expiration of the partn<>rsbip into which 
they had entered with Bradlc>y, were restored to the good will 
. which belonged to their business when the partnersl1ip was 
1formed, and were entitll"d to resume that business under the 
name they had formerly used, it is not perceivl"d bow that 
could operate to vest in them any pnrt of the good will of the 
1ftrm, or preYent its vesting in Bradley under the receiver's 
sale. 
2. The orcler under which the sale was made, directs the 
recei11er to sell all of the property of the firm "as a whole, 
•including the good will," and provides that "the purchaser 
shall have the right to carry on the business as succC>ssor to 
the Snyder l\lanufacturing Company," but states that "the 
court d-0es not pass upon or make any order· whateYer as to 
what name said purchaser would lrnve the right to use in car-
rying on said business." The last clause of the oruer is relied 
upon as excluding any right, on the part of the purcl:aser 
under it, to employ the name of the firm in any busim•ss he 
might choo~e to carry on after the purchasc>, and as further 
excluding any authority to do such business tl1S the succ~ssor 
of the firm. But it is obvious the clause has not that operation. 
Instead of bPing an adjudication abridging the rig-hts of the 
purchaser with rPgnrd to the use of the firm name. its design 
was to leave the det<>rmination of thoi;;e rights, in any contI'O· 
versy that rr..ight thereafter ari:"e concl'rning them, unaffected 
by the order. And, as a partner who purchases the property 
and good will of the coparlner~d1ip bceom~s entitled to the use 
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of the firm name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it,
an express provision in the sale, or the order of the court
under which it was made, that the purchaser should have that
right, was unnecessary.
3. The proposition mainly urged in support of the judgment
below is that the good will of a copartnership can exist only
so long as it is a going concern, and, ceasing upon the termi-
nation of the partnership, is not thereafter a subject of sale.
It may be that, when a firm is dissolved, its effects distributed,
or sold in parcels to purclrnser not wishing to embark in a
similar business, and its affairs are wound up, its go-od will is
dissipated and lost; but that results from the acts of the part-
ners themselves in making such a disposition of the assets as
renders the good will unavailable as a salable article, for it is
not a distinctive article of property, which may be sold sep-
arate from the tangible effects of the partnership, and in "that
sense it may be said to cease when the partnership is so wound
up. That, in substance, is the scope and purport of the rule
declared in the cases cited in the brief of the defendant in
error. In neither of the cases was the question here presented
involved. But the doctrine maintained, both in England and
this country, where the copartnership is wound up in the man-
ner indicated, is that the good will remains the undivided
property of the members of the firm, either or any of whom
may thereafter lawfully use the firm name if they desire to
continue in business, although the name of the partner so
using it does not appear in that of.the firm. Banks vs. Gibson,
34 Beav. 566; Bradbury vs. Dickens, 27 Beav. 53; Caswcll rs.
‘Hazard, 121 N. Y. 484, 24‘ N. E. Rep. 707; Dou_r/herty vs. Van Nos-
trand, Hofi. Ch. 58. The proposition contended for, if sus-
tained, would practically destroy the value of the good will
as an asset of the partnership, and entail upon its members,
in many instances, serious loss. As partnerships rest upon
the agreement of the parties, express or implied, a dissolution
occurs, and a new partnership is formed, whenever a partner
retires or a new one is admitted; and if, when that occurs, the
good will of the dissolved firm should cease, and could neither
be acquired by the new firm nor transferred by any sale made
by the members of the old 0-ne,though expressly included in
the sale of its efiocts, its value as an asset of the firm would
disappear. Yet, it is commonly known that the good will con-
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of the firm name, in the abs€nce of u stipulation for·bidding it, 
an express provision in tlte sale, or the order of the court 
under which it was made, that the purchaser should have that 
right, wa.s unneces1mry. 
3. The proposition mainly urged in support of the judgment 
below is that the good will of a copartm•rship can exist only 
so long as it is a going concern, and, ceasing upon the termi-
nation of the partnership, is not thereafter a subject of sale. 
It may be that, when a finn is dii-;solved, its efTects distributed, 
or sold in parcels to purdrasers not wishing to embark in a 
similar business, and its affairs are wound up, its good will is 
dissipated nnd Jost; but that results from the acts of the part-
ners themseln~s in making such a dispo-sition of the assets as 
renders the good will unavailable a.s a salable article, for it is 
not a distinctive article of property, which may be sold sep-
arate from the tangible effects of the partnership, and in -that 
sense it may be said to cease when the partnership is so wound 
up. That, in substance, is the scope and purport of the rule 
declared in the cases cited in the brief of the defendant in 
error. In neither of the cases was the question here presented 
involved. But the doctrine maintained, both in Englan·d and 
this country, where the copartnership is wound up in the man-
ner indicated, is that the good will remains the undivided 
property of the members of the firm, either or any of ~horn 
may therea.fter lawfully use the firm name if they desire to 
continue in business, although the name of the partner so 
using it does not appear in that of. the firm. Banks t:s. Gi1Json, 
34 Beav. 566; Bra<lbur11 t)s. Dickens, 27 Beav. 5!1; Caswell n~. 
·Hazard, 121 N. Y. 484, 2.f N. E. Rep. 707; Dour11terty rs. Van No~­
frand, Hoff. Ch. 58. '.rhe proposition contended for, if sus-
tained, would practically destroy the value of the good ~ill 
as an asset of the pai·tnership, and entall upon its members, 
in many instances, serious loss. As partnerships rest upon 
the agreement of the parties, express or implied, a dissolution 
occurs, and a new partnership is formed, whenever a partnn 
retires or a new one is adm:itted; and if, when that occurs, the 
good will of the dissolved finn should c<>ase, and could neither 
be acquired by the new firm nor transferred by any sale made 
by the members of the old one,though expressly included in 
the sale of its effects, its value as an asset of the firm would 
disappear. Yet, it is rommonly known that the goo~ wilf con-
stitutes an important, and sonwt ilnes a controlling, part' of the 
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vconsideration for the purchase, and it has long been the settled
haw, that, in cases of the kind mentioned, the purchaser obtains
'the good will, including the right to the use of the firm name
in the continued prosecution of the business. In so holding,
'-the courts give effect to the intention of the parties as dis-
fclosed by the transaction. Where the partners themselves
jmake a sale of the firm effects, including the good will, the
lintention and understanding is manifest that the purchaser
shall acquire and enjoy every advantage and benefit which the
‘firm had, so far as the parties are capable of transferring the
-same; and, when a sale is made under an order of court, in
a proceeding to which the partners are parties, that intention
is not less plainly inferable. The object to be accomplished
tin making the sale, in either mode, of the go-od will, with the
-other partnership effects, is to enhance the value of the assets
lby inducing persons to bid more for them than they otherwise
!WOI1l(1, under the belief that the purchaser will obtain all the
‘benefits of the good will; and, when the sale is made and con-
-summated on that basis, it would be neither just nor equitable
‘to permit the vendors to deprive the purchaser of anything
they undertook to sell, and for which they have been paid.
‘The good will being thus sold as a thing of value, and paid
ifor by the purchaser as such, to deny him the benefit of it
~would operate as a fraud, which the law will not sanction.
We are not reluctant, therefore, in holding that, upon the
dissolution of a trading copartnership, its assets, including
the good will of the business, may be sold as a whole, either
=by the partners directly, or through a receiver, under an order
made by a court in a ease to which they are parties; and that
Ia purchaser thereof under either method of sale is entitled to
continue the business as the successor of the firm, and make
mse of the firm name for that purpose; and, further, that, where
ithe purchaser transfers the property so acquired by him to
Ia corporation of which he is a member, organized to succeed
to the business, it may eairry on the business, in the same man-
ner, under a corporate name including the name which had
been used by the firm. Iron Works Co. es. Payne-, 50 Ohio St.
115, 33 N. E. Rep. SS. 1!) L. R. A. 82. If it is desired to limit the
right of the purchaser or his vcndee in thie use of the firm
name, or exclude such right altogether, it should be done by
stipulation in the contract when the sale is made by the part-
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iconsideration for the purchase, nnd it bas long been the settled 
~aw, that, in cases of the kind mentioned, the purchaser obtains 
'the good will, including the right to the use of the firm name 
'in the oontinued prosecution of the business. In so holding, 
~he courts give effect to the intention of the parties as dis-
'.closed by the transaction. \Vherc the partners tllemselves 
;nake a. saJe of the firm effects, including the good will, the 
~ntention nnd understanding is manifest that the purchaser 
t1hall acquire and enjoy every advnntage and benefit which the 
lfi.rm bad, so fnr as the parties al'e capable of transferl'ing the 
isame; and, when a. sale is made under an order o-f court, in 
a proceeding to which the partners are parties, that intention 
is not less plainly inferable. The object to be accomplished 
tin ma.king the Rale, in eitht>r mode, of the good will, with the 
·other partnership effects, is to enhance the value of the assets · 
.'by inducing persons to bid more for them than they otberwis~ 
1would, under the belief that the purchaser will obtain nll the 
\benefits of the good will; and, when the sale is mad~ and con-
·summated on that basis, it would be neither just nor equitable 
'to permit the vendors to deprive the purchaser of anything 
they undertook to sell, and for which they have been paid. 
'The good will being thus sold as a thing of value, and paid 
1for by the purchaser as such, to deny him the benefit of it 
•would operate as a. fraud, which the law will not sanction: 
We are not reluctant, therefore, in holding that, upon the 
dissolution of a trading copartnership, its assets, including 
the good will of the business, may be sold as a. whole, either 
:by the partnel'S directly, or through a receiver, under an order 
made by a court in a case to which they ar~ parties; and that 
ta purchaser thereof under either method of sale is entitled to 
.continue the business as the successor of the firm., and make 
1use of the firm name for that purpose; and, further, that, where 
rthe purchaser transfers the property so ncquired by him to 
•a corporation of which he is a member, organized to succeed 
to the business, it may ca1rry on the business, in the same man-
ne>r, under a corporate name including the name which had 
lH~en usc>d by the firm. Iron Worlcs Co. t·s. Payne, 50 Ohio St. 
115, 33 N. R. IlPp. ~8. rn LR. A. 8~. If it is dc:sii'~d to limit the 
right of the purch:rner or his vc>mke in th:e use of the firm 
name, or exe1ude surh ri~ht alto~ether, it should be done by 
stipulation in the contract wh:'n the i;;aJe is made by the part-
ners, or by a provision to that cITPct in the <Jrder, when the 
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sale is made through the court. In the ca.se of Horton M anu-
facturing Co. cs. Horton Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816,
cited by counsel for the defendant in error, a copartnership,
without any consideration, obtained the consent of a person
not a member to use his name in, and as part of, the firm name.
That consent, the court held, amounted to a mere license,
revocable at pleasure, and the partnership so obtaining it
could not, without the consent of such person, “transfer the
right to another company or corporation to make a like use
of the name.” But that case cannot be regarded as an author-
ity against the claim made by the plaintilf in error in this
case; for, where-the partners themselves make a sale of their
firm’s good will, which carries with it the right to use the firm
name, or authorize such sale'to be made, it cannot be said
that the use of the name, either by the purchaser, or those suc-
ceeding to the business, is without their consent. As said by
the court in the case just cited, on page 819: “If one has made
of his own name a trade mark, and then transfers to another
his business, in which his name has been so used, the right
to continue such use of the name will doubtless follow the
business as often as it may be transferred.” '
Upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the judgment of
the circuit court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for
the plaintiff in error.
Judgment accordingly.
No'rE.—See l\Iechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ S6, 67. 88, 89.
Compare also with preceding and following cases.
TREGO vs. HUNT.’
English House of Lords, 18.95.
[1890] A. 0. '1.
For some years prior to 1876 \Villiam Henry Trego, the hus-
band of the appellant, Anna Trego, had carried on business
as a varnish and japan manufacturer at Bow and in London,
under'the name of Tabor, Trego & Co. In 1876 he took the
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sale is made through t~e court. In the ca.se of Horton Manu- . 
facturing Co. vs. Horton Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816, 
cited by counsel for the defendant in error, a copartnership, 
without any consideration, obtained the consent of n pers<>n 
not a member to use his name in, and as part of, the firm name. 
That consent, the court held, amounted to a mere license, 
revocable at pleasure, and the partnership so obtaining it 
could not, without the consent of such person, "transfer the 
right to another company or corporation to make a like use 
of the name." But that case cannot he regarded as an author-
ity against the claim made by the plaintiff in error in this 
case; for, where the partners themselves make a sale of their · 
firm's good will, which carries with it the right to use the firm 
name, or authorize such sale 'to be made, it cannot be said 
that the use of the name, either by the purchaiser, or those suc-
ceeding to the business, is without their consent. As said by 
the c~urt in the case just cited, on pnge 819: "If one has made 
of his own name a trade mttrk, and th~n transfers to another 
his business, in which his name has been so used, the right 
to continue such use of the name will doubtles~ follow the 
business as often as it may be transferred." 
Upon the facts admitted by the pleadings, the judgment of 
the circuit court must be reversed, and judgment rendered for 
the plaintiff in error. 
Judgment accordingly. 
NOTE.-See l\Iechem's Elem. or Pnrtn., §~so, 67. 88, SD. 
Cowpare also with prece~g and followiug cases. 
TREGO vs. HUNT: 
English House of Lords, 1895. 
(1806] A. C. 7. 
For some years prior to 1876 'Yi11iam Henry Trego, the hus-
bnnd of the appellant, Anna Trego, Irnd carriecl on business 
as a varnish .and japan man~f.acturer at now and in London) 
under'the nnme of Tabor, Trego & Co. In 1876 be took the 
respondent into partnership, but upon t11e terms that the good 
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will of the business should be and remain the sole property
of “’illiam Henry Trego. The partnership continued until
his death, in 1888. In February, 1889, a partnership agree-
ment was made between the appellants and the respondent
that they should carry on the business under the old style of
Tabor, Trego 8: Co., for a term of seven years, computed from
January 1, 1889. The agreement provided that the good will
should nevertheless be and remain the sole property of Anna
Trego. In December, 1894, the appellants found that the
respondent had employed a clerk of the firm, out of ofiice
hours, to copy for him the names, addresses, and businesses
of all the firm's customers. The respondent admitted that his
object in having the list made was to acquire information
which would enable him,‘ when the partnership expired, to can-
vass these persons, and to endeavor to obtain their custom for
himself. The appellants accordingly brought this action, and
moved for an injunction to restrain the respondent from mak-
ing any copy of or extract from the partnership books for any
purpose other than the purpose of the partnership business.
S'rmr.1_\'o, J. made no order, and this decision was affirmed
by the court of appeal. ‘(Lord Hsnsnunr, Lmnnm and A. L.
SMITH, L. J .J.) [1895] 1 Ch., 462.
H astlngs, Q. 0., and C'ozens—Hardy, Q. 0'. (Leigh Clare, with
them), for the appellants.
Sir R. E. Webster, Q. 0., and Buckley, Q. 0'. (George Hender-
son with them.)
Lord Hnnscnnnn. My Lords, a very impo-rtant question
which has given rise to much difference of judicial opinion
presents itself for decision in the present case. [His lord-
shi stated the facts set forth above and c nt'u
~.,km °"""“ ' f" nu: ' “ 4‘-J
been admitted in the argument, and for the purposes of it, that
the defendant intends, in the event of the partnership coming
to an end at the beginning of next year, to use this list for
the purpose of soliciting the customers of the present firm.
He proposes then to engage in a business of a similar nature
to that carried on by the firm, and the question which I have
to decide is whether he is entitled to make such a use of
the list.” .
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will of the business should be and remain the sole property 
of "rilliam Henry Trego. The partnership continued until 
bis death, in 1888. In February, 1889, a partnership agree-
ment was made between the appt>llants and the respondent 
that they should carry on the bu~iiwss under the old style of 
Tab<>r, Treg-o & Co., for a term of seven years, computed from 
January 1, 1889. The agreement provided that the good will 
should nevertheless be and remain the sole proprrty of Anna 
Trego. In Dc>rember, 18!>4, the appellants found that the 
respondent had employed a clerk of the firm, out of oflire 
hours, to copy for him the names, ndJresses, and bnsinesses 
of all the firm·s customers. The> r<'spoudent admitted that bis 
object in h:n·ing tb.e list made was to acquire infoi·mation 
which would <>nable him,, when the partnersllip expired, to can· 
vass these persons, and to endeavor to obtain their custom for 
himself. The appPllants accordingly brought this action, and 
moved for an injunction to restrain the respondent from mak-
ing any copy of or extract from the partnership books for any 
purpose otb~r than the purpose of the partner1d1ip business. 
RTmL1:-;o, J. made no order, and this decision was affirmed 
by the court of appeal. . (J .. ord HALSBURY, LINDLEY and A. L. 
SMITH, L. J.J.) [18!}5] 1 Ch., 462. 
Hastings, Q. C., and Cozens-Hardy, Q. 0. (Leigh Clare, with 
them), for the appellants. 
Sir R. E. Webster, Q. C., and Buckley, Q. 0. (George Hcnder-
1on with them.) 
. 
Lord HERSCHELL. My Lords, a very impo·rtant question ' 
which has given rise to much difference of judicial opinion 
presents itself for decision in the prC'sent ca.se. fllis lord-
ship stated thE; facts set forth.= and ~q,ntln~t 
S'l'tftt5Hl8' 1J., il.':'9:-U-~r''l i~@isi~R wa& &ftiPIBed 
been admitted in the argument, and for the purposes of it, that 
the defendant intends, in the event of the partnership coming 
to an end at the beginning of next year, to use this list for 
the purpose of soliciting the customers <>f the present firm. 
He proposes then to engage in a business of a similar nature 
to that carded on by the firm, and th<: question which I have 
to decide is whether he is entitled to make such a use of 
the list." 
It seems clear, the ref ore, that the point in contest before 
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the learned judge who heard this-motion was whether the
respondent was entitled to make use of the list of the custom-
ers of the firm which he had obtained in order to canvassthem
when he started business on his own account. I mention this
because it may have been open to contention on behalf of the
respondent that he was at all events entitled, whilst he
remained a) partner, to make copies of the partnership books,
and that it was premature to come to the court to restrain the
use of these copies even if he were not entitled when he ceased
to be a partner to canvass the customers of the firm-; but in
view of the fact that the respondent threatened to use the list
for the purpose of canvassing the persons named therein, and
having regard to the course taken before the learned judge,
I think it would have been open to him to grant an injunction,
though not in the terms prayed for, if the canvassing of those
customers would be a wrongful act on the part of the
respondent. -
STIRLING, J., and the court of appeals had, I think, no alter-
native but to refuse to grant any injunction. They were bound
by the decision of the court of appeal in the case of Pearson vs.
Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, that, even though the good will belongs
to one of the partners, it is lawful for the other, on the termi-
nation of the partnership, to canvass the customers of the
firm. Consistently with that decision, I think it would have
been impossible to hold that the appellants were entitled to
an injunction. That case is, however, open to review by your
lordships, and the real question in the present case is whether
it was well decided.
The question whether a. person who had sold the good will
of his business was entitled afterwards to canvass the cus-
tomers of that business came first before the courts for deci-
sion in the case of Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322. Lord
ROMILLY, M. R., answered in the negative._ He was of opinion
that the principles of equity must prevail, and that persons
are not at liberty to depreciate the thing which they have sold.
He considered that the defendant was not entitled personally,
or by letter, or by his agent or traveler, to go to anyone who
was a customer of the firm and to solicit him not to continue
business with the old firm but to transfer it to him; that this
was not a fair and reasonable thing to do after he had sold the
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the learned judge who heard this motion was whether the 
respondent was entitled to make use of the list of the custom-
ers of the firm which be had obtained in order to canvass.tllt•m 
when he started business on his own account. I mention thi~ 
because it may have been open to contention on behalf of the 
respondenttthat he was at all events entitled, whilst he 
remained apartner, to make oopies of the partnership books, 
and that it was premature to come to the court to restrain the 
use of these copies even if he were not entitled when he ceased 
to be a partner to canvass the customers of the firm; but in 
view of the fact that the respondent threatened to use the list 
for the purpose of canvassing the persons named therein, and 
having regard to the course taken before the learned judge, 
l think it would have been open to him to grant an injunction, 
though not in the terms prayed for, if the canvassing of those 
customers would be a wrongful act on the part of the 
respondent. 
S·.rmLING, J., and the court of appeals had, I think, no alter-
native but to refuse to grant any injunction. Tltey weI"e bound 
by the decision of the court of appeal in the case of Pearson vs. 
Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, that, even though the good will belongs 
to one of the partners, it is lawful for the other, on the tem1i-
nation of the partnership, to canvass the customers of the 
firm. Consistently with that decision, I think it would have 
been impossible to hold that the appellants were entitled to 
an injunction. That case is, however, open to review by your 
lordships, and the real question in the present case is whether 
it was well decided. 
The question whether a person who had sold the good will 
of his business was entitled afterwards to canvass the cus-
tomers of that business came .first before the courts for deci-
sion in the case of Labouchere 1;s. Dau:son, L. R. 13 Eq. 3~~. Lord 
RoMILLY, M. R, answered in the negative. _ Ile was of opinion 
that the principles of equity must prevail, and that persons 
are not at liberty to depreciate the thing which they have sold. 
He considered that the defendant was not entitled personally, 
or by letter, or by his agent or traveler, to go to anyone who 
was a customer of the firm and to solicit him not to oontinue 
business with the old firm but to transfer it to him; that this 
was not a fair and reasonable thing to do after he bad sold the 
good will. He accordingly granted an injunction to restrain 
26 
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the defendant, his partners, servants, or agents from applying
to any person who was a customer of the old firm prior to the
date of the sale, privately, by letter, personally or by a trav-
eler, asking such customers to continue to deal with the
defendant'or not to deal with the plaintiffs.
In the ease of Ginesi vs. Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, Sir George
Jnssnn, M. R., followed the decision in Labouchcrc rs. Dawson,
L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and expressed in very strong terms his con-
currence with it. He granted an injunction restraining the
defendants, their clerks, servants, agents, workmen, or others,
from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the cus-
tom of or orders for goods similar in character to those dealt
in by the old firm from such of the customers as were custom-
ers of the old firm, or from attempting to take away any por-
tion of the business bought by the plaintiff. This was all that
the plaintiff in that case asked for; but the learned judge went
further, and expressed a strong opinion that a man who sold
the good will of his business must not only refrain from solicit-
ing the old customers to deal with him, but must not deal with
them. It was not, he said, necessary to decide it on that
occasion; but he stated it because he thought what the mean-
ing of selling the good will of a trade or business is should be
thoroughly understood.
In the case of Lcggott vs. Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, which came
before the same learned judge shortly afterwards, he acted
upon the same view, and extended the injunction to restrain
the defendant from dealing with the customers of the old firm.
From this judgment there was an appeal; but the appellant
confined his appeal to that part of the order which restrained
him from dealing with the customers of the old firm». He made
no objection to the injunction so far as it restrained him from
canvassing those customers. The court of appeal dissolved
that part of the injunction of which the appellant complained.
They thought they could not on any just principle prevent the
defendant from supplying a man with goods if he applied for
them; that there was no implied obligation upon him, either
legal or moral, to shut his door against a customer who came
to him of his own free will; that a sale of good will did no-t
involve an implied contract not to deal with any customers
of the old business the good will of which was sold. The case
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the defendant, his partners, servants, or agents from applying 
to any p~rson who was a cµstomer of the old firm prior to the 
date of the sale, privately, by letter, personally or by a trav-
eler, asking such customers to continue to deal with the 
defendant· or not to deal with the plaintiffs. 
In the case of Ginesi t:s. Cooper, U Ch. D. 596, Sir George 
JESSEI,, M. R., followed the d?dsion in Labouchere t:s. Dawson, 
L. R. 13 Eq. 322, and expressed in very strong terms his con-
currence with it. He granted an injunction restraining the 
defendants, their cl2'rks, servants, agents, workmen, or others, 
from soliciting or in any way endeavoring to obtain the cus-
tom of or orders for goods similar in character to those dealt 
in by the old firm from such. of the customers as were custom-
ers of the old firm, or from attempting to take away any por-
tion of the business bought by the plaintiff. This was all that 
the plaintiff in that case asked for; but the learned judge went 
further, and expressed a strong opinion that a man who sold 
the good will of .his business must not only refrain from solicit-
ing the old customers to deal with him, but must not deal with 
them. It was not, he said, necessary to decide it on that 
occasion; but he stated it because he thought what the mean-
ing of selling the good will of a trade or business is should be 
thoroughly understood. 
In the case of Leggott vs. Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, which came 
before the same learned judge shortly afterwards, he a.eted 
upon the same view, and extended the injunction to restrain 
the defendant from dealing with the customers of the old firm. 
From this judgment there was an appeal; but the appellant 
confined his appeal to that part of the order which restrained 
him from dealing with the customers of the old firm. He made 
no objection to the injunction so far as it restrained him from 
canvassing those customers. The court of appeal dissolved 
that part of the injunction of which the appellant complained~ 
They thought they could not on any just principle prevent the 
defendant from supplying a man with goods if he applied for. 
them; that there was no implied obligation upon him, either 
legal or moral, to shut his door against a customer who came 
to hi.m of his own free will; that a sale of good will did not 
involve an implied contract not to deal with any customers· 
of the old business the good will of which was sold. The case . 
is chiefly impon:ant for present purposes, in so far as it dis-
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closes the view taken by the learned judges, who, on that
occasion, constituted the court of appeal, on the point now
under consideration.
In the case of Pearson rs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 to which
I shall have occasion to refer immediately, Co'r'roN, L. J ., stated
that the decision in Laboucherc vs. Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322,
was doubted in Lcggott as Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, by J AMES,,L.
J ., and himself. This is no doubt correct so far as Co1"ro.\1, L. J .,
is concerned; but I am unable to find any clear indication that
this was the view of JAMES, L. J. It is quite true that in an
early part of his judgment he said: “I do not like going much
into the case, because what I should say might perhaps be
considered to mean that the injunction which is submitted
to is too wide.” But in a. later part of the judgment he says:
“At first it did not appear to me that we might, from the
equitable view of the case, say that the defendant shall be pre-
vented from dealing with_any customer or customers whom
he had solicited; but it appeared to me that that was too vague
and too wide.” He pointed out that a man might give the
order afterwards without any reference to previous solicita-
tion. Further on, when discussing the effect of the agree-
ment, and showing that there was no implied obligation not
to deal with the customer, he says: “It means that you are
not to solicit customers.” The impression produced upon my
mind by the whole of the judgment is that the learned judge
had not arrived at the conclusion that Labouchcrc vs. Dawson,
L. R. 13 Eq. 322 was wrong. l3nn1"r, L. J ., expressed a decided
approval of that decision. He was of opinion that, on the sale
of a good will for a valuable consideration, there was an
implied contract that the vendor would not solicit former cus-
tomers, who were really the people who formed the good will.
The next case in which the matter was brought under the
consideration of the court of appeal was that of Walker vs.
Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355. In that case the good will of the busi-
ness carried on by a bankrupt had been sold by his trusteesin
bankruptcy. It was sought afterwards to restrain the bank-
rupt from soliciting the customers of that business. Sir
Gnoncn Jnssnn, M. R., refused tojgrant an injunction on the
ground that the doctrine laid down in Labouclmrc vs. Dawson,
L. B., 13 Eq. 322, did not apply to the case of a bankrupt whose
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closes the view taken by the learned judges, who, on that 
occasion, constituted the court of appeal, on the point now 
under consideration. 
In the case of Pearson -r:s. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145 to which 
I shall have occasion to refer immediately, CoTTO)J, L. J., stated 
that the decision in Labouchcre vs. Daicson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, 
was doubted in Lcg,qott vs Barrett, 15 Ch. D. 306, by J A:\rns,. L. 
J ., and himself. This is no doubt correct so far as COTTON, L. J., 
is concerned; but I am unable to find any clear indication that 
thh~ was the view of JA!lms, L. J. It is quite true that in an 
early part of his judgment he said: "I do not like going much 
into the case, because ·what I should say might perhaps be 
considered to mean that the injunction whic3. is submitted 
to is too wide." But in a later part of the judgment he says: 
"At first it did not appear to me that we might, from the 
(>quitable view of the cas~, say that the defendant shall be pre-
vented from dealing with.any customer or customers whom 
he bad solicited; but it appeared to me that that was too vague 
and too wide." He pointed out that a man might give tlle 
order afterwards without any reference to previous solicita-
tion. Further on, when discussing the effect of the agree· 
ment, and showing that there was no implied obligation not 
to deal with the customer, he says: "It means that you are 
not to solicit customers." The impression produced upon my 
mind by the whole of the judgment is that the learned judge 
bad not arrived at the conclusion thnt Laboucltcrc -vs. Dawson, 
L. R. 13 Eq. 322 was wrong. BnETT, l.1. J., expressed a decided 
approval of that decision. He was of opinion that, on the sale 
of a good will for a valuable consideration, there was an 
implied contract that the vendor would not solicit former CUR-
tomers, who were really the pe-0ple who formed the good will. 
The next case in which the matter was brought under tbe 
consideration of the court of appeal was that of Walker t:.'l. 
Mottram., 19 Ch. D. 3ri5. In that case the good will of th~ busi-
ness carried on by a bankrupt bad been sold by his trustees in 
bankruptcy. It wa.s sought afterwards to restrain the bank-
rupt from soliciting the customPrs of that business. Sir 
GEORGE JESSEL, 1\1. R., refused to grnnt an injunction on the 
ground that the doctrine laid down in Labouclwrc -rs. Dazc.<Jon, 
TJ. R., 13 Eq. 322, did not apply to the case of a bankrupt wbosP. 
bm;iness bad been sold by his trustees. This judgment was 
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aflirmed by the court of appeal. Of the lord justices who then
constituted the court, BAGGALLAY, L. J., expressed a strong
doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Labouchere vs.
Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322. He said that it appeared to him, as
at present advised, that it went far beyond what any of the pre-
vious decisions would have sanctioned. Lcsn and Lmnuar,
L. JJ., the other members of the court, said that the rule laid
down in Labouchcre vs. Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322, had, it was
believed, been recognized and acted upon in practice, and,
whatever else might be said of it, the rule was in accordance
with the general opinion of what was fair and right, and was
easily applied.
In the case of Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, the question
came again before the court of appeal. The facts were there
less favorable to the plaintiff than in the case of Labouchere
vs. Dawson, and BAGGALLAY and Lmnnnr, L. JJ., both consid-
ered that, even if Labouchere vs. Dawson was rightly decided,
the case then before them was not’ governed by it. Bacon.-
LAY and Co1"roz~:, L. JJ., however, distinctly rested their judg-
ments on the ground that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson
was wrong and ought to be overruled. LINDLEY, L. J., on the
other hand, was of opinion that it was rightly decided. The
reason of BAGGALLAY, L. J., for dissenting from Labouchere vs.
Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the report of his judgment,
appears to be that it went beyond a number of decision of a
higher court, and, as he thought, without sufficient reason.
Even assuming that the decision in Labouchere rs. Dawson
went beyond previous decisions, this does not seem to me to
afford any indication that it was wrong, unless it can be shown
that it was in conflict with the principles involved in those
earlier decisions. COTTON, L. J., examined the earlier deci-
sions and arrived at the conclusion that Lord Ennos was
against the notion that the vendor of the good will of a busi-
ness was, in the absence of express contract, to be restrained
from carrying on a similar business in the way in which he
might lawfully carry it on if there had been no sale of the good
will. The learned lord justice pointed out that Lord Romnnx
rested his decision in Labouchere rs. Dawson on the principle
that a man could not derogate from his grant. “But,” he said,
“it is admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his
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affirmed by the rourt of appeal. Of the lord justices who then 
constituted the court, BAGGALLAY, L. J., expressed a strong 
doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Labouchere vs. 
Dawson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322. He said that it appeared to him, as 
at present advised, that it went far beyond what any of the pre· 
vious decisions would have sanctioned. Ll:'SII and LrnDLEY, 
L. J,J., the other members of the court, said that the rule laid 
clown in Labouchcre i·s. Datcson, L. R., 13 Eq. 322, had, it was 
ht>lieved, been recognized and acted upon in practice, and, 
whatever else might be said of it, the rule was in accordanc<> 
with the general opinion of what was fair and right, and was 
easily a.pplied. 
In the case of Pearson vs. Pearson, 27 Ch. D. 145, the question 
came again before the court of appeal. The facts were thl'r(• 
less favorable to the plaintiff than in the case of Labouchere 
t'B. Dairson, and BAGGAJ..LAY and LINDLEY, L. JJ., both consid· 
ered that, eve~ if Labouchere vs. Daicson was rightly decided, 
the case then before them was not" governed by it. BAGGAL-
L.A.Y and CoTTON, L. JJ., however, distinctly rested their judg-
ments on the ground that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson. 
was wrong and ought to be overruled. LI:SDLEY, L. J., on the 
other hand, was of opinion that it was rightly decided. The 
reason of BAGGALL.&.Y, L. J., for dissenting from La.bouchere i·s. 
Dawson, so far as it is disclosed by the report of his judgment, 
appears to be that it went beyond a number of decisions of a 
higher court, and, as he thought, with<>ut sufficient reason. 
Even assuming that the decision in Labouchere vs. Dawson 
went beyond previous decisions, this does not seem to me to 
afford any indication that it was wrong, unless it can be shown 
that it was in conflict with the principles involved in those 
earlier decisions. COTTON, L. J., examined the earlier deci-
sions and arrived at the conclusion that Lord ELDON was 
against the n<>tion that the vendor of the good will of a busi-
ness was, in the absence of express contract, to be restrained 
from carrying on a similar business in the way in which be 
might lawfully carry it on if there bad been no sale of the good 
will. The learned lord justice pointed out that Lord RoMILLY 
rested his decision in Laboucltere i·s. Dau;son on the principle 
that a man could not derogate from his grant. "But," he said, 
"it is admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his 
business may set up a similar business next door and say that 
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he is the person who carried on the old business; yet such
proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customer from
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. If
he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with him
and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to them and
ask them to do so? I think it would be wrong to put such a
meaning on ‘good will’ as would give a right to such an injunc-
tion as has been granted in the present case.”
I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state
at once, however, that I'can find nothing in them inconsistent
with the decision in'Labouchere vs. Dawson. It no doubt went
beyond them, inasmuch a it dealt with a question not deter-
mined by them; but this seems to me to be no demerit, nor to
afford any indication that it was wrong. The earliest case
which has any bearing upon the point is that of Cruttwell vs.
Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, before Lord Ennox. The business of a
bankrupt, who was a carrier between Bristol and London, had
been sold by his assignees in bankruptcy. He afterwards com-
menced carrying on the trade of a carrier between Bristol,
Bath and London; but though the termini were the same the
route employed was different. He addressed direct solicita-
tion to the public for the carriage of their goods, stating that
he had been reinstated in his business; and there was further,
in the opinion of the lord chancellor, so much probability of
direct solicitation to the customers of the old concern, in some
few instances that the fact might fairly be assumed. Under
these circumstances the purchaser of the bankrupt’s business
applied for an -injunction. The case was therefore the same
as Walker vs. Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355, w=here Sir Gnonon Jas-
snn—than whom no one has more strongly insisted upon the
propriety of the decision in Laboucherc vs. Da-wson—was of
opinion that no injunction should be granted. The bankrupt
was no party to the contract of sale; there could therefore be
no implied contract on his part to be derived from it. It is
most material also to observe what was the nature of the
injunction then in question. It was whether the bankrupt
was to be restrained from carrying on the trade which he was
pursuing of carrying goods between Bristol, Bath and London.
The lord chancellor held that he could not be so restrained;
and I think it must now be taken as settled that the sale of the
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be is the person who carried on the old business; yet such 
proceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customer from 
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. If 
he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with him 
and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to them and 
• ask them to do so? I think it would be wrong to put such a 
meaning on 'good will' as would give a right to such an injunc-
tion as has been granted in the present case." 
I propose now to examine the older authorities. I may state 
at once, however, that I can find nothing in them inconsistent 
with the decision in Laboucnere -vs. Dawson. It no doubt went 
bc>yond them, inasmuch as it dealt with a question not deter· 
mined by them; but this seems to me to be no demerit, nor to 
~tfford any indication that it was wrong. The earliest case 
which has any bearing upon the point is that of Cruttmell vs. 
Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, before Lord ELoo~. The business of a 
bankrupt, who was a carrier between Bristol and London, had 
been sold by his assignees in bankruptcy. Ile afterwards com-
menced carrying on the trade of a carrier between Bristol>-
Bath and London; but though the termini were tile same the 
route employed was different. Ile addressed direct solicita-
tion to the public for the carriage of their goods, stating that 
he had been reinstated in his business; and there was further, 
in the opinion of the lord chancellor, so much p1·obability of 
direct solicitation to the customers of the old concern, in some 
few instances that the fact might fairly be assumed. Under 
these circumstances the purchaser of the bankrupt's business 
applied for an injunction. The case was therefore the same 
· as Walker vs . .Mottram, 19 Ch. D. 355, where Sir GEORGE JES-
SEL-than whom no one has more strongly insisted upon the 
propriety of the decision in Laboucltere t:s. Daicson-was of 
opinion that no injunction should be granted. The bankrupt 
was no party to the contract of sale; there could the1·efore be 
no implied contract on his part to be derived from it. It is 
most material also to observe what was the nature of the 
injunction then in question. It was whether the bankrupt 
was to be restrained from carrying on the trade which be waa 
pursuing of carrying goods between R1·istol, B:ith and London. 
'l'he lord chancellor held that he could not be so restrained; 
and I think it must now be taken as settled that the sale of the 
~ood will of a business, even when 1 be vendor himself is a 
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party to the contract, does not impose upon him any obliga-
tion to refrain from carrying on a trade of the same nature as
before. But Lord ELDON certainly did not decide that such a
vendor was entitled to solicit the customers of the old-firm.
He was not asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from so doing. It was suflicient for the decision of that case-
that, in the opinion of the lord chancellor, there was no prin-
ciple arising out of the provisions of the bankruptcy law upon
which the court could hold that the bankrupt ought not to
engage in the same trade and by the same road as before;
though I think that, so far, the opinion of the lord chancellor
would have been the same if the sale o-f the business had been
effected by the bankrupt himself and not by his assignees.
The importance of the case consists in the definition which
Lord ELDON gave of the good will there sold. He said: “The
good will which has been the subject of sale is nothing more
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the
old place. Fraud would form a different consideration; but if
that effect was prevented by no other means than those which
belong to the fair course of improving a trade in which it was
lawful to engage, I should, by interposing carry the effect of
injunction to a much greater length than any decision has
authorized or imagination ever suggested.’/? These observa-
tions were much reliedon by COTTON, L. J ., in Pedrson vs. Pear-
son, 27 Ch. D. 145. If the language of Lord Ennox is to be
taken as a definition of good will of general application, I think
it is far too narrow, and I am not satisfied that it was intended
by Lord Ennox as -an exhaustive definition.
“ ‘Good will,’ I apprehend,” said Wool), V. 0., in Ohurton vs.
Douglas, Joh. 174, 188, “must mean every advantage—every
positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with
the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the
business hirnself—that has been acquired by the old firm in
carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises
in which the business was previously carried on, or with the
name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with
it the benefit of the business.” The learned vice chancellor
pointed out in this connection that it would be absurd to say
that when a large wholesale business is conducted the public

















































































































































206 CA.sEs o~ .P.AnT.NEnSIIIP. 
party to the contract, does not impose upon him any obliga-
tion to refrain from carrying on a trade of the same nature as 
before. But Lord ELDON certainly did not decide that such a 
vendor was entitled to solicit the customers of the old· firm. 
He was not asked for an injunction to restrain the defendant 
from so doing. It was sufficient for the decision of that case• . 
that, in the opinion of the lord chancellor, there was no prin-
ciple arising out of the provisions of the bankruptcy law upon 
which the court could hold that the bankrupt ought not to 
engage in the same trade and by the same road as before; 
though I think that, so far, the opinion of the lord chancellor 
would have been the same if the sale of the business had been 
effected by the bankrupt himself and not by his assignees. 
The importance of the case consists in the definition which 
Lord ELDON gave of the good will there sold. He said: ''The 
good will which bas been the subject of sale is nothing more 
than the probability that the old customers will resort to the 
old place. Fraud would form a different consideraition; but if 
that effect was prevented by no other means than those which 
belong to the fair course of improving a trade in which it was 
lawful to engage, I should, by interposing carry the effect of 
injunction to a much greater length than any decision baa 
authorized or imagination ever suggested~ These observa-
tions were much relied on by COTTON, L. J., in Petit-son vs. Pea.r-
son, 27 Ch. D. 145. If the language of Lord ELDON is to be 
taken as a definition of good will of general application, I think 
it is far too narrow, and I am not satisfied that it was intended 
by Lord ELDON as an exhaustive definition. 
"'Good will,' I apprehend," said 'Vooo, V. C., in Ohurton t:B. 
Douglas, Job. 174, 188, "must mean every advantage-every 
positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with 
the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the 
business himself-that has been acquired by the old firm in 
carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises 
in which the business was previously carried on, or with the 
name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with 
it the benefit of the business." The learned vice chancellor 
pointed out in this connection that it would be absu:rd to say 
that when a la:rge wholesale business is conducted the public 
are mindful whether it is carried on in Fleet street or in the 
Strand .. 
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The question, what is meant by “good will,” is, no doubt, a
critical one. Sir GEORGE J nssnn, discussing in Ginesi rs.
Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, the language of WOOD, V. C., which I
have just quoted, said: “Attracting customers to the business
is a matter connected with the carryingtof ityog. It is the
formation of that connection which has made the value of the
thing that the late firm sold, and they really had nothing else
to sell in the shape of good will.” ' He pointed out that, in the
case before him, the connection had been formed by years of
work. The members of the firm knew where to sell the stone,
and he asked: “Is it to be supposed that they did not sell
that personal connection when they sold the trade or business
and the good will thereof?”
The present master of the rolls took much the same_view as
to what constitutes the good will of a business. I cannot
myself doubt that they were right. It is the connection thus
formed together with the circumstances, whether of habit or
otherwise, which tend to make it permanent, that constitutes
the good will of a business. It is this which constitutes the
difference between a business just started, which has no good
will attached to it, and one which has acquired a good will.
The former trader has to seek out his customers from among
the community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready
made. He knows what members of the community are pur-
chasers of the articles in which he deals, and are not attached
by custom to any other establishment. What obligations then
does the sale of the good will of a business impose upon the
vendor? I do not think they would necessarily be the same
under all circumstances.
In Cook vs. Collingridge, Collyer on Partnership, 2d Ed. 215,
27 Beav. 456, Lord Chancellor Ennos had to determine what
orders were to be given where a partnership had expired by
efiiuxion of time, and where the good will had to be valued.
He declared that there existed no obligation upon the part-
ners to restrain them from carrying on the same trade, or any
of them wanting to do so; that a claim to have an estimated
value put upon any subject that could be considered as
described by the term “good will” could not be supported upon
the same grounds or principles as those upon which a value
was received from a partner buying the share of the partner
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The question, what is meant by "good will," is, no doubt, a 
critical one. Sir GEORGE JESSEL, discussing in Ginesi -i;s. 
Cooper, 14 Ch. D. 596, the language of Wooo, V. C., which I 
have just quoted, said: "Attra<..1:ing customers to the business 
is a matter connected with the carrying (~f it ·~ It is the 
formation of that connection which has made the value of the 
thing that the late firm sold, and they really had nothing else 
to sell in the shape of good will." · He poi.nted out that, in the 
case before him, the connection had been formed by years of 
work. The members of the firm knew where to sell the stone, 
and he asked: "Is it to be supposed that they did not sell 
·that personal connection when they sold the trade or business 
and the good will thereof?" 
The present master of the rolls took much the same. view as 
to what constitutes the good will of a business. I cannot 
myself doubt that they were right. It is the connection thus 
formed together with the circumstances, whether of habit or 
otherwise, which tend to make it permanent, that constitutes 
the good will of a business. It is this which constitutes the 
difference between a business just started, which has no good 
will attached to it, and one which has acquired a good will. 
The former trader has to seek out his customers from among 
the community as best he can. The latter has a custom ready 
made. He knows what memt>ers of the community are pur-
chasers of the articles in which be deals, and are not attached 
by custom to any other establishment. ·what obligations then 
does the sale of the good will of a business impose upon the 
vendor? I do not think they would necessarily be the same 
under all circumstances. 
In Cook vs. Collingridge, Collyer on Partnership, 2d Ed. 215, 
27 Beav. 456, Lord Chancellor ELDON bad to determine what 
orders were to be given where a partnership bad expired by 
effluxion of time, and where the good will had to be valued. 
He declared that there existed no obligation upon the part-
ners to restrain them from carrying on th~ same trade, or any 
of them wanting to do so; that a claim to have an estimated 
value put upon any subject that could be considered as 
described by the term "good will" could not be supported upon 
the same grounds or principles as those upon which a. value 
was received from a partner buying the share of the partner 
going out of the business and retiring from the trade alto-
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gether. He thought that all that could be valued was the
chance of the customers adhering to the old establishment,
notwithstanding that the previous partners or any of them
carried on a similar business elsewhere.
In Johnson vs. Hcllcley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, a bill was filed by
the surviving partner to wind up the business of the partner-
ship. The usual decree was made. The chief clerk certified
that it was most beneficial that the business should be sold
as a going concern. The master of the rolls ordered it to be
stated in the advertisement and particulars that the surviving
partner would be at liberty to continue carrying on the busi-
ness of a wine merchant in the same town and place. This
judgment was aflirmcd by the Lord Justices. In Hall vs. Bar-
rows, 4 D. J. & S. 150, Lord Chancellor WI-zsrnunv said: “I
think the direction to value the good will should be accom-
panied by a declaration defining what is meant by it, at least
negatively; that is to say, a declaration that the good will is
not to be valued upon the principle that the surviving part-
ner, if he were not the purchaser, will be restrained from set-
ting up the same description of business.” In cases of this
description, where a partnership has been dissolved by etllux-
ion of time or death, the good will is regarded as a part of the
assets, and subject therefore to realization on winding up the
partnership; but it would obviously be absurd that because a
partnership becomes thus dissolved those who formerly con-
stituted the firm, or the survivors thereof, where the dissolu-
tion has been due to death, should thereafter be restrained
from carrying on what trade they pleased. \Vhatever restric-
tion the sale of the good will may im-pose, it is clear that in
this class of cases it could not extend to prevent the former
partners carrying on a similar trade to that in which they
were previously engaged. It is noteworthy that in Johnson vs.
Hcl-IcIe_1/, 2 D. J. & S. 446, it was thought necessary to warn
intending purchasers that, though the good will was being
sold, one of the persons who had previously carried on the
bnsiness might continue to trade in the same town; and Lord
\\'r:s'rni:nY thought it necessary to give the same warning to
the person who was to value the good will in Hall vs. Barrows,
4 D. J. & S. 151). _
These circumstances appear to me to afford an indication
that the courts recognized that their view of what was meant
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gether. He thought that all that could be valued was th~ 
chance of the customers adhering to the old establishment, 
notwithstanding that the previous partners or any of them 
carried on a similar business elsewhere. 
In Johnson i·s. Hellcley, 2 D. J. & S. 446, a bill was filed by 
the surviving pa~tner to wind up the business of the partner-
ship. The usual dt>cree was made. The chief clerk certified 
that it was most beneficial that the business should be sold 
as a going conc<>rn. The master of the rolls ordered it to be 
stated in the adverti~ment and particulars that the survh·ing 
partner would be at liberty to c<Jntinue carrying on the busi-
ness of a wine merchant in the same town and pince. This 
judgment was affirnwd by the Lord Justices. In Hall -z:s. Bar-
roirs, 4 D. J. & S. 150, L<Jrd Chancellor \VESTBURY said: "I 
think the dirPetion to value the good will should be accom-
panied by a declai·ation defining what is meant by it, at least 
negatively; that is to say, a declaration that the good will is 
not to be valued upon the principle that the sur\"iving part-
ner, if he were not the purchaser, will be restrained from set-
ting up the same description of business." Jn cases of this 
deseription, where a partnership has been dissolved by efilux-
ion of time or death, the go-0d will is regarded as a part of the 
assets, and subject therefore to ri:•alization on winding up the 
partnership; but it would obviously be absurd that because n. 
partnership b<'comes thus dissolved those who formerly con-
stituted the firm, or the survi\'ors th::-1·eof, where the dissolu-
tion has been due to dc>ath, should thereafter be restrained 
from carrying on what tl'ade thry pleased. \Vhutevt•r restric-
tion the sale of the good will may imposc>, it is clear that in 
this class of cases it could not extend to prevent the former 
partners carr,vin~ on a similar trad~ to that in which they 
were pre,·iously engag<'d. It is notewo11by that in Johnson t'S. 
Hr1lclcy, 2 D . . J. & S. 44G, it was thought necessary to warn 
intending pnrehni;:C'rs that, though the good will was being 
sol<l, one of thC' persons who had previously carried on the 
bu:--iness might eo11tinue to trade in the same town; and Lord 
"'1·:sTin:nY thought it necessary to give the same warning to 
the person who was to value th~ good will in Hall vs. Barroics, 
4 D. J. & S. l:JO. 
'l'hese <"ircumstances appear to me to afford an indication 
tliat the courts rC'co~nized that th<'ir view of what was meant 
by "good will" and the effect of a sale of it ditiercd from the 
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popular conception. Vv'here the good will of a business is not
sold under circumstances such as I have been discussing, but
the sale is the voluntary act of the vendors, I am by no means
satisfied that a different effect might not have been given to
the sale and the obligations which it imposed. It might have
been held that the vendor was not entitled to derogate from
his grant by seeking in any manner'to withdraw from the pur-
chaser the customers of the old business, as he would do by
setting up a business in such a place or under such circum-
stances that it would immediately compete for the old custom~
1-rs. It is now, however, too late to make any such distinction.
I think it must be treated as settled that whenever the good
will of a business is sold the vendor does not, by reason only
of that sale, come under a restriction not to carry on a com-
peting business. This is really the strong point in the posi-
tion of those who maintain that Labouchere vs. Dawson, L. R.
13 Eq. 322, was wrongly decided. Co'r'ros, L. J., says: “It is
admitted that a person who has sold the good will of his busi-
ness may set up a similar business next door and say that he
is the person who carried on the old business. Yet such pro-
ceedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customers from
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line.
If he may, by his acts, invite the old customers to deal with
him and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to
them and ask them to do so?” I quite feel the force of this
argument, but it does not strike me as conclusive. It is often
impossible to draw the line and yet possibly to be perfectly
certain that particular acts are on one side of it or the other.
It does not seem to me to follow that because a man may, by
his acts, invite all men to deal with him, and so, amongst the
rest of mankind, invite the former customers of the firm, he
may use the knowledge which he has acquired of what per-
sons were customers of the old firm in order, by an appeal
to them, to eek to weaken their habit of dealing where they
have dealt before, or whatever else binds them to the old busi-
ness, and so to secure their custom for himself.’ This seems
to me to be a direct and intentional dealing with the good
will and endeavor to destroy it. If a person who has pre
viously been a partner in a firm sets up in a business on his
own account and appeals generally for custom, he only does
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popular conception. Where the good will of a business is not 
sold under circumstances such as I have been discussing, but 
the sale is the voluntary act of the vendors, I am by no means 
satisfied that a different effect might iiot have been given to 
the sale and the obligations which it imposed. It might have 
been held that the vendor was not entitled to derogate from 
his grant by seeking in any manner'to withdraw from the pur-
<'haser the customers of the old business, as be would do by 
~ctting up a business in such a place or under such circum-
.-tances that it would immediately compete for the old custom--
<•rs. It is now, however, too la.te to make any such distinction. 
I think it must be treated as settled that wbeneve1· the good 
will of a business is sold the vendor does not, by reason only 
of that sale, come under a restriction not to carry on a com-
J>eting bnsin~ss. This· is really the strong point in the posi-
tion of those who maintain that Laboucltere vs. Dawson, L. R. 
13 Eq. 322, was wrongly decided. CoTTON, L. J., says: "It ia 
admitted that a person who bas sold the good will of bis busi-
ness may set up a similar business next door and say that be 
is the person who carried on the old business. Yet such pro-
("eedings manifestly tend to prevent the old customers from 
going to the old place. I cannot see where to draw the line. 
If he ~y, by bis acts, invite the old customers to deal with 
him and not with the purchaser, why may he not apply to 
them and ask them to do so?" I quite feel the force of this 
argument, but it does not strike me as conclusive. It is often 
impo~sible to dra.w the line and yet possibly to be perfectly 
certain that particular acts are on one side of it or the other. 
It does not seem to me to follow that because a man may, by 
his acts, invite all men to deal with him, and so, amongst the 
rest of mankind, invite the former customers of the firm, he 
may use the knowledge which be bas acquired of what per-
sons were customers of the old firm in order, by an appeal 
to them, to seek to weaken their habit of dealing where they 
have dealt before, or whatever else binds them to the old busi-
ness, and so to secure their custom for himself., This seems 
to me to be a direct and intentional dealing with the good 
will and endeavor to destroy it. If a person who has pre-
viously been a partner in a firm sets up in a business on his 
own account and appeals generally for custom, he only does 
that which any member of the public may do, and which those 
27 
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carrying on the same trade are already doing. It is true that
those who were former customers of the firm to which he
=belonged may of their own accord transfer their custom to
.him; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable, and does
not result from any act of his. He only conducts his busi-
ness in precisely the same way as he would if he had never
been a member of the firm to which he previously belonged.
~But when he specifically and directly appeals to those who
were customers of the previous firm he seeks to take advan-
tage of the connection previously formed by his old firm, and
of the knowledge of that connection which he has previously
acquired, to take that which constitutes the good will away
-from the persons to whom it has been sold and to restore
it to himself. It is said, indeed, that he may not represent
himself as a successor of the old firm, or as carrying on a
continuation of their business, but this in many cases appears
to me of little importance, and of small practical advantage.
if canvaing the customers of the old firm were allowed with-
out restraint. I do not think that in cases where an injunc-
tion was granted in the terms employed in Labouchere vs. Daw-
son, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, there would be any real difliculty in
drawing the line and determining whether there had been a
breach of it or not. In several cases such injunctions were
granted. and there i nothing to show that any practical dif-
flculty arose in enforcing them. It is not material to consider
whether, on the sale of a good will, the obligation on the part
of the vendor to refrain from canvassing the customers is to
be regarded as based upon the principle that he is not entitled
-to depreciate that which he has sold, or as arising from an
implied contract to abstain from any act intended to deprive
the purchaser of that which has been sold to him and to
restore it to the vendor. I am satisfied that the obligation
'exists, and ought to be enforced by a court of equity. I have
so far dealt with the case as if the good will had been sold,
but I think the rights and obligations must be precisely the
same for present purposes when, on the creation of a partner-
ship, it has been agreed that the good will shall belong
exclusively to one of the partners.
For these reasons I think the judgment must be reversed
and that an injunction should he granted in the form adopted
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carrying on the same trade are already doing. It is true that 
those who were former customers of the firm to which he 
:belonged may of their own accord transfer their custom to 
.him; but this incidental advantage is unavoidable, and does 
not result from any act of his. He only conducts bis busi-
ReSB in precisely the same way as he would if he had never 
been a member of the firm to which he previously belonged. 
·But when he specifically and directly appeals to tboRe who 
were cm~tomers of the previous firm he seeks to take advan-
tage of the connection previously formed by bis old firm, and 
of the knowledie of that connection which he has previously 
acquired, to take that which constitutes the good will away 
·from the persons to whom it has been sold and to restore 
it to hi111.tSelf. It is said, indeed, that he may not represent 
himself as a successor of the old firm, or as Qarrying on a 
contilrnation of their business, but this in many cases appears 
to me of little importance, and of small practical adV'antage. 
if canvassiag the customers of the old firm were allowed with-
out restraint. I do not think that in cases where an injunc-
tion was granted in the terms employed in Labouc11cre vs. Dau:-
son, L. R. 13 Eq. 322, there would be any real difficulty in 
drawi11g the line and determining whether there had been a 
breach of it or not. In several cases such injunctions were 
•granted, and there is nothing to show that any practical dif-
ficulty arose in enforcing them. It is not material to consider 
whether, on the sale of a good will, the obligation on the part 
·of the vendor to refrain froll) canvassing the customers is to 
'he regarded as based upon the principle that he is not entitled 
to depreciate that which he has sold, or as arising from an 
implied contract to abstain from any act intended to deprive 
the purcba~er of that which has been sold to him and to 
restore it to the vendor. I am satisfied that the obligation 
'exists, and ought to be enforced by a court of equity. I have 
so far dealt with the case as if the good will had been sold, 
but I think the rights and obligations must be precisely the 
same for present purposes when, on the creation of a partner-
ship, it has been agreed that the good will shall belong 
exclusively to one of the partners. 
For th£'!5e reasons I think the judgment must be reversed 
and thut an injunction i.-;hould he granted in the form adopted 
in Labouchere i:s. Dairsun, L. R. ta Eq. 322, with the modifica-
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tion rendered necessary by the circumstance that here the
partnership has not yet expired.
Under the very peculiar circumstances I think that_no costs
should be given here or in the court of appeal. -
Lords MACNAGHTEN, DAVEY and Asnnocnxn, concurred.
Order of the court of appeal reversed, with a declaration
that the appellants are entitled to an injunction restraining
the respondent, his partners, servants, or agents, from apply-
ing privately, by letter, personally, or by a traveler, to any
person who was, prior to the dissolution of the partnership,
a customer of the firm of Tabor, T1-ego & Co., asking such cus-
tomer to continue after the dissolution to deal with him, the
respondent, or not to deal with the appellant; the respond-
ent to repay to the appellants the costs in the court of appeal
paid by them to him. 1
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tion rendered necessary by the circumstance that here the 
partnership has not yet expired. 
Under the very peculiar circumstances I think that.no costs 
should be given here or i,i the court of appeal. 
Lords MACNAGHTEN, DA VEY and ASHBOt:RXE, concurred. 
Order of the court of appeal reversed, with a declaration 
that the appellants are entitled to an injunction restraining 
_the ~spondent, his partners, servants, or agents, from apply-
ing privately, by ·Jetter; per8onally, or by a traveler, to any 
person who was, prior to the dissolution of the partnership, 
a customer of the ftrm of Tabor, Trego & Co., asking such cus-
tomer to continue after the dissolution to deal with him, the 
respondent, or not to deal with the appellants; the respond-
ent to repay to the appellants the costs in the court of appeal 
paid by them to him. A 




RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARD
EACH OTHER.
LATTA vs. KILBOURN.
United States Supreme Court, 1893.
150 U. S. 524, 37 L. Ed. 1169.
Action by Kilbourn and Olmstead against Latta for an
account of profits made by the latter in transactions which
the former claimed were partnership transactions and the
benefit of which therefore enured to the firm, of which all
three had been members but which was now dissolved. Latta
and Kilbourn had been partners as “real estate brokers and
auctioneers” under the firm name of Kilbourn & Latta. After-
wards Olmstead was taken into the firm, the name remaining
the same. During the continuance of the firm, Latta entered
into real estate speculations with one Dr. Stearns, which
resulted in large profits, and it was to secure a share in these
that this action was chiefly instituted. The court below
decreed that Latta should account to his former partners for
these profits, and Latta appealed. It was claimed by com-
plainants that, when Olmstead was taken into the firm, a new
arrangement was made to the effect that if either member
heard of a piece of property for sale and saw an opportunity
for speculation, or was going into any speculation, it should be
communicated to the firm, so that the other partners also
might have an opportunity of going into the speculation.
Other facts appear in the opinion.
W. D. Dazvidgc, for appellant.




















































































































































RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTNERS TOWARD 
EACH OTHER. 
tATTA vs. KILBOURN. 
United States Supreme Court, 189~. 
150 U. 8. 524, 87 L. Ed. 1169. 
Action by Kilbourn and Olmstead against Lattll for an 
account of profits made by the latter in transactions which 
the former claimed were pa1·tnership transactions and the 
heneftt of which therefore enured fo the firm, of which all 
three had been membel"B but which was now dissolved. Latta 
and Kilbourn had been partners as "real estate brokers and 
auctioneers" under the firm name of Kilbourn & Latta. After-
wards Olmstead was taken into the firm, the na~ rema.ining 
the sauie. During the continuance of the ftrm, Latta entered 
into real eetate speculations with one Dr. Stearns, which 
resulted in large priofits, and it was to secure a share in these 
that this action was chiefly instituted. · The court below 
decreed that Latta should account to his former partners for 
these profits, and IALtta appealed. It was claimed by com-
plainants that, when Olmstead was taken into the firm, a new 
arrangement was made to the effect that if either member 
heard of a piece of property for sale and ea w an opportunity 
for speculation, or was going into any speculation, it should bP 
communicated to the firm, so that the other partners also 
might have an opportunity of going into the speculation. 
Other facts appear in the opinion. 
W. D. nat,i<lgc, for appellant. 
Enoch Tolfcn and W. F. Jlatti11gl,11, for appellees. 
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Jacxson, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of other
matters.) The court below based opinion upon two grounds:
First, that the scope of the cop nership business and agree-
ment, as alleged in the third paragraph of the bill, was estab-
lished, and that the appellant could not engage in purchases
of real estate on his own account or in connection with others
except by the consent of his copartners, without violating the
duty and obligation which he owed to his firm; and, se{:p_1_1flQ,
that, even if the copartnership did not include the business of
buying and selling real estate on partnership account, still the
appellant could not employ the knowledge and information
acquired in the course of the partnership business in respect
to the real estate market, in making purchases or transactions
for his own benefit.
The general principles on which the court proceeded admit
of no question, it being settled that one- partner cannot,
directly or indirectly, use partnership assets for his own bene-
fit; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partner-
ship, take any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot
carry on the business of the partnership for his private advan-
tage; that he cannot carry on another business in competition
or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the
benefit of his time, skill, and fidelity without being account-
able to his copartners for any profit that may accrue to him
therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself
that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of
which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge
or information, which may be properly regarded as the prop-
erty of the partnership, in the sen-se that it is available or
useful to the firm for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business.
It therefore becomes necessary, in testing the liability of the
appellant to account for the profits realized from the trans-
actions with Stearns, to consider and ascertain what was the
scope of the partnership agreement in reference to the pur-
essential fact on which rests the proper determination of the
question whether the appellant, in engaging in the joint enter-
prise with Stearns, violated any duty or obligation which he
owed to the firm of Kilbourn & Latta. In other words, the
{ihase and sale of real estate. This is the underlying and
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JACKSON, J. (After stating the facts &nd disposing of other 
matters.) The court below ba~ its opinion upon two grounds: 
First, that the scope of the cop~nership business and agree-
ment, as alleged in the third paragraph of the bill, was estab• 
Itshed, and that the appellant could not engage in purchases 
of real estate on his own account or in oonnection with otherH 
except by the consent of his copartne1·s, without violating t'he 
duty and obligation which he owed to his firm; and, ~omllJ, 
that, even if the copartnership did not include the business of 
buying and selling real estate on partnership account, still the 
appellant oould not employ the knowledge and information 
acquired in the course of the partn~rship business in respect 
to the real estate market, in making purchases or transactions 
for his own benefit. 
The general principles on which the court proceeded admit 
of no question, it being settled that one. partner cannot, 
directly or indirectly, use partnership a~sets for his own benP-
ftt; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partner-
ship, take any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot 
carry on the business of the partnership for his private advan-
tage; that he cannot carry on another business in competition 
or rivalry with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the 
benefit of his time, skill, and fidelity without being account-
abJ.e to his copartners for any profit that may accrue to him 
therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to secure for himself 
that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for the firm of 
which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge 
or information, which may be properly regarded as the prop-
erty of the partnership, in the sense that it is available ot'. 
useful to the firm for any purpose within the scope of the 
partnership business. 
It therefore beoomes necessary, in testin~ thf' liability of tl11! 
appellant t-0 account for the profits realized from the trans-
actions with Stearns, to consider and asce1·tain what was the 
scope of the partnership agreement in reference to the pur-
chase and sale of real estate. This is the underlying and 
essential fact on which rests the proper d~termination of the 
question whether the appellant, in engaging in the joint entn-
prise with Stearns, violated any duty or obligation which he 
owed to the firm of Kilbourn & Latta. In other words, the 
ue&tion <>n this branch of the caf'e de-pends entirely upon this: 
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.VVere or were not those transactions within the scope of the
firm business, in respect to which Latta owed a duty to his
firm, or in respect to which he could properly be said to be
the agent of the firm?
In his answer, which was called for under oath, Latta posi-
tively and in direct terms denied the allegation of the bill that
it was ever agreed that the firm should carryton the busi-
ness of buying and selling real estate, and that at no time was
such transaction within the scope of the partnership business.
Under the well-settled rules of equity pleading and practice.
this answer must be overcome by the testimony of at least two
witnesses, or of one witness with corroborating circumstances.
The proofs in the present case not only fail to break down
his denial on this point. but on the contrary aflirmatively estab-
lish that neither under the first nor the second firm of Kil-
bourn & Latta did the partnership agreement extend to the
business of buying and selling real estate either for invest-
ment or for speculation on firm account. The appellee Kil-
bourn. when pressed upon the question, evaded a reply thereto,
and Olmstead, in his sworn testimony, failed to support the
allegation of the bill as made on that particular subject. O11
the other hand. the testimony of the appellant fully supported
the denial of his answer. and he is corroborated by all the
facts and circumstances in the ease, such as the character of
the business as advertised and as actually conducted. The
well-known characteristics of “real estate and note brokers,"
indicating as the words imply, those engaged in negotiating
the sale and purchase of real property for the account of
others, afi'ord a presumptive limitation upon the scope of the
business, such as the appellant asserted and testified to in
this case. His sworn answer and testimony on this point has
not been overcome by the vague and equivocal testimony of
the appellees. The court below was in error in finding as a
matter of fact that the partnership extended to the buying
and selling of real estate for the account of the firm. There is,
therefore, no right on the part of the complainants to relief
in this cause. based upon the consideration that the scope and
character of the partnership business embraced the purchase
and sale of real estate. either for the firm alone, or jointly with
others.
The further allegation of the bill, “that all profits result-
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{
:\Vere or were not those h'ansactions within the scope of the 
firm business, in re1o1pect to which Latta owed a duty to his. 
fl.rm, or in respect to which he could properly be said to be 
the agent of the fl rm? 
In bis answer, which wns called for under oath, Latta poKi-
tively and in direct terms denied the allegation of the bill that 
it was ever agreed that the firm should carry. on the busi-
ness of buying and selling l'{'-31 estate, and that at no time waR 
such trammction within the scope of the partne1•ship businesi,;. 
) 'VndN the well-settled rules of t>quity pleading and practice, 
~his answ••r must be ovt:'rcome b~· the tN1timony of at least two 
witnesses, or of one witness with corroborating circumstances. 
Th(· proof1o1 in t.he present case not only fail to break down 
his dPuial on t11is point, but on thP eontrnry affirmatively estab-
Ji!olh that nPithPr und<•1· the first nor the second finu of Kil-
bourn & Latta did the partnership ag1-eement extend to the 
busiiwss of bu~·ing and selling real estate eitl1er for inv~t­
ment or for s1weulation on firm ac('ount. The appellee Kil· 
bourn. wlwn pressed upon the question, evaded a reply thereto, 
and Olmi;1tead, in his Kworn t<•stimony, failed to support the 
allegation of the bill a.s made on that particular subject. On 
the otlwr hand. tlw tPstimony of the appellant fully supported 
the denial of his answer, and he is corroborated by all tht~ 
facts and circumstance-s in thl:' ruse, i;mch as the character of 
the business as advertised and us actually conducted. The 
w<>ll-known charactt~1:istics of "rt>al estate and note brokers,'' 
indic,ating as the words imply, those engaged in negotiating 
the sale and purchase of real property for the account of 
others, afford a presumptive limitation upon the scope of the 
bn8iness, such as the appPllant a.sserted and testified to in 
this ea~. His swom answe1· and testimony on this point has 
not be<>n on•rcome by the vague and equivocal testimony of 
the appelle(•R. The court below w:u; in error in finding as a 
mattPr of fact that the partnership exfrrnled to the buying 
and selling of real Psta.te for the account of the firm. There is, 
thPrefore, no right on the part of the complainants to relief 
in this cuut'lt'. based upon the consi<lf'ration that the Rcope and 
character of the partnership business embraced the purchase 
and sale of real estate, either for the firm alone, or jointly with 
others. 
The further allegation of thP bill, "that all profits result-
ing from operations in real c>8tate by any member·of the firm 
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of Kilbourn & Latta during the existence of said partnership
should belong to said firm and be entered upon the books of
the firm and be paid into the partnership account, and that no
member of said firm should engage in the business of buy-V
ing and selling real estate in the said district on.his own,
account, or with any other person or persons, except in cases,
where the proposed transaction had been explained to the said
firm, and the firm had declined to take any part therein,” was
also positively denied by the answer of the appellant under
oath. There is no testimony in the cause to overcome that
denial. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that there
was no such restriction or limitation im-posed upon the indi-l
vidual members. So that the complainants were entitled to,
no relief on that ground. .
But aside from the foregoing questions of fact, how stands
the case on the assumption that there was a new stipulation
or agreement when Olmstead was taken into the firm (as
claimed by Kilbourn and Olmstead, and as set out above) that
knowledge and information obtained by any member of the
firm as to bargains in real estate should be first communi-
cated to the firm, with the view of giving the firm, or the mem-
bers thereof, the first opportunity of purchasing, before any
individual member thereof could act upon such knowledge or.
information for his own benefit? Can the agreement to fur-_
nish information as to bargains in real estate and give copart-
ners the option of taking benefit of such bargains, be consid-
cred as so enlarging the scope of the partnership business as
to include therein the purchase and sale of real estate on
joint account? It would be a perversion of language and a
confusion of ideas to treat such a stipulation, if it were clearly
establihed, as creating a partnership in future options to buy
what did not already, by the terms of the copartnership, come
within the scope and character of the partnership business.
That alleged stipulation, instead of enlarging the partnership
business, was manifestly a restriction and limitation upon the
power and authority of the copartners to bind the firm, or the
members thereof, in any real estate transaction, until each
member had expressly consented or agreed to join in the par-
ticular purchae, specially submitted for consideration.
By the well-settled law of partnership each member of the‘
firm is both a principal and an agent to represent and bind‘
















































































































































LATTA VS. KILBOURN. 21.5· 
of Kilbourn & Latta during the existence of said partnership. 
should belong to said firm and be entered upon the books of 
the firm and be paid into the partnership account, and that no. 
member of said firm should engage in the business of buy-
ing and selling real estate in the said district on. his own. 
account, or with any other person or persons, except in cases 
where the proposed transaction had been t>xplained to the said 
firm, and the firm had declined to take any part therein," was 
also positively denied by the answer of the .appellant under 
oath. There is no testimony in the cause to overcome that 
denial. On the contrary, the evidt:>nce establishes that taere 
was no such restriction or limitation imposPd upon the indi-
vidual members. So that the complainants were entitled to. 
no relief on that ground. 
But aside from the foregoing quest.ions of fact, how standR 
the case on the assumption that there was a new stipulation 
or agreement when Olmstead was taken into the firm (aB 
claimed by Kilbourn and Olmstead, and as set out above) th-at 
knowledge and information obtainf'il by any member of the 
firm as to bargains in real estate should be fil"St communi-
cated to the firm, with the view of giving the firm, or the mem -
bers thereof, the first opportunity of purchasing, before any 
individual member thereof could .act upon such knowledge or 
information for his own benefit? Can the agreement to fur-. 
nish information as to bargains in real estate and give copart-
ners the option of taking benefit of such bargains, be consid-
ered as so enlarging the scope of tlle partnership business as 
to include therein the purchase and sale of real estate on 
joint account? It would be a perversion of language and a 
confusion of ideas to treat such a stipulation, if it were clearly 
t>stablished, as creating a partnership in future options to buy 
what did not already, by the terms of the copartnership, come 
within the -scope and character of the partnership business. 
That alleged stipulation. instead of Pnlarging the partnershjp 
business, was manifestly a restriction and limitation upon the 
power and authority of the copartners to bind the firm, or the 
members thereof, in any real estate transaction, until each 
member had expressly consented or agreed to join in the p:tr· 
ticular purchase, spPeially submitted for consideration. 
By the well-settled law of µartnPrship ea.eh member of the· 
firm is both a principal and an agPnt to represent and bind · 
the firm and his associate partnt'rs in dt>alings and transactions; 
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within the scope of the copartnership. No express authority
is necessary to confer this agency or fiduciary relation in
respect to the business of the firm. If the buying and elling
of real estate was a part of the business of Kilbourn & Latta,
the alleged stipulation about giving an option to the firm and
the members thereof to accept special bargains would have
been an idle arrangement. But under the alleged stipulation
each and every purchase of real estate was a special and indi-
vidual transaction or enterprise, requiring the special assent
and agreement of each partner thereto, before it bec-ame a sub-
ject of partnership, or was brought within the scope of the
partnership buiness. Under the operation of the agreement,
a partner who purchased real estate, either on joint or partner-
ship account, did so not under or by virtue of the partnership
articles, or under authority derived from the partnership busi-
ness and his implied agency to represent the firm therein, but
solely and exclusively from the special assent or agreement of
his associates to engage in that particular purchase. So that
each parcel of real estate to be acquired, as well as the agree-
ment to purchase the same, was first made the subject of a
special arrangement. It is difficult to understand how, under
such circumstances and conditions, a copartnership could prop-
erly be said to include or extend to the business of purchasing
and selling real estate.
The special subject of each purchase, as admitted by Kil-
bourn,—like the purchase of bonds and other securities,—did
not and could not come within the operation of the copartner-
sh-ip, or become a part of the partnership agreement, until each
particular piece of property had been selected and agreed upon.
It is undoubtedly true that, under this alleged agreement, if a
partner had submitted to the firm or his associates the
question of buying a particular parcel of land, and they had
agreed to make that purchase, he would thereafter have occu-
pied an agency or fiduciary relation in respect to that particu-
lar piece of property. But the question here is whether his
failure to give the firm, or his copartners, the opportunity of
making an election to buy certain real estate, and his making
the purchase thereof for his own account, or jointly with
another, is such a violation of his fiduciary relations to the
firm and his associates in respect to copartnership business as
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within the scope of the copartnersbip. No express authority 
ls necessary to confer this agency or fiduciary relation in 
respect to the business of the firm. If the buying and selling 
of real estate was a pa.rt of the business of Kilbourn & Ldtta, 
the alleged stipulation about giving an option to the firm and 
the members thereof t-0 accept specia.l bargains would have 
been an idle arrangement. But under the alleged stipulation 
each and every purchase of real estate was a special and indi-
vidual transaction or enterprise, requiring the special assent 
and ag1-eement of each partner thereto, before it became a sub-
ject of partnership, or was brought within the scope of thE" 
partnership business. Under the operation of the agreement, 
a partner who purchased real estate, either on joint or partnet·-
ship account, did so not under or by virtue of the partnership 
articles, or under authority derived from the partnership busi-
ness and his implied agency to represent the firm therein, but 
solely and exclusively from the special assent or agreement of 
his associates to engage in that particular purchase. So that 
each parcel of real estate to be acquired, as well as the agree· 
ment to purchase the same, was first made the subject of a 
special atrangement. It is difficult to understand how, under 
such circumstances and conditions, a copartnership could prop-
erly be said to include or extend to the business of purchasing 
and selling real estate. 
The special subject of each purchase, as admitted by Kil-
bourn,-like the purchase of bonds and other securities,-did 
n<>t and could not come within the operation of the copartner-
ship, or become a part of the partnership.agreement, until each 
particular piece of property had been selected and agreed upon. 
It is undoubtedly true that, under this alleged agreement, if a 
partner had submitted to the firm or his associates the 
question of buying a particular parcel of land, and they had 
agreed to make that purchase, he would thereafter have occu-
pied an agency or fiduciary relation in respect to that particu-
lar piece of property. But the question here is whether bis 
failure to give the firm, or his copartners, the opportunity of 
making an election to buy certain real estate, and his making 
the purchase thereof for bis own account, or jointly with 
another, is such a violation of his fiduciary relations to the 
tlrm and his associates in respect to copartnership business as 
to entitle the latter to call him to account f.or profits ~alized 
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in such transactions. In other words, will the violation of his
undertaking to give to the firm, or his associates, the oppor-
tunity or option to engage in any particular transaction, not
within the scope of the firm’s business, entitle the copartners
to convert him into a constructive trustee in respect to the
profits realized therefrom?
That the members of the firm, prior to 1871, or after that
date, by special agreement, made purchases of particular par-
cels of real estate on speculation or for investment, did not
make such speculative transactions a part of the partnership
business so as to invest either partner with the implied author-
ity to engage therein on account of the firm. The name of the
firm w-as never, in fact, used in such special ventures, which
no partner had authority to enter into except, and until, the
consent of the others had been specifically obtained so to do-
each instance of buying on firm or joint account being the sub-
ject of a separate, special, and distinct agreement.
It may be said of any and every partnership, irrespective of
its regular business, that by consent of all the members, other
matters beyond the scope of the partnership may become the
subject of investment or speculation on joint account, but such
special transactions cannot properly be said to come within
the scope of the partnership. The very fact that the express
consent of each partner was required in order to engage in such
special ventures goes clearly to show that the transactions
were not within the scope of the partnership, for, if they were,
special consent could not be required as a condition precedent
for engaging therein.
Matters within the scope of the partnership are regulated
and controlled by a majority of the partners, but by the alleged
stipulation under consideration a single member of the firm
could control the firm’s action in respect to purchases of real
estate. This is inconsistent with the idea that the business
of the firm extended to such purchases.
Again, the alleged agreement does not provide how such
future acquisitions as might be specially elected or agreed
upon for speculation or for investment were to be paid for,
or in what proportion the several partners should be inter-
ested therein. Neither does it distinctly appear from the alle-
gations of the bill, nor from the testimony of the appellees,
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in such transactions. In other words, will the violation of his 
undertaking to give t<> the firm, or his associates, the oppor-
tunity or option to engage in any particular transaction, not 
within the scope of the fh·m's businetJs, entitle the copartners 
to convert him int<? a constructive trustee in respect to the 
profits realized therefrom? 
That the members of the firm, prior t<> 1871, or after that 
date, by special agreement, made purchases of particular par-
rels of real estate on speculation or for investment, did not 
make such speculative transactions a part of the partnership 
business so as to invest either partner with the implied autbor-
ity to engage therein on account of the firm. The name e>f the 
ft.rm w.as never, in fact, m~ed in such special ventures, which 
no partner had authority to enter into except, and until, the 
consent of the others had been specifioolly obtained BO to do-
each instance of buying on firm or joint account being the sub-
ject of a separate, special, and distinct agreement. 
It may be «aid of any and every partnership, irre.spective of 
its regular business, that by consent of all the members, other 
matters bey-0nd the scope of the partnership may become tha 
subject of investment or speculation on joint aceoun·t, but such 
special transactions cannot properly be sai~ to come within 
the scope of the partnership. The very fact that the express 
oonsent of each partner was required in order to engage in such 
special ventures goes clearly to show that the transactions 
were not within the scope of the partnership, for, if they were, 
special consent could not be required as a condition pr~edent 
for engaging therein. 
Matters within the scope of the partnership are regulated 
and controlled by a majority of the partners, but by the alleged 
stipulation under consideration a single member ot the firm 
could control the firm's action in respect to purchases of real 
estate. This is inconsistent with the idea that the business 
of the firm ext.endw to such purchases. 
Again, the alleged agreement does not provide h<>w such 
future acquisitions as might be specially selected or agreed 
upon for speculation or for investment we1•e to be paid for, 
or in what proportion the several partneN should be inter-
ested therein. Neither doetJ it distinctly appear from the alle-
gations of the bill, nor from the testimony of the appellees, 
whether, in acting upon information given, the special pur-
28 
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chases were to be made for the account of the partnership or
for the account of the several members of the firm. The meth-
ods of keeping the accounts of such transactions in t-he name
of the individual members rather than in the name of the firm,
would indicate that such purchases were for the benefit of the
separate partners rather than for the firm.’
There is no allegation in the bill, nor any direct statement
in the testimony of the appellees, that if the information had
been given as to the Stearns’ transactions, either t-he firm or
themselves would have exercised the option of engaging
therein upon the conditions of allowing Stearns to determine
“when, at what price, and on what terms any portion of the
real estate might be sold.” Neither is it alleged in the bill,
nor shown by the proofs, that the appellant in any way neg-
lected the partnership business, nor that the firm and his
copartners sustained any damage whatever from the trans-
action. On the contrary, it is shown that from the purchases
and ales of the property bought on joint account with Stearns
the firm derived its regular commissions.
This alleged new stipulatio-n amounts, if it has any legal
force and operation, simply to an agreement for a future part-
nership, or the joint acquisition of such special properties as
might by mutual and unanimous consent be considered as hold-
ing out a prospect of profitable speculation; and at most could
only be regarded as an agreement for a future partnership in
respect to such properties as might be specially selected for
speculation. It is well settled in such case that no partnership
takes place until the contemplated event actually occurs. It
stands upon the same principle as an option to become a part-
ner, which creates no partnership until the option i actually
exercised.
If the stipulation in question could be construed into an
agreement that no partner should engage in the buying and
selling of real estate on his own account, would that entitle
the other members of the firm to share in the profits that
Latta. made in real estate speculation without having first
secured the consent of his copartners to his engaging therein?
No such proposition can be sustained.
In Murrcll vs. Murrell, 33 La. Ann. 1233, it was held that a
partner who, in violation of the act of partnership, enters
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chases were to be made for the account of the partnership or 
for the account of the seve1·al members of the firm. The meth-
ods of keeping the accounts of such transaetions in the name 
of the individual members rather than in the name of the firm, 
would indicate that such purchases were for the benefit of the 
~parate partners rather than for the firm.' 
There is no allegation in the bill, nor any direct statement 
in the tE>stimony of the appellees, that if the information had 
heen given as to the Strorns' transactions, either t·be firm or 
themselves would have exercised the option of engaging 
therein upon the conditions of allowing Stearns to determine 
"when, at what price, and on wh~t terms any portion of the 
real estate might be sold." :Neither is it alleged in the bill, 
nor shown by the proofs, that the appellant in any way neg-
lected the partnership business, nor that the firm and bis 
copartners '1!\1J81:ained any damage whatever from the .trans-
action. On the contrary, it is shown that from the purchases 
and sales of the property bought on joint account with Stearns 
the firm derived its regular commissions. 
This alleged new stipulation amounts, if it has any legal 
force and operation, simply to an agreement for a future part-
n~rship, or the joint acquLsition of such special properties a8 
might by mutual and unanimous consent be considered as hold-
ing out a prospect of profitable speculation; and at most could 
only be regarded as an agreement for a future partnership in 
respect to such properties .as might be specially selected for 
speculation. It is well settled in such case that no partnership 
takes place until the contemplated event actualiy occurs. It 
stands upon the same prindple as an option to become a part-
ner, which creates no partnership until the option is actually 
exercised. 
If the stipulation in question could be QOnstrued into an 
agreement that no partner should engage in the buying .and 
selling of real estate on his own account, would that entitle 
the other "members of the firm to share in the profits that 
Latta made in real estate speculation without hav'ing first 
secured the consent of bis copartners to his engaging therein! 
No such proposition can be sustained. 
In Murrell vs. Murrell, 3:3 La. Ann. 1233, it was held that a 
partner who, in violation of the act of partnership, ente1·l'l 
into another firm, does not thereby give the right to his origi~' 
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nal copartner to claim a share in the profits of the new fix-,m.
The violation of the agreement may give rise to an action for
damages, but inasmuch as the original copartner could not
be held, without his consent, for the debts of the new firm,
he cannot claim to be made a partner therein.
In Dean vs. McDowell, 8 Ch. D. 345, one of the stipulations
in the articles of copartnership was that “said C. A. McDowell
should diligently -and faithfully employ himself in'and about
the business of the partnership, and carry on and conduct the
same to the greatest advantage of the partnership,” and by
another article it was tipulated that neither partner should
“either alone or with -another person, either directly or indi-
rectly, engage in any trade or business except upon the account
and for the benefit of the partnership.” The business of the
firm was to deal as merchants and brokers in selling the pro-
duce of salt works on commission, and during its existence
McDowell clandestinely purchased a share in afirm of salt
manufacturers. A bill was filed by the other partner for an
account of the profits realized in the new business, and it was
held by the master of the rolls that the bill could not be sus-
tained. On appeal this judgment was aflirmed. Lord Justice
James, after stating the general principles of partnership
law, said: “The business which the defendant has entered
into was that of manufacturing salt, which was to be the sub-
ject-matter of the trade of the first firm. If in that he had
in any way deprived the firm of any profits they otherwise
would have made—if by his joining in the partnership for the
manufacture he had diverted the goods from the firm in which
he was a partner to some other firm, I can see that that would
be a breach of his duty; but it is not pretended or alleged
that any alteration took place in the business of the firm by
reason of his having become a shareholder in the other busi-
ness. It is not pretended that there was any alteration in the
commission or anything else. Everything remained exactly
as it was, so that it cannot be suggested that there was a
farthing’s worth of actual damage done to the original firm
by reason of his having become a shareholder in the works
which produced the thing in which the firm traded. Under
these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot say his
profits fromthe new business was a benefit arising out of his
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nal copartner to claim a share in the profits of the new fi1;m. 
The violation of \he agrPement may gh·e rise to an action for 
damages, but inasmuch as the original copartner oould not 
be held, without bis consent, for the debts of the new firm, 
he cannot claim to be made a partner therein. 
In Dean vs. JicDoicell, 8 Ch. D. 345, one of the stipulations 
in t11e articles of copartnership was that "said C. A. McDowell 
should diligently and faithfully employ himself in" and about 
the business of the partnership, and carry on and conduct thP 
ea.me to the greatest advantage of the partnership," and by 
another article it was stipulated that neither partner should 
"either alone or with another person, either directly or indi-
rectly, engage in any trade or business except upon the account 
and for the benPfit of the partnership." The business of the 
firm was to deal as merchants and brokers in selling the pro· 
duce of salt works on commission, and during its existence 
McDowell clandestinely purchased a share in a· firm of salt 
manufacturers. A bill was filed by the other partner for an 
account of the profits realized in the new business, and it was 
held by the master of the rolls that the bill could not be sus-
tained. On appeal this judgment was affirmed. Lord JustiL't' 
JAMES, after stating the general principles of partnership 
law, said: "The business which the defendant bas entered 
into was that of manufacturing salt, which was to be the sub-
ject-matter of the trade of the first firm. If in that he bad 
in any way deprived the firm of any profits they otherwise 
would have made-if by bis joining in the partnership for the 
manufacture he had diverted the goods from the firm in which 
he was a partner to some other firm, I can see that that would 
be a breach of his duty; but it is not pretended or alleged 
that any alteration took place in the business of the firm by 
reason of his having become a shareholder in the other busi-
ness. It is not pretended that there was any alteration in the 
commission or anything else. Everything remained exactly 
as it was, so that it cannot be suggested that there was a 
farthing's worth of actual damage done to the original firm 
by reason of bis having become a sh.areholder in the works 
which produced the thing in which the firm traded. Under 
these circumstances it seems to me that we cannot say his 
profits from the new business was a benefit arising out of his 
partnership with the plaintiffs. It was not a benefit derived 
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from his connection with the partnership, or a benefit in
respect of which he was in a fiduciary relation to the partner-
ship. His relations to the partnership in this respect was
the same as an ordinary oovenantor to a covenantee in respect
of any other covenant which is broken. It was a covenant
by a partner with a copartner, a covenant that he would
not do something which might result in damage. But
it was not a covenant, in my view, which was in any way con-
nected with the fiduciary relations between the parties. That
being so, it seems to me that the master of the rolls was
right in saying that you cannot extend the cases with regard
to a share in the profits to a case in which, as between the
parties, there really was nothing but a breach of covenant,
which in truth did not result, and could not have resulted, in
the slightest loss to the partnership, unless it could have been
shown that it led to the covenantor neglecting the business
of the partnership, and devoting himself to other business,
and diverting his time and attention from the business to
which it was his duty to attend.” These views,.which were
concurred in by the/other members of the court, are directly
in point in the present case, which, in principle, cannot be
distinguished from the case there under consideration.
VVe are clearly of the opinion that the alleged new stipula-
tion that each copartner should furnish to the firm, or to the
members thereof, information as to bargains in real estate,
and give it or them the option to engage in the acquisition
thereof before acting upon such information for his own benc-
fifit, neither enlarged the scope of the partnership so as to make
i it include the purchases and sales of real estate, nor precluded
any member of the firm from making purchases on his own
3 account or jointly with others; and that the act of the appel-
, lant in purchasing property with Stearns was not such a vio-
lation of his duty and obligation to the firm of Kilbourn 8:
Latta, or to the mom-hers thereof, as to entitle the appellees
to share in the profits which he realized therefrom.
In respect to the second ground, on which the court below
rested its judgment, that the appellant could not take advan-
tage of the skill, knowledge, and information as to the real
estate market acquired in the course of his connection with
I thepartnership of Kilbourn & Latta so as to gain any profit
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frem his connection with the partnership, or a benefit in 
respect of which he was in a fiduciary relation to the partner-
ship. His relations to the partnership in this respect was 
the same as an ordinary oovenantor to a oovenantee in respect 
of any other covenant which is broken. It was a covenant 
by a partner with a copartner, a oovenant that he would 
n.ot do something which might result in damage. But 
it was not a covenant, in my view, which was in any way con-
nected with the fiduciary relations between the parties. Tl1at 
being eo, it seems to me that the master of the rolls. was 
right in saying that you cannot extend the cases with regard 
te a share in the profits to a case in which, as between the 
parties, there really was nothing but a breach of covenant, 
which in truth did not result, and could not have resulted, in 
the slightest loss to the partnership, unless it could hav~ been 
shown that it led to the covenantor neglecting the business 
of the partnership, and devoting himself to other business, 
and diverting his time and attention from the business to 
which it was his duty to attend." These views,. which were 
concurred in by the ,other members of the court, are directly 
in point in the present case, which, in principle, cannot be 
distinguished from the case there under consideration. 
We are clearly of the Qpinion that the alleged new stipula-
tion that each copartner should furnish to the firm, or to the 
members thereof, information as to bargains in real estate: 
and give it or them the option to engage in the acquisition 
I thereof before acting upon such information for his own bent•-
(\ flt, neither enlarged the scope of the partnership so as-to make 
I it include the purchases and sales of real estate, nor precluded 
· any member of the firm from ma king purchases on his own 
l account or jointly with others; and that the act of the appel-
1 lant in purchasing property with Stearns was not such a vio-
lation of his duty and obligation to the firm of Kilbourn & 
Latta, or to the men11bers thereof, as to entitle the appellees 
to share in the profits which he realized therefrom. 
In respect to the second ground, on which the court below 
I rested its judgment, that the appellant could not take advan-tage of the skill, knowledge, and infonnation as to the real 
estate market acquh-ed in the course of his connection with 
l the partnership of Kilbourn & I.-atta so aa to gain any profit 
individuaBy therefrom, but was bound to share with his 
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copartners all the beneficial results which- could be derived
from his knowledge or information on that subject, we need
not do more than to say that this proposition is wholly unsup-
ported either by the authorities or by any legal principle appli-
cable to partnership law.
lt is well settled that a partner may trafiic outside of the
scope of the firm’s business for his own benefit and advantage,
and without going into the authorities it is suflicient to cite the
thoroughly considered case of AS-s vs. Benham, 2 Ch. D. (1891)
244, 255, in which it was sought to make one partner account-
able for profits realized from another busines, on the ground
that he availed himself of information obtained by him in the
course of his partnership business, or by reason of his con-
nection with the firm, to secure individual advantage in the
new enterprise. It was there laid down by Lord Justice Lisb-
LEY that if a member of a partnership firm avails himself of
information obtained by ‘him in the course of the transactions
of the partnership business, or by reason of his con-
nection with the firm-, for any purpose within the scope of the
partnership business, or for any purpose which would compete
with the partnership business. he is liable to account to the firm
for any benefit he may have obtained from the use of such infor-
mation; but if he uses the information for purposes which are
wholl/_y without the scope of the partnership business and not
competing with it, the firm is not entitled to an account of such
benefits. ,
It was further laid down in that case, in explanation of
what was said by Lord Justice Co'r'ro.\' in Dean cs. .-l!cDowell,
ubi supra, that£“it is not the source of the information, but
the use to which it is applied, which is important in such
m-attersi To hold that a partner can never derive any per-
sonal b‘ efits from information which he obtains as a part-
ner would be manifestly absurd;” and it was said by Lord
Justice Bownm that the character of information acquired
from the partnership transaction, or from connection with the
firm, which the partner might not use for his private advan-
tage, is such information as belongs to the partnership in the
sense of property which is valuable to the partnership, and in
which it has a vested right.
Tested by these principles, it cannot be properly said that
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copartners all the beneficial results which• oould be derived 
from his knowledge or information on that subject, we need 
not do more than to say that this proposition is wholly unsup-
ported either by the authorities or by any legal principle appli-
cable to partnership law. 
It is well settled that a partner may traffic outside of the I 
scope of the firm's husiness for his own benefit and advantage, 
and without going into the authoriti<>s it is sufficient to cite the 
thoroughly considered case of .t&s vs. Benham, 2 Ch. D. (1891) ...-.-
244~ 255, in which it was sought to makP one partner account-
able for profits realized from another bu"ioess, on tbe ground 
that he avajled himself of information obtained by him in the 
course of his partnership business, or by reason of bis con-
nection with the firm, to secure individual advantage in the 
new enterprise. It was there laid clown by J...ord Justice J_,IND-
J,EY that if a member of a partnership fir·m avails himself of 
information obtained by him in the conl'Se of the transactions 
of the partnP1"8hip bnsinefls, or by reason of his con-
nection with the firm, for an!J purpo..~e wit11in the scope of the 
partnership busi11ess, or for any pw·vo.~c lchich icould compete 
1cith the pof'tners11ip b-usincss. he is liable to account to the firm 
for nny benefit lie ma11 hai•e obtaim.xl from the use of such i11for-
mat·ion; but if 1rn uses the. informo.tion f01- purposes wh iC'h are 
tohol'ty witho'llt the scope of the partnership business and not 
com 1>eting icith it, the finn is not entitled to an account of such 
benefits. 
It was furthe1· laid down in that case, in explanation of 
what was said by IA>rd .Tustice CoT'rO:" in Dean vs. JI cD01oell, 
ubi supra, that~'it is not the souree of tbe information, but 
thP use to which it is ~d, which is important in such 
matters. ) To holrl that a partner can never dt'rive any per-
sonal be~efits from information whk.h he obtains as a part-
ner would be manifestly absurd;" and it was said by Lord 
Justice BowEN that the character of information acquired 
from the partnership h"llnsaction, or from connection with the 
firm, which the partner might not use for his private advan-
tage, is such information as belongs to the partnership in the 
sense of property which is valuable to the partnership, and in 
which it has a vested rig-ht. 
Tested by these principles, it cannot be properly said that 
Latta used any information whid1 wai:; pal'tnel'ship property 
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so as to render him chargeable with the profits made there-
fr-om. His knowledge of the real estate market, or in respect
to profitable investments therein, was not used in competition
with the business of the firm, nor in any manner so as to come
within the scope of the flrm’s business.
The points already considered being sufiicient to dispose
nf the case, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other
question discussed as to whether a. parol partnership, in
respect to purchasing and selling real estate, or an agreement
between copartners to give each other the option of engaging
in such purchases, would come within the operation of the
statute of frauds.
We are clearly of opinion, upon the whole case, that the
decree should be '
Reversed, and the causc remanded to the court below with direc-
tions to tlismiss the bill at the cost of the appellccs.
Non‘-:.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 112, 118.
~-
INSLEY vs. SHIRE.
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1895.
54 Kan. 793, 39 Pac. Rep. 713, 45 Am. St. Rep. 308.
Insley and Shire were equal partners in carrying on banking
and other business at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1882, Shire
died, leaving a will, under which Ann M. Shire (his widow),
J. W. Graw (his brother-in-law), and Levi Wilson, were
appointed executors and were authorized to continue the busi-
-ness of the firm. This was done, and no steps were taken to
ascertain S*hire‘s interest nor did Insley assume the position
or rights of a surviving partner. Insley and Shire’s executors
continued to cam-_v on the business, Gaw taking the active
management on the part of the executors, until 1887, when
the firm was found to be insolvent. It appeared also that one
Milligan, who had been employed by Gaw to serve in the Bank,
had fraudulently appropriated a large part of the assets. Mrs.
Shire brought this action against Insley, Gaw, Milligan and
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so· as to render bim chargeable with the profits made there-
fl'-0m. His knowledge of the real estate market, or in respect 
to profitable investmt>nts therein, was not used in competition 
with the business of the firm, nor in any manner so as to come 
within the scope of the firm's business. 
The points already ~onsidel'l'<I being sufficient to dispost-
»f the c·ase, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other 
question discussed as to whether a parol partnership, in 
reRpect to pur<',hasing and selling real estate, or an agreement 
between copartners to give each other the option of engaging 
in such pul'cbases, would come within the operation of the 
statute of frauds. 
'Ye are clearly of opinion, upon the whole case, that the 
· decree should be 
Re·versed, and the cause remanded to the court below 1cith direc-
ltf)ns to dismiss tlie bill at the cost of the a.ppell.ees. 
NoTR.-See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 112, 118. 
INSLEY vs. SHIRE. 
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1895. 
54 Kan. 793, !l9 Pac. Rep. 713, 45 Am. St. Rep. 308. 
Insle.v and Shire were equal partners in caITying on banking 
and other business at Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1882, Shire 
died, leaving a will, under which Ann M. Shire (his widpw), 
J. ,V. Gaw (his brother-in-law), and Levi Wilson, were 
appointed executors and were authorized to continue the busi-
·ness of the firm. This was done, and no steps were taken to 
ascertain S'hire'R intf'rest nor did Insley assume the position 
or rights of a surviving partner. Insley and Shire's exerutorH 
continued to carr.'' on the business, Gaw taking the active 
management on the part of the executors, until 1887, whf'n 
the firm was found to be insolvent. It appeared also that one 
Milligan, who had bel·n employed by Gaw to serve in the Bank, 
had fraudulently appropriated a large part of the assets. Mrs. 
~hire brought this action against Insley, Gaw, Milligan and 
others, to recover damages fol' what was alleged to be their 
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negligent mismanagement of the business resulting in insol-
vency and the loss of the assets. -
The court below found that Insley and Gaw had been
guilty of such negligent mismanagement, and rendered judg-
ment against them, from which this appeal was taken.
W. O‘. Hook and D. M. Valentine, for appellant.
E. Hagan, Hag/den é Hayden, T. A. Hurd. and L. B. <£ S. E.
Wheat, for appellees.
Jonnsrox, J . (After disposing of the question of Gaw’s lia-
bility as an executor, and of Insley’s liability as a coexecutor.)
There is the further contention that the plaintiff could not
maintain an action against Insley for the purpose of obtain-
ing an accounting of the partnership business. This conten-
tion is based upon the idea that all of the executors represent
the Shire interest in the partnership, and, as the estate is joint
and entire, the executors are to be considered in law as one
person, and all of them m-ust join as plaintiffs. This is the
correct rule, and all three of the representatives of the estate
should have joined in bringing the action for an accounting
with Insley. 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 360, and cases
cited; 11 Amer. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1033. No proper objec-
tion, however, was made on account of the nonjoinder of Gaw
and \Vilson, and, as they were made defendants in the action
in their representative capacity, and remained in the court
throughout the proceeding, while the accounting was being
made, the failure to name them as plaintiifs cannot be
regarded as a fatal objection. Treating the proceedings, then,
as one in which all of the representatives of the estate had
joined in asking an accounting of the partnership business,
the question remains as to the liability of Insley. Insley and
Shire, as we have seen, were equal partners. When Shire
died Insley did not give a bond and take possession of the
partnership property as surviving partner, as he might have
done under t-he statute‘. The death of Shire operated to dis-
solve the partnership, but it appears that by a mutual arrange-
ment, and in accordance with the provisions of the will, the
business was continued by the executors upon the same terms
as it was during the lifetime of Daniel Shire. This arrange-
ment had the efl’ect of creating a new partnership, composed of
the executors on one side and Insley on the other.
















































































































































INSLEY VS. SHIRE. 223 
llegligent mismanagement of the business resulting in insol· 
vency and the loss of the assets. 
The court below found that Insley and Gaw bad been 
guilty of such negligent mismanagement, and rendered jndg-
mE>nt against them, from which this appeal was taken. 
W. 0. Hook and D. M. Valentine, for appellant. 
E. Hagan, Hayden & .Hayden, T • .A. Hurd, and L.B. & 8. E. 
lVheat, for appellees. 
JoBNSTON, J. (After disposing of the question of Gaw's lia-
bility as an executor, and of Insley's liability as a coexecutor.) 
There ls the further contention that the plaintiff could not • 
maintain an action again,st Insley for the purpose of obtain-
ing an accounting of the partnership business. This conten-
tion is based upon the idea that all of the executors represent 
·the Shire interest in the partnership, and, as the estate is joint 
and entire, the executors are to be considered in law as one 
person, and all of them must join as plaintiffs. This is the 
correct rule, and all three of the representatives of the estate 
should have joined in bringing the action for an accounting 
with Insley. 7 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 360, and cases 
cited; 11 Amer. & Eng. Ency of Law, 1033. No proper objec-
tion, however, was made on account of the nonjoinder of Gaw 
and 'Vil son, and, as they were made defendants in the action 
in their representative capacity, and remained in the court 
throughout the proceeding, while the accounting was being 
made, the failure to name them as plaintiffs cannot be 
regarded as a fatal objection. Treating the proceedings, then, 
us one in which all of the representatives of the estate had 
joined in asking an accounting of the partnership business, 
the question remains as to the liability of Insley. Insley and 
Hhire, as we have seen, were equal partners. When Shire 
<lied Insley did not give a bond and take possession of the 
partnership property as surviving partner, as be might have 
done under t.be statute1 • The death of Shire ()perated to dis-
solve the partnership, but it appears that by a mutual arrange-
ment, and in accordance with the provisions of the will, the 
business was continued by the executors upon the same terms 
~ as it was during the lifetime of Daniel Shire. This arrange-
ment had the effect of creating a new partnership, composed of 
the executors on one side and Insley on the other. 
1 See Shattuck v,,, Chandler, ante. 
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Some attempt is made torhold Insley to the liability of a
surviving partner under the law, but, from the testimony, it is
clear that he was not so regarded or treated by any of the
parties. He did not assume title and control as surviving
partner. No bond was given by him; no inventory of the part-
nership estate was made; and he did not take the manage-
ment of the partnership estate as sprviving partner. On the
contrary, all the parties united in the control and possession
of the property; the executors, representing the Shire interest,
and Insley, representing his own, they joined together in car-
rying on the business until it was discontinued. They were
partners to all intent and purposes, and all alike equally
owed the duties of pa.rtners to each other. There was no
agreement for a division of labor between the executors on one
side and Insley upon the other. Insley was not employed
to represent the executors or to attend to the business
of the partnership for the estate. It i.s true that he
devoted most of his time and attention to the partnership
business, but, from 1885, Gaw was employed on behalf of the
estate to attend to the Shire interest in the partnership, and
he received an annual salary of $1,000 as compensation for his
services. There is a finding by the referee that he undertook
to represent the Shire interest in the partnership, and was
continuously so engaged down to the close of the bank. l
The claim that Insley was general manager for the firm,
and liable as such, is not sustained by the record. While he
was active in the management of the affairs of the firm, he
was not appointed nor employed as manager, nor did he hold
any bfficial position which made him the representative of the
estate in the firm business. There was no agreement that he
should receive compensation as manager or agent for the firm,
and none was allowed or paid. It is true that, when the con-
troversy arose between the parties, a credit was entered and
a claim for extra services made, but, as there was no such
agreement, it was not allowed and it appears to have been
abandoned. So far as the partnership -accounting is concerned
lnsley is to be treated as a one-half owner and the Shire estate
as the owner of the other half interest. The three executors
are to be regarded as one‘ person, and together they sustain
the same relation to lnsley that Shire did in his lifetime.
Insley owed them. as partners, no higher duty or any greater
diligence than he would have owed to Shire under similar cir-
cumstances if he had been alive. It was the duty of the
u

















































































































































224 0A8F.8 ON PARTNERSHlP. 
Some attempt ls made to . hold Insley to the liability <>f a 
surviving partner under the law, but, from the testimony, it is 
clear that he was not so regarded or treated by any of the 
parties. He did not assume title and control as $Urviving 
partner. No bond was given by him; no inventory of the part-
nership estate was made; and he did not take the manage-
ment of the partnership estate as sµrviving partner. On the 
contrary, all the parties united in the control and possession 
• of the property; the executors, reprPst•nting the Shire interest, 
and Insley, representing bis own, the~· joined together in car-
rying on the business until it was discontinued. They were 
partners to all intents and purposes, and all alike equally 
owed the du1ies of pa.rtners to each other. There was no 
agreement for a division of la.bor between the executors on <>ne 
side BDd Insley upon tihe other. Insley waa not employed 
to represent the executors or to attend t-0 the business 
of the partm>rship for the estate. H is true that be 
devoted most of his time and attention to the partnership 
business, but, from 1885, Gaw was employed on behalf of the 
Pstate to attend to the Rhire interest in the partnership, and 
he received an annual salary of fl,000 as rompem1ation for bis 
1-1ervices. There is a finding by thr referee that he undertoo~ 
1 o represent the Shire interest in the partnership, and was 
t·ontinuously so engagrd down to the close of the bank. · 
The claim that lnslry was gent->ral manager for the firm, 
and liable as such, is not sustained by the record. While he 
was active in the management of the affairs of the firm, be 
was not appointed nor employed as manager, nor did he bold 
nny official position which made him the l'C'presentath·e of the 
f>state in the firm business. There was AO agreement that be 
should receive compensation as manager or agent for the firm, 
nnd none was allowed or paid. It is true that, when the con-
troversy arose between the partiPR, a credit was entered and 
a claim for extra services made, but, as there was no such 
agrPement, it was not allowed and it appears to have been 
abandoned. So far as the partnership accounting is concerned 
Insley is to be tre-at<'d as a one-half owner and the Shire estate 
as the owner of the other half interest. The thr(~e executors 
are to be regnrd<>d as one· person, nnd together tlley sustain 
the same relation to lnsl<'y that Shire did in his lifetime. 
Insley owed them, as partners, no higher duty or any greater 
diligence than he would have owed to Shire under similar cir-
cumstances if be bad been alive. It was the duty of the 
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partners to devote their time and best endeavors to carry on
the business, and promote the prosperity of the partnership.
In the absence of any special agreement between them as to
the division of labor, each should give time and attention to
the conduct of business without compensation, and without
regard to the relative value of the services of the several
parties: Parsons on Partnership, 3d Ed. 244; 17 Amer. &
Eng. Ency. of Law 1056. Scrupulous good faith and reason-
able diligence is required from each to the other, and all losses
caused by culpable neglect of duty or bad faith on the part of
a partner are chargeable against him in favor of the firm.
“A fair degree of care only, however, is required. An honest
mistake of judgment, or a trivial departure from the partner-
ship agreement in cases of emergency, will not impose the
burden of the losses of the firm on the deviating partner."
17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1219.
A partner of equal responsibility, and who himself is indif-
ferent to his own interest or guilty of negligence, is hardly in
a position to claim and recover for the entire losses resulting
from the negligence of both. In this case the duty of
carefully selecting employés and supervising the business
of the partnership rested equally upon Insley and the
representatives of the estate; and yet we find that the
entire loss resulting from the fraud and defalcation of
employés was placed upon a single partner. The principal
losses resulted from the action of Milligan in abstract-
ing and purloining money from the bank. Gaw, who
was giving special attention to the interests of the Shire
estate, procured the employment of Milligan, who was a rela-
tive, and there is testimony that Milligan was employed and
placed on the working force of the bank as a representative of
the Shire estate. It was as much the duty of those representing
-the estate to exercise a watchful care over the conduct of Milli-
gan and the other employés as it was of Insley. The accounts
which he fraudulently manipulated and the books which he
falsified were under the eyes and supervision of the partners.
Why, then, should Insley account for all these losses? If
Shire had been alive, and had selected Milligan as an
employé, and he had been guilty of frauds similar to those
charged against him, and if there had been no other division

















































































































































INSLEY vs. SHIBB. 
partners to devote their time and best endeavors to carry 011 
the business, and prom-0te the prosperity of the partnership. 
In the absence of any special agreement between them as to 
the division of labor, each s~ould give time and attention to 
the conduct of business without compensation, and without 
regard to the relative value of the services of the several 
parties: Parsons on Partnership, 3d Ed. 244; 17 Amer. & 
Eng. Ency. of Law 1056. Scrupulous good faith and reason-
able diligence is required from each to the other, and all losses //' 
caused by culpable neglect of duty or bad faith on the part of 
a partner are chargeable against him in favor of the firm. 
"A fair degree of care only, however, is required. An honest 
mistake of judgment, or a trivial departure from the partner-
ship agreement in cases of emergency, will not impose the 
burden of the losses of the firm on the deviating partner.,, 
17 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1219. 
A partner of equal responsibility, and who himself is indif-
ferent to his own interest or guilty of negligence, is hardly in 
a position to claim and recover for the entire losses resulting 
from the negligence of both. In this case the duty of 
carefully selecting employee and supervising the business 
of the p:utnersbip rested equally upon Insley and the 
representatives of the estate; and yet we find that the 
entire Joss resulting from the fraud and defalcation of 
<~mployes was plac<'d upon a single partner. The principal 
losses resulted from the action of Milligan in abstract• 
ing and purloining money from the bank. Gaw, whc> 
w-ae giving special attention to the interests of the Shire 
estate, procured the employment of MilJigan, who was a rela-
th'e, and there is testimony that Mi11igan was employed and 
placed on the working force of the bank ae a representative of 
the Shire estate. It was as much the duty of those representing 
the estate to exercise a watchful care over1:he conduct of Milli· 
gan and the ooher employee ns it was of Insley. The accounbt 
which be fraudulently manipulated and the books which he 
falsified were under the eyes and supervision of the partners. 
Why, then, should Insley account for all these losses? It 
Shire had been alive, and bad selected MiJJigan as an 
employe, and be had been guilty of frauds similar to those 
charged against him, and if there had been no other division 
of labor or responsibility between Insley and Shire than did 
29 
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exist while they were partners, how could Shire have claimed
that Insley should bear all the losses resulting from the frauds
and peculations of Milligan?
It appears that the methods by which Milligan abstracted
and purloined the money of the 'firm were so ingenious as to
almost bafile the skill of expert accountants, and several weeks
were consumed before they were able to uncover the fraud
and determine by whom the money was taken. Insley was
not a bookkeeper nor an expert accountant, and no reason is
seen why he should be held to a higher degree of care with
respect to the books than those representing the other inter-
ests. Where the partners share alike in the control and labor
of business one of them cannot sit passively by, indifferent to
the interests of the firm, and after neglecting to use reason-
able diligence himself, hold the other responsible to the firm
for a like indifference or negligence. lt does not appear that
Insley had any special skill as a banker, and as a partner
he cannot be held for thelack of skill in that respect. His
partners had a right to expect reasonable care and diligence
from him in assisting to carry on the business, but they knew
what his capabilities were when they entered into business
with him, and therefore have no right to complain of a lack of
ability or skill. The charge of bad faith and of conspiracy
with Gaw was not sustained because there was an express
finding that Insley did not participate in any fraudulent trans-
action of the employés or in any of the fruits thereof, and,
more than that, that he had no knowledge of the same. lt
is clear that the accounting was made upon an incorrect
theory. The liability of Insley was extended beyond what
was warranted by the evidence or the law, and hence the
judgment cannot be sustained.
Reversed.
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emat while they were partners, how could Shire baTe elaimed 
that Insley should bear all the losses resulting from the frauds 
ud peculations of Milligan? 
It appears that the methods by which Milligan abstracted 
and purloined the money of the ·ftrm were so ingenious as to 
almost baftle the skill of expert accountants, and sevel"'81 weeks 
were consumed before they were able to uncover the fraud 
and determine by whom the money was taken. Insley was 
not a bookkeeper nor an expert accountant, and no reason is 
seen why be should be held to a higher degree of care with 
respect to the books than those representing the other inter-
t>Sts. 'Vhere the partners share alike in the control and labor 
of business one of them cannot sit passively by, indifferent to 
the interests of the firm, and after neglecting to use reason-
able diligence himself, hold the other responsible to the firm 
for a like indifference o~ negligence. It does not appear that 
Insley bad any special skill as a banker, and as a partner 
he cannot be held for the lack of. skill in that respect. His 
partners bad a right to expect reasonable care a.nd diligence 
from him in assisting to carry on the business, but they knew 
what his capabilities were when they entered into business 
with him, and therefore have no right to complain of a lack of 
ability or skill. The charge of bad faith and of conspiracy 
with Gaw was not sustained becam~e there was an express 
finding that Insley did not participate in any franduJt.>nt tl'ans-
action of the employes or in any of the fruits thereof, and, 
more than that, that be had no knowledgP of the same. It 
le clear that the aC'connting was made upon an incorrect 
theory. The liability of Jnslry was extended beyond what 
was warranted by the evidence or the law, and hence the 
judgment cannot be snstainrit. 
Reversed. 
NOTE.-StM! Mechem'11 Elem. of Partn., § 114. 
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MURPHY vs CRAFTS.
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1858.
13 La. Ann. 519, 71 Am. Dec. 519.
Plaintiff and defendant were commercial partners, transact-
ing a general commission business under the name and style
of Murphy & Crafts, in the city of New Orleans. Their con-
tract of partnership was in writing, and the third article
thereof was in these wordszl “We will not indorse any note, -
draft, or give our signatures separately or collectively, except
for our legitimate business purposes.”| Crafts, in violation
of this article, accepted in the partnership name, for the accom-
modation of his brother-in-law, John C. Robertson, of the city
of Boston, bills of exchange to the amount of $12,500. Robert-
son failed in business, and the firm of Murphy & Crafts lost,
by these acceptances, the sum of $5,592.90. The action was
by Murphy against Crafts to recover indemnity for this loss.
Judgment below for plaintiff, and defendant appeals,
Singleton tfi Clack, for plaintifi. '
Game (E Breaum, for defendant.
LAND, J . (After stating the facts.) The principal question
in this case is, whether Crafts is liable to his partner for the
loss. (Omitting references to the code). Judge STORY, in his
Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, says: “One of the
most obvious duties and obligations of all the partners is
strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations eon-
tained in the partnership articles, and also to keep within the
bounds and limitations of the rights, powers, authorities, and
acts‘ belonging and appropriate to the due discharge of the
partnership trade or business. Of course every known devi-
ation from and every excess in the exercise of such rights,
powers, authorities and acts, which produce any loss or injury
to the partnership, are to that extent to be borne by the part-
ner who causes or occasions the loss or injury, and he is bound
to indemnify the other partners therefor. The same doctrine
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MURPHY vs CRAFTS. 
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1858. 
18 La. Ann. 619, 71 Am. Dec. :il9. 
Plaintiff and defendant were commercial partners, transact-
ing a general commission business under the name and style 
of Murphy & Crafts, in the city of New Orleans. Their con-
tract of partnership was in writing, and the third .article 
thereof was in these words: I "We will not indorse any note, · 
draft, or give our signatures separately or collectively; except 
for our legitimate business purposes."• Crafts, in violation 
of this article, accepted in the partne1·ship name, for the accom-
modation of his brother-in-law, John C. Robertson, of the city 
of Boston, bills of exchange to the amount of $12,500. Robert-
son failed in business, and the firm of Murphy & Crafts lost, 
by these acceptances, the sum of $5,592.90. The action was 
by Murphy against Crafts to recover indemnity for this loss. 
Judgment below for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. 
Singleton & <Jlack, for plaintiff. 
Co:re & Breau:c, for defendant. 
LAND, J. (After stating the facts.) The principal question 
in tllis case is, whether Crafts is liable to his. partner for tlw 
loss. (Omitting references to the code). Judge STORY, in his 
Commentaries on the Law of Partnership, says: "One of the 
most obvious duties and obligations of all the partners is 
strictly to conform themselves to all tbe stipulations con-
tained in the partnership articles, and also to keep within the 
bounds and limitations of the rights, powers, authorities, and 
acts· belonging and appropriate to the due discharge of tlle 
partnership trade or business. Of course every known de\'i-
ation from and every excess in the exercise of such righb~, 
powers, authorities and acts, which produce any loss or injury 
to the partnership, are t<> that extent to be borne by the part-
ner who causes or occasions the loss or injury, and he is bournl 
t-o indemnify the other partners therefor. The same doctrine 
ta recognized by Pothier as existing in the French law; and it 
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seems, indeed, so clearly the result of natural justice as to
require no particular exposition.” Sec. 173. .
According to these rules, the defendant is clearly bound to
indemnify the plaintiff for the loss resulting from his breach
of the third article of their contract of partnership, unless the
same was superseded or waived in the course of their busi-
ness, with the assent of the plaintiff. And this is the defense
made by the defendant to the action; but we concur with the
district judge that the evidence is insuflicient to show that
the partners came to a new arrangement, in the course of their
business, and thereby superseded article third of their con-
tract, or that the plaintiff ratified the acceptances in favor
of Robertson. ' ' '
Afiirmed.
NOTE.—See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn . § H5.
YVEBB vs. FORDYCE.
Supreme Court of Iowa, 1880.
55 Iowa 11.
The parties to this action had been partners, and, having
dissolved and not being able to adjust their accounts, each
had brought an action against the other. The ease was tried
before a referee, who found that defendant had drawn out
of the partnership funds the sum of $11,187.74, and that he
had accounted for $8,404.72, leaving a balance due from him
of $2,783.02. As to this, defendant testified that all of the
money he had drawn out had been properly applied to part-
nership uses, but he was unable to make any statement of
his disbursements, having no account whatever of many of
his transactions.
Judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed.
L. Evans, for appellant. -
Gram ¢€ Flick, and Whi/fin (E Brown, -for appellee.
Rornnoox, J. (After stating the facts.) The sole question
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seems, indeed, so clearly the result of natural justice as to 
require no particular exposition." Sec. 173. 
According to these rules, the defendant is clearly bound to 
indemnify the plaintiff for the loss resulting from bis breach 
of the third article of their contract of partner·sbip, unless the 
same was superseded <>r wah·ed in the course of their busi-
ness, with the assent of tbe plaintiff. And this is the defense 
made by the defendant to the action; but we concur with the 
district judgt> tliat the e,·idence is insufficient to show that 
the partners came to a new arrangement, in the course ·of their 
business, and thereby superseded article tliird of their con-
tract, or that thf' plaintiff ratified the acceptances in favor 
of Ro be rt son-. • • • 
Affirmed. 
NOTB.-See .Mechem'a Elem. of Partn , § 115. 
WEBB vs. FORDYCE. 
Supreme Court of Iowa, 1~80. 
55 Iowa 11. 
The parties to this action had been partners, and, having 
disS<>lved .and not being able to adjust their accounts, each 
bad brought an action against the other. The case was tried 
before a referee, who fouJ?.d that defend11nt bad dr-dwn out 
of the partnership funds the sum of ,11,187.74, and that be 
bad accounted for f8,404.72, leaving a balance due from him 
of f2,783.02. As to this, defendant testified that aJJ of the 
money he had drawn out had been properly applied to part-
nership uses, but be was unable to make any statement of 
bis disbursements, having no account whatever of many of 
his transactions. 
Judgment was rendered against him, and he appealed. 
L. Evans, for appellant. 
Crum cE Flick, and Whitfin cE Brown, for appellee. 
RoTsnocK, J. (After stating the facts.) The sole question 
presented by appellant in this appeal is whether the defend-
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ant should be held liable for such of the partnership funds
as came into his hands, and for which he could render no
account and as to which he could but testify generally that he
did not convert the same to his own use.
It is contended that the question presented is the same as
that determined in Davenport vs. Sehutt, 46 Iowa, 510. But
we think the cases are quite different. In that case Daven-
port delivered to Schutt promissory notes, for the purpose of
effecting loans by discounting the notes. Schutt, as the agent
of Davenport, sold the notes and paid the proceeds to Daven-
port. lt was held that there was no more obligation upon
one party to keep books of account than the other, and that
Schutt was not liable merely because he could not show an
itemized statement of the transactions between the parties,
and that being a credible person, and having testified posi-
tively that he had paid and disposed of all sums realized by
him from plaintiff’s notes as directed by the plaintiff, this, in
the absence of some account or showing by Davenport that
the proceeds of the notes were not accounted for, was a suf-
ficient defense. In that case no confidence nor trust as to
the disposition of the proceeds of the notes was reposed in
Schutt. He was to pay to Davenport, who could well have
kept a correct account of all the notes deposited and pay-
ments made.
Here the relation of the parties is quite different. Each
checked out the funds of the partnership at will, upon his
own check, and it was the duty of each to account to the firm
for what he drew out. If the defendant drew checks and
obtained the money thereon its expenditure was a matter
peculiarly within his own knowledge. The plaintilf was
entitled to some showing more than a general statement that
the proceeds of the checks were used for partnership purposes.
“All partners having any charge of the business of the firm
are bound to keep constantly, regular, intelligible and accurate
accounts of all the business, and to give all the partners at
all times access to them and to the means of verifying them."
Parsons on Partnership, p. 527.
Aflirmed.
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ant should be held liable for such of the partnership funds 
as came into his hands, and for which he oould render no 
account and as to w~ich he coul~ but testify generally that he 
did not convert the same to his own use. 
It is contended that the question presented is the same as 
that determined in Davenport vs. Schutt, 46 Iowa, 510. But 
we think the cases are quite different. In that case Daven-
port delivered to Schutt promissory notes, for the purpose of 
effecting loans by discounting the note~. Schutt, as the agent 
of Davenport, sold the n()tes and paid the proceeds to Daven-
port. It was held that there was no more o·bligation upon 
one pa1·ty to keep books of account than the othPr, and that 
Schutt was not liable merely becam;p he could not show an 
itemized statement of the transactionN between the J>arties, 
and that being a credible person, and having testified posi-
tively that be had paid and disposed of an sums realized by 
him from plaintiff's notes as directed by the plaintiff, this, in 
the absence of some account or showing by D:ivenport that 
the proceeds of the notes were not accounted for, was a suf-
ficient defense. In that case no confidence nor trust as to 
the disposition of the proceeds of the notes was l'l'posed in 
Schutt. He was to pay to Dnvenport, wbo could well have 
kept a correct account of all the notes deposited and pay-
ments made. 
Here the relation of the parties is quite different. Each 
checked out the funds of the partnership at will, U})()n his 
own check, and it was the duty of each to account to the firm 
for what he drew out. If tlle defendant drew checks and 
obtained the money thereon its expenditure was a matter 
peculiarly within his own knowledge. The plaintiff was 
entitled to some showing more than a general statement that 
the p1·oceeds of the checks were used for partnership purposes. 
"All partners having any chai·ge of the business of the firm 
are bound to lrnep constantly, regular, intelligible and accurate 
accounts of n11 the business, and to give all the partners at 
all times access to them and to the means of verifying them." 
Parsons on Pnrtnnship, p. u~7. 
AffirmPd. 
NOTE -See Mecht>m"s Elem of Partn., ~ 118. 
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YORKS vs. TOZER.
Suprenw Court of Jllinnesota, 1894.
59 Minn. 78, 60 N. W. Rep. 846, 28 L. R. A. B6.
Plaintiff and defendant were partners in rcspect to one par-
cel of land, the title to which was taken in defendant’s name.
Defendant negotiated a sale of the land, without the plaintifl"s
knowledge, but, on obtaining an abstract, the title appeared
defective in la-cking one conveyance. The title was, however,
perfect, and the fault was in the abstract. Plaintiff could
have informed defendant of this error, but, without consulting
plaintiff, defendant paid $526, to procure a conveyance to sup-
pl_v the supposed deficiency. The action was by plaintiff for
an accounting for the proceeds of the sale, and the defendant
sought to be allowed the $526 so paid.
Disallowed and defendant appeals.
Glapp é 1|-!cO'artne_1/, for appellant.
Henry N. Sctzcr, for appellee.
C.-u\"rY, J. (After stating the facts.) The court [below] ea
finds that defendant acted in good faith in the sale of the land.
and in expending said sum of $526 in attempting to cure the
supposed defect in his title, but holds that he -cannot compel
plaintifi to stand one-half or any part of such expense. \Ve
are of the same opinion. If defendant did not act in bad faith,
he was, to say the least, gpgsslyneglig cnt. It does not appear
that plaintiff was not accessibleand could not be communi-
cated with in a reasonable time. This land was the only part-
nership property, and its purchase and sale was the only part-
nership business. It was not an act in the usual course of
the partnership business, but one which went to the very foun-
dation of the partnership. It is found by the court that the
plaintiff, and not the defendant, conducted the negotiations
for the purchase of this land, and procured the conveyance to
defendant; and he should be presumed to have had some
knowledge of the state of the title. No reason is given by
defendant w\hy all negotiations for the sale of the land and
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YORKS vs. TOZER. 
Sttpr~ Court of Minnesota, 189.f. 
G9 .Minn. 78, 60 N. W. Rep. 846, 28 L. R. A. 88. 
Plaintiff and defendant were partners in respect to one par-
cel of land, the title to which was taken in defendant's name. 
Ddendant negotiated a sale of the land, without the plaintiff's 
knowledge, but, on obtaining an abstract, the title appeared 
defective in lacking one conveyance. The title was, h<>wever, 
perfect, and the fault was in the abstract. Plaintiff could 
lmve informed defendant of this error, but, without consulting 
plaintiff, defendant paid $526, to procure a conveyance to sup-
ply the supposed deficiency. The action was by plaintiff for 
an aroounting for the proceeds of the sale, and the defendant 
flonght to be allowed the f526 so paid. 
• I Disallowed and defendant appeals.· 
Clapp tE McCartney, for appellant. . 
Henry N. Setzer, for appellee. 
CANTY, J. (After stating the facts.) The court [below]..,, 
finds that defendant acted in good faith in the sale of the land~ 
and in expending said sum of $526 in attempting t-0 cure the 
supposed defect in his title, but holds that he -cannot compel 
plaintiff to stand one-half or any part of sucih expense. We 
are of the same opinion. If defendant did not act in bad faith, 
he was, to say the least, grosslj:. negligent. It does not appear 
I 
that plaintiff was not accessible ·and could n<>t be communi-
cated with in a reaso.nable time. This land was the 01:11Y ~rt­
nership property, and its purehase and sale was the only part-
nership business. It w0as not an act in the mmal course of 
the partnership business, but one which went to the very foun-
dation of the partnership. It is found by the court that the 
plaintiff, and not thP defe>ndant, conducted the negotiations 
for the purchase of this land, and procured the conveyance to 
defendant; and he should be pres~med to have had some 
knowledge of the state of the title. No reason is given by 
defendant why all negotiations for the sale of the land and 
the purcllli.se of this supposed title by him were kept secret 
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from plaintifi. In every important exigency the partner about
to act should consult the other partner, at least, if there are
no circumstances which excuse him from so doing.
Afiirmed.
No'rE.—See Mechem's Elem. of Pal-tn., 5 117.
LINDSEY vs. STRANAHAN.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1889.
129 Pa. St. 685, 18 Atl. Rep. 524.
Action for accounting of partnership transactions. It
appeared that J. A. Stranahan had carried on business alone
until 1876, when J. K. Lindsey bought a half interest in it and
the two united as partners under the firm name of J . K. Lind-
sey & Co. After the formation of the firm Stranalhan left the
entire management and control of the business to Lindsey.
On the settlement, Lindsey claimed compensation for thus
managing the business. The matter was referred to masters
in ch-ancery to state an account, and they reported, among
other things, as follows: “No express agreement or contract
was made by said partners that either of them was to receive
compensation for services rendered by either of them in the
business of the partnership; but as Lindsey took credit for
his services from time to time on the books of the firm, and
such books were open to the inspection of Stranahan, he must
be presumed to have known the fact and to ha.ve assented
thereto; and, as it is not to be presumed that the said Lindsey
would render his services in managing the affairs of said part-
nership for nothing, we, therefore, find as a fact, that there
was an implied contract that Lindsey should receive such
compensation for his services as they were reasonably worth.”
They therefore credited him with “salary, $3,700.” -
The court below disallowed this claim, and Lindsey
appealed.
S. and S. B. Grifiith, for the appellant.

















































































































































LnrnsB'f vs. STRANAHAN. ell 
from plaintiff. In every important exigency the· pa.rtner about 
to act should consult the other partner, at least, if there a.re 
no circumstances which excuse him from so doing. 
Affirmed. 
NOTB.-8ee Mechem'& Elem. of Partn., ~ 11'7. 
l.1TNDSEY vs. STRANAHAN. 
Bupreme Ootirl of Penns-ylvania, 1889. 
129 Pa. St. 685, 18 Atl. Rep. 524. 
Action for accounting of partnership transactions. It 
appeared that J. A. Stranahan had carried on business alone 
until 1876, when J. K. Lindsey bought a half interest in it and 
the two united as partners under the firm name of J. K. Lind-
sey & Cio. After the formaition of the firm Stran.ruhan left the 
entire management and control of the business to Lindsey. 
On the settlement, Lindsey claimed compensation for thus 
managing the business. The matter was ref erred to masters 
in chancery to state an account, and they reported, among 
other things, as follows: "No express agreement or contract 
was made by said partners that either of them was to receive 
compeneation for services rendered by either of them in the 
business of the partnership; but as Lindsey took credit for 
his services from time to time on the books of the firm, and 
such books were open to the inspection of Stranahan, he must 
be presumed to have known the fact and to have assented 
thereto; and, as it is not to be presumed that the said Lindsey 
would render bis services in man-a~ing the affairs of said part-
nership for nothing, we, therefor~, find as a fact, that there 
was an impliPd oontract that Lindsey should receive such 
compensation for his services as they were reasonably worth.'' 
They therefore credited him with "salary, f3,700." 
The court below disallowed this claim, and Lindsey 
appealed. 
8. and S. B. Griffith, for the appellant. 
J. A.. Stranahan, for appellee. 
____ ....... 
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PER Cunmu. There is but a single question in this case:
ls J. K. Lindsey, the plaintiff, entitled to compensation for his
services as a partner? It is conceded that there was no
express contract that he should be paid for such services, and
there is no principle better settled than that the law will not
imply a contract in such cases. The reason is that the part-
ner is but attending to his own affairs. This rule is inexor-
able; as much so as that between parent and child. Were it
otherwise, we might have a contest between the partners upon
the settlement of every partnership account, as to the value
of their respective services. -It is true this principle may work
hardship in particular cases; almost every general rule does,
but that is a weak argument against the soundness of the
rule. When the copartnership agreement contemplates that
on'e partner shall manage the business, or do more than his
hare of the work, it is easy to provide for his compensation
in the agreement itself; and if no such stipulation is then
m-ade, as before said, the law will not imply one. Even where
a liquidating or surviving partner settles up the business, it
has been repeatedly held that he is not entitled to compensa-
tion for doing so, although, in such case, he performs all the.
service; Beatty vs. Wrag/, 19 Pa. 516, 57 Am. Dec. 677; Brown
vs. McFarland, 41 Pa. 129, 80 Am. Dec. 598; G_vger’s Appeal,
62 Pa. 73, 1 Am-. Rep. 382; Brown’s Appeal, 89 Pa. 139.
Judgment affirmed.
N0'1's.—See also Meohenfs Elem. of Part:n., §§ 119, 120, for other cases to
the same effect. The same general rule ordinarily governs the allowance
of interest to one partner upon money advanced by him for partnership
purposes. See Mechem‘s Elem. of Pat-tn., § 121.
MoFADDEN vs. LEEKA.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 18.91.
. 48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874.
McFadden, Leeka, and a large number of others organized
an unincorporated association known as The Union Pork
House Company, under a constitution and by-laws agreed

















































































































































182 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
PER Cum.&M. There ia bot a single queBtion in this case: 
Ta.J. K. Lindsey, the plaintiff, entitled to compensation for his 
services as a partner? It is -conceded that there was no 
expreRs contract that he should be paid for such services, and 
there ia no principle better settled than that the law will not 
imply a contract in such cases. The reason is that the part-
n~r is but attending to bis own affairs. This rule is inPxor-
able; as much so as that between parent and child. \Yere it 
otherwise, we might have a contest between the partners upon 
the settlement of every partnership account, as to the value 
of their respective senices. ·It is true this principle may work 
hardship in particular cases; almost every general rule does, 
but that is a weak argument against the soundness of the 
rule. \Vhen the copartnenhip agreement contemplates that 
one partner shall manage the business, or do more than his 
share of the work, it is easy to provide for bis compensation 
in the agreement itself; and if no such stipulation is then 
made, as before said, the law will not imply one. EYen where 
a li<1uidating or surviving partner settles up the business, it 
has been repeatedly held that he is not entitled to compensa-
tion for doing so, although, in such case, he performs all the. 
service; Beatty vs. Wray, 19 Pa. 516, 57 Am. Dec. 677; Broten 
'VB. AlcFarland, 41 Pa. 129, 80 Am. Dec. 598; Gyger's Appeal, 
62 Pa. 73, 1 .\m. Ilep. 382; Brown'11 Appeal, 89 Pa. 139. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NoTE.-See also Meohem'a Elem. of Partn., H 119, 120, for other cases to 
the same effect. The same general rule ordinarily governs the allowance 
of interest to one partner upo11 money advanced by him for partoerahip 
purposea. See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 121. 
McFADDEN vs. LEEKA. 
Supreme Cottrt of Ohio, 1891. 
48 Ohio St. 513, 28 N. E. Rep. 874, 
.McFadden, Leeka, and a large number of others organized 
an unincorporated association known as The Union Pork 
House Company, under a constitution and by-laws agreed 
upon. The affairs of tlle association were in charge of a board 
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of directors provided forby the by-laws, and elected from the
members. One of the purposes of the organization was the
erection of a packing house. By-law VIII provided that the
directors should not incur indebtedness beyond the available
capital of the company. In erecting the packing house, the
contributions from the members proved insufficient, and the
directors borrowed large sums on their persona.l responsibility.
They then procured a mortgage upon the property to secure
them against this indebtedness, foreclosed the mortgage,
bought in the property, and, after applying the proceeds upon
this indebtedness, brought this action against all the stock-
holders to recover a large balance remaining unsatisfied.
Leeka was one of these directors and McFadden one of the
stockholders so sued. ' l
Judgment below against McFadden and others, and they
brought error. '
Alphonso Hart, for plaintiffs in error.
Steel ¢£~ Hough, and Uric Sloane, for defendant in error. _
DIIJKMAN, J. (After holding that the association was a
partnership and that the rights and liabilities of the members
were to be determined as partners). When the directors,
finding they were able to oollect only eight thousand and
five hundred dollars of the stock, proceeded to contract an
indebtedness largely in excess of the available capital of the
company, and in disregard -of a. plain provision of an
unchanged by-law, their action, as between the partners, was
binding only upon those who eit'her assented beforehand to
the creation of the indebtedness or ratified it after it was
incurred. In general, the act of one or more partners in con-
travention of the partnership articles in a substantial point,
cannot, as among the members of the firm, bind the non-
assenting partners. .
One of the most obvious duties and obligations of all part-
ners is, strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations
contained in the partnership articles. In respect to the extent
of the partnership as stated in the articles, courts of equity
construe the articles -strictly, and do not permit the business
to be extended by any of the partners without the consent of
all of them. Story, Part., secs. 173, 193. In the management

















































































































































McFADDEN VS. LEEK-". 233 
of directors provided for by the ·by:laws, and elected ·from the 
members. One of the purposes of the organization was the 
erection of a packing house. By.Jaw VIII provided that the 
directors should not incur indebtedness bPy-0nd the available 
ca.pita} of the company. In erecting the packing house, the 
contributions from the members proved insufficient, .and the 
directors borrowed large sums on their personal responsibility. 
They then procured a mortgnge up.on the property to secure 
them against this indebtedness, foreclosed the mortgage, 
bought in the property, and, after applying the proceeds upon 
this indebtl'dncss, brought this action against all the stock-
holders to recover a large balance rc·nrniniug unsatisfied. 
Leeka was one of these directors and McFadden one of the 
stockholders so sued. 
Judgment below against Mcl!"adden and others, and they 
brought error. 
Alphonso Hart, for plaintiffs in error. 
Steel & Hough, and Uric Sl-Oane, for defendant in error. 
DICKltAN, J. (After holding that the association was a 
partnership and that the rights and liabilities of the members 
were to be determined as partners). lVhen the directol"S, 
finding they were able to collect only eight thousand and 
five hundred dollars of the stock, proceeded to contract an 
indebtedness largely in excess of the available capital of the 
company, and in disregard ·of a plain provision of an 
unchanged by-law, their action, as between the partners, was . 
binding only upon those who eit11er assented beforehand to 
the creation of the indebtedness or ratified it after it was 
incurred. In g(•neral, the act of one or more partners in con-
tra\'ention of the padnersbip articles in a substantial point, 
cannot, as am<>ng the mt.>mbers of the firm, bind the non· 
assenting partners. 
One of the most obvious duties and obligations of all part-
ners is, strictly to conform themselves to all the stipulations 
contained in the partnership articles. In respect to the extent 
of the p,artnership as stated in the articles, courts of equity 
construe the articles ·Strictly, and do not permit the business 
to be extended by any of the partners without the consent of 
all of them. Story, Part., secs. 173, 193. Jn the management 
of the interior concerns of the partnership among thE>mselves, 
30 
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the weight of authority is in favor of the power of a majority
of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the
ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have
been consulted. 3 Kent’s Com., 45. But unless special pro-
visions in the articles of association be made to the contrary,
this’ right of the majority does not extend to the right to set
aside, or materially change any of the articles of the partner-
ship. In effecting such a change, or in substantially violating
any of the articles, it is essential that all should unite; other-
wise, it is not obligatory upon them. Golly. Part., 3d Am.
Ed., 182. In no case can the majority bind the minority inter
sese to anything expressly stipulated against in the contract,
or which is not fairly within the scope of the partnership
business, and that cannot be considered within its scope which
in any respect is subversive of the fundamental agreement.
Abbott vs. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; 1 Wood’s Colly. Part. sec. 155,
p. 285, N.
In Davies vs. H owkins, 3 Maule and Sel. 488, a company was
formed for brewing ale, and by deed they confided the conduct
of the business to "two persons, who were to be trustees of the
company. General quarterly meetings of the company were
to be held. It was resolved by the King’s Bench, that one per-
son only could not be appointed at a general quarterly meet-
ing in place of the two originally appointed under the deed,
unless such alteration was made with the consent of all the
subscribers. Lord E1.r.n>:nonouon said, that “a change had
been made in the constitution of this company, which could not
be made with-out the consent of the whole body of the sub-
scribers. It was such a substituted alteration in its constitu-
tion as required the consent of all.” _
The right oficontribution and indemnity between partners
grows, in a large measure, out of the agency of the partner
seeking reimbursement. Each member, as an agent of the
firm, is entitled to be indemnified by the firm, against liabilities
bona fide incurred by him while pursuing the authority con-
ferred upon him by the agreement entered into between him-
self and his copartners; but he has no right to claim con-
tribution from the other members of the firm, for liabilities
incurred in disregard of the authority thus reposed in him. It
devolves upon agents and trustees who seek indemnity from
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the weight of auth'Ority is in favor of the power of a majority 
of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the 
ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have 
been consulted. 3 Kent's Com., 45. But unless special pro-
visions in the articles of association be made to the contrary, 
thi!'/ right of the majority does not extend to the right to set 
aside, or materially change any of the articles of the partner-
8hip. In effecting such a change, or in substantially violating 
nny of the articles, it is essential that all should unite; other-
wise, it is not obligatory upon them. Colly. Part., 3d Am. 
Ed., 182. In no case can the majority bind the minority intM 
aese to anything expressly stipulated against in the oontract, 
or which is not fairly within the scope of the partnership 
business, and that cannot be considered witbin its scope which · 
in any respect is subversive of the fundamental agreement. 
Abbott vs. Johnson, 32 N. H. 9; 1 Wood's Colly. Part. sec. 105, 
p. 285, N. 
In Datiies vs. Ha.wkins, 3 Maule and Sel. 488, a company was 
f orm('d for brewing ale, and by deed they confided the conduct 
of the business to two persons, who were to be trustees of the 
company. General quarterly meetings of the company were 
to be held. It waa resolved by the King's Bench, that one per-
son only could not be appointed at a general quarterly meet-
ing in place of the two originally appointed under the deed, 
unless such alteration was made with the consent of all the 
suhscr-ibers. Lord Er.r.ENBOROUGH said, that "a change had 
been made in the constitution of this company, which could not 
be made with-out the consent of the whole body of the sub-
1cribers. It was such a substituted alteration in its Constitu-
tion as required the consent of all." 
'l'he right of contribution and indemnity between partners 
grows, in a large measure, out of the agency of the partner 
11eeking reimbursement. Each member, as an agent of the 
firm, is entitled to be indemnified by the firm, against liabilities 
bona fide incurred by him while pursuing the authority con-
ferred upon him by the agreement entered into between him-
self and his copartners; but he has no right to claim con-
tribution from the other members of the firm, for liabilities 
incurred in disregard of the authority thus reposed in him. It 
•levolves upon agents and trustees who seek indemnity from 
their principals and ceat-uis que trustent, to show that they have 
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not acted contrary to their instructions, for on principle they
will not be entitled to any indemnity or reimbursement for
losses and expenses incurred while so acting. And this rule
has been applied to directors of companies. In The Worcester
Corn Exchange Company’s Case, 3 l)e Gex, Mac. & G. 180, a
company was organized for the purpose of building a corn
exchange. The deed of settlement of the company limited the
amount of each shareholder’s subscription, and authorized the
directors to create new shares, and to raise the money by bor-
rowing, under certain restrictions. The capital of the com-
pany being expended, and more money being required, the
directors advanced money themselves, and expended it in pay-
ment of debts of the company. They also, but in excess of
their powers, borrowed money of a bank which had notice
of the company’s deed. It was held that the directors were
not entitled to charge the shareholders, either in respect of
the advances, or in respect of the bank debt, beyond the
amount of the capital which each shareholder had_ agreed to
subscribe. And this decision is pronounced to be, “strictly
in conformity with the sensible rule that agents are not
entitled to any indemnity from their principals in respect of
unauthorized expenditures.” 1 Wood’s Golly. Part., 495.
But we are reminded that the constitution and by-laws of
The Union Pork House Company provide, by article XI of
the one and article IX of the other, that either the constitu-
tion or by-laws “may be altered or amended at any regular
meeting by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders represented
at said meeting.” And it is urged in argument, that notwith-
standing article VIII of the by-laws restraining the action
of the directors has never been altered or amended, yet, the
shareholders, at certain extra but n-ot regular meetings, by a
vote sufiicient to alter or amend that section, virtually
assented to and ratified the acts of the directors in creating
an indebtedness beyond the available capital of the company,
by authorizing them to borrow money and directing a mort-
gage on the company’s property to indemnify them against
loss. But the object of a change in the by-laws is not to be
attained by an indirect, irregular, and unauthorized method,
calculated to mislead the shareholders. The shareholders had
the right to rely upon the inviolability of the constitution
















































































































































McFADDE¥ vs. Lau. !35 
not acted contrary to their instructions, for on principle the7 
will not be entitled to any indemnity or reimbursement for 
losses and expenses incurred while so acting. And tbiit rule 
hns been applied to directors of companies. In The Worcester 
Corn Exchange Company's Case, 3 De Gex, Mac. & G. 180, a 
company was organized for the purpose of building a corn 
exchange. The deed of settlement of the company limited the 
amount of each shareholder's subscriptlon, and authorized the 
directors to create new shares, and to raise the money by bor-
rowing, under certain restrictions. The capital of the com-
pany being expended, and more money being required, the 
directors advanced money themselves, and expended it in pay-
ment of debts of the company. They also, but in excess of 
their powers, borrowed money of a bank which had notice 
of the company's deed. It was held that the directors were 
not entitled to charge the shareholders, either in respect of 
the advances, or in respect of the bank debt, beyond the 
amount of the capital which each shareholder had. agreed to 
Mubscribe. And tlds decision is pronounced to be, "strictly 
in conformity with the sensible rule that agents are not 
entitled to any indemnity from their principals in respect of 
unauthorized expenditures." 1 Wood's Colly. Part., 495. 
But we are reminded that the constitution and by-laws of 
The Union Pork House Company provide, by article XI of 
the one and article IX of the other, that either the constitu-
tion or by-laws "may be altered or amended at any regular 
me>eting by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders represented 
at said meeting." And it is urged in argument, that notwith-
standing article VIII of the by-laws restraining the action 
of the directors has never been altered or amended, yet, the 
E1hareholders, at certain extra but not regular meetings, by a 
vote sufficient to alter or amend that section, virtually 
al'sented to and ratified the acts of the directors in creating 
an indebtedness beyond the available capital of the company, 
by authorizing them to borrow money and directing a mort-
gage on the company's property to indemnify them against 
loss. But the object of a change in the by-laws is not to be 
attained by an indirect, irregular, and unauthorized method, 
calculated to mislead the shareholders. The shareholders had 
the right to rely upon the inviolability of the constitution 
and by-laws, unless changed in the manner prescribed. Until 
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the by-laws to restrict the directors in the expenditure of
money should be changed in the mode provided, to wit: by
a two-thirds vote of all the stock represented at a regular meet"-
ing, of which due notice had been given, and held on the first
Thursday of March or September, the directors would be con-
fined within the bounds of the available capital of the com-
pany, and in transgressing those bounds, would, we think, be
entitled to no contribution or reimbursement from non-assent
ing shareholders or partners who had paid their subscriptions.
If it is proposed to make an alteration in the partnership arti-
cles by an agreement which shall be binding on all parties,
notice of the proposed change and of the time and place at
which it is to be taken into consideration ought to be given
to all partners. Const vs. Harris, 1 T. & R. 496. For, even
if the change is one which it is competent for a majority to
make against the assent of the minority, all are entitled to be
heard upon the subject; and unless all have an opportunity
of opposing the change, those who object to it will not be
bound by the others. 2 Lind. Part., 2d Am. Ed., 410.
Recurring, however, to the court’s findings of fact in refer-
ence to the extra meeting of December 1, 1875, when a reso-
lution was adopted authorizing the directors to finish the
building and borrow money to pay off the indebtedness; and
the extra meeting of September 26, 187 6, when the matter of
paying ofl? the indebtedness, and completing the building was
considered; and the extra meeting of December 23, 1876, when
the trustee was authorized to execute and deliver a mortgage
to secure the di"<>.ctors from loss on account of their individual
liability on the indebtedness, it does not appear how many
shares of stock were represented at any one of those meetings,
or whether any resolution was adopted by a two-thirds vote,
or whether any notice was ever given to any shareholder,
informing him that an alteration or amendment of any of
the by-laws would be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, where a member of a firm materially violates
the articles of copartnership, and claims contribution and in-
demnity from his copartners for the losses and expenses to
which he has thereby been subjected, it will be incumbent
upon him to show assent or ratification of his acts by his
copartners before he can recover of them. In the findings of
fact it is not disclosed that the plaintiffs in error, or any of
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the by-Iaw·s 1o restrict tile directors in the expenditure of 
money should be changed in the mode provided, to wit: by 
a two-thirds VQte of all the stock represented at a regular meet-
ing, of which due notice had been given, and held on the first 
Thursday of March or September, the directors would be con-
ftned within the bounds of the available capital of the com-
pany, and in transgressing those bounds, would, we think, be 
entitled to no contribution or reimbursement from non-assent-
ing shareholders or putners who had paid their subscriptions. 
If it is proposed to make an alteration in the partnership arti-
cles by an agreement which shall be binding on all parties, 
notice of the proposed change and of the time and place at 
whi<.'h it is to be taken into consideration ought to be given 
to all partners. Const tJB. Harris, 1 T. & R. 496. For, even 
if the change is one which it is competent for a majority to 
make against the assent of the minority, all are entitled to be 
heard upon the subject; and unless all have an opportunity 
of opposing the change, those who object to it will not be 
bound by the others. 2 Lind. Part., 2d Am. Ed., 410. 
Recurring, however, to the court's findings of fact in refer-
ence to the extra meeting of De~ember 1, 1875, when a reso-
lution was adopted authorizing the directors to finish the 
building and borrow mPney to pay off the indebtedness; and 
the extra meMing of SPptember 26, 1876, when the matter of 
paying off t:tie indebtPdness, and completing the building was 
eonsidered; and the extra meeting of December 23, 1876, when 
the trustee was authorized to execute and deliver a mortgage 
to secure the di.··~cto1·s from Joss on account of their individual 
liability on the indebtedn<.>ss, it does not appear how many 
shares of stock were represented at any one of those meetings, 
or whether any resolution was adopted by a fwo-thirds vote, 
or whether any notice was ever given to any shareholder, 
informing him that an alteration or amendment of any of 
the bJ-laws would be taken into consideration. 
Furthermore, where a member of a firm materially violates 
the artirles of copartner1'1hip, and claims contribution and in-
demnity from his copartners for the losses and expenses to 
which he has thereby been subjected, it wi_ll be incumbent 
upon him to show ass<.>nt or ratification of his acts by his 
copartners before he can r<>cover of tbPm. In the findings of 
fact it is not disclosed that the plaintiffs in error, or any of 
them, ever expressly assented to the creation or payment of 
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any of the indebtedness contracted by the directors. Indeed,
the court evidently did not regard such assent necessary to
bind the other shareholders. For, the court found, that a
stockholder who was never present at any meeting when the
indebtedness was made known or talked of, who never
attended any meeting after he heard of the indebtedness, and
who expressed his dissatisfaction at the creation of the debt;
that a stockholder who never attended any of the meetings,
never heard of the indebtedness until the commencement of
the original action, and never expressly assented to it; and
that a stockholder who attended a meeting when the indebted-
ness'was made known, but voted against paying it, and never
expressly assented to it, should each, nevertheless, be holden
to contribute toward the reimbursement of the directors.
'[‘he fact that the shareholders received notice of the meet-
ings and failed to attend, seems to have been deemed ade-
quate to bind them. But, the directors having disregarded
an important article of the by-laws, essential to the safety
and protection of the company, and thereby created an
indebtedness beyond the company’s available capital, at share-
holder who did not see fit, upon notice, to attend a meeting
called by those directors to consider their own neglect of duty,
should not therefore be concluded by the action of those stock-
holders present who ratified the unauthorized acts of the
directors.
In our view the conclusions of law, and the decree of the
circuit court are not altogether sustained by the facts as
found by the court; and those of the plaintitfs in error who
did not, in any other manner than by failure to attend the
meetings of the stockholders when notified, assent expressly
or by necessary implication, to the creation or payment 01
any of the indebtedness incurred by the directors, should not
be required to contribute toward the payment of such indebt-
ness, after paying the amount due upon their respective sub-
scriptions. YVe think, therefore, that a judgment should be
rendered for the plaintiffs in error upon the facts found, in
conformity with the foregoing opinion of the court.
Judgment accordingly.
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any of the indebtedness contracted by the directors. Indeed, 
the court evidently did not regard such assent necessary to 
bind the other shareholders. For, the court found, that a 
stockholder who was never present at any meeting when the 
indebtedness was made known or talked of, who never 
n ttended any meeting after he heard of the indebtedness, and 
who expressed his dissatisfaction at the creation of the debt; 
that a stockholder who never attended any of the meetings, 
never heard of the indebtedness until the commencement of 
the original action, and never expressly assented to it; and 
that a stockholder who attended a meeting whea the indebted-
ness ·was made known, but voted against paying it, and never 
PXpressly assented to it, should each, nevertheless, be holden 
to contribute toward the reimbursement of the direocto1'8. 
'rbe fact that the shareholders received notice of the meet-
ings and failf'd to attend, seems to have been dee~ed ade-
c1uate to bind them. But, the directors having disregarded 
an important article of the by-laws, essential to the safety 
and protection of the company, and thereby created an 
irul<•btedness be~·ond the company's available capital, a share-
holder who did not see fit, upon notice, to attend a meeting 
called by those directors to consider their own neglect of duty, 
should not therefore be concluded by the action of those stock-
holders present who ratified the unauthorized acts of the 
directors. 
In our view the conclusions of law, and the decree of the 
circuit court are not nltogether sustained by the facts as 
found by the court; and those of the plaintiffs in error who 
did nott in any other manner than by failure to attend the 
meetings of the stockholders when notified, assent expreBSly 
or by neceseary implication, to the creation or payment ol 
any of the indebtedDf'.SS incurred by the directors, should not 
be required to contribute toward the payment of such indebt-
nese, after paying the amount due upon their re3pective sub-
scriptions. We think, therefore, that a judgment should be 
rendered for the plaintiffs in error upon the facts found,. in 
conformity with the foregoing opinion of the court. 
Judgment ac~or~ing-1y. 






Supreme Court of Iowa, 1860.
10 Ia. 332.
In February, 1857, plaintiff and defendant formed a copart-
nership in the grocery and provision busines in the city of
Keokuk, each of said partners agreeing to furnish his share of
the capital stock and share equally in the profits of their firm
business. The copartnership thus formed was dissolved in
December, 1857. The stock in trade was sold and placed to
the credit of plaintiff on the partnership account. The plain-
tiff in his petition avers that the defendant failed to furnish his
share of the capital for the said firm; that he drew out of the
said firm more than his just share of the profits, and that upon
a settlement and account stated between plaintiff and defend-
ant there was due from defendant to plaintiff the sum of $1,109,
for which sum the plaintiff sues. Defendant demurred to
plaintiff’s petition, which demurrer was sustained by the court
and judgment entered thereon, from which plaintiff appeals.
Noble ct Strong, for appellant.
Rankin, Miller & Enster, for appellees.
BALDWIN, J. The defendant demurred to the petition of
plaintiff, and assigned as cause of demurrer, that the petition


















































































































































ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS. 
1. AT LAW. 
WYCOFF vs. PURNELL. 
Supreme Court of Iowa, 1860. 
10 Ia. 832. 
In February, 1857, plaintiff and defendant formed a copa;·t-
nership in the grocery and provision business in the city of 
Keokuk, ea~h of said partners agreeing to furnish bis share of 
the capital stock and share equally in the 11rofits of their firm 
busineBS. The oopartnersh.ip thus formed was- dissolved in 
necember, 1857. The stock in trade was sold and placed to 
the credit of plaintiff on the partnership accom1t. The plain-
tiff in bis petition avers that the defendant failed to furnish bis 
share of th.e capital for the said firm; that he drew out of the 
said firm more than his jnNt share of the profits, and that upon 
a settlement and account i;itated between plaintiff and defend-
ant there was due from defendant to plaintiff the sum of $1,109, 
for which sum the plaintiff sues. Defendant demurred to 
plaintiff's petition, which demurrer was sustained by the court 
and judgment entered thereon, from which plaintiff appeals. 
Noble & Strong, for appellant. 
Rankin, Miller & Enster, for appellees. 
BALDWIN, J. The defendant demurred to the petition of 
plaintiff, and assigned as cause of demurrer, that the petition 
showed that it was a controversy for the settlement of partner-
Wxcorr vs. Pununnn. 239
ship matters, and its subject-matter was one of exclusive
chancery cognizance; also that an action at common law
would not lie for the matters and things set_up in the petition.
It is contended by counsel for appellee that one partner
cannot sue another at law for an unsettled account, and that
chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters
between partners. Upon this point there is no controversy.
But it also claimed by appellant that the principle is full_v
and clearly settled that one partner can maintain an action at
law against his copartner upon an amount found to be due him
upon settlement and account stated. We think the current of
authorities show this to be the proper and settled rule. While
in some courts it has been held that upon a settlement of part-
nership accounts, an express promise to pay is essential to sup-
port an action, _vet in most of the states it has been held that
where there has been a settlement and balance ascertained, the
law itself will imply a. promise to pay: Collyer on Partner-
ship, §§ 278, 279, 280, and note; Story Eq. Jur., Q 644 and note.
“'hether this is a suit at law to recover upon a promise b_v
defendant, either express or implied to pay a balance ascer-
tained to be due upon settlement, or a proceeding to recover an
amount unliquidated between partners, must be determined
by the language of the petition. It is averred in the petition
that the partnership has been dissolved; that the property of
the firm had been disposed of, and upon a settlement and
account stated, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff
the amount claimed in the petition.
VVe think that the plaintiff shows by his petition, under a
fair and natural construction, a cause of action properly main-
tainable in a court of law. That while the petition is defective
in not setting forth fully the character of the settlement of the
partnership business, yet it shows also that the partnership
was ended; that the account between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, as partners, was no longer a matter of controversy; that
the amount sued for had been agreed as due to plaintifl’;
which, if established by evidence, the plaintiff had a. right to
recover. - ~
J udgmcnt reversed.
N0'1'E.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 180.
As stated by BALDWIN. J., there are some states in which it is said that
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ltbip matters, and its subject-matter was one of exclusivt~ 
chancery cognizance; also that an action at common law 
would not lie for the matters and things set. up in the petition. 
It is contended by counsel for appellee that one partne1· 
cannot sue another at law for an unsettled account, and that 
chancery has exclusive jurisdiction of unsettled matters 
between partners. Upon this point there is no controversy. 
\ 
Bot it also claimed by nppellant that the principle is fully 
and clearly settled that one partner can maintain an action at 
i 
law against his copartner upon an amount found to be due him 
upon settlement and account stated. We think the current of 
authorities show this to be the proper and settled rule. While 
in some courts it has been held that upon a settlement of part-
nership accounts, an express promise to pay is essential to sup-
( port an action, yet in most of the states it has been held that 
\ where there has been a settlement and balance ascertained, the 
law itself will imply a promise to pny: Collyer on Partner-
ship, §§ 278, 279, 2SO, and note; Story Eq. Jur.,' 644 and note. 
Whether this is a suit at law to recover upon a promise by 
df'fendant, either express or implied to pay a balance ascer-
tained to be due upon settlement, or a proceeding to recover an 
amount unliquidated between partners, must be determined 
by the language of the petition. It is averred in the petition 
that the partnership has been dissolved; that the property of 
the firm had been disposed of, and upon a settlement and 
account stated, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff 
.the amount claimed in the petition. 
We think tllat the plaintiff shows by his petition, under a 
fair and natural construction, a cause of action properly main-
tainable in a court of law. That while the petition is defective 
in not setting forth fully the character of the scttlemE'nt of the 
partnership business, yet it shows also that the partnership 
was ended; that the account between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, as partners, was no J-0nger a matter of controversy; that 
the amount sued for had been agreed as due to plaintiff; 
which, if established by evidence, the plaintiff had a right to 
recover. 
Judgment reversed. 
NOTE.-See Mechem'e Elem. of Pa.rtn., § 180. 
Aa stated by BALDWIN, J., there are some states In which It Is eatd that 
there must be an e:eprtRB promiae to pay. Thus, eee Courae va. p, ince, 1 
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Mill, (S. Car.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649; Murray vs. Bogeri, 14 Johns. (N. Y.)
818, 7 Am. Dec. 466; Chadsey rs. Harrison, 11 Ill. 151: Burns vs. Notting-
ham, 60 Ill. 361: Nims rs. Bigelow, 44 N. H. 376. But the general rule is
that the promise may be implied. IV;/cojf vs. Purnell, supra; Holyoke vs.
Ma 0. 50 Me. 385; Spear vs. I\’eu'eIl, 13 Vt. 288, post, p-—-; Pope vs. Ran-
dolph, 18 Ala. 14; U'ray vs. Mileslone, 5 Mees vs. W ells, 21.
In Massaclmsetts, a. still more liberal rule prevails. See Williams vs.
Henslmw, 11 Pick. 79. 22 Am. Dec. 366; 12 Pick. 378, 23 Am. Dec. 614.
In Michigan, see lVheeler vs. Arnold, 30 Mich. 804.
ji-?i_L_i
BULLARD vs. KINNEY.
Supreme Court of C'al~if01'-nia, 1858.
10 Cal. 60.
This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff on
an account assigned to him by Sotzen and Goodnow, for goods,
wares, and merchandise sold to thedefendants. The defend-
ants composed a joint stock association, known as the “Colum-
bus Quartz Mining Company.” While Sotzen and Goodnow,
merchants and partners, were shareholders in the company,
they sold to the company goods, wares and merchandise to a.
large amount. They afterwards, and during the existence of
the company, sold their stock to one \Vhite, and assigned their
account against the company to the plaintiff.
There was nothing in the constitution of the company whidh
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between them-
selves. Nor was there any final settlement of the partnership
accounts, or any balance struck, or promise on the part of the
shareholders to pay this account. The plaintiff commenced
his suit by attachment against the property of defendants.
The defendants had judgment in the court below, and the
plaintifi appealed.
Sanderson and H ewes, for appellant
D. K. Ncwell, for respondent.
BURNETT, J . The only question arising in the case is, whether
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Mill, CS. Car.) 416, 12 Am. Dec. 649; Murray va. Bogert, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 
818, 7 Am. Dec. 466; Chadsey t·s. Harrison, 11 Ill. 151: Burn8 w. Notting-
ham, 60 Ill. 861; Nims t·s. Big~lOtD, « N. H. 376. But the jteneral rule is 
that the promise may. be implied. Wycoff vs. Purnell, supra; Holyo~ w. 
Ma· o, fiO Me. 885; Spear vs. Neu:ell, 13 Vt. 288, po11t, p-; Pope w. Ran.. 
dolph, 18 Ala. 14: Wray va. Mik11tone, ts Me.ea v11. M-ell11, 21. 
In l\l888&chusetta, a still more liberal rule prevails. See Williama w . 
Henshaw, 11 Pick. 79, 22 Am. Dec. 866; 12 Pick. 878, 28 Am. Dec. 614. 
In l\Iichlgan, see Wli.eeler w. Arnold, 80 ?rlicb. 804.. 
BULLARD vs. KINNEY. 
Supreme Courl of California, 1858. 
10 Cal. 60. 
This was an a'Ction of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff Oil 
an account assigned to him by Sotzen and Goodnow, for goods, 
wares, and merchandise sold to the ·defendants. The defend-
ants composed a joint stock association, known as the "Colum-
bus Quartz Mining Company." While Sotzen and Goodnow, 
merchants and partners, were shareholders in the company, 
they sold to the company goods, wares and me1·chandise to a 
large amount. They afterwards, and during the existence of 
the company, sold their stock to one White, and assigned their 
account against the company to the plaintiff. 
There was nothing in the constitution of the company whidh 
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, a~ between them-
selves. Nor was there any final settlement of the partnership 
accounts, or any balance struck, or promise on the part of the 
shareholders to pay this account. The plaintiff commenced 
his suit by attachment against the property of defendants. 
The defendants had judgment in the court below, and the 
plaintiff appealed. 
Sanderson and Hewes, for appellant. 
D. K. Ncu;ell, for respondent. 
BURNETT, J. The only question arising in the case is, whether 
the plaintiff can sue .in this form? 
BULLARD vs. KINNEY. 241
There was nothing in the constitution of this company which
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between them-
selves, and, therefore, the general law of partnership must
prevail (Coll. on Partn., Sec. 1115). There having been no
final settlement of the partnership accounts, and no balance
struck, and no express promise on the part of the individual
members to pay their ascertained portion of this amount to
Sotzen and Goodnow, they could not maintain assumpsit. As
they could not sue, it is ditficult to see how their assignee could
do so. To permit a partner, who has a claim against the firm,
and who cannot, therefore, sue the firm at law, to avoid this
disability by assignment of the debt, would defeat all the
substantial reasons upon which this rule is predicated. This
rule rests upon three grounds:
1. The technical ground, that a man cannot, at the same
time, in the same suit, be both a plaintiif and a defendant.
Because it would be useless for one partner to recover that
which, upon taking a general account, he might be compelled
to refund; and thus a multiplicity of suits be permitted, where
one would answer.
3. The contrary rule would defeat the equitable right of the
other partners to set-off their advances against those of plain-
titf, and would force them to first pay the amount, and then
rely upon the individual responsibility of the partner for a.
return "of his proportion. _
The first ground, being merely technical, may be considered
as not so material under our system of pleading; but the other
two grounds are substantial in their character. ' * *
Affirmeda


















































































































































BULLARD VS. KINNEY. 241 
There was nothing in the constitution of this company which 
regulated the remedies of the shareholders, as between them-
selves, and, therefore, the general law of partnership must 
prevail (Coll. on Partn., Sec. 1115). The1·e having been no 
final settlement of the partnership accounts, a11d no balance 
struck, and no express prnmise on the part of the individual 
members to pay their ns<·<•1·tained portion of thh~ amount to 
Sotzen and Goodnow, tlley could not maintain asimmpsit. As 
they could not sue, it is difficult to see bow their assignee could 
do so. To permit a partner, who ha8 a claim against the firm, 
mid who cannot, therefore, sue the firm at law, to avoid this 
dhmhility by assignment of the d<>l>t, would dPfeat all the 
~ubstantial reasons upon which this rule is predieuted. This 
l'ule rests upon three grounds: 
1. 'l'lie teelmical ground, that a man cannot, at the same 
time, in the same suit, be both a plaintiff and a dt~fenclant. 
:!. BC'eause it would be usell'SS for one partnPr to rec-0ver that 
which, upon taking a genf'ral arcount, he might be compelled 
to refund; and thus a multiplicity of suits be permitted, where 
one would answPr. 
3. The <·ont1·ary ml<' would defeat the equitable right of the 
other pai·tn<•r:-: to Sl·l·off th<'il' advances against those of plain-
tiff, and wou Id fo1·1·1• tlwrn to first pay the amount, and then 
rely upon the indiddnal rPsponsibility of the partner fo1• a 
1·eturn of his proportion. . 
The first irround, bt>ing merely technical. may be considered 
as not so matp1·ial undet· our system of pleading; hut the other 
two grounds are snhstant ial in their ehnraeter. * * * 
Affirmed. 
NoTE.-See Mechem s Elem. of Partn., § 130, and cases there cited. 
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CARPENTER V8. GREENOP.
Supreme Court of Michigan, -1889.
74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep. 276, 18 Am. St. Rep. 662.
Action by Charles D. Carpenter against John Greenop and
another upon a promissory note.
Judgment was given for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Glidden tfi Bates, for appellant.
M. Brown and Frank Damon, for respondents.
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintifi’ purchased in good faith, but after
maturity, a note of John Greenop & Co., payable to the order of
Robert A. Lavery, and indorsed by Lavery. Lavery was a mem-
ber of the firm of John Greenop & Co., and made the note, with
Greenop’s consent, for money lent by Law-r_\' to the firm. The
note was dated January 21, 18:-<3, payable in six months. It
was transferred to plaintitf in 1884 while the firm was still in
business, and about a year before it ceased doing business.
There was no evidence of the state of-accounts, or that Lavery
was in any way a debtor to the firm when the transfer was
made, or that there were any equities existing against him
which did not exist when the note was made. The court below
held that plaintiff could not recover. The reason assigned
was that the note could not be transf_erred after maturity, so
as to enable the indorsee to sue upon it, if suit could not have
been brought by the assignor, and that Lavery could have
brought no suit on it. The decision also seems to have been
based partially on the idea that a partner can have no deal-
ings with his firm which are not subject to the final account-
ing, and that the equities of such an accounting attach to such
claims as he may hold against the firm.
I do not think this doctrine is tenable. It certainly has not
been directed in this court. The only case that is seriously
claimed as bearing in that direction is Davis rs. .lIerriIl, 51
Mich. 480, 16 N. \V. Rep. 864. That case has no resemblance
to' this. One member of the firm, named Eastwood, received
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CARPEXTER vs. GREENOP. 
Sup1·eme Court of Michi.gan, -1889. 
74 Mich. 664, 42 N. W. Rep. 276, 16 Am. St. Rep. 669. 
Action by Charles D. Carpenter against John Greenop and 
another upon a promissory note. 
Judgment was given for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. 
Glidden ~ Bates, for appellant. 
M. Brown and Frank Dumon, for respondents. 
CAMPBELL, J. Plaintiff purehased in ~ood faith, but after 
maturity, a note of John Greenop & Co., payable to the order of 
Robert A. Lavery, and indorsed by Lavery. Lavery was a mem-
ber of the firm of .John G 1·eenop & Co., and made the note, with 
Greeno1,'s com1ent, for money Jent by I~• n·ry to the firm. The 
note was dated January ~1, l~~:l. pa~·ahlt> in six months. It 
was transferred to plaintiff in 18~4 while the fil'm was still in 
business, and about a year before it ceased doing business. 
There was no evidence of the state of.accounts, or that Lavery 
was in any way a debtor to the firm wh(•n the transfer was 
made, or that there were any equities existing against him 
which did not exist wh(•n the note was m.ade. The court below 
held that plaintiff could not recover. '.rbe reason assigned 
was that the note could not be trans~<·rred after maturity, ·so 
as to enable the indorst•e to sue upon it, if suit could not have 
been brought by the assignor, and that Lavery could have 
brou~ht no suit on it. The dedsion also seems to have been 
basl•d partially on tlw i«lea that a partner can have no deal-
ings with his firm which are not subject to the final account-
ing, and that the equities of such an accounting attach to such 
clainu~ as he may hold aµ-aimit the firm. 
I do not think this doetrine is h'nable. It certainly has not 
been directed in tllis court. The onlv case that is serionslv 
~ . 
claimed as bearing in that dirt•dion is Daris rs. Jlerrill, 51 
Mich. 480, 16 N. "'· Rep. 8fi4. That case has no resemblaD<:e 
to' this. One member of the firm, named Eastwood, receiw•d 
from the firm in October, 1874, a note due in one month after 
/
CARPENTER vs. Gs EENOP. 243
date. In 1875 the firm was dissolved, and the affairs were put
into the hands of George YV. Merrill, one of the partners, to
wind up. Merrill’s credit in the firm accounts was larger than
Eastwood’s, and Eastwood had been credited on the books
with the amount of the note, which had never been presented
or demanded during the period after dissolution. In May, 1881,
Eastwood, who had lost the note by accidental fire in January
of the same year, assigned to the plaintiff in general terms
whatever claims he had against the firm, with no reference to
the note as such. It is plain enough that there could have
been no recovery in such a case. Even had the note been
described, the statute does not authorize the assignee of a
negotiable note, who is not an indorsee, to sue in his own
name on it. But. furthermore, there was no attempt to trans-
fer the note as such. The assignment was one which trans-
ferred nothing but Eastwood’s claims generally against the
company, and must therefore be subject to the partnership
settlement. There was no firm in existence for nearly six
years before the assignment. ‘In the present case the note
was transferred by regular indorsement a considerable time
before the firm went out of business. It was due already as
an independent claim against the firm for money lent, and
not for money invested _in the. business. It was not by its
terms, or by the nature of the transaction, to be postponed‘
until the future dissolution of the concern, and there is no
accounting in advance of dissolution, unless by agreement.
VVhile there is a. difficulty in a suit at law in the name of
a party against himself, yet, if this is the only difliculty, it
goes only to the form of the remedy, and not to its existence.
There never was any legal or equitable reason why a partner
should not have specific dealings with his firm'as well as any
other person; and unless those dealings. from their nature, are
intended to go into the general accounting. and wait for their
adjustment till dissolution, they give a right to have a remedy
according to their exigency, and can be dealt with like any
other claims. Theonly reason why they must. under the old
practice, be prosecuted at equity instead of at law, arose from
the necesity at law of having plaintiffs capable of suing the
defendants. In such a tease the failure of a rein-edy at law
justified a resort to equity. But equity could grant relief in

















































































































































CARPENTER vs. GRF.ENOP. 243 
<late. In 1875 the firm was dissolved, and the affairs were put 
into the bands of George W. Merrill. one of the partners, to 
wind up. Merrill's credit in thP firm nceonnts was larger than 
Eastwood's, and Eastwood had bei>n credited on the books 
with the amount of the note, whfrh had never bef'n presented 
or demandf'd during the period after dh11ml11tion. In May, 1881, 
Eastwood, who had Jost the note by ac<"idt·ntal fire in January 
of the sa·me year, assigned to the plaintiff in gPnt>ral terms 
whatever claims be bad against the firm, with no reference to 
the note as such. It is plain enough that there could have · 
been no recovery in such a case. Even had the note been 
described, the statute does not authorize the assignee of a 
negotiable note, who is not an indorsee, to sue in his own 
name on it. Rut, fm·tlwrmot·t>, tllt're was no attern}lt to trans-
fer the note as sneh. The assignment was one which tram~­
ferred nothing but Eastwood's claims geuerall~· against the 
company, and must therefore be subjt•ct to the partnership 
settlement. There was no firm in existenee for nf'arly six 
years before the assignnwnt. In the prel'wnt ease the note 
was transferred by regular indorsement a com;iderable time 
before the firm went out of business. It was due already as 
an independent claim against the firm for money )('lit, and 
not for money invested .in tlu~ bnsim's8. It was not by its 
terms, or by the nature of the transa<'tion, to be postponed. 
until the futm·e dissolution of the eonf'ern. and thp1·f• is no 
accounting in advance of dissolution, unless by agrt·enwnt. 
\Vhile there iR a diffkulty in a Emit at law in t111• name of 
a party against himsp)f .. ri·t, if this is th<> only diftieulty, it 
g<>t's only to the form of the rPm('dy, and not to its existence. 
There nevt>r was any Jpgal or e<ptitable rea1-1on why a partner 
should not have s1weitic dt>nlings with his tt1·m ·as well as an.r 
other person; and unless those dealings. from their natnt'l'. are 
intended to go into the gent>ral accounting. and wait for their 
adjustment till dissolntion, thP,\' give a 1·ight to han• a remed.f 
according to their exigency, and can be dealt with like any 
other claims. The only rc>m;on why they must. mu.let• the old 
' practice, be prospeufrd at equit,,· instPad of at law, arose from 
the necessity at law of !mdng plaintiffs capable of suing the 
defendants. In such a case the failure of a renwdy at Jaw 
justified a resort to equity. But f'qnity could grant rPlief in 
such cases, and under our prest>nt r11lf's tl11•1·t· 1·an be no dif· 
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ficulty at law. Where partners have seen fit to deal with each
other without reference to the final accounting, the trans-
action is not subject to the necessity or delay of such an
accounting.
This note was by its terms negotiable. It is elementary doc-
trine that negotiability does not cease when paper matures.
It is only subject to such equities as exist against the paper
at the date when it-is negotiated. And the equities which
afl’ect the indorsee are only such as attach directly to the note
itself, and do not include collateral matters. This is very old
doctrine, and is laid down without qualification. Lord TEN-
TERDEN and his associates, speaking through Mr. Justice BAY-
LEY in Burrough rs. M ass, 10 Barn. & C. 558, refer to the sub-
ject in this way: “This was an action on a promissory note,
made by the defendant, payable to one Fearn, and by him
indorsed to the plaintiff after it became due. For the defend-
ant it was insisted that he had a right to set off against the
plaintifl”s claim a debt due to him from Fearn, who held the
note at the time when it became due. On the other hand, it
was contended that this right of set-off, which rested on the
statute of set-off, did not apply. The impression on my mind
was that the defendant was entitled to the set-off, but, on dis~
cussion of the matter with m-y Lord TE.\'TF.-RDE.\' and my
.learned brothers, I agree with them in thinking that the
indorsee of an overdue bill or note is liable to such equities
only as attach on the bill or note itself, and not to claims
arising out of collateral matters. The consequence is that the
rule for reducing the damages i11 this case must be discharged.”
See Chit. Bills, 244-246; Story, Bills. § 221); Lca'1'itt cs. Put-
nam, 3 N. Y. 494. 53 Ann. Dec. 322; Bazrter vs. Little, 6 Metc.
7, 39 Am. Dec. 707; and cases in note to page 275 of Bigelow’s
Leading (‘ases; 3 Kent Comm. 91, and notes.
It was 11ot shown, and cannot be claimed on this record,
that there was any unfairness or want of consideration, or
paylnent, or any other matter bearing on the note in this case,
when it was transferred, and in such case it can make no dif-
ference when it was transferred.» It continued to be a valid
note, and capable of transfer by indorsement. That a partner
himself may have a remedy of some kind, where the trans-
action is such as to be separated from the general partner-



















































































































































OASES ON p .ARTS ERSHIP. 
ftculty at law. "'here partners have seen fit to dpal with each 
othrr without refc>rence to the final accounting, the trans-
action is not subject to the necessity or dt>lay of such an 
accounting. 
This note was by its t(•rms negotiable. It is elementary doc-
trine that negotiability does not cease when pap1•r matures. 
It is only subjeet to such equities as exh;t againi-t the paper 
at the date when it. is negotiated. And the equities which 
affect the indori-;e<' nre onl.'· 1mch as attach directly to the note 
itself, and do not indude collati>ral matters. This is very old 
doctrine, and is laid down without qualifieation. Lord TEx-
'l'ERDEN and his associates, speaking through Mr. Justice BAY-
LEY in Burrough 1·s. Moss, 10 Ilam. & C. 558, refer to the sub-
ject in this way: "This was an action on a promissory note, 
made by the deft>ndant, pa,yable to one Fearn, and by him 
indorsE'd to the plaintiff after it becam(• due. For the defend-
ant it was insh•ll•d that lw had a right to set off against the 
plaintiff's daim a dl•bt clne to him from Fearn, who held the 
note at the time whPn it be<·ame due. On the other hand, it 
was eontended that this right of sPt-off, which rested on the 
statute of s.-t-otf, did not apply. The imprPssion on my mind 
was that 1h<> defendant was C'ntitlC'd to the set-off, but, on dis-
cussion of the mnt1er with my Lord TE:'.l'TBHDEX and m~· 
.learned hrotlwrs, I agrc'<' with the>tn in thinking that tlw 
indorse<' of an ovt>rd11e bill or not<> i~ liable to such equities 
only as att:ich on tlw hill or note itsl•lf, and not to claims 
arising ont of rollatPrnl 111att<>rs. The C'onseqnrnce is that the 
rule for reducing thP da111a:r<•s in tliis <·asp mnRt he discharged.'' 
~ee Chit. flills, 244-24-fi; ~tor,Y, Rills. § 2:!0; J,earitt 1'8. Put-
wttn, 3 N. Y. 4!H, 5:l Am. De('. :l22; Haxter vs. Uttlr, 6 Mete. 
7, 39 Am. l>Pc. 707; and ('USC'S in note to page 275 of Bigelow's 
Leading ('ai-Ps; 3 Kent Comm. 91, and notrs. 
It was not shown, and cannot be claimed on this record, 
1 hat thrre was an~· unfoirrwss or want of coni;;idl'ration, or 
payment, or any o1 her matt Pl' lwa ring on the note in th is case, 
when it was transferred, and in such casr it can make no dif-
ference whE:>n it was tranisf Prred. . It continuPd to be a valid 
note, and ('apable of transft>r b,Y indorsernent. That a partner 
himself ma,v have a remed,Y of some kind, whel'l' the trans-
action is such as to be l'!eparated from the general partner-
ship accounting. doPs not s1•<>m to be qtwstioned. Mr. Collyer 
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refers to several illustrations, in book 2, c. 3. Partn. (2d Ed.)
Judge Sromr, in his work on Partnership, § 222 ct scq., indicates
Very clearly the right of a partner to relief in the case of con-
tracts as a creditor or otherwise with his firm; and the fact
which is referred to in all the books, that an accounting can
only be had at the close of the business, indicates as clearly
as anything can that either a partner can make no separate
contract with his firm at all, or else there must be some means
of enforcing it. A contract which cannot be enforced is nuga-
tory. Partnerships are often made for long terms of years.
Members become managers on salaries which are payable at
regular intervals, and they frequently furnish articles for
which they a.re entitled to pay. No one doubts their right to
pay themselves out of moneys in their charge; but all do not
have this opportunity, and to hold that a person must, if his
copartners will not advance him what is due, wait the whole
term of business for payment, is not reasonable or maintain-
able. A very thorough discussion of the various questions is
found in the early case of Smith rs. Lll8Il(')‘, 5 (‘ow. 688, where
the judges of the supreme court, and the chancellor and other
members of the court for the correction of errors dealt with
the subject in a very exhaustive way, with entire unanimity.
The cases of .\'erins rs. Tozrnscrzd, 6 Conn. 5, and Gray rs. Bank.
3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156, are also somewhat pertinent. I
have found no authority which sanctions the doctrine that
plaintifi was precluded by the fact that the note was past due
from taking the title by indorsement, and none that allows a
note to be affected by collateral equities. \\'h_en this note was
indorsed there could be no accounting, because the firm con-
tinued its ordinary business. The debt was for a loan, and
not for investments in the capital. It was distinct from the
mutual relations among the partners, and stood as a separate
contract. I think there was nothing to bar recovery, and that
the judgment to the contrary should be reversed.
CHAMPLIN, Loxo, and Monsn, JJ., concurred.
Smmwooo, C. J ., dissented.

















































































































































CARPENTER VS. GHEEXOP. 245 
refPrs to several illustrations, in book 2, <'. !l. Partn. (2d Ed.) 
·Judge STORY, in his work on Partnership, § 222 ct seq., indicates 
very clearly th~ right of a partner to reli<>f in the case of con-
tracts as a creditor or otherwise with his fim1; and the fact 
whieh is rt•ft•rr('() to in all the books, that an acl'onnting can 
only be had at thl' dose of thP hnsin:•ss, indkatc•s as clt>arly 
as anything can that either a p:irtJwr ran make no separate 
contract with his firm at all, or else there must bt• some means 
of enforcing it. A CQntract whi<'h f'annot ht> Pnforeed is nuga-
tor,,._ Partnen'lhips art• oftn1 made fot· long tt't·rns of years. 
Members beeome manag-t>rs on salal'il'H whi<-h ar·t• payable at 
regular intPrvals, and nwy frequently fumhih artich•s for 
whieh they are entitlt•<l to pay. i\o one donhts their right to 
pay tl!emselvps out of n11mPys in thPil' dutq{"; but all do not 
hm·e this opportunity, and to hold that a pt•r·son must, if his 
<·opartm•rs will not adrnnee him what is <lue, wait the whole 
tPrm of bni-inefls for pa,vnwnt. is not rt>a~otiable or maintain-
able. A \'Pl',V thlH'OHl-{h disenssion of tlw vnrionR q1u•stions is 
found in the early ca!'e of .~111ifh t".'I. Lusher, 5 <'ow. fJ88, where 
the judges of the snprt>me court, and the chancellor and other 
mem ht•t·s of the t·on rt fot• the corr(•ction of e1·r01·io; dPa It with 
the 1rnhjeet in a wry t>xhanstive way, with entire nnanimily. 
Thf' <'ll~t·1-1 of Xains n1. '1'011"1/!ff'lld, 6 Conn. 5, and Gra!I rs. Rank, 
3 1\Inss. 364, 3 Am. Dec. H>G, are also Romewhat pertint>nt. J 
ha,·e found no authority whieh sanctions the doctrine that 
plaintiff was precluded hy the fact that thP note was past dm• 
from taking the title hy in<101·1o1Pm('nt, and none that :tllows a 
note to be affected by collateral equities. Wh_t>n this note wa:o1 
imlo1·1-1ed tlwre could be no accounting, becam~e the firm eoH-
tinued its ordinary buHim•ss. The debt was for a loan, an<l 
not for investments in the capital. It was distinct from tlu~ 
mutual relations among the partners, and 1-1tood as a separatP 
contract. I think there was nothiHg to har r·ecovery, and that 
the judgment to the cont1·ai·y should be i·eversed. 
CHAMPLrn, Lo:sa, and ~loRsF., .J,J., conf'nrred. 
SHERWOOD, c. J., dissentPd. 
NOTE.-See also .Mechem'11 Elt!m. of Partn., ~~ 130, 131, and cases there 
referred to. 
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BEEDE vs. FRASER. _
S‘upreme (Your! of Vermont, 1894.
as Vt. 114, 28 Atl. Rep. sso, 44 Am. st. Rep. s24.
The court below found the following facts: Prior to Octo-
ber 15, 1891, the plaintiff and one George were copartners,
under the firm name of George & Beede, in the business of
quarrying and selling granite at Barre, and the. defendants, as
copartners under the firm name of P. B. Fraser & Co., were
engaged in manufacturing granite into monuments, etc. The
former partnership was dissolved about September 1, 1891.
Prior to that time, it had sold and delivered to the defendants a
quantity of granite, for which the defendants owed George &.
Beede; and the debt, by the contract of dissolution, became the
property of Beede. The defendants were so notified before
this suit was brought, and thereupon promised to pay the
plaintilf the amount of said debt, and afterwards did pay him
$50, leaving a balance due of $4.62. October 15, 1891, the
plaintiff and defendants entered into copartnership under the
firm name of Beede & Co., and that firm carried on the busi-
ness of quarrying an_d selling granite, and prior to December
4, 1891, sold the defendants granite to the amount of $90.
which was due from the defendant to Beede & Co. on that
date, when the firm of Beede 8: Co. was dissolved. The firm of
Fraser & Co., composed of Fraser and Smith, owed the $90 to
the other firm, which was composed of Beede, Fraser, and
Smith. The plaintiff was not a member‘ of the defendant
firm. The court found that as a part of this contract of disso-
lution the plaintiff became the owner of all debts dire to Beede
& Co., and that concurrently with the making of the contract
the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay him the demand of
$90, but it certifies that these facts were found solely from
Paper A, which is as follows: “This is to certify that the
copartnership heretofore existing by and between F. A. Beede,
P. B. Fraser, and G. VV. Smith, all of Barre, in the county of
\Vashington, and state of Vermont, under the firm name and

















































































































































246 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
BEEDE vs. FRA~ER. 
Supremr Court of rermo11t, 189.f. 
66 Vt. 114, 28 Atl. Rep. 880, 44 Am. St. Rep. 82'9 
The court bt.->low found the following farts: Prior to Octo· 
ber 15, 1891, the plaintiff and one George wPre copartners, 
under the firm name of George & Beede, in the business of 
quarrying and selling granite at Barre, and thP. defendants, as 
t·opartners under the firm name of P. B. Fraser & Co., were 
f•nguged in manufacturing g1·anite into monuments, etc. The 
former partnership was dissol\"ed about Sept(-'mber 1, 1891. 
Prior to that time, it had sold and delh·ered to the defendants a 
quantity of granite, for which the defendants owed George & 
Beede; and the debt, by the contract of dissolution, became the 
pro1>erty of Bee4e. The defendants were so notified before 
this suit was brought, and thereupon promised to pay the 
plaintiff the amount of said debt, and afterward~ did pay him 
f50, leaving a balance due of $4.62. October 15, 1891, the 
plaintiff and defendants entered into copartnership under the 
flrru name of llPede & Co.; and that firm ca1·riPd on the busi-
ness of quarrying and selling granite, and prior to December 
4; 18~1, sold the defendants granite to the amount of '90, 
which was due from the defendants to Beede & Co. on rhat 
date, when the firm of Beede & Co. was dissolved. The firm of 
Fraser & Co., composed of Fraser and Smith, owed the f90 to 
the other firm, which was composed of Beede, Fraser, and 
Smith. The plaintiff was not a member of the defendant 
firm. The court found that as a part of this contract of disso-
lution ti1e plaintiff became the owner of all debts du~ to Beede 
& Co., and that concurrently with the making of the contract 
the defendants promised the plaintiff to pay him the demand of 
'90, but it certifies that these facts were found solely from 
Paper A, which is as follows: "This is to certify that the 
•·opartnership heretofore existing by and between F. A. Beede, 
r. B. Fraser, and G. ,V. Smith, all of Barre, in the county of 
'Vashington, and state of Vermont, under the firm name and 
style of Beede & Company, is hereby dissolved by mutual 
_ Bnnnn vs. FRASER. 247
agreement. And it is further agreed by and between said
Beede, Fraser, and~Smith that the said F. A. Beede is to, and
hereby agrees to assume and pay all of the debts of the said
firm, and to have and collect all of the debts due and owing
said firm. Witness our hands and seals, and dated at said
Barre this fourth‘day of December, 1891. F. A. Beede [L. S.],
P. B. Fraser [L. S.], G. W. Smith [L. S.].”
There was a judgment for the plaintiff -and defendants
appealed. I
Martin (1? Slack, for plaintiff.
J . W. Gordon and E. W. Bisbee, for defendants.
TYLER, J . Before the dissolution the defendants owned the
demand jointly with the plaintiff, and Beede & Co. could not
have maintained an action upon it against the defendants,
because Fraser and Smith would have been both plaintiffs and
defendants, and “no one can be interested as a party on both
sides of the record.” \Vhere two companies are composed in
part of the same individuals, no action at law can be main-
tained by one against the other. Green vs. Chapman, 27 Vt.
236, citing Mainuwring vs. Newman, 2 Bos. & P. 120, and Boson-
quet vs. Wray, 6 Taunt. 597; Dicey, Parties, rule 22. It is a gen-
eral rule that all the partners must join as plaintiffs in an
action at law to enforce a partnership claim, whether the
action is brought before or after the dissolution of the partner-
ship. Therefore, two partners cannot maintain a suit against
a third to recover for goods charged to him on the partnership
books, although by the contract of dissolution the two were to
have all the debts due the firm, there being no promise by him
to pay the other partners. Judd vs. Wilson, 6,Vt. 185. One
partner cannot recover of another an unliquidated and unset-
tled balance of a partnership buiness. Spear vs. Nowell, 13
Vt. 288. Butwhen, on the dissolution, one retained a portion
of the partnership assets suflicient to pay a particular partner-
ship debt, and agreed with his copartner to pay it, and the
copartner was afterwards obliged to pay it, it was held that he
could recover in assumpsit the amount so paid. Hicks vs.
Cottrill, 25 Vt. 80. As a rule, assumpsit will not lie by one
partner against his copartner, in respect to any matter con-
















































































































































BEEDE VS. FRASER. 
agreement. And it is further agreed by and between said 
Beede, Fraser, and ·smith that the said F. A. Beede is to, and 
hereby agrees to assume and pay all of the debts of the said 
firm, and to have and collect all of the debts due and owing 
said firm. 'Vitness our hands and seals, and dated at said 
Bu.rre this fourth'day of December, 1891. F. A. Beede [L. 8.], 
P. B. Fraser [L. 8.], G. ,V. Smith [L. S.]." 
There was a judgment for the plaintiff ·and defendants 
appealed. 
Marlin & Slack, for plaintiff. 
J. W. Gordon and E. W. B_isbee, for defendants. 
TYL1rn, J. Before the dissolution the defendants owned the 
df>mand jointly with the plaintitf, and Beede & Co. could not 
have maintained an action upon it against the defendants, 
because Fraser and Smith would have been both plaintiffs and 
dt•fendants, and "no one can be interested as a party on both 
sides of the rec9rd." \Vhere two companies are composed in 
part of the same individuals~ no action at law can be main· 
tained by one against the other. Green vs. Chapman, 27 Vt. 
2!l6, Citing Main1cci.ring vs. Ne1rman, 2 Bos. & P. 120, and Bosari-
quet vs. lV-ray, 6 Taunt. 597; Dicey, Parties, rule 22. It is a gen-
eral rule that all the partners must joi~ as plaintiffs in an 
action at law to enforce a partnership claim, whether the 
action is brought before or after the dis1mlution of the partnel'· 
ship. Therefore, two partners cannot maintain a suit against 
a third to recover for goods charged to him on the partnership 
books, although by the contract of dissolution the two were to 
have all the debts due the ftrm, there being no promise by him 
to pay the other partners. Judd vs. Wilson, 6. Vt. 185. Om~ 
partner cannot recover of another an unliquidated and unset· 
tied balance of a partnership business. Spear vs. Newell, l!l 
Yt. 288. But when, on the dissolution, one retained a portion 
of the partnership assets sufficient to pay a particular partner. 
ship debt, and agreed with bis copartner to pay it, and the 
copartner was afterwards obliged to pay it, it was held that he 
could recover in assumpsit the amount so paid. Hicks vs. 
Cottrill, 25 Vt. 80. As a rule, assumpsit will not lie by one 
partner against his copartner, in respect to any matter con-
nected with the partnership transactions, or which would 
248 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.
involve the consideration of their partnership dealing. Yet
one may sustain an action against his copartner on an express
contract or covenant to do, or omit any particular act not
involving any question as to the general accounts. And when
the parties by an express agreement separate a distinct matter
from the partnership dealing, and one expressly agrees to pay
the other a specified sum for that matter, assumpsit will lie on
the agreement, though the matter arose from the partnership
dealing. Colla-mcr rs. Foster, 26 Vt. 754. “It is quite clear,” says
T. Parsons on Partnersliip (section 190), “that certain particu-
lar and distinct transactions maybe separated from the affairs
or business of the partnership, by the agreement of the partners.
Then, those persons who are concerned in this separated mat-
ter a.re not as partners to each other, although in all other
business relations they remain partners.” Where partners
agree to divide a partnership debt, and the debtor assents to it.
and promises one of the partners to pay him his moiety, such
partner may maintain an action for his moiety against the
debtor. 1 Lindl. Partn. 265, citing Blair vs. Snovcr, 10 N. J .
Law, 153. After a dissolution, and a balance has been struck
and agreed upon by the partners, one may maintain assumpsit
against the other to recover his balance upon an implied
promise. Spear rs. Nowell, 13 Vt. 292, (post p. 257), Warren vs.
Wheelock, 21 Vt. 323; Gibson vs. Moore, ti N. H. 547; Wllby vs.
Phinmjr/, 15 Mass. 121; Wheeler vs. Wheeler, 111 Mass. 247.
Assumpsit lies where, after dissolution and settlement, one
partner received more than was his due. Bond rs. Hays, 12
Mass. 34; Clark vs. Dibble, 16 \Vend. 601.
(Omitting a discussion in which the court held that general
assumpsit was a proper action.)
Atfirmed.
















































































































































248 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
involve the consideration of their partnership_ dealing. Yet 
one may sustain an action against his copa rtner on an express 
contract or covenant to do, or omit any particular act not 
iBvolving any question as to the ge1wral accounts. And when 
the parties by an express agreement separate a distinct matter 
from the partnership dealing, and one expressly agrees to pa.v 
the other a specified sum for that matter, assumpsit will lie on 
the agreement, though the matter arose from the partnership 
dealing. Collamcr i·s. Foster, 2G Yt. 754. "It is quite clear," says 
T. Parsons on Partnership (section mo), "that certain particu-
lar and distinct tmnsactions ma.v l•e ~wparated from the affairs 
or business of the partnership, by the agr<>ement of the partners. 
Then, those pe1·sons who are concerned in this separated mat-
ter are not as partne1·s to each other, although in all othtr 
business relations th<'y remain partners." \Vhere partners 
agree to divide a pa1·tne1·="hip debt, and the debtor assE>nts to it. 
and promises one of the partners to pay him his moi<•ty, such 
partner may maintain an action for his moiety against the 
debtor. 1 Lindi. Partn. 265, citing Blair vs. Snover, 10 N. J. 
Law, 153. After a dissolution, and a balance hns been struck 
and agreE>d upon by the partnerR, one may maintain assumpsit 
again111t thP other to recover his balance Upon an implied 
promise. Spea1· i·s. Ne1Cell, 13 Vt. 292, (po.'ft p. 257), Warren vs. 
Wheelock, 21 Vt. 3:!3; Gibs<>n 1:s. Mo01·e, (; N. H. 547; Wilby vs. 
Phin11e!/, 15 .Mass. 121; lVliecler vs. Wheeler, 111 ~fass. 247. 
AssumpAit lies where, after dissolution and settlement, one 
partner received more than was bis due. Bon<l us. Haya, 12 
Mass. 34; Clark i:s. Dibble, 16 \Yend. fiOl. 
(Omitting a diseussion in which the court held that general 
assumpsit was a proper action.) 
Affirmed. 
Non.-See Mecheru'11 Elem. of Partn., § 134, 147. 
~
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HILL vs. PALMER.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1882.
56 Wis. 123, 13 N. W. Rep. 20, 43 Am. Rep. 703.
Action for breach of a partnership agreement. The opinion
states the facts sufficiently. The defendant had judgment
below.
Bump, Hetzcl <€ Cannon and Pafchen tfi Weed, for a.ppellant.
Charles W. Fclker, for respondent.
LYON, J. Counsel agree that the learned circuit judge sus-
tained the demurrer to the complaint on the ground that
the facts therein stated show that the parties were partners
in the contract with Cline, and in the execution thereof, and
that the only remedy of the plaintiffs is by an action in equity
for an accounting and settlement of the partnership affairs.
The question to be determined is, does the complaint state
facts which constitute a cause of action at law for the recov-
ery of damages, or must the plaintiffs resort to an equitable
action for relief? It is a fairly debatable question whether it
appears from the complaint that the agreement between the
parties in respect to the copartncrship was anything more
than an executory agreement to enter into a partnership in the
future, which was never executed. The agreement alleged is
not in terms that the parties thereby formed a copartnership,
but that “it was agreed that the said parties should enter into
a copartnership” for the purposes therein specified. The breach
0f_ such agreement alleged in the complaint is that the defend-
ant “refused to comply with the conditions thereof by refusing
to enter into or carry out said partnership.” But, however this
may be, it seems clear that if any copartnership ever existed
between these parties it commenced when the agreement
between Cline and the defendant was executed. Giving to the
complaint the most favorable construction for the defendant
of which it will admit, we think that the agreement therein
alleged is, in substance and effect, that if the defendant should
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HILL vs. PALMER. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1882. 
li6 Wis. 123, 13 N. W. Rep. 20, 43 Am. Rep. 703. 
Action for breach of a partnership agreement. The opinion 
states the facts sufficiently. The defendant had judgment 
below. 
Bump, Hetzel & Cannon nnd Patcltcn & Weed, for appellant. 
Charles W. Pelker, for respondent. 
LYON, J. Coum;p} agrl•e that the h•m·n<•d circuit judge sus-
tained the dPmurrer to the complaint on the ground that 
the facts th£•rt.>in stated show that the parties were partners 
in the contract with l'linP, and in the execution thereof, and 
that the only remedy of the plaintiffs is by an action in equity 
for an accounting and S('ttlcment of the partnership affair1-1. 
The q1wstion to be detc>rmined is, dees the complaint state 
facts wh:<'h <'Onstitute a cnnse of ndion at law for the recov-
ery of damages, or must the plai11titt'io1 resort to nn equitnhle 
action for relief? It is a fairly dl'hatable question whether it 
appt'8l'B from tlie complaint that tlw agreement hetwPt-'n the 
parties in respect to the copnrtnership was anything more 
than an executory agn;l'uwnt to entl'r into a partnership in the 
future, which was ne\°er exN·uted. The agrec>nwnt allPged is 
not in tem1s that the partiPs thereby fom1ed a copartnPrship, 
but that "it was agreed that the said parties should enter into 
a copartner1:1hip" for the purposes therein speeifit~d. The brt>ach 
of_ such agrc>t•ment alleged in the complaint is t'hat the d(•fpnd-
ant "refused to comply with the conclitions the1·eof by refusing 
to enter into or carry out said partnf'rship.'' But, however this 
may be, it seems clear that if any copartnership ever existt-d 
between these parties it commenct•d when the agreement 
between Cline and the defendant was executed. Giving to the 
complaint the most favorable construction for the defendant 
of which it will admit, we think that the ngrf'ement thert•in 
alleged is, in substance and effect, that if the defendant should 
succeed in m~ing a contract with Cline which should be sntis-
32 
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I
7
factory to the plaintifis, to cut, log and run Clines timber.
then the parties should become partners in that enterprise on
the terms and conditions stipulated between them.
In that view of the case there may have been a time when a
copartnership actually existed between the parties, but it was
immediately terminated by the wrongful act of the defendant
(so far as he could terminate it) and no business was trans-
acted—nothing whatever was done by the parties as partners.
The defendant excluded the plaintiffs from all participation
whatever in his contract with Cline as soon as it was made,
and they had no part in the performance thereof. By such
wrongful act the defendant refused to launch the partnership
business, and thus rendered the copartnership inoperative for
the purposes for which it was formed. There is no doubt what-
ever that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an
executory contract to form a future copartnership to recover
damages for a wrongful refusal by the other party to execute
such agreement. It is also well settled that the wrongful
refusal by a party to a contract of copartnership to permit the
firm to commence business, or as it is sometimes termed, to
launch the partnership business, is ground for an action at law
by the injured partner to recover damages of the partner whose
wrongful act has defeated the purpose for which the copartner-
ship was formed. The cases which so hold, both in England
and this country, are very numerous. Indeed, the authorities
seem to be quite uniform in so holding. The following are a
few of the cases referred to: Venning vs. Lecktie, 13 East 7;
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107; Ellannirrg vs. Wadsworth, 4 Md. 59;
Glover vs. Tuck, 24 VVend. (N. Y.) 153; Bagley vs. Smith, 10 N.
Y. 489 (post p. 251); Terrill vs. Richards, 1 Nott. & McC. (S. Gar.)
20; Ellison vs. Chapman", 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 224; Williams vs. Hen-
shaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79; 22 Am. Dec. 366; Adams vs. Totten,
39 Penn. St. 447; Vance vs. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467;
1 Story Eq. J nr. Sec. 665; Collyer on Part. Sec. 245; 2 Lindley
on Part. (4th Ed.), 1025, and cases cited in notes. The subject
is much discussed in some of the above cases and many other
cases asserting the same doctrine are cited in the opinions as
well as in the above text-books.
The test seems to be that if the damages resulting from a
breach of a. covenant or stipulation in the partnership agree-
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factory to the plaintift's, to cut, log and run Cline's timber, 
then the parties should become partners in that enterprise on 
the terms aqd conditions stipulafrd between them. 
In that view of the case there may have been a time when a 
copartnership actually existed betw~en the parti('Si but it was 
immediately terminated by the wrongful act of the defendant 
(so far as he could terminate it) and no busint>SS was trans-
acted-nathing whatever was done by the parties as partners. 
The defendant excluded the plaintiffs from all participation 
whatever in his contract with Cline as soon as it was made, 
and they had no part in the performance thereof. By such 
wrongful act the defendant refused to launch the partnership 
business, and thus rendered the copartnership inoperative for 
the purposes for which it was formed. There is no doubt what-
ever that an action at law may be maintained by a party to an 
executory conh·act to form a future copartnershlp to recove1· 
damages for a wrongful refusal by the other party to execute 
such agreement. It is also well settled that the wrongful 
refusal by a party to a contract of copartnership to permit the 
firm to oommence business, or as it is sometimes termed, to 
launch the partnership business, is ground for an action at law 
by the injured partner to recover damages of the partner whose 
wrongful act has defeated the purpose for which the e<>partner-
ship was formed. The cases which so hold, both in England 
and this country, are very ll'Umerous. Indeed, the authorities 
seem t<> be quite uniform in so holding. The following are a 
few of the cases referred to: l"enning i1s. Leckie, 13 East 7; 
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Rtark. 107; Jlamling vs. Wadsworth, 4 Md. 59; 
Glover vs. Tuck, 24 'Vend. (N. Y.) 153; Bagley vs. Smith, 1.0 N. 
Y. 489 (post p. 251); Terrill rs. Richards, 1 Nott. & McC. (8. Car.) 
20; ElUson vs. Chapman, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 224; Williams vs. Hen-
shaw, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 79; 22 Am. Dec. 366; Adams vs. Totten, 
3~J Penn. St. 44 7; Vance i:s. Blair, 18 Ohio 532, 51 Am. Dec. 467; 
1 8tory Eq. Jnr. Sec. 665; Collyer on Part. Sec. 245; 2 Lindley 
<>n Part. (4th Ed.), 1025, and ca.see cited in notes. The subject 
is much discussed in some of the above cases and many <>ther 
cases asserting the same doctrine are cited in the opinions as 
well as in the above text-books. 
The test seems to be that if the damages resulting from a 
breach of a covenant or stipulation in the partnership agree-
ment by one partner belong exclusively to the other partner, 
Bsomzr vs. Snrrn. 251
and can be assessed without taking an account of the partner-
ship business, covenant or assumpsit may be maintained by
the injured partner against the other for such damages. Here
no partnership business was transacted; hence no account
could be taken, and the damages claimed belong to the plain-
tifis. This principle was applied in Sprout rs. Crowley, 30 Wis.
187. Should it be conceded that by the alleged agreement of
September, 1877, the parties became partners, this action can
still be maintained under many of the cases cited above. This
court has frequently held that one partner has no claim against
his copartner individually (that is to say, he cannot maintain
an action at law against such copartner), on account of partner-
ship transactions, although a final settlement of the atfairs of
the firm would show a balance in his favor. Tolford vs. Tol-
ford, 44 VVis. 547, and cases cited. But it has not held that if
one partner, immediately after the contract of copartnership
is made and before anything has been done under it, wrong-
fully repudiates the contract and prevents the firm from ever
doing any business under it, the injured party cannot main-
tain an action at law against his copartner and recover the
damage which he has sutfered thereby.
In Tolford vs. Tolford, supra, and also in Lower vs. Denton, 9
\\'is. 268, an accounting was necessary in order to determine
the damages or compensation to which the plaintifi was
entitled. These were actions at law. The same is true of
Wood vs. Bea-th, 23 Wis. 254, which was a suit’ in equity.
It follows from the foregoing views that the complaint
states a valid cause of action at law.
Judgment i an»-an--J~
Otrros, J., dissented.
Norm-See Mechenrfs Elem. of Partn., § 136.
BAGLEY vs. SMITH.
Court of Appeals of Z\*eu" York, I853.
10 N. Y. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 756.
Appeal from a judgment of the New York superior court
for damages for breach of articles of copartnership. The
















































































































































BAGLEY vs. SmT11. 
and can be assessed without taking an account of the partnrr-
ship business, covenant or assumpsit may be maintained by 
the injured partner against the other for such damages. Here 
no partnership business was transacted; hence n<> account 
could be taken, and the damages claimed belong to the plain· 
tHls. Tlli.s principle was applied in Sprout n. Orou'lcy, 30 Wis. 
l~f. Should it be conceded that by the alleged agre<>ment of 
~ptember, 1877, the parties became partners, this action can 
atitt lte maintainf'd under· many of the cases cited above. This 
court 1tas frequently held tbnt one partner bas no claim against 
his capartner individually (that is to say, be cannot maintain 
an action at law against such copartner), on account of partner-
ship transactions, although a final settlement of the affairs of 
the irm would show a balance in his favor. Tolford vs. Toi. 
ford, 44: Wis. 547, and cases cited. But it has not held that if 
one partner, immediately flfter the contract of copa.rtnership 
is made and before anything has been done under it, wrong-
fully repudiates the contract and prevents the firm from ever 
doing any business under it, the injured pa1-ty cannot main· 
tain an action at law against bis copartner and recover the 
damage which be bas suffered thereby. 
la Tolford vs. Tolford, sitpra, and also in Lower vs. Denton, 9 
'\Via. 268, an accounting was necessary in order to determine 
the damages or compensation to which the plaintiff was 
entitled. These were actions at law. The same is trne of 
Wood vs. Beath, 23 \Vis. 254, which was a suit" in equity. 
It follows from the foregoing views that the complaint 
8tates a valid cause of action at law. 
Judgment 7 I ~
ORTON, J., dissented. 
Non-Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 188. 
BAGLEY vs. SMITH. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1858. 
10 N. Y. 489, 61 Am. Dec. 7~. 
Appeal from a judgment of the New York superior court 
for damages for breach of articles of copartnership. The 
agreement was in writing and under seal, and provided for a 
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continuance of the firm for a term of four years and one month
from December 1, 1846. Before two years had quite expired,
two of the partner, while the third was traveling in the west
on business of the firm, published a notice of dissolution of
the old firm, and of the formation of a new one in their own
names to continue the business. They took possession of the
stock, and commenced business, according to their announce-
ment. This suit was brought by the ousted partner for dam-
ages for this wrongful dissolution; and resulted in a verdict
and judgment for plaintiff, subject to exceptions taken by
defendant, which raised the quest-ions discussed in the follow-
ing opinion.
Dani-el. Lord, for the appellants, who had dissolved the firm-.
John Slosson, for the respondent, the ousted partner.
Jonxsox, J. The principal points presented by the excep-
tions in this case are: 1, \Vhether an action can be main-
tained for a breach of a covenant to continue a partnership
for a fixed period, unless sooner dissolved in accordance with
the terms of the covenant; 2, \Vhether actual damages can
in such case be recovered; 3, Whether expected profits can
be regarded as ground for damages in such a case, and 4,
whether the amount of profits made prior to the dissolution
could be considered by the jury as bearing, in any degree, upon
the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled.
Another objection was presented on the argument, that the
covenants of the defendants being several, no judgment for
joint damages could be given. This objection, not having been
presented at the trial, so far as the bill of exceptions informs
us, cannot be considered here.
There do not seem to be any special rules of law applicable
to covenants contained in partnership articles and not to other
covenants; and we may therefore say, without discussion, that
an action will lie for a breach of covenant, no matter in what
instrument the covenant be found. V\’e may further affirm
that no rule of law declares that the breach of a covenant con-
tained in partnership articles shall be compensated only by
nominal damages. The measure of damages must depend on
the nature of the obligation, and the extent of the injury in
this as in all other cases of broken covenants.
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oontinuance of tbe firm for a term of four years and one month 
from December 1, 1846. Before two years bad quite expired~ 
two of the partners, while the third was traveling in the west 
on business of the firm, published a notice of dissolution of 
the old firm, and of the formation of a new one in their own 
names to continue the business. They took posses1:1ion of the 
stock, and commenced business, according to their announce-
ment. This suit was brought by the ousted partner for dam-
ages for this wrongful dissolution; and resulted in a verdic·t 
and judgment fo1· plaintiff, snhjec_·t to exceptions taken by 
defendant, which raised the questions discussed in the follow-
ing opinion. 
D011iel L01·d, for t11e appellants, who had dissolved the firm. 
John Slosson, for the respondent, the ousted partner. 
JoH~SoN, J. The principal points JH'esented by the exc<'p-
tions in this case are: 1, 'Vhether an action can be main-
tained for a breach of a covenant to continue a partnership 
for a fixed period, unless sooner dissolved in accordance with 
the terms of the covenant; 2, \Vhether actual damages can 
in surh case be recovered; 3, 'V~ether expected profits can 
be regarded as ground for damages in such a case, and 4, 
whether the amount of profits made prior to the dissolution 
could be considered by the jury as bearing, in any degree, upon 
the amount of damages to which the plaintiff was entitled. 
Another objection was presented on the argument, that the 
covenants of the defendants being se\·eral, no judgment for 
joint damag-es could be giyen. This objection, not having been 
presented at the triul, so far as the bill of exceptions informs 
us, cannot be conside1·ed here. 
There do not seem to be any special rules of law ap1Jlicable 
to covenants <>ontained in partnf>rship artirles and not to other 
eovenants; and we ma,v therefort> say, without discussion, that 
an action will lie for a breach of coYenant, no matter in what 
instrument the covenant be found. 'Ve may further affirm 
that no rule of law declares that the breach of a covenant con-
tained in partnership articles shall be compensated onl,Y by 
nominal damages. The measure of damages must depend on 
the nature of the obligation, and the extent of the injury in 
this as in all othn cases of broken covenants. 
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No question was made at the trial as to the sufliciency of
the proof that a. breach of the obligation to continue the part-
nership h-ad taken place, except only so far as a question of
that sort is raised by the objection of the defendants’ counsel,
that by the constitution of the partnership the partners have a
power of revocation whenever they lose confidence in each
other. It is not quite clear whether this objection points to
the particular frame of this partnership, or is supposed to be
founded upon the general rules applicable to that relation. If
it relate to the provisions of the partnership agreement in
this case, then it is clear that the articles contain no clause
which warrants the defendants’ proposition, If, on the other
hand, the general law of partners-hip is referred to, while it
must be conceded thart some diflerence of opinion seems to
exist as to the power 0-f either partner in a partnership for
a fixed term, contrary to his agreement, to put an end to the
continuance of the firm at his own mere will, it can be safely
affirmed that, conceding this power to exist in the broadest
form, it has never been pretended that a partner who should,
in contravention of his agrecme,-nt, put an end to the partner-
ship would not be held responsible for the injury thus
coimnitted.
\\'e are left, then, to the only substantial question which this
case presents: \\'hether the loss of those profits which the
plaintiff would have made during the stipulated term of the
partnership is a proper subject of compensation, and whether
the evidence of past profits, during the period next preceding
the dissolution, can he considered as bea ring upon the question
of prospective profits. The form o-f the exceptions taken concede
that the judge committed no error, unless in taking the profits
into consideration at all; that if he was correct in this he has
annexed to his instructions all the proper qualifications to
prevent an excessive and erroneous estimate of the amount of
compensation for prospective profits.
The object of commercial partnership is profit. This is the
motive upon which men enter into the relation. The only
legitimate beneficial consequence of continuing a partnership
is the making of profits. The most‘ direct and legitimate
injurious consequence which can follow upon an unauthorized
dissolution of a partnership is the loss of profits. Unless that
















































































































































BAGLEY vs. SMITH. 253 
No question was made at the trial as to the sufficiency of 
tht• proof that a breach of the obligation to continue the part-
nen-1hip had taken place, except only so far as a question of 
that sort is raised by the objection of the defendants' counsel, 
that by the constitution of the partnerl'hip the pa11ners have a 
power of revocation whenever thc>y lol'le confidenee in each 
other. It is not quite cl<>ar wlH•ther this objection points to 
the particular frame of this parhwrship, or is suppm-1ed to be 
founded upon the ~e11nal rules applicabl<> to that 1·pl11tion. If 
it rplate to the pro\"isions of the partnership ag1·e<"ment in 
this case, then it is cli:>a1· that the articles contain no clause 
wl1il-h warrants the d<>fendants' proposition, If, on t·he e>ther 
hand, the gen{'ral law of pai1ners·hip is referred to, while it 
must be concedc·d thart some diff Prenre of opinion sec>nui to 
exist as to the power of eilher partner in a partne1·ship for 
a fixed tenn, C'ontrary to hi~ agr('(•meut, to put an end to the 
continuance of t IH• ti1·rn at his own mere will, it ean be safely 
affirmed that, eon1·Pdi11g this J>OW('l' to exist in 1 he hrnadest 
form, it haR ne,·er lw1.1n prPt(•1ulPd that a partner who 8llould, 
in f'onfravention of hi!'! ag1·p1·111ent, put an end to thl' 1ia1·tner-
sbip would not be held responsible for the injm·y thus 
co111 mitted. 
" ·e are left, tlwn, to the only suLstantial quest ion whkh this 
ca!'!1• prf:s<•nti;: \Yltf'ther tlw loss of thost• profits whid1 the 
plaintiff woul'1 liaw made dul'ing the stipulated term of the 
pa1·tneri;hip i:-; a J.ll'l•(l('l' i:;ulijed of tompt•11:-1ation, and whether 
the evidenee of past profits, during the 1wriod next p1·eceding 
the dis1-ml11tion, ea11 ht· c·o11:-1id1•rpd as lwal'ini.: upon the question 
of prospective profits. The form of the exet>plions taken concede 
that the judge committf'd no f"l'ror, nnlt1 ss in taking the profits 
into consideration af all; that if he was col'l'eet in this he ha.s 
annexed to his instructions all the proper qualitications to 
prevent an exePi-:sh·t· and ~n·o1wo11~ Pstirnnte of the amount of 
compensation fo1· pl'Ospective pl'Otits. 
The object of commercial partnership is profit. This is the 
motive upon which men enter into the relation. The onl,v 
legitimate beneficial conseqtwnee of continuing a partnership 
is the making of profits. '!'he most direct and leg'itimate 
injurious consequence whieh can follow ~lpon an unanthorhwtl 
dissolution of a partnership is th{' lo!i!s of profit!'. l!nleRs that 
loss can be made up to the injnrp<l party. it is idle to say that 
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any obligation is imposed by a contract to continue a partner-
ship for a fixed period. The loss of profits is one of the com-
mon grounds, and the amount of the profits lost one of the
common measures. of the damages to be given upon a breach of
contract. I neec only refer to Master-ton rs. Mayor, etc. of
1s'~rooI.'l_|/n, 7 Hill, 61 [42 Am. Dec. 38]. So, too, in Wilson. rs.
Martin, 1 Denio 602; Heekshcr -rs. .lIc(‘rea, 24 i\'end. 304; and
Shannon vs. Comstock, 21 Id. 457 [3-1 Am. Dec. 20:2], what the
party would have made, in other words, his prospective profit,
from the performance of the contract was held to be the true
measure of damages. I refer also to two English cases on the
question, although the English courts do not seem so carefully
to have considered the rules by which, as matter of law,
damages are to be measured as the courts of this country.
Gale vs. Lcckie, 2 Stark. 107, was at -nisi prius before Lord
Ennnsnonouon. The defendant agreed, as author, to furnish
a manuscript work to plaintiffs, to be published at their
expense, and the profits to be equally divided. The defendant
failed to fulfill, and this action was brought for damages.
Lord ELLENBOROUGH told the jury the plaintiffs were entitled to
their expenses of paper and printing, and added, “the sum of
ninety pounds has been stated by the witnesses as the amount
of profit which would probably have been derived from the first
edition; and it is doubtful whether it would have reached a sec-
ond;” after suggesting that there might have been a loss
instead of profit, which would have been wholly the plaintiffs‘
loss under the contract, he submitted the matter to the jury.
who found for the plaintifl‘s fifty pounds more than the expen-
ses, etc., for loss of profit. The case does not appear to have
been moved afterwards.
1lIc.\~'eil rs. Reid. 0 Bing. 68, was an action upon a contract,
by the defendant, to take the plaintiff into a firm of which the
defendant was a member. It appeared, upon the trial, that
the plaintiff had been offered. upon certain terms, the coin
mand of_an East India ship for a double voyage; that the value
of such voyage to the captain was not less than one thousand
pounds; that the plaintiff had been induced by the defendant
to give up this voyage to enter into the promised partnership.
The jury found five hundred pounds for the plaintiff. It was
objected. among other things, that the jury were wrongfully
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any obHgation is impostc>d by a contmct to continue a partner-
ship for a fixed period. The loss of profits is one of the com-
. mon grounds, and the amount of the profits lost one of the 
common measures~ of the damages to be giYen upon a breach of 
eontra<:t. I neec only refer to Masterton t'S. Mayor, etc. of 
Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61 [42 Am. Dec. 38). So, too, in Wilson r~. 
Martin, 1 Denio 602; HeckJJher tw. McCrea, 24 ""end. 304; and 
Sha1111011 us. Comstock, 21 Id. 457 [34 .Am. Dec. 26~], what the 
party would have made, in other words, his prospective profit, 
from the performance of the contract was held to be the true 
measure of damages. I refer also to two English cases on the 
question, although the English courts do not seem so carefully 
to have considered the rules by which, as matter of law, 
damages are to be measured as the courts of this country. 
Gale vs. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107, was at nisi pril.ts before Lord 
ELJ.ENBOHOUGH. 'l'he defendant agreed, as author, to furniE1b 
a manuscript work to plaintiffs, to be published at tlwir 
expense, and the profits to be equally divided. The defendant 
failed to fulfill, and this action was brought for damairt>~. 
Lord Er.LENBOROF«H told the jury the plaintiffs were entitled to 
their expenses of paper and printing, and added, "the sum of 
ninety pounds has been stated by the witnesses as the amomit 
of profit whieh would probabl~· have been derived from the first 
edition; and it is doubtful whether it would have rea('hed a St'l'· 
ond;'' after snggPsting that there might have been a los1o1 
instead of profit, whkh would have been wholly the plaintiffs' 
loss under the eontract, he 1mbmitted tbe matter to the jury, 
who found for tlw plaintiffs fifty pounds more than the expen-
ses, ete., for lo8s of profit. The case does not appear to have 
bet>n JllOVPd aft(•J'WUl'f18. 
McNeil rs. Rrid, B Bing. 68, was an aetion upon a contraet, 
by the defendant, to take the plaintiff into a firm of wbit-h the 
defendnnt was a nwmuer. It appeart•d, upon thl' trial, that 
the plaintiff ~ad been offt>rt>d, upon certain terms, thl• com 
mand of_an East India ship for a double voyage; that the value 
of such voyage to the eaptain was not less than one thousand 
pounds; that the plaintiff bad l,}el•n induced by the dl~fendant 
to give up this voyage to enter into the promised partnership. 
The jury found five hundred pounds for tlw plaintiff. It was 
objected. among otlwr things, that the jury were wrongfully 
instrueted as to thl• damages. On this point TINDAL, C. J., 
~l —5 *' "'7
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says: “I told the jury that they might see that the plaintiff
considered the engagement equal to an Indian voyage, because
he would not otherwise have relinquished it, a.nd the defend-
ant could not have estimated it at less, because he made his
offer as a friend of the plaintiff.” It was the value of the
engagement as partner, therefore, which the jury were to esti-
mate; and Bosaxonrrr, J ., says: “The damages were estimated
according to what the jury thought was the value of the con-
tract. The value of the East India voyage has not been recov-
ered as special damage, but has been taken as an ingredient
for estimating the value which each party set on the proposed
contract of partnership.” In each of these cases the prospec-
tive profits of a joint undertaking unperformed was made the
subject of compensation in damages in an action at law.
The next question relates to the admission of the evidence
of the amount of past profits, to be considered by the jury as
bearing upon the future profits. It will be observed that the
objection does not at all relate to the mode of proof, but only
to the competency of the fact. It seems to me quite obvious
that, outside of a court of justice, no man would undertake
to form an opinion as to the prospective profits of a business
without in the first place informing himself as to its past
profits, if that fact were accessible. As it is a fact in its nature
entirely capable of accurate ascertainment and proof, I can see
no more reason why it should be excluded from the consid-
eration of a tribunal called upon to determine conjecturally
the amount of prospective profits than proof of the nature of
the business, or any other circumstance connected with its
transaction. It is very true that there is great difiiculty in
making an accurate estimate of future profits, even with the
aid of knowing the amount of the past profits. This difficulty
is inherent in the nature of the inquiry. \Ve shall not lessen
it by shutting our eyes to the light which the previous trans-
actions of the partnership throw upon it. Nor are we the more
inclined to refuse to make the inquiry by reason of its diffi-
culty, when we remember that it is the misconduct of the
defendants which has rendered it necessary.
Another question arises upon the defendant’s third request
to charge, viz.: “That supposing Bag]-ey to be accountable
through want of diligence, that should be taken into view in
















































































































































BAGLEY VS. 8.MITH. 255 
says: "I told the jury that they might see that the plaintiff 
. considered the engagement equal to an Indian voyage, because 
he would not otherwise have relinquished it, and the defend-
ant could not have estimated it at less, because he made his 
offer as a friend of the plaintiff." It was the value <>f the 
engagement as partner, therefore, which the jury were to esti-
mate; and BosAXQUET, J., says: "The damages were estimated 
according to what the jury thought was the value of the con-
tract. The value of the East India voyage bas not been recov-
ered as special damage, but has been taken as an ingredient 
for estimating the value which each party set on the pr<>posed 
contract of partnership." In each of these cases the prospec-
tive profits of a joint undertaking unperformed was made the 
subject of compensation in damages in an action at law. 
The next question relates to the admission of the evidence 
of the amount of past profits, to be considered by the jury as 
bearing upon the future profits. It will be observed that the 
objection does not at all relate to the mode of proof, but only 
to the competency of the fact. It sec>ms to me quite obvious 
that, outside of a court of justice, no man would undertake 
to form an opinion as to the prospective profits of a business 
without in the first place informing himself as to its past 
profits, if that fact were accessible. As it is a fact in its nnture 
entirely capable of accurate ascertainment and proof, I can see 
no more reason why it should be excluded from the consid-
eration of a tribunal called upon to determine conjecturally 
the amount of prospective profits than proof of the nature of 
the business, or a.ny other circumstance connected with its 
transaction. It is very true that there is great difficulty in 
making an accurate estimate of future profits, even with the 
aid of knowing the amount of the past profits. This difficulty 
is inherent in the nature of the inquiry. 'Ve shall not lessPn 
it by shutting our eyes to the light whiC'h the previous tram;:. 
actions of the partnership throw upon it. Nor are we the more 
inclined to refuse to make the inquiry by reason of its diffi-
culty, when we remember that it is the misconduct of the 
defendants which bas rendt•red it necessary. 
Another question arises upon the defendant 's tbh·d requeRt 
to charge, viz.: "That supposing Bagky to be accountable 
through want of diligence, that should be taken into view in 
diminution of the damages.~' An issue had been formed upon 
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the pleadings, and tried, whether Bagley had fraudulently
abstracted a quantity of gold from the firm, and the judge had
instructed the jury that if they found this issue for the defend-
ants, then they were justifled in dissolving the partnership,
and the plaintiff could not recover damages. No issue had
been made as to negligence on Bagley’s part, nor did the evi-
dence tend to the proof of such negligence; and on these
grounds, as well as because the request was not in such a
shape, even conceding it to have been well founded upon the
evidence, as to require the judge to compl_v with it, we think
the exception not well taken. A request must be in such form
that the judge may properly charge in the terms of the request
as made, without qualification, or his refusal will not be ground
of error. If made, as requested here, the effect would have
been to submit to the jury to find Whether Bagley was account-
able through want of diligence, without any instructions as
to what sort of diligence he was bound to exhibit, or what
sort of losses or other mishaps he was thus to be made account-
able for. In this refusal there was no error.
It may be proper to notice briefly the proposition that the
plaintiffs claim for profits must be limited to the period
between the dissolution and his subsequent entry into busi-
ness. This is obviously unfounded. The only question which
could be made as to this part of the case is, whether the
defendants, in mitigation of damages, could show that the
plaintifi either was or might have been as profitably employed
in business on h-is own account as he would have been had
the firm business been continued. The plaintiff might, per-
haps, have disputed the competency of such evidence. But
surely the defendants can not be heard to say that the plain-
tiff was bound to remain idle at their expense, or lose his
claim upon them altogether from the moment when he engaged
in business. .
Judgment afiirmed.

















































































































































256 CA.SES ON p A.RTNERSHIP. 
the pleadings, and tried, whether Bagley had fraudulently 
abstracted a quantity of gold from the firm, and the judge had 
instructed the jury that if they found this issue for the defend-
ants, then thPy were justified in dissolving the partnership, 
and the plaintiff could not recover ?amages. 'Xo issue had 
heen mode as to negligence on Bagley's part, nor did the evi-
dence tend to the proof of such negligence; and on these 
ground-a, as well as because the request was not in such a 
shape, even conceding it to have been well founded upon the 
evidence, as to require the judge to comply with it, we think 
the exception not W(>ll taken. A request must be in such form 
that the judge may prop<-t·ly charge in the tPrms of the request 
as made, without qualification, or his refusal will not be ground 
of error. If made, as requested here, the effect would have 
bl'en to submit to the jur.v to find whetht>r Bagi(>.'' was account-
able through want of diligence, without any instructions as 
to what sort of diligence he was bound to exhibit, or what 
sort of losses or other mishaps he was thus to be made account-
:i ble for. In this refusal there was no error. 
It may be proper to notice briPliy the proposition that the 
plaintiff's claim for profits must be limited to the period 
between the dissolution and llis subsequent entry into busi-
ness. This is obviously unfounded. The only question which 
could be made as to this part of the case is, whether the 
defendants, in mitigation of damages, could Rhow that the 
plaintiff either was or might have been as profitably emplo.ved 
in business on his own account as he would han> been had 
the fir-m. business been continued. The plaintiff might, per· 
haps, haYe disputed the competency of sueh evidt•nce. But 
surely the defrndants can not be heard to say that the plain· 
tiff was bound to remain idle at their expense, or loJe his 
claim upon tlwm altogether from the moment when he engaged 
in business. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NOTE.-See :Mechem's Elem. of Partn., 5 137. 
Srnas vs. Nnwnm. 257
/It
2. Is EQUITY. !/
SPEAB vs. NE\VELL.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1841.
13 Vt. 288.
Bill in equity, for accounting and settlement of a partner-
ship.
Spear, Carlton and Newell entered into partnership for the
manufacture and sale of paper. Spear and Carlton owned one
half interet and Newell the other half. Spear and Carlton
were to manage the business, sell the product, and collect the
receipts, and the profits or losses were to be divided accord-
ing to their interests. The business resulted in a large loss,
and Spear and Carlton brought an action of account against
Newell in the United States Circuit Court, to recover half of
the loss, but that court held that, as the defendant had never
received any of the partnership effects, no action of account
could be sustained against him, and that the only remedy was
by bill in equity. They then filed the bill, but the court below
dismissed the bill. Complainants appeal.
C’. Lin-slay and E. A. Ormsbec, for complainants.
R. Pierpoint and E. N. Br-i_r/gs, for defendant.
COLLAME-R, J. These parties were copartners, the orator:
being jointly interested in one-half of the partnership, and the
defendant in the other. The orators were the active part-
ners, the recipients of all the property and avails of the con-
cern; but, it being an unprofitable and losing concern, there is
a balance due the orators from the defendant, and to ascertain
this balance, which has not been done, and to close the concern
and recover this balance, this bill is filed.‘
The articles of copa.rtnership were not under seal, and there-
fore no action of covenant can be maintained. That an action
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!. IN EQUITY. 
SPEAR vs. NEWELL. 
B11pretne Court of Vermont, 1841. 
18 Vt. 288. 
16' 
Bill In equity, for accounting and settlement of a partner-
ship. 
Spear, Carlton and Newell entered into partnership for the 
manufacture and sale of paper. Spear and Carlton owned one-
half interest and Newell the other half. Spear and Carlton 
were to manage the business, sell the product, and collect the .. 
I't'ceipts, and the profits or losses were to be divided accord-
ing to their interests. The business resulted in a large Joa, 
nod Spear and Carlton brought an action of account against 
N'ewell in th~ United States Circuit Court, to recover half of 
the loss, but that court held that, as the defendant bad never 
rPcC'ived any -0f the partnership effeets, no action of account 
<·ould be sustnined against him, and that the only remedy was 
by bill in equity. Th{·~- tll<'n filed the bill, but the court belc>w 
dismissed the bill. Complainants appea.l. 
0. Linsley and E. A .. Ormsbee, for complainants. 
R. Pierpoint and E. N. Br·iffgs, for defendant. 
CoLLAM&n, J. ThE>8e parties were copartners, the oraton 
being jointly iu1Prested in one-half of the partnership, and the 
defendant in tht• other. The orators were the active part-
ners, the recipients of all the property and avails of the con-
cern; but, it being an unprofitable and losing concern, there ht 
a balance due the orators from the defendant, and to ascertain 
this balance, which has not been done, and to close the concern 
and recover this balance, this bill is filed.; 
The articles of copa.rtnership were not under seal, and there· 
fore no action of covenant can be maintained. That an action 
of assumpsit cannot be maintujned at law by one partner 
83 
... 
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against another to recover an unliquidated and unsettled bal-
ance of a copartnership business, has been too fully and fre-
quently decided to be considered open to discussion. Gow on
Partnership, 98; Collyer on Partnership, 143, 144. If, after a
dissolution, a balance is struck and agreed upon by the parties,
assumpsit may be maintained to recover it, on an implied
promise to pay. I Holt’s R. 368. Different rules have been
adopted in different states whether there must be an empress
promise to pay the balance; yet, all concur that it is only when
the final balance has been adjusted that assumpsit can be main-
tained. Oollyer on Partn., 153, note 45. [See also W3/cofi‘ vs.
Purnell, ante, p. 238 and note.] To this_ rule, Massachusetts
tands alone an exception. There, in the absence of a chancery
jurisdiction, the court of law has gone further than other
court of mere common law jurisdiction; probably influenced
by the pressure of a necessity which does not here exist.
It has been fully settled in an action of account between
these parties that these orators, who were the active partners
and received the whole property and avails of the copartner-
ship, cannot maintain, at law, an action of account against the
defendant to recover the balance of losses. It follows that the
orators are without remedy at law, and are therefore compelled
to resort to chancery to adjust the balance of the concern, and
to recover of the defendant his proportion of the loss when so
ascertained. The mere statement of the case shows the neces-
sity of the bill, and shows too that it is not a mere bill for an
account which could be sustained at law. It is true that, in
matters of account, generally, chancery has concurrent juris-
diction with the courts of law; and where the defendant is
pursued in chancery for an account in any capacity in which he
could be pursued at law, a bill will not be sustained where an
action would not be. But in this case the bill is not addressed
to the concurrent, but to the peculiar and exclusive, jurisdic-
tion of the court of chancery, in a case where the orators have
a just claim but are without a remedy at law. It is not a bill
calling on the defendant to account. He has received nothing,
and of course had no account to render. It is a bill to settle
and adjust a mutual account between the parties of a copart-
nership transaction, which the defendant will not settle and
















































































































































168 UA.SlL'i ON PARTNERSHIP. 
against another to recover an unliquidated and unsettled bal-
ance of a C()partnership business, has been too fully and fre-
quently decided to be considered open to discussion. Gow on 
Partnership, 98; Collyer on Partnership, 143, 144. If, after a 
dissolution, a balance is struck and agreed upon by the parties, 
assumpsit may be maintained to recover it, on an implied 
promise to pay. I Holt's R. 368. Different rules have been 
adopted in different states whether there must be an express 
promise to pay the balance; yet, all concur that it is only when 
the final balance bas been adjusted that assumpsit can be main-
tained. Collyer on Partn., 153, note 45. [See also Wycoff vs. 
Purnell, ante, p. 238 and note.] To this. rule, Massachusetts 
stands alone an exception. There, in the absence of a chancery 
jurisdiction, the court of law bas gone further than other 
court of mere common law jurisdiction; probably inOuenced 
by the pressure of a necessity which does not here exist. 
It bas been fully settled in an action of account between 
these parties that these orators, who were the active partners 
and received the whole property and avails of the copartner-
ship, cannot maintain~ at law, an action of account against the 
defendant to recover the balance of losses. It follows that the 
orators are without remedy at law, and are therefore compelled 
to resort to chancery to adjust the balance of the concern, and 
to recover of the defendant his proportion of the loss when so 
ascertained. The mere statement of the case shows the neces-
sity of the bill, and shows too that it is not a mere bill for an 
account which could be sustained at law. It is true that, in 
matters of account, generally, chancery has concurrent juris-
diction with the courts of law; and where the defendant is 
pursued in chancery for an account in an.y capacity in which he 
could be pursued at law, a bill will not be sustained where an 
action would not be. But in this case the bill is not addressed 
to the ooncurrent, but to the peculiar and exclusive, jurisdic-
tion of the court of chancery, in a case where the orators have 
a just claim but are without a remedy at law. It is not a bill 
calling on the defendant to account. He has received nothing, 
and of course had no account to render. It is a bill to settle 
and adjust a mutual account between the parties of a copart-
nership transaction, which the defendant will not settle and 
which the law cannot. 
... 
PIBTLE vs. PENN. 259
(Omitting the consideration of a plea of the statute of limi-
tations.)
Decree of the court of chancery reversed, plea disallowed,
and the cause ordered to pass to the court of chancery to take
an account, settle and adjust the same, and ascertain the bal-
ance, and decree the same to the party to whom it shall be
found due. ‘
No'rn.—See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 153, 154.
Compare with following cases.
PIRTLE vs. PENN.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1885.
8 Dana 247. 28 Am. Dec. 70.
Henry Pirtle filed a bill in chancery against Shadrack Penn,
alleging that they were partners in the publication of “Pirtle’s
Digest ;” that Pirtle, as author, was to furnish the manuscript,
and Penn, as mechanic, was to execute the printing and bind-
ing, and each to be entitled to half of the proceeds to be derived
from the sale of the books; that Penn was not bound to com-
mence the printing unless he should be satisfied that the public
patronage would be satisfactory and sufficient; that the state
subscribed for five hundred copies, and individuals for two
hundred and fifty copies, and that afterwards Penn had
printed two thousand copies and bound about half of them,
but that after dividing equally the gross sum paid by the
state for five hundred copies, he had refused to permit Pirtle
to have any control over the books, or any participation in
the sale of them—alleging, for the first time, that he was
entitled only to one-half of the net profits, after deducting
the cost of printing and binding, which had not yet been
wholly reimbursed; and lastly, that Penn was insolvent, and,
therefore, praying for an account of sales which had been
made, and for an injunction restraining further sales, and for
the appointment of a receiver.
Penn in his answer to the bill and amended bill, admitted the
















































































































































PIRTLE VS. PENN. 259 
(Omitting the consideration of a plea of the statute of limi-
tations.) 
Decree of the court of chancery reversed, plea disallowed, 
and the cauee ordered to pass to the court of chancery to take 
an account, settle and adjust the same, and ascertain the bal-
ance, and decree the same to the party to whom it shall be 
found due. 
Non.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., g~ 153, 154. 
Compare with following cases. 
PIRTLE vs. PENN. 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 189.''i. 
8 Dana 247, 28 Am. Dec. 70. 
Henry Pirtle filed a bill jn chancer.v against Shadrnck Penn, 
alleging that they were partners in the publication of "Pirtle's 
Digest;" that Pirtle, as author, was to furnish the manuscript, 
and Penn, as mechanic, was to execute the printing and bind-
ing, and each to be entitled to half of the proceeds to be derivefl 
from the sale of the books; that Penn was not bound to com-
mence the printing unless he should be satisfied that the public 
patronage would be satisfactory and sufficient; that the state 
subscribed for five hundred copies, and individuals for two 
hundred nnd fifty copies, and that afterwards Penn had 
printed two thousand copies and bound about half of them, 
but that after dividing equally the gross sum paid by the 
state for five hundred copies, he had refused to permit Pirtle 
to have any control over the books, or any participation in 
the sale of them-alleging, for the fir.st thnP, that he was 
entitled only to one-half of the net profits, after deducting 
the cost of printing and binding, which had not yet been 
wholly reimbursed; and lastly, that Penn was insolvent, and, 
therefore, praying for an account of sales which had been 
made, and for an injunction restraining further sales, and for 
the appointment of a receiver. 
Penn in his answer to the bill and amended bill, admitted the 
partnership as alleged, with only one material qualification, 
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i
and that is, that his personal supervision and the interest on
his capital expended in the publication were, by the agreement,
to be a set-otf against I‘irtle’s skill and labor in preparing the
manuscript, and that the net profits only were to he divided,
after reimbursing the amount expended in the printing and
binding, and in the purchase of materials; denied that he was
insolvent, and after exhibiting a general account, insisted that
Pirtle had received about as much as he had himself received.
The circuit court having, on final hearing, dismissed the bill,
this appeal is proecuted to reverse the decree.
(Trittende-n and Pirtle, for appellant.
.-llorehead & Brown, for appellee.
Rommrsos, Ch. J. (After stating the facts as above.) As
there was no prayer for a dissolution of the partnership,
interim management, by a receiver or otherwise, under the con-
trol or direction of the court, was not authorized by the estab-
lished rules and usages of courts of equity. Gow ou Part., 120,
139; Cary, 32. -
And it has been said, that without a prayer for dissolution,
a court of equity will not entertain a bill for an account,
because such bills might be annual, or of indefinite recurrence.
But both principle and authority tend to the conclusion,
that a bill for an account between copartners may be main-
tained without a prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, if
there be any good reason for compelling an account and settle-
ment. (‘ar_v, 34; Gow, 120, 136.
A court of equity may, moreover, compel a specific execu-
tion of a partnership contract, and may sometimes enjoin a.
partner from persisting in improper conduct, jeopardizing the
rights or derogating from the power or authority of his copart-
ner, and when the latter, if he can be protected and secured
by injunction, does not desire a dissolution, but prefers a con-
tinuation of the partnership, according to the spirit and end of
the association.
In this case, though there is no prayer for dissolution, yet,
as Penn has been selling the books and does not deny that he
refuses to permit Pirtle to control or participate in the sale of
the residue, we think the circuit court had power to decree, and
ought to have decreed some relief, if the allegations of the bill
as to the terms of the partnership be true.
















































































































































260 CASES OY PARTNERSHIP. 
and that is, that his personal supervision and the interest on 
his capital expended in the publication were, by the agreement, 
ttl be a set-off aga.inst Pirtle's skill and labor in preparing the 
manuscript, and that the net profits only were to be divided, 
after reimbursing the amount expended in the printing and 
binding, and in the purchase of materials; denied that he was 
insolvent, and after exhibiting a general account, insisted that 
Pirtle had rec·C'ived about as much as he had himself received. 
The circuit court havin~, on final hearing, dismissed the bill, 
this appeal is prosecuted to reverse the decree. 
Crittenden and Pirtle, for appellant. 
Morehead & Brnzon, for appellee. 
ROBERTSON, Ch. J. (After stating the facts as above.) As 
there was no prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, 
interim management, by a receiver or otherwise, under the con-
trol or direction of the court, was not authorized by the estab-
lished rules and usages of courts of equity. Gow on Part., 120, 
139; Cary, 32. 
And it hm1 been said, that without a prnyer for dissolution, 
a court of <>quity will not entertain a bill for an account, 
ber.ause surh bills might be annual, or of indefinite recurrence. 
But both principle and authority tend to the conclusion, 
that a bill for an account b<>t~een copartners may be main-
tained without a prayer for a dissolution of the partnership, if 
there be any good reason for compelling an account and settle-
ment. f'nry, :~.t; Gow, l~O, l!-16. 
A court of equity may, moreover, compel a specific execu-
tion of a partn<>rship contract, and may sometinH'S enjoin a 
partner from persisting in improper conduct, jeopardizing the 
I . 
'. rights or derogating from t~e power or authority of his copart-
i ner, and when the latter, if he can be protected and St>cured 
by injunction, does not desire a dissolution, but Jll'l'fers a con-
tinuation of the partnership, according to the spirit and end of 
the association. 
In this case, though thei-e is no prayer for disRolution, yet, 
as Penn has been sPlling the books and does not deny that he 
refuses to permit Pirtle to control or participate in the sale of 
the residut>, we think the circuit court had power to decree, and 
ought to have decreed some relief, if the allegations of the bill 
as to the terms of the partnership be true. 
~V , _ ___ _
I
Purrm vs. PENN. 261
As there was no written memorial, nor any evidence aliundc,
of the contract of partnership, its terms must be settled as a
deduction of law from what the parties have agreed in their
pleadings. A A‘ V
The parties agree, that one was to furnish the manuscript,
and the other to print and bind it; but they disagree as to their
proportion of interest in the gross proceeds.
Upon these fact alone, the law decides that what each con-
tributed was his share of the joint capital, that their respective
contributions _were, by themselves, deemed equivalents, and
that therefore each of them is entitled to an equal interest in
the books, and in their gross vendible value. Gow, 9-10; 3
Kent’s Com., 28-9; H onore rs. Col-mcsnil, 1 J . J ._ Mar. 506. The
general conclusion of law, in the absence of any fact to the con-
trary, is that “the losses are to be equally borne and the profits
equally divided.” Kent’s Com., supra.
But as profits are only what remains of the avails of the con-
cern after defraying incidental expenses and reimbursing the
capital, the counsel for Penn insists, that the rule of law
applied to the facts of this case will entitle Pirtle to only one
half of “the net profits,” after deducting a jut compensation
for materials, printing and binding, and that, consequently,
Penn’s understanding of the express agreement, and the legal
interpretation of the character of the partnership a1-e the same.
This a_rgument would be sound if the fact which it presupposes
were admitted; but the assumed fact, to wit: That Penn's capi-
tal exceeded that of Pirtle, to the extent of the value of the
materials, printing and binding. has no existence in proof or in
presumption of law. If one partner contributes a thousand dol-
lars and another contributes five hundred, nothing else appear-
ing, equity would fix a corresponding ratio of interest, and of
loss and gain between them.
But the production of genius or of knowledge are scarcely
appreciable, the value of writing a book must necessarily be
uncertain, before publication. But that Pirtlc’s manuscript
and copyright were of some value, and of considerable value
too, and were so considered by both parties, cannot be doubted.
The precise amount of the actual value was not only unknown,
but unascertainable when the contract was made. Perhaps it
exceeded the amount of all the cost of printing and binding;

















































































































































PIRTLE vs. PENN. 2Gl 
As there was no written mem<>ria 1, nor any evidence aliundc, 
of ·the contract of partnership, its terms must be settled as a 
deduction of law from what the parties have agreed in their 
pleadings. · -
The parties agree, that one was to furnish the manuscript, 
and the other to print and bind it; but they disagree as to their 
proportion of interest in the gross proceeds. 
Upon these facts alone, the Jaw d<>l"ides that what each con· 
tributed was his share of the joint capital, that their respective 
oontributions .were, by themselvPs, dN'med equivalents, and 
that therefore each of them is entitlt>d to an equal inh'rest in 
the books, and in their gross vPndiblc value. Gow, 9-10; 3 
Kent's Com., 28-9; Honore 1:s. Col·nwsnil, 1 J. J .. :Mar. 506. The 
I general conclusion of law, in the absPnce of any fact to the con-
trary, is that "the losses are to be equally borne and the profits 
equally divided." Kent's Com., supra. 
But as profits are only what remains of the avails of the con-
cern after defraying incidental expenses and reimbursing the 
capita.1, the counsel for Penn insists, that the rule of law 
upplied to the facts of this case will entitle Pirtle to only one-
balf of "the net proflts," after deducting a just c-0mr><'nsation 
for materials, printing and binding, and that, consequently, 
Penn's understanding of the t•xprcss agreement, and the legal 
interpretation of the churacte1· of the partnership are the same. 
This ~rgument would be sound if the fact which it presupposes 
were admitted; but the assumed fact, to wit: That Penn's capi-
tal exceeded that of Pirtlt', to tJw <·xtent of the value of the 
materials, printing and binding. has no existence in proof or in 
presumption of law. If one pnrtner contributes a thousand dol-
lars and another contributes five hundred, nothing else appear-
ing, equity would fix a corresponding ratio of intei:t>St, and of 
loss and gain between them. 
But the production of genius or of knowledge are scarcely 
appreciable, the value of writing a book must ne("Pssarily be 
uncertain, before publication. But that Pirtle's manuscript 
and copyright w.ere of some value, and of considPrable value 
too, and were so conside1·ed by both parties, cannot he doubted. 
The precise amount of the actual value was not only unknown, 
but unascertainable when the contract was made. Perhaps it 
exceeded the amount of all the cost of printing and binding; 
and it is far from being improbable that it did. But it is sum. 
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cient only to observe, that the law cannot decide that the con-
tributions of each partner were not of equal value, or were not
estimated by themselves as equivalent. And therefore, in
estimating profits, nothing is to be deducted in favor of the one
or the other party for capital or excess of contribution to the
joint stock.
This deduction of law is fortified, rather than weakened, by
extraneous facts. From the pleadings, it must be taken as
admitted, that by the contract of partnership, Penn was under
no obligation ever to commence the publication, unless the
patronage to be obtained should, in his judgment, be sufficient
to insure his indemnity. The state afterwards subscribed for
five hundred copies, which, added to two hundred and fifty
copies subscribed for by individuals would, at eight dollars a
copy, bring the gross sum of six thousand dollars. But it seems
that the amount actually subscribed was six thousand three
hundred and eighty dollars; the half of which, to wit: three
thousand one hundred and ninety dollars, was, according to
any hypothesis, assured to Penn before he began the printing,
or was under any obligation to begin it; and which sum was,
according to the proof, at least equal to the actual cost of print-
ing and binding two thousand copies, including the cost of
materials. A
Then, according to these facts, Penn, if he were entitled to
only one-half of the books or of their value, was sure.of being
reimbursed, and of then having left for his remaining interest
in the books,‘after supplying the subscribers, six hundred and
twenty-five copies, which, at eight dollars a set, would be worth
five thousand dollars, which, or whatever that number of copies
would sell for, would be clear profit.
Thus, supposing the contract to be as Pirtle avers it was,
and as the law presumes it to have been, it appears that Penn
incurred no hazard, and had a sure prospect of profit to a large
amount, and that the whole risk and loss were I’irtle’s.
It is intrinsically improbable, therefore, that Pirtle ever
agreed that Penn shouldx be entitled to more than one-half of
the gross proceeds of the publication. But it is enough that
there is no proof that Penn contributed more than Pirtle did
to the joint stock, or that he was to have more than an equal
joint interest; and, therefore, according to the proper deduc-
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cient only fo observe, that the law cannot decide that the con-
tributions of each partner were not of equal value, or were not 
estimated by themselves as equivalents. And therefore, in 
estimating profits, nothing is to be deducted in favor of the one 
or the other party for capital or excess of contribution to the 
joint stock. 
This deduction of law is fortified, rather than weakened, by 
extraneous facts. From the pleadings, it must be taken as 
admitted, that by the contract of partnership, Penn was under 
no obligation ever to commence the publication, unless the 
patronage to be obtained should, in his judgment, be sufficient 
to insure his indemnity. The state afterwards subscribed for 
five hundred copies, which, added to two hundred and fifty 
copies snbtH'rilwd for by indi ddnals would, at eight dollars a 
copy, bring tbP g1·oss sum of six thousand dollars. But it seems 
that the amount actually subscribed was six thousand three 
hundred and eighty dollars; the half of which, to wit: three 
thousand one hundred and ninety dollars, was, according to 
any hypothesis, assured to Penn before he began the printing, 
or was under any obligation to begin it; and which. sum was, 
according to the proof, at least equal to the actual e<>st of print-
ing and binding two thousand copies, including the cost of 
materials. 
Then, according to these facts, Penn, if he were entitled to 
only one-half of th<> books or of their value, was sure ,of being 
reimbursed, and of then having left for his remaining interest 
in the books,' after supplying the subscribers, six hundred and 
twenty-five copies, which, at eight dollars a set, would be worth 
1lve thousand dollars, which, or whatever that number of copies 
would sell for, would be clear profit. 
'fhus, supposing the contmct to be as Pirtle avers it was, 
and as the law presumes it to have been, it appears that Penn 
incurred no hazard, and had a sure prospect of profit to a large 
amount, and that the whole risk and loss were Pirtle's. 
It is intrinsically improbable, therefore, that Pirtle ever 
agreed that Penn should, be entitled to more than one-half of 
the gross proceeds of the publication. But it is enough that 
there is no proof that Penn contributed more than Pirtle did 
to the joint stock, or that he was to have more than an equal 
joint interest; and, therefore, according to the proper deduc-
tions from the pleadings, the law will give him no more. 
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From this view of the case, it would seem that, under the
circumstances of this case, Pirtle is entitled to a decree for
an account, and for securing to him his equal control over the
books, and correspondent participation in the sale or dispo-
sition of them, by a partial injunction, or otherwise, so as to
effect that end most securely and appropriately. And conse
quently the absolute dismission of the bill was improvident.
I I I
Wherefore, it is decreed and ordered that the decree of the
circuit court be reversed, and the cause remanded.
NOTE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 152, 153.
See also Howell v. Harvey, post, p. -.
_i*%_t_
NEW vs. W RIGHT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1870.
44 Miss. 202.
New filed a bill in equity against Wright, alleging that New
owned a tract of cypress timber, a mill site and part of the
machinery and material for the construction of a saw-mill;
that he entered into partnership with \Vr_ight who was to
supply the necessary materials and machinery to complete
the mill, and was to superintend the construction and manage
ment; that the timber was to be sawed into lum-ber, and the
proceeds divided equally after reimbursing each party for a
stipulated portion of his outlay on the mill; that New was
to supply the timber and Wright was to pay all the expenses
of sawing and selling. The bill further charged that \Vright
refused to account, alleging that the proceeds did not equal
the outlay by about $7,000, etc.; that YVright had ceased to
use complainant’s timber and wa procuring it elsewhere; that
Wright was so largely indebted to complainant that the latter
could not be paid unless out of the proceeds of the timber
and lumber which Wright had about the mill; and the bill
















































































































































NEW vs. W.IUGJIT. 263 
From this view of the case, it would seem that, under the 
circumstances of this case, Pirtle is entitled to a decree for 
an account, and for securing to him bis equal control over the 
books, and correspondent participation in the sale or dispo-
sition of them, by a partial injunction, or <>therwise, so as to 
effect that end most securely and appropriate1y. And conse-
quently the absolute dismission of the bill was improvident. 
• • • 
Wherefore, it is decreed and ordered that the decree of the 
circuit conrt be reversed, and the cause remanded. 
Nom.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §~ 152, lli3. 
Bee a1ao HoweU v. Harvey, post, p. -
NEW vs. WRIGHT. 
Supreme Court of Mi8sissipp-i, 1870. 
44 'Miss. 202. 
New filed a bill in equity against \Vright, alleging that New 
owned a tract of cypress timber, a mill site and part of the 
machinery and material for the construction of a saw-mill; 
that be entered into partnership with \Vright who was to 
supply the necessary materia1s and machinery to complete 
the mill, and was to superintend the construction and manage-
ment; that the timber was to be sawed into lumber, and the 
proceeds divided equally after reimbursing each party for a 
stipulated portion of his outlny on the mm; that New was 
to supply the timber and "'right wns to pay all the expenses 
of sawing and selling. The bill further charged that \Vrigbt 
refused to account, allf'ging that the procef'ds did not equal 
the outlay by about $7,000, etc.; that "'right had ceased to 
use complainant's timber and was procuring it elsewhere; that 
Wright was so largely indebted to complainant that the latter 
· could not be paid unless out of the proceeds of the timber 
and lumber which Wright had about the mill; and the bill 
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prayed an injunction to prevent Wright from removing or sell-
ing the lumber or timber, that a receiver be appointed, the
partnership dissolved and an accounting had. A preliminary
injunction was issued, but the court subsequently dissolved
it and denied the application for a receiver. New thereupon
appealed.
G00. L. Potter, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Pnwros, C. J. (After stating the facts.) The propriety
of the action of the court in dissolving the injunction is
impeached by the appellant, and presents the first ques-
tion for our consideration. The bill of complaint charges
that neither party contemplated any use of the said
mill than to saw the cypress timber on the complainant’s said
tract of land, on which the mill wa erected, and for the saw-
ing of no other timber. and that the said defendant, in disre-
gard of the terms of the partnership, and without the consent
of the complainant, has ceased to procure cypress timber from
the said tract of land of the complainant, for the use of the
saw-mill thereon, and has been for some time heretofore, and
now is, procuring other cypress from other persons to saw,
and is sawing the same into lumber on said mill, and thereby
defezéiang one of the objects the complainant had in view in
enter info the partnership, and that object was to turn his
own cypress timber into productive capital. And this alle-
gation is, to some extent, corroborated by the evidence of
the appellee, who testified that his wife bought saw log and
timber. This was using the mill in a. manner unauthorized
by the terms of the contract of partnership, and would justify
an injunction, and together with the loss of seven thousand
dollars in running the mill for more than three years, would
perhaps authorize a dissolution of the partnership. The
injunction, therefore, could not have been properly dissolved
for the want of equity on the face of the bill. “ * "
The remaining question for our decision is, did the court err
in ‘overruling the motion for the appointment of a receiver?
“It must be admitted,” said the master of the rolls, in Madg-
wtth vs. Wtmble, 6 Beavan, 495, “that when an application is
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prayed an injunction to prevent Wright from removing or sell-
ing the lumber or timber, that a receiver be appointed, the 
partnership dissolved and an accounting had. A preliminary 
injunction was issued, but the court subsequently dissolved 
it and denied the application for a receiver. New thereupon 
appealed. 
Geo. L. Potter, for appP.llant. 
No appearance for appellee. 
PmYToN, C. J. (After stating the facts.) The propriety 
of the action of the court in dissolving the injunction is 
impeached by the appellant, and presents the first ques-
tion for our consideration. The bill of complaint charges 
that neither party contemplated any use of the said 
mill than to saw the cypress timber on the complainant's said 
tract of land, on which the mill was erected, and for the saw-
ing of no other timber. J.nd that the said defendant, in disrP-
gard of the terms of the partnership, and without the consent 
of the complainant, has ceased to procure cypress timber from 
the said tract of land of the complainant, for the use of thP 
saw-mill thereon, and has been for some time heretofore, and 
now is, procuring other cypress from other persons to saw, 
and is sawing the same into lumber on said mill, and thereby 
defe~~!i_ng one of the objects the complainant had in view in 
enterM. i..rA"::'> the partnership, and that object was to tnrn his 
own cypress tiraher into productive capital. And this allP-
gatiou is, to som~ extent, ~orroborated by the evidence of 
the appellee, who testified that his wife bought saw logs and 
timber. This was mdng the mill in a manner unauthorized 
by the terms of the contract of partnership, and would justify 
an injunction, and together with the loss of seven thousand 
dollars in running the mill for more than three years, would 
perhaps authorize a dissolution of the partnership. The 
injunction, therefore, could not have been properly dissolved 
for the want of equity on the face of the bill. • • • 
The remaining question for our decision is, did the court err 
in 'overruling the motion for the appointment of a receiver? 
"It must be admitted," said the master of the rolls, in Madg-
with vs. Wimble, 6 Beavan, 495, "that when an application is 
made for a receiver in partnership cases, the court is always 
i~
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placed in a position of very great diffieulty. On the one hand,
if it grants the motion, the effect of it is to put an end to the
partnership, which one of the parties claims a right to have
continued; and on the other hand, if it refuses the motion, it
leaves the defendant at liberty to go on with the partnership,
at the risk and probably at the great loss and prejudice of the
dissenting party. Between these difliculties, it is not very
easy to select the course which is best to be taken, but the
court is under the necessity of adopting some mode of proceed-
ing to protect, according to the best view it can take of the mat-
ter, the interests of both parties.”
In order to justify the dissolution of a partnership, on the
ground of misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith of one of the parties,
it is not sufiicient to show that there is a temptation to such
misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith, but there must be an unequivo-
cal demonstration, by overt acts or gross departures from duty,
that the danger is imminent, or the injury already accom-
plished: Story on Partnership, 464, § 288. ‘V here a concern
of any character or kind, covering a partnership, is broken up
by controversial suits, and it is apparent that there can be no
agreement between the parties in interest for its continuance,
a receiver will be appointed: Williams vs. Wilson, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.) Chan. 379; Edwards on Receivers, 330. And a. disso-
lution of a partnership may be granted and a receiver
appointed on account of the gross misconduct of one or more
of the parties: 1 Story‘s Eq. 635, § 672 a. To authorize the
appointment of a receiver there must be some breach of the
duty of a partner, or of the contract of partnershipf Harding
vs. Glover, 18 Ves. 281.
It was the duty of the appellee to take the timber used in the
mill, from the tract of land on which it was erected, belonging
to the appellant; and the getting timber elsewhere, as alleged
in the bill of complaint, was a breach of that duty and of the
contract of partnership. And if the mill sawed six thousand
feet of lumber per day, and the running of the mill from the
fall of 1865 to the commencement of this suit in the spring of
1369, brings the parties in debt seven thousand dollars, as
stated by the appellee in his testimony, it would seem to be a
business which neither party should desire to continue.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the case made by the

















































































































































NEW VS. WRIGHT. 26~ 
placed in a position of very great difficulty. On the one band, 
if it grants the motion, the effect of it is to put an end to the 
partnership, which one of the parties claims a right to have 
oontinued; nnd on the other hand, if it refuses the motion, it 
leaves the defendant at liberty to go on with the partnership, 
at the risk and probably at the great loes and prejudice of the 
dissenting party. Between these difficulties, it is not very 
easy to select the course which is best to be taken, but the 
court is under the necessity of adopting some mode of proceed- · 
ing to protect, according to the best view it can take of the mat-
ter, the interests of both parties." 
In order to justify the dissolution of a partnership, on the 
ground of misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith of one of the parties, 
it is not sufficient to show that there is a temptation to such 
misconduct, abuse, or ill-faith, but there must be an unequivo-
cal demonstration, by overt acts or gross departures from duty, 
that the dnnger is imminent, or the injury already accom-
plished: Story on Partnt>rship, 464, § 288. ·where a concern 
ef any character or kind, covering a partnership, is broken up 
by controversial suits, and it is apparent that there can be n~ 
agreement between the parties in interest for its coBtinuance, 
a receiver will be appointed: Williams -vs. Wilson, 4 Sandf. 
(N. Y.) Chan. 379; Edwards on Receivers, 330. And a disso-
lution of a partnership may be granted and a receiver 
appointed on uccount of the gross misconduct of one or more 
of the parties: 1 Story's Eq. 635, § 672 a. To authorize the 
appointment of a receiver there must be some breach of the 
duty of a partner, or of the contract of partnership:· Harding 
1'B. Glover, 18 Ves. 281. 
It was the duty of the appellee to take the timber used in the 
mill, from the tract of land on which it was erected, belonging 
to the appellant; and the getting timber elsewhere, as alleged 
in the bill of complaint, was a bre.nch of that duty and of the 
contract of partnership. And if the mill sawed six thousand 
feet of lumber per day, and the running of the mill from the 
fall of 1865 to the commencement of this suit in the spring of 
1369, brings the parties in debt seven thousand dollars, as 
stated by the appellee in his testimony, it would seem to be a 
business which neither party should desire to continue. 
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the case made by the 
34 
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bill authorizes the appointment of a receiver,~and that, there
fore, the court erred in overruling the application therefor.
For the reasons herein stated, the decrees of the court in dis-
solving the injunction and overruling the motion for the
appointment of a receiver, will be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion, with leave to the appellee to answer the bill within
sixty days from this date.
N0'l'E.—See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., § 152, 155.
For other cases of dissolution in courts of equity, see Gerard vs. Gateau,
post, p. -
BUCK vs. SMITH.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1874.
29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. Rep. 84.
Bill in equity by Buck against Smith for specific perform-
ance of the agreement referred to below a11d more ‘specifically
set out in the opinion, and for an accounting and injunction.
The bill recited that G. W. Swan, J. R. McArt.hur, W.
McArthur and J. F. McDonald had been partners in the lum-
bering business, under the name of McArthur & Co., and had
large and valuable property; that Smith agreed with complain-
ant Buck that Smith would buy the interest of Swan and
J. R. McArthur, in the firm’s real and personal property; con-
vey one-half of this interest to Buck to be paid for as rapidly
as he could do so out of the profits or otherwise; and that
Buck, Smith, XV. McArthur and McDonald should then go into
partnership to manage and work the lumber property formerly
so belonging to McArthur & Co.; that Buck should have the
management of the business, give it his personal attention and
go to reside near the property; that Smith bought the interest
referred to, but went into partnership with the others, exclud-
ing complainant, and thereby deprived him of valuable gains
and property.
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bill authorizes the appointment of a receiver,· and that, there-
fore, the court erred in overruling the application therefor. 
For the reasons herein stated, the decrees of the court in dis-
solving the injunction and overruling the motion for the 
appointment of a receiver, will be reversed., and the cause 
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion, with leave to the appellee tp answer the bill within 
sixty days from this date. 
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 1~2. 155. 
For other cases of cliasolution in courts of equity, see Gerard O& Gattati, 
post, p. ._ 
BUCK vs. SMITH. 
Supreme Gou.rt of Michigan, 1874-
29 Mich. 166, 18 Am. Rep. M. , 
Bill in equity by Buck against Smith for specific perform-
ance of the agreement referred to below and more "specifically 
set out in the opinion, and for an accounting and injunction. 
·The bill recited that G. W. Swan, J. R. McArthur, W. 
McArthur and J. F. McDonald bad been pa1·tners in the lum-
bering business, under the name of McArthur & Co., and had 
large and valuable property; that Smith agreed with complain-
ant Buck that Smith would buy the interest of Swan and 
J. R. McArthur, in the firm's real and personal property; con-
vey one-half of this interest to Buck to be paid for as rapidly 
as he could do so out of the profits or otherwise; and that 
Huck, Smith, '\V. McArthur and McDonald should then go into 
partnership to manage arid work the lumber property formerly 
so t<>longing to McArthur & Co.; that Buck should have the 
management of the business, give it his personal attention and 
go to reside near the property; that Smith bought the interest 
rPft>rred to, but went into partnership with the others, exclud-
ing co.mplain-ant, and thereby deprived. him of valuable gains 
and property. 
The court below dismissed. his bill and Buck appealed. 
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M. Buck, in person, and D. W. Perkins, for complainant. ‘ J
O. I. Walker, for defendant.
Gnsvns, C. J. (After stating the facts.) We consider it
very clear that the case which the complainant makes by his
bill is not suitable for the jurisdiction invoked. The power
vested in courts of equity to compel the specific performance
of contracts, instead of leaving parties in all cases to obtain
comm-on-law redress through actions for damages, is a very
useful one when legitimately exercised. It must, however, be
borne in mind that the jurisdiction has many necessary limits
and qualifications, and that it docs not necessarily attach or
operate with imperative force wherever a contract relation
exists which the complainant has respected and the defendant
has not. In each case the court must consider whether, in
view of all the facts and those doctrines which are interwoven
with the very texture of equity jurisprudence, and in view of
the specific peculiarities presented, and the settled principles
and maxims of the court, it is right and proper to entertain
the case and administer relief. 1l[0Murt1'e vs. Bennette, Har.
(Mich.) Oh. 124; Smith vs. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Chambers vs.
Livermore 15 Mich. 381; Millard vs. Ta-yloe, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 557.
Among the primary considerations is the question whether
the substantial sense and design of both parties can be worked
out by the decree of the court, since the real equity of the
proceeding, the spirit of the particular jurisdiction, means
performance on both sides and not a compulsory surrender by
one party to another without a present substantial and practi-
cal equivalent,—an equivalent susceptible of enforcement and
execution by the court.
Now, what is the real essence of the case made by this bill?
What is the arrangement the-court is asked to carry out? It is
an agreement, according to the representation of complainant,
between himself and the defendant, by which the latter agreed
to convey an undivided interest in real and personal property
held by defendant in common with third persons, and that the
complainant should, for an indefinite time, become a partner
with the defendant and such third persons in operating the
property; that the defendant should advance from time to
time the c0mplainant’s quota of the funds necessary for the
















































































































































BUCK VS. SMITH. 267 
'ill. ·Buck; in person, and D. W. Perkins, for complainant. · 
0. I. Walker, for defendant. 
GRAVES, C. J. (After stating the facts.) We consider it 
very clear that the case which the complainant makes by bis 
bill is not suitable for the jurisdiction invoked. The power 
vested in courts of equity to compel the specific performance 
of contracts, instead of leaving parties in all cases to obtain 
common-law redress through actions for damages, is a very 
useful one when legitimately exercised. It must, however, be 
borne in mind that the jmisdiction has many necessary limits 
and qualifications, and that it does not necessarily attach or 
operate with imperative force wherever a contract relation 
exists which the complainant has respected and the defendant 
bas not. In each case the court must consider whether, iu 
view of all the facts and those doctrines which are interwoven 
with the very texture of equity jurisprudence, and in view of 
the specific peculiarities presented, and the settled principles 
and maxims of the court, it is right and proper to entertain 
the case and administer relief. MoMurtie vs. Bennette, Har. 
(Mich.) Oh. 124; S 111 ith vs. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Chambers vs. 
Livermore 15 Mich. 381; Millard vs. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (U. S.) 557. 
Among the primary conside1"3.tions is tbe question wbethl'r 
the substantial sense and design of both parties can be worked 
out by the decree of the court, since the real equity of the 
proceeding, the spirit of the particular jurisdiction, means 
performance on both sides and not a compulsory surrender by 
one party to another without a present substantial and practi· 
cal equivalent,-an equivalent susceptible of enforcement and 
execution by the court. 
Now, what is the real r-ssence of the case made by this bill? 
What is the arrangement the court is asked to carry out? It is 
an agreement, according to the representation of complainant, 
between himself and the defendant, by which the latter agreed 
to ·convey an undivided interest in real and personal proper1 .v 
held by defendant in common with third persons, and that the 
complainant should, for an indefinite time, become a partner 
with the defendant and such third persons in operating the 
property; that the defendant should advance from time to 
time the complainant's quota of the funds necPssary for the 
business and the improvement of the property; that the com-
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plainant should have the right to manage and direct the busi-
ness and the improvements; and that he would employ his
time, skill, judgment and experience in the direction and uper-
vision of the property and business, and that the purchase
price of his proprietary share, and the amount advanced for
his benefit in carrying on the business, should be paid by his
skill and services in the concern, and the gains obtained in
the enterprise.
Waiving all objection founded on the circumstance that the
bill does not assert that McDonald and McArthur became in
any manner engaged with complainant to admit him to a part-
nership, or to clothe him with any right or power to manage
their interests, we first encounter the rule, which is pretty well
recognized, that the court will not enter upon so vain an under-
taking as to compel a party to go into a partnership where the
agreement is silent as to its durafion, and where, therefore, it
may be dissolved at the will of either as soon as formed.
But, secondly, we confront the inevitable and very formid-
able objection that the agreement by its very nature is practi-
cally not enforceable on both sides. It is extremely plain
that the court cannotjssume to enforce the performance of
daily prospective ditties, or supervise or direct in advance
the course or conduct of one who is to control and manage
in the interest of a firm in which he is to stand as a member,
and where, too, the stipulated arrangement as plainly set forth
contemplates that his personal skill and judgment hall be
applied and govern according to the shifting needs of property
and business. No court is competent to execute such an
arrangement. The complainant’s portion of the executory
scheme, then, which relates to his introduction to the position
of partner and manager, to his rights and duties in that posi-
tion, and to the agreed method for working out the compen-
sation to be made by him for the benefit he seeks, cannot be
specifically enforced. Looking at the case made by the bill,
the court is powerless to execute the equivalent the complain-
ant is bound to render. If a conveyance to the complainant
should be ordered, he would get at once the essence of what
he claims, whilst the defendant would fail in getting, through
a decree, any substantial consideration whatever.
A.s the court possesses no means by which to work out per-
formance on the part of complainant, he would become at once
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plalnant should have the right to manage and direct the busi-
ness a'nd the improvements; and that .he would employ .his 
time, skill, judgment and experience in the direction and super-
vision of the property and business; and that the purchase 
price of hie proprietary share, and the amount advanced for 
his benefit in c~rrying on the business, should be paid by his 
skill and services in the concern, and the gains obtained in 
the enterprise. 
Waiving all objection founded on the circumstance that thP 
bill does not assert that McDonald and McArthur became in 
any manner engaged with complainant to admit him t~ a part-
nership, or to cl-0the him with any right or power to manage 
their interests, ~e first encounter the rule, which .is pretty well 
recognized, that the court will not oo.ter upon so vain an under-
taking as to compel a party to go into a partnership where the 
agreement is silent as to its dura~on, and where, therefore, it 
may be dissolved at the will of either as soon as formed. 
But, seconclly, we confront the inevitable and very formid-
able objection that the agreement by its very nature is practi-
cally not enforceable on both sides. It is extremely plain 
that the court cannot~ssume to enforce the performance of 
daily prospective dJties, or supervise or direct in advance 
the course or conduct of one who is to control and manage 
in the interest of a firm in which he is to stand as a member, 
and where, too, the stipulated a1·rangement as plainly set forth 
cootemplates that his personal skill and judgment shall be 
applied and govern according to the shifting needs of property 
and business. No court is competent to execute such an 
ariangement. The complainant's portion of the executory 
scheme, then, which relates to his introduction to the position 
of partner and manager, to his rights and duties in that posi-
tion, and to the agreed Iru:!thod for working out the compen-
sation to be made by him for the benefit be seeks, cannot be 
specifically enforced. Looking at the case made by the bill, 
the court is powerless to execute the equivalent the complain-
ant is b-Ound to render. If a conveyance to the complainant 
should be ordered, he would ~et at once the essence of what 
he claims, whilst the defendant :would fail in getting, through 
a decree, any substantial consideration whatever. 
As the court possesses no means by which to work out per-
formance on the part of complainant, he would become at once 
invested with the benefit for which he prosecutes, whilst the 
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defendant would be left standing upon a naked right to exact
theconsideration through the future performance of duties
incapable of being specifically decreed. The doctrine of the
court will not sanction such one-sided relief; Blackett vs.
Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 117; Stacker vs. Brockclbank, 3 McN.
& G. 250, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; Johnson vs. Shrcwsbury ¢£ B. R.
W. 00., 3 DeGex. M. & G. 914, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 584; Pickeri/ng
vs. Bishop, 2 Y. & G01. Ch. 249; Kemble cs. Kean, 6 Sim. 333;
Kimberley vs. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Baldurin vs. Society, 9 Sim.
394; Gervais vs. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W. 80; Bozon vs. Farlow, 1
Mer. 459; Flight vs. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.
It is, then, very apparent, that, apart from other difficulties,
the case presented by the bill is wanting in mutuality, and is
not so constituted as to warrant the court in giving the relief
demanded. As a consequence, the decree below dismissing
the bill must be affirmed, with costs, but to preclude all ques-
tion as to the effect of it, it may be so varied as expressly to
he without prejudice to any proceedings at law the complain-
ant may think proper to take.
N0'1'E:—In Morris vs. Peclcham, 51 Conn. 128, it is said, “ It is a rule in
equity that the court will not decree a specific performance where it has
no power to enforce the decree. Hence partnership articles will not be en-
forced, especially where no time is fixed for its continuance, as either party
may dissolve it at pleasure. And even where a. time is fixed it is diflicult
to see how the decree can be enforced. Take this case as an illustration;
is the court to keep its hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel
them to carry on this business?” In Pollock’s Dig. of Partn, 6, it is said:
" The remedy of specific performance is generally not applicable to an
agreement to enter into partnership, for ‘ it is impossible to make persons,
who will not concur, carry on a business jointly for their own common
advantage.’ ”
In Somerby vs. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459, it is said: “ Al-
though a. court of equity will not ordinarily decree specific performance of
an agreement to form a partnership which may be immediately dissolved
by either pal-ty, it will secure to a partner the interest in property to which
by the partnership agreement he is entitled, Buzlon vs. Lister, 3 Atk. 383."
See also England vs. Curling, 8 Beav. 129; Scott rs. Rayment, 7 Eq. 112.
See also Mschem's Elements of Partnership, § 81, 149-151, and notes.
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BUCK vs. SMITH. 269 
defendant would be left standing upon a naked right to ex-a.et 
the ·consideration through the future performance of duties 
incapable of being epecifically decreed. The doctrine of the 
court will n'Ot sanction such one-sided relief; Blackett 08. 
Bates, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 117; Stocker VB. Brockelbank, 3 McN. 
& G. 250, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 67; ,Johnson VB. i~hrczcsbury <EB. R. 
W. Co., 3 DeGex. M. & G. 914, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 584; Picker\.ng 
vs. Bishop, 2 Y. & Ool. Ch. 249; Kem.ble t7R. Kean, 6 Sim. 333; 
Kimberley f)B. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340; Ba.ldrcin vs. Soci,ety, 9 Sim. 
:!94; Ge.rvais vs. Edwards, 2 Dr. & W. 80; Bozon vs. Farl&w, 1 
Mer. 459; Flight vs. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298. 
It is, then, very apparent, t!iat, apart from other difficulties, 
the ca:se presented by the bill is wanting in mutuality, and is 
not so constituted as to warrant the court in giving the relief 
demanded. As a consequence, the decree below dismissing 
the bill must be affirmed, with costs, but to preclude all ques-
tion as to the effect of it, it may be so varied as expressly to 
he without prejudice to any proceedings at law the complain-
nnt may think prop~r to take. 
NOTB:-ln Morria vs. Peckham, 51 Conn. 128, it is aaid, " It is a rule in 
equity that the court will not decree a specific perrormanoe where it has 
no power to enforce the decree. Hence partnership articles will not be en-
forced, espeoi&lly where no time is fixed for it.a continuance, as either party 
may dissolve it at plea.sure. And even where a time is fixed it is difficult 
to see bow the decree can be enforced. Take this case as an illustration; 
is the court to keep it.a hand on the parties for seventeen years and compel 
them to carry on this business?" In Pollock's Dig. of Partn, 6, it is said: 
•· The remedy of specific performance is generally not applicable to an 
agreement to enter into partnership, for I it is impossible to make persons, 
"who will not ooncur, carry on a busim;iss jointly for their own common 
•dvantage.'" 
In Some:r'b1J va. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 19 Am. Rep. 459, it is aaid: " Al-
though a court or equity will not ordinarily decree specific performance of 
an agreement to form a partnership which msy be iiumediately diBSolved 
by either patty, it will secure to a partner the interest in property to which 
by the partnership agreement he is entitled, Bu.xton vs. Lister, 8 Atk. 883." 
Bee also England va. Curling, 8 Beav. 12U; Scott 1:a. Raymmt, 7 Eq. 112. 





Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1893.
18 R. 1. ass, 2s Atl. Rep ass.
Assumpsit for the use of a horse let to'hire. Plaintiff had
judgment below. The opinion states the facts.
W. B. Tanner and E. L. Gannon, for plaintiff.
B’. B’. Stone and E. F. Lovejoy, for defendants.
MATTESON, C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial
on the ground of erroneous ruling, and also because the verdict
is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the
defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general
store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses
in carrying on their business. The plaintiff testifies that
Frank W. \Vood, one of the defendants, came to him and stated
that they (thee defendants) were in need of a horse and would
like to get hisAto use for a few days; that he consented to such
use; and that said Wood thereupon took the horse away. This,
however, was denied by Wood, who testified that he asked the
plaintiff for the use of the horse for one Walden in his laundry
business, and that, with the plaintiff’s permission, he took the
horse to Walden’s stable; that \Valden continued to use the
horse for several months, to the plaintili"s knowledge; that the
plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from Walden’s
stable and returned him there when he had done using him.
The defendants requested the court to instruct the jury that,
if they found that the hiring of the horse was not necessary
for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary

















































































































































POWERS OF PARTNERS. 
SWEET vs. WOOD. 
Supreme Court of Rlwde Island, 1893. 
18 R. I. 886, 28 A ti. Rep SS:>. 
Aesumpeit for the use of a horse let to·hire. Plaintiff had 
judgment below. The opinion states the facts. ,-
W. B. Tanner and E. L. Gann.on, for plaintiff. 
8. 8. Stone and E. F. Lovejoy, for defendants. 
MATTESON, C. J. The defendants petition for a new trial 
on the ground of erroneous ruling, and also because the verdict 
is against the evidence. The testimony shows that the 
defendants, as copartners, were engaged in keeping a general 
store in Burrillville, and that they had occasion to use horses 
in carrying on their business. The plaintiff testifies that 
~,rank W. 'Vood, one of the defendants, came to him and stated 
that they (th7· ~~~~ndants) were in need of a horse and would 
like to get hisAto rise for a few days; that be consented to such 
use; and that said \Vood tllereupon took the horse away. This, 
however, was denied by 'Vood, who testified that he asked the 
plaintiff for the use of the horse for one \Vaiden in bis laundry 
business, and that, with the plaintiff's permission, be took the 
horse to Walden's stable; that \Vaiden continued to use the 
horse for several months, to the plaintiff's knowledge; that tlie 
plaintiff, at different times, took the horse from Walden's 
stable and returned him there when he bad done using him. 
The defendants requested the court to instmct the jury that, 
if they found that the hfring of the horse was not necessary 
for the carrying on of the partnership business in the ordinary 
~__.__ 5 . __ _ __._$=; _
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way, the firm was not prima facie liable for the hiring by one
partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants
excepted.
We think the request was properly refused. As the use of
hores was necessary for carrying on the partnership business
in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was
clearly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule
is too well established to admit of question that the acts, admis-
sions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the
partnership, while engaged in the transaction of its business,
or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against
the firm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1077, and cases cited in
note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fact,
the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on
the business of the firm in the ordinary way; for being within
the scope of the partnership business, and therefore within the
authority of one partner to bind the firm, the firm would be
bound by the declaration of the partner that the firm needed
the horse for the transaction of its business, whatever the fact
might be.
The defendants also requested the court to instruct the jury
that one partner could not, without authority from the other
members of the firm, bind the firm on an implied contract, not
in any way connected with its business, or for its benefit. The
court gave the instruction, with the qualification that, if the
partner declared when he hired the horse that it was for the
benefit of the partnership, it would be responsible. To this
qualification the defendants excepted. VVe think the instruc-
tion requested, in view of the testimony, was erroneous, and
that the qualification of it was correct. The request was
erroneous, in that it assumed, contrary to the evidence, that
the hiring by one partner was unauthorized by the other. It
was not unauthorized by the other, because, as we have seen,
it was within the scope of the partnership business, and one
partner is the agent of his copartner in all matters within the
scope of the partnership business. -As such agent, his declara-
{ions are suflicient to bind his copartner, whether in accordance
with the fact or not. ‘
The verdict is supported by the testimony of the plaintifi’.
Though this testimony is denied by that of the defendant,

















































































































































SwKET vs. Woon. 271 
way, the firm was not pt"ima facie liable for the hiring by one 
partner alone. The request was refused, and the defendants 
excepted.. 
We think the request was properly refused. As the use of 
horses was necessary for carrying on the partnership business 
in the ordinary way, the hiring of a horse for that purpose was 
clearly within the scope of the partnership business. The rule 
is too wen established to admit of question that the acts, admis-
sions, and declarations of a partner during the existence of the 
partnership, whlle engaged in the transaction of its business, 
or relating to matters within its scope, are evidence against 
the firm. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1077, and cases cited in 
note 2. It was wholly immaterial whether, as a matter of fa.ct, 
the hiring of a horse was or was not necessary for carrying on 
the business of the firm in the ordinary way; for being within 
the scope of the partnership business, and therefore within the 
authority of one partner to bind the firm, the firm would be . 
bound by the declaration of the partner that the firm needed 1 
the horse for the transaction of its business, whatever the fact · 
might be. 
The defendants also requested the court to instruct the jury 
that one partner could not, without authority from the other 
members of the firm, bind the ftrm on an implied contract, not 
in any way connected with its business, or for its benefit. The 
court gave the instruction, with t},le qualification that, if the 
partner declared when he hired the horse that it was for the 
benefit of the partnership, it would be responsible. To this 
qualification the defendants excepted. 'Ve think the instruc-
tion requested, in view of the testimony, was erroneous, and 
that the qualification of it was correct. The request was 
erroneous, in that it assumed, contrary to the evidence, that 
the hiring by one partner was unauthorized by the other. It 
was not unauthorized by the other, because, as we have seen, 
it was within the scope of the partnership business, and one 
partner is the agent of bis copartner in all matters within the 
acope of the partnership business. As such agent, his dec1ara-
tions are sutlicient to bind his copartner, whether in accordance 
with the fact or not. 
The verdict is supported by the testimony of the plaintiff. 
Though this testimony is denied by that of the defendant, 
Frank W. Wood, and though there are circumstances which 
272 CASES on PARTNERSHIP.
may or may not, according to the view taken 6: them, tend to
corroborate the testimony of the latter, it is the province of
the jury to judge of the credibility of the testimony, and to
determine its weight. Unless it is clear that they have made
a mistake, or have been swayed by passion, partiality, corrup-
tion, prejudice, or sympathy, so that their verdict is strongly
against the evidence, the intervention of ‘the court is unwar-
ranted. Defendants’ petition for a new trial is denied and dis
missed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Part;n., §§ 162, 181, 191 .
—~
BARNARD vs. PLANK ROAD CO.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1859.
6 Mich. 274.
This was anaction brought by the plank road company to
recover upon a subscription made to its stock by (Joe in the
name of (Joe & Barnard. Barnard alone defended. One John-
son testified that a plank road was very necessary to enable
lumbering operations to be carried on in the vicinity in which
defendant’s lands were situated. Judgment for plaintiflf, and
Barnard brings error.
Mitchell <6 McAIpinc, for Barnard, were stopped by the court.
Conger <£ H ar-ris, for the company.
Mnnrm, C. J. Barnard & Coe are admitted to have been
“partners in the lumbering business, owning lands in St. Clair
county as such partners, and manufacturing lumber there-
from.” While such partners, (Joe subscribed the name of the
firm to the articles of association of the plank road company,
but without Barnard’s knowledge or consent. This subscrip-
tion, it is claimed, made Barnard a stockholder in the company.
(No rule is better settled than that one partner cannot bind
his copartner by any contract not within the immediate scope
of the partnership, unless with such copartner’s knowledge and
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, 
may or may not, according to the view taken of them, tend to 
corroborate the testimony of the latter, it is the province of 
the jury to judge of the credibility of the testimony, and to 
determine its weifht. Unless it is clear that they have made 
a mistake, or have been swayed by passion, partiality, corrup-
tion, prejudice, or sympathy, so that their verdict is strongl7 
against the evidence, the intervention of 'the court is unwar-
ranted. Defendants' petition for a new trial is denied and dia-
miBSed. 
Non: See Mechem'• Elem. of Partn., §§ 162, UU, 191. . 
BARNARD vs. PLANK ROAD CO. 
8upreme Court of Michigan, 1859. 
6 Mich. 274. 
This was an. action brought by the plank road company to 
recover upon a subscription made to its stock by Coe in the 
name of Coe & Barnard. Barnard alone defended. -One John-
son testified that a plank road was very necessary to enable 
lumbering operations to be carried on in the vicinity in which 
defendant's lands were sittiated. Judgment for plaintiff, and 
Barnard brings error. 
Mitchell & Mc.Alpine, for Barnard, were stopped by the court. 
Conger & Harris, for the company. 
MARTIN, C. J. Barnard & Coe are admitted to have been 
"partners in the lumbering business, owning lands in ~t. Clair 
county as such partners, and manufacturing lumber there-
from." While such partners; Coe subscribed the name of the 
firm to the articles of association of the plank road company, 
but without Barnard's knowledge or consent. This subscrip-
tion, it is claimed, made Barnard a stockholder in the company. 
(No rule is bett<.>r settl<.>d than that one partner cannot bind 
liis copartner by any co~tract not within the immediate scope 
of the partnership, unless with such copartner's knowledge and 
<·onsent._) Each partner is an agent for all the members of the 
5% 7 5~~ - ~4' ' 7'" —""’
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firm, in the transaction of all business of such firm; but as to
matters foreign to such business, he is regarded as a
stranger. The general business of the firm being that of man-
ufacturing lumber, and the ownership of land as incident
thereto, the subscription to stock in a corporation, or to articles
of association for the creation of one, was not an incident of
such partnership. Incidental benefits would not authorize one
partner to bind his fellow, and no authority so to bind him is
shown.
And the knowledge and assent required to bind the copart-
ner must be established by evidence aflirmatively showing it,
or from which it may be clearly inferred. This is sought to be
establihed from the fact that assessment were made, and
their payment demanded of the firm, which were unresponded
to; and it is urged that it was Barnard’s duty, upon such
demands, to repudiate any interest in the company, and that
his silence should be construed into a recognition of his rela-
tion as a stockholder. Now, a demand either through the
mail, or personal, is sufficient to bind a tockholder, but not to
create one. If the person of whom the demand is made be not
one, it is not his duty to disclaim the character of tockholder;
it is enough that he does not respond to such demand. The
simple admission that demand was duly made of the firm, is
not one of a personal demand of Barnard, nor is it of anything
more than a fact—its etieet being a question of law. There is
no evidence, nor any admission, in the case, that knowledge
of the demand ever came to Barnard; and certainly none that
he ever, by any word or act, recognized any connection with
the company.
The liability of Barnard is also sought to be established from
the testimony of Johnson. This testimony is objected to, as
inadmissible under the case as presented, and for general
incompelcncy.
VVe do not regard the stipulation as the making of a case,
but only as an admission of facts for the purpose of obviating
the necessity of producing witnesses'to prove them. Any
other facts necessary for either party to show could still be
proven.
The testimony was competent as tending to show the inter-
est of the partnership in the road, but falls far short of being

















































































































































BARNARD vs. PLANK Ro.&.i) Co. 
firm; in the transaction of all business of such firm; but as to 
matters foreign to such business, be is regarded as a 
stranger. The general business of the firm being that of man-
ufacturing lumber, and the ownership of land as incident 
tbel;'eto, the subscription to stock in a corporation, or to articles 
of association for the creation of one, was not an incident of 
such partnership. Incidental benefits would not authoriir.e one 
partner to bind his fellow, and no authority so to bind him is 
shown. 
And the knowledge and assent required to bind the copa.rt-
ner must be established by evidence affil'Inatively showing it, 
or from which it may be clearly inferred. 'l'his is sought to be 
('stablished from the fact that assessments were made, and 
their payment demanded of the firm, which were unresponded 
to; and it is urged that it wrui Barnard's duty, upon such 
demands, to repudiate any interest in the company, and that 
his silPnce should be construed into a recognition oi his rela-
tion as a stockholder. Now, a demand either through the 
mail, or personal, is sufficient to bind a stockholder, but not to 
create one. If the person of whom the demand is made be not 
one, it is not his duty to disclaim the character of stockholuer; 
it is enough that he does not respond to such demand. The 
simple admission that demand was duly made of the firm, is 
not one of a personal d(~mnnd of Barnard, nor is it of anything 
more than a fact-its (•ffoct being a question of law. T11ere is 
no evidence, nor any admission, in the case, that knowledge 
of the demand ever came to Barnard; and certainly none that 
be ever, by any word or act, recognized any connection with 
the company. 
The liability of Barnard is also sought to be established from 
the testimony of Johnson. This testimony is objected to, a.a 
inadmi~~.;j bl<> under the case as presented, and for general 
incompelen(~y. 
"Te do not regard the stipulation as the making of a case, 
but only as an admission of facts for the purpose of obviating 
the necessity of producing witnesses •to prove them. Any 
other facts necessary for either party to show oould still be 
proven. 
The testimony was competent as tending to show the inter-
est of the partnership in the road, but falls far short of being 
35 
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sufiicient to establish, or of tending to fix, any liability upon
Barnard.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
' NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 165.
BANNER TOBACCO CO. vs. JENISON.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1882.
48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. Rep. 655.
On June 26, 1875, the defendants, Luman and Lucius Jeni-
son, were in business as partners in the milling business at
Jenisonville under the name of L. & L. Jenison. One B. F.
Emery, who was in business at Whitehall, owed them about
$1,000. He was also heavily indebted to others and presum-
ably insolvent. Under these circumstances, and of his own
motion, he put on record a chattel mortgage on his stock to
defendants and then telegraphed them to come to Whitehall.
Luman Jenion, who had personal charge of the milling busi-
ness, went. \Vhile at Whitehall an arrangement was made
between him and Mr. Emery under which the apparent owner-
ship of the stock of goods was placed in the firm of L. & L.
Jenison, and their name placed upon the store as is usual to
indicate proprietorship. Mr. Emery was then to go on and sell
the stock in the usual course of business as their agent, keep-
ing it up by new purchases as should be found needful. Luman
Jenison in his testimony says that no purchases were to be
made on credit, and all authority to use the credit of the firm
was expressly withheld. Emery denies this, but admits he
was cautioned not to get the store in debt. He bought, how-
ever, from time to time on credit, and among other purchases
made of the plaintiff the purchase of cigars, the bill which is
the subject of this suit. Luman Jenison at the time of the
arrangement opened a bank account for Emery in the name of
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sufficient to establish, or of tending to fix, any liability upon 
Barnard. 
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted. 
The other justices concurred. 
NOTB: See Mechem's Elem. of Parto., § 185, 
BANNER TOBACCO CO. vs. JENISON. 
Supreme Court of Mi.chigan, 1882. 
48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. Rep. 655. 
On June 26, 1875, the defendants, J,uman and Lucius Jeni-
san, were in business as partners in the milling business at 
Jenisonville under the name of I"'. & J.,. Jenison. One B. }I,_ 
Emery, who was in business at Whitehall, owed them about 
fl,000. He was also heavily indebted to others and presum-
ably insolvent. Uncler these circumstnnces, and of his own 
motion, be put on record a chattel mortgage on bis stock to 
·defendants and then telegraphed them to come to \Vbitehall. 
Luman Jenison, 1"ho had personal charge of the milling busi-
ness, went. \Vhile at 'Whitehall an arrangement was made 
between him and Mr. Emery under which the apparent owner-
ship of the stock of goods was placed in the firm of L. & L. · 
Jenison, and their name placed upon the store a.s is mmal to 
indicate proprietorship. Mr. Emery was then to go on and sell 
the stock in the usual course of business as their agent, keep-
ing it up by new purchases as should be found needful. Luman 
Jenison in bis testimony says that no purrhases were to be 
made on credit, and all authority to use the credit of the firm 
was expressly withheld. Emery denies this, but admits he 
was cautioned not to get the store in dc•bt. He bought, how-
ever, from time to time on credit, and among other purchaRel!I 
made of the plaintiff the purchase of cigars, the bill which is 
the subject of this suit. Luman Jenison at the time of the 
arrangement opened a bank account for Emery in the name of 
L. & I .... Jenison with a banker at Whltehall, and Emery pro-
- Baum-:1; TOBACCO Co. vs. Jmuson. 275
cured letter and bill heads in the same firm name which were
used by him.
The business continued under this arrangementuntil the
fall of 1879; Emery and Luman Jenison evidently understand-
ing that, though Emery was ostensibly agent, he was really as
between the parties themselves only mortgagor, with permis-
sion to sell the mortgaged goods to pay the debt. IIe did not,
however, during all this time reduce the debt, but on the other
hand received flour from defendants for which he paid only a.
part. Meantime he took the benefit of the bankrupt law, and
received his discharge. On September 11, 187 9, Luman/Jenison
went to \Vhitehall and with the concurrence of Emery sold
out the stock to one Banks, realizing therefor less than the
sum due his firm. Subsequently the account of the plaintiff
was presented to him for settlement, and he refused to recog-
nize any liability upon it. It was then put in suit. Plaintiff
had judgment and defendants appealed.
Taggart, Stone ¢f- Earle, for plaintifl.
J. 0. Fitzgerald, for defendants.
Cooucr, J. (After stating the facts.) If the plaintiff’s case
is weak in any point it is in the evidence to connect Lucius
Jenison with the arrangement whereby Emeny was made agent
for carrying on the business at Whitehall. The circuit judge
correctly instructed the jury that if the action of Luman Jeni-
son was taken, and the business subsequently carried on in the
name of L. & L. Jenison without the knowledge of Lucius at
the time or his subsequent ratification, there could be no recov-
ery in this action; but that if Lucius authorized it, or knew
how the business was being conducted and did not dissent, then
both were bound to the extent of the agency Luman undertook
to create. He also instructed them that merely leaving Emery
in possession with instructions to sell the goods, would not
give him authority to purchase goods on credit. This instruc-
tion was as favorable as defendants could ask, and we find no
requests refused which we think the defendants entitled to.
It is conceded that the authority of Luman J enison as a part-
ner in the mill did not empower him to engage the firm in
another and independent business without the consent of his
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cured letter and bill heads in the same firm name which were 
used by him. 
The business continued under this arrangement ·until the 
fall of 1879; Emery and Luman Jenhwn evidently understand-
ing that, though Emery was ostensibly agent, be was really as 
between the parties themselves only mortgagor, with permis-
sion to sell the mortgaged goods to pay the debt. He did not, 
however, during all this time reduce the delJt, but on tlle other 
hand received flour from defendants for which he paid only a 
part. Meantime he took the benefit of the bankrupt law, and 
received his discharge. On September 11, 18W, LumalYJenison 
went to 'Vhiteball and with the con.currence of Emery sold 
out the stock to one Ba~ks, realizing therefor less than the 
sum due his firm. Subsequently the account of the plaintiff 
was presented to him for settlement, and he refusetl to reco:~­
nize any liability upon it. It was then put in suit. Plaintiff 
had judgment and defendants appealed. 
Taggart, Stone & Earle, for plainti1f. 
J. 0. F'itzgerald, for defendants. 
CooJ,EY, J. (After stating the facts.) If the plaintiff's ca~ 
is weak in any point it is in the evidence to connect Lucius 
.Jenison with the arrangement whereby Erne~ was made agent 
for carrying on the business at Whitehall. The circuit judge 
correctly instructed the jury that if the action of Luman Jf.'ni-
son was taken, and the business subsequently carried on in the 
name of L. & L. Jenison without the knowledge of Lucius at 
the time or his subsequent ratification, there could be no recov-
ery in this action; but that if J,ucius authorized it, or knew 
how the business was being conducted and did not dissent, then 
both were bound to the extent of the agenry Luman undertook 
to create. He also instructed them that merely leaving Emery 
in possession with instructions to sell the goodR, would not 
give him authority to purchase goods on credit. This instruc-
tion was as favornble as defendants could ask, and we find no 
requests refused which we think the defendants entitled to. 
It is conceded that the authority of J ... uman Jenison as a part-
ner in the mill did not empower him to engage the firm in 
another and independent business without the consent of his 
aasociate. It was a very important fact, however, that the 
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debt for which Luman Jenison assumed to take security in the
peculiar manner above described was a partnership debt. He
undoubtedly had authority to take goods in payment, and to
create an agency for the purpose of’ selling ofi the goods so
taken; and if in his opinion keeping up the stock for a time
was the best means of enabling the goods to be sold to advan-
tage, very slight circumstances of knowledge or assent on the
part of his copartner ought to be sufficient to make the firm
responsible for the acts of the agent in keeping up the stock
in the usual way. Secret instructions to the agent under such
circumstances cannot avail. It would be a reproach to the law
if it could suffer a principal to escape responsibility for those
acts of the agent which, according to the usual course of the
business in which he was engaged, the public had a right to
understand were authorized. There was abundant evidence
in the case to charge Luman Jenison, and we think there was
also enough from which the jury might infer that Lucius J eni-
son could not have been ignorant of the business carried on so
long in the name of his firm.
It was urged on the part of the defense that as the defend-
ants had a known place of business which they personally man-
aged, and which was altogether different from that carried on
at Whitehall, the plaintifi‘ was guilty of negligence in making
sale to Emery without first communicating with defendants
and learning from them - directly what was the extent of
l<1mery’s agency. \Ve think, on the other hand, that the negli-
gence, if any, was all on the other side. The arrangement
under which L. & L. Jenison became apparent owners, while
as to Emery they were mortgagees only, and under which
Emery for several years was enabled to carry on business
though a bankrupt, was more than questionable in its nature,
and if it landed the parties in trouble it was what they ought
10 have anticipated. The plaintiff sold its goods in the usual
course of trade, and with no reason to doubt that Emery had
the authority he professed to have, and which one of the
defendants at least, according to the evidence which the jury
believed, had done what he could to confer.
(Omitting a question of practice.)
Affirmed.
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debt for which Luman Jt>nison assumed to tnke security In the 
peculiar mnnner above described was a partnership debt. Be 
undoubtedly bad authority to take goods in payment, and to 
create an agency f.or the purpose of selling off the goods so 
taken; and if in bis opinion ke<>ping up the stock f <>r a time 
was the bt-st means of enabling the goods to be sold to advan-
tage, very slight circumstances of knowledge or assent on the 
part of his copartner ought to be sufficient to make the firm 
responsible for the acts of the agent in keeping up the stock 
in the usual way. Secret instructions to the agent under such 
\ drcumstances cannot avail. It would be a reproach to the law 
\if It could suffer a princ_ipal to escape responsibility for those 
incts of the agent which, according to the usual course of the 
'husiness in which he was engaged, the public had a right to 
understand were authorized. There was abundant evidence 
in the case to charge Luman Jenison, and we think there was 
also enough from which the jury mi1d1t infer that Luciu_s Jeni-
Kon could not have been ignorant of the business carried on so 
long in the name of his firm. 
It was urged on the part of the defense that as the defend-
ants had a known place of business which they personally man-
uged, and which was altogether different from that carried on 
:it Whitehall, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in making 
sale to Emery without first communicating with defendants 
:md learning from them · directly what was the extent of 
Emery's ag<>ncy. 'Ve think, on the other hand, that the negli-
i,:ence, if any, was all on the other side. The arrangement 
under which L. & L. Jenison \)(>came apparent owners, while 
as to EmPry they were mortgagees only, and under which 
Emery for sevt>ral years was enabled to carry on business 
1 hough a bankrupt, was more than quf!stionnble in its nature, 
and if it landed the parties in trouble it was what they ought 
10 have anticipated. The plaintiff sold its good~ in the usual 
course of trade, and with no reason to doubt that Emery had 
the authority he professed to have, and which one of the 
defendants at least, according to the e\··idence which the jury 
believed,• had done what he could to confer. 
lOmitting a question of practice.) 
Affirmed. 
NOTK: - 8l'l' l\l•·c!lt'm':i El•'lll , uf Parln., ~~ lfi;,, 166. 
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BOARDMAN vs. ADA MS.
-Supreme Cou-rt of Iowa, 1857.
5 Iowa 224.
The plaintiffs, Boardman & Gray. were manufacturers of
pianos at Albany, N. Y. Adams & Hackley were partners in
the printing business and published the “Tribune” newspa.per
at Dubuque, Iowa. On June 19, 1854, Adams wrote to plain-
tiffs, saying “your offer to us of an agency, we accept,” and-
urging plaintiffs to send sample pianos. Hackley also wrote
the same day, recommending Adams a a competent man, and
saying: “I think you would promote your interest by ship-
ping us, at once, a small but select assortment of your instru-
ments.” Plaintiffs replied on June 23 declining to send any as
samples, but offered to sell them the pianos on certain terms
and said they had forwarded two on those terms. On Septem-
ber 29 Hackley wrote, “\Ve have just effected a sale of your
two pianos at six months. We have a prospect of selling two
or three more, if we had them. A. W’. Hackley.” On the
receipt of this letter plaintiff shipped two more pianos on the
terms mentioned in their previous letter. Hackley received
these pianos and put them in the hands of a commission mer-
chant for sale. When sold the proceeds were paid to Hackley.
Adams had nothing to do with this last transaction, and, in
fact, the partnership between Adams and Hackley had been
dissolved about August 25. Not receiving pay for any of the
pianos plaintiffs brought this action against Adams & Hackley
to recover the price of the four. Verdict for plaintiffs, and
Adams appeals. .
Smith, McKinla_r/ <5 Poor, for appellant.
No appearance for plaintiffs.
STOCKTON, J. The court charged the jury that the plaintiffs
must recover for pianos sold and delivered, or they could not
recover at all; that if the pianos were sold to Hackley alone,
and not to the firm, the plaintiffs could not recover in this
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DOA RD MAN vs. A DA MS. 
· Supreme Oou.rt of lotva, 1851. 
G Iowa 224. 
The plaintiffs, Boardman & Gra~·. were mnnnfacturers of 
pianos at Albany, N. Y. Adnms & Hackley were partners in 
the printing business and publiijhed the "Tribune" newspapet• 
at Dubuque, Iowa. On June 19, 1854, Adams wrote to plain-
tiffs, saying "~·our offer to us of an agency, we accept," and. 
urging plaintiffs to send sample pianos. Hackley also wrote 
the same day, recommending Adams as a competent man, and 
saying: "I think you would promote your inte1·est by ship-
ping us, at once, a small but select assortment of your instru-
~nts." Plaintiffs replied on June 23 declining to send any as 
samples, but offered to sell them the pianos on certain terms 
and said th<~y had forwarded two on those terms. On Septem-
ber 29 Hackley wrote, "\Ve have just effected a sale of your 
two pianos at six months. We have a prospect of selling two 
or three more, if we had them. A. \V. Hackley." On the 
receipt of ~his letter plaintiff shipped two more pianos on the 
terms mentioned in their previous letter. Hackley received 
these pianos and put them in the hands of a commission mer-
chant for sale. When sold the proceeds were paid to Hackley. 
A.dams bad nothin~ to do with this last transaction, and, in 
fact, the partnership between Adams and Hackley had been 
dissolved about Augnst 25. Not receiving pay for any of the 
pianos plaintiffs brought this acti-0n against Adams & Hackley 
to recover the price of the four. Verdict for plaintiffs, and 
Adams appeals. 
Smith, McKinla11 & Poor, for appellant~ 
No appearance for plaintiffs. 
STocKTON, J. The court charged the jury that the plaintiffs 
must recover for pianos sold and delivered, or they oould not 
recover at all; that if the pianos were sold to Hackley alone, 
and not to the firm, the plaintiffs could not recover in this 
action; that there must be satisfact.ory proof, either that the 
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buying and selling of the pianos was within the scope of the
partnership business of defendants, or that they jointly
ordered the pianos from plaintiffs, before they can recover;
that plaintiffs having sued for pianos sold and delivered, can-
not recover on proof that the pianos were sent to defendants
to be sold on commission, or on any other proof falling short
of proof of sale and delivery; and that the jury must examine
the testimony with reference to each of the defendants sepa-
rately. It is first assigned for error, that the district court
refused to charge the jury that it was necessary for plaintiffs
to show that Adams had knowledge of the whole of the trans-
actions, and consented thereto (or what was equivalent
thereto), before he could be made liable. It is assumed that
the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested was in
effect saying to them that one member of a partnership firm,
without the consent of the other partner, can bind the firm in
matters which are without the scope of the partnership busi-
ness.
The law is well settled, as claimed by defendants’ counsel,
that one partner cannot bind the firm by any contract made
in the name of the firm, unless it be in a matter within the
scope of the partnership dealings or falling within the ordinary
business and transactions of the firm: Western Stage C0. vs.
Walker, 2 Iowa 512, 65 Am. Dec. 789; Story on Partnership,
I§ 322. Looking at all the instructions given in this case, and
at the testimony contained in the record, we cannot say that
the court undertook to lay down a different rule, or that there
‘was error in refusing the instructions asked. The respective
iletters of Adams & Hackley to plaintiffs of June 19, 1854,
lthough signed in their individual names, were evidently writ-
‘ten in the name and upon the business of the firm. Adams
says: “Your advertisement of pianos is in our paper, and your
offer to us of an agency we accept.” Attached to this is the
letter of Hackley in which he says: “I think you would pro-
mote your own interests by shipping to us a small but select
assortment of your instruments.” The jury were told that
“they must be satisfied that the business of buying and selling
pianos was within the scope of the partnership business, or
that defendants jointly and as copartners specially ordered
the pianos before a joint liability was incurred.” By this

















































































































































278 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
buying and selling of the pianos was within the scope of the 
partnership business of defendants, or that they jointly 
ordered the pianos from plaintiffs, before they can recover; 
that plaintiffs having sued for pianos sold and delivered, can-
not recover on proof that the pianos were sent to defendants 
to be sold on commission, or on any other proof falling short 
of proof of sale and delivery; and that the jury must examine 
the testimony with rc>ference to each of the defendants sepa-
rately. It is first assigned for error, that the district court 
refused to charge the jury that it was necessary for plaintiffs 
to show that Adams bad knowledge of the whole of the trans-
.actions, and consented thereto (or what was equivalent 
thereto), before he could be made liable. It is assumed that 
the refusal of the court to charge the jury as requested was in 
effect saying to them that one member of a partnership firm, 
without the consent of the other partner, can bind the firm in 
matters which are without the scope of the partnership busi-
ness. 
The law is well settled, as claimed by defendants' counsel, 
that one partner cannot bind the firm by any contract made 
in the name of the firm, unless it be in a matter within the 
Fll'ope of the partnrrship dea!ings or falling within the ordinary 
hnsinE'ss and transactions of the firm: Western Stage Co. vs. 
Wu.Zker, 2 Iowa 512, 65 Am. Dec. 789; Story on Partnership, 
1 § 322. Looking at all the instructions given in this case, and 
at the testimony contained in the record, we cannot say that 
the court undertook to lay down a different rule, or that there 
. was error in refusing the instructions asked. The respective 
I letters of Adams & Hackley to plaintiffs of June 19, 1854, 
I 
!fh-0ugh signed in their individual names, were evidently writ· 
·ten in the name and upon the business of the firm. Adams 
says: "Your advertisement of pianos is in our paper, and your 
offer to us of an agency we accept." Attached to this is the 
letter of Hackley in which be says: "I think you would pro-
mote your own interests by shipping to us a small but select 
assortment of your instl'llments." The jury were told that 
"they must be satisfied that the business of buying and selling 
pianos was within the scope of the partnership business, or 
that defendants jointly and as copartners specially ordered 
the pianos before a joint liability was incurred." By this 
instruction the question of fact was left for the determination 
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of the jury whether the dealing in pianos had been made a part
of the business of the firm. And from the evidence we think
accepting, in the name of the firm, the agency offered them by
they were authorized to infer that the defendants concurred ij
plaintiffs, and had agreed to add to their regular partnershi
business that of dealing in pianos.
It is to be observed that defendants in their letters to plain-
tiifs make no stipulation as to the terms on which the pianos
are to be sent to them. Nothing is said of their being sent to
be sold on commission. They accept the agency, and advise
plaintiffs to send on their pianos to them. In reply the plain-
tifis inform-them that they do not consign pianos to be sol?
on commission——they decline all such applications. The
have, however, shipped to defendants two pianos on these
terms; that they are to be at the risk of the defendants when
delivered at Albany on the railroad or canal, and all sales are
to be at defendants’ risk; that the pianos are sold to them at
the usual rates; but they agree to wait with defendants for
payment until the pianos are sold by them, charging them
interest on account after four months; and that if the defend-
ants choose to purchase the pianos “out and out” twenty per
cent. will be deducted from the invoice price at six months’
credit—if for cash a discount of five per cent. additional will be
made. Upon these terms the first two pianos were shipped to
defendants. Upon notice to them of the terms of the plain-
tiffs, if not acceptable to them, they should have notified plain-
titfs of their dissent and their refusal to receive the pianos.
Instead of this Hackley, one of the defendants, writes to plain-
tiffs from the “Tribune” oflice, Septem-ber 29: “We have just
eifected a sale of your two pianos at six months.” Having
made the dealing in pianos a part of their partnership busi-
ness, and notified plaintiffs thereof, this letter, though written"
and signed by Hackley alone, binds the firm. There is no
expressed dissent to the terms on which the pianos were sold
to them, and no unwillingness manifested to continue the busi-
ness and agency on the same terms. On the contrary, they
inform the plaintiffs that they “have a prospect of selling two
or three more if they had them.” In accordance with this
suggestion the remainder of the pianos charged are shipped
to defendants.
Where a partnership firm, embarked in a particular business
















































































































































BOARDMAN VS. ADA.HS. 279 
of the jury whether the dealing in pianos had been made a part 
of the business of the firm. And from the evidence we th.ink 
they were authorized to infer that the defendants concurred i~ 
accepting, in the name of the firm, the agency offered them by 
plaintiffs, and bad agreed to add to their regular partnersbi 
business that of dealing in pianos. 
It is to be observed that defendants in their letters to plain· 
tiffs make no stipulation as to the terms on which the pianos 
a re to be sent to them. N otlling is said of their being sent to 
be sold on commission. They accept the agency, and advise 
J'laintiffs to send on their pianos to them. In reply the plain· 
tiffs inform them that they do not consign pianos to be sole\. 
on commission-they decline all such applications. Thef 
have, however, shipped to defendants two pianos on these 
terms; that they are to be at the risk of the defendants when 
delivered at Albany on the railroad or canal, and all sales are 
to be at defendants' risk; that the pianos a.re sold to them at 
the usual rates; but they agree to wait with defendants for 
payment until the pianos are sold by them, charging them 
interest on account after four months; and that if the defend· 
ants choose to purchase the pianos "out and out" twenty per 
cent. will be deducted from the invoice price at six months' 
credit-if for cash a discount of five per cent. additional will be 
made. Upon these terms the first two pianos were shipped to 
nefendants. Upon notice to them of the terms of the plain-
tiffs, if not acceptable to them, they should have notified plain-
tiffs of their dissent and their refusal to receive the pianos. 
Instead of this Hackley, one of the defendants, writes to plain-
tiffs from the "Tribune" office, September 29: "We have just 
effected a sale of your two pianos at six months." Having 
made the dealing in pianos a part of their partnership busi-
ness, and notified plaintiffs tb~reof, this letter, though written· 
and signed by Hackley alone, binds the firm. There is no 
expressed dissent to the terms on which the pianos were sold 
to them, and no unwillingness manifested to continue the busi-
ness and agency on the same terms. On the contrary, they 
inform the plaintiffs that they "have a prospect of selling two 
or three more if they had them." In accordance with this 
suggestion the remainder of the pianos charged are shipped 
to defendants. 
Where a partnership firm, embarked in a particular business 
to which their engagements are confined, and to which alone 
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their partnership contracts extend, by mutual agreement,
enlarge the sphere of their operations, and include another
branch of business, the power of each partner to bind the firm
by his contracts is co-extensive with the whole business of the
partnership; and the acts of each member are as binding on
the firm in the new branch of business in which they are
engaged as they are in the former regular and ordinary busi-
ness. If Adams & Hackley agree to add the business of deal-
ing in pianos to their regular business of printing and publish-
ing newspapers, the acts of each member of the fi-rm are bind-
ing on the other in everything connected with the buying and
selling of pianos, and neither can object that the other partner
makes contracts or incurs liabilities in the name of the firm,
which, by virtue of the relation existing between them, shall
bind them both. It was not necessary, therefore, in our view
of the law and the facts, that the plaintiffs hould prove that
Adams had knowledge of all the transactions which passed
between his copartner and the plaintiifs, and that he consented
thereto. He is presumed to consent to all the acts of his part-
ner within the scope of the business of the firm.
The second assignment of error is upon the refusal of the
court to charge the jury “that if the letter of Boardman & Gray
does not accept the offer and terms stated by Adams, it is nec-
essary to bring home to Adams a knowledge of the contents
of the letter of Boardman & Gray.” The refusal to give this
instruction was not erroneous. No offer of terms was made by
Adams in his letter to plaintiffs. He informs them that the
offer to their firm of an agency for the sale of their pianos is
accepted by defendants, and advises plaintifls that they had
better have one of their pianos in Dubuque. Having accepted
the agency proposed, and agreed to make the dealing in pianos
a part of their business as a. partnership, Adams, as one of the
partners, is equally and jointly with Hackley liable for all
pianos sold and delivered to the partnership firm. Even if
Adams never aw or knew anything of the letter of plaintiffs,
he is bound by the acts of his copartner.
Judgment affirmed.
No'rE:—See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 167; Latta vs. Kilbourn, ante,
p. 212.
_ g. ._ ‘__» 4 ..@____ ‘Ali — ?
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their partnership contracts extend, by mutual agreement, 
enlarge the sphere of their operations, and include another 
branch of business, the power of each partner to bind the firm 
by hie contracts is co-extensive with the whole busine88 of the 
partnership; and the acts of each member are as binding on 
the firm in the new branch of business in which they are 
engaged as they are in the former regular and ordinary busi-
ness. If Adams & Hackley agree to add the business of deal-
ing in pianos to their regular business of printing and publish-
ing newspapers, the acts of each member of the fl.I'm are bind-
ing on the other in everything connected with the buying and 
selling of pianos, and neither can object that the other partner 
makes contracts or incurs liabilities in the name of the firm, 
which, by virtue of the relation existing between them, shall 
bind them both. It was not necessary, therefore, in our view 
of the law and the facts, that the plaintiffs should prove that 
Adame had knowledge of all the transactions which passed 
. between his copartner and the plaintiffs, and that he consented 
thereto. He is presumed to consent to all the acts of his part-
ner within the scope of the business of the firm. 
The second assignment of error is upon the refusal of the 
court to charge the jury "that if the letter of Boardman & Gray 
does not accept the offer and terms stated by Adams, it is nec-
essary to bring home to Adams a knowledge of the contents 
of the Jetter of Boardman & Gray." The refusal to give this 
instruction was not erroneous. No offer of terms was made by 
Adams in his Jetter to plaintiffs. He informs them that the 
offer to their firm of an agency for the sale of their pianos is 
accepted by defendants, and advises plaintiffs that they had 
better have one of their pianos in Dubuque. Having accepted 
the agency proposed, and agreed to make the dealing in pianos 
a part of their business as a partnership, Adams, as one of the 
partners, is equally and jointly with Hackley liable for all 
pianos sold and delivered to the partnership firm. Even if 
Adams never saw or knew anything of the letter of plaintiffs, 
he is bound by the nets of his copartner. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NoTE:-See Mt-cheo1'1:1 Elem. of Parto., § 167; Latta va. Kilbourn, ante, 
p. 212. 
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PORTER vs. CURRY.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1869.
' 50 Ill. 319, 99 Am. Dec. 520.
Assumpsit by Porter against Curry and Majors, as partners,
for the balance of'the price of a mare, claimed to have been
sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. Curry alone was
served. The defendant had a verdict and judgment, and the
plaintiff appealed.
Skinner and Marsh, for the appellant.
Warren and Wheat, for the appellee.
Lavvmsxcn, J. Curry and Majors were partners in the man-
ufacture of wagons, and in August, 1807, sold a wagon to Por-
ter, the appellant, for $110, for which he gave his note. Soon
afterwards Porter, by an arrangenient with Majors, sold the
latter a mare for $200, and received therefor his own note and
one executed by Majors for~$90. Porter swears, however, that
Majors claimed to be purchasing the horse for the use of the
firm, and on the credit of the firm, and that he "himself sup-
posed that he was taking the firm note, instead of the indi-
vidual note of Majors, and not being able to read did not dis-
cover his error until Majors absconded and he showed his note
to a neighbor. Majors absconded to Missouri a few days after
the purchase, taking with him the mare. Curry pursued
Majors, obtained possession of the mare, and sold her. Porter
brought this suit against the firm to recover the $90, and it
is resisted on the ground that the mare was not required in the
business, and therefore Majors had no power to buy her on the
firm credit.
It is clear, however, even if the purchase of a horse was not
within the scope and usage of such a partnership as existed
between Curry and Majors, yet if the mare was in fact pur-
chased on the firm credit, and if Curry afterwards claimed her
from Majors as firm property, and obtained possession of her
on that ground, he thereby ratified the act of Majors in buying

















































































































































PORTER vs. CUJU:Y. 
PORTER vs. CURRY. 
Supreme Coorl of Illinois, 1869. 
60 Ill. 819, 99 Am. Dec. 520. 
281 
Aseumpsit by Porter against Corry and Majors, as partners, 
for the balance of ·the price of a mare, claimed to have been 
sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. Curry alone was 
served. The defendant bad a verdict and judgment, and the 
plaintiff appealed. 
8kinner and Marsh, for the appellant. 
Warren and Wheat, for the appeJJee. 
LAwnExcE, J. Curry and Majors were partners In the man-
ufacture of wagons, and in August, 1867, sold a wagon to Por-
ter, the appellant, for fllO, for which be gave his note. Soon 
afterwards Porter, by an arrangement ·with Majors, sold the 
latter a mare for '200, and received therefor his own n<>te and 
one executed by Majors for f90. Porter swears, however, that 
Majors clain:ied t-0 be purchasing the horse for the use of the 
ilrm, and on the credit of the firm, and that he ·himself sup-
posed that he was taking the firm note, instead of the indi· 
vidual note of Majors, and not being able to read did not dis-
cover his error until Majors absconded and he showed his note 
to a neighbor. Majors absconded to Missouri a few days after 
the purchase, taking ~ith him the mare. Curry pursued 
Majors, obtained possession of the mare, and sold her. Porter 
brought this suit against the firm to recover the f90, and it 
is resisted on the ground that the mare was not required in the 
business, and therefore Majors had no power to buy her on the 
ilrm credit. 
It is clear, however, even if the purchase of a horse was not 
within the scope and usage of such a partnership as existed 
between Curry and Majors, yet if the mare was in fact pur-
chased on the firm credit, and if Curry afterwards claimed her 
from Majors as firm property, and obtained possession of her 
on that ground, he thereby ratified the act of Majors in buying 
her on the partnership credit. Be cannot be permitted at the 
36 
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\
same moment to claim the benefit of the purchase and deny
its obligations. This view of the law was embodied in the
sixth and seventh instructions asked by plaintifi, and they
should have been given. For the same reason, the first instruc-
tion given for the defendant should have been refused. It puts
the case to the jury wholly on the question of an original power
by Majors to buy on the firm credit, and makes the case turn
entirely upon that, leaving the question of ratification alto
gether out of view.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.
Nona:-See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., §§ 176, 190.
PEASE vs. COLE.
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1885.
53 Conn. 53, 22 Atl. Rep. 681, 55 Am. Rep. 53.
Action by Ernest M. Pease against Charles H. Cole and
Daniel McC‘-arthy on a no_te executed by McCarthy in the firm
name of defendants to J. B. McCarthy, father of Daniel
M cGarth y, and by him indorsed to plaintiff.
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Cole appeals.
G. G. Sill and H. S. Sanford, for appellant.
L. E. Stanton and S. F. Jones, for appellee.
Looms, J. The question involved in this case is whether
one member of a copartnership formed for the purpose of con-
ducting a theater in Hartford could, under the circumstances
mentioned in the finding, bind the other member by executing
a negotiable promissory note in the name of‘ the firm for
money borrowed. The finding, in terms, excludes all express
authority of the other partner, and even all knowledge of
the matter on his partQSo that any conclusion that the note
is the note of the firm, rather than of the member executing it,
must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here,
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same moment to claim the benefit of the purchase and deny 
its obligations. This view of the law was embodied in the 
sixth and seventh instructions asked by plaintiff, and they 
should have been given. For the same reason, the first instruc-
tion gh·en for the defendant should have been refused. It puts 
the case to the jury wholly on the question of an original power 
by Majors to buy on the firm credit, and makes the case tun 
entirely upon that, leaving the question of ratification alto-
gether out of view. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. 
Judgment reversed. 
Nom:-See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 176, 100. 
PEASE vs. COLE. 
Supreme Court of Connccttcut, 1885. 
GS Conn. 63, 22 Atl. Rep. 681, M Am. Rep. 68. 
Action by Ernest M. Pease against Charles H. Cole and 
Daniel 'M:cCaMhy on a note executed by McCarthy in the firm 
name of defendants to .J. B. McCarthy, father of Daniel 
McCarthy, and by him indorsed to plaintiff. 
.Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Cole appeals. 
G. G. Sill and H. 8 .• ~anford, for appellant. 
L. E. Stanton and 8. F. Jones, for appellee. 
Looius, J. The qnestion involved in this case is whether 
one member of n copartnership formed for the purpose of con· 
ducting a theater in Hartford could, under the circumstances 
mentioned in the finding, bind the other member by executing 
a negotiable promissory note in the name of· the firm for 
money borrowed. The finding, in terms, excludes all express 
authority of the other partner, and even all knowledge of 
the matter on his part._So that any conclusion that the note 
is the note of the firm, rather than of the member executing It, 
must necessarily rest on an authority to be implied. But here, 
ngain, the facts found so circumscribe the range of inquiry· aa 
"-· 
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to exclude all the ordinary sources of uch authority. The cir-
cumstances from which an authority may be implied are
identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency,
for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest.
In many cases the decisive fact is found in the customary
course of dealing; but not so here, for it is found that the note
in question was the only note ever given in the name of the
firm. The copartnership first commenced business in August,
1883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in suit was
given. There was therefore very little time for a course of con-
duct or usage of any sort to grow up, giving any apparent
authority. The finding traces the money bcgflowed only into
the hands of McCarthy, the partner who signed the firm name,
and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively, that
the act was necessary for any of the purposes of the partner-
ship. The only remaining source from which an authority may
be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and
scope of the partnership and in the nature of the act; and here,
if we examine the legal principles that are applicable, it will
be found, not only that all such implication is wanting, but
that the presumption is directly against the authority assumed.
The weight of authority in the United States, and the uniform
tenor of the authorities in England, will be found to estab-
lish a controlling distinction in respect to implied authority
between commercial or trading and non-trading p~llpS.
Story, Partn.‘ (6th Ed.) § 102a; 1 Lindl. Partn. (4th Ed., by
Ewell), top p. 266, and note 1, and cases there cited; 1 Colly.
Partn. 648, 658; Metc. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes.
In a commercial partnership each acting partner is its gen-
eral agent, with implied authority to act for the firm in all mat-
ters within the scope of its busines; and the presumption of
law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of
the firm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the
partnership, for the reason that the giving of such notes would
be Within the usual course of mercantile transactions. But
when we pass to non-trading partnerships the doctrine of gen-
eral agency does not apply, and there is no presumption of
authority to support the act of one partner. Hence, in order
to subject the firm upon a bill or note executed by one partner
in its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or other facts suiti-
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to exclude all the ordinary sources of such authority. The cir-
cumstances from which an authority may be implied are 
identical with those involved in a question of ordinary agency, 
for each partner is regarded as the accredited agent of the rest. 
Jn many cases the decisive fact is found in the customary 
course of dealing; but not so here, for it is found that the note 
in q nestion was the onJy note ever given in the name of the 
firm. The copartnershjp first commenced business in August, 
l.883, and on the 24th of the same month the note in snit was 
given. There was therefore very little time for a course of con-
duct or usage of any sort to grow up, givinO' any apparent 
authority. The finding traces the money i;fowed only into 
the hands of McCai1hy, the partner who signed the firm name, 
and no fact appears showing directly or presumptively, that 
1he act was necessary for any of the purp<>ses of the partner-
sMp. The only remaining source from which an authority may 
be derived by implication must be sought in the nature and 
scope of the partnership and in the nature of the act; and here, 
if we examine the legal principles that are applicabJe, it will 
be found, not onJy that all such implication is wanting, but 
that the presumption is directly against the authority assumed. 
The weight of authority in the United States, and the uniform 
tene>r of the authorities in England, will be found to estab-
lish a controJJing distinction in i;espect to impJied authority 
between commercial or trailing and non-trading partnerships. 
Story, Partn. (6th Ed.) § 102a; 1 Lindi. P.artn. (4th Ed., by 
Ewell), top p. 266, and note 1, and cases there cited; 1 Colly. 
Partn. 648, 658; Mete. Cont. 121, and cases cited in the notes. 
In a commercial partnership each acting partner is its gen-
eral agent, with implied authority to act for the firm in all mat-
ters within the scope of its bnsinees; and the presumption of 
law is that all commercial paper which bears the signature of 
the firm, executed by one of the partners, is the paper of the 
partnership, for the rease>n that the giving of such notes would 
be within the usual course of mercau tile transactions. But 
when we pass to .non-trading partnerships the doctrine of gen. 
eral agency docs not apply, and there is no presumption of 
authority to support tlie act of one partner. Hence, in order 
to subject the firm upon a bill or note executed by one partner 
tn its name, a course of conduct, or usage, or other facts suffi· 
dent to warrant the conclusion that the acting partner had 
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been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority,
must appear, or that the firm has ratified the act by receiving
the benefit of it. That the partnership in question belongs to
the non-trading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion.
The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and
gives a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases
establish as of the non-trading class, and, although the conduct
of a theater is not there mentioned, yet the analogies m-ani-
festly include it. To show the existence of the distinction
contended for, and its application, we elect from a. multitude
of authorities the following in addition to those previously
referred to:
ln Judge rs. Bmswell, 13 Bush, 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185, the
defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in
mining business upon lands then leased or which might be
thereafter acquired. One of the members of the firm pur-
chased, without the others’ consent, and took conveyancesvof,
mining land in the name of the firm, and gave the bills of the
firm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against
the firm, a defense was made by the other partners that the
purchase was without their consent or ratification, and in the
plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The
court held that the firm was not liable on the bills, saying that
the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on
the usage of merchants, and _does not amount to a rule of law
in any other than commercial partnerships. In non-commercial
partnerships, one who seeks to hold the firm bound upon a con-
tract made by a single member must be able to show, either
express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the
particular branch of business in which the firm is engaged, or
such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partner had
been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority.
In Hetllcy rs. Bra-inbridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the defendants were
attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave a note
in the name of the firm to the plaintiffs for the balance of
advancements made to one partner who was acting in behalf
of the firm. The advances were to be laid out on mortgage by
the firm. Lord Dhxnnx, O. J., in giving the opinion, said:
“No doubt a debt was due from the firm; but it does not follow
that one partner had authority to give a promissory note for
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been invested by his copartners with the requisite authority, 
must appear, or that the firm bas ratified the act by receiving 
the benefit of it. That the partnership to question belongs to 
the non-trading class seems so obvious as to need no discussion. 
The brief in behalf of the defendant Cole cites many cases, and 
gives a long list of pursuits and professions which those cases 
establish as of the non-trading class, and, although the conduct 
of a theater is not there mentioned, yet the anal<>gies mani-
festly include it. To show the existence of the distinction 
contended for, and its application, we select from a multitude 
of authorities the following in addition to those previously 
referred to: 
Ju Jud96 vs. Bms1ceil, 13 Hush, 67, 26 Am. Rep. 185~ the 
defendants were partners under an agreement to engage in 
mining business upon lands then leased or which might be 
thereafter acquired. One of the members of the firm pur-
chased, without the others' consent, and took conveyances. of. 
mining land in the name of the firm, and gave the bills of the 
8rm therefor. In an action by the payee of the bills against 
the firm, a defense was made by the other partners that the 
purchase was without their consent or ratification, and in the 
plea they renounced all claim to the lands purchased. The 
court held that the firm was not liable on the bills, saying that 
the power of one partner to bind his copartners rests alone on 
the usage of merchants, and .does not amount to a rule of law 
in any other than commercial partnerships. In non-commercial 
partnerships, one who seeks to hold ~he firm bound upon a con-
tract made by a single member must be able to show, either 
express authority, or that such is the customary usage of the 
particular branch of business in which the firm is engaged, or 
such facts as will warrant the conclusion that the partner had 
been invested by his copnrtners with the requisite authority. 
In Hedley i:s. Brainbridge, 3 Q. B. 316, the defendants were 
attorneys in partnership, and one of the partners gave a note 
in the name of the firm to the plaintiffs for the balance of 
advancements made to one partner who was acting in behalf 
of the firm. The advances were to be laid out on mortgage by 
the firm. Lord DkNMAN, C. J., in giving the opinion, said: 
''No doubt a debt was doe from the ft rm; but it does not follow 
that one partner had authority to give a promissory note for 
that debt. Partners in trnde have authority, as regardR 
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third person, to bind the firm by bills' of exchange, for it is
the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this
authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is
part of the general law of the land, But the same reason does
not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage
that attorneys should be parties to negotiable instruments, nor
i it necessary. for the purposes of their business. ' ' ‘
Upon the whole, we think that the implied authority is
confined to partners in trade.”
In Dickinson 1:8. Valpy. 10 Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an
indorsee for value of a bill of exchange drawn and accepted in
the name of a mining partnership by order of its regular direct-
ors. It was held incumbent on the plaintifls to prove that the
directors had authority to bind the company, and that it was
necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the
company, or usual for other similar mining companies, to draw
or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were given by Lord
TE.\"l‘ERD1-IN, C. J., and Judges BAYLEY, Lrr'r1.r:oA1.r>, and
PARKE, and the same distinction was made as in the other cases
between trading and non-trading partnerships. See, also,
Grernsladc rs. Dower, 7 Barn. & (3. 635.
In Levy vs. P_1/ne, tried before Baron Annnnsox, 1 Oar. & M.
453. it was held that, "if a bill of exchange or promissory note
be drawn, accepted, or indorsed by one of two persons who are
partners in a business which is not a trade (e. g., as attorneys),
in the name of the firm. “ ‘ ‘f the plaintifl’ must give
evidence of the authority of the other partner to draw, accept,
or indorse in the name of the firm; but in the case of a com-
mercial firm, this is not necessary, as there is a general
;:' "-iority.” See, also, Richards vs. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223;
Garland vs. Ja-comb, L. R. 8 Exch. 218.
ln S1m'th-11s. Sloan. 37 \Vis. 285, 19 Am. Rep. 757, the court, by
LYON, J., a£ter_a_n_3_b_|_o aml exl1€!_u.S1;i1e review of the a.u.t.hnn'n
ties, adopted the following proposition as fully sustained:
“\Ve gather from all the authorities that the distinction
between a trading and a non-trading partnership, in respect to
the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiable
instruments, is not limited to a mere presumption of such
authority in one case, and the absence of such presumption in
the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but
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third persons, to bind the firm by bills· of exchange, for it is 
the usual course of mercantile transactions so to do; and this 
authority is by the custom and law of merchants, which is 
part of the general law of the land.. B.ut the same reason does 
not apply to other partnerships. There is no custom or usage 
that attorneys should he parties to negotiable instruments, nor 
is it nece>ssary. for the purposes of their business. • • • 
Upon the whole, we think that the implied authority is 
confined to partners in trade." 
In Dickinson vs. Talpy. lO Barn. & C. 128, the plaintiff was an 
indorsee for value of a bill of e>xchange drawn and accepted in 
the name of a mining partnership hy order of its regular direct-
ors. It was held incu1!1b(•nt on the plaintiffs to prove that the 
dirc>etors had authority to bind tlle company, and that it was 
necessary, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the 
company, or nsua 1 for other similar mining companies, to draw 
or accept bills of exchange. Opinions were givC'n by Lord 
TEXTERDE:I!, C .• J., and .Judges BAYLEY, LITTLEDAI.R, and 
PAHKE, and the same distinction was made as in the other cases 
between trading and non-trading partnerships. See, also, 
Grr,-nsladc 1~.~. T>ou:er, 7 Barn. & C. 6::l5. 
In Lcv11 1:s. Pyne, tried he>fore Baron A1.DERSON, 1 Car. & M. 
45!l. it was lu•ld that, "if a hil1 of Pxchan~e or promissory note 
be cfrawn, ac''"JltPd, or indorspd h,Y one of two persons who are 
partners in a business which is not a trade (e.g., as attorneys), 
in 1 he name of the firm. • • • the plaintiff must give 
evidence of the author-ity of thr other partnC'r to draw, accept, 
or indorse in the name of the firm; but in the case of a com-
me1·cial firm, this is not necessary, ns there is a general 
:: · · :1ority." See, also, Rickards t:s. Bennett, 1 Barn. & C. 223; 
<iarland t:s. Jo.comb, I,. R. R Exch. 218. 
Ju Smith ·1111. Slonn. ::l1 'Vis. 2f.:::J, HI Am. Rep. 757, the court, by 
LYON, ,J., nftn on able and exhaustive review of the autborj. 
tics, adopted the followin~ proposition ns fully sustained: 
"'Ye gather from all the authorities that the distinction 
bdween a trading and a non-trading partnership, in respect to 
the power of a partner to bind his copartner by negotiahl~ 
instruments, is not limited to a mei:e presumption of such 
authority in one case, and the absence of such presumption in 
·the other, as the learned counsel for the plaintiff argued; but 
we think, and mm~t i;10 hol<l. tli:1t one partner in a non-trading 
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partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn,
accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the firm, not even
for a debt which the firm owes, unless he have express
authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of
such instrument is necessary to the carrying on of the firm’s
business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is
upon the holder of the note. who sues upon it, to prove such
authority, necessity, or usage.”1>
In Ulcry vs. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 53 , the partnership was for farm-
ing purposes, and the note in suit was given by one in the name
of the firm for money borrowed. It was held to be a non-trading
firm; and the same principles were adopted as in the cases
previously cited. In Hunt vs. C'hrl:pin, 6 Lans. 139, it was held,
MILLER, P. J., giving the opinion,that the rule which authorizes
one member of a copartnership to bind the firm is only appli-
cable to business of a trading nature, and has no application
to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a simi-
lar character. See, also, K imbro vs. Baillitt, 22 How. 256;
Graces vs. Kellcnbcrger, 51 Ind. 66; Bank vs. Snyder, 10 Mo.
App. 211.
In Chalmers’ Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange, Prom-
issory Notes, and Cheques (2d Ed. pp. 68, 69), the following
propositions are laid down as well-settled rules: “Art. 77. A
partner in a trading firm has prima facie authority to bind the
firm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the firm name
for partnership purposes; and, if the bill get into the hands of
a holder for value without notice, the presumption of authority
becomes absolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given
for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a non-
trading partnership has pr-ima facie no authority to render his
copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name.
The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible.”
Many more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but
these will suflice to show that the distinction relied upon is
strongly supported both in England and in the United States.
While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the
two classes of partnership so far as the presumption of author-
ity or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessary
for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry
its application so far as to deny absolutely, as some of the
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partnership cannot bind his copartner by bill or note, drawn, 
accepted, or indorsed by him in the name of the firm, not even 
for a debt which the firm owes, unless he have express 
authority therefor from his copartner, or unless the giving of 
such instrument is necessary to the carrying on of the firm's 
business, or is usual in similar partnerships; and the burden is 
upon the bolder of the note, who sues upon it, to prove such 
authority, necessity, or usage." \ 
In Ulery vs. Ginrich, 57 Ill. 531(tbe partnership was for farm-
ing purposes, and the note in suit was given by one in the name 
of tlw firm for money borrowed. It was held to be a non-tradin:.;-
ft11n; and the same principles were adopted as in the cases 
previously cited. In R uut v.'l. Clur=pin, 6 I.ans. 139, it was held, 
MILLER, P. J., giving the opinion, that the rule which authorizes 
one member of a copartnership to bind the firm is only appli-
cable to business of a trading nature, and has no application 
to partnerships for agricultural purposes, or others of a ~mi­
lar character. See, also, Kimbro vs. Ba.llitt, 22 How. 25G; 
Graus t:s. KellC11berger, 51 Ind. 66; Bank vs. Snydc1·, 10 Mo. 
App. 211. 
In Chalmers' DigC'st of the Law of Bills of Exchange. Prom-
it:~ory Not('s, and Cheques (2d Ed. pp. 68, 69), the following 
propositions are laid down as well-settled rules: "Art. 77. A 
partner in a trading firm has prim.a facic authority to bind th~ 
firm by drawing, indorsing, or accepting bills in the firm name 
for partnership purposes; and, if the bill get into the hands of 
a holder for value without notice, the presumption of authority 
becomes absolute, and it is immaterial whether it were given 
for partnership purposes or not. Art. 78. A partner in a non-
trading partnership bas prima facie no authority to render his 
copartners liable by signing bills in the partnership name . 
. The holder must show authority, actual or ostensible." 
Many more authorities equally pertinent might be cited, but 
these will suffice to show that the distinction relied upon is 
strongly supported both in England and in the United States. 
While we feel constrained to adopt the distinction between the 
two classes of partnership so far as the presumption of author-
ity or the want of it is concerned, we do not deem it necessary 
for the purposes of this case, or even quite reasonable, to carry 
its application so far as to deny absolutely, as some of tlie 
cases do, the right to recover on a note gh•en by a non-trading 
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firm for money borrowed for the firm and appropriated to its
use, or on a note given in payment of its debts. Some author-
ities ignore the test of liability referred to, but adopt another,
which is equivalent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter
on partnerships in the third volume of his Commentaries (7th
Ed. p. 44), omits the use of the terms “trading” and “non-trad
ing,” and makes the distinction between partnerships, in
respect to the power of one partner to bind the firm, depend on
the single test of the usual scope of the business, in connection
with the subject-matter of the contract. This rule was adopted
in Crosthwait rs. Ross, 1 Humph. 23, 3-1 Am. Dec. 613, where il-
was held that one pa.rtner in the practice of medicine could
not bind the firm by drawing a bill or note on which to raise
money, because it was not within the scope of the partnership
business. Though under a different name, the real distinction
here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an
occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Poolcy
vs. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629, 27 Am. Rep. 783, in a most able and
elaborate opinion, held that the liability of a pa.rtnership firm
of the non-trading class to a bona fide holder of negotiable
paper without notice, upon a note endorsed in its name by a
member for his own benefit, would depend upon the nature of
the business, the usage of trade, and the course of dealing of
the particular firm. It was also held that, where the nature
of the partnership is such that it may or may not be proper
to deal in negotiable instruments (as in that case, which was
a publishing company), it was error in the circuit judge to
charge, without qualification, that the firm was liable if the
holder received the note before maturity, in the due course of
trade, and without notice. VVe think the same principle, under
the circumstances of the case at bar, made it error in the
court below to hold the firm liable. This court hitherto has
had no occasion to give prominence to the distinction under
discussion. The nature of the partnership business has, how-
ever, been made a ground forapresumption and a test of liabil-
ity. In Walcott rs. Canficld, 3 Conn. 1.94, the defendants were
partners in running a line of stages from Hartford to Albany
and back. One of the partners by an advertisement promised
to transport passengers and leave them at Albany in a speci-
fied time, upon which agreement the suit was based. The





















































































































































~~------------------------ -·- ··--- ~ 
PEASB vs. COLB. 287 
-flrm for money borrowed for the firm and npproprlated to its 
nee, or on n note given in payment of its debts. Some author~ 
ities ignore the test of liability referred to, but adopt another, 
which is equivnlent in result. Chancellor Kent, in his chapter 
on partnerships in the third volume of his Commentaries (7th 
Eel. p. 44), <>mits the use of the terms "trading" and "non-trad-
ing," and makes the distinction between partnerships, in 
respect to the power of one partner to bind the firm, depend on 
the single test of the usual scope of the business, in connection 
with the subject-matter of the contract. '!'his ru]e was adopted 
in Crosthu;ait t'B. Ross, 1 Humph. 23, 34 Am. Dec. 613, where i .. 
was held that one partner in the practice of medicine oould 
not bind the firm by drawing a bill or note on which to raise 
money, because it was not .within the scope of the partnership 
business. Though under a different name, the real distinction 
here taken is between partners in trade and partners in an 
occupation. Afterwards the same court, in the case of Pooley 
vs. Whitmore, 10 Heisk. 629, 27 Am. Rep. 783, in a moist able and 
elaborate opinion, held that the liability of a partnership firm 
of the non-trading class to a bona fid.e holdPr of negotiable 
paper without notice, upon a note endorsed in its name by a 
member for his own benefit, would depend upon the nature of 
the business, the usage of trade, and the course of dealing of 
the particular firm. It was also held that, where the nature 
of the partnership is such that it may or may not be proper 
to deal hi negatiable instruments (as in that case, which was 
a publishing company), it was error in the circuit judge to 
charge, without qualification, that the firm was liable if the 
holder received the note before maturity, in the due course of 
trade, and without notice. We think the same principle, under 
tbe circumstances of the case at bar, made it error in the 
court below to bold the firm liable. This court hitherto h~s 
had no occasion to give prominence to the distinction under 
discussion. The nature of the partnership business has, how-
ever, been made a ground fora presumption and a test of liabil-
ity. In Walcott -rs. Canfield, 3 C-Onn. 194, the defendants were 
partners in running a line of stages from Hartford to Albany 
and back. One of the partners by an advertisement promised 
to transport passengers and leave them at Albany in a speci-
fied time, upon which agreement the suit was based. The 
adverlisement, being the act of one partner, was held not even 
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admissible in evidence against the firm, without previously
establishing the authority of that one to bind the others.
Hosmnn, C. J., in delivering the opinion, on page 198, said:
“A copartnership formed to transport passengers and their
baggage in a stage does not authorize one of the part-
ners to bind the firm by an agreement that he will convey a
person a certain distance within a specified time. Unless he
had special authority, he could only obligate himself by a
contract not within the scope of the connection, and not his
partners, who have never expressly or impliedly assented."
The subject-matter of the contract was different from the case
at bar, but it seems even more closely connected with the scope
of the business than the giving of the note in suit.
Many authorities lay down the unqualified proposition, as if
it was applicable to all partnerships, that if one partner raises
money on a negotiable bill or note signed or indorsed in the
name of the firm, and which comes into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser, the partnership is bound, although it was in fact
for the individual use of the acting partner. The doctrine is
so stated in substance by this court in Insurance O0. vs. Bennett,
5 Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109. The case shows that the part-
nership was a commercial one. VVe do not say, however, that
public convenience does not demand the same rule in the case
of non-commercial partnerships, where the holder was not
advised of the nature of the partnership and its course of deal-
ing, or of other circumstances to put him on inquiry, and where
the circumstances would justify the belief that he was dealing
with the partnership. \-Ve may well leave this for future con-
sideration, for, upon the facts found, we think the plaintiffs
right was impaired by reason of what he knew in connection
with the circumstances. We do not forget that the court
below, in terms, found that the plaintiff purchased the note
in good faith without notice of any defect. This, of course,
means simply that there was no actual bad faith and no actual
notice, and, as matter of fact, it is final; but at the same time
the court found special facts as to the plaintiff’s knowledge
and action which we must also consider, and, if we find con~
structive notice or constructive fraud, the law must prevail,
The plaintiff, as holder, must stand affected by the nature
of the partnership, of which he was fully advised. He pm--
















































































































































288 CA.BBS ON PARTNERSHIP. 
admissible in evidence against the firm, without previously 
establishing the authority of that one to bind the others. 
HosMER, C. J., in delivering the opinion, on page 198, said: 
"A copartnership formed to transport passengers and their 
baggage in a stage does not authorize one of the part-
ners to bind the firm by an agreement that he will convey a 
person a certain distance within a specified time. Unless he 
had special authority, he could only obligate himself by a 
contract not within the scope of the connection, and not his 
partners, who have never exprc>ssly or impliedly assented." 
The subject-matter of the contract was ditl'erc>nt from the case 
at bar, but it seems even more closely connected with the scope 
of the business than the giving of the note in suit. 
Many autboritil>s lay down the unqualified proposition, as if 
it was applicable to all partnel"Ships, that if one partner raises 
money on a negotiable bill or note signed or indorsed in the 
name of the firm, and which comes into the lumds of a bona fide 
purchaser, the partners_hip is bound, although it was in fact 
for the individual use of the acting partner. The doctrine is 
so stated in substa.nce by this court in lnsum11ce Oo. vs. Bennett, 
o Conn. 574, 13 Am. Dec. 109. The case shows that the part-
nership was a commercial one. We do not say, however, that 
public convenience does not demand the same rule in the case 
of non-commercial partnerships, where the holder was not 
advised of the nature of the partnership and its course of deal-
ing, or of other circumstances to put him on inquiry, and where 
the circumstances would justify the belief _that he was dealing 
with the partnership. \Ve may well leave this for future con-
sideration, for, upon the facts found, we think the plaintiff's 
right was impnil'ed by reason of what he knew in connection 
with the circumstances. We do not forget that the court 
below, in terms, found that the plaintiff purchased the note 
in good faith without notice of any defect. This, of course, 
mP.ans simply that there was no actual bad faith and no actual 
notice, and, as matter of fact, it is final; but at the same time 
the court found special f3;cts as to the plaintiff's knowledge 
and action which we must also consider, and, if we find con-
structive notice or constructive fraud, the law must prevail. 
The plaintiff, as holder, must stand affected by the nature 
of the pa1-tnership, of which he was fully advised. He pur-
':hased the note in the face of the presumption that it was 
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unauthorized. To show the general nature of the facts which
courts have held to be constructive notice, we cite a few
cases. In I/icing/ston vs. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 278, 4 Am. Dec.
273, A and B formed a copartnership under the style of A &
Co., in the business of sugar refining, and so advertised in
the newspapers. B afterwards, without the knowledge of A,
bought a quantity of brandy, for which he gave a note indorsed
by him with the name of the firm. The plaintifl’, who was an
indorsee of the note, took the newspaper in which the firm’s
business was advertised. l{ENT, C. J., after commenting on
certain facts tending to show that the plaintitf knew that the
purchase of the brandy was not a partnership concern, pro-
ceeded to lay down these principles: “But if the plaintiff did
not in fact knowf that the purchase was made by G. I. Roose
velt on his own account, and acted under the mistaken impres-
sion that it was a partnership purchase, still the firm were not
"bound by the indorsement, because the facts disclosed
amounted to constructive notice or notice in law. ‘ " ‘
\Vhen a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not
within the scope of the partnership, the intendment of the
law will be that he deals with him on his private account, not-
withstanding the partner may give the, partnership name,
unless there be circumstances to destroy that presumption. ‘If,’
says Lord ELDON (Em parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves. 544), ‘under the
circumstances the person taking the paper can be considered
as being advertised that it was not intended to be a partner-
ship proceeding, the partnership is not bound.’ Public notice
of the object of a copartnership, the declared and habitual busi-
ness carried on, the store, the counting-house, the sign, etc.,
are the usual and regular indicia by which the nature and
extent of a partnership are to be ascertained. \Vhen the busi-
ness of a partnership is thus defined and publicly declared,
and the cmnpany do not depart from that particular business,
nor appear to the world in any other light than the one
thus exhibited, one of the partners cannot make a valid
partnership engagement on any other than a. partnership
account. “ ' ' When the 'public have the usual
means of knowledge given them, and no nieans have been
sufiered by the partnership to mislead them, every man
is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with
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unauthorized. To show the general nature of the facts which 
courts have held to be constructive notice, we cite a few 
cases. In Livingston vs. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. 278, 4 Am. Dec. 
273, A and B formed a copartnership under the style of A & 
Co., in the business of suga·r refining, and so advertised in 
the newspapers. B afterwards, without the knowledge of A, 
bought a quantity of brandy, for which he gave a note ind<>rsed 
by him with the name of the firm. The plaintiff, who was an 
indorsee of the note, took the newspaper in which the firm's 
business was advertised. KENT, C. J., after commenting on 
c~rtain facts tending to show that the plaintiff knew that the 
purchase of the brandy was not a partnership concern, pro-
ceeded to lay down these principles: "But if the plaintiff did 
not in fact know; that the purchase was made by C. I. Roose-
velt on his own account, and acted under the mistaken impres-
sion that it was a partnership purchase, still the firm were not 
bound by the indorsement, because the facts disclosed 
· nmounted to constructive notice or no0tice in law. • • • 
'Vhen a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not 
within the scope of the partnership, the intendment of the 
law will be that he deals wtth him on bis private account, nat:· 
withstanding thE> partner may give the. partnership name, 
unless there Le circumstances to destroy that presumption. 'If,' 
says Lord ELDON (E.r parte Bonbonus, 8 Ves. 544), 'under the 
circumstances the person taking the paper can be considered 
as being advertisPd that it was not intended to be a partner· 
ship proceeding, the partnE>rship is not bound.' Public notice 
of the object of a copartnership, the declared and habitual busi-
ness carried on, the store, the counting-house, the sign, etc., 
nre the usual and regular indicia by which the nature an4, 
extent of a partnership nre to be ascertained. 'Vhen the busi-
ness of a partnership is thus defined and publicly declared, 
and the company do not depart from that particular busine88, 
nor appear to the world in any other light than the one 
thus exhibited, one of the partnns cannot make a valid 
partnership engagement on any other than a partnership 
account. • • • 'Vhen the ·public have the usual 
means of knowleffge given them, and no means have been 
suffered by the partnership to mislead them, every man 
is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with 
whose members he dc>als." In 1 Collyer on Partnership (page 
87 
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650) it is said that “a note ‘given by one partner in the partner-
ship name, within the scope of the partnership, is binding upon
the firm, but the payee is bound to know whether it is within
the scope of his apparent authority, and, if it is in excess
thereof, the firm is not responsible.” In Cocke vs. Bank, 3 Ala.
175, the note in suit was signed in the partnership name of J.
F. & W. Cocke, who were partners in keeping a tavern. It was
executed by J. F. Cocke, and payable to Lea & Langdon for
their accommodation, without the knowledge of the other part-
ner. §Voodson Cooke. No actual knowledge of the circum-
stances was shown on the part of the bank, which sued as
indorsee; but it was assumed to have been the duty of the bank
to make inquiry. GOLDTI-IWAITE-, J., in delivering the opinion,
said (page 180): “The law presumes that the bank, if it
inquired a.t all into the partnership of the defendants, must
have received information that they were not partners in a.
mercantile trade, but only in the business of tavern-keeping.
This ascertained, it took the note at its peril, and must have
relied on the faith of the indorsers.” It was held that Wood-
son Cocke, the partner who had no knowledge of the transac-
tion, was not liable.
In the case at bar the plaintiff had full and actual knowledge
of the nature of the partnership, and the law attributed to him
knowledge, also, that one partner could not bind the other by
bill or note with-out authority, and knowing, as he did, that the
note had been written and signed by McCarthy, who was irre-
sponsible, and that, if he purchased it, it would be upon the
credit of Cole alone, and having also actual knowledge of a
course of dealing which avoided McCarthy and pointed to
Cole alone as the financial representative of the firm, it
seems to us the plaintiff took the note at his peril. It
was very strange for the plaintifl’ to inquire of the one who had
used the firm name if it was the note of the firm, and omit
entirely, when he had ample and easy opportunity, to inquire
of the other partner, on whose sole credit he depended; but the
court has found that the failure to inquire of Cole was not
owing to a belief that the inquiry would result in finding the
note invalid, and this we must accept as true. Ordinarily such
a finding would save the rights of a holder in good faith of
negotiable paper, but the great difficulty in the present case is
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650) it ls said that "a note-given by one partner tn the partner-
ship name, within the scope of the partnership, is binding upon 
the firm~ but the payee is bound to know whether it is within 
the scope of his apparent authority, and, if it is in excess 
thereof, the firm is not responsible." In Cocl.'.e vs. Bank, 3 Ala. 
175, the note in suit was signed in the partnership name of J. 
F. & W. Cocke, who were partners in keeping a tavern. It was 
executed by .J. F. Cocke, and payable to Lea & Langdon for 
their nc<'ommodation, without the knowledge of the other part· 
ner, ~Yoodson Corke. No actual knowlc>dge of the circum-
stances was shown on the part of the bank, which sued as 
indorsee; but it was assumed to ha Ye been the duty of the bank 
to make inquiry. GoLDTHWAITI~, J., in delivering the opinion, 
said (page 180): "The law p·resumes that the bank, if it 
inquired at all into the partnership of the defendants, must 
have received informntion that they were not partners in a 
mercantile trade, but only in the business of tavern-keeping. 
This ascertained, it took the note at its peril, and must have 
relied on the faith of the indorsers." It was held that \Vood-
so-n Cocke, the partner who had no knowledge of the transac-
tion, was not liable. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff had full and actual knowledge 
of the nature of the partnership, and the Jaw attributed to him 
knowledge, also, that one partner could not bind the other by 
bill or note with.out autho1·ity, and knowing, as he did, that the 
note had been written and signed by ;McCarthy, who was irre-
sponsible, and that, if he purchased it, it would be upon the 
credit of Cole alone, and having also a('tual knowledge of a 
course of dealing which avoided McCarthy and pointed to 
Cole alone as the financial representative of the firm, it 
seems to us the plaintiff took the note at his peril. It 
was ve1·y strange for the plaintiff to inquire of the one who had 
used the firm name if it was the note of the firm, and omit 
entirely, when he had ample and easy opportunity, to inquirr. 
of the other pnrtncr, on whose sole credit he depended; but the 
court has found that the failure to inquire of Cole was not 
owin~ to a belief that the inquiry would result in finding the 
note invalid, and this we must accept as true. Ordinarily such 
a finding would save the rights of a holder in good faith of 
( 
negotiable paper, but the great difficulty in the present case iR 
that the note was purchased with constructive notice that it - · --· . .......--- ·' -
Passe vs. Com. 291
was not within the apparent scope of the partnership business,
and pri-ma faeic was not the note of the firm; and the actual
course of business, so far as it was known to the plaintiff’,
tended to increase rather than allay the suspicion of a want of’
authority.
But the plaintiff contends that the judgment in his favor
cannot be disturbed because the burden of proof was on the
defendant. On this general subject of the burden of proof,
most of the authorities cited in another connection to show the
distinction between the two classes of partnerships, and many
others that we might cite, assert most positively that in the
case of noncommercial partnerships the burden is on the
holder of the note. But we concede that many cases can be
found which in terms would seem to place the burden on the
defendant. In some of these cases the partnerships were in
fact commercial, as in the case of Faler vs. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283.
In Doty vs. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, PLATT, J., giving the opinion,
said: “The partnership being admitted, the presumption of
law is that a note made by one partner in the name of the firm
was given in the regular course of partnership dealings until
the contrary is shown on the part of the defendants.” The case
is so brief in the report that we cannot see clearly what was
involved in the admission of the partnership which furnished
the basis for the presumption. It incidentally appears in the
description of the firm that its business was tanning, currying,
and shoe making. This, doubtless, involved the buying of
hides, bark, and materials for tanning, and the sale of leather
and shoes. The basis of the presumption was doubtless the
apparent scope of the business. In Holmes rs. Porter, 39 Me.
157, the head note omits an important qualification. The
proposition laid down by the court is that, “when the contract
i made in the name of the firm, it will prima facie bind the
firm unless it is ultra the business of the firm.” The head
note omits the last clause. The case of Carrier cs. Cameron,
31 Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. 192, was relied upon by the
plaintiff to show that the burden was on the defendant.
In terms it so holds, but a brief analysis will show that it is not
inconsistent with our position in this case, and will suggest a
mode of reconciling many apparently conflicting cases. There
was nothing at all in the case to show the nature of the partner-
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l was not within the apparent scope of the partnership business, 
(and pritna facic was not the note of the firm; and the actual 
course of bm:iness, so far as it was known to the plaintiff, 
tendf'd to increase rather than allay the suspicion of a want of 
authority. 
But the plaint!ff contends that the judgm«.>nt in his favor 
cannot be disturbed because the burden of proof was on the 
defendant. On this general subject of the bur<len of proof, 
most of the authorities cited in another connection to Hhow the 
distinction between the two classes of partnerships, and many 
othen that we might cite, assert most positively that in the 
case of non-commercial partnerships the burden is on the 
holder of the note. Rut we concede that many cases can be 
found which in terms would seem to place the burden on the 
defendant. In some of these cases the partne1·ships were in 
fact commercial, as in the case of Faler vs. Jordan, 44 Miss. 283. 
In Doty vs. Bates, 11 Johns. 544, PLATT, J., giving the opinion, 
said: "The partnership being admitted, the presumption of 
law is that a note made by one partner in the name of the firm 
was given in the regular course of partnership dealings until 
the contrary is shown on the part of the defendants." The case 
is so brief in the report that we cannot see clearly what was 
involved in the admission of the partnership which furnished 
the basis for the p1·esumption. It incidentally appears in the 
description of the firm that its business was tanning, currying, 
and shoe making. This, doubtless, involved the buying of 
hides, bark, and materials for tanning, and the sale of leather 
and shoes. The basis of the presumption was doubtless the 
apparent scope of the business. In Halmes rs. Porter, 39 l\Ie. 
157, the head note omits an important qualification. The 
proposition laid down by the court is that, "when the contract 
is made in the name of the firm, it will prima facie bind the 
firm unless it is ultra th~ business of the firm." Th~ head 
note omits the last clause. The case of Carrier vs. Cameron , 
Sl Mich. 373, 18 Am. Rep. rn2, was relied upon by the 
plaintiff to show that the burden was on the defendant. 
In terms it so holds, but a brief anal.vsis will show that it is not 
Inconsistent with our position in this case, and will sugj:!'est a 
mode of reconciling many apparently eontlicting cases. There 
was nothing at all in the case to show the nature of the partner-
ship, and the plaintiff's knowledge of it. GnAYEs, C. J., ill 
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giving the opinion, stated the question as follows: “Was the
plaintiff below required, in order to make out a prima facile
case, to show at the outset that Carrier had express authority
to make notes generally, or else to show either that the copart-
nership was one of the class in respect to which such authority
is presumed, or that its course of business had been such as to
imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been ap-
proved or ratified?” The question was answered in the nega-
tive, upon the authority of Littcll vs. Fish, 11 Mich. 525. It is to
be noticed that the question was simply as to the burden of
proof after the fact of partnership was admitted, and before
the nature or class of the partnership appeared. That being the
position of the case, the court well remarked that “it was not
needful for the plaintiff, by any positive averment or positive
proof, to negative a defense which, in virtue of a general pre
sumption, would be intended not to exist. He could not be re-
quired to go into particular proof on such a point until some
proof should appear in contravention of the presumption.” In
this statement of the law we fully concur, but it is not applica-
ble to the facts in the case at bar, because the controlling fact
in the proposition is wanting. Proof in contravention of the
presumption, which at the outset was in favor of the plaintiff,
had appeared, and had resulted in the finding of the opposing
facts; and it is significant that all the facts which the above
question impliedly concedes to be sufiicient to overcome the
presumption referred to are distinctly found,namely, that there
was no express authority to make notes generally or to give
this note; that the partnership was of the non-trading class, in
respect to which no authority can be implied; that there was
no course of business that could imply authority; and that the
giving of this note had never been ratified or approved by Cole.
\Vhatever presumption, therefore, there might have been in
favor of the plaintifl’ at the outset had been fully overcome,
and, if there exists any further fact from which an authority
might be implied, the plaintiff must show it, or lose his case.
It is manifest that in the Michigan case, as, indeed, in all the
cases treating of the burden of proof in suits on notes alleged
to have been executed by partnerships, an illegitimate use has
been made of the term “burden of proof.” Properly, it is ap-
plied only to a party atiirming some fact essential to the sup-
port of his case. Thus used, it never shifts from side to side
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giving the opinion, stated the question as follows: "Was the 
plaintiff below required, in order to make out a prima facie 
case, to show at the outset that Carrier had express authority 
to make notes generally, or else to show either th.at the copart-
nership was one of the class in respect to which such autl1ority 
IR presumed, or that its course of business had been such as to 
imply authority, or that the signing by Carrier had been ap-
proved. or ratified?" The question was answered in the nega-
tive, upon the authority of Littell vs. Fisli, 11 Mich. 525. It is to 
be noticed that the question was simply as to the burden of 
proof after the fact of partnership was admitted, and before 
the nature or class of the partne1·ship appeared. That being the 
position of the case, the court well remarked that "it was not 
needful for the plaintiff, by any positive averment or positive 
proof, to negative a defense which, in virtue of a general pre-
sumption, would be intended not to exist. He could not be re-
quired to go into particular proof on such a point until some 
proof should appear in contravention of the presumption." In 
this statement of the law we fully concur, but it is not applica-
ble to the facts in the case at bar, because the controlling fact 
in the proposition is wanting. Proof in contravention of the 
presumption, which at the outset was in favor of the plaintiff, 
had appeared, and had resulted in the finding of the opposing 
facts; and it is significant that all the facts which the above 
question impliedly concedes to be sufficient to overcome the 
presumption referred to are distinctly found, namely, that there 
was no express authority to make notes generally or to give 
this note; that the partnership was of the non-trading class, in 
respect to which no authority can be implied; that there was 
no course of business that could imply authority; and that the 
giving of this note had never been ratified or approved by Cole. 
\Vhatever presumption, therefore, the1·e might have been in 
favor of the plain tiff at the outset had been fully overcome, 
and, if there exists any further fact from which an authority 
might be implied, the plaintiff must show it, or lose his case. 
It is manifest that in the Miohigan case, as, indeed, in all the 
cases treating of the burden of proof in suits 011 notes alleged 
to have been executed by partnerships, an illegitimate use has 
been made of the term "burden of proof." Properly, it is ap-
plied only to a party affirming some fact essential to the sup-
port of his case. Thus used, it never shifts from side to side 
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during the trial. Loosely used, as in the cases referred to, it is
confounded with the weight of evidence, a very different thing,
which often shifts from one side to the other as facts and pre-
sumptions appear and are overcome; and, in this indiscrim-
inate use of the term “burden of proof,” much of the apparent
conflict in the cases has its origin. For, after all, the test of
the burden of proof is very simple, and so is the question of the
weight of evidence, and there is no contrariety in the principle
adopted by the authorities. In the light of principle, we
think it may be demonstrated that the position of the plaintiff
is untenable. A partnership has been sued on a note executed
in its name. Upon the trial the note is produced by the plain-
tifif, and the first question is, wa_it the note of the firm? The
plaintiff takes the aflirmative of this issue, because, if no evi-
dence is offered on either side. he must fail. He has then the
burden of proof, and it remains on him, and does not pass at all
to the defendant, But suppose now it is shown or.admitted
that the partnership alleged exists, and that one of the firm
executed and delivered the note in its name. By virtue of the
genera] presumption that authority was given by the partner-
ship, the plaintifl’ is entitled to recover, if nothing further ap-
pears, because the weight of evidence is on his side. But sup-
pose the defendants take their turn, and prove the identical
facts here found, that there was no authority, general or
special, given; no ratification of the act; no course of dealing
to imply authority; a.nd, furthermore, that the partnership was
of a class from which no authority can be implied. Is the
plaintifi now entitled to a verdict? Has he proved that the
note was the note of the firm? Surely not. \Vhat,then,is left on
which to rest his case? The preponderance of evidence is not
with him. The burden upon him to show that it was a partner-
ship note has not now been met. But it is said that there is a
realm of inquiry not touched by either party; that is, that itwas
not shown whether or not the partnership had the benefit of the
consideration of the note. If such a fact appeared, we concede,
for the purposes of this case, that it would tend to show that
the note was the note of the firm. But if any authority could
not be implied as the case stood before, can it now be implied?
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during the trial. Loosely used, as in the cases ref erred to, it is 
confounded with the weight of evidence, a very different thing, 
which often shifts from one side to the other as facts and pre-
sumptions appear and are overcome; and, in this indiscrim-
inate use of the term "burden of proof," much of the apparent 
conflict in the cases has its origin. For, after all, the test of 
the burden of proof is very simple, and so is the question of the 
weight of evidence, and there is no contrn1·iety in the principle 
adopted by the authorities. In the light of principle, we 
think it may be demonstrated that the position of the plaintiff 
is untenable. A part~ership bas been sued on a note executed 
in its name. Upon the frial the note is produced by the plain· 
tiff, and the first question is, was _it the note of the firm'? The 
plaintiff takes the affirmative of this issue, because, if no evi· 
dence is offered on either side. he must fail. Ile hrui then the 
burden of proof, and it remains on him, and does not pass ht all 
to the defendant, But suppose now it is shown or .admitted 
that the partners11ip alleged exists, and that one of the firm 
executed and delivered the note in its name. By virtue of the 
general presumption that authority was given by the partner-
ship, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if nothing further ap-
pears, because the weight of evidence is on his side. But sup-
pose the defendants take their turn, and prove the identical 
facts here found, that there was no authority, general or 
specia I, given; no ratification of the act; no course of dealing 
to imply authority; and, furthermore, that the partnership was 
of a class from which no authority can be implied. Is the 
plaintiff now entitled to a verdict? Has he proved that the 
note was the note of the firm? Sn rely not. 'Vhat, then, is left on 
which to rest his case'! The preponderance of evidence is not 
with him. The burden upon him to show that it was a partner-
ship note bas not now bC>en met. llut it is said that there is a 
realm of inquiry not touclled by either party; that is, that it.was 
not shown whetheP or not the vartnership had the benefit of the 
consideration of the note. If such a fact appeared, we concede, 
for the purposes of this case, that it would tend to show that 
the note was ~he note of the firm. But if any authoiity could 
not be implied as the case stood before, can it now be implied? 
The case stands precisely as before. There can be no chauge 
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in the weight of evidence, because nothing has been added; and
the claim of the plaintiff would seem to be reduced to the
absurdity that he is to have the same benefit from an unproved
fact as from one proved. There was error in the judgment
complained of, and, as against the defendant Cole, it is re-
versed, and a new trial ordered. The other judges concurred,
except GRANGER, J ., who dissented.
N011: :—For other cases upon the power of one partner to bind the firm
by negotiable instruments, see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 174.





Supreme Court of Missouri, 1852.
16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 235.
This was a proceeding to set aside a judgment entered
against A. & J. M. Richardson, partners, upon a promissory
note executed in the name of the firm. The judgment was
entered upon a confession made by J. M. Richardson alone,
after the dissolution of the partnership. The execution was
levied upon the property of A. Richardson. The court below
set aside the judgment against A. Richardson and quashed the
execution. Plaintiff appeals.
Leonard, for the appellants.
Hayden, contra.
Soorr, J. The facts in this case stand admitted by the
demurrer to the petition, and we are at a loss to conceive the
ground upon which the proceeding can be susta.ined against
A. Richardson. The case of Green vs. Bcals, 2 Caines (N. Y_)
254, is an authority to show that the judgment confessed by
J. M. Richardson was void as to A. Richardson. The cases of
M otteum vs. St. Aubin, 2 W. Blackst. 1133, and Danton vs. Noyes,
6 Johns (N. Y.) 299, 5 Am. Dec. 237, are not applicable to the
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in the wr\ght of evidence, because nothing bas been added; and 
the cla\m of the plaintiff would seem to be reduced to the 
absurdity that he is to have the same benefit from an unproved 
fact as from one proved. There wa.s error in the judgment 
complained of, and, as against the defendant Cole, it is re-
versed, and a new trial ordered. The other judges concurred, 
except GRANGER, J., who dissented. 
NOTE:-For otller cases upon the power of one partner to hind the firm 
by negotiable instruments, see :Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 174. 
For the dlslincLion between trading and non·LradinllC fi1ms, see Id. 
§ 162. 
MORGAN vs. RICHARDSON. 
Bupreme Court of Missouri, 185!. 
16 Mo. 409, 57 Am. Dec. 235. 
This was a proceeding to set aside a judgment entered 
against A. & J. M. Richardson, partners, upon a promissory 
note executed in the name <>f the firm. The judgment was 
entered upon a confession made by J. M. Richardson alone, 
after the dissolution of the partnership. The execution was 
levied upon the propert1 of A. Richardson. The court below 
set aside the judgment against A. Richardson and quashed the 
executi-0n. Plaintiff appeals. 
Leonard, for the appellants. 
Hayden, contra. 
SooTT, J. The facts in this case stand admitted by the 
demurrer to the petition, and we are at a loss to conceive' the 
ground upon which the proceeding can be sustained agai..ufi 
A. Richardson. The case of Green vs. Beals, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 
254, is an authority to show that the judgment confessed by 
J.M. Richardson was void as to A. Richardson. The cases of 
Mottcu:c vs. St. Aubin, 2 W. Blackst. 1133, and Denton vs. Noyes, 
G Johns (N. Y.) 2!)~, 5 .\m. DPc. ~:n, are not applicable to the 
circumstances of this case. It cannot be maintained that a 
ml -_____.___-._ 4-i-D ‘Z—
Fox vs. Noirrox. 295
partner, either before or after the dissolution of the copartner-
ship, has authority to confess a judgment for his copartner.
The authorities are abundant to show that one partner cannot
confess a judgment which will bind his copartner: Crane vs.
French-, 1 \Vend. (N. Y.) 311; McBride vs. Hagan, Id. 327. We
can see no difference in principle between setting aside the
judgment and restraining an execution upon it, as either mode
of action is based upon the nullity of the proceeding, which
is not permitted to be used as a foundation for any future
action against the party for whom it has been unwarrantedly
entered. It does not appear that the judgment against J. M.
Richardson has been vacated, nor will we interfere with it.
Affirmed.
NOTE.-_—-S98 Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., Q 179.
‘4
FOX vs. NORTON.
Supreme Court of Mich-igan, 1861.
9 Mich. 207.
Norton and others sued Charles R. Fox, Thomas D. Gilbert
and Francis B. Gilbert on a bond. The bond, which was
received in evidence against defendants’ objection, described
the obligors as Charles R. Fox and Gilbert & Co. It was con-
ditioned that said Fox and Gilbert & Co. should pay, etc.; and
was signed thus:
Cnsnnns R. Fox [Seal].
., GILBERT & Co. [Seal].
Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error.
Withcy é Gray, for plaintiffs in error.
J . T. Holmes, for defendants in error.
CIIRISTIANCY, J. (After stating the facts.) The individual
names of the Gilberts do not appear upon the bond. It was,
however, proved that Thomas D. Gilbert and Francis B. Gil-
bert were, at the date of the bond, partners composing the firm
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partner, either before or after the dissolution of the copartne~ 
ship, has authority to confess a judgment for his copartneri. 
The authorities are abundant to show that one partner cannot 
confess a judgment which will bind his copartner: Crane tJB. 
F1·cncll, 1 'Vend. (N. Y.) 311; McRridc vs. Hagan, Id. 327. We 
can see no difference in principle between setting aside the 
juclgment and restraining an execution upon it, as either mode. 
of action is based upon the nullity of the proceeding, which 
is not permitted to be used as a foundation for any future_ 
action against the party for whom it has been unwarraptedli 
entered. It does not appear that the judgment against J. M. 
Richardson has been vacated, nor will we interfere with it 
Affirmed. 
NoTB.~e Mechem's Elem. of Partn..1179. ,, 
FOX vs. NORTON. 
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1861. 
9 Mich. 207. 
Norton and others sued Charles R. Fox, Thomas D. Gilbert 
nnd Francis B. Gilbert on a bond. The bond, which waa 
l'eceived in evidence against defendants' objection, described 
the obligors as Charles R. Fox and Gilbert & Co. It was con-
ditioned that said Fox and Gilbert & Co. should pay, etc.; and 
was signed thus: 
CHARLES R. Fox [Seal]. 
G1LnE1t'l' & Co. [Sealj. 
Judgment for plaintiff and defendants bring error. 
Wit11CTJ & Gray, for plaintiffs in error. 
J. T. Holmes, for defendants in error. 
CHRIBTIASCY, J. (After stating the facts.) The individual 
names of the Gilberts do not appear upon the bond. It was, 
Iiowever, proved that Thomas D. Gilbert and Francis B. Gil-
bert were, at the date of the bond, partners composing the firm 
of Gilbert & Co., and that the said Thomas D. Gilbert executed 
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the bond in the name of the firm. £But no evidence was given
or offered showing or tending to s ow that the bond was exe-
cuted by the single partner in the presence of the other part-
ner, nor that the other partner had previously assented to its
execution, nor that he subsequently recognized or ratified it
as the act or obligation of the firm.)
We understand the general rule of law to be well settled
that (with the exception of the release of a debt, which stands
upon peculiar ground) one partner cannot execute a specialty
binding as such upon the firm, without express authority for
that purpose under seal. The English decisions recognize but
a single exception to this rule, and that is when the single part-
ner executes the instrument in the preence and with assent
of the other member or members of the firm. But, by the gen-
eral current of American authorities, the instrument may also
be sustained against the firm by proof of prior parol assent, o-r
subsequent parol ratification by the other member. We are
aware of no case which goes further. See the authorities col-
lected in Story on Cont. §§ 218, 220; Story on Partn. § 117,
at scq.; Gollyer on Partn. (Perkins Ed.) §§ 462 to 467.
The bond in this case was not admissible under the general
rule, and no evidence was given tending to bring it within any
of the recognized exceptions to the rule. It was therefore
improperly admitted. The bond not being in evidence, and all
the other questions raised in the case being dependent upon the
bond, such dependent questions have no bearing upon the case
before us, and we do not deem it necessary to notice them here.
Reversed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 180.
SHATTUCK vs. CHANDLER.
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1889.
40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 225, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227.
Chandler,.as assignee of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, sued
Shattuck and Bowers, upon the notes referred to in the opinion.
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the bond in the name of the firm. {But no evidence was given 
or offered showing or tending to stow that the bond was exe-
cuted by the single partner in the presence of the other part-
ner, nor that the other partner had previously assented to its 
execution, nor that he subsequently recognized or ratified it 
as the act or obligation of the firm.) 
We understand the general rule of law to be well settled 
that (with the exception of the relea.se of a debt, which stands 
upon peculiar ground) one partner cannot execute a specialty 
binding as such upon the firm, without express authority for 
that purpose under seal. The English decisions recognize but 
a single exception to this rule, and that is when the single part-
ner executes the instrument in the presence and with assent 
of the other member or members of the firm. But, by the gen-
eral current of American authorities, the instrument may also 
be sustained against the firm by proof of prior parol assent, or 
subsequent parol ratification by the other member. We are 
aware of no case which goes further. See the authorities col-
lected in Story on Cont. §§ 218, 220; Story on Partn. § 117, 
et seq.; Collyer on Partn. (Perkins Ed.)§§ 462 to 467. 
The bond in this case was not admissible under the g~neral 
rule, and no evidence was given tending to bring it within any 
of the recognized exceptions to the rule. It was therefore 
improperly admitted. The bond not being in evidence, and all 
the other questions raised in the case being dependent upon the 
bond, such dependent questions have no bearing upon the case 
before us, and we do not deem it necessary to notice them here. 
Reversed. 
NOTE: Bee Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., ~ 180. 
fiBATTUCK vs. CHANDLER. 
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1889. 
40 Kan. 516, 20 Pac. Rep. 22li, 10 Am. St. Rep. 227. 
Cha~dler,. as assignee of the ft rm of Pierpont & Tuttle, sued 
Rhattuck and Bowers, upon the notes referred to in the opinion. 
Plaintitf bad judgment below and defendants bring erroi:. 
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Don C'a.rlos ¢G Son, for the plaintiffs in error.
A. G. ¢€ W. H. M 0B1-ids, for the defendants in error.
CLocs'r0N, C. This was an action upon a large number of
promissory notes made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and
guaranteed by the firm of Shattuck & Bowers in these words:
“For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of this
note according to the terms thereof, waiving demand, notice,
and protest. Shattuck &'Bowers.” The evidence shows that
Pierpont & Tuttle were a manufacturing firm, located at Bush-
nell, Illinois, and that Shattuck 8: Bowers resided in Phillips
county, Kansas, and were engaged in the sale of agricultural
implements. I Certain 'agricultural implements furnished by
Pierpont & Tuttle were sold by Shattuck & Bowers, and the
notes sued on were taken in payment therefor, said notes being
made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and before delivery to
them were guaranteed as above stated. In answer to the peti-
tion, the defendant alleged, aniong other defenses, that the
plaintitf was not the assignee of Pierpont & Tuttle, and that
he had no right or authority to bring the action; and also
alleged that Pierpont & Tuttle had failed to collect the notes
when the same were due and payable; that the makers of the
notes were solvent at that time, and afterward became insol-
vent and non-residents of Kansas.
The plaintiff oifered in evidence the notes sued on, and the
deed of assignment made in Illinois by Tuttle in the firm name
of Pierpont & Tuttle; also a deed of assignment by Tuttle as
the surviving partner of Pierpont & Tuttle. Said last deed of
assignment, in addition to a general assignment of all the prop-
erty of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, ratified the first deed of
assignment, and all the doings and proceedings had there-
under by the plaintiff as such assignee. Both of these assign-
ments were objected to, and the objection overruled, and were
admitted in evidence. The first deed was objected to upon the
ground that one of several partners has no authority, with-
out the consent of the other partners, to make a general assign-
ment of the partnership property. The plaintiff contends that
the deed of assignment is prima facie good, and it devolved
upon the defendant to show that Pierpont did not consent to
the assignment, and that unless it was at least shown that he

















































































































































SHATTUCK vs. CllANDl.ER. 
Dem Ca.rlos & Son, for the plaintiffs in error. 
A.G. & W. H. McBride, for the defendants in error. 
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CLOGSTON, C. This was an action upon a large number o~ 
promissory notes made payable to Pierpont & Tnttle, and 
guaranteed by the firm of Shattuck & Bowers in these words: 
"For value received, I hereby guar~tee the payment of this 
note according to the terms thereof, waiving demand, notice, 
and protest. Shattuck &. Bowers." The evidence shows that 
Pierpont & Tuttle were a manufacturing firm, located at Bush-
nell, Illinois, and that Shattuck & Bowers resided in Phillips 
county, Kansas, and were engaged in the sale of agricultural 
implements. / Certain 'agricultural implements furnished by 
Pie1-pont & Tuttle were sold by Shattuck & ~owers, and the 
notes sued on were taken in payment therefor, said notes being 
made payable to Pierpont & Tuttle, and before delivery to 
them were guaranteed as above stated. In answer to the peti· 
tion, the defendant alleged, aniong other defenses, that the 
plaintiff was not the assignee of Pierpont & Tuttle, and that 
he ha.d no right or authority to bring the action; and also 
alleged that Pierpont & Tuttle had failed to collect the notes 
when the same were due and payable; that the makers of the 
notes were solvent at that time, and afterward became insol-
vent and non-residents of Kansas. 
The plaintiff offt>red in evidence the notes sued on, and the 
deed of assignment made in Illinois by Tuttle in the firm name 
of Pierpont & Tuttle; also a deed of assignment by Tuttle as 
the surviving partner of Pierpont & 'futtle. Said last deed of 
assignment, in addition to a general assignment of all the prop-
erty of the firm of Pierpont & Tuttle, ratified the first deed of 
assignment, and all the doings and proceedings had there-
under by the plaintiff as such assignee. Both of these assign-
ments were objected to, and the objection overruled, and were 
admitted in evidence. The first deed was objected to upon the 
ground that one of several partners has no authority, with-
out the consent of the other partners, to make a general assign-
ment of the pa11:nersbip property. The plaintiff contends that 
the deed of assignment is prima facie good, and it devolved 
upon the defendant to show that Pierpont did not consent to 
the assignment, and that unless it was at least shown that he 
objected to the assignment, the assignment must be held good. 
38 
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In this we do not agree with the plaintiff. VVhere an assign-
ment is made by one partner, his right to make that assign-
ment depends upon the consent of his copartner; and to give
him authority to make it, he must, in addition, show that his
partner consented thereto, or show such a state of facts from
which the court could presume assent, or show that the part-
ner was absent from the country, and that therefore his assent
could not be procured, or some other state'of facts that would
show to the court that the partner making the assignment
had authority, either by reason of the articles of‘ partnership,
or by the fact of his being managing agent of the partner-
ship, or some such fact from which the court could say that
the assignment was authorized by the partnership. 'N 0 such
,/proof was made in this case, and we think, in the absence of
such proof, the assignment offered in evidence was absolutely
void. See Burrill o-n Assignments, 5th Ed., Secs. 68-88; Loeb vs.
Pierpont, 58 Iowa, 469; 43 Am. Rep. 122; Lowenstein vs.
Flaurand, 82 N. Y. 494; Haggerty vs. Granger, 15 How. Pr. 243;
Dunklin vs. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251; Sloan vs. Moore, 37 Pa. St.
217; Graves vs. Hall, 32 Tex. 665; Story on Partnerships, Sec.
101; Parsons on Partnerships, 166. This doctrine is now
almost universally acknowledged to be the rule.
The second assignment offered in evidence presents a more
difficult question. In many of the states the doctrine is held
that a surviving partner cannot make a general assignment,
and in these states, the theory upon which the decisions were
rendered is, that, at the death of one partner, the surviving
partner becomes trustee of the partnership estate, and that he
has no power to transfer the trust so created to another trus-
tee. This seems to be the doctrine held in New York: Nelson
vs. Sutlierland, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 327; Loeschigk -vs. Hatfield, 51
N. Y. 660; Cushman vs. Addison, 52 Id. 628; also Tiemann vs.
Molliter, 71 Mo. 512; Vesper rs. Kramer, 31 N. J . Eq. 420.
On the other hand, it has been held by ome of the states that
the surviving partner may make a general assignment of a
partnership; and to this etfect are numerous decisions, among
which is Emcrson rs. Scntcr, 118 U. S. 3, in which case the court
held that the surviving partner could make a general assign-
ment. The court said: “The right to do so grows out of h-is
duty, from his relations to the property, to administer the
affairs of the firm so as to close up its business without unrca.
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In this we do not agree with the plaintiff. Where an assign-
ment is made by one partner, his right to make that assign-
ment depends upon the consent of his copartner; and to give 
him authority to make it, he must, in addition, show that his 
partner consented thereto, or sho'Y such a state of facts from 
which the court could presume assent, or show that the part-
ner was absent from the country, and that therefore his assent 
could not be procured, or some other state·of facts that would 
show to the com1 that the partner making the assignment 
had authority, either by reason of the articles of" partnership, 
or by the fact of his being managing agent of the partner-
ship, or some such fact from which the court could say that 
'J the assignment was auth-Orized by; the partnership. ·No such 
Jproof was made in this case, and we think, in the absence of 
such proof, the assignment offered in evidence was absolutely 
void. See Burrill o·n Assignments, 5th Ed., Secs. 68-88; Loeb t>8. 
Pierpont, 58 Iowa, 469; 43 Am. Rep. 122; Lowenstein !'8. 
Flaurand, 82 N. Y. 494; Haggerty vs. Granger, 15 How. Pr. 243; 
Dunklin vs. Kimball, 50 Ala. 251; Sloan VB. Moore, 37 Pa. SL 
217; Graves VB. Hall, 32 Tex. 665; Story on Pa.rtnerships, Sec. 
101; Parson'S on Partnerships, 166. This doctrine is now 
almost universally acknowledged to be the rule. 
The second assignment offered in evidence presents a ID<>re 
difficult question. In many of the states the docb•ine is lield 
that a surviving partner cann()t make a general assignment, 
and in these states, the theory upon which the decisions were 
rendered is, that, at the death of one partner, the surviving 
partner becomes trustee of the partnership estate, and that he 
\J has no power to transfer the trust so created to another trus-
tee. This set> ms to be the doctrine held in New York: N el.sOR 
tJB. Sutllerland, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 327; Loescliigk vs. Hatfield, 51 
N. Y. 660; Cushman vs. Addison, 52 Id. 628; also Tiemann vs. 
Jlolliter, 71 Mo. 512; l'osper i·s. Kramer, 31 N. J. Eq. 420. 
On the other hand, it bas been h<"ld by some of the states that 
the surviving partner may make a general assignment of a 
partnership; and to this effect a.re numerous decisions, among 
which is Emerson i~s. Senter, 118 U.S. 3, in which case the court 
held that the surviving partner could make a general assign-
ment. The court said: "The right to do so grows out of hf s 
duty, from his relations to th.e property, to administer the 
n!Tairs of the firm so as to close up its business without unrea-
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_s_on_able delay.” (This seems to be the settled doctrine of the
supreme court of the United States, and should be followed
unless there is some statute making a different rule) This
assignment was made under the laws of Illinois, and should be
interpreted thereunder; but in this case no statute of Illinois -
was offered disclosing what provisions had been made in that
state by statute for the winding up of partnership business;
and in the absence of any showing of this kind, we must pre-
sume that the statute of Illinois is like that of Kansas. This
brings up the question, is there any statute in Kansas that
conflicts with the rule laid down by the supreme court of the
United States in the last case cited? Article 2, chapter 37, of
the compiled laws of 1885, provides for the winding up and
settlement of partnership estates. This provides for the
appraisement of partnership property, and that the property
shall remain in the possession of the surviving partner, and if
he sees fit to continue its management, and the disposing of
the partnership assets and the payment of the partnership
debts, he may do so upon condition that he give a bond for
faithful performance of the duties imposed, and the power is
given the probate court to cite him, after the giving of such
bond, to an accounting, and to adjudicate upon such accounts,
as in the case of an ordinary administrator, and for an action
upon the bond in case of his failure to faithfully administer
the partnership estate; and upon his refusal to give the bond
and take charge of the partnership property, it becomes the
duty of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate to
assume the management of the same and to settle it up. By
this statute ample provisions are made for the closing up of a
partnership estate, either by the surviving partner, or by the
administrator of the deceased partner’s estate. (\Ve think
that the legislature by this provision intended to provide a
trustee to close up the partnership upon the death of a member
of the firm, and that the statute creates a trust in the surviv-
ing partner which he has no power to transfer to another
except as it is transferred by his refusal to administer upon the \ ,
partnership estate, in which event it is transferred by operating
of law to the administrator of the deceased partner’s estate.) '/
_ It was said in Carr vs. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393, in speaking of this
class of administrators: “He is neither more nor less than a
special trustee as to this property and this class of debts.”
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sonable delay." (This seems to be the settled doctrine of the 
supreme court of the United States, and should be followed 
unless there is some statute making a different rule~ This 
assignment was made under the laws of Illinois, and' should be 
interpreted thereunder; but in this case no statute of Illinois 
was offered disclosing wbat provisions had been made in that 
state by statute for the winding up of partnership business; 
and in the absence of any showing of this kind, we must pre-
sume that the statute of Illinois is like that of Kansas. This 
brings up the question, is there any statute in Kansas that 
conflicts with the rule laid down by the supreme court <>f the 
United States in the last case cited? Article 2, clrn.pter 37, of 
the compiled laws of 1885, proYides for the winding up and 
settlement of partnership estates. This provides for the 
appraisement of partnership property, and that the property 
shall remain in the possession of the surviving partner, and if 
he sees ftt to continue its managem~nt, and the disposing of 
the partnership assets and the payment of the partnership 
debts, he may do so upon condition that he give a bond for 
faithful performance of the duties imposed, and the pow.er is 
given the probate court to cite him, after the giving of such 
bond, to an accounting, and to adjudicate upon such accounts, 
as in the case of an -0rdinary administrator, and for an action 
upon the bond in case of his failure to faithfully administer 
the partnership estate; and upon his refusal to give the bond 
and take charge of the partnership property, it becomes the 
duty of the administrator of the deceased partner's estate to 
assume the management of the same and to settle it up. By 
this statute ample proviHions are made for the closing up of a 
partnership estate, either by the surviving partner, or by the 
administrator of the dect"ased partner's estate. (\Ve think 
that the legislature by this provision intended to provide a 
trustee to close up the partnership upon the death of a member 
of the firm, and that the statute creates a trust in the surviv-
ing partner wliicb he bas no power to transfer to another 
except as it is transferred by his refusal to administer upon the ~ 
partnership estate, in which event it is transferred by operation~\)IJ 
of law to the administrator of thl" deceased partner's estate.) v 
. It was said in Carr vs. Catlin, 13 Kan. 393, in speaking of this 
class of administrators: "Ile is neither more nor less than a 
special trustee as t-0 this property and th.is rlass of debts." 
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The rule is, that where a form of procedure is provided by
statute, and the manner of doing a particular act or thing is
pointed out, it precludes the doing of it in any other manner
or form. If the surviving partner under our statutes may
transfer his trust toan assignee, then the assignee would close
up the entire partnership business in the court having juris-
diction of the assignment and estate thereunder, and would
be entirely free from the jurisdiction of the probate court, and
the statute above cited would be without any force or effect.
Did the legislature intend that this statute might be regarded,
or not, at the pleasure of the surviving partner? We think
not. This means of winding up a partnership business has
been prescribed by the legislature, and in the absence of any
proof of the statutes of Illinois to the contrary, we must pre
sume that this is the manner of closing up partnership estates
in that state. We therefore think the court erred in permitting
the second assignment to begiven in evidence, as it gave the
plaintifi no authority or right to commence the action. ' ‘ '
l Judgment of the court below reversed and a new trial
ordered.
NOTE: For other cases upon the powerto make assignments for creditors,
see Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 172.
LO\V M AN vs. S11 El-ITS.
Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.
124 Ind. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. 351, 7 L. R. A. 73$
Templeton and Sheets made a contract for the establishment
of a stock farm and acquired a herd of brood mares for that pur-
pose. Without the knowledge or consent of Sheets, Templeton
undertook to sell the entire herd to the plaintifl’. Sheets re
fused to surrender them and Ltii/nan brought replevin. Verdict
for defendant and plaintiflf appeals.
Wallace, Baird & Chase, for appellant.
E. P. Hammond, M. H. Wall.-er, D. Fraser, I . H. Phares and W.
B. Austin, for appellee
















































































































































800 VASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
The rule is, that where a form of procedure is provided by 
statute, and the manner of doing a particular act or thing is 
pointed out, it precludes the doing of it in any other manner 
or form. If the surviving partner under our statutes may 
transfer hie trust to·an assignee, then the assignee would close 
up the entire partnership business in the court having juris-
diction of the assignment and estate thereunder, and would 
be entirely free from the jurisdiction of the probate court, and 
the statute above cited would be without any force or effect. 
Did the legislature intend that this statute might be regarded, 
or not, at the pleasure of the surviving partner? We think 
not. This means of winding up a partnership business has 
been prescribed by the legislature, and in the abs~nce of any 
proof of the statutes of Illinois to the contrary, we must pre-
sume that this is the manner of closing up partnel'Ship estates 
in that state. We therefore think the court erred in permitting 
the second assignment to be 'given in evidence, as it gave the 
plaintiff no authority or right to commence the action. • • • 
· Judgment of the court below reversed and a new trial 
ordered. 
NOTE: For other caaes. upon the power to make Balignmenta for creditors, 
.ee M:echem's Elem. of Partn., § 17.8. · 
LO\VMAN vs. SHEETS. 
8uprC"me Court of Indiana, 1890. 
124 lnd. 417, 24 N. E. Rep. B:Jl, 7 L. R. A. 784. 
Templeton and Sheets made a contract for the establishment 
of a stock farm and acquired a herd of brood mares for that pur-
pose. Without the knowledge or consent of Sheets, Templeton 
undertook to sell the entire herd to the plaintiff. Sheets re-
w 
fused to surrender them and Lqinan brought replevin. Verdict. 
for defendant and plaintiff appeals. 
- Wallace, Baird & Chase, for appellant. 
E. P. Hammon.d, Al. H. Walker, D. Fraaer, I. H. Pharea and W. 




CLARKE vs. WALLACE. 301
Corrnr, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of other
questions.) It is contended by the appellant thaxt Templeton
and appellee were partners, and that, as such, either partner
had the right to sell the property owned by the firm and confer
a good title,and that by his purchase from Templeton he ac-
quired the title to the whole of the property in controversy and
has a right to its possession. \Ve do not deem it necessary to
decide whether the contract between the parties was one of
partnership or not, as the appellant had no power to sell the
entire property, whether it was held as partnership property or
otherwise. The partnership, if one existed, was not one in
which the parties contemplated a sale of the property here in-
volved, but it was one in which this property was to be kept for
the purpose of carrying on a particular business. In such case
neither party had the power to sell the entire property: Bates,
Partn. § 401; Hewitt vs. iqturdevant, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Ca-yton
vs. Hardy, 27 Mo. 536; Massey vs. Holt, 24 N. H. 248; Hudson vs.
M cKenz1'.e, 1 E. D. Smith, (N Y.)358. Mr. Bates, in his valuable
work on partnerships, in treating the subject in the section
above cited, says: "But I have no doubt but that the power of
sale must be confined to those things held forsale, and that the
scope of the business does not include the sale of the property
held for the purpose of business and to make a profit out of it,
and that this only is the true rule.” ' ' '
Aflirmed.
NOTE.—See also Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 186, and cases there cited;
Arnold vs. Brown, 24 Pick. 89, 35 Am. Dec. 296.
CLARK E VS. W1\ l.l.1\ CE.
Supreme Court of North Dakota, I891.
I N. Dak. 404, 48 N. W. Rep. 339. 26 Am. St. Rep. 636.
Action by Clarke against Wallace, Winslow, Allen and the
administrators of Sheets and Bickford. Judgment for plaint-
iff, and the defendants, \Vinslow, Allen ct al., appeal. The
findings of the court show that in 1883 the defendants Wins-

















































































































































CLARKE Vd. WALLA.CB. 301 
COFFEY, J. (After stating the facts and disposing of oth~r 
questions.) It is oontended by the appellant thad: Templetoii 
and appellee were partners, and that, as such, either partner 
bad the right to s~ll the property owned by the firm and confer 
a good title,and that by his purchase from Templeton be aer 
quired the title to the whole of the property in controversy and 
has a right fo its possession. "re do not deem it necessary to. 
decide whether the contra.ct ,between the parties was one of 
partnership or not, a.a the ap~1lant bad no power to sell the 
entire property, whether it was held as partnership property or 
otherwise. The partnership, if one existed, wa.e not one in 
which the parties contemplated a sale of the property here in-
volved, but it was one in which this property was to be kept for 
the purpose of carrying on a particular business. In such case 
neither party had the power to sell the entire pr<>perty: Bates, 
Partn. § 401; Hewitt t'B. Sturdevant, 4 B. Mon. (Ky.) 453; Cayton 
cs. Hardy, 27 Mo. 53G; Mussey vs. Holt, 24 N. H. 248; Hudson vs. 
McKenzie, 1 E. D. Smith, (N Y.)358. Mr. Bates, in his valuable 
work on partnerships, in treating the subject in the section 
above cited, says: ''But I have no doubt but that the power of. 
sale must be confined to those things held for·sale, and that the 
scope of the business does not include the sale of the property 
held for the purpose of business and to make a profit out of it, 
and that this only is the true rule." • • • 
Affirmed. 
NOTB.-See also Mechem's ElE>m. of Partn., ~ 186, and casea there cited; 
Arnold va. Brown, 24 Pick. 89, 85 Am. Dec. 296. 
CLARKE vs. WAT.LACE. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota, 1891. 
1 N. Dak. 404, 4.8 N. W. Rep. 839, 26 Am. St. Rep. 636. 
Action by Clarke against Wallace, Winslow, Allen and the 
administrators of Sheets and Bickford. Judgment for plaint-
iff, and the defendants, Winslow, All~n ct al., appeal. The 
findings of the court show that in 1883 the defendants Wins-
low and Allen, together with John A. J. Sheets and Samuel 
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M. Bickford, the‘ two latter now deceased, and their adminis-
trators, being defendants herein, were co-partners engaged in
the banking, real estate, and loan business at Jamestown, Dak.
T., under the firm name of “North Dakota Bank.” Allen was
the managing member of the firm. The firm had about $1,300
on deposit in the First National Bank of Jamestown. The
defendant Robert E. \Vallace was president of the la-tter bu/nk.
This bank was in failing circumstances. \Vallace needed
$5,000 to help him out of the embarrassments connected wit‘:
the failure of the bank, and he proposed to Allen that, if the
North Dakota Bank would aid him in obtaining a loan of that
amount, he would secure the deposit of that firm in the said
First National Bank. Allen, in his individual name, opened
a correspondence with the plaintiff, Clarke, who was a non-
resident, which resulted in obtaining a loan from Clarke, to
Wallace for the required amount, the note to be guaranteed
by the North Dakota Bank. Accordingly Wallace executed
the note, and Allen guaranteed it in the name of the.North
Dakota Bank, and the money was paid over to, W'allace._
Plaintiff, Clarke, loaned the money largely on the credit of
the North Dakota Bank. Wallace secured the deposit of the
North Dakota Bank in the First National Bank by deliver-
ing collatcrals to Allen, and the amount of the deposit was
subsequently realized out of the collaterals. Allen had no
express authority from the other members of the firm to
guaranty the note of Wallace, nor did the other members of
the firm have any knowledge of such guaranty, or ever in any
manner ratify the same, nor did they, prior to the bringing
of this action, have any knowledge that the deposit in the
First National Bank was paid from the proceeds of collaterals
delivered by Wallace to Allen. .
N ickeus <G Baldwin, for appellants.
Edgar W. Camp, for respondent.
Bsrrruonomnw, J . (After stating the facts.) This action, so
far as these appellants are concerned, is brought on the guar-
anty heretofore mentioned, the defense being lack of authority
on the part of Allen to thus bind the firm. The contract of
guaranty was entered into contemporaneously with the execu-
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M. Bickford, the' two latter now deceased, and their adminis-
trators, being defendants herein, were co-partners engaged in 
the banking, real estate, and loan business at Jamestown, Dak. 
T., under the fl.rm name of "North Dakota Bank." Allen was 
the managing member of the firm. The firm had about $1,300 
on deposit in the First National Bank of Jamestown. ~he 
defendant Hobert E. 'Vallace was president of the latter bdnk. 
This bank was in failing circumstances. \Vallace needed 
15,000 to help him oat of the embarrassments connected wit '1 
the failure of the bank, and he proposed to Allen that, if the 
North Dakota Bank would aid him in obtaining a loan of that 
amount, he would secure the deposit of that firm in the said 
First National Bank. AJJen, in his individual name, opened 
a correspondence with the plaintiff, Clarke, who was a non-
resident, which resulted in obtaining a loan from Clarke, to 
Wallace for the required amount, the note to be guaranteed 
by the North Dakota Bank. Accordingly WaJJace executed 
the note, and Allen guaranteed. it in the uame of the .North 
Dakota Bank, and the money was paid over to Wallace. 
Plaintiff, Clarke, loaned the money largely on the' credit of 
the North Dakota Bank. Wallace secured the deposit of the 
North Dakota Bank in the First National Bank by deli,·er-
ing coJJaterals to A)]en, and the amount of the deposit was 
subsequently re:ilized out of the collatefals. Ailen had no 
express authority from the other members of the fl.rm to 
guaranty the note of \Va)]ace, nor did the other members of 
the firm have any knowledge of such guaranty, or ever in any 
manner ratify the same, nor did they, prior to the bringing 
of this action have any knowledge that the deposit in the ' . First National Bank was paid from the proceeds of conaterale 
delivered by Wallace to Allen. 
Nickeus &: Baldwin, for appellants. 
Edgar W. Camp, for respondent. 
BARTHOLOMEW, J. (After stating the facts.) This action, eo 
far as these appellants are concerned, i.s brought on the guar-
anty heretofore mentioned, the defense being lack of authority 
on the part of Allen to thus bind the firm. Tb.e contract of 
guaranty was entered into contemporaneously with the execu-
tion of the note, and plaintiff parted with his money largely 
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upon the strength of the guaranty, and the considera.tion there-
for was ample. “ Ilaylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law,
69, and cases cited. The benefit received by the firm in obtain-
ing security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes
material only so far as it bears upon the question of the author-
ity of Allen to bind the firm. It i not usual for persons in
business to make themselves answerable for the conduct of
other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a
fpromissory note bearing the indorsement of a firm, either as
guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption
‘that the firm name was not signed in the usual course of part-
nership business, and no recovery can be had by simply show-
ing the indorsement. The holder is required to show special
authority to make the indorsement on the part of the partner
by whom the firm name was signed, or an authority to be im-
plied from the common course of business of the firm or pre-
vious course of dealing between the parties, or that the
indorsement was subsequently adopted and acted upon
by the firm. Swectser vs. French, 2 Cush. 309, 48 Am. Dec. 666;
Schermcrhorn vs. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; Bank vs.
Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot vs. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154, 10 Am. Dec.
208; Bank vs. Mcllonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan vs. H anaford,
42 Mich. 329, 3 N. WV. Rep. 944. In this case there was no pre-
vious course of dealing between t-he parties from which author-
ity on the part of Allen to guarantee in the firm name could be
implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent
ratification on the part of the firm, or any member thereof.
But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the pur-
pose of preserving the firm assets or collecting a firm debt, and
that the implied powers of a partner cover such a case. We
think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further
than any decided case warrants. The case of A ndrcws vs. Con-
gar, 102 U. S. (Co. Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support
the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one mem-
ber of a firm, without the consent of his copartners, indorsed in
the firm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It ap-
pear-ed, however, that the firm owned a majority of the stock of
the corporation,and the larger part of the benefit-s arising from
the notes accrued at once to the firm. The business of the


















































































































































CLARKE vs. w ALLAC.E. 303 
upon the strength of the guaranty, and the consideration there-
for was ample. · _Baylies, Sur. 54, 55; 9 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 
G9, and cases cited. The ben'efit received by the firm in obtain-
ing security on its deposit in the First National Bank becomes 
material only so far as it bears upon the question of the author-
ity of Allen to bind the firm. It is not usual for persons in 
business to make themselves answerable for the conduct of 
other people; and it is settled law that the party who takes a ! 
!promiss-0ry note bearing the indorsement of a firm, either as \ 
guarantors or sureties, takes it burdened with the presumption ' 
:that the firm name was not signed in the usual course of part-
pership business, and no recovery ran be bad by simply show- ' 
~ng the indorsement. The holder is required to show special 
~uthority to make the indorsement on the part of the partner 
by whom the firm name was signed, or an authority to be im-
plied from the common course of business of the firm or pre-
vious course of dealing between the parties, or that the 
indorsement was subsequently adopted and acted upon 
by the firm. Sweetser vs. F-rench, 2 Cush. 309, 48 Am. Dec. 666; 
Schermerh01"n vs. Schermerhorn, 1 Wend. 119; Bank vs. 
Bowen, 7 Wend. 158; Foot vs. Sabin, 19 Johns. 154, 10 Am. Dec. 
208; Bank vs. McDonald, 127 Mass. 82; Moynahan vs. Hanaford, 
42 Mich. 329, 3 N. ,V, Rep. 944. In this case there was no pre-
vious course of dealing between the parties from which author-
ity on the part of Allen to guarantee in the firm name could be 
implied; there was no express authority, and no subsequent 
ratification on the part of the firm, or any member thereof. 
But it is claimed that the indorsement was made for the pur-
pose of preserving the firm assets or collecting a firm debt, and 
that the implied powers of a partner cover such a case. We 
think, however, that plaintiff seeks to push the rule further 
than :my decided case warrants. The case of A.ndrews vs. Con-
gar, 102 U. S. (Co. Op. Ed.) bottom page 90, is cited to support 
the contention. It does not go so far. In that case one mem-
ber of a firm, without the consent of bis copartners, indorsed in 
the firm name certain notes issued by a corporation. It ap-
peared, however, that the firm owned a majQ.lity of the stock of 
the corporation, and the larger part of the benefits arising from 
the notes accrued at once to the firm. The business of the 
eorporation might almost be regarded as a branch of the busi-
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ness of the firm. But the correctness of the deci_sion in that
case seems to be questioned in Bates on Partnership (volume
1, § 321), and it no doubt goes as far as any court has gone in
that direction. In Lindley on Partnership, 341 (bottom pag-
ing), it is said: “The latter cases, however, decide that, unless
it can be shown that the giving of guaranties is necessary for
carrying on the business of the firm in the ordinary way, one of
the members will be held to have no implied authority to bind
the firm by them.” Nor do we think that one partner has any
implied power to bind his firm in the use of unusual and extra.-
ordinary means for collecting a debt. In this case the guar-
anty was not necessary to carry on the firm business in the or-
dinary way. It does not appear but that the deposit of the firm
would have been paid in full without the guaranty; but further
than that we are not willing to hold that one member of a firm,
in order to secure a debt, has implied authority to bind a firm
for a distinct and separate liability to a third person; and, par-
ticularly must that be true where, as in this case, the liability
incurred is several times greater than the debt sought to be
secured. It can be readily seen that any different rule would
be extremely hazardous. As fully sustaining our views, see
Moore vs. Stevens, 60 Miss. 809; Macklin vs. Kerr, 28 U. C. C. P.
90. Plaintiff failed to establish any liability upon the guar-
anty in suit as against these appellants, and the judgment of
the lower court as to them must be reversed, and a new trial
ordered. All concur. -
NOTE.-—S€B Mechem‘s Elem. of Partnership, Q 188.
1
JOHNSTON vs. DUTTON.
Supreme Court of Alabama, 1855.
27 Ala. 245.
Action by Dutton’s administrator against Johnston & Co.
The latter firm was composed of Johnston, Fogg and Vander-
slice. The notes were drawn and signed, in the firm name, by
Fogg. They were dated Dec. 17, 1852, and Jan. 8, 1853. John-
















































































































































304 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
ness of the firm. But the correctness of the decision in that 
case seems to be questioned in Bates on Partnership (volume 
1, § 321), and it no doubt goes as far as any court has gone in 
that direction. In Lindley on Partnership, 341 (bottom pag-
ing), it is said: "The latter cases, however, decide that, unless 
it can be shown that the gh•ing of guaranties is necessary for 
·carrying on the business of the firm in the ordinary way, one of 
the members will be held to have no implied authority to bind 
the firm by them." Nor do we think that one partner has any 
implied power to bind his firm in the use of unusual and extra-
ordinary means for collecting a qebt. In this case the guar-
anty was not necessary to carry on the firm business in the or-
dinary way. It does not appear but that the deposit of the firm 
would have been paid in full without the guaranty; but further 
than that we are not willing to hold that one m_ember of a firm, 
in order to secure a debt, has implied authority to bind a ftrm 
for a distinct and separate liability to a third person; and, par-
ticularly must that be true where, as in this case, the liability 
ineurred is several times greater than the debt sought to be 
secured. It can be readily seen that any different rule would 
be extremely hazard-0us. As fully sustaining our views, see 
Moore vs. Stevens, 60 Miss. 809; Uacklin vs. Kerr, 28 U. C. C. P. 
90. Plaintiff failed to establish any liability upon the guar-
anty in suit as against these appellants, and the judgment of 
the lower court as to them must be reversed, and a new trial 
ordered. All concur. 
NoTB.-See Mechem·a Elem. of Partnership, I 188. 
JOHNSTON vs. DUTTON. 
Supreme Court of Alabama, 1855. 
27 Ala. 245. 
Action by Dutton's administrator again-st Johnston & Co. 
The latter firm was composed of Johnston, Fogg and Vander-
slice. The notes were drawn and signed, in the firm name, by 
Fogg. They were dated Dec. 17, 1852, and Jan. 8, 1853. John-
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ston denied liability on the ground that prior to the giving of
the notes he had given personal notice to Dutton and had also
published a notice in the newspaper that he, Johnston, would
not be bound by or for any future contracts made by Fogg
without Johnston‘ consent. Other facts appear in the opin-
ion. Judgment for plaintitl’ and defendant appeal. _
P. Hamilton and F. S. Bloun t, for appellants.
R. H. Smith, contra.
GOl.l)'l‘IIWAl'l‘E, J . The evidence in this case tended to show
that the appellants and one Vanderslice carried on in copart-
nership a steam saw-mill, which, by the articles of copartner-
ship, was to continue at least five years; that the note sued on
was given with the concurrence of two of the partners, Fogg
and Vanderslice, for supplies necessary for the hands engaged
in carrying on the mill, which had been ordered by one of them.
Upon these facts alone, there can be no doubt that the firm
would be bound. The furnishing of supplies to those engaged
in the immediate direction of the business was essential to the
conducting of it, and within the scope of the purpose for which
the individuals had associated; and the authority of either of
the partners to purchase such supplies, and give the note 01'
the firm, cannot be questioned.
The principal ground of objection, however, is, that the evi-
dence proved that, before the goods were furnished and the
note given, the appellant, Johnston, gave notice to the public
that he would not be responsible for any future debt con-
tracted on account of the copartnership, and that this notice
was brought home to the party with whom the debt was con-
-tracted; and it is insisted that its effect was to revoke the
authority of the other partners, so far as he was concerned, to
bind the firm from that time. ,
It is to be observed, that in the present case the contract was
concurred in by two members of the firm; and the question,
therefore, is, as to the right of the majority to bind the other
pa;-me;-,a.gainst_their disst-nt,as to matters appertaining to the
common business, and in the absence of any stipulation con-
ferring that power in the articles of copartnership. This ques-
tion is a new one in this court, and indeed we have found no
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ston denied liability on the ground that prior to the giving of. 
the notes he bud given personal notice to Dutton and bad also 
published a notite in the newspaper tha.t he, Johnston, would 
not be bound by or for any future c-0ntracts made by Fogg 
without Johnston's consent. Other facts appear in the opin· 
ion. J udgrn:!n t for plain tifI and defendant appeal. 
P. lla111ilto1i and P. S. Blount, for appellants. 
I~. II. Smilli, contra.. 
Gor.nTIIWAITF., J. The eYidenre in this case tenclrd to s~rn\V 
that the appellants and one Vandrrslice carrir(l on in copart-
nership a steam saw-mill, which, by the articlP-s of copartner-
flhip, was to continue at least five years; that the note sued on 
was gfren \vith the concurrence of two of the partners, Fogg 
and Yandersliee, for supplies nec<~ssary for the hands engaged 
in cnil'ying on the mill, which had been ordered by one of them. 
Upon these facts alone, there can be no doubt that the firm 
would be bound. The furnishing of supplies to those engaged 
in the immediate direction of the business was essential to the 
conducting of it, and within the scope of the purpose for which 
the individuals had associatrd; and the authority of either of 
the partners to purchase such supplies, and give the note of 
the firm, cannot be qut>stioned. 
The principal ground of objection, however, is, that the evi· 
dence proved that, before the goods were furnished and the 
note given, the appellant, Johnston, gave notice to the public 
that he would not be responsible for any future debt C()n· 
tracted on account of the copa1·tnership, and that this notice 
was b1·ought home to the pai1y wilh whom the debt was con· 
tracted; and it is insisted that its effect was to revoke the 
nuthot•ity of the other partners, so far as he was concerned, to 
bind the firm from that time. 
It is to be observed, that in the present case the contract was 
concurred in by two members of the firm; and the question, 
therefore, is, as to the right of the majority to bind the other 
partners, against their diss~nt,as to matters appertaining to the 
common business, and in the absence of any stipulation con· 
!erring that power in the articles of c-0partnership. This ques-
tion is a new one in this court, and indeed we have found no 
case in which it bas been expressly decided. Both in England 
39 
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Q
and the United States, there are cases which assert the general
proposition, that a partner may protect himself against the con-
equences of a future contract, by giving notice of his dissent
to the party with whom it is about to be made. Gallway vs. Mat-
thew, 10 East 264; Will-is vs. Dyson, 1 Stark. 164; ll‘-icc vs. Flem-
ing, 1 Y. & Jerv, 227, 230; Lc(u:itt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 125, post
p. 308; Feiglcy vs. Sponebcrger, 5 W. & S. 564; Monroe vs. Con-
nor, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. And where the firm consists
if-bf but two persons and there is nothing in the articles to pre-
‘ vent each from having an equal voice in the direction and con-
J trol of the common business, the correctness of the proposition
cannot be questioned. In such case, the duty of each partner
? would require him not to enter into any contract from which
I the other in good faith dissented; and if he did, it would be a
violation of the obligations which were imposed by the nature
‘| of the partnership. It would not, in fact, be the contract of
the firm; and the party with whom it was made, having notice,
‘could not enforce it as such. So, if the firm was composed of
,more than two persons, and one of them dissented, the party
. with whom the contract is made acts at his peril, and cannot
ihold the dissenting partner liable, unless his liability results
lfrom the articles or from the nature of the partnership con-
mpact. All the cases can be sustained on this principle; and
1 is in strict analogy with the civil law, which holds where the
stipulations of the partnership expressly intrust the diq,,fi'ion
and control of the business to one of the partners, that the‘dis-
sent of the other would not avail, if the contract was made in
good faith, (Pothier, Traits du Com. dc Soc., No. 71, 90); and
such also, we think, is the rule of the common law. Const vs.
Harris, Turn & Russ. 496; Story on Partn. Sec. 121. Were it
otherwise it would be denying to parties the right to make
their own contracts. If our views as to the governing force
of express stipulations are correct, the efl’ect of such terms
or conditions as result by clear implication from the articles,
or arise out of the nature of the partnership, must be the
same. It is as if they had been expressly provided.
_ Now, whenever a partnership is formed by more than two
persons, we think that in the absence of any express provision
to the contrary, there is always an implied understanding that
(the acts of the majority are to prevail over those of the min-
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and the United States, there are cases which assert the general 
proposition, that a partner may protect himself against the con: 
sequences of a future rontract, by giving ru>tice otf his dissent 
to the party with whom it is about to be made. Gallway vs. Mat-
thew, 10 East 264; Willis 11s. Dyson, 1 Stark. 164; rice vs. Flem-
ing, 1 Y. & Jerv, 227, 230; Leavitt vs. Peck, 3 Conn. 125, post 
p. 308; Feigky vs. 8poneberger, 5 W. & S. 564; Monroe vs. Oon-
or, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. And where the firm consists 
of but two persons and there is nothing in the articles to pre-
vent each from having an equal voice in the direction and con-
trol of the common business, the <.'<>rrectness of the proposition 
cannot be questioned. In such case, the duty ()f each partner 
would require him not to enter into any contract from which 
the other in good faith dissented; and if be did, it would be a 
violation of the obligations which were imposed by the nature 
of the partnership. It would not, in fact, be the contract of 
the firm; and the party with whom it was made, having notice, 
could not enforce it as such. So, if the firm was composed of 
more than two persons, and one of them dissented, the party 
with whom the contract is made acts at his peril, and cannot 
hold the dissenting partner liable, unless bis liability results 
from the articles or from the nature of the partnership con-
tract. All the cases can be sustained on this principle; and 
1 is in strict analogy with the civil law, which holds where the 
stipulations of the partnership expressly intrust the di-•'ion ..,... 
and control of the business to one of the partners, that tne dis-
sent of the other would not avail, if the contract was made in 
good faith, (Pothier, Traite du Com. de l~oc., No. 71, 90); and 
such also, we think, is the rule of the common law. Const vs. 
Harris, Turn & Huss. 496; Story on Partn. Sec. 121. Were it 
otherwise it would be denying to parties the right to make 
their own contracts. If our views as to the governing force 
of express stipulations are correct, the effect of such terms 
or conditions as result by clear implication from the article!':, 
or arise out of the nature of the partnership1 must be the 
same. It is as if they had been expressly provided. 
~ 
Now, whenever a partnership is formed by more than two 
persons, we think that in the absence of any express provision 
to the contrary, there is always an implied understanding that 
1 the acts of the majority are to prevail over those of the min-
( ority, as to all matters within the scope of the common busi-
' 
, 
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ness; and such we understand to be the doctrine asserted by
Lord ELDON in Const vs. Harris, supra, and such was the
opinion of Judge Story: Story on Part., sec. 123; 3 Kent’s
Com. (5 ed.) 45. The rule as thus laid down, is certainly more
reasonable and just, than to allow the minority to stop the
operations of the concern, against the views of the majority.
We do not sav that it would-be a bona fidc transaction, so as
to bind the firm, if the majority choose information to or consultation with the minority (Story on
Part. sec. 123); but when, as in the present case, the one partner
has given notice, and expressed his dissent in advance, there
could be no reason or propriety in requiring him to be con-
sulted by the other two.
We do not consider the cases to which we have been referred,
holding that one partner has the right at pleasure to dissolve
a partnership, although the articles provide that it is to con-
tinue for a specified term (lllarquand vs. New York Ins. Co., 17
Johns. 525; Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Id. 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286), as
having any bearing on the case under consideration. Conced-
ing they are law—-which is doubtful (Story on Part. sec. 275, n.
3, and cases there cited)—the decision rests solely upon the
ground, that the limitation on the right of dissolution is incom-
patible with the nature of the copartnership contract; and this
principle does not militate against the position we have
asserted. The dissent, in the present case, cannot be regarded
as a dissolution; for, if effectual, it would not necessarily pro-
duce that result, although it might operate to change the mode
of conducting the business. In other words, it might be car-
ried on without contracting debts.
Our conclusion is, that the act, being concurred in by two
of the partners, was, under the circumstances, the act of the
firm; and that the charge, asserting the proposition that the
dissent of one partner against the other two would necessarily
exonerate him, was properly refused.
Judgment afiirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 163, 189.
Compare with cases following. ____ _
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nees; and such we understand to be the doctrine asserted by 
Lord ELDON in Const VB. Harris, supra, and such was the 
opinion of Judge Story: Story on Part., sec. 123; 3 Kent's 
Com. (5 ed.) 45. The rule as thus laid down, is certainly more 
reasonable and just, than to allow the . minority to stop the 
operations of the concern, against the views of the majority. 
W~ do not sa__y that it would ·be a bona fide transaction, so as 
to bind the firm, if the majority choOf!e wanjWJJy to 1ict wHhou;._ 
information to or consultation with the min.o-ri.!..Y (Story on 
Part. sec. 123); but when, as in the present case, the one pai-tner 
bas given notice, and expi-essed his dissent in advance, there 
could be no reason or propriety in requiring him to be con· 
suited by the other two. 
We do not consider the cases to which we have been referred, 
holding that one partner has the right at pleasure to dissolve 
a partnership, although the articles provide that it is to con· 
tinne for a specified term (Marquand t•s. New York Ins. Co., 17 
Johns. 525; Skinner VB. Dayton, 19 ~d. 513, 10 Am. Dec. 286), as 
having any bearing 011 the case under consideration. Conced-
ing they are law-which is doubtful (Story on Part. sec. 275, n. 
3, and cases there <:ited)-the decision rests solely upon the 
ground, that the limitation on the right of dissolution is incom-
patible with the nature of the copartnership contract; and this 
principle does not militate against the position we have 
asserted. The dissent, in the present cHse, cannot be regnnled 
as a dissolution; for; if effectual, it wouM. not necessarily pro-
duce that result, although it might operate to chang~ the mode 
of conducting the business. In other words, it might be car-
ried on without contracting debts. 
Our conclusion is, that the act, being concurred in by two 
of the partners, was, under the circumstances, the act of the 
.O.rm; and that the chargP., asst:"t1ing 11.e p1·oposition that the 
dissent of one partner against the other two would necessarily 
Pxonerate him, was properly refused. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 163, 189. 
Compare with cases foHowiog. 
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LEAVITT Vs. PECK.
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1819.
8 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157.
Action, against G-ad Peck and Egbert D. Peck, as copartners
under the firm name of Egbert D. Peek, to recover upon :1.
promissory note made by Egbert to Gad, and by him endorsed
to plaintifi’. There was evidence that Gad was a dormant
partner with Egbert, but Gad denied this and a.lso proved that
when plainlifl’ applied to him to sign the note with Egbert he
had refused to do so, but agreed to indorse it and did indorse
it, and that plaintiff accepted it. Verdict for and
~h1)1)c.1lcd. /\_’QJ/I/..,, \> €
N. Smith and Twining, for appellant.
1
Staples and Denison, eontra._
]1os.\n-zn, C. J. It is a well established principle that the
contract of a partner is obligatory on his copartner, by virtue
of an implied authority which may be rebutted by a refusal to
be bound by his acts. By legal consequence, the partner
whose authority is thus declined cannot bind the copartner-
ship in favor of those who have knowledge of this fact: Gal-
~wa_1/ vs. Matthew, 1 Campb. 403; S. C. I0 East 264; Willis vs.
D3/son, 1 Stark; 164. Nothing can be more reasonable than
~that a person may protect himself in this manner against the
fraud and misconduct of his associate. The principle under
consideration is not founded at all on any supposed waiver by
the creditor; but solely and exclusively on the declaration of
the person declining to be bound. The implied authority of
his partner he has annihilated; and the contract in the name
of the firm is of no validity beyond the personal obligation it
infers on the individual making it.
Vvhether a person in any given case has rebutted the implied
authority of his partner to-bind him, is a question of fact. On
this head I am inclined to think the charge to the jury wag
incorrect. They were directed, if Gad Peck was a dormant

















































































































































308 CASES ON PARTNERSIIIP. 
LEA VITT vs. PECK. 
Supreme Court of Con11ccticut, 1819. 
8 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157. 
Ac1ion, ngninst Gnd reek and Egbert D. reek, as copartnC'r& 
under the firm name of Egbert D. l'C'ck, to recover upon a. 
promissory note made by Egbert to Gad, and by him endorsed 
to plaintiff. There was evidence that Gad was a durniant 
partner with J<:gbert, but Gad denied this and also 1n·on•d that 
when plaintiff applic·d to him to sign the note with Egbert he 
liad refused to do so, but agreed to indorse it and did in1lorse ' 
it, and that J>laintilI accepted it. Verdict fo1· ~HI and 
~"1ppcalcd. /\/(_/?,-._.;_ ·\_.J ,~. { 
N. Smitl! mu] 1'1ri11i119, for ap11cllant. 
' Staples and Denison., contra.. 
Ilos:'lrnn, C. J. It is a well establiflhed principle that the 
contract of a partner is obliiwtory on bis copartner, by virtue 
of an implied authority wllich may be rebutted by a refusal to 
be bound by his acts. Ily legal consequence, the partn_er 
whose authority is thus declined cannot bind the copartner-
ship in favor of those who Jmve knowledge <>f this fact: Ga1,.. 
·way t:s. Mattlw1v, 1 Campb. 403; S. C. to East 264; lVillis vs. 
Dyson, 1 Stark. 164. Nothing can be more reasonable than 
·that a pel'son may protect himBelf in this manner against the 
fraud and misconduct of bis associate. The principle under 
consideration is not founded at all on any supposed waiver by ~ 
the creditor; but solely and exclusively on the declaration of 
the person declining to be bound. The implied authority of 
bis partner he has annihilated; and the contract in the name 
of the firm is of no validity beyond the personal obligation it 
infers on the individual making it. 
'Vhether a person in any given case has rebutted the implied 
nuthority of his partner to bind him, is a question of fact. On 
this head I am inclined to think the charge to the jury was 
in<'orrect. They were directed, if Gad reek was a dormant 
partner with Egbert, and refused to give a joint note with 
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him, to render a verdict for the defendant. The charge
involved this principle, that a refusal by Gad Peck to put his
name to the note in suit was necessarily a. revocation of
Egbert’s implied authority. This ascribed a consequence to
the act of Gad Peck which the premises did not warrant. It
is very possible that he might decline aflixing his signature
to the note, and not refuse to be bound by his acts as a partner.
l am aware that there is a difliculty attending the prohibition
of Egbert’s authority without dissolving the partnership, but
l do not consider it as insuperable. If it should appear that
Gad Peck did not merely decline to execute a. joint note with
Egbert, but refused to be bound by his acts, at all events,
and this was clearly understood by the plaintiff, I should con-
sider him as within the principle of the cited cases.
The ignorance of the plaintiffs relative to the existence of \
the copartnership could be of no avail. It is true, they did
not know that Gad Peck was partner with Egbert; and of con-
sequence, they could not foreee the manner in which his
refusal to become bound as joint promisor would operate. But
they would know, and this alone was necessary, that if Egbert
were a partner, his authority was disclaimed. The opposite
principle involves this proposition: that the plaintiff must have
knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal
would extend. Sufficient is it, if they know the fact, that in
every conceivable shape, Gad Peck refued to be bound by the
note of Egbert.
New trial to be granted.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 163.
WIPPERMAN vs. STACY.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.
so Wis. 345, 50 N. w. Rep. ass.
Action for the price of goods sold by Wipperman to Green
and Stacy. Recovery below and Stacy appeals.
The defendants, F. F. Green and W. H. Stacy, on the 26th
















































































































































WIPPEIUU.N VS. STACY. 809 
him, to render a verdict for the defendant. The charge 
involved tbie principle, that a refusal by Gad Peck to put hie 
name to the note in suit was necessarily a revocation of 
Egbert's implied authority. This ascribed a consequenee to 
the act of Gad Peck which the premises did not warrant. It 
is very possible that he might decline affixing his signature 
to the note, and not refuse to be bound by bis acts ae a partner. 
1 am aware that there is a difficulty attending the prohibition 
of Egbert's authority without dissolving the partnership, but 
I do not consider it as insuperable. If it should appear that 
Gad Peck did not merely decline to execute a joint note with 
Egbert, but refused to be bound by his acts, at all events, 
and this was cleal'ly understood by the plaintiff, I should con· 
sider him as within the principle of the cited cases. 
The ignorance of the plaintiffs relative to the existence of\ 
the copartnership could be of no avail. It is true, they did 
not know that Gad Peck was partner with Egbert; and of con-
sequence, they could not foresee the manner in which bis 
refusal to become bound as joint promisor would operate. But 
they would know, and this alone was necessary, that if Egbert 
were a partner, bis authority was disclaimed. The opposite 
principle involves this proposition: that the plaintiff must have 
knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal 
would extend. Sufficient is it, if they know the fact, that in 
every conceivable shape, Gad Peck refused to be bound by the 
note of Egbert. 
New trial to be granted. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 168. 
WIPPERMAN vs. STACY. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891. 
80 Wis. 34/'i, 50 N. W . Rt>p. 836. 
Action for the price of goods sold by 'Vipperman to Green 
and Stacy. Recovery below and Stacy appeals. 
The defendants, F. F. Green and W. H. Stacy, on the 26th 
day of October, 1888, entered into an ag1·eement whereby 
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defendant Green was to put in his time and labor, and the
said Stacy was to furnish $20,000 in money or credits, to carry
on the business of retail merchandise at the village of Keshena,
in this state, and they were to share the profits of said business
equally. The said Green was to have the purchasing of all
goods that were used in said store, but of parties named by
said Stacy. Stacy resided at Clintonville, a considerable dis-
tance from Keshena, and Green resided at Keshena with his
family. Plaintitf had been in the habit of selling goods to
the concern at Kcshena on the order of Green, and by the con-
sent of Stacy, up to the 3d day of December, 1888. On that
day Stacy served upon the plaintiff the following notice:
“Clintonville, Wisconsin, Dec. 3d, 1888. Dear Sir: Don’t
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me unless by
an order [upon order] from Clintonville,given by me. [Signed.]
W. H. Stacy.” About that time Stacy published in a Clinton-
ville paper the following notice: “Notice is hereby given that
I, \V. H. Stacy, do forbid all and every one from selling F. F.
Green, in my name, anything of any kind or nature, for I will
not pay for the same, nor hold myself responsible. [Signed.]
VV. H. Stacy.” Of the goods sued for, part were sold and
delivered and went into the Keshena store before, and part
after, the service of the above notice; and they were used or
sold and accounted for in said store; and Stacy knew that at
least some of them were so sold and delivered and used or
sold in said store after the service of said notice, and without
any objection from him. Stacy was often at the store, and
knew what business was done, and all the bills for the same
were present in the store, open to his observation and inspec-
tion.
Benjamin M. Goldberg (Charles Barber, of counsel), for
appellant.
E. J. Goodrich, for respondents.
OR'roN, J. (After stating the facts.) The referee found, in
both cases, that the defendant Stacy, by his acts and conduct,
previous and subsequently to said notice, in receiving the
plaintitf’s goods without hindrance or objection, and selling
the same, and applying the proceeds to the use and benefit of
the said copartnership, ratified and approved or consented to

















































































































































310 CA.SES ON p ARTS EB.SHIP. 
defendant Green was to put in his time and labor, and the 
said Stacy was to furnish $20,000 in money or credits, to carry 
on the business of retail merchandise at the village of Kesbena, 
in this state, and they were to share the profits of said business 
equally. The said Green was to have the purchasing of all 
goods that were used in said store, but of parties named by 
said Stacy. 8tar.y resided at Clintonville, a considerable dis-
tance from Keshena, and Green resided at Keshena with his 
family. Plaintiff had been in the habit of selling goods to 
the concern at Keshena on the order of Green, and by the con-
Rent of Stacy, up to tlle 3d day of December, 1888. On that 
day Stacy served upon the plaintiff the following notice: 
"Clintonyille, '\Visconsin, Dec. 3d, 1888. Dear Sir: Don't 
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me unless by 
an ord2r [upon order] from Clintonville, given by ri1e. [Signed.] 
W. H. Stacy/' About that time Stacy published in a Clinton· 
ville paper the following notice: "Notice is hereby given that 
I, ,V, H. Stacy, do forbid all and every one from selling F. F. 
Green, in my nnme, anything of any kind or nature, for I will 
not pay for tbe same, nor hold myself responsible. [Signed.] 
'\V. H. Stacy." Of the goods sued for, part were sold and 
delivered and went into the Keshena store before, and part 
after, the service of the above notice; and they were used or 
sold and accounted for in said store; and Stacy knew that at 
least some of them were so sold and delivered and used or 
sold in said store after the service of said notice, and without 
any objection from him. Stacy was often at the store, and 
. knew what business was done, and all the bills for the same 
were present in the store, open to bis observation and inspec-
tion. 
Benjamin M. Goldberg (Charles Barber, of counsel), for 
appellant. 
E. J. Goodrick, for respondents. 
OnToN, J. (After stating the facts.) The referee found, in 
both cases, that the defendant Stacy, by his acts and conduct, 
previous and subsequently to said notice, in receiving the 
plaintiff's ~oods without hindrance or objection, and selling 
the same, and applying the proceeds to the use and benefit of 
the said copartnership, ratified and approved or consented to 
the doings and acts of bis copartner, F. F. Green, in said 
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matter. This finding appears to have been fully warranted by
the evidence. These are the substantial and material facts,
and, as a question of fact, we cannotdisturb the finding of the
referee. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that
the firm is not liable for any goods sold to it by the order of
Green after the service of that notice. There was no provision
in the agreement of copartnership for any such notice to those
who are selling goods to the concern, not to sell on Green’s
order. There is a clause, “that said goods shall be purchased
of parties named by said WV. H. Stacy.” That can have force
only as between Stacy and Green. Stacy may name to Green
the parties from whom he shall purchase goods for the concern.
From the fact that the plaintiff had been selling goods to the
firm for a long time by the consent and acquiescence of Stacy,
the presumption would be that he was one of the parties named
by Stacy. There is no evidence that Stacy had ever notified
Green that he should not continue to purchase good-s of the
plaintiff. It follows that Green had the right to continue to
purchase of the plaintifl’. If Green had such right, then the
plaintiff had the right to sell to him, so far as the agreement
is concerned. It is stipulated that Green should have the
purchasing of all goods that are used in said store. The only
limitation of that right was that Stacy should name the parties
from whom purchases might be made by him, and that limita-
tion Stacy has never attempted to enforce upon Green. Green
had the right, therefore, to purchase from whom he pleaed. If
Green had the right to purchase, the plaintiff had the right to
sell. ¥Vhat right had Stacy to forbid the plaintifi’ from selling
to Green or any-one else? The agreement contains no such
provision. This must be the legal construction of the agree-
ment. But the notice is not that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the firm of Stacy & Green for their store. But it is: “Don’t
let F. F. Green have anything to be charged to me, unless by
order [or upon order] given by me.” The notice provided for
in the agreement is personal to Stacy and Green as individuals.
“Don’t let Green have anything on my account, without my
order,” is the effect of the notice. The plaintiff had the right
to construe and undertand this notice according to its lan-
guage. The plaintiff had no notice from Stacy not to sell
goods to the partnership to be charged to the partnership. The
















































































































































WIPPERMA..N VS. STACY. 311 
matter. This finding appears to have been fully warranted by 
the evidence. These are the substantial and material facts, 
und, as a question of fact, we cannot'disturb the finding of the 
referee. The learned counsel of the appellant contends that 
the firm is not liable for any goods sold to it by the order of 
Green after the sen·ice of that notice. There was no provision 
in the agreement of copartnership for any such notice t-0 those 
who are selling goods to the concern, not to sell on Green~s 
order. There is a clause, "that said goods shall be purchased 
of parties named by said \V. H. Stacy." That can have force 
only as between Stacy and Green. Stacy may name to Green 
the parties from whom he shall purchase goods for the concern. 
F1·om the fact that the plaintiff had been selling goods fo the 
firm for a long time by the consent and acquiescence of Stacy, 
the presumption would be that he was one of the parties named 
by Stacy. There is no evidence that Stacy had ever notified 
. Green that he should not continue to purchase goods of the 
plaintiff. It follows that Green had the right to continue to 
purchase of the plaintiff. If Green had such right, then the 
plaintiff had the right to sell to him, so far as the agreement 
is concerned. It is stipulated that Green should have the 
purchasing of all goods that are used in said store. The only 
limitation of that riglit was that Stacy should name the parties 
from whom purchases might he made by him, and that limita-
tion Stacy bas never attempted to enforce upon Green. Green 
had the right, therefore, to purchase from whom be pleased. If 
Green had the right to purchase, the plaintiff had the right to 
sell. \Vhat right had Stacy to forbid the plaintiff from selling 
to Green or any one else? The agreement contains no such 
provision. This must be the legal construction of the agree-
ment. But the notice is not that the plaintiff shall not sell 
to the firm of Stacy & Green for theil' store. But ,it is: "Don't 
let F . F. Green have anything to be charged to me, unless by 
order [or upon order] given by me." The notice provided for 
in the agreement is personal to Stacy and Green as individuals. 
"Don't let Green have anything on my account, without my 
order," is the effect of the notice. The plaintiff had the right 
to construe and understand this notice according to its lan-
guage. The plaintiff had no notice from Stacy not to sell 
goods to the partnership to be charged to the partnership. The 
notice, therefore, has no effect whatever upon the liability of 
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the firm, even if Stacy had any right to give it. But if the
notice can be construed to mean that the plaintiff shall not sell
to the concern to be charged to the concern, which was the only
thing he had been doing or offered to do, it is equally nugatory,
because not provided for in the agreement.
The only other contention of the learned counsel is that
the agreement does not constitute a copartnership between
Stacy and Green. It seems to us that it contains every essen-
tial element of a partnership. Stacy was to contribute his
money, and Green his skill and labor as a merchant, and to
conduct the business and make all the purchases, and they
were each to have one-half the profits. Although there is no
provision that each was to bear one-half of the losses, the equal
division of the profits implies that of the losses. Upham vs.
Hewitt, 42 YVis. 85. As is said in that case, where there was no
such express provision, “there was necessarily a communion of
profit and loss.” Rosenficld vs. Height, 53 Wis. 260, 10 N. W.
Rep. 378, 40 Am. Rep. 770, 1 Lindl.1’artn. 12; see Gilbank vs.
Stephenson, 31 Wis. 592, and other cases cited in respondent’s
brief. But the evidence that Stacy knew that these goods
were being sold to the firm, and that they were received into
the store, and were being sold out, and tacitly assented to the
purchases, and participated in the profits derived therefrom,
without dissent or objection, is a ratification of the purchases,
and it is now too late for him to shield himself by such a
notice, even if it had been given to Green himself with the
knowledge of the plaintifi. The liability of the partnership
is beyond question.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.





























































































































































812 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
the ftrm, even if Stacy bad any right to give it. But if the 
notice can be construed to mean that the plaintiff shall not sell 
to the concern to be charged to the concern, which was the only 
thing he had been doing or offered to do, it is equally nugatory, 
because not provided for in the agreement. 
The only othe1• contention of the learned counsel is that 
the agreement does not constitute a copartnershlp between 
Stacy and Green. It seems to us that it contains evecy essen-
tial element of a partnership. Stacy was to contribute bis 
money, and Green his skill and labor as a merchant, and to 
conduct the business and make all the purchases, and they 
were each to have one-half the profits. Although there is no 
provision that each was to bear one-half of the losses, the equal 
division of the profits implies that of the losses. Upham vs. 
Hewitt, 42 Wis. 85. As is said in that case, where there was no 
such express provision, "there was necessarily a communion of 
profit and loss." Rosenfield vs. Haight, 53 "\Vis. 260, 10 N. W. 
Rep. 378, 40 Am. Rep. 770, 1 Lindi. Partn. 12. See Gilbank vs. 
Stephenson, 31 Wis. 59~, and other cases cited in respondent's 
brief. But the evidence that Stacy knew that these goods 
were being sold to the firm, and that they were received into 
the store, and were being sold out, and tacitly assented to the 
purchases, and participated in the profits derived therefrom, 
without dissent or objection, is a ratification of the purchases, 
and it is now too late for him to shield himself by such a 
notice, even if it had been given to Green himself with the 
knowledge of the plaintiff. The liability of the partnership 
is beyond question. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 
NoTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § i63. 
( 
x.,
WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF A PARTNER.
(See also the cases under Subd. IX, ante.)
1. In Oonrrcscr.
PITKIN vs. BENFER.
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1893.
50 Kan. 108, 31 Pac. Rep. 695, 84 Am. St. Rep. 110.
Action by Geo. W. Pitkin & Co. against John Y. Benfer, H.
C. Settle and L. B. Keith, as copartners doing business under
the firm name of John Y. Benfer, to recover for goods sold and
delivered. There had been such a firm, but, in pursuance of a
notice given in January, it was dissolved on the last day of
February, 1888. Benfer gave a written order for the goods on
February 9, but stipulated that they should not be shipped
until March 1, 1888. Plaintiffs, at the time of the sale, did
not know of the partnership, and charged the goods to Benfer.
Judgment below was in favor of Settle and Keith, and plaintitf
appealed.
H. (7. Solomon, for plaintiffs.
Wells ¢€ Wells, for defendants.
Jonxsrox, J. (After stating the facts.) It is insisted by
plaintitfs in error that, as Settle and Keith were dormant part-
ners of the firm of John Y. Benfer, they are liable for the goods
ordered during the existence of the partnership. It will be
observed that, while the goods were ordered during the con-
tinuance of the partnership, they were not to be shipped or
delivered until the partnership had expired. By agreement of
the parties the partnership was to be discontinued on the last
day of February,1888,and Benfer ordered the goods in his own


















































































































































WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF A PARTNER. 
(See also the cases under Subd. IX, ante.) 
1. IN CONTRACT. 
PITKIN vs. BENFER. 
Supreme Court of Kansas, 1892. 
ISO Kan. 108, 81 Pac. Rep. 695, 24 Am. St. Rep. 110. 
Action by Geo. W. Pitkin & Co. against John Y. Benfer, H. 
C. Bettle and L. B. Keith, as copartners doing business under 
the firm name of John Y. Benfer, to recover for goods sold and 
delivered. There bad been such a firm, but, in pursuance of a 
notice given in January, It was dissolved on the last day of 
February, 1888. Benfer gave a written order for the goods on 
February 9, but stipulated that they should not be shipped 
until March 1, 1888. Plaintiffs, at the time of the sale, did 
not know of the partnership, and charged the goods to Benfer. 
Judgment below was in favor of Settle and Keith, and plaintiff 
appealed. 
H. 0. Solomon, for plaintiffs. 
Wells~ Wells, for defendants. 
JOHNSTON, J. (After sta.ting the facts.) It Is insisted by 
plaintiffs in error that, as Settle and Keith were dormant part-
ners of the firm of John Y. Benfer, they are liable for the goods , 
ordered during the existence of the partnership. It will be 1 
observed that, while th·e goods were ord€red during the con-
tinuance of the partnership, they were not to be shipped or 
deJiYercd until the partnership had expired. By agreement of 
the parties the partnership was to be discontinued on the last 
day of February,1888,and Benfer orde1·ed the goods in his own 
name, to be shipped the day after the dissolution of the partner-
40 
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ship occurred. It is true, as contended, that the persons who
participate in the profits of a trade or business ostensibly car-
ried on by another are liable for contracts made and credits
given during the existence of the partnership. The credit is not
presumed to have been given on the sole and separate respon-
sibility of the ostensible partner, but binds all for whom the
partner acts, if done in their business and for their benefit,
to the same extent as though the partnership had been open
and avowed. Here, however, no goods had been furnished, no
sale made, nor was any credit given while the partnership
existed. Particular attention is called to the case of Bromley
-vs. Elliot, 38 N. H. 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182, as being on all fours
with the case at bar. In that case the goods were furnished
and the credit given while the dormant partner was a mem-
ber of the firm. He received the benefits of the transaction,
and, according to all the authorities, was equally liable with
the ostensible partner. The distinction in this case is that the
goods were not received while Settle and Keith were connected
with the partnership, nor was it intended by Benfer that they
should be shipped and delivered to the firm. Knowing that
the partnership would expire with the month of February, Ben-
fer ordered the goods in his own name, and particularly
directed that they should not be shipped to him until the 1st.
of March, after the expiration of the partnership. It was evi-
dently his intention that no sale or shipment would be made
to the firm, and that delivery would be purposely deferred until
he would have absolute control of the business. No benefits
were received by Settle and Keith from the transaction, nor
was there any credit given to the firm for these goods while
they were members of it. A dormant partner, when discov-
ered, is liable to the same extent as an ostensible partner, but
no further; and, if the partnership had been open and avowed
in this case, and its duration known, and Benfer had ordered
goods in its own name, to be shipped and delivered after the
dissolution of the partnership, Settle and Keith would not have
been liable for the value of the same. Judge S'ronY, in speak-
ing of the liability of dormant partners, remarks that “of
course, the retiring partner is not, by his retirement, exoner~
ated from the prior debts and liabilities of the firm. In the first
place, then, a dormant partner is not liable for any debts or
other contracts of the firm, except for those which are con-
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ship occurred. It is true, as contended, that the persons who 
participate in the profits of a trade or business ostensibly car-
ried on by another are liable for contracts made and credits 
given during the existence of the partnership. The credit is not 
presumed to have been given on the sole and separate respon-
sibility of the ostensible partner, but binds all for whom the 
partner acts, if done in their business and for their benefit, 
to the same extent as though the partnership bad been open 
and avowed. Here, however, no goods had been furnished, no 
sale made, nor was any credit given while the partnership 
existed. Particular attention is called to the case of Brom'ley 
t:B. Elliot, 38 N. H. 287, 75 Am. Dec. 182, as being on all fours 
with the case at bar. In that case the goods were furnished 
and the credit given while the dormant partner was a mem-
ber of the firm. He received the benefits of the transaction, 
and, according to all the authorities, was equally liable with 
the ostensible partner. The distinction in this case is that the 
goods were not received while Settle and Keith were connected 
with the partnership, nor was it intended by Benfer that they 
should be shipped and delivered to the firm. Knowing that 
the partnership would expire with the month of February, Ben-
fer ordered the goods in his own name, and particularly 
directed that they should not be shipped to him until the 1st 
of March, after the expiration of the partnership. It was evi-
dently his intention that no sale or shipment would be made 
to the fl.rm, and that delivery would be purposely deferred until 
he would have absolute control of the business. No benefits 
were received by Settle and Keith from the transacti-On, nor 
was there any credit given to the firm for these goods while 
they were members of it. A dormant partner, when discov-
ered, is liable to the same extent as an ostensible partner, but 
no further; and, if the partnership bad been open and avowed 
in this case, and its duration known, and Benfer had ordered 
goods in its own name, to be shipped and delivered after the 
dissolution of the partnership, Settle and Keith would not have 
been liable for the value of the same. Judge STonY, in speak-
ing of the liability of dormant partners, remarks that "of 
course, the retiring partner is not, by his retirement, exoner-
ated from the prior debts and liabilities of the firm. In the first 
place, then, a dormant partner is not liable for any debts or 
other contracts of the firm, except for those which a.re con-
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tracted during the period that he remains a dormant partner.
Upon his retirement, his liability ceases, as it began, dc jure,
only with his accession to the firm. The reason is that no
credit is, in fact, in uch case, giv'en to the dormant partner.
His liability is created by operation of law, independent of
his intention, from his mere participation in the profits of the
business; and therefore it ceases by operation of law as soon
as such participation in the profits ceases, whether notice of his
retirement be given or not.” Story, Partn. § 159. See, also,
Pars. Partn. (3d Ed.) p. 451. Here no liability was created
until Settle and Keith had retired from the firm. The goods
never came into the possession of the firm, nor was it the pur-
pose that they should. They were sold to Benfer, and came
into his individual possession as his own property, and he sold
them as such. We think the court correctly held that he alone
was liable for the price of the same. A
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
All the justices concurred.
NOTE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §§ 193, 265.
GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1850.
22 Vt. 181, 54 Am. Dec. 64.
Action by Grifiith & Co. against Buffum and Ainsworth as
partners, to recover for marble sold to Butfum. Judgment to
account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor was
appointed to report the facts. Judgment was rendered for the
defendants upon the report. The facts appear from the
opinion.
Cook, Harrington ¢€- Ross, for the plaintiffs.
D. E. Niclwlson, for the defendants. ~
HALL, J. The question for our decision is, whether, upon
the facts reported by the auditor, the defendants are properly
chargeable with the marble slabs sold and delivered by the
















































































































































GRIFFITH vs. Bu.F.Uull. 815 
tracted during the period that be remains a dormant partner. 
Upon bis retirement, his liability ceases, as it began, de jure, 
only with his accession to the firm. The reason is that no 
credit is, in fact, in such case, given to the dormant partner. 
His liability is created by operation of law, independent of 
his intention, from his mere participation in the profits of the 
businetis; and therefore it ceases by operation of law as soon 
as such participation in the profits ceases, whether notice of his 
retirement be given or not." Story, Partn. § 150. See, also, 
l'ars. Partn. (3d Ed.) p. 451. Ilere no liability was created 
until Settle and Keith had retired from the firm. The goods 
never came into the possession of the firm, nor was it the pur-
pose that they should. '£hey were sold to Benfer, and came 
into his individual possession as his own property, and he sold 
them as such. \Ve think the court correctly held that he alone 
was liable for the price of the same. 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
All the justices concurred. 
NoTE.-See Mechem's Elem. of Partn .• §a Ul3, 2G3. 
GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM. 
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1850. 
22 Vt. 181, M Am. Dec. 64. 
Action by Griffith & Co. against Buffum and Ainsworth as 
partners, to recover for marble sold to Buffum. Judgment to 
account was rendered in the county court, and an auditor was 
appointed to report the facts. Judgment was rendered for the 
defendants upon the report. The facts appear from the 
opinion. 
Cook, Harrington & Ross, for the plaintiffs. 
D. E. Nicholson, for the defendants. 
HALL, J. The question for our decision IR, whether, upon 
the facts reported by the auditt>r, the defendants are properly 
chargeable with the marble slabs sold and delivered by the 
plaintiffs to the defendant Buffum. 
316 CASES on PARTNERSHIP.
property upon his single credit, for the use of the partnership
concern, and the seller is not aware of the existence of the
partnership, he may, when he discovers it, have the benefit of
the partnership liability. The ground of making the partner-
j There seems to be no doubt that if one partner purchase
ship firm liable is, that the property having been obtained
for their joint benefit and to enable them to make a common
profit, it is but just that they should be jointly liable to pay
for it. _
It is doubtless essential to the validity of such a. claim
by the vendor that the partnership should have been unknown
to him at the time of the sale; for if he were aware of the
partnership, or ignorant of it through his own fault, he would
be presumed to have made his election to give credit to the
individual instead of the firm, and having made such election,
would be bound by it: 3 Steph. N. P. 2402.
It is not claimed on the part of thefdefendants that the
plaintiffs had any knowledge that they were partners. The
existence of such partnership is denied, and the question is,
whether the defendants were in fact partners.
It is true, that two or more persons may be made liable to
third persons as ‘partners, when, as between themselves, they
are really not so. But such liability only arises when third
persons have trusted to their credit—have parted with their
property upon the faith of the acts or declarations of the
supposed partners, indicating that they were such. In this
they gave no credit to the firm, but trusted Buffum only; and
if Ainsworth is to be made liable, it can only be because he was
fase the plaintiffs were not deceived by any false appearances;
really and truly a partner with Butfum.
In order to constitute a partnership between the parties
themselves, it is necesary that they should have a common
interest in the Profit and loss of the business in which they
are engaged.
It is not essential that each should furnish a share of the
capital or property which is to become the stock or subject
matter of the business of the partners.
One may furnish the capital or stock, and another con-
tribute his labor and skill. And if it be agreed between
the parties that one shall furnish on his own account a par-

















































































































































316. CASES ON P ARTNEBSHIP. 
· There seems to be no doubt that if one partner purchase 
property upon his single credit, for the use of the partnership 
concern, and the seller is not aware of the existence of the 
partnership, he may, when he discovers it, have the benefit of 
the partnership liability. The ground of making the partner· 
s ip firm liable is, that the property having been obtained 
for their joint benefit and to enable them to make a common 
profit, it is but just that they should be jointly liable to pay 
for it. 
It is doubtless essential to the validity of such a claim 
by the vendor that the partnership should have been unknown 
to him at the time of the sale; for if be were aware of the 
partnership, or ignorant of it through his own fault, be would 
be presumed to have made his election to give credit to the 
individual instead of the firm, and having made such election, 
would be bound by it: 3 Steph. N. P. 2402. 
It is not claimed on the part of the ·defendants that the 
· plaintiffs had any knowledge that they were partners. The 
existence of such partnership is denied, and the question is, 
whether the defendants were in fact partners. 
It is true, that two or more persons may be made liable to 
third persons as 'partners, when, as between themselves, the,-, 
are really not so. But such liability only arises when third 
persons have trusted to their credit-have parted with their 
property upon the faith of the acts or declarations of the 
upposed partners, indicating that they were s_uch. In this 
case the plaintiffs were not deceived by any false appea.rances; 
they gave no credit to the firm, but trusted Buffum only; and 
if Ainsworth is to be made liable, it can only be because be was 
l'E'ally and truly a partner with Buffum. 
In order to constitute a partnership between the parties 
themselves, it is necesary that they should have a common 
interest in the profit and loss of the business in which they 
a re engaged. 
It is not essential that each should furnish a share of the 
cnpital or property which is to become the stock or subject 
matter of the business of the partners. 
One may furnish the capital or stock, and another con-
tribute his labor and skill. And if it be agreed b~tween 
the parties that one shn 11 furnish on his own nccount a par· 
t icular kind of stock to . be used in the business, yet if, 
I 
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when purchased, it becomes the subject of labor and ‘skill,
and in its altered state is to be sold for the common benefit,
it constitutes a partnership business; and if such particu-
lar kind of stock be purchased on his own account by the
party who is by the agreement to furnish it, yet the seller, on
discovering the partnership, may make the firm chargeable
for it. This position is sustained by many authorities referred
to in the argument: 3 Kent‘s Com. 26; S_r/lrcstcr 1:8. Smith,
9 Mass. 119; Ercritt vs. Chapman, 6 Conn. 347. ‘
In the present case the parties agreed to work together in
the business of manufacturing marble. Butfum was to furnish
the marble and Ainsworth to pay him one-half of the cost
of it. Buffum was to board Acinsworth, and both were to con-
tribute their labor and skill in the business; and the products
and avails of the business were to be equally divided between
them. We think the parties became strictly partners as
between themselves. \Vhatever the manufactured articles
should sell for, above the‘ cost of the materials and labor
bestowed upon them, would be profits, which the parties were
to share in common; and if the sale should be for less than such
cost, the parties would suffer a loss, which would fall equally
on both. The defendants thus having a common interest in
the profits and loss of the business, and the marble charged in
the plaintitf’s account having been used by the defendants
in such business, we think they are liable for it as partners.
The judgment of the county court is therefore reversed, and
judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount
of their account, as reported by the auditor.
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GRIFFITH vs. BUFFUM. 317 
when pnrcliai;tc>d, it becomes the subjrct of labor and 'skill, 
and in its altered state is to be sold for the common benefit, 
it ronstitutes a partnership business; and if such particu-
lar kind of stock be purchased on his own ael'·ount by the 
party who is by the agreC'ment to furnish it, yet the seller, on 
discovering the partnership, mn~· make the fi1·m chargeal>le 
for it. This position is sustained by many authorities referred 
1o in the al'gument: a Kent's Com. 2G; Sylt-cslcl" t:s. Smith, 
9 l\lass. 110; Ercritt tis. Chapman, G Conn. :3-17. 
In the present case the parties agreed to work together in 
the business of manufacturing marble. Buffum was to furnish 
the ~arble and Ainsworth to pay him one-half of the cost 
of it. Buffum was to board Ainsworth, and both were to con-
tribute their labor and skill in the business; and the products 
and avails of the business were to be equally divided between 
them. \Ve think the pa.rties became strictly partners as 
between themselves. \Vhatever the manufactured articles 
ehould sell for, above the· cost of the materials and labor 
bestowed upon them, would be profits, which the parties were. 
to share in common; and if the sale should be for less than such 
cost, the parties would suffer a loss, which would fall equally 
on both. The defendants thus having a common interest in 
the profits and loss of the business, and the marble charged in 
the plaintiff's account having been used by the defendants 
in such business, we think they are liable for it as partners. 
The judgment of the county court is thPrefore reversed, and 
judgment is to be rendered for the plaintiffs for the amount 
of their account, as reported by the auditor. 
NOTli:.-5ee :Mechem•s Elem. of Partn., § 197. 
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CLEVELAND vs. VVOODVVARD.
Supreme Court of Vermont, 1843.
15 Vt. 302. 40 Am. Dec. 682.
A ction u a book account. The 0 ' /lop suffi iently states
the case.
S. H. <6 . F. Ho ges, for the plaintiff. p
By Court, W'|Lr.1Ans, C. J. This case seems to be conclu-
sively settled by authority. The plaintiff had dealings with
the defendant. The only dispute is in relation to the four last
items in the plaintiiT’s account, which were for labor performed
on a farm, of which the defendant and Stillman Woodward
were owners, and which they carried on in company. The
not know of the existence of the company until after the com-
mencement of this suit. If these items are disallowed, the
balance would be due to the defendant. It is to be remem-
bered that it is only in this action that advantage can be taken
[defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the labor, who did
IS settled that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be a creditor
of two, one of whom he did not know, as his joint debtors, and
not be the sole creditor of the one he does know. In the case
of Dubois vs. Ludert, 5 Taunt. 609, it was decided that if a man
enters into a contract with one person, not knowing he has a
partner, it is competent for that partner, being sued, to plead.
in abatement, that he has other partners who are not joined.
That case, however, stands alone, and is opposed to the deci-
sion in the case of Baldney vs. Ritchie, 1 Stark. N. P. Cas. 338;
Doe vs. Clzippmden, there cited; to the opinion of Lord Enraox
in I-1.1: parte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, and directly overruled by
Lord TENTERIJEN, in Mullett rs. Hook, Moo. & M. 88, and by the
court of king’s bench, in the case of De Jllautort vs. Saunders,
1 Barn. & Adol. 398. By these cases it is fully settled that,
even in the case of a general partnership, if a contract is made
with one of two partners alone, and the plaintiff is not aware
that he is dealing with the partnership, and it is not disclosed
If the non-joinder of a joint debtor, on trial of the merits. It
1



















































































































































:il8 CASES ON PAn.UERSlllP. 
CLEVELAND vs. WOODWARD. 
Bupreme Coterl of Vermont, 1848. 
15 Vt. 802, 40 Am. Dec. 682. 
Action °}, a book account. Tpe o~SU.?Jient11 statBS 
. the ease. r ~~ 
8. H. 4: • F'. Ho es, for the plaintiff. _ 
By Court, 'VJLI.IAllS, C. J. This case seeml!I to be conc1u-
Bfyely settled by authority. The plaintitJ had dealings with 
tht~ defendant. The only dispute is in relation to the four last 
Items in the plaintiff's account, which were for labor performed 
on tt farm, of which the defendant and Stillman Woodward 
were owners, and which they carried on in company. The 
[
defendant contracted with the plaintiff for the labor, who did 
not know of the existence of the company until after the com-
mencement of this suit. If these items are disallowed, thP. 
balance would be due to the defendant. It is to be remem-
bered that it is only in th.is action that advantage can be takPn 
f:f the non-joinder of a joint debtor, on trial of the merits. It s settled that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to be a creditor f two, one of whom he did not know, as his joint debtors, and 
not be the sole creditor of the one he does know. In the case 
of Dubois vs. liltdcrt, 5 Tmmt. 609, it was decided that if a man 
enters into a contract with one person, not knowing he has a 
partn<'r, it is competent for that partner, being sued, to plead, 
In abatement, that he has other partners who are not joined. 
That case, however, stands alone, and is opposed to the deci· 
sion in the case of Baldney -vs. llitclt·ie, 1 Stark. N. P. Cas. 33S; 
Doe tiS. Cllippenden, there cit«!d; to the opinion of Lord Er.noN 
in E.:c pa.rte Norfolk, 19 Ves. 455, and directly overruled by 
Lord TEXTEIWE~, in Mullett t'S. Hook, Moo. & M. 88, nnd by the 
\!OUrt of king's bench, in the case of De Ma·utort va. Saundera, 
1 Barn. & Adol. 398. By these cases it is fuIJy settled that, 
even in the case of a general partnership, if a contract is made 
-with one of two partners alone, and the plaintiff is not awal'c 
that he is dealing with the partnership, and it is not disclosed 
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to him by the defendant with whom he deals, the non-joinder
cannot be pleaded in abatement. A fortiori, it cannot be done
in the action on book, where a failure to recover might endan-
ger all the security he may have by attachment for his debts.
The judgment the county court is, therefore, atfirmed.
No'rE.—See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., I 197. Compare with preceding
case. _
~i
" BERKSHIRE woonniv co. vs. JUILLARD.
New York Court of Appeals, 1879.
75 N. Y. 535, 31 Am. Rep. 488.
Action in the nature of a creditor’s bill. The opinion suffi-
ciently states the facts.
Thomas H. Hubbard, for appellant.
Charles M. Da Costa, for respondent.
RAPALLO, J. The bond upon which the hanks found their
Spragues & Co. is executed by all the six members of that firm,
and purports to be their joint obligation, as well as the several
obligations of each of them. It also purports to create a
[laim against the copartnership assets of the firm of Hoyt,
joint obligation on the part of any two or more of them. The
only aspect in which it is necessary to consider it on this
appeal, is as the joint obligation of all the members of the firm,
and the question presented is whether it can be enforced as
a copartnership obligation against the copartnership assets,
notwithstanding that the firm name is not mentioned therein,
but it appears on its face to he simply the joint obligation of
the copartners, contracted in their individual names, and is
under seal.
instrument, if it was executed in the business of the firm and
for its benefit. it should be regarded as a copartnership obli-
K We are of the opinion that, notwithstanding the form of the
gation payable out of the copartnersliip funds.
In the present case it is quite clear from/ut\l%eQproofs that the
















































































































































BBnKsirrnE WooLEN Co. vs. JtrILLAnD. 319 
to him b7 the defendant with whom he deals, the non-joinder 
cannot be pleaded in abatement. A fortiori, it cannot be d-0ne 
in the action on book, where a failure to recover might endan-
ger alJ the security he may have by attachment for bis debts. 
The judgment oj". the county court is, therefore, affirmed. 
NOTB.-See llechem•a Elem. of Pa.rtn., i 197. Compare with preceding 
cue. 
. 
BERKSHIRE WOOLEN CO. Ta • . JUILLARD. 
New York Court of Appeals, 1819. 
'3 N. Y. 585, 81 Am. Rep . .(89. 
Action in the nature of a creditor's bill. The opinion suffi-
ciently states the facts. 
Tlwmas H. Hubbard, for appellant • 
. Charles M. Da Costa, for respondent. 
RAPALLO, J. The bond upon which the banks found their , 
·claim against the copartnership assets of the firm of Hoyt, 
Spragues & Co. is executed by all the six members of that firm, 
and purports to be their joint obligation, as well as the s~veral 
obligations of each of them. It also purports to create a 
Joint obligation on the part of any two or more of them. The 
only aspect in which it is necessary to consider it on this 
appeal, is as the joint obligation of all the members of the firm, 
and the question presrntcd is whether it can be enforced as 
a copartnership obligation against tlte copartnersbip assets,. 
notwithstanding that the firm name is not mentioned therein, 
but it appears on its face to be simply the joint obligation of 
the copartners, contracted in their individual names, and is 
under seal. 0 We are of the opinion that, no.twithstanding the form of the nstrument, if it was ex. ecuted in the business of the firm and or its benefit, it should be regarded as a copartnership obli-
gation payable out of tbe copa.rtnership funds. 
In the present case it is quite clear froll\JJle/'proofs that the 
transaction in whic~ the bond was give~ 10r the benefit of 
320 Cases ox 1’a1rmEusn11>.
the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., and that all but a fraction of
the sum advanced by the banks on the credit of the bond was
paid over by them to that firm. and ap-plied on account of its
claims against the Riverside Mills and the City \Voolen C0m~
pany. The loan from the banks to Chapin was negotiated by
Mr. Gallup, one of the firm of Iloyt, Spragiies & Co., in behalf
of that firm, as he testifies. The two companies last named
being indebted to Hoyt, Spragucs & Co. in a million of dollars:
for which indebtedness Mr. Chapin was surety, Mr. Gallup
negotiated the arrangement whereby the banks agreed to loan
to Mr. Chapin the sum of $600,000 on his notes for that amount,
secured by mortgage on his real estate and the collateral guai-~
anty of the bond in question executed by all the members of
the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co. All this was done to enable
Chapin to reduce the debt for which he was surety to Hoyt,
Spragues & Co, and accordingly he gave that firm orders on
the several banks for their respective proportions of the loan‘
of $600,000, all of which sums were paid to and receipted for
by Hoyt, Spragues 8: Co. except the first six months’ interest
in advance, which was retained by the banks, and the sum
of about $55.()0() of the principal sum loaned, which Hoyt,
Spragues & Co. do not appear to have received. The form of
the bond is peculiar, but seems to have been contrived for the
purpose of giving to the banks power to enforce it against
either the joint or separate estates of the members of the firm
of Hoyt, Spragues 8: Co., or any of them, as might prove mo-st
to the interest of the banks. From the nature of the trans~
action we think it must have been the intention of the parties
that the firm should be bound, and that the individual names
of all the partners were used for the reason that the instrument
was under seal, and that a several as well as joint liability was
desired. \\’e can see no objection to a firm binding itself in
that form, where the transaction is one for the account of the
partnership and all the partners unite in the act; while it
would be in the highest degree inequitable to deny to the credi-
tors whose funds have under such circumstances gone into and
increased the copartnership assets, the right of resorting to
those assets for repayment.
When funds or property are obtained on the obligation of
only a portion of the members of a firm, the fact that the prop-

















































































































































320 CASES OY l> AUTNEllSillP. 
the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., and that all but a fractioo of 
t Ile sum advanced b~· the l>nnks on the credit of the bond was 
paid over by them to that firm, nnd npplied on account of its 
claims ngainst the Rh·l~rside Mills and the City 'Voolen Com-
pany. The loan from the banks to C!1:ipin was nC'gotiated by 
Mr. Gallup, one of the firm of Ilo~·t, f\pr·a~ues & Co., in behalf 
of that firm, as he testifiC's. 'fhe two companies last named 
being indebted to Hoyt, Spragues & Co. in a million of dollars; 
for which indebtedness Mr. Chapin was surety, Mr. Gallup 
nC'gotiated the arrangement whereby the bnnks agreed to loan 
to ~[r. Clwpin the sum of $GOO,OOO on his notc>s for that amount, 
securc>d by mortgrige on his real estate and the collateral guar· 
nnty of the bond in question executed by all the members of 
the firm of Ilo,yt, Spragues & Co. All this was done to enable 
Chapin to 1·educe the debt for which he was surety to Hoyt, 
Rpragues & Co, and a<>cordingly he gal"e that firm orders on 
t)le seyeral banks for their respective proportions of the load 
. of f600,000, all of which sums were paid to and receipted for . 
by Hoyt, Spragues & Co. except the first six months' interest 
in advance, which was retainetl by the banks, and the sum 
of about ~:15,000 of the pl'incipal sum loaned, which Iloyt, 
Spragues & Co. do not appear to have received. 'l'he rorm of 
the bond is peculiar, but seems to have been contrived for the 
purpose of giving to tlle banks power to enforce it against 
either the joint or separate estates of the rnernb(lrs of the firm 
of Iloyt, Spragues & Co., or any of them, as might prove most 
to the inte1·est of the banks. From the nature of the trans· 
action we think it must have been the intention of the parties 
that the firm should be bound, and that the individual names 
of all the partners were used for the re:ison that the instrument 
was under seal, and that a several as well as joint liability was 
desired. '\Ye can see no objection to a firm binding itself in 
that form, where the transaction is one for the account of the 
partnership and all the partners unite in the act; while it 
would be in the highest degree inequitable to deny to the credi-
tors whose funds have under such circumstances gone into and 
increased the copartnership assets, the right of resorting to 
those assets for repayment. 
When funds or property are obtained on the obligation of 
only a portion of the members of a firm, the fact that the prop-
erty thus obtained goes to the use of the firm is not of itself 
Bsnxsnms Woo1.r;s Co. vs. J ornnsnn. 321
is not only obtained for and applied to the benefit of the firm‘
but is so obtained by the joint act and upon the joint written
obligation of all its members, and the credit is given to all,
the transaction is in substance a copartnership transaction,
though the firm name is not actually used in the writing and
though the partners may have superadded to their joint obli-
sufficient to render the firm liable. But where the properfli
gation the several liability of each of them. The cases cited
on the part of the appellant in support of the proposition that
the joint obligation of all the members of a firm is not equiva-
lent to an .,obligation of the firm do not sustain that propo-
sition, where the transaction i-s in the business or for the bene
fit of the firm. In Forsyth vs. Woods, 11 \Vall. (U. S.) 486, the
reasoning is strictly confined to an obligation contracted by
the members outside of the partnership business and proceeds
wholly on the ground that the firm property should be applied
in the first instance to the payment of debts incurred for the
benefit of the partnership, as its property presumably consists
of what has been obtained from its creditors. In Turner vs.
Jag/com, 40 N. Y. 470, I do not understand, from the note of
the reporter, anything more than that the majority of the
court declined to hold as a general proposition that a note
signed by all the members of a firm was the same as one signed
by the firm. That no-thing more was decided is apparent from
the judgment, which sustained the note in that case as a
copartnership debt. In In re Weston, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 1, the
decision is placed upon the ground that the partners had
signed as sureties and there was no evidence that it was a
partnership transaction. In Ea: partc Stone, L. R. 8 Chan. App.
914, 917, where the obligation was shown to have been given
for money borrowed for partnership purposes, it was allowed
to be proved against the partnership estate though signed and
sealed by the partners as individuals without naming the firm.
IVe think it sufiiciently appears in this case that the pur-
pose of the transaction was to raise money from the banks, to
be paid to the firm of Hoyt, Spragues & Co., for which loans
Ghapin and his property were to be primarily liable to the
banks, and that the bond now in question was given by the
members of the firm to induce the banks to make the loan,
so that the firm might receive the avails in part payment of the

















































































































































BERKSHIRE WooLEN Co. vs. Ju1LLARD. 821 
sufficient to ·render the firm liable. But whe-re the propert 
is not only ohtained for and applied to the benefit of the firm 1 
but is so obtained by the joint act and upon the joint written 
obligation of all its members, and the credit is given to all. 
the transaction is in substance a copartnei'ship transaction, 
though the firm name is not actually used in the writing and 
though the partners may have superadded to their joint obli-
gation the several liability of each of them. The cases cited 
on the pnrt of the appellant in support of the proposition that 
the joint obligntion of all the members of a firm is not equiva-
lent to an obligation of the firm do not sustain that propo-
sition, where the tr.msa.ction i-s in the business or for the bene-
fit o-f the firm. In Fo1·syth vs. Wood.s, 11 \Vall. (U. S.) 486, the 
t•easoning is strictly confined to an obligation contracted by 
the members outside of the partnership business and proceeds 
wholly on the ground that the firm property should be applied 
in the first instance to the payment of debts incurred for .the 
benefit of the partnership, as its property presumably consist:a 
of what has been obtained from its creditors. In Turner va. 
J aycoz, 40 N. Y. 4 70, I do not understand, from the note of 
the reporter, anything more than that the majority of the 
court declined to hold as a general pt·oposition that a note 
signed by all the members of a firm was the same as one signed 
by the firm. That nothing m')re was decided is apparent from 
the judgment, whi('h sustained the note in that case as a 
copartnersbip debt. In In 1·e Weston, 12 Mete. (Mass.) 1, the 
decision is placed upon the ground that the partners had 
eigned ns sureties and there wns no evidence that it was a 
pai·tnership transaction. In Ex partc Stone, L. R. 8 Chan. App. 
014, 017, where the obligation was shown to have been given 
for money borrowed for partnership purposes, it was all(}Wed 
to be proveu against the partnership estate though signed and 
sealed by the partners as inuivicluals without naming the firm. 
We think it sutliciently appears in this case that the pur-
pose of the transaction was to raise mon<.>y from the banks, to 
be paid to the ftrrn of Hoyt, Sprngues & Co., for which loans 
Chapin and his property were to be primarily liable to the 
banks, and that the bond now in question was given by the 
members of the firm to induce the banks to make the loan, 
so that the firm might receive the avails in part payment of the 
claims for which Chapin was liable to them as surety, and 
41 
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/
that these circumstances are sufficient to justify the allowance
of the claims of the banks against the copartnership.
The orders should be atlirmed, with costs out of the fund.
All concur.
Orders atfirmed.
See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn., § 200. _
It
HASTINGS NATIONAL BANK vs. HIBBARD.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1882.
48 Mich. 452, 12 N. W. Rep. 651.
Assumpsit. Plaintiff sued W. and M. Hibbard, Peter Graff
and Covode as makers, and Hinsdale and Philip Graft as
endorsers of a promissory note for $5,000 made and discounted
in December, 1879, and payable April 1, 1880, when it was dis-
honored. The only question which became material related to
the legal identity of the makers, who signed as “Hibbard &
Gratf.”
Upon certain facts there was no dispute. The two Hibbards
and Peter Graif for several years did business at Grand Rapids
under the name of Hibbard & G1-alt, and in that name ran two
flouring mills, called the Valley City mills and the Crescent
mills. The Valley City mill was a rented building and had
only been occupied about a year. .
On January 27, 1879, Hibbard & Grafi formed a partnership
with Covode to run the Valley City mill, that firm to own
three-fourths and Covode'one-fourth interest. The business
was to be entirely distinct from the Crescent mill business, in
which Covode was to have no interest, although the business
so far as practicable was to be done in the Crescent mill oflice,
but the accounts were to be kept separate. Different book-
keepers kept the books, and the Valley City mill ofiice was in
a different room from the other. The name of the new firm
was to be the same as the old one, Hibbard & Graff.
. After the new firm was organized letter heads were printed
which at the top contained the names of all four. Beneath
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thnt these circumstances are eumcient to justify the allowance 
of the claims of the banks against the copartnership. 
The orders should be afllrmed, with costs out of the fund. 
All concur. 
Orders aftlrmed. 
8ee Hechem'• Elem. of Partn. , § 200. 
HASTINGS NATIONAL BANK vs. HIBBARD. 
Buprcme Court of Michigan, 1882. 
48 Mich. 452, 12 N. W. Rep. 631 • . 
. .. 
Assumpslt. Plalntitr sued W. and M. Hibbard, Peter Graf! 
and Covode as makers, and Hinsdale and Philip Graff as 
endorsers of a promissory note for f5,000 made and discounted 
in December, 1879, and payable April 1, 1880, when it was di• 
honored. The only question which became material related to 
the legal identity of the makers, who signed as "Hibbard & 
Graff." 
Upon certain facts there was no dispute. The two Hibbards 
and Peter Graff for several years did business at Grand Rapids 
under the name of Hibbard & Graff, and in that name ran two 
flouring mills, called the Valley City mills and the Crescent 
mills. The Valley City mill was a rented building and had 
only been occupied about a year. 
On January 27, 1879, Hibbard & Graff formed a partnership 
.with Covode to run the Valley City mill, that firm to own 
three-fourths and Covode' one-fourth interest. The .businesl!I 
was to be entirely distinct from the Crescent mill business, in 
which Covode was to have no interest, although the business 
so far as practicable was to be done in the Crescent mill office . , 
but the accounts were to be kept separate. Different book-
keepers kept the books, and the Valley City mill office was in 
a different room from the other. The name of the new firm 
was to be the same as the old one, Hibbard & Graff. 
. After the new firm was organized letter heads were printed 
which at the top contained the names of all four. Beneath 
these names appeared the name Hibbard & Graff, as proprie-
1
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tors of the two mills. These appear to have been used indis-
criminately. The Valley City mill kept no bank account and
did no bank business, but borrowed when necessary of the
Crescent mill, and was charged for such advances and credited
with money and other counter credits furnished by itself to
the other. No notes were issued by the Valley City mills in
the course of their business, and all moneys received on loan
discounts were paid into the Crescent mills where an account
was kept of advances made to the Valley City mills as with
any other individual debtor.
Blair, Kingsley ¢£- Klei-nhains, for appellant.
John Patton, Jr., and N. A. Earle for defendant Covode;
John C’. Fitzgerald for \V. Hibbard; and Si-monds, Fletcher <5
Wolf for P. M. Graif, M. Hibbard and P. Graff, Jr.
CAMPBELL, J. The note in suit is one of two $5,000 notes
executed by Wellington Hibbard while Covode was absent in
Europe, under the name of Hibbard & Grafl’, not for the benefit
-of the firm, but to use in his and Philip Graifs outside gam-
bling wheat speculations, which seem to have been destroying
the means of the business. The money was obtained as claimed
by plaintiff under pretense that it was wanted for actually
contemplated wheat purchases for milling business. The ques-
tion is, if this was so, which firm was the maker in the eye of
the law? The jury found that the new firm was not the
maker. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court,
given or refused, on various parts of the case.
The court actually charged that Covode would not be liable
merely because he was a partner in the Valley City business,
if the loan was negotiated as part of the business of the Cres-
cent mills, but that presumptively a note might be made by
a partner which would bind the firm for which he made it, if
’taken without knowledge in the bank, on reasonable grounds
of inquiry, that it was unauthorized. Also that Covode might
be hound by allowing himself to be held out as a member of
the firm purporting to act, if faith was given in the discount
to his being a partner;
It was charged that if credit was given exclusively to the
other members of the firm and not to Covode, he would not be
bound unless by subsequent ratification, if the money was not
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tors of the two mills. These appear to have been used indis-
criminately. The Valley City mill kept no bank account and 
did no bank business, but borrowed when necessary of the 
Crescent mill, and was charged for such advances and credited 
with money and other counter credits furnished by itself to 
the other. No notes were issued by the Valley City mills in 
the course of their business, and all moneys received on loan 
discounts were paid into the Crescent mills where an account 
was kept of advances made to the Valley City mills as with 
any other individual debtor. 
Blair, Kingsley &: Kleinhans, for appellant . 
John Patton, Jr., and N. A.. Earle for defendant Covode; 
John 0. Fitzgerald for 'W. Hibbard; and Simonds, Fletcher " 
Wolf for P. M. Graff, M. Hibbard and P. Graff, Jr. 
CAMPBELL, J. The note in suit is one of two f5,000 notes 
executed by Wellington Hibbard while Covode was absent in 
Europe, under the name of Hibbard & Graff, not for the beneftt 
·of the firm, but to use in bis and Philip Graff~s outside gam-
bling wheat speculations, which seem to have been destroying 
the means of the business. The money was obtained as claimed 
by plaintiff under pretense that it was wanted for actuall' 
contemplated wheat purchases for milling business. The ques-
tion is, if this was so, which firm was the maker in the eye of 
the law? The jury found that the new firm was not the 
maker. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court, 
given or refused, on various parts of the case. 
The court actually charged that CoYode would not be liable 
merely because he was a partner in the Valley City business, 
if the loan was negotiated as part of the business of the Cres-
cent mills, but that presumptively a note might be made by 
a partner which would bind the firm for which he made it, if 
•taken without knowledge in the bank, on reasonable grounds 
of inquiry, that it was unautl10rized. Also that Covode might 
be bound by allowing himself to be held out as a m~mber of 
the firm purporting to act, if faith was given in the discount 
to his being a partner; 
It was charged that if credit was given exclusively to the 
other members of the firm and not to Covode, he would not be 
bound unless by subsequent ratification, if the money was not 
negotiated for the business of the Valley City mill. But on 
• 
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the other hand if the bank only knew of a firm which it sup
posed to be composed of the four, and made the loan on the
credit of that firm, then all would be bound if the transaction
was in good faith; and further, that although Covode was not
a member of the Crescent mills firm, he would be bound if he
had allowed himself to be held out as a member of a firm operé
ating both mills, if the bank relied upon that in good faith.
The letter heads were held to authorize the jury to draw such
an inference if they thought them calculated to create such an
impression, and if acted on by the bank as before mentioned.
And it was also held that unless the bank had reason to believe
to the contrary it could rely on the representations of Mr. Hib-
bard concerning the purpose of the loan, and if informed it was
for the firm of four, credit should be presumed to have been
given to the four. .
The jury, in answer to specific requests, found that Covode
was not known to plaintifl’, and that exclusive credit was given
to the other persons as a firm. They also found that the note
was given by Wellington Hibbard to obtain money to speculate
in wheat margins on his own account, and that this was a
gambling transaction.
It is assigned as error that these findings are not supported
by evidence. .
Error is also assigned on the charges bearing on the efiect of
giving exclusive credit to others than Covode and on his liai-
bility in case he was not actually a partner of the firm relied
on. Also to so much of the charge as held that if the money
was lent with notice that it was tor business beyond the scope
of the partnership business and for different parties, the bank
might be affected by the fraud without absolute knowledge
of it. '
\ Error is also alleged on the refusal of the court to make
‘several charges substantially as follows: First, that when
two firms in one city of the same name have some members in
common, and a person who is a member of both issues a note
which is discounted in good faith without information as to
which firm issued it, the holder may elect which firm he will
hold. Second, a charge was asked to the same effect as applied
specifically to the firms in question and Mr. Covode’s liability.
Thirdly, that in such case the partners were themselves respon-
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the other band if the bank only knew of a firm which it sup-
posed to be composed of the four, and made the loan on the 
credit of that firm, then all would be bound if the transaction 
was in good faith; and further, that although Covode was not 
n member of the Crescent mills firm, he would be bound if he 
had allowed himself to be held out as a member of a firm oper: 
ating both mills, if the bank relied upon that in good f ait~ 
The letter heads were held to authorize the jur-y to draw such 
an inference if they thought them calculated to create such an 
impression, and if acted on by the bank as before mentioned: 
And it was also held that unless the bank had reason to believe 
to the contr-ary it could rely on the representations of Mr. Hib-
bard concerning the pul"pose of the loan, and if informed it was 
for the firm of four, credit should be presumed to have been • 
given to the four. 
The jury, in answer to specific requests, found that Covode 
was not known to plaintift', and that exclusive credit was given 
to the other persons as a firm. They also found that the note 
was given by Wellington Hibbard fo obtain money to speculate 
in wheat margins on his own account, and that this was a 
gambling transaction. 
It is assigned as error that these findings are not supported 
by evidence. 
Error is also assigned on the charges bearing on the effect of 
giving exclusive credit to others than Covode and on his lia-
bility in case he was not actually a partner of the firm relied 
on. Also to so much of the charge as held th.at if the money 
was lent with notice that it was £or business beyond the scope 
of the partnership business and for different parties, the bank 
might be affected by the fraud without absolute knowledge 
·\of it. 
\ Error is also alleged on the refusal <>f the court to make 
'several clmr-ges substantially as follows: First, that when 
two firms in one city of the same name have some members in 
·common, and a person who is a member of both issues a note 
r 
· which is discounted in good faith without information as to 
· which firm issued it, the holder may elect which firm he will 
' hold. Second, a charge was asked to the same effect as applied 
specifically to the firms in question and Mr. Covode's liabillt). 
Thirdly, that in such case the partners were themselves respon-
sible for- the hardship which they might have avoided by using 
1
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different firm names. Fourth, that writing the letters which
were sent in regard to obtaining the discounts, on the letter
heads before referred to, was such a holding out of Covode
as a partner in both mills as, if relied on in good faith, would
rend_er him liable. And fifth, that there was no evidence that
the bank officers knew it was for an improper purpose.
The special findings of the jury, if based on testimony, ren-
der the fourth and fifth requests just named unimportant. It is
distinctly found that credit was not given to Covode as a. part-
ner and was given only to the others. It is not claimed, how-
ever, and the court below did not hold, that the use of the letter
heads in question would not have bound him if credit was
actually given in reliance on them as showing one firm for
-both mills. But we are not satisfied that the jury had not tes-
timony enough to act on, which justified them in the conclusion
that the bank oflicers relied on the formerly existing firm,
which had been known for some time, and p-aid no heed to
the names printed in the corners, or to the letter head itself.
It is not uncommon for persons dealing with business houses
to pay very little attention to their printed letter heads, and
if the inference the jury drew from the whole testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses before them was, as it seems to have
been, that the bank officers acted on other grounds, we have
no right to say, as matter of law, that their conclusions are
wrong. It was, after all, a question of fact.
the fact that Hibbard represented both firms and both had a
ommon name, gave the plaintiff a right to elect which firm
to hold responsible, without reference to the credit actually
relied on.
The cases referred to in the elementary works cited by coun-
sel 1'o»r plaintiff do not, in our opinion—whether correctly
decided or not—-cover just such a case as the present. They
hold unquestionably that where money is lent or credit given
to a partnership business, unknown as well as known partners
will be bound. It i held also in one or more of these cases
that where several firms are concerned together in common
interests and a member of some of the firms has so acted con-
cerning paper issued by one of the firms in which he was not
a partner, as to give reason to believe him a member, those
Tlhe case, so far as we can see, comes do-wn to the question
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different firm names. Fourth, that writing the letters which 
were sent in regard to obtaining the discounts, on the letter 
heads before referred to, was such a liolding out of Covode 
as a partner in both mills as, if relied on in good faith, would 
rend.er him liable. And fifth, that there was no evidence that 
the bank officers knew it was for an improper purpose. 
The special findings of the jury, if bused on testimony, ren· 
der the fourth and fifth requests just named unimportant. It is 
distinctly found that credit was not given to Covode as a part· 
ner and was given only to the others. It is not claimed, how. 
ever, and the court below did not hold, that the use of the letter 
heads in question would not have bound him if credit was 
actually given in reliance on them as showing one firm for 
both mills. Ilut we are not satisfied that the jury had not tes· 
timony enough to act on, which justified them in the conclusion 
that the bank officers relied on the formerly existing firm, 
w'hir.h bad been known for some time, and paid no •heed to 
the names printed in the comers, or to the letter head itself. 
It is not uncommon for persons dealing with business houses 
to pay very little attention to their printed letter beads, and 
if the inference the jury drew from the whole testimony and 
demeanor of the witnesses before them was, as it seems to have 
been, that the bank officers acted on other grounds, we have 
no right to say, as matter of law, that their conclusions are 
wrong. It was, after all, a question of fnct. 
The case, so ~ar as we can see, comes down to the question 
which was the chief one relied on upon the bearing, whether 
the fact that Hibbard represented both firms and both had a 
ommon name, gave tlle plaintiff a right to elect which firm 
to hold responsible, without reference to the credit actually 
relied on. 
The cases referred to in the elementa1·y works cited by cou11. 
sel for plaintiff do not, in our opinion-whether correctly 
decided or not-cover just such a case as the present. They 
hold unquestionably that where money is lent or credit given 
to a partnership business, unknown as well as known partners 
will be bound. It is held also in one or more of these cases 
that where several firms are concerned together in c<>mmon 
interests and a member of some of the firms has eo acted con-
cerning pa.per issued by one of the firms in which he was not 
a partner, as to give reaeon to believe him a member, those 
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who dealt on that belief might hold him personally. This is
all that was actually decided in the Scotch case of 1lIcNair vs.
Fleming, in which the House of Lords partially aflirmed the
decision of the Court of Sessions, 3 Dow. P. C. 229. This is
the case which Mr. Collyer (Partnership, p. 222) says was
regarded by Sir Samuel Romilly as deciding that where differ-
ent partnerships do business under the same firm and make
negotiable paper under the same signature the holder may
select whichever of them he pleases as his debtor, but cannot
select them all. Neither this nor any other well-defined clas
of cases went—so far as we can judge—outside of the general
rule that partnership lia.bility rests on the ground of agency,
and that those who have authorized any one to act on their
behalf, either actually or impliedly, are bound when he does
so act, to those who deal with him as representing them or the
firm to which they belong. It must always be remembered
that general- language in legal discussions is to be construed
with its surroundings, and cannot be dealt with in the
abstract. ,
In the case of .l[cNair vs. Flcmin_r/, after sustaining the gen-
eral view of the Court of Sessions; the House of Lords allowed
the defendant to set up the defense that plaintiff was barred
by sequestration proceedings against the partnership in whose
name the paper was issued, of which he was no-t actually a
member, although they supposed him to be. The case of York
shire Banking Go. vs. Beatson, 4 C. P’. Div. 204; s. c. on appeal,
5 C. P. Div. 109, refers to several of the familiar cases on the
subject, and like most of them regards the facts of each case as
material in fixing the liability. ‘
In the present case there can be no doubt that as between
himself and his partners Hibbard had no right to borrow this
money for his own purposes. If not absolutely determined by
‘the evidence it certainly tends to show that under their usual
course of business even the main firm of Hibbard & Grad could
not properly bind Covode by any such loan for firm purposes.
As between the two firms the usual practice seems to have con-
fined loans to the original firm. In any event the latter firm
if bound at all could only be bound on the principle that it is
incident to such business that one partner may bind it. And
it is equally clear in our judgment that the firm to be bound
must be the firm in whose name and for whose benefit Hibbard.
_ r
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who dealt on that belief might hold him personally. This is. 
all that was actually decided in the Scotch case of McNair t)8. 
Fleming, in wbi('h the House of Lords partially affirmed the 
·decision of the Court of Sessions, 3 Dow. P. C. 229. This is 
the case which l\Ir. Collyer (Partnership, p. 222) says was 
regarded by Sir Samuel Romilly as deciding that where differ-
ent partnerships do business under the same firm and make 
negotiable paper under the same signature the holder ma;., 
select wliicheYer of them he pleases as his debtor, but cannot 
sel~ct them all. Neither this nor any other well-defined class 
of cases went-so far as we can judge-outside of the general 
rule that partnership liability rests on the ground of agency, 
·and that those who have authorized any one to act on their 
behalf, eith<"r actually or impliedly, are bound when he does 
so act, to those who deal with him as representing them or the 
firm to which they belong. It must always be remembered 
that general language in legal discussions is to be construed 
with its surroundings, and cannot be dealt with in the 
abstract. ~ 
In the case of McNair f)8. Fleming, after sustainin~ the gen-
eral view -0f the Court of Sessions; the House -of Lords allowed 
the defendant to set up the defense tliat plaintiff was barred 
by sequestration proceedings against the partnership in whose 
name the paper was issued, of which he was not actualJy a 
member, although they supposed him to be. The ca.se of York-
shire Banking Co. vs. Beatson, 4 C. P. Div. 204; s. c. on appeal, 
5 C. P. Div. 109, refers to several of the familiar cases on the 
subject, and like most of them regards the facts of each case as 
material in fixing the liability. ... 
In the present case there ran be no doubt that as between 
himself and his partners Hibbard had no right to borrow this 
money for his own purposes. If not absolutely determined by 
'.the evidence it certainly tends to show that under their usual 
'course of business even the main firm of Hibbard & Graff could 
not properly bind Covode by any such loan for firm purposes. 
As between the two firms the usual practice seems to have con-
fined loans to the original firm. In any event the latter firm 
If bound at all could only be bound on the principle that it i15 
incident to such business that one partner may bind it. And 
rit is equally clear in our judgment that the firm to be bound 
/Jnust be the firm in whose name and for whose ben~~t Hibbard. 
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clearly that it the bank ofucers supposed there was but one
firm of all the four doing business,.all would be bound.
But as a matter of fact the original firm of Hibbard & Graft
had never changed, and continued on the same relations as
before. It had only made an arrangement for two years, sub-
ject to termination on ninety days’ notice, whereby it allowed
the use of one of its mills to a firm in which it held a three-
fourths interest, as a partnership, and not in the several names
of its members‘. The case does not therefore differ materially
from that of an individual making a partnership arrangement
for a separate part of his business, where it has always been
held that it must depend on the facts of the case whether paper
signed in the individual name was sole or firm paper.
If therefore the bank dealt with the firm it had always
known and which was still doing business, and lent money
supposing it to be for that firm, the new firm could not be made
liable unless the money was actually borrowed or used for
its benefit. But this is not pretended, unless on the theory
lgas gnderstood to be acting. The court below charged very
_ that credit was given to all four, which is clearly negatived.
\Vhen this case was here before—although not then in per-
fect shape for disposal—it was intimated that the result now
arrived at appeared to be the proper one. If the jury were
right on the facts, we think the court was right on the law.
There was evidence from which a different conclusion might
have been reached, but the verdict has been allowed to stand,
and we must assume justly.
We discover no error in the record, and the judgment must
be aflirmed with costs. _- it
__/
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I 
was understood to be acting. The court below charged very 
clearly that if the bank officers supposed there was but one 
firm of all the four doing business,.all would be bound. 
But as a matter of fact the original firm of Hibbard & Graff 
had never changed, and continued on the same relations as 
before. It had only made an arrangement for two years, sub-
ject to termination on ninety days' notice, whereby it allowed 
the use of one of its mills to a firm in which it held a three-
fourths interest, as a partnership, and not in the several namea 
of its members'. The case does not therefore differ materially 
from that of an individual making a partnership arrm.~gement 
for a separate part of his business, where it has always bee:g 
held that it must depend on the facts of the case whether paper 
signed in the individual name was sole or firm paper. 
If therefore the bank dealt with the firm it had always 
known and which was still doing business, and lent money 
supposing it fo be for that firm, the new firm could not be made 
liable unless the money was actually oorro.wed or used for 
Its benefit. But this is not pretended, unless on the theory 
that credit was given to all four, which is clearly negatived. 
When this case was here before-although not then in per· 
feet shape for disposal-it was intimated that the result now 
arrived at appeared to be the proper one. If the jury were 
right on the facts, we think the court was right on the law~ 
There was evidence from which a different conclusion might 
have been reached, but the verdict has been allowed to stand, 
and we must assume justly. 
We discover no error in the record, and the judgment must 
be affirmed with costs. / . - I l 
NOTE: See Mechew'i:; Elem. o1 Partn., § 20!). 
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2. Fon Toms.
EN GLAR vs. OFFUTT.
Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1889.
70 Md. 78, 16 Atl. Rep. 497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 833. _
On the 21st of May, 1883, John P. Shriner, who was engaged
in business in Baltimore, was appointed guardian of Mary and
John Englar, infants, and as such guardian received of their
estate the sum of $10,846.25. He deposited this sum in his
own account and used more or less of it in his business. On
December 31, 1885, he took his brother, Edward C. Shriner,
into partnership with him in the business. On November 15,
1886, the firm was insolvent and made an assignment for the
benefit of creditors. The partnership assets amounted to but
$9,500. The wards, Mary and John Englar,‘sought to impress
this fund with the trust in their behalf and in priority to the
firm creditors upon the ground that their money, in the hands
of John P. Shriner as guardian, had gone into the stock of the
firm, and that the firm had received the money knowing that
it was trust money and was so used in violation of the trust.
Edward C. Shriner dehied any knowledge that the trust funds
had gone into the business. The claim of the wards was
denied and they appealed.
F. C. Slinglufl‘ and Robert Biggs, for appellants.
John P. Poe, for appellee.
1ALv1~:Y, C. J. (After_discussing the principle upon which
trust funds may be traced.) But suppose at the time of the
partnership formed between John P. Shriner and Edward C.
Shriner that some portion of the trust fund remained invested
in the stock of goods then on hand, or was otherwise em-
ployed in the business; in such case the question whether
the appellants can be entitled to occupy the position
of creditors of the firm, so as to share in the distribu-
tion of its assets, and to hold Edward C. Shriner liable,
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I. Fon Tonn. 
ENGijAR ve. OFFUTT. 
Courl of Appeals of Maryland, 1889. 
'10 Md. 78, 18 Atl. Rep. 497, 14 Am. St. Rep. 831 
On the 21st of May, 1883, John P. Shriner; who was engaged 
in business in Baltimore, was appointed guardian of .Mary and 
John Englar, infants, and as such guardian received of their 
t>state the sum of $1.0,846.25. He deposited this sum in his 
own account and used more or less of it in his business. On 
December 31, 1885, he took his brother, Edward C. Shriner, 
Into partnership with him in the business. On November 15, 
188_6, the firm was insolvent and made an assignment for the 
bt>nefit of creditors~ The partnership assets amounted to but 
f9,500. The wards, ~fary and John Englar, -sought to impress 
this fund with the trust in their behalf and in priority to the 
ftnn creditors upon the ground that their money, in the hands 
of John P. Shriner as guardian, had gone into the stock of the 
firm, and that the firm had received the money knowing that 
it was trust money and was so used in violation of the trust. 
Edward C. Shriner denied any knowledge that the trust funds 
had gone into the business. 'fhe claim of the wards was 
denied and thPy appealed. 
F. 0. Slingluff and Robe1·t Biggs, for appellants. 
John P. Poe, for appellee: 
h.LVEY, C. J. (After. discussing the principle upon which 
trust funds may be traced.) But suppose at the time of the 
partnership formed between John P. Shriner and Edward C. 
Shriner that some portion of the trust fund remained invested 
in the stock of goods then on hand, or was otherwise em· 
.vloyed in the business; in such case the question whether 
the appellants can be entitled to occupy the position 
of creditors of the firm, so as to share in the distribu-
tion of its assets, and to hold Edward C. Shriner liable, 
. depends upon the fact whether Edward C. Shriner had 
1.4’
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notice of and a~ in the breach of trust ~ by John P.
$5313 the guardian; for the principle of law is very clear
/that if a partner, being a trustee or fiduciary, improperly
employs the money of his _¢£:§tui quc trust in the partnership
-business, or in the payment of partnership debts, this fact
lalone, andwithout anything more, is not suflicient to entitle
the cestui que trust to occupy the position of creditor, and to
der the firm liablein such case the firm itself must be shown
,enforce repayment of his money as against the firm. To ren-
to liaVe'B'e'én implicated in the breach of trust, and this can-
not be unless all the partners either knew whence the money
came, or knewthat it did not belong to the partner making use
of it. But if the other partners have knowledge of such mis-
ue of trust money, and know that such money is being
employed in the partnership business for common benefit, they
will all be bound for the money so employed, and be made
answerable for the breach of trust committed by their copart-
ner with their acquiescence. Ea: parte Heaton, Buck, 386; Ea:
parte Apsey, 3 Brown, Ch. 266; Sm-ith vs. Jameson, 5 Term R.
601; Ea: partc Watson, 2 Ves. & B. 415; Story, Partn. § 368;
1 Lindl. Partn. (5th Ed.) 161. Here, however, the proof would
seem to establish the fact of thelentire absence of knowledge
on the part of Edward C. Shriner of the use of trust money by
John J . Shriner in the partnership business; and in this class
of cases it is clearly established by the authorities that the
knowledge of the partner committing the breach of trust does
not affect the other members of the firm. 1 Lindl. Partn. 161}
Edward C. Shriner swears that he had no such knowledge, and
he is fully supported in his testimony as to this fact by the testi-
mony of his brother, who swears that no part of the trust fund
was used in the business after the formation of the partner-
ship. It is true, Mr. Englar testifies to a declaration or admis-
sion made by Edward C. Shriner to the effect that he knew that
the trust money was used in the partnership business; but we
think there must be some mistake or misunderstanding in
regard to the matter, as Edward C. Shriner is emphatic in
denying that he ever made such declaration, and he is strongly
corroborated in this by the testimony of his brother, and the
circumstances of the case. ' Upon the whole, we are of opinion

















































































































































ENGLAR vs; Onul'T. 629 
notice of and a~~ced in the breach of trust · by John P. 
Biirrner, the guardian; for the principle of law is very clear 
'rthat if a p:u·tner, being a trustee or 6.duciary, improperly 
employs the money of his _c.E._s_tui que trust iIJ, the partnership 
busin<~ss, or in the payment of partnership debts, this fact 
t alone, and without anything more, is not sufficient to entitle 
the cestui que trust to occupy the position of creditor, and to 
1enforce repayment of his money as against the firm. To ren- \ . 
I der the firm liable..Jn such case the firm itself must be shown 
, to liaveoef>n - -i~plicated in the breach of trust, and this can-
, not be unless all the partners either knew whence the mom•y 
came,or knew that it did not belong to the partner making use 
of it. But if thE! other partners have knowledge of such mis-
use of trust m-0ney, and know that such money is being 
employed in the partnership business for common benefit, they 
will all be bound for the money so employed, and be made 
an8Werable for the breach of trast committed by their copart-
ner witl1 their acquiescence. Ea: parte Heaton, Buck, 386; E:D 
parte Apsey, 3 Brown, Ch. 266; Smith vs. Jameson, 5 Term R. 
601; Ex parte lVatson, 2 Ves. & B. 415; Story, Partn. § 368; 
l Lindi. Partn. (5th Ed.) 161. Here, however, the proof woultl 
seem to establish the fact of the ·entire absence of knowledge 
on the part of Edward C. Shriner of the use of trust money by 
J<>bn J. Shriner in the partnership business; and in this class 
of cases it is clearly establisht•d by the authorities th.at th<• 
knowledge of the partner committing the breach of trust d-0es 
not affect the other members of the firm. 1 Lindi. Partn. 161. 
Edward C. Shriner swears that he had no such knowledge, and 
he is fully supported in his testimony as to this fact by the testi-
mony of his brother, who swears tbat no part of the trust fund 
was used in the business after the formation of the partner-
t1hip. It is true, Mr. Englar testifies to a declaration or admis-
sion made by Edward C. Shriner to the effect that he knew that 
the trust money was used in the partnership business; but we 
think there must be some mistake or misunderstanding in 
regard to the matter, as Edward C. Shriner is emphatic in 
denying that he ever made such declaration, and he is strongly 
corroborated in this by the testimony of his brother, and the 
eircumstances of the case. · Up-0n the whole, we are of opinion 
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appellants’ exceptions to the auditor’s account and distribu-
tion, and in dismissing the petition, and the order appealed
~ > f _» ‘ ‘ ,’ _
from will therefore be aflirmed. 5 L. g _ i 6;’/_/_;’T:‘~




Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.
122 Ind. 225, 23 N. E. Rep. 156, 17 rkm. St. Rep. B55.
Action for damages for malpractice, brought by Isaac Low-
rey against Luther W. Hess and Frank C. Hess. There was
judgment for plaintiif, and defendant appealed.
llfellctt <6 Bundy and Brown <6 Brown, for appellant
T. B. Rcdding, Chambers ¢£ Hedges and Charles Rochl, for
appellee. _
l\I1'roum.i., O. J. This action was originally instituted by
Isaac Lowrey against Luther \V. and Frank G. Hess, to recover
damages for an injury sustained to the person of the plaintiff,
alleged to have been caused by the negligent and unskillful
manner in which the defendants, who were partners engaged
in the practice of medicine and surgery, reset and treated the
plaintiff’s shoulder, which had been dislocated. Pending the
action, Luther \V. Hess died, and the case proceeded to judg-
ment against his personal representative and surviving part-
ner jointly. On appeal to this court, the judgment was
reversed. Boor vs. Lowrcy, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N. E. Rep. 151, 53
Amer. Rep. 519, and note. On the former appeal we arrived
at the conclusion that, even though the action was in form
ea: cmitractu, since the principal or only damages sought to be
recovered grew out of an injury to the person, the action would
not survive against the personal representative of a deceased
partner. Hegerich vs. Kcddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. Rep. 787,
52 Am. Rep. 25; Ott vs. Kaufman, 68 Md. 56, 11 At]. Rep. 580.
The nature of the daniageésued for, and not the nature of its
5/
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appellants' exceptions to the auditor's account and distribu-
tion, and in dismissing the petition, and the order appealed 
from will therefore be affirmed. ~ ,·.-· ~ . t · .-. / ,, ... -
: (, o""' ·i-: 
NoT&.-See Mechem's Elem. of Par.tn., § 208. "' / . ) 
BESS vs. LOWREY. 
8up1·eme Court of Indiana, 1890. 
129 Ind. 22j, 23 N. E. Rep. lfiG, 17 ~m. t:;t. .Rep. m. 
Action for damages for malpractice, brought by Isaac Low-
rPy ngainl!lt Luther \V. Hess and Frank C. Hess. There was 
judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. 
Mellett & Bundy and Brown di Brown, for appellant 
'l'. B. Redding, Chambers cG Hedges and Cliarks Roc1,l, few 
appcllee. 
M1TCHEI.L, C. J. This action was originally instituted by 
Jsnac Lowrey ngainRt Luther \V. and Frank C. Hess, to reco"cr 
damages for an injury sustained to the person of the plaintiff, 
allPged to have been caused by the negligent and unskillful 
manner in which the defendants, who were partners engaged 
in the practice of medicine and surgery, reset and treated the 
plaintiff's shoulder, which had been dislocated. Pending tht• 
action, Luther W. Hess died, and the case proceeded to judg-
ment ngainst his personal representative and surviving part-
ner jointly. On appeal to this court, the judgment we.a 
reversed. Boor va. Lowre:iJ, 103 Ind. 468, 3 N. E. Rep. 151, 53 
Amer. Rep. 519, and note. On the former appeal we arrived 
ot the conclusion that, even though the action was in form 
u co11tractu, since the principal or only damag~s sought to be 
recov<>red grew out of an injury to the person, the action would 
not survive against the personal representative of a deceased 
partner. Hegericli vs. Kedd·ie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. Rep. 787, 
52 Am. Rep. 25; Ott vs. Kaufman, GS Md. 56, 11 Atl. Rep. 580. 
The nature of the damagtued for, 8lld not the nature of ibi 
-r~-
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cause, determines whether or not the action survives. Cutter
cs. Hamlcn, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. Rep. 397; 1 Chit. Pl. 101.
The case is here on a second appeal, and the question is now
presented \lligther_<)r not, the action having been abated
against the estate of the deceased partner. it can be prose;
cjg-.d to jpdgment againgtlhe survivor. That each partner
is the agent of the firm while engaged in the prosecution of
the partnership business, and that the firm is liable for the
torts of each, if committed within the scope of his agency,
appears to be well settled. Ghamplin vs. Laytin, 18 \Vend.
407, 31 Am. Dec. 382; Tucker vs. Cole, 54 Wis. 539, 11 N. W’.
Rep. 703; Fletcher vs. Ingram, 46 Wis. 101; Taylor vs. Jones, 42
N. H. 25; Schu-abaclccr vs. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517; Story, Partn.
§§ 107-166; 1 Bates, Partn. § 461. “It follows from the prin-
ciples of agency, coupled with the doctrine that each partner
is the agent of the firm, for the purpose of carrying on its busi-
ness in the usual way, that an ordinary partnership is liable
in damages for the negligence of any one of its members in
conducting the business of the partnership.” 1 Lindl. Partn.
299. Thus, in II~_|/trnc vs. Erwin, 23 S. C. 226, 55 Am. Rep. 15,
which was an action against‘ two physicians for an injury
resulting from the negligent and unskillful setting of a broken
arm, it was held that the act of one within the scope of the
partnership business was the act of each and all, as fully as
if each was present, participating in all that was done, and
that each partner guaranties that the one in charge shall dis-
play reasonable care, diligence, and skill, and that the failure
of one is the failure of all. lt is contended, however, that if
the appellant was liable at all, he was only liable jointly with
his deceased partner, and that, the action having abated as to
the deceased partner, the case falls within the rule that, where
one or more of the joint plaintiffs or joint defendants dies, the
action shall not thereby be abated, if the cause of action
survives, but if the cause of action is one that does not sur-
vive, then the death of either joint plaintiff or joint defendant
abatcs the whole action: Mock vs. Raffncr, 2 Blackf. 23; Wil-
liams rs. Kent, 15 ‘Wend. 360. The general rule established
by the cases is that, where several persons jointly commit
a tort for which an action in form cw dclicto may be main-
tained, without reference to any contract relation between
















































































































































HESS vs. LOWRF.Y, 331 
cause, determines whether or not the action survives. Outte1· 
t:B. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18 N. E. Rep. 397; 1 Obit. Pl. 101. 
The cnse is here on a second appeal, and the question is now 
presented whet_her_gr not, the action h.nving been aba~ 
i'!_gainst the estate of the deceased partner, it can be prose· 
~d to judgme11:t against_j_he survivor. That each partner 
is the agent of the firm while engaged in the prosecution of 
the partnership business, and that the firm is liable for the 
torts of each, if committed within the scope of Ws agency, 
appears to be well settled. Champlin vs. Laytin, 18 \Vend. 
407, 31 Am. Dec. 382; Tur.ker vs. Cole, 54 Wis. 539, 11 N. \V'. 
Rep. 703; Jt'lcfr,her vs. Ingram, 46 \Vis. 191; Taylor vs. Jones, 42 
N. H. 25; l~chu:abarker vs. Riddle, 84 Ill. 517; Story, Partn. 
§§ 107-166; 1 Bates, Partn. § 461. "It follows from the prin-
ciples of agency, coupled with the doctrine that each partner 
is the agent of the firm, for the purpose of carrying on its busi-
ness in the usual way, that an ordinary partnership is liable 
in damages for the negligence of any one of its members in 
conducting the business of the partnership." 1 Lindi. Partn. 
299. Thus, in Ily1·nc vs. E1"1Cin, 23 S. G. 226, 55 Am. Rep. iu, 
which was an action ngninst two physicians for an injury 
resultin~ from the negligent and unskillful setting of a broken 
nrm, it was held that the act of one within the scope of the 
partnership business was the act of each and all, as fully us 
if each was present, participating in all that was done, and 
1hat each partner guaranties that the one in charge shall dis· 
play reasonable care, diligence, and skill, and that the failure 
of one is the failure of all. lt is contended, however, that if 
the appellant was Hable at all, he was only liable jointly with 
his deceased partner, and that, the action having abated as to 
the deceased partner, the case falls within the rule that, where 
one or more of the joint plaintiffs or joint defendants dies, the 
nction shall not thereby be abated, if the cause of action 
survi\"es~ but if the cause of action is one that does not sur-
vive, then the death of either joint plaintiff or joint defendant 
abates the whole action1 Meck vs. Ruffner, 2 Blackf. 23; Wil-
liams t~a. !Cent, 15 "rend. 360. The general rule established 
h;v the cases is that, where several persons jointly commit 
a tort for which an action in form ea: delicto may be main-
tnined, without reference to any contract relation between 
the parties, the plaintiff has his election to sue all or nny 
332 Cases on PARTNI-}l$S§11P.
g
"one of those engaged in the wrongful act, even though the
existence of a contract may have been the occasion, or fur-
nished the opportunity, to commit the act complained ofl
But where the action is founded on a joint contract, and
is in substance, whatever its form may be, to recover dam-
ages for a breach of the contract upon which the action is
predicated, all those jointly liable must be sued, in case all are
alive, and within the jurisdiction of the court. Low vs. Mum-
ford, 14 Johns. 426, 7 Am. Dec. 469; Weall vs. King, 12 East.
452; Whittaker vs. Collins; 34 Minn. 299, 57 Am. Rep. 55, 25 N.
\V. Rep. 632; 1 Lindl. Partn. 482; Bish. Non-Contract Law,
§ 521; Chit. Pl. 469. In a case like the present, where the
gravamcn of the action isthe breach of a contract, by the terms
' of which two persons undertook, as partners, to reset the
plaintifl”s shoulder, and to treat him with the skill and dili-
gcnce ordinarily displayed by competent surgeons, and the
action is not maintainable without referring to the contract,
it may well be, even though the action be laid in tort, that the
non-joinder of one of them would be ground for a plea in abate-
ment. Colly. Partn. § 732; Dicey, Parties, 455. But a plea
-_in\ abatement for non-jqindggiparties _nlust_, in ol1I1e1'_t9_be
goodfshow th_:I_tj_hc pershn alleged to be jointly liable and not
s_ue_d is living, alld/§l&j€Ct to _thejgfocess _of’the7 cougt. Dillon
as. Bun'k,’6'Elackt. 5; lV_i§on vs. State, Id. 212; Bragg vs. Wot-
zcl, 5 Blackf. 95; Levi vs. Haverstick, 51 Ind. 236; Ferguson rs.
Hagans, 90 Ind. 38; Golly. Partn. § 741; Merriman vs. Barker,
121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. Rep. 992. -
If, in an action against partners to recover damages for a per-
sonal injury growing out of the breach of a contract, it is neces-
I sary, as in ordinary actions an coutractu, to join all the part-
" ners, it must follow that upon the death of one, notwithstand-
l ing the action may abate as to the deceased partner, the rule
f applicable to ordinary actions upon contracts against part-
lxners must obtain. At the common law, the contract of part-
ners was always treated as a joint agreement, but the firm
creditors could not proceed against the estate of a deceased
partner, because the death of one of the partners extinguished
the contract as to him, leaving it in force as the separate
engagement of the survivior./ The legal remedy of the cred-
itor was thereafter confined exclusively to the surviving part-
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~lie of those engaged in the wrongful act, even though the 
existence of a contract may have been the occasion, or fur-
nished the opportunity, to commit the act complained ofl 
But where the action is founded on a joint contract, and 
is in substance, whatever its form may be, to recover dam-
ages for a breach &f the contract upon which the action is 
predicated, all those jointly liable must be sued, in case all .are 
alive, and within the jurisdiction of the court. /.Jow vs. Mum-
ford, 14 Johns. 426, 7 Am. Dec. 469; Weall vs. King, 12 East. 
4:5~; Wltittalrer vs. Collins; 34 :Minn. 2!l9, 57 Am. Rep. 55, 25 ~. 
W. Rep. 632; 1 Lindi. Partn. 482; Bish. Non-Contract Law, 
I 521; Chit. Pl. 469. In a case like the present, where the 
gravamen. of the action is.the breach of a oontract, by the terms 
of which two persons undertook, as partners, to reset tbP. 
plaintiff's shoulder, and to treat him with the skill and dili-
gence ordinarily displayed by competent surgeons, and the 
action is not maintainable without referring to the contract, 
it may well be, even though the action be laid in tort, that the 
non-joinder of one of them would be ground for a plea in abah"!-
ment. Colly. Partn. § 732; Dicey, Parties, 455. But a plea. 
J. abatement for non-joinder of arties 11!..1:1~~1 in o~_J9_bf! 
good, show that_the p n alleged t-0 be jointly liable and not 
~g, and ~~!_~the !1rocess ~f the ~ou~. Dilkm 
vs. Bank, 6 illilckf. 5; Wilson vs. State, Id. 212; Bragg vs. Wet-
zel, 5 Blackf. 95; Led vs. H at·erstick, 51 Ind. 236; Ferguson i:s. 
Hagans, 90 Ind. 38; Colly. Partn. § 741; Ale,..riman vs. Barker, 
121 Ind. 74, 22 N. E. Rep. 992. • rr lf,in an action against partners to recover damages for a per· 
ysonal injury growing out of the breach of a contract, it is neces-
. sary, as in ordinary actions c:c coutractu, to join all the part-
{ ne1·s, it must follow that upon the death of one, notwitbstand· 
! ing the action may abate as to the deceased partner,, the rule 
j\~pplicable to ordinary actions upon contracts against part-
1 iners must obtain. At the common law, the contract of pa1't-
ners was always treated as n joint agreement, but the firm 
creditors could not proceed against the estate of a deceased 
partne1·, because the death of one of the partners extinguished 
the contract as to him, leaving it in force as the separate 
engagement of the sunivior.1 'rhe legal remedy of the cred· 
itor was thereafter confined exclusively to the surviving part-
~er, except a1 the common law was modified by statut~e, Qr 
' l I 
• 
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by the principles of equity. Sherman vs. Kreul, 42 “’is. 33.
The right to sue for claims due the firm, as well as the liability
to be sued for claims against the firm, devolves exclusively
upon the surviving partner. Meek vs. Ru/Tner, supra; Mcbain
vs. (7arson’s E'.z-’r, '4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777; Chtlds vs. H _1/do,
10 Iowa 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 596,
54 Am. Dec. 200; 2 Lindl. Partn. 665. Upon the death of one
partner, the creditor has a right to collect his claim at law
from the survivor, or, if the cause of action survives against
the personal representative, to proceed, in the manner pointed
out by the statute, against the estate of the deceased partner.
Ralston vs. Moore, 105 Ind. 243, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Kimball vs.
Whitney, 15 Ind. 280; Gere vs. Clarke, 6 Hill, 350. If a partner
dies pending an action against the firm, the death being sug-
gested on the record, the action does not abate, but may pro-
ceed to judgment against the surviving partner__unless the
cause of action dies, not only as against the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased partner, but as against the surviving
partner also. Golly. Partn. §_727; Pom. Rem. §§ 250, 251;
Bates, Partn. § 1055; Williams vs. K ent, supra. When the
damages sued for arise out of an injury to the person of the
plaintiff, the cause of action dies with the person of either,
party; but the cause of action dies only so far as it affects the,
liability of the decedent, or his personal representative,
Neither by the common law, nor under the statute, does the
cause of acti-on die as to a surviving partner or defendant, who,
as we have seen, remains liable for all claims against the firm.
King vs. Bell, 13 Neb. 409, 14 N. VV. Rep. 141; 8 Wait. Act. Def. 502. I While the members of the firm were all alive, each
was liable in sollclo as principal, .the firm being in law a single
entity. Upon the death of one partner, his liability was extin-
guished, but the surviving partner, as the sole representative
of the firm, continued liable.I Shale vs. Sehantz, 35 Hun, 622.
It is only where the cause of action does not survive in favor
of, or against either of, the joint plaintiffs or defendants that
the death of one abates the whole action. If the action is,; as
doubtless it should be, regarded as a suit quasi ea: con-tractu for
damages, for an injury to the person occasioned by the breach
of a joint contr., the death of one of the defendants simply
severed the joint liability and extinguished the claim against
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by the principles of equity. STicrman vs. Kreul, 42 Wis. 3.1. 
"'rhe right to sue for claims due the firm, as well as the liabilitj 
to be sued for claims against the firm, devolves exclusively 
upon the surviving partner. Meek rs. Ruffner, supra; McLafa 
t~s. Carson'IJ Ex'r, 4 Ark. 164, 37 Am. Dec. 777; Child.a vs. Hyd.o, 
10 Iowa 294, 77 Am. Dec. 113; Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 596, 
54 Am. Dec. 200; 2 Lindi. Partn. 665. Upon the death of one 
partner, the creditor has a right to collect his claim at law 
from the survh·or, or, if the cause of action survives against 
the personal representative, to proceed, in the manner pointed 
<>at by the statute, against the estate of the deceased partnel'. 
Ralston vs. Moore, 105 Ind. 24!l, 4 N. E. Rep. 673; Kimball VB. 
Whitney, 15 Ind. 280; Gere vs. Clarke, 6 Hill, 350. If a partnr.r 
dies pending an action against the firm, the death being sug-
gested on the record, the action does not abate, but may pro-
ceed to judgment against the surviving partner __ unless the~ 
cause of action dies, not only as against the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased partner, but as against the surviYing 
partner also. Colly. Partn. § .727; Porn. Rem. §§ 250, 251; 
"Bates, Partn. § 1055; William.JJ vs. [(cnt, supra. When the) 
damages sued for arise out of an injury to the person of tbe 
plaintiff, the cause of action dies with the person of either, 
party; but the cause of action dies only so far as it affects the, 
liability of the decedent, or his personal representative, 
Neither by the common law, nor under the statute, does the 
cause of action die as to a surviving partner or defendant, who, 
as we have seen, remains liable for all claims against the firm. 
King VB. Bell, 13 Neb. 409, 14 N. \V. Rep. 141; 8 Wait. Act. & 
Def. 502. r While the members of the firm were all alive, each 
was liable in solido as prineipal, .the firm being m law a single 
entity. Upon the death of one partner, his liability was extin-
guished, but the survivin~ partner, as the sole representative 
of the firm, continued liable.I Shale vs. Schantz, 35 Hun, 622. 
It is only where the cause of action does not survive in favor 
of, or against either of, the joint plaintiffs or defendants that 
the death of one abates the whole action. If the action is,: as 
doubtless it should be, regarded as a suit quasi eJ: co11.tractu for 
damages, for an injury to the person occasioned by the breach 
of a joint cont., the death of one of the defendants simply 
severed the joint liability and extinguished the claim against 
the decedent, while it continued in full force as to the sur-
.. 
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vivor. If the action is regarded as purely in tort, as where the
injury is willful and intentional, then the liability of the
defendants may be joint and several, and the death of one
does not abate the action as to the other. (Jolly. Partn. (Gth
Ed.) 1079, note. |The death of one partner in no wise affects
the liability of th~ upon the happening of that
event, becomes individually liable to make good the joint
undertaking of both.’ Ordinarily, in actions ea: dclieto, where
the liability arises from the misconduct or wrongful act of the
partie, each, is liable for all the consequences, and there is
no right to enforce contribution; but this r_ul_e does not apply
_g1wggn_pa_rti_1§§s, unless the liability resultedfrom a rxfedi
tated or willful wrong, intentionally inflicted by the one seek-
ing to enforce contrihution..o Armstrong Co. vs. Clarion Co.,
66 Pa. St. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 368; Pearson vs. Skelton, 1 Mecs. &
W. 504; Jacobs vs. Pollard, 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105;
Acheson rs. Miller, 2 0'hio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 603; Bailey cs.
Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; 4 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 12, 13;
Lindl. Partn. 771. '
at all affect the question of the right of contribution between
he survivor and his personal representative. The right of
contribution grows out of the partnership relation, and rests
upon the implgicd obligation of each partner to contribute jn
proportion to the liquidation of all partnership liabilities,
unless theliability arose out of an intentional tort, committed
by the partner asking contribution. That the right of con-
tribution exists, affords a persuasive reason for holding that
the action may be maintained against the surviving partner.
6 That the cause of action died a to Luther W. Hess does not
cause of action did not die as to both partners because one
.member of the firm died, and that the proceeding to judgment
against the survivor was not of itself erroneous.
. (Omitting questions of practice.)
Aflirmed.
2" From every point of view the conclusion follows that the


















































































































































C..lSES ON p A.RTNERSBIP. 
vivor. If the action is regarded as purely in tort, as where t11e 
mJury is willful and intentional, then the liability of the 
defendants may be joint and several, and the death of one 
does not abate the action as to the other. Colly. Partn. (Gth 
Ed.) 1079, note. IThe death of one partner in no wise affect11 l the liability of the suryivor, who, upon the happening of that event, becomes individually liable to make good the joint 
undertaking of both.) Ordinarily, in actions e:i: dclicto, where 
the liability arises from the misconduct or wrongful act of the 
parties, each. is liable for all the consequcnce8, and there is 
no right to enforce contribution; b_ut this rule does not apply 
.l!tl~eep_p~rt~ unless the liability re-slllted'-from a meat- . 
tatt>d or willful wrong, intentionally inllicted by the one seek-
ing to enforce contribution.1 Annst1·ong Co. vs. Clal"ion Co., 
66 Pa. St. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 3GS; Pca1'son vs. Skelton, 1 Mees. & 
W. 504; Jacobs 'l:B. Pollard, 10 Cush. 287, 57 Am. Dec. 105; 
Ache8on t·s. J.l illcr, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; BaUey t·s. 
Bussing, 28 Conn. 455; 4 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 12, 13; 
Lindi. Partn. 771. · 
[;
That the cause of action died as to Luther W. Hess does not 
t all affect tlle question of the right of contribution between 
~ he sun'iYor nnd his personal representative. The right of 
contribution grows out of the partnersllip relation, and rests 
upon the impl,ied obligation of each partner to contribute )n 
proportion to the liquidation of all partnership liabilities, 
unl<.'ss the-1iability nrose out of an intentional 1.ort, committed 
by the partne1· asking contribution. That the right of con-
1 tribution exists, affords a persuasive reason for holding that the action may be maintained against the surviving partner. 
[ 
:from every point of view the conclusion follows that the 
cause of action did not die ns to both partners because one 
member of the firm <lied, and that the proceeding to judgment 
against the survivor was not of itself e1·roneous. 
(Omitting questions of practice.) 
Aft\ rm ed. 
No~- See M.echem's·Elem. of Partn., § 204, and cases citecJ.. 
• 
>
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IIOSENKRANS vs. BARKER.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885.
115 Ill. 331, 8 N. E. Rep. 93, 56 Am. Rep. 109.
This was an action brought by A. E. Barker in the superior
court of Cook county against O. L. Rosenkrans and J. H.
Weber, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecu-
tion and false imprisonment. A trial of the cause before a
jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plain-
titf for $2,000. The defendants appealed to the appellate
court, where the judgment was afiirmed, and they now appeal
to the supreme court. The facts out of which. this litigation
grew, so far as is necessary to state them, are substantially.
as follows: In 1882 Barker resided in Iowa, and was engaged
in a small way in the jewelry business. In the latter part of
the year he bought a bill of goods of Rosenkrans & \Veber, of
Chicago, amounting to $350. The goods were sold by a trav-
eling man named Johnson. When the bill became due $100
was paid, but no part of the balance has Over been paid.
Rosenkrans resided in Wisconsin and did business in Milwau-
kee, but at the same time he was a partner in the jewelry busi-
ness of Rosenkrans & Weber, in Chicago, the firm being com-
posed of Rosenkrans and Lucy B. Weber, who was the wife of
J. H. YVeber. J. H. Weber had the general management of
the business of this Chicago firm. On or about the first of
February, 1883, the bill of goods remaining unpaid, Johnson,
who had sold the goods, induced Barker to visit Chicago under
the pretense that he.would enter into partnership with. him
in the jewelry business in Chicago. Upon the arrival of Bar-
ker, Y-Veber was notified by Johnson of the arrival, and on the
fifth day of February, 1883, Weber filed a petition and obtained
an order for a writ of no eazeat. The writ was issued and
placed in the hands of the sherifl’, who arrested Barker and
held him in custody ten or twelve hours, when he was released
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~OSENKRANS vs. BARKER. 
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1885. 
115 Ill. 831, 8 N. E. Rep. 98, li6 Am. Rep. 109. 
This was an action brought by A. E. Barker in the superior 
court of Cook county against 0. L. Rosenkrans and J. H. 
Weber, to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecu· 
tion and false imprisonment. A trial of the cause before a 
jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plain· 
tiff for f2,000. The defendants appealed to the appellate 
·ec>ort, where the judgment was aftlrmed, and they now appeal 
to the supreme court. The facts out of which this litigation 
grew, so far as is necessary to state them, are substantially• 
as follows: In 1882 Barker resided in Iowa, and was engaged 
in a small way in the jewelry business. In the latter part of 
the year he bought a bill of goods of Rosenkrans & Weber, of 
Chicago, amounting to $350. The goods were sold by a trav· 
eling man named Johnson. 'Vhen the bill became due $100 
was paid, but no part of the balance has ever been paid. · 
Rosenkrans resided in Wisconsin and did business in Milwau· 
kee, but at the same time he was a partner in the jewelry busi· 
ness of nosenkrans & Weber, in Chicago, the firm being com· 
posed of Rosenkrans and Luc;:i B. Weber, who was the wife of 
J. H. ·weber. J. H. \Veber had the general management of 
the business of this Chicago firm. On or about the first of 
February, 1883, the bill of goods remaining unpaid, Johnson, 
who had sold the goods, induced Barker to visit Chicago under 
the pretense that h1J would enter into partnership with him 
in the jewelry bu~iness in Chicago. Upon the arrival of Bar-
ker, ·weber was notified by Johnson of the arrival, and on the 
ftfth day of February, 1883, \Veber filed a petition and obtained 
an order for a writ of nc ezeat. The writ was issued and 
placed in the hands of the sheriff, who arrested Barker and 
.beld him in custody ten or twelve hours, when he was released 
o.n bail. Subsequently, and on the 17th day of March, 1883, 
-336 Cases ox PARTNERSHIP. ,
on demurrer, the petition was dismissed. It does not appear
that Rosenkrans had any knowledge that the proceedings had
been instituted against Barker until about the 1st day of
April, 1883, and at this time a petition for a ne eareat had been
held bad on demurrer and dismissed, and Weber had then or
a few days thereafter appealed to the appellate court. When
Rosenkrans learned what had been done he notified Vveber
that it was wrong, and advised the dismissal of the appeal
from the appellate court, and under his advice no further steps
were taken to prosecute the appeal. ' 1
Rosenthal d? Pence, for Omar L. Rosenkrans.
Shaman 16 Dcfrccs, for J . Hawley Weber.
Abbott, Oliver 45 Showalter, for appellee.
Cn.uo, J. (After stating the facts.) At the request of
nthe plaintiflf the court instructed the jury: “If Rosenkrans
became acquainted with the facts in the matter about the last
of March, 1883; that, being so informed as to said facts attend-
ing the commencement of said proceedings, said Rosenkrans
suffered said proceedings to be continued in the courts'through
the medium of an appeal, and did not in any way discounten-
ance said procfiedings, or put a stop to the same,—then the
court instructs the ‘jury that if they find from the evidence that
said nc em-eat proceedings were intituted maliciously and with-
out probable cause, and said Rosenkrans was so informed, but
allowed the ne meat case to proceed, then all such facts, if the
jury so believe, may be taken into consideration in determin-
ing whether said Rosenkrans ratified and approved of the
arrest of said Barker; and if he did so approve and ratify the
arrest of said Barker, then he would be equally liable with
_\Veber, if said arrest was made maliciously and without prob»-
able cause.” The court also instructed Qhe jury that if they
found the defendants guilty under the evidence, that the arrest
was malicious and without probable cause, and that plaintitf
has sustained actual damages, then, on assessing damages,
they are not limited to compensation for actual damages sus-
tained, but may give exemplary or vindictive damages.
= These instructions are claimed to be erroneous as to the
















































































































































CA.SES ON p ARTNERSHIP. 
on demurrer, the petition was dismissed. It does not ,appear lthat Rosenkrans had any knowledge that the proceedings had been instituted against Barker until about the 1st day of 
April, 1883, and at this time a petition for a ne e:ceat had been 
held bad on demurrer and dismissed, and Weber had then or 
a few days thereafter appealed to the appellate court. When 
Ro8enkrans learned what had been .done he notified '\Yeber 
that it was wrong, and advised the dismissal of the appeal 
from the appellate court, a.Iid under his advice no further steps 
were taken to prosecute the appeal. 
Rosenthal & Pence, for Omar L. Rosenkrans. 
Sh1lman <G Defrees, for J. Hawley 'Veber;. 
Abbott, Oliver 4 Showalter, for appellee. 
CRAIG, tT. (After stating the facts.) At the request of 
.the plaintiff the court instructed the jury: "If Rosenkrans 
became acquainted witl1 the facts in the matter about the last 
of March, 1883; that, being so informed as to said facts attend-
ing the commencement of said proceedings, said Rosenkrans 
suffered said proceedings to be continued in the courts' through 
the medium of an appeal, :md did not in any way discounten• 
ance said proc~dings, or put a stop to the same,-then the 
court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence that 
said nc e:.ceat proceedings were instituted maliciously and with-
out probable cause, and said Rosenkrans was so informed, but 
·&llowed the ne exeat case to proceed, then all such facts, if the 
jury so believe, may be taken into consideration in determin-
ing whether said Rosenkrans ratified and approved of the 
arrest of said BRrker; and if he did so approve and ratify the 
.arrest of said Barker, then he would be equally liable with 
'Veber, if said arrest was mc;tde maliciously apd without probp· 
able cause." The court also instructed ~e jury that if they 
found the defendants guilty under the evidence, that the arrest 
,was malicious and without probable cause, and that plaintiff 
has sustained actual damages, then, on assessing damages, 
they are not limited to compensation for actual damages sus-
tained, but may give exemplary or vindictive damages. 
: These instructions are claimed to be erroneous as to the 
·defendant Rosenkrans. An instruction which is not baaed otl 
~ 
I 
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the evidence in the case is improper, and should not be given;
it is liable to mislead the jury, and usually results in a wrong
verdict. As to the first instruction supra, we find no evi-
dence in the record upon which it could fairly be predicated.
Rosenkrans testified, and in this he is corroborated by other
evidence, that when he came to Chicago and learned for the
first time of the proceedings, he notified \Veber, who was in
charge of the matter, that it was wrong, and the appeal ought
to be dismissed. Here he not only failed to sanction and
approve, but condemned, what had been done, and under his
direction no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal.
The conduct and acts of Rosenkrans contain no element of
approval, and the instruction based upon the theory of an
approval, in the absence of any evidence to sustain such theory,
could do no less than mislead the jury. As respects the other
instruction, we are of opinion as to Rosenkrans it is erroneous.
It is not claimed that he ordered, advised, or directed the
arrest, or_ that he even knew of the occurrence until after the
proceeding in the ne (meat case had been dismissed. The claim
is that after knowledge of the arrest he approved what had
been done. If such was the case, he would only be liable for
the real injury sustained, and not for vindictive damages, as
held in Gru-mi vs. Van Week, 69 Ill. 478. But under the instruc-
tion the jury were directed that each defendant was liable for
actual and vindictive damages.
It is, however, claimed by appellee that Rosenkrans is
liable upon either one of two grounds: First, because those
who caused the arrest were servants or agents of Rosenkrans,
acting within the scope of their agency; second, the wrongful
proceeding was instituted for Rosenkrans, and in his name,
and when he became aware of what had been done he ratified
it. W'eber, who caused the arrest of Barker, was not in fact
a partner of Rosenkrans, but he acted for his wife, who was
the partner, and, so far as the acts are concerned, they may
be regarded as the acts of Rosenkrans’ partner. In many
respects one partner is the agent of the other. In the purchase
and sale of goods within the scope of the partnership business
the acts of one may be regarded as the acts of both. In such
cases the one that transacts the business acts for himself and

















































































































































ROSENKRANS vs. BA.RKBB. 837 
the evidence in the case is improper, and should not be given; 
it is liable to mislead the jury, and usually results in a wrong 
verdict. As to the first instruction supra, we find no evi-
dence in the record upon which it could fairly be predicated. 
Rosenkrans testified, and in this he is corroborated by other 
evidence, that when he came to Chicago and learned for the 
first time of the proceedings, be notified Weber, who was in 
charge of the matter, that it was wrong, and the appeal ought 
to be dismissed. Here be not only failed to sanction and 
approve, but condemned, what had been done, and under his 
direction no further steps were taken to prosecute the appeal. 
The conduct and acts of Rosenkrans contain no element of 
approval, and the instruction based upon the theory of an 
approval, in the absence of any evidence to sustain such theory, 
could do no less than mislead the jury. As respects the other 
instruction, we are of opinion as to Rosenkrans it is erroneous. 
It is not claimed that be ordered, advised, or directed tha 
arresti or. that he even knew of the occurrence until after the 
proceeding in the ne exeat case bad been dismissed. The claim 
is that after knowledge of the arrest he approve(! what had 
been done. If such was the case, he would only be liable for 
the real injury sustained, and not for vindictive damages, H 
held in Grund vs. l'an Vlcek, 6!) Ill. 478. But under the instruc-
tion the jury were directed that each defendant was liable for 
a-ctual and vindictive damages. 
It is, however, claimed by appellee that Rosenkrans la 
liable. upon either one of two grounds: First, because those 
who caused the arrest were servants or agents of Rosenkrans, 
acting within the scope of their agency; second, the wrongful 
proceeding was instituted for Rosenkrans, and in his name, 
and when he became aware of what had been done he ratified 
it. Weber, who cnused the arrest of Darker, was not in fact 
a partner of Rosenkrans, but he acted for his wife, who was 
the partner, and, so far as the acts are concerned, they may 
be regarded as the acts of R-Osenkrans' partner. In man7 
respects one partner is the agent of the other. In the purchase-
and sale of goods within the scope of the partnership business 
the acts of one may be regarded as the acts of both. In such 
cases the one that transacts the business acts for himself and 
in the capacity as agent of the other, and in that capacity he 
43 
838 CASES on PARTNERSllIP.~
binds himself and also binds his partner. By entering into
partnership each party reposes confidence in the other, and
constitutes him his general agent as to all partnership con-
cerns. Gow, Partn. 52. But the question involved here is
other, but it is whether one partner may be liable in damages
for the wrongs of the other. Mr. Collyer, in his work on Part-
ership, § 457, says: “A learned writer observes that though
partners are in general bound by the contracts, they are not
answerable for the wrongs, of each other. In general, acts
or omissions in the course of the partnership trade, or busi-
ness, in violation of law, will only implicate those who are
guilty of them.” And, in 1 Lindl. Partn. bk. 2, c. 1, § 4, the
author says: “As a rule, however, the willful tort of one part-
ner is not imputable to the firm. For example, if one partner
maliciously prosecutes a person for stealing partnership prop-
erty, the firm is not answerable unless all the members are in
fact privy to the malicious prosecution.”
In Gilbert vs. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, where a question arose as
to the liability of one partner for the act of the other in causing
the arrest of a person charged with larceny of money belong-
ing to the firm, it was held that the mere knowledge and con-
sent of one partner that the other should have the person
accused arrested would not render the partner so knowing
and consenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution;
it was necessary that the consent should be of such a char-
acter as to amount to advice a.nd co-operation. In Grund rs.
Van Vleck, 69 lll. 478, a question arose as to the liability of one
partner for the tort of the other, and it was held that one part-
ner cannot involve another in a trespass unless in the ordinary
course of their business, and in a case where the trespass is
tn the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership;
and in such case, to render the partner liable who did not join
in the commission of the trespass, he must afterwards have
concurred and received the benefit of it. Here no part of the
debt was collected by the commencement or prosecution of the
proceedings against Barker, and it is not claimed that a liabil-
ity exists on account of receiving any benefit from the arrest;
and if Rosenkrans is to be held liable, it is upon the ground
that he was a member of the firm which instituted the suit and
















































































































































0.HE8 ON p A.RTNERSUIP. · 
binda himself nnd ah10 binds his partner. By entering into 
partnersWp each party reposes confidence in the other, and 
constitutes him his general agent as to all partnership con-
cerns. Gow, Partn. 52. But the question involved here ia 
ot as to the liability of one partner for the contracts of the 
ther, but it is whether one partner may be liable in damages 
or the wrongs of the other. Mr. Collyer, in his work on Part-
ership, § 457, says: "A learned writer observes that though 
partners are in general bound by the contracts, they are not 
answerable for the wrongs, of each other. In general, acts 
or omissions in the course of the partnership trade, or busi-
ness, in violation of law, will only implicate those who are 
guilty of them." And, in 1 Lindi. Partn. bk. 2, c. 1, § 4, the 
author says: "As a rule, however, the 'ICillful tort of one part-
ner is not imputable to the firm. For example, if one partner 
maliciously prosecutes a person for stealing partnership prop-
erty, the firm is not answerable ~nless all the members are in 
f~ct privy lo the malicious prosecution." 
In GillJert N. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, where a question arose ·1.9 
to the liability of one partner for the act of the other in causing 
the arrest of a person charged with larceny of money belong-
ing to the firm, it was held that the mere knowledge and con-
eent <>f one partner that the other should have the person 
accused arrested would not render the partner s<> knowing 
and consenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution; 
it was necessary that the consent should be of such a chai·-
acter as to amount to advice and co-operation. In Grund f'I. 
Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478, a question arose as to the lia.bility of one 
partner for the tort of the other, and it was held that one part-
ner cannot involve another in a trespass unless in the ordinary 
course of their business, and in a case where the trespass ia 
in the nature of a taking which is available to the partnership; 
and in such case, to render the partner liable who did not join 
in the commission of the trespass, he must afterwards have 
concurred and receh'ed the benefit of it. Here no part of the 
debt was collected by tlle commencement or prosecution of the 
p1•oceedings against Barker, and it is not claimed that a liabil~ 
ity exists on account of receiving any benefit from the arrest; 
end if Rosenkrans is to be held liable, it is upon the ground 
that he W&S a member of the firm Which iDBtituted the suit anCJ 
i
l
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caused the arrest. This, under the authorities cited, cannot
be done. As to the second ground relied upon by appellee,—-
ratification,—what was said in passing upon the instructions
given for appellee is sufficient to dispose of that matter, and
no further discussion of the subject is deemed necessary.
(-Omitting questions of practice.)
Reversed.
























































































































































ROSENKRANS VS. BARKER. 339 
caused the nrrest. This, under the authorities cited, cannot 
be done. As to the second ground relied upon by appellee,--
ratiflcation,-what was said in passing upon the instructions 
giyen for appellee is sufficient to dispose of that matter, and 
no further discussion of the subject is deemed necessary. 
(Omitting questions of practice.) 
Reversed. 
NoTE.-See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., §li 204 and 203, and notes. 








Supreme Court of Alabama, 1879.
63 Ala. 278.
Appeal from a judgment denying a petition to supersede
or quash an execution. The opinion states the facts.
Bragg and Thorington, for appellants.
L. A. Dobbs, contra.
Sross, J. Partnership debts and liabilities, except in lim-
ited partnerships, are equally the debts of the firm and each
member thereof; and the individual property of the several
members, as well as the partnership property, may be taken
in executon for the payment of such partnership debt. Part-
nership debts (under the code in this state, though not at com-
mon law) are joint and several, if evidenced by promise in
writing, and may be sued on against the members jointly or
severally. Code of 1876, Sec. 2905, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala.
596; Waltlron vs. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Va/n Wagner vs. Chap’
man, 29 Ala. 172. A modification of this principle exists, in
cases of bankruptcy and insolvent administration, and a
marshalling of assets will sometimes be decreed; but that doc-
trine has no application to this case, as no bankruptcy or insol-
vency is averred.
The suit and the judgment in the present case are against
W. J . Haralson and Terrence Reynolds, defendants, under the
firm name of W. J. Haralson & Co. The mandate of the exe~
O


















































































































































OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF A PARTNER'S 
LIABILITY . 
• 
HARALSON vs. CA.MPBELL. 
Supreme Courl of Alabama., 1819. 
63Ala. 278. 
Appeal from a judgment denying a petition to supersede 
or quash an execution. The opinion states the facts. 
Bragg and Thorington, for appellanta. 
L. A. Dobb1, contra. 
STONE, .J. Partnership debts and liabilities, except In lim-
ited partnerships, are equally the debts of the firm and each 
member thereof; and the individual property of the several 
members, as well as the partnership property, may be taken 
in executon for the payment of such partnership debt. Part-
nership debts (under the code in this state, though not at com-
mon law) are joint and several, if evidenced by promise in 
writing, and may be sued on against the members jointly or 
severally. Code of 1876, Sec. 2005, Emanuel vs. Bird, 19 Ala. 
596; lVal<lrnn vs. Simmons, 28 Ala. 629; Van Wagner vs. Cliap-
tnan, 29 Ala. 172. A modification of this principle exists, in 
<>ases of bankruptcy and insolvent administration, and a 
mar.i!halling of assets will sometimes be decreed; but that doc-
trine has no a'pplication to this case, as no bankruptcy or insol-
Yency is averred. 
The suit and the judgment in the present case are against 
"'· J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds, defendants, under the 
tlrm name of W. J. Haralson & Co. The mandate of the exe-
• 
Juno 011. Co. vs. Husnnnn. 341
cution is, that the sheriff cause the amount of the judgment
to be made “of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements,
of Willialn J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds.” There was
a motion in the court below to quash the execution, because
it directed the money to be made out of the individual effects
of the defendants, and not out of the partnership property.
The circuit court overruled the motion. This suit is not gov-
erned by Sec. 2904 of the Code. That section contemplates a
suit against the partnership, in its partnership name merely,
without naming the individual members composing the firm.
In this case the individuals are named, and sued as such. The
individual property of each partner is liable to seizure in satis-
faction of this judgment. ‘ " '
The judgment is affirmed.
I
NOTE.-See Mechenfs Elem. of Partn. §§ 209 21$
See also the two cases next following herein.
.~
JUDD OIL CO. vs. HUBBELL.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1879.
76 N. Y. 543.
Appeal from an order made upon a motion to set aside a
judgment, obtained by the Oil Co. against Hubbell and one
Taylor, as copartners. The opinion states the facts.
Charles H. Tweed, for appellant.
George H. Forster, for respondent.
DANFORTH, J . (After disposing of other matters.) At ‘the
outset the plaintiff was called upon “to show cause why the
judgment should not be vacated and set aside as irregular, in
that a several judgment is entered against tlge deg:-ligant,
Hubbell, for'$40,950.29, and a several. judgment is entered
against the defendant, Taylor, for $43,420.11), instead of a judg-
ment against the defendants joiiitly, pursuant to the um-
mons and complaint; also as unauthorized l;y__law.” The
moving papers establish beyond cofitroversy that the cause

















































































































































JUDD OrL Co. vs. HUBBELL. 341 
cutfon is, that the sheriff cause the amount of the judgment 
to be made "of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, 
of William J. Haralson and Terrence Reynolds." There was 
a motion in the court below to quash the execution, because 
it directed the money to be made out of the individual effects 
of the defendants, and not out of the partnership property. 
The circuit court overruled the motion. This suit is not gov-
erned by Sec. 2904 of the Code. That section contemplates a 
suit against the partnership, in its partnership name merely, 
without naming the individual members composi~g the firm. 
In this case the individuals are named, and sued as such. The 
individual property of each partner is liable to seizure in sa.tia· 
faction of this judgment. • • • 
The judgment is a1Jirmed. 
NOTE.-See Mechem'& Elem. of Parto. ~§ 209 Jl'J 
Bee also the two cases next following herein. 
JUDD OIL ·co. vs. HUBBELL •. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1819. 
76 N. Y. MS. 
• 
Appeal from an order made upon a motion to set aside a 
judgment, obtainf'd by the Oil Co. against Hubbell and one 
Taylor, as copartners. The opinion states the facts. 
Oha.rles H. Tweed, for appellant. 
Qeorge H. Forster, for respondent. 
DANFORTH, J. (After disposing of other matters.) At 'the 
outset the plaintiff was called upon "to show cause why the 
judgment should not be vacated and set aside as irregular, in 
thnt a several "udgment is entered against e defendant, 
Hubbell, for $40,950.2., and a several _judgment is entered 
against the defendant, 'l'aylor, for $431420:'.Iil, instead of a judg-
ment against the defendants jointly, pursuant to the sum-
mons and complaint; also as unauthorized b w." The 
moving papers establish beyond co troversy that the cause 
of action was a joint liability on the part of Hubbell and Tay-
342 Cssns on Purmnnsnrr.
tor as copartners. This the complaint alleged, the defendant
~Hubbell by his default admitted, and the defendant Taylor has
had that fact found against him by a referee, and by his silence
acquiesces in the finding. Upon that determination the plain-
tifl's, at the same time and by means of the same record or
judgment roll, took judgments against the defendants sep-
arately, as stated in the order to show cause. This was clearly
irregular; but we think it was nothing more. The plaintifis
did not adhere “to the prescribed rule or mode of proceeding,"
by which they were entitled to a joint judgment, and which
n. due and orderly conduct of the suit required them to take.
But this defect was m~and does not affect any
substantial right of the adverse party. It does not in any
way increase the liability of the defendant, for upon each part-
ner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of every
debt due from the partnership. Parsons on Partnership (2d
Ed.) 63; and although originally a joint contract, it may be
separate as to its effects. Though all are sued jointly and a
joint judgment obtained and a joint execution taken out, yet
it may be enforced aga~ly. Each partner is answer-
able for the whole, and not merely for his proportionable part;
and as the judgments were taken against each partner, for a
partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the
same extent as if there had been but one judgment, for the
whole, aga~t1Ers. Brinkcrhofl‘ cs. Marvin, 5 Johns.
Ch;, 326. Nor does the form of the judgment in any way affect
the debtor's relations with his copartner; for if he pays the
debt or judgment, he ~&dt:opti-il>gt’i@ mat
credit for the sum/p_:_1_id, in any accounting respecting the part-
nership affairs.
Motion to set aside judgment denied.
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ior as copal'tnere. This the oo:mplaint alleged, the defendant 
Hubbell by his default '8dmitted, iand the defendant Taylor has 
had that fact found against him by a referee, and by his silenc'~ 
acquiesces in the finding. Upon that determination the plain-
tifl's, at the snme time and by means of the same record or 
judgment roll, took judgments against the defendants sep-
arately, as stated in the order to show cause. This was clearly 
irregular; but we think it was nothing more. The plaintiffs 
did not adhere "to the prescribed rule or mode of proceeding," 
by which they were entitled to a joint judgment, and which 
a due and orderly conduct <>f the suit required them to take. 
But this defect was mtlfl1 teclmicaland does not affect any 
substantial right of the adverse party. It does not in any 
way increase tbe liability of the defendant, for upon each part-
ner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of every 
debt due from the partnership. rarsons on Partnership (2d 
Ed.) 63; and although originally a joint contract, it may be 
separate as to its effects. Though all are sued jointly and a 
joint judgment obtained and a joint execution taken out, yet 
it may be enforced against one only. Each partner is answer-
able for the whole, and not merely for his proportionable part; 
and as the judgments were taken against each partner, for a 
partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the 
same extent as if there had been but one judgment, for the 
whole, nga~!~rs. Brinkerhoff cs. Marvfo, 5 Johns. 
Ch;, 326. Nor does the form of the judgment in any way affect 
the debtor's relations with his copartner; for if he pays the 
debt or judgment, he WiITbe engtle~o!!Jrj_butiQD or tQ._ il. 
credit for the su~d, in any accounting respecting the part- ._· ~ 
nership affairs. 
Motion to set aside judgment denied. 
NoTB.-See llcchem'is Elem. of Partn., ~ 209, 2ll>, 818. 
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MASON vs. ELDRED/»i'~$'
Supreme Court of United States, 1867.
6 Wall. 231, 18 L. Ed. 783.
Mason sued, in the circuit court for Wisconsin, Anson
Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and one Balcom, trading as partners,
upon a partnership note of theirs. Process was served on
Anson Eldred alone, who alone appeared, and pleaded non
assumpsit. On the trial, the note being put in evidence by the
plaintiff, Eldred offered the record of a judgment in one of the
state courts of Micltigan, showing that Mason had already
brought suit in that court on the same note against the part-
nership; where, though Elisha Eldred was alone served and
alone appeared, judgment in form had p ed against all the
defendants for the full amount due uponme note.
The evidence being objected to by the plaintiff, because not
admissible under the pleadings, and because it appeared on
the face of the record that there was no judgment -against,
either of the defendants named except Elisha Eldred, who
alone, as appeared also, was served or appeared, and because
it was insufficient-to bar the plaintiff’s action,(the question
whether it was evidence under the issue in bar of, and to
defeat a recovery againt Anson Eldred, was certified to this
court for decision as one on which the judges of the circuit
court were opposed.
G. W. Lakin, for plaintiff.
J. W. Cary, contra.“
FIELD, J. (After stating the facts.) If the note in suit
was merged in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to
the action, and an exempliflcation of its record is admissible,
for it has long been settled that under the plea of the general
issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to sh0w,,n_gt
-§
~ulmalleged cause of action never existed, but also
to show that it did not subsist at the commencement of the
suit. Young vs. Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Young vs. Rummcll, 2
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Buprcme Court of United States, 18G1. 
6 Wall. 231, 18 L. Ed. 783. 
8'3 
Mason sued, in the circuit court for \Visconsin, Ansen 
Eldred, Elisha Eldred, and one Balcom, trading as partnerH, 
upon n pnrtnersbip note of th~irs. Process wns served on 
Anson Eldred nlone, wb.o alone appeared, and pleaded n!ln 
~ssumpsit. On the trial, the note being put in evidence by tho 
plaintiff, Eldred offered the record of a judgment in one of tha 
state courts of Micll'lgan, showing that Mason had already 
brought suit in that court on the same note against the part-
nership; where, though Elisha Eldred was alone served and 
alone a~peared, judgment in form had PfjiSCd against all the 
defendants for the full amount due upon ~e note. 
The evidence being objected to by the plaintiff, because not 
admiEisible under the pleadings, and because it appeared on 
the face of the record that there was no judgment against. 
eithel' of the defendants named except Elisha Eldred, who 
alone, as appeared also, was served or appeared, and because 
it was insufficient -to bar the plaintiff's action,· (the question 
whether it was evidence under the issue in bar of, and to 
defeat a recovery against Anson Eldred, was certified to this-
court for decision as one on which the judges of the circuit 
· court were opposed. 
G. lV. La-kin, for plaintiff. 
J. W. Cary, contra . ..i_ 
FIELD, J. (After stating the facts.) If the note in (:Juit 
was me1·ged in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to 
the action, and an exemplification of its record is admissible, 
for it has long been settled that under the plea of the general 
issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to show, _nQ!.. 
lllfil'_~LtlllLaIJeged cause of action never existed, but also 
to show that it did not subsist at the commencement of the 
suit. Young i·s. Black, 7 Cranch, 565; Young vs. Rummell, 2 
Jlill, M~O. On the other hand, if the note i~ pot thus pi~r~~Q.J 
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i
it still forms a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment
is immaterial and irrelevant.
The question then for determination relates to the operation
of the judgment upon the note in suit.
The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note is the sev-
eral obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obliga-
tion of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note
against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note
against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted
upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint
debtor act of Michigan.
It is true that e§h copartner is bound for the entire amount
due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so
far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the non-
joinder of his copartners, a recovery may be had against him
for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judg-
ment against the copartners may be enforced against the prop-
erty of each. But‘his is a different thing from the liability
which arises from a joint and several contract. There the
contract contains distinct engagements, that of each con-
tractor individually, and that of all jointly, and different rem-
edies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be
sued separately on their several engagements or together on
their joint undertaking. But in copartnerships there is no
such several liability of the copartners. The copartnerships
are formed for joint purposes. The members undertake joint
enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases
joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this com-
mon risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon
these transactions all the copartners must be brought in,except
when there is some ground -of personal release from liability,
as infancy or a. discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought
in, theomission may be pleaded in abatement. The plea in
abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the
action is brought were made jointly with another and n-ot with
the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning,
if the oopartnership contract was the several contract of each
copartner.
The language of Lord Maxsrmnn in giving the judgment of
the king’s bench in Rico cs. Slmte, 5 Burr. 2611, “that all con-
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ft still forms a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment 
is immaterial and irrelevant. 
The question then for determination relates to the operation 
of the jndgrn~nt upon the note in suit. 
The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note Is the sev-
eral obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obliga-
tion of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note 
against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note 
against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted 
upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint 
debtor act of Mich~n. 
'--
It is true that each co.partner is bound for the entire amount 
due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so 
far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the non-
joinder of his copa.rtners, a recovery may be had against him 
for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judg-
ment against the oopartners may be enforced against the prop-
erty of each. Bu~ie is a different thing from the liability 
which arises from a joint and several contract. There the 
contract contains distinct engagements, that of each con· 
tractor individually, and t'hat of all jointly, and different rem-
edies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be 
1med separately on their several engagements or together on 
their joint under·taking. But in copartnerships there is no 
such several lia.bility of the copartners. The copartnerships 
are formed for joint purposes. The members undertake joint 
enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases 
joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this com-
mon risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon 
these transactions all the copnrtners must be brought in, except 
when there is some ground -0f personal release from liability, 
as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought 
In, the omission may be pleaded in abatemen~. The plea in 
abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the 
action is brought were made jointly with anot11er and not with 
the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning, 
if the oopartnership contract was the several ~ntract of each· 
co partner. 
The language of IJOrd MANSFIELD in giving the judgment of 
the king's bench in Rfoe vs. Sh11te, 5 Burr. 2611, "that all con- . 
tracts with partners are j~t and s~erai, and e.,,.y partner 
\ 
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is liable to pay the whole,” must he read in connection with the
facts of the case, and when thus read does‘not warrant the
conclusion that the court intended t-0 hold a copartnership
contract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the
joint contract of all the copartners, in the sense in which these
terms are understood by the plaintifi"s counsel, but only that
the obligation -of each copartner was so far several that in a
suit against him judgment would pass for the whole demand,
if the non-joinder of his copartners was not pleaded in abate-
ment.
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be inter-
posed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a
several liability.
For the support of the second position, that a judgment
against one copartner on a copartnership note does not con-
stitute a bar to a suit upon the same note against another
copartner, the plaintiff relics upon the case of Shcchy vs. Man-
deellle ¢£ Jamesson, decided by this oourtfland reported in 6
Cranch, 254. In that case the plain-tiff brought a suit upon a
promissory note given by Jamesson for a copartnership debt
of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit had been brought
upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment
recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the
judgment in the first action was pleaded by the defendant,
Mandeville, and the court held that it constituted no bar to
the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea.
The decision in this case has never received the entire appro-
bation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted
and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the
highest tribunals of different states. It was elaborately
reviewed by the supreme court of New York in the case of
Robertson es. Smith, 18 Johnson, 459, where its reasoning was
declared unsatisfactory, and a judgment rendered in direct
conflict with its adjudication.
In the supreme court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to
that of Robertson vs. Smith was made. Ward vs. Johnson, 13
Mass. 148. In Wann vs. McNulty, 2 Gilman, 359, the supreme
court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy vs. Man-
devi-lle, and declined to follow it as authority. The court
observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for
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Is liable to pay the whole," must be read in connection with the 
facts of the case, and when thus read does ·not warrant the 
conclusion that the court intended to bold a copartnership 
eontract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the 
joint ronirart of all the cop:utners, in the sense in which these 
terms are understood by the plaintiff's counsel, but only that 
the obligation of each oopartner was so far several that in a 
suit against him judgment would pass for the whole demand, 
if the non-joinder of his oopartners was not pleaded in abate-
ment. 
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be inter-
posed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a 
several liability. 
For the support of the second position, that a judgment 
against one copartner on a copartnership note does not con-
stitute a bar to a suit upon the same n-0te a~ainst another 
co1>artner, the plaintiff relic.•s upon the case of Sheehy -va. Man-
deville & Jamesson, decided by this oourt~nd reported in 6 
Cranch, 254. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit upon a 
promissory note given by .Jamesson for a copartnership debt 
of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit bad been brought 
upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment 
recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the 
judgment in the :first action was pl~ed by the defendant, 
Mandeville, and the court held that it oonstituted no bar to 
the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea. 
The decision in this case bas never received the entire appro-
bation of the profession, and its correctness has been doubted 
and its authority disregarded in numerous instances by the 
highest tribunals of different states. It was elaborately 
reviewed by the supreme court of New York in the case of 
Robertson t,s. Smith, 18 Johnson, 450, where its reasoning was 
declared unsatisfactory, and a judgment rendered in direct 
conflict with its adjudication. 
In the supreme court of Massachusetts a ruling similar to 
that of Robertson VB. Smith was made. Ward vs. Johnson, 13 
Mass. 148. In Wann 'VB. McNu.lty, 2 Gilman, 359, the supreme 
court of Illinois commented upon the case of Sheehy vs. Man-
deville, and declined to follow it as authority. The court 
observed that notwithstanding the respect which it felt for 
the opinions of the supreme court of the United States, it 
44 ) 
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was well satisfied that the rule adopted by the several state
courts--referring to those of New York, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, and lndiana—was more consistent with the principles of
law, and was supported by better reasons.
In Smith vs. Black, 9 Sergt. & Rawle, 142, the supreme court
of Pennsylvania held that a judgment recovered against one
of two partners was a bar to a subsequent suit against both,
though the new defendant was a dormant partner at the time
of the contract, and was not discovered until after the judg-
ment. “No principle,” said the court, “is better settled than
that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole
cause of action, and that neither the matter nor the parties
can be severed, unless indeed where the cause of action is joint
and several, which, certainly, actions against partners are
not.”
In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy cs. lllandev-illo,
and remarked that the decision in that case, however much
entitled to respect from the character of the judges who com-
posed the supreme court of the United States, was not of
binding authority, and it was disregarded.
In King rs. Hoar, 13 Meeson & \Velsby, 495, the question
whether a judgment recovered against one of two joint con-
tractors was a bar to an action against the other, was pre-
sented to the court of exchequer and was elaborately consid-
ered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the con-
clusion reached that by the judgment recovered the original
demand had passed in rem judicatam, and could not be made
the subject of another action. In the course of the argument
the case of Shcchy vs. Mandecillc was referred to as opposed
to the conclusion reached, and the court observed that it had
the greatest respect for any decision of Chief Justice Man-
SHALL, but that the reasoning attributed to him in the report
of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice Sronr, in
Trafton vs. The United States, 3 Story, 651, refers to this case
in the exchequcr, and to that of Sheehy vs. Mandcuillc, and
observes that in the first case the court of exchequcr pro-
nounced what seemed to him a very sound and satisfactory
judgment, and as to the decision in the latter case, that he
‘had for years entertained great doubts of its propriety.
The general doctrine maintained in England and the Unl-
ted States may be briefly stated. A judgment against one
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.was well Bfttisfted that the rule adopted by the several state 
~ourts-referring to those of New York, Massachutietts, Mary-
lan!J, and Indiana-was more consistent with the principlei, of 
law, and was supported by better reasons. 
In Smilli vB. Rlac.k, 9 Sergt. & Rawlf', 14~, the supreme court 
of Pennsylvania held that a judgment recover~d against one 
of two partners was a bar to a subsequent suit against both, 
though the new defendant was a dormant p:irtner at the time 
of the contract, and was not discovered until after the judg-
ment. "No principle," said t11e court, "is better settled than 
that a judgment once rendered absorbs and merges the whole 
cause of action, and that neither the matter nor the partie~ 
can be severl•d, unless indeed where the cause of action Is joint 
and several, which, certainly, actions against partners are 
not." 
In its opinion the court referred to Sheehy t:s. Mandevill&, 
and remarked that the decision in that case, however much 
entitled to respect from the character of the judges who com~ 
posed the supreme court of the United States, was not of 
binding authority, and it was disregarded. 
Jn King i~s. Hoar, 13 Meeson & 'Velsby, 495, the question 
whether a judgment recovered against one of two joint con-
tractors was a bar to an action against the other, was pre-
sented to the court of exchequer and was elaborately consid-
ered. The principal authorities were reviewed, and the con-
clusion reached that by the judgment recovered the original 
demand bad passed in rem. judicatam, and could not be made 
the subject of another action. In the course of the argument 
the case of Sheehy VB. Mandeville was referred to -as opposed 
to the conclusion reached, and the court observed that it had 
the greatest respect for any decision of Chief Justice MAR-
SHALL, but that the reasoning attributed to him in the report 
of that case was not satisfactory. Mr. Justice STORY, in 
Trafton vs. The United States, 3 Story, 651, refers to this case 
in the exchequer, and to that of Bheehy VB. Mandeville, and 
observes that in the first case the court of exchequer pro-
nounced what seemed to him a very sound and satisfactory 
judgment, and as to the decision in the latter case, that he 
'had for years entertained great doubts of its propriety. 
The general doctrine maintained in England and the Uni-
' 
ted States mny be briefly stated. A judgment against one 
upon a joint contract of several persons, bars an action against 
1
/‘.
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the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the
defendant in the original action, and this fact was unknown
to the plaintiff when that action was commenced. When the
contract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause
of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of-
the parties not sued with those against whom the judgment
is recovered, being extinguished, their entire liability is gone.
They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no
several obligation; they cannot be sued jointly‘with the others,
-because judgment has been already recovered against the lat-
ter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the
same cause.
If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern the deci-
sion of this case, we should feel obliged notwithstanding
Shcchy v. lllandcvillc, to hold that the promissory note was
merged in the judgment of the court of Michigan, and that the
judgment would be a bar to the pres-ent action. But, by a.
statute of that state, compiled laws of 1857, vol. 2, chap. 133,
page 1219, the rule of the common law is changed with respect
to judgments upon demands of joint debtors, when som-e only
of the parties are served with process. The statute enacts
that “in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted
upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process
against all of the defendants shall have been duly served upon
either of them, the defendant so served shall answer to the
plaintiff, and in such case the judgment, if rendered in favor
of the plaintiff, shall be against, all the defendants in the same
manner as if all had been served with process,” and that, “such
judgment shall be conclusive evidence of the liabilities of the
defendant who was served with process in the suit, or who
appeared therein; but against every other defendant it shall be
evidence only of the extent of the plaintiff’s demand, after the
liability of such defendant shall have been established by other
evidence.” '
Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not
served with process, or who do not appear therein, have no
binding force upon them, personally. The principle is as old
as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be per-
sonally bound until he has had his day in court, which means
until citation is issued to him, and opportunity to be heard is
afforded. D’.-fray -rs. Kctchum-, 1 Howard 165. Nor is the

















































































































































. , , 
H.UOlf VB. ELDRED. •t?; ---
the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the · 
defendant in the original action, and this fact was unknown 
tP the plaintiff when that action was commenced. When the 
contract is joint, and not joint and several, the entire cause 
of action is merged in the judgment. The joint liability of 
the parties not sued with those against whom the judgmant 
is recovered, being extinguished, theh· entire liability is gone. 
They cannot be sued separately, for they have incurred no 
several obligation; they cannot be sued jointly-with the others, 
·becaus~ judgment has been already recovered against the lat· 
ter, who would otherwise be subjected to two suits for the 
same cause. 
If, therefore, the common-law rule were to govern tbe deci· 
sion of this case, we should feel obliged notwithstanding 
Sheehy v. Mandeville, to hold that the promissory note was 
merged in the judgment of the court of :Michigan, and that the 
judgment would be a bar to the preeent action. But, by a 
statute of that state, compiled laws of 1857, vol. 2, chap. 133, 
page 1210, the rule of the common law is changed with respect 
to judgments upon demands of joint debtors, when some only 
of the parties are serYed with process. The statute enacts 
that "in actions against two or more persons jointly indebted 
upon any joint obligation, contract, or liability, if the process 
against all of the defendants shall have been duly served upon 
either of them, the defendant so served shall nnswer to the 
iflttintiff, and in such cnse the judgment, if rendered in favor 
of the plaintiff, shall be against all the defendants in the same' 
manner as if all had been served with process," and that, "such 
judgment shall be conclusive eYidenoo of t'he liabilities of the 
defendant who was served with process in the suit, or who 
appeared therej.n; but against every other defendant it shall be 
evidence only of the extent of the plnintiff's demand, after the 
liability of such defend_ant shall have been established by other 
evidence." 
Judgments in cases of this kind against the parties not 
served with process, or who do not appear therein, have no 
binding force npon them, personally. The principle is as old 
as the law, and is of universal justice, that no one shall be p<!r-
eonally bound until he has bad his duy in court, which means 
until citation is issued to liim, ancl opportunity to be heard is 
afforded. D'A.rc11 -rs. Kctr.11um-, 1 Howard 165. Nor is the 
demand against the parties not sued merged in the judgment 
348 CASES on PARTNERSHIP.
against the party brought into court. The statute declares
what the effect of the judgment against him shall be with
respect to them; it shall only be evidence of the extent of the
plaintiit’s demand after their liability is by other evidence
established. It is entirely within the power of the state to
limit the operation of the judgment thus recovered. The state
can as well modify the consequences of a judgment in respect
to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the original
demand, as it can modify the operation of the judgment in any
other particular.
A similar statute exists in the state of New York, and the
highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing
these statutes, have held, notwithstanding the special pro-
ceedings which they authorize against the parties not served
to bring them afterward before the court, if found within the
state, that such parties may be sued upon the original demand.
In Bonrstcel rs. Todd, 9 Mich. 379, an action of covenant was
brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a
lease. One of them was alone served with process, and he
appeared and pleaded the general issue, and on the trial, as in
the case at bar, produced the record of a judgment recovered
against himself and his co-defendant under the joint debtor
act of New York, processin that state having been served upon
his co-defendant alone. The court below held the judgment to
be a bar to the action. On error to the supreme court of the
state this ruling was held to be erroneous. After referring to
decisions in New York, the court said, “No one has ever
doubted the continuing liability of all parties. We cannot,
therefore, regard the liability as extinguished. And, inasmuch
as the new action must be based upon the original claim, while,
as in the case of foreign judgments at common law, it may be
of no great importance whether the action may be brought in
form upon the judgment, or on the previous debt, it is cer-
tainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form
of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy.
While we do not decide an action in form on the judgment to
be inadmissible, we think the action on the contract the better
remedy to be pursued.”
In Oakley vs. Aspinzcall, 4 N. Y. 513, the court of appeals
of New York had occasion to consider the effect of ajudgment
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against the party brought into court. The statute declares 
what the effect of the judgment against him shall be with 
respect to them; it shall only be evidence of the extent of the 
plaintiff's demand after their liability is by other evidence 
established. It is entirely within the power of the state to 
limit the operation of the judgment thus recovered. The state 
can as well modify the consequences of a judgment in respect 
to its effect as a merger and extinguishment of the original 
demand, as it ran modify the operation of the judgment in any 
other particular. 
A similar statute exists in the state of New York, and the 
highest tribunals of New York and Michigan, in construing 
these statutes, have held, notwithstanding the svecial pro-
ceedings which they authorize against the parties not served 
to bring them afterward before the court, if found within the 
state, that such parties may be sued upon the original demand. 
In BonestceZ t•s. Todd, 9 Mich. 379, an action of covenant was 
brought against two parties to recover rent reserved upon a 
lease. ·One of them was alone served with proceBB, and he 
appeared and pleaded the general issue, and on the trial, as in 
the case at bar, produced the record of a judgment recovered 
against himself and his co-defendant under the joint debtor 
act of New York, process in that state having been served upon 
his co-defendant alone. The court below held the judgment to 
be a bar to the action. On error to the supreme court of the 
. state this ruling was held to be erroneous. After referring to 
decisions in New York, the court said, "No one has ever 
doubted the continuing liability of all parties. We cannot, 
therefore, regard the liability as extinguished. And, inasmuch 
as the new attion must be based upon the original claim, while, 
as in the case of foreign judgments nt common law, it may be 
of no g.reat importance whether the action may be brought in 
form upon the judgment, or on the previous debt, it is cer-
tainly more in harmony with our practice to resort to the form 
of action appropriate to the real demand in controversy. 
While we do not decide an action in form on the judgment to 
be inadmissible, we think the action on the contract the better 
remedy to be pursued." 
In Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 4 N. Y. 513, the court of appeals 
of New York had occasion to consider the effect of ajudgment 
recovered under the joint debtor act of that state upon the 
1
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original demand. Mr. Justice BRONSON, speaking for the court,
says: “It is said that the original demand was merged in,
and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently, that the
plaintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That
would undoubtedly be so if both the defendants had been be
fore the court in the original action. But the joint debtor act
create an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving
efl’ect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the
rights of all parties, the plaintitf must be allowed to sue on the
original demand. There is no diificulty in pursuing such a
course; it can work no injury to any one, and it will avoid the
absurdity of allowing a party to sue on a pretended cause of
action which is, in truth, no cause of action at all, and then to
recover on proof of a different demand.”
Following these authorities, and giving the judgment recov-
ered in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would
have in that state, we answer the question presented in the
certificate, that the exemplification of the record of the judg-
ment recovered against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, olfered
by the defendant, Anson Eldred, is not admissible in evidence
in bnr of, and to defeat, a recovery against the latter.
g_____%




















































































































































MASON VS. ELDRED. 849 
original demand. Mr. Justice BRONSON, speaking for the court, 
says: ''It is said that the original demand was merged in, 
and extinguished by the judgment, and consequently, that the 
plaintiff must sue upon the judgment, if he sues at all. That 
would undoubtedly be BO if both the defendants bad been re 
fore the court in the original .action. But the joint debtor act 
creates an anomaly in the law. And for the purpose of giving 
effect to the statute, and at the same time preserving the 
rights of all parties, the plaintiff must be allowed to sue on the 
original demand. There is no difficulty in pursuing such a 
course; it can work no injury to any one, and it will avoid the 
absurdity of allowing a party to sue on a pretended cause of 
action which is, in truth, no cause of action at all, and then to 
recover on proof of a different demand." 
Following these authorities, and giving the judgment recov-
ered in Michigan the same effect and operation that it would 
have in that state, we answer the question presented in the 
certificate, that the exemplification of the record of the judg-
ment recovered against the defendant, Elisha Eldred, offered 
by the defendant, Anson Eldred, is not admissible in eviden• 
In bar of, and to defeat, a recovery against the latter. 
'--- . 




or DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE.
HOARD vs. CLUM.
Supreme Con-rt of Minnesota, 1883.
81 Minn. 186, l7 N. W. Rep. 275.
Action for an accounting and the winding up of the afiairs of
it partnership. The plaintiffs in the action are three of the
"partners and the widow and heirs-at-law of a fourth partner,
and the defendant is the only other partner. From the articles
which are dated March 15, 1880, it appears that the partner-
ship was formed, under the name of the Clum Compounding
Company, for the purpose of manufacturing and selling a med-
icine, and that the partnership was “to have an existence of
thirty years from the date of these articles, unless sooner
dissolved by mutual consent.” The articles also provide for
the taking of inventories at stated times, and that, in case any
member of the partnership may wish at any time to dispose of
his interest in the business, the other partners are to have the
right to purchase such interest by paying its value as deter-
mined by the last preceding inventory. The articles then pro-
vide that “in case of death of any member of the company, the
heirs of such member may retain their interest therein, with all
the rights and privileges of the original members; and the
administrator of his estate, or the executor under his will, shall
represent such heir or heirs at the meetings (or otherwise) of
said company, so as to share the burden of management; and
in the event that this cannot be done, the company shall have
the right to purchase the interest of such deceased member in

















































































































































OF DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE. 
HOARD' vs. Ct.UM. 
8uprenw; Coiirt of Mitaneaota., 1BU. 
81 Mino. 186, 1'1 N. W. Rep. 275. 
Action for an accounting and the winding up of the llffairs of 
ll i>artnetship. The plaintiffs in the acfion are three of t'IW 
partners and the widow and heirs-at-law of a fourth partner: 
an~ tlle defendant iR the only other partner. From the article~ 
which are dated March 15, 1880, it appears that the partner-
ship was formed, under the name of the Clum Compounding 
Company, for the purpose of manufacturing and selling a med-
icine, and that the partnership was "to have an existence of 
thirty years from the <late of these articles, unless sooner 
dissolved by mutual c-0nsent." The articles also provide for 
the taking of inventories at stated times, and that, in case any 
member of the partnership may wish at any time to dispose of 
his interest in the business, the other partners are to have the 
right to purchase such interest by paying its value as deter-
mined by the last preceding inventory. The articles then pro-
vide that "in case of death of any member of the company; the 
heirs of such member may retain their interest therein, with all 
the rights and privileges of the original members; and the 
administrator of his estate, or the executor under his will, shall 
re11resent such heir or heirs at the meetings (or otherwise) of 
said company, so ns to share the burden of management; and 
ln the event that this ca~not be done, the company shaJJ have 
the right to purchase the interest of snch deceased member in 
the same manner, and for the same amount, as in the case of 
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a member wishing to sell as before stated. Nothing in the
foregoing articles is to be construed as meaning that the com-
pany is compelled to pay at the inventory price, but it simply
gives the right to buy on the above-named terms if it chooses
to do so; and each party to this agreement hereby grants such
right and privilege to buy such retiring or deceased party’s
interest on above-named terms; the company reserving the
right to buy at better figure and terms if they can.” The
complaint further alleges the adoption of a resolution, on
February 17, 1882, for the discontinuance of business and the
"dissolution of the partnership, and due notice thereof given to
defendant; also the death of one of the partners, on April 1,
1882, and the refusal of each and all of the plaintiffs to pur-
chase the interest of the deceased partner. .
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds (1)
that there is a defect of parties plaintiff, and (2) that the com-
plaint does not state facts suflicient to constitute a cause of
action. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant ap-
pealed.
H. G. Williston, for plaintiff.
J. 0'. McClure, for appellant.
Bnnnr, J. 1. An excess of parties is not ground of demurrer
‘as “a defect of parties,” in the meaning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 66,
’§ 92, subd. 4; Pomeroy on Remedies, § 206; Richtmg/er rs.
’R'ichtm3/er, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 55; Allen vs. City of Buffalo, as N. Y.
280; Lewis vs. W-ill-imns, 3 Minn. 95 (151). _ ‘
2. Three members of a partnership firm and the heirs of a
deceased fourth bring this action against the remaining mem-
ber, for the purpose (1) of having the partnership adjudged
dissolved; (2) of having the partnership wound up, and, to that
end, an accounting had, a receiver appointed, its assets con-
verted, its debts paid, and the rights of the partners among
themselves ascertained and adjusted.
In the absence of previous agreement to the contrary, the.
death of a partner works a total dissolution of a partnership;
that is to say, a dissolution both as respects the deceased and"
the surviving partners: Pollock on Partnership, § 183; Coll-
yer on Partnership, §§ 103, 106; Story on Partnership, §§ 317,
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a· member wishing to sell a8 before stated. Nothing in the 
foregoing articles is to be construed as meaning that the com· 
pany is compelled to pay at the inventory price, but it simply 
gives the right to buy on the above-named terms if it chooses 
to do so; and each party to this agreement hereby grants such 
right and privilege to buy such retiring or deceased party's 
interest on above-named terms; the company reserving the 
right to buy at better figure and terms if they can." '.l'he 
complaint further alleges the adoption of a resolution, on 
February 17, 1882, for the discontinuance of business and the 
·'1issolution of the partnership, and due notice thereof given to 
d.efendant; also the death of one of the partners, on April 1, 
1&:2, and th(' refusal of each and all of the plaintiffs to pur-
chase the interest of the deceased partner. 
nC'fendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds (1) 
'that there is a defect of parties plaintiff, and (2) that the com· 
plaint does not state facts sumcient to constitute a cause of 
action. The demurrer was overruled an'1 the defendant ap-
~nled. 
H. C. Will'8tc»i, for plaintiff. 
,/. 0. Mc(Hure, for aIJPellant. 
11EnnY, J. 1. An e:cccss ot parties ts not gfonnd of demurrer 
ns "a defect of parties," in the meuning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 6G., 
t nz, subd. 4; Pomeroy on RPmE'dieA, § 206; R-ichtmt1er 1:-9. 
"Rwhtmyer, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 55; Allen vs. Oitu of BuffakJ, 38 N. Y. 
280; Leu:is vs. lV-illimns, !l .Minn. 95 (151). · 
2. Three members of a partnership firm and the heirs of a 
dec:eased fourth bring this action against the remaining mem-
ber, for the purpose (1) of having the partnership adjudged 
dissolved; (2) of hnving t.he partnership wound up, and, to that 
end, aD' accounting had, a receiver appointed, its assets con-
vert<'d, its debts pnid, and the rights of the partners among 
tht:mselves ascertained and adjusted. 
Jn the absence of previous agreement to the contrary, the , 
death of a partner works a total dissolution of a partnership;/ 
that is to say, a dissolution both as respects the deceased and; 
t\le surviving partners: Pollock on Partnership, § 183; Coll-
yer on Partnership, ~§ 103, 106; Story on Partnership, §§ 317, 
319 a; Ma·rlett vs. Jackman, 3 Allen (Mass.) 287; Roberts .:a. 
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Kelsey, 38 Mich. 602; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 231. A simple
provision in the articles for the continuance of the partnership
for a fixed period, as, in the present instance, for thirty years,
is not such an agreement: Collyer on Partnership, §§ 100, 105 ;
Crawford ts. H amilton, 3 Madd. 251; Crosbi-e vs. Guion, 23 Beav.
518; Story on Partnership, § 319 a. Mining partnerships
appear to be governed by somewhat different rules: Jomzs vs.
Clark, 42 Cal. 180.
In case of such dissolution, the right of surviving partners
and of the representative of a deceased partner to have the
partnership wound up, and any surplus property distributed,
-is matter of course; 1 Collyer on Partnership, § 107.
In the case at bar the partnership was dissolved by the death
of the partner Hoard. The articles contain no stipulation
for the continuance of the business of the concern, except upon
specified contingencies, none_of which have occurred, and none
of which, therefore, cut any material figure in the case. It
follows that the three partners plaintilt can maintain this
action against the partner who refuses to recognize the dissolu-
tion, and to co-operate in closing up and adjusting the business
of the concern. As respects their right to maintain it, it is not
important that the heirs of the fourth partner, who are joined
with them as plaintiffs, havealleged no facts to show that
they are proper parties to the action, nor that the executor or
administrator of the deceased is not joined; for no objection,
as respects parties, has been taken, except that there is a defect
of parties on account of the joinder of the heirs, and this we
have disposed of.
Order affirmed.
NOTE: See Mecl\em’s Elem. of Partn., § 245.
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Kel8ey, 38 Mich. 602; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 231. A simple 
provision in the articles for the continuance of the partnership 
for a fixed period, as, in the present instance, for thirty years, 
is not such an agreement: Collyer on Partnership,§§ 100, 105; 
Cratcford i-s. Hamilton, 3 Madd. 251; Crosbie t'B. Guion, 23 Beu-. 
51~; Story on Partnership, § 319 a. Mining partnerships 
appear to be governed by somewhat differeut rules: Jones w. 
Clark, 42 Cal. 180. 
In case of such dissolution, the right of surviving partners 
and of the representative of a deceased partner to have the 
partnership wound up, and any surplus property distributed, 
-is matter of course; 1 Collyer on Partnership,§ 107. 
In the case at bar the partnership was dissolved by the death 
of the partner Hoard. The articles contain no _stipulation 
for the continuance of the bmdness of the concern, except upon 
specified ~ontingencies, none. of which have occurred, and none 
of which, therefore, cut any material figure in the case. It 
follows that the three partners plaintiff can maintain this 
action against the part:per who refuses to recognize the dissolu-
tion~ and to co-operate in closing up and adjusting the business 
of the concern. As respects their right to maintain it, it is not 
important that the heirs of the fourth partner, who are joined 
with them as plaintiffs, have· alleged no facts to show that 
they are proper parties to the action, nor that the executor or 
administrator of the deceased is not joined; for no objectioa, 
as respects parties, has been taken, except that there is a defect 
. of parties on account of the joinder of the heirs, and this we 
have disposed of. 
Order affirmed. 
NoTB: See Meehem's Elem. or Partn., ~ 243. 
See also cases under 811bd. Vlli, A.orm.:u B&TW.BBN PAB.TYBB& 
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HALSEY vs. NORTON.
Suprerrw Court of Mississippi, 1871.
45 Miss. 703, '7 Am Rep. 745.
Actioh by Norton a assignee in bankruptcy of H. F. Giren
and D. A. Giren, as members of the firm of Giren, Brown &
Co., against Halsey. Judgment below for plaintitf. Halsey
appealed. ,
W. <5 J. R. Ycrger, for appellant.
No counsel for appellee.
Snmnnn, J. It is urged for the plaintiff in error that the
judgment ought to be reversed because the assignee, Norton,
ought to have united with him as co-plaintitf the solvent part~
ner. It was said by the Chief Baron in Taylor vs. Fields, 4 Ves.
396, “that the surplus of partnership eflects is joint property;
and that the interest of each partner is only his share of what
remains after the partnership accounts are taken.” The
asignee takes precisely the position of the bankrupt, as
respects the joint property. That interest is transferred to
him to be administered for the creditors. Bankruptcy does not
divest the title of the solvent partner. It dissolves the copart-
nership, and constitutes the assignee and the solvent partner
tenants in common or joint owners. To stand in :1 court of law,
the plaintitf must have the entire legal right; if the title be
held by several, all must join in the suit. Eckhard vs. Wilson,
8 Term Rep. 140, and Murray vs. Murray, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ch.
70, are to the point that the assignee and the solvent partner
must unite in a suit respecting the joint effects and choses in
action. But it must be manifested that there is another per-
son, not co-plaintitf, who ought t-o, etc.; this may be by plea in
abatement, or by nonsuit if proved on the trial (1 Chitty’s
Plead. 452, 453); or by demurrer if it appears on the face of the
declaration. The declaration is thus: “E. E. Norton, assignee,
etc., of Henry F. Giren and Dickson A. Giren, as members of
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HALSEY vs. NORTON. 
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1811. 
45 Mi1?9. 703, 7 Am Rep. 745. 
Action by Norton as assignee in bankruptcy of H. F. Giren 
and I>. A. Giren, as members of the firm of Giren, Brown & 
Co., against Halsey. Judgment below for plaintiff. Halsey 
appealed. 
W. cf J. R. Yerger, for appellant. 
No counsel for appellee. 
SmnALL, J. It is urged for the plaintiff in error that the 
judgment ought fo be reversed because the assignee, Norton, 
ought to have united with him as co-plaintiff the solvent part-
ner. It wns said by the Chief Baron in Taylor -r;s. Fields, 4 Ves. 
39f)~ "thnt the surplus of partnershJp effects is joint property; 
and that the interest of each partner is only his share of what 
remains after the partnership accounts are taken." The 
assignee takes precisely the position of the bankrupt, as 
respects the joint property. That interest is transferred to 
Mm to be administered for the creditors. Bankrupt<'y does not 
divest the title of the solvent partner. It dissolves the copar.t-
nership, and constitutes the assignee and the solvent partner 
tenants in common or joint owners. To stand in a court of law, 
the plaintiff most have the entire legal right; if the title be 
held by several, all must join in the suit. Eckhard vs. Wilson, 
8 Term Rep. 14-0, and Murray vs. Murray, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) ch. 
70, are to the point that the assignee and the solv~nt partner 
must unite in a suit respecting the joint effects and choses in 
action. But it must be manifested that there is another per-
son, not co-plaintiff, who ought t·o, etc.; this m'.ly be by plea in 
abatement, or by nonsuit if proved on the trial (1 Cbitty's 
Plead. 452, 453); or by demurrer if it appears on the face of the 
declaration. The declaration is thus: "E. E. Norton, assignee, 
etc., of Henry F. Giren and Dickson A. Giren, as members of 
the firm of Giren, Brown & Co." It is not averred who com-
45 
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pose the firm, except these two bankrupts, nor does it appear
aflirmatively that there were any other members; the copart-
nership name may be and often is purely artificial, not discov-
ering who are its members. Proof was not made on the trial
that any other person was a member, although objection was
made by the defendant to the admission of evidence, in trutli
of the account, on that ground. If it was not apparent on the
record that there was a solvent partner; if the defendant pro-
posed to nonsuit the plaintifl? or prevent his recovery, she
ought to have proved the existence of such a partner. We do
not think that the record presents the point made by the plain-
tifl’ in error, so that she can avail of it in this court.
Affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. Q 247; Bank vs. R. R., ante, p. 147.
HOWELL vs. HARVEY.
Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1843.
5 Ark. 270, 39 Am. Dec. 8'76.
Bill for an accounting brought by Harvey, alleging that he
and one Shanklin sold a store of goods to John Howell and
McConnell, taking their notes for the purchase price. That
McConnell afterwards withdrew; and Harvey bought his inter-
est, paying therefor his share in the notes. One Smith was
afterwards taken in as partner. The remaining facts suf-
ficiently appear from the opinion. Judgment for the complain-
ant. The defendants appealed.
Linton, for the appellants.
Pike and Baldwin, contra.
Lacy, J . It i said that the bill should have been dismissed
upon the hearing, for the want of proper parties. W'e think
Iotherwise. The necessary parties were all before the court.
-The firm of John Howell & Co. was composed of John B. Har-
vey, John Howell, and John B. Howell, and the record shows
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pose the firm, except these two bankrupts, nor does It appear 
aftlrmatively that there were any <>ther members; the copart-
ne~ship name may be and often is purely artificial, not discov-
ering who are its members. Proof was not made on the trial 
that any other person was a member, although objection was 
made by the defendant to the admission of evidence, in truth 
of the account, on that ground. If it was n<>t apparent <>D the 
record that there was a solvent partner; if the defendant pro-
posed to nonsuit the plaintiff or prevent his recovery, she 
ought to have proved the existence of such a partner. We do 
not t~ink that the record presents the p<>int made by the plain-
tiff in error, so that she can avail of it in this court. 
Affirmed. 
NOT&: See Mechem'& Elem. of Partn., f 247; Bank t.ta. R.R., ante, p. 147. 
HOWELL vs. HARVEY. 
8upreme Court of Arkansas, 184~. 
5 Ark. 270, 89 Am. Dec. 878. 
Bill for an accounting brought by Harvey, alleging that he 
and one Shanklin sold a store of goods to John Howen and 
McConnell, taking their notes for the purchase price. That 
McConnell afterwards withdrew; and Harvey bought his inter-
est, paying therefor his share in the notes. One Smith was 
afterwards taken in as partner. The remaining facts suf-
6ciently appear from the opinion. Judgment for the complain-
ant. The defendants appealed. 
Linton, for the appellants. 
Pike and Baldwin, contra. 
LACY, J. It is said that the bill should have been dism!ssed 
upon the hearing, for the want of proper parties. We think 
'otherwise. The necessary parties were all before the court. 
·The firm of John Howell & Co. was composed of John B. Har-
vey, John Howell, and .John B. HowE>Il, and the record shows 
that no one else had any interest in their business, or the set· 
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tlement of their accounts; Shanklin had not the most remote
connection with the partnership concern. Harvey bought an
interest in a stock of goods of John Howell, and credited a
note that he and Shanklin jointly held on Howell and McCon-
nell with the amount of the purchase money. This he had a
right to do. Should Harvey have used more than his just pro-
portion of this joint note, he would unquestionably be answer-
able over to Shanklin; but then it is manifest that this mere
possible liability of Harvey would give Shanklin no interest in
the partnership concern, nor would it entitle him to be made
a party to the present suit. Smith was originally one of the
partners with Harvey and Howell, but after continuing in the
firm eight or nine months, he sold and conveyed all his interest
to John B. Howell, with the consent and approbation of the
other partners. As it is evident that John B. Howell was sub-
stituted as a partner in the firm in the place of Smith, he of
course was subrogated to all the rights and privileges of
Smith, who has no interest in the present suit. The rule on
the subject of making the necessary parties in suits of equity,
is so plain and universal that it can neither be mistaken nor
misapplied. All persons should be made parties who have an
interest in the matters in dispute, or who may be benefited or
injured by the decree. This rule has been followed in the pres-
ent instance, and therefore it was proper to hear the cause
upon its merits: Wendell vs. Van Rensselacr, 1 Johns. Ch. 349;
Petch vs. Dalton, 8 Price, 9; Dufl‘ vs. East I ndla Co., 15 Ves. 213,
227. The business was to be conducted in the name of John
Howell and Company, and Howell and Harvey were to share
an equal moiety of the profits and losses with Smith, and upon
the dissolution of the partnership, Smith was to be reimbursed
for the excess of his advances with six per cent interest.
Smith and Howell agreed to advance the necessary funds, as
far as practicable, to keep up a supply of goods, and Harvey
was to attend to selling them while at home. Smith, as before
stated, sold and conveyed to John B. Howell all his interest
on the sixteenth of December, 1838; thereupon Howell was
admitted as a partner, with all Smith’s rights, and he took
upon himself the discharge of all his duties. The bill states
that the complainant performed his part of the agreement,
and that John Howell and‘John B. Howell violated their con-
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tlement of their accounts; Shanklin bad not the most remote 
connection with the partnership concern. Harvey bought an 
interest in a stock of goods of John Howell, and credited a 
n-0te that he and Shanklin jointly held on Howell and McC<>n-
nell with the amount of the purchase money. This he bad a 
right to do. Should Harvey have used more than his just pro-
portion of this joint note, he would unquestionably be answer-
able over to Shanklin; but then it is manifest that this mere 
imssible liability of Harvey would give Shanklin n-0 interest in 
the partnership coocern, nor would it entitle him to be made 
a party to the present suit. Smith was originally one of the 
partners with Harvey and Howell, but after continuing in the 
firm eight or nine months, he sold and conveyed all his interest 
to John B. H-0well, with the consent and approbation of the 
other partners. As it is evident that John B. Howell was sub-
stituted as a partner in the firm in the place of Smith, he of 
eourse was subrogated to all the rights and privileges of 
Smith, who has no interest in the present suit. The rule on 
the subject of making the necessary parties in suits of equity, 
is so plain and universal that it can neither be mistaken nor 
misapplied. All persons should be made parties who have an 
interest in the matters in dispute, or who may be benefited or 
injured by the decree. This rule has been followed in the pres-
ent insta·nce, and therefore it was proper to hear the cause 
upon its merits: Wendell vs. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Cb. 349; 
Petch vs. Dalton, 8 Price, 9; D1tff vs. East India Co., 15 Ves. 213, 
227. The business was to be conducted in the name of John 
Howell and Company, and Howell and Harvey were to share 
an equal moiety of the profits and losses with Smith, and upon 
the dissolution of the partnership, Smith was to be reimbursed 
for the excess of his advances with six per cent interest. 
Smith and Howell agreed to advance the necessary funds, ~ 
far as practicable, to keep up a supply of goods, and Harvey · 
was to attend to selling them while at home. Smith, as before 
stated, sold and conveyed to John B. Howell all his interest 
on the sixteenth of December, 18~8; thereupon Howell was 
admitted as a partner, with all Smith's rights, and he took 
upon himself the discharge of all his duties. The bill states 
that the complainant performed his part of the agreement, 
and that John Howell and John B. Howell violated their con-
tract, in not furnishing the necessary supplies of goods for 
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the store; that John Howell went to Philadelphia and bought
a large stock of goods and shipped them in his own name, and
on his return advertised a dissolution of the copartnership,
with the consent of John B. Howell, in the absence of the com-
plainant, and against his will. It avers that John Howell took
all the goods, books, and accounts into his own hands, and
excluded Harvey from all participation in the business. The
bill makes John Howell and John B. Howell defendants, and
prays an account may be taken; that the partnership may be
continued or dissolved, as the equity of the case may be, and it
concludes with a prayer for general relief.
The answers admit most of the material allegations of the
bill. The answer of John Howell insists that he, together
with Smith, had purchased the necessary supplies for the
store, and that he bought the goods at Philadelphia, on his
own account and shipped in his own name, and that he
excluded the complainant from intermeddling with the part-
nership effects and from taking charge of the goods of him-
self, and that he dissolved the firm, as he had the right to do,
‘because the complainant was guilty of gross negligence and
misconduct, in not attending to the business of the firm, and
in absenting himself unnecessarily from the state.
A partnership, in its most significant and extended sense,
is a voluntary contract of two or more persons for joining
together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all
of them, upon an agreement that the gain or loss shall be
divided proportionably between them, and having for its object
the advancement and protection of fair and open trade: Gow.
Part. p. 1; Story’s Part. p. 1; 1 Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2;
Initrod. 1 Doma.t Civ. L. b. 1, tit. 8, art. 1. This is, sub
stantially, the definition given by all the writers on the sub-
ject, and it embraces within its terms and spirit all the
principal obligations and duties of the contract. It is per-
fectly clear, upon principle as well as authority, that
wherever the conditions of the partnership are incapable
of being fulfilled, or the fruits arising from ‘the agree-
ment can not be properly enjoyed, that such a case fur-
nishesa. good cause for the renunciation of either party. _Under
such circumstances the further continuance of the partner-
ship would be productive of serious inconvenience and great
















































































































































356 CASES ON p A.RTNERSHIP. 
the store; that John Howell went to Philadelphia and bought 
a large stock of goods and shipped them in his own name, and 
on his return advertised a dissolution of the copartnersbip, 
with the consent of John B. Howell, in the absence of the com-
plainant, and against his will. It avers that John Howell took 
all the goods, books, and accounts into his own hands, and 
excluded Harvey from all participation in the business. The 
bill makes John Howell and John B. Howell defendants, and 
prays an account may be taken; that the partnership may be 
continued or dissolved, as the equity of the case may be, n.nd it 
concludes wit:Q a prayer for general relief. 
The answers admit most of the material allegaU.oos of the 
bill. The answer of J olm Howell insists that he, together 
with Smith, had purchased the necessary supplies for the 
store, and that he bought the goods at Philadelphia, on his 
own account and shipped in his own name, and that he 
excluded the complainant from intermeddling with the part-
nership etrects and from taking charge of the goods of him-
self, a"'d that he dissolved the firm, as he bad the right to do, 
because the complainant was guilty of gross neg1igence and 
misconduct, in n-0t attending to the business of the firm, and 
in absenting himself unnecessarily from the state. 
A partnership, in its most significant and extended sense, 
is a voluntary contract of two or more persons for joining 
together their money, goods, labor, and skill, or either or all 
of them, upon an agreement th.at the gain or loss shall be 
divided proportionably between them, and hnving for its object 
• the advancement and protection of fair and open trade: Gow. 
Part. p. 1; Story's Part. p. 1; 1 Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2; 
Introd. 1 Doma.t Civ. L. b. 1, tit. 8, art. 1. This is, su~ 
stantially, the definition given by all the writers on the sub-
ject, and it embraces within its terms and spirit all the 
principal obligations and duties of the contract. It is per-
fectly clear, upon principle as well as authority, that 
wherever the conditions of the partnership are incapable 
of being fulfilled, or the fruits arising from ,the agree-
ment can not be properly enjoyed, that such a case fur-
nishes :a good cause for the renunciation o-f either party. pnder 
such circumstances the further continuance of the partner-
ship would be productive of serious inconvenience and great 
injury to the other partners, and might end in their immediate 
I
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ruin or the utter prostration of the business. Story on Part.
419, 421. The same doctrine is fully borne out by the civil
law, and is illustrated by the case of a partner, where one of
the partners.is grievously oppressed with insolvency, or where
from some bodily infirmity he i unable to discharge his
engagements. The jurisdiction of a. court of equity, in cases
of copartnership flowing from the peculiar trust and duties
growing out of that connection, is of the most extensive and
beneficial character. It often declares partnerships utterly
void, in cases of fraud, imposition, and oppression in the orig-
inal agreement; or decrees a dissolution of a partnership which
wa unobjectionable in its origin, but which subsequent causes
have rendered onerous and oppressive; gross misconduct, want
of good faith, or criminal want of diligence, or such cause as
is productive of serious and permanent injury in the partner-
ship concerns, or renders it impracticable to carry on the bui-
ness, is good ground for a dissolution at the suit of the injured
partner. Habitual drunkenness, great egztravagance, or
unwarrantable negligence in conducting the business-of_ the
partnership, justifics a dissolution; but then it mut be a.
strong and clear case of positive or meditated abuse to author-
ize such a decree. For minor misconduct and grievances, if
they require redress, the court will interfere by way of injunc-
tion to prevent the mischief : Story on Part. 414, 415.
The application of the principles here stated will test the
conduct of the complainant, and show whether or not the
defendan»t_.John Howell,was justified in renouncing the copart-
nership at the time and under the circumstances of the pres-
ent cae. The proof is somewhat contradictory on this point;
still the weight of the testimony, both in respect of numbers
and the circumstances detailed by the witness, is clearly with
the complainant. The articles of partnership show that the
defendants were to furnish the funds to keep up the necessary
supplies, when it was in their power to do so, and that the
complainant was to attend to selling the goods while he
remained at home. The terms of this agreement clearly indi-
cate that the parties never contemplated that slight neglect
or accidental failure of their respective engagements should
dissolve the partnership. The articles of the partnership con-
clusively show that the parties themselves looked to unequiv-
















































































































































HOWELL vs. IIA RVEY. 357 
ruin or the otter prostration of tl1e bu~in<>ss. Story on Part. 
419, 421. The same doctrine is fully borne out by the civil 
law, and is illustrated by the case of a partner, where one of 
the partners.is grievously oppressed with insolvency, or where 
from some bodily infirmity he is unable to discharge his 
engagements. The jurisdiction of a court of equity, in cases 
of copartnership flowing from the peculiar trust and duties 
growing out of that connection, is of the most extensive and 
beneficial character. It often declares partnerships utterly 
void, in cases of fraud, imposition, and oppression in the orig-
inal ugreement; or decrees a dissolution of a partnership wbich 
was unobjectionable in its origin, but which subsequent causes 
have rendered onerous and oppressive; gross misconduct, want 
of good faith, or criminal want of dilig<'nce, or such cause as 
·is productive of serious and permanent injury in the partner-
ship concerns, or renders it impracticable to carry on the busi-
ness, is good ground for a dissolution at the suit of the injured 
partner. Habitual drunkenness, great e~travagance, or 
on warrantable negligence in conducting the business· ef. the 
partnership, justifies a dissolution; but then it must be a 
strong and clear case of positive or meditated abuse to author-
ize such a decree. For minor misconduct and grievances, if 
they require redress, the court will interfere by way of injunc-
tion to prevent the mischief: Story on Part. 414, 415. 
The application of the principles here stated will test the 
conduct of the complainant, and show whether or not the 
defendant.Jo-ho Howell, was justified in renouncing the copa1·t-
nership at the time and under the circumstances of the pres-
ent case. The proof is somewhat contradictory on this point; 
still the weight of the testimony, both in respect of numbers 
and the circumstnnces detailed by the witness, is clearly with 
the complainant. The articles of partnership show that the 
defendants were to furnish the funds to keep up the necessary 
supplies, when it was in their power to do so, nnd that the 
compluinant was to attend to selling the goods while he 
remained at home. The terms of this agreement clearly indi· 
cate that the parties never contemplated that slight neglect 
or accidental failure of tlleir respective engagements should 
dissolve the partnership. The articles of the partnership eon-
clusively show that the parties themselves looked to unequiv-
ocal demonstrations of gross acts of abuse and miscollllnct, 
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where the injury would be imminent and irreparable, to auth-
orize a dissolution. It is true that the complainant was absent
in Kentucky upon several occasions, but then, business or his
family afilictions seem to have called and detained him there;
and the proof is that Howell was apprised of his absence, and
so far from objecting to his going the last time to Kentucky,
or making it a cause of complaint against him, that upon the
eve of starting for Philadelphia to purchase goods, he urged
the complainant to get back against his return, and be ready
to receive the goods. This the complainant tried to do, but
was detained by the sickness of his family, and did not arrive
until after Howell's return with the goods, which he claims
to have purchased for himself, and until after he had published
the dissolution of the copartncrship. Howell, it seems, never
intimated a wish. or desire to dissolve the copartnership before
he started to Philadelphia. The testimony is that in the opin-
ion of some of the witnesses, the complainant was not a very
profitable or attentive partner, but it wholly fails to establish
such overt acts of misconduct or gross negligence as would
authorize a dissolution of the partnership.
In the present case the partnership was to continue during
the pleasure of the contracting parties. It is therefore strictly
a partnership at will, and subject to the rules that govern
such agreements. Chancellor I{m:'r says, that it is an estab-
lished principle of the law of partnership, that if it be without
any definite period, any party may withdraw at a minute’s
notice when he pleases and dissolve the partnership. The ex-
istence of engagements with third person.s will not prevent
the dissolution, though their engagements will not be affected
by the act. He admits that cases may occur where reasonable
notice might be advantageous, but he holds it not to be requi-
site. and he adds that a party may, in a case free from fraud,
choose an unreasonable time for the dissolution. The exception
he makes in a case of fraud, indicates to our minds that the
rule is not so unbending or universal, as it is laid down, unless
the limitation is intended to include those cases where the
renunciation is made in good faith and at a proper time. As
a general principle, contracts subsisting during pleasure, are
naturally and necessarily dissolvable by the mere exercise of
the will of either of the parties; and this is the principle ac-
















































































































































358 0..lSBS Olf PARTNERSHIP. 
where the injury would be imminent and irreparable, to auth-
orize a dissolution. It is true that the oomplainant was absent 
in Kentucky upon several occasions, bot then, business or hie 
family affiictions seem to have called and detained him there; 
and the proof is that Howell was apprised of his absence, and 
so far from objecting to his going the last time to Kentucky, 
or making it a cause of complaint against him, that upon the 
eve of starting for Philadelphia to purchase goods, he urged 
the complainant to get back against his return, and be ready 
to receive the goods. This the oompln.inant tried to do, bot 
was detained by the sickness of his family, and did not arrive 
until a!ter Howell's return with the goods, which be claims 
to have purchased for himself, and until after he had published 
the dissolution of the copartnership. Howell, it seems, never 
intimat<•d a wish or desire to dissolve the copa1·tnership before 
be started to Philadelphia. The testimony is that in the opin-
ion of some of the witnesses, the complainant was not a very 
profitable or attentive partner, but it wholly fails to establish 
such overt acts of misconduct or gross negligence as would 
authorize a dissolution of the partnership. 
In the presrnt case the partnership was to continue during 
the pleasure of the contracting parties. It is therefore strictly 
a partnership at will, and subject to the rules that govern 
such agreements. Chancellor K1~N"T says, that it is an estab-
lished principle of the law of partnership, that if it be without 
any definite period, any party may withdraw at a minute's 
notice when be pleases and dissolve the partnership. The ex-
istence of engagements with third persons will not prevent 
the dissolution, though their engagements will not be affected 
by the act. Ile admits that cases may occur where reasonable 
notice might be advantageous, but be holds it not to be requi-
site, and he adds that a party may, in a case free from fraud, 
choose an unreasonable time for the dissolution. The exception 
he makes in a case of fraud, indicates to our minds that the 
rule is not so unbending or universal, as it is laid down, unless 
the limitation is intended to include those cases where the 
renunciation is made in good faith and at a proper time. As 
a general principle, contracts subsisting during pleasure, ar«i> 
naturally and necessarily dissolvable by the mere exercise of 
the will of either of the parties; and this is the principle ac-
cording to the civil law under ordinary circumstances, and to 
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such an extent is it carried that a positive stipulation against
the dissolution at the will of either o_f the parties will be held
utterly void, as inconsistent with the true nature and intent
of such relation. In cases of equity, we think the true rule to
be this,that to enable one partner to dissolve at will the part-
nership, two things must occur; first, the renunciation of the
partnership must be in good faith, and secondly, it must not
be made at an unreasonable time. This is the doctrine of the
civil law, and of the code of Louisiana, and Pothier lays down
the same rule, and inculeates it in the same manner; for he
says that no partner has a right to prefer his own particular
interest to that of the firm, or to take away its profits, or to ap~
propriate them to his own private advantage, and it is upon
this principle, that while a partner is engaged in business,
courts of equity will restrain him from like pursuits. He has
no right to divert from the firm the diligence, skill, or capital
that rightfully belongs to it. The French civil law expresses
the whole law upon the subject in the following brief terms:
“Dissolution of partnerships,” says Domat, “by the will of
one of the "partners, applies only to partnerships the duration
of which is unlimited, and is effected by a renunciation notified
to all the parties; provided such renunciation be bona fidc; and
not made at an improper time.” Renunciation is held not to
be made bona fide, where one partner renounces in order to
appropriate to himself the profits which the partners are en-
titled to receive. It is said to be made at an improper time,
when the things are no longer entire that were of consequence
to partnership, and which should have deferred the dissolu-
tion. A partnership for a limited period of time cannot be
dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the parties, within the
time prescribed. On the contrary, it only can be dissolved from
just motives and for a reasonable cause. There is an implied
understanding that the partnership shall continue to the ex-
piration of the term, unless where one partner fails in his
engagements, or any habitual infirmity renders him unfit to
carry on the business, or where the renunciation is for the
benefit of the partnership and not for the advantage of the
dissolving partner. The principle here stated is extracted from
all the authorities by Justice Sronx, and fully approved by
him in his complete and admirable treatise upon partnerships.
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such an extent is it carried that a positive stipulation against 
the dissolution at the will of either of t~e parties will be held 
utterly void, as inconsistent with the true nature and intent 
of such relation. In cases of equity, we think the true rule to 
be this,that to enable one partner to dissolve at will the part-
nership, two things must occur; first, the renunciation of the 
partnership must be in good faith, and secondly, it must not 
be made at an unreasonable time. This is the doctrine of the 
civil law, and of the code of Louisiana, and Pothier lays down 
the same rule, and inculcates it in the same manner; for he 
says that no partner has a right to pref er his own particular 
interest to that of the firm, or to take away its profits, or to ap-
propriate them to his own private adYantage, and it is upon 
this principle, that while a partner is engaged in business, 
courts of equity will restrain him from like pursuits. He has 
no right to divert from the firm the diligence, skill, or capital 
that rightfully belongs to it. '!'he French civil law expresses 
the whole law upon the subject in the following brief terms: 
"Dissolution of partnerships,'' says Domat, "by the will of 
one of the partners, a.pplies only to partnerships the duration 
of which is unlimited, and is effected by a renunciation notified 
to all the parties; provided such renunciation be bona fide; and 
not made at an improper time." Uenunciation is held not to 
be made bona fide, where one partner renounces in order to 
appropriate to himself the profits which the partners are en· 
titled to receive. It is said to be made at an improper time, 
when the things are no longer entire that were of consequence 
to partnership, and which should have deferred the dissolu-
tion. A partnership for a limited period of time cannot be 
dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the parties, within the 
time prescribed. On the contrary, it only can be dissolved from 
just motives and for a reasonable cause. 'fhere is an implied 
11ndc>rstanding that the partnership shall continue to the ex-
piration of the term, unll:'ss wlwre one partner fails in his 
engagements, or any habitual infirmity renders him unfit to 
carry on the business, or where the renunciation is for the 
benefit of the partnership and not for the advantage of the 
dissolving partner. The prinriple hc.>re stated is extracted from 
all the authorities by Justice STonY, and fully approved by 
him in his complete and admirable treatise upon partnerships. 
In cases where the partnership is to endure for a limited 
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period of time, the question, whether within that period it
may be dissolved by the mere act and will of one of the part-
ners, without the consent of the others, is not definitely or
absolutely settled, says Justice Sronr, in our jurisprudence.
He clearly intimates, if ever such a case should arise, where
one partner claimed the right, sua sponte, of dissolving the
partnership, that he possesses no such power; and he takes
the distinction between a. court of equity dissolving the part-
nership, and that of a partner, acting upon his own caprice and
pleasure, dissolving the engagement. He admits the doctrine
to be somewhat different according to the Roman law; but he
denies that a partner has a right to found his own claim to
immediate indemnity and safety by committing a known injury
on the interest and privileges of his copartners: and in this
opinion he is sustained by many elementary writers and a
number of adjudged cases of unquestionable authority: Gow.
on Part. c. 5, sec. 1, 219, 225, 226, 288; 3 Coll. Part. b. 1, c. 2,
sec. 2, p. 62, 2d Ed.; Kent's Com. sec. 43, pp. 61, 4th Ed.;
Peacock vs. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56; Crawshay vs. Mauls, 1 Swans.
495; Pcnrpoint vs. Graham, 4 \Vash. G. O. 234.
The partner who breaks off the partnership with an unfair
design, or for selfish objects, discharges his copartners from
all liabilities to him, but he does not thereby free himself from
his obligations to them. \Vhen he quits the partnership, that
he may buy for himself what the partnership has a right to
purchase, or that he may make a profit for his own advantage
and to their prejudice, he is answerable to the community for
the loss and damage; and so, if he quits at an unreasonable
time, which occasioned a deprivation of profits to the com-
munity, it is but right he should repair and make good such
loss: Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 64-68; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sec.
5; arts 1-S, by Straham; Story on Part. 383-420. -
The proof-in this case clearly shows that Howell renounced
the partnership for his own private advantage, and not to ben-
efit the firm. He said nothing to his partner of his wish to
dissolve until his return from Philadelphia. He then adver-
tised a dissolution of the firm, and seized all the goods and
effects into his own hands. \'Vhile he was in partnership with
Harvey, he had no right to purchase the goods in his own
name; for in doing so he would have acted in bad faith, and
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perioo of time, the question, whether within that period it 
may be dissolved by the mere act and ,will of one of the part-
ners, without the consent of the others, is not definitely or 
absolutely settled, says Justice STORY, in our jurisprudence. 
He clearly intimates, if ever such a case should arise, where 
one partner claimed the right, BUa 8ponte, of dissolving the 
partnership, that he possesses no such power; and he takes 
the distinction between a court of equity dissolving the part· 
nership, and that of a partner, acting upon his own caprice and 
pleasure, dissolving the engagement. He admits the doctrine 
to be somewhat different according to the Roman law; but he 
denies that a partner has a right to found his own claim to 
immediate indemnity and safety by committing a known injury 
Qn the intere8t and privileges of his copartners: and in this 
opinion he is sustained by many elementary writers and a 
number of adjudged cases of unquestionable authority: Gow. 
on Part. c. 5, sec. 1, 219, 225, 226, 288; 3 Coll. Part. b. 1, c. 2, 
aec. 2, p. 62, 2d Ed.; Kent's Com. sec. 43, pp. 61, 4th Ed.; 
Peacock vs. Peacock, 16 Ves. 56; Cratcshay tis. Maule, 1 Swans. 
495; Pearpoint vs. Graham, 4 'Yash. C. C. 234. 
The partner who breaks off tl1e partnership ·with an unfair 
design, or for seltish objects, discharges bis copartners from 
all liabilities to him, but he does not thereby free himself from 
his obligations to them. \Vhen he quits -the partnership, that 
he may buy for himself what the partnership has a right to 
purchase, or that he may make a profit for his own advantage 
and to their prejudice, be is answerable to the community for 
the loss and damage; and so, if he quits at an unreasonable 
time, which occasioned a deprivation of profits to the com-
munity, it is but right he should repair and make good such 
loss: Poth. Pand. lib. 17, tit. 2, n. 64-68; Domat, b. 1, tit. 8, sec. 
5; arts 1-8, by Strabam; Story on Pal't. 383-420. 
The proof· in this case clearly shows that Howell reno.unced 
the partnership for his own private advantage, and not to ben-
efit the firm. Re said nothing to his partner of his wish to 
dissolve until his return from Philadelphia. He then adver-
tised a dissolution of the firm, and seized all the goods and 
effects into his own hands. 'Vhile be was in partnership with 
Harvey, he had no right to purchase the goods in his own 
name; for in doing so he would have acted in bad faith, and 
besides, Harvey would have been answerable for the purchase. 
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Was it more to Howell’s interest, or to the firm’s, that the dis-
solution should take place at the time it did? The answer to
this inquiry is neither difiicult nor doubtful. At the time
Howell published the dissolution of the copartnership, mer-
chants were realizing large profits upon their stock, and goods
,were sold readily at an advance of fifty to one hundred per
Acent. Did he not dissolve the partnership that he might buy
,for himself and realize this profit? \Vere not the other part-
ners of the firm prejudiced in their business, and he benefited
,by the transaction? Were not his motives sinister and selfish,
,and did he not withdraw from the community at an unwar-
rantable time and in bad faith? The proof leaves no doubt
upon this subject, and if the rules and principles above stated
be correct, then he is unquestionably answerable to the com-
plainant for the damages he may have sustained. That damage
seems to have been calculated and awarded upon a correct
basis. The chancellor, in rendering the decree, debited and
credited each of the partners in conformity to the articles of
agreement, with their respective advance and expenditures,
taking a list of the notes and accounts furnished by the books,
and properly auditing them; and he then charged Howell with
fifty per cent profit upon the whole amount of goods "he pur-
chased at Philadelphia, as well as the stock on hand belonging
to the firm. In this calculation and -adjustment, we perceive no
error.
Decree affirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 237, 251.
Compare with following case.
-1
SOLOMON vs. KIRKYVOOD.
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884.
55 Mich. 258, 21 N. ‘V. Rep. 336.
The plaintiffs, who are, in the city of Chicago, dealers in
jewelry, seek to charge the defendants, as partners, upon a.
promissory note for $791.92, bearing date November 9, 1882,
and signed “Hollander & Kirkwood.” The note was given by

















































































































































SOLOY.ON vs. KIRKWOOD •. 861 
Was it more to Howell's interest, or to the firm's, that the dis-
solution should take place at the time it did? The answer to 
this inquiry is neither difficult nor doubtful. At the time 
Howell published the dissolution of the copartnership, mer-
chants were realizing large profits upon their stock, and goods 
,were sold readily at an advance of fifty to one hundred per 
,cent. Did he not dissolve the partnership that he might buy 
~or himself and realize this pro.fit? Were not the other part-
.ners of the firm prejudiced in their business, and be benefited 
1by the transaction? Were not bis motives sinister and selfish, 
,and did he not withdraw from the community at an unwar-
rantable time and in bad faith? The proof leaves no doubt 
upon this subject, and if the rules and principles above stated 
be correct, then he is unc1uestionably answerable to the com-
plainant for the damages be may have sustained. That damage 
seems to have been calculated and awarded upon a correct 
basis. The chancellor, in rendering the decree, debited and 
credited each of the partners in conformity to the articles of 
agreement, with their respective adva:n.ces and expenditures, 
taking a list of the notes and accounts furnished by the books, 
and properly auditing them; and he then charged Howell with 
fifty per icent profit upon the whole amount of gio.ods ·be pur-
chaaed at Philadelphia, as well as the stock &n hand belonging 
· to tthe firm. In this caloulation Md adjustment, we perceive no 
error. 
Decree affirmed. 
Non: Bee Mee hem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 287, 251. 
Compare with following caee. 
SOLO.~!ON vs. KIRKWOOD. 
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884. 
55 Mich. 256, 21 N. W. Rep. 83B. 
The plaintiffs, who are, in the city of Chicago, dealers In 
jewelry, seek to charge the defendants, as partners, upon a 
promissory note for $791.92, bearing date November 9, 1882, 
and signed "J;lollander & Kirkwood." The note was given by 
.the defendant Hollander, but Kirkwood denies that any part-
46 
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nership existed between the defendants at the date of the
note.
The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July
6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agree-
ment for a partnership for one year from the first day of the
next ensuing month, in the business of buying and selling
jewelry, clocks, watches, etc., and in repairing clocks, watches,
and jewelry, at Ishpeming, Michigan. Business was begun
under this agreement, and continued until the latter part of
October, 1882, when Kirkwood. becoming dissatisfied, locked
up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the
business. He also caused notice to be given to all persons
with whom the firm had had dealings that the partnership
was dissolved, and had the following inserted in the local
column of the paper published at Ishpeming: “The copartner-
ship heretofore existing between Mr. C. H. Kirkwood and one
Hollander, as jewelers, has ceased to exist, Mr. Kirkwood
having purchased the interest of the latter.” This was not
signed by any one.
A few days later Hollander went to Chicago, and there, on
November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of Hollander &
Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to
$7 91.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissor_v note
now in suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882,
at a bank in Ishpeming. When the purchase was completed
Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintiffs
had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but
they had heard that there was such a firm, and were not aware
of its dissolution. They claim to have made the sale in good
faith, and in the belief that the firm was still in existence. On
the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the
plaintiffs had conspired together to defraud him by a pre-
tended sale to the firm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hol-
lander intended to appropriate exclusively to himself; and he
was allowed to prove declarations of Hollander which, if
admissible, would tend strongly to prove such a conspiracy.
The questions principally contested on the trial wer<=>First,
whether the acts of Kirkwood amounted to a dissolution of the
partnership; second, whether sufiicient notice of dissolution
was given; and, third, whether there was any evidence to go

















































































































































36~ 0ABBS ON PABTNERSIIIP. 
nerehip existed between the defendants at the date of the 
note. 
The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July 
6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agree-
ment for a partnership for one year from the first day of the 
next ensuing month, in the business of buying and selling 
jewelry, cl-0cks, watches, etc., and in repairing clocks, watches, 
and jewelry, at Ishpeming, :Michigan. Business was begun 
under this agreement, and continued until the latter part of 
October, 1882, when Kirkwood, becoming dissatisfied, locked 
up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the 
business. He also caused notice to be given to all persons 
with whom the firm had had dealings that the partnership 
was dissolved, and bad the following inserted in the local 
column of the paper published at Ishpeming: "The copartner-
ship heretofore existing between Mr. C.H. Kirkwood and one 
Hollander, as jewelers, has ceased to exist, Mr. Kirkwood 
having purchased the interest of the latter." This was not 
signed by any one. 
A few days later Hollander went to Chicago, and there, on 
November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of Hollander & 
Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to 
$791.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissory note 
now in suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882, 
at a bank in Ishpeming. "rhen the purchase was completed 
Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintiffs 
~ had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but 
they had beard that there was such a fl.rm, and were not aware 
of its dissolution. They claim to have made the sale in good 
faith, and in the belief that the firm was still in existence. On 
the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the 
plaintiffs had conspired tog-ether to defraud him by a pre-
tended sale to the firm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hol-
lander intend(>(} to appropriate exclusively to himself; and be 
was allowed to prove declarations of Hollander which, if 
admissible, would tend strongly to prove such a conspiracy. 
The questions principally contested on the trial were-First, 
whether the acts of Kirkwood amounted to a dissolution of the 
partnership; second, whether sufficient notice of dissolution 
was given; and, third, whether there was any evidence to go 
to the jury of an understanding between Hollander and the 
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plaintiffs to defraud Kirkwood. The trial judge, in submitting
the case to the jury, instructed them that Kirkwood, notwith-
standing the written agreement, had a right to withdraw from
the partnership at any time, leaving matters between him and
JHollander to be adjusted between them amicably or in the
courts; and for the purposes of this case it made no difference
whether Kirkwood was right or wrong in bringing the part-
nership to an end; if wrong, he might be liable to Hollander
in damages for the breach of his contract. Also, that when
partners are dissatisfied, or they cannot get along together,
and one partner withdraws, the partnership is then at an end
as to the public and parties with whom the partnership deals,
and neither partner can make contracts in the future to bind
the partnership, provided the retiring partner gives the proper
notice. Also, that if they should find from the evidence that
there was trouble between Hollander and Kirkwood prior to
the sale of the goods and the giving of the note; that Kirk-
wood informed Hollander, in substance, that he would have
no more dealings with him as partner; that he took possession
of all the goods and locked them up, and from that time they
ceased to do business—then the partnership was dissolved.
Further, that whether sufiicient notice had been given of the
\ dissolution was a question for the jury. Kirkwood was not
bound to publish notice in any of the Chicago papers; he was
only bound to give actual notice to such parties there as had
dealt with the partnership. But Kirkwood was bound to use
all fair means to publish as widely as possible the fact of a dis-
solution. Publication in a. newspaper is one of the proper
means of giving notice, but it is not absolutely essential; and
on this branch of the case the question for the jury was
whether Kirkwood gave such notice of the dissolution as under
the circumstances was fair and reasonable. If he did, then he
is not liable on the note; if he did not, he would still continue
liable.
The judge also submitted to the jury the question of fraud
in the sale of the goods. The jury returned a verdict for the
defendants. Plaintiff brings error.
Ball <£ Hanscom, for appellants.
W. P. H ealy, for appellee.
Coouazv, C. J . (After stating the facts as above.) I. We
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plaintiffs to defraud Kirkwood. The trial judge, in submitting 
the case to the jury, instructed them that Kirkwood, notwith-
:standing the written agreement, had a right to withdraw from 
the partnership at any time, leaving matters between him and 
;Hollander to be adjusted between them amicably or in the 
courts; and for the purposes of this case it made no difference 
whether Kirkwood was right or wrong in bringing the part-
nership to an end; if wrong, he might be liable to Hollander 
in damages for the breach of his contract. AlBO, that when 
partners are dissatisfied, or they cannot get along together, 
and one partner withdraws, the partnership is then at an end 
as to the public and parties with whom the partnership deals, 
and neither partner can make contracts in the future to bind 
the partnership, provided the retiring partner gives the proper 
notice. Also, that if they should find from the evidence that 
there was trouble between Hollander and Kirkwood prior to 
the sale of the goods and the giving of the note; that Kirk-
wood informed Hollander, in substance, that he would have 
no more dealings with him as partner; that he took possession 
of all the goods and locked them up, and from that time they 
ceased to do business-then the partnership was dissolved. 
Further, that whether sufficient notice had been given of the 
~.dissolution was a question for the jury. Kirkwood was not 
bound to publish notice in any of the Chicago papers; he was 
only bound to give actual notice to such parties there as had 
dealt with the partnership. But Kirkwood was bound to use 
nll fair means to publish as widely as possible the fact of a dis-
solution. Publication in a newspaper is one of the proper 
means of giving notice, but it is not absolutely essential; and 
on thjs branch of the case the question for the jury was 
whether Kirkwood gave such notice of the dissolution as under 
the circumstances was fair and reasonable. If be did, then he 
is not liable on the note; if he did not, he would still continue 
liable. 
The judge also submitted to the jury the question of fraud 
In the sale of the goods. The jury returned a verdict for the 
defendants. Plaintiff brings error. 
Ball & Hanscom, for appellants. 
W. P. Healy, for appellee. 
CooLEY, C. J. (After stating the facts as above.) I. We 
think the judge committed no error in his instructions respect-
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ing the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this sub-
ject is thus stated in an early New York case: The right of a
partner to dissolve, it is said, “is a right inseparably incident
to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indis-
solublc partnership. Every partner has an indefeasible right
to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by pub-
lishing his own volition to that effect; and after such publica-
tion the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind
him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with
each other ‘that the partnership shall continue seven years,
either partner may dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his
determination for that purpose; the only consequence being
that he thereby subjects himself to a claim for damages for a
breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to
another to make joint contracts for them both is not only a
revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of
the capacity to revoke it:” Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N.
Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286. To the same effect are Mason
vs. Con-nell, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 381, and Slemnwr’s Appeal, 58 Pa.
St. 155. There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a
dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to
make it' specially injurious; but no question of equitable
restraint arises here. When one partner becomes dissatisfied
there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compel-
ling a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract
will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the
right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure,
subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that
responsbility would exist in breaking a contract of partner-
ship as in other cases.
II. The instruction respecting notice was also correct. No
court can determine for all cases what shall be sufficient
notice and what shall not be; the question must necessarily
be one of fact. Publication of notice of dissolution in a local
newspaper is common, but it is not the only method in which
notice can be given. The purpose of the notice is to make
notorious in the local community the fact that a dissolution
has taken place; and publication of a notice may or may not
be the most effectual means for that purpose. Very few per-
sons in any community probably read all the advertisements
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Ing the dissolution of the partnership. The rule on this sub-
ject is thus stated in an early New York case: The right of a 
partner to dissolve, it is said, "is a right inseparably incident 
to every partnership. There can be no such thing as an indis-
soluble partnership. Every partner bas an indefeasible right 
to dissolve the partnership as to all future contracts by pub-
lishing hi.9 own volition to th?t effect; and after such publica-
tion the other members of the firm have no capacity to bind 
him by any contract. Even where partners covenant with 
each other 'that the partnership shall continue seven years, 
eith~r partner may dissolve it the next day by proclaiming his 
determination for that purpose; the only consequence being 
that he thereby SQbjects himself to a claim for damages for a 
breach of his covenant. The power given by one partner to 
anotb.er to make joint contracts for them both is not only a 
revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest himself of 
the capacity to revoke it:" Skinner vs. Dayton, 19 Johns. (N. 
Y.) 513, 538, 10 Am. Dec. 286. To the same effect are Mason 
vs. Connell, 1 Wbart. (Pa.) 381, and Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 
St. 155. There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a 
dissolution for a time, when the circumstances were such as to 
make if specially injurious; but no question of equitable 
restraint al'ises here. When -0ne partner becomes ilissatisfied 
there is commonly no legal policy to be subserved by compel-
ling-a continuance of the relation, and the fact that a contract 
will be broken by the dissolution is no argument against the 
right to dissolve. Most contracts may be broken at pleasure, 
subject, however, to responsibility in damages. And that 
responsbility would exist in breaking a contract of partner-
ship as in other cases. 
II. The instruction respecting notice was also correct. No 
court can determine for all cases what shall be sufficient 
notice and what shall not be; the question must necessarily 
be one of fact. Publication of notice of dissolution in a local 
newspaper is common, but it is not the only method in which 
notice can be given. The purpose of the notice is to make 
notorious in the local community the fact that a dissolution 
has taken place; and publication of a notice may or may not 
be the most effectual means for that purpose. Very few per-
sons in any community probably read all the advertisements 
published in the local papers; and matters of local importance 
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which are advertised are quite as likely to come to them from
other sources as from the published notices.
That publication in a newspaper is suflicient, is not dis-
puted by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be
n.utho1-itative: Ketcham vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5 Am.
flee. 197; Graves vs. Merry, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 701; 16 Am. Dec.
-171; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill ‘(N. Y.), 578; Nott vs.
roaming, 6 La. 680; 26 Am. Dec. 491; Watkinson rs. Bank of
I’:-nnsylvania, 4 W'hart. (Pa.) 482; 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose vs.
('o;7ield, 53 Md. 18; 36 Am. Rep. 389. But in this case it is said
the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a
local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and
may in any particular case have no better foundation than
rumor or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the
verity which a notice signed by the party would import.
.\ll this may be true without being conclusive. \Vhen the
purpose is to "put the fact of dissolution before the public, it
certainly cannot be affirmed that the purpose is more likely
to be accomplished by a formal advertisement than by an
item in the local column of the newspaper. Many publish-
ers, it is believed, have in their papers a local column in which
items appear which seem onptheir face to be editorial, but
which are really advertisements; and not only paid for, but
paid at extra rates, for the reason that in that column they
would be more likely to be seen and read than if published
as advertisements in the ordinary way. When such is the
case, a court could hardly hold as matter of law that the
advertisement would be sufficient, but the notice in the local
column not. To do so would be to make form more important
than the purpose to be accomplished. One who derives knowl-
edge of the fact from public notoriety is sufliciently notified:
Bernard vs. Torrance, 5 Gill & J . (Md.) 383; H alliday vs. M cD0u-
gall, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 81; and probably in many small com-
munities a fact would sooner be made notorious by a. notice in
the loxml column of the county or village paper than in any
other way. In a large city it might-be otherwise. But all that
can be required in any case is that such notice be given as is
likely to make the fact generally known locally: Vernon vs.
Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 183, 193; Loaejoy vs. Spa/ford,
93 U. S. 430. When that is done the party giving the notice
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which are advertised are quite as likely to come to them from 
other sources as from the published notices. 
That publication in a newspaper is sufficient, is not dis-
puted by the defense, provided it appears on its face to be 
nuthoritative: I{etcham vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5 Am. 
J)ec. 197; Grave.s vs. Merr11, 6 Cow. (N. Y:) 701; 16 Am. Dec. 
-~71; National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 578; Nott va • 
:rmming, 6 La. 680; 26 Am. Dec. 491; Watkinson i·s. Ba.nk of 
l'1·1111sylvania, 4 "'·h.-irt. (Pa.) 482; 34 Am. Dec. 521; Rose vs. 
<'offeel.d, 53 Md. 18; 36 Am. Rep. 389. But in this case it is said 
the notice did not appear to be authoritative; it appeared as a 
local editorial item, and such items are often baseless, and 
may in any particular case have no better foundation than 
rumor or even suspicion. They do not bear upon their face the 
verity which a notice signed by the party would import. 
All this may be true without being conclusive. 'Vhen the 
purpose is to ·put the fact of diss<>lution before the public, it 
certainly c:mnot be affirmed that the purpose is more likely 
to be accomplished by a formal advertisement than by an 
item in the local column of the newspaper. Many publish· 
ers, it is believed, have in their papers a local column in which 
item~ appear which seem on their face to be editorial, but 
wh.ieh are really advertisements; and not only paid for, but 
paid at extra rates, for the reason that in that column they 
would be more likely to be seen and read than if published 
as advertisements in the ordinary way. When such ie the 
case, a court could hardly h.old as matter of law that the 
advertisement would be sufficient, but the notice in the local 
column not. To do so would be to make form more important 
than the purpose to be accomplished. One who derives knowl-
ed~e of the fact from public notoriety is sufficiently n<>tifiedc 
Bernard vs. Tormnce, 5 Gill & J. (Md.) 383; Halliday vs. McDou-
gall, 20 ·wend. (~. Y.) 81; and pr<>bably in many small com-
munities a fact would s~oner be made notorious by a notice in 
the local column of the county or village paper than in any 
other way. In a large city it might·be otherwise. But all that 
can be required in any case is that such notice be given as ie 
likely to make the fart generally known locally: Vernon vs . 
.Manhattan Oo., 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 183, 193; Lovejoy vs. Spafford, 
93 U. S. 430. When that is done the party giving the notice 
has performed his duty, and ·any one contemplating for the 
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first time to open dealings with the partnership must at his
peril ascertain the facts. This, in eflect, was the instruction
given.
III. But we think the judge erred in receiving evidence
of Holl:.nder’s admissions or declarations tending to show
fraudulent collusion between him and the plaintiffs. The dec-
larations of a conspirator may be evidence against his asso-
ciates after the conspiracy is made out; but to receive them as
proof of the conspiracy would put every man at the mercy of
rogues. VVe find in this case no evidence of the conspiracy
except in the statements of Hollander; and those having been
erroneously received, there was nothing on that branch of the
case to submit to the jury.
For this error there must be a new trial.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §240.
See also Fletcher ca. Pullen, ante, p. 134.
GERARD vs. GATEAU.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1876.
84 Ill. 121, 25 Am. Rep. 438.
Bill for dissolution of partnership, etc. The facts appear in
the opinion.
Emery A. Storrs, for appellant.
Geo. W. Cass, R. Riddle Roberts, and E. Harvey, for appellee.
Sco'r'r, J. The copartnership between the parties to this
litigation was for the manufacture and sale of zinc roofing and
zinc and other metal ornamen-tal work. It was formed in Jan-
uary, 1872, and was to continue through a period of ten years.
Although equal partners the capital put in was not equal.
Complainant put in $12000 in cash, and defendant was the
owner of plaster of Paris dies which would be needed in
the business of the firm, and which were rated to h-im as
capital at $3,500. It was stipulated that the firm was to
pay interest on t-he excess of capital put in by complain-
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ftret time to open dealings with the partnership must at his 
peril ascertain the facts. This, in effect, was the instruction 
given. 
III. But we think the judge erred in receiving evidence 
of Holl:4nder's admissions or declarations tending to show 
fraudulent collusion between him and the plaintiffs. The dec-
larations of a conspirator may be evidence against his asso-
ciates after ~ conspiracy is made out; but to receive them as 
proof of the conspiracy would put eT"ery man at the mercy of 
rogues. We find in this case no evidence of the conspiracy 
except in the statements of Hollander; and those having been 
erroneously received, there was nothing on that branch of the 
ease to submit to the jury. 
For this error there must be a new trial. 
NOTB:: See Meche m's Elem. ot Pa.rtn •• ~ 240. 
See also Jr'letcher t:•. Pullen, ante, p . 134. 
GERARD vs. GATEAU. 
Supreme Court of llZinoi8, 1816. 
St Ill. 121, 25 Am. Rep. '38. 
Bill for dissolution of partnership, etc. The fact1 appear in 
the opinion. 
Emery A .. Storrs, for appE>IJant. 
Geo. W. Cass~ R. Riddle Roberts, and E. Han;ey, for aprllee. 
Sco'M', J. 'rhe copartnership between the parties to this 
litigation was for the manufacture and sale of zinc roofing and 
~inc and other metal ornamt>nital work. It was formed in Jan-
uary, 1872, and was to continue through a period of ten years. 
Although equal partnC'rs the capital put in was not equal. 
Complainant put in ~1 ~.000 in cnsh, and defendant was the 
owner of plaster of Paris dies which would be needed in 
the businel!ls of the firm, and whiC'h were ra:ted to him a.a 
capital at ,3,500. It was stipulntPd that the firm was to 
pay interest on t·be ex('('Ss of capital put in by -complain-
ant, and it was secured to him upon the stock <>f the firm. 
-.._'_\
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In the articles of copartnership it was provided what causes
should operate as a dissolution: First, death of either party;
and second, “incapacity, embezzlement or gross neglect or
misconduct of either party.” On account of the latter causes
either party could have the firm dissolved by giving thirty
days’ notice to the other party, of such intention, stating in
uch notice his grounds and reasons for so doing. After the
lapse of a little over two years complainant filed this bill for
a dissolution of the copartnership, for an account and for an
injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the
affairs of the company. No notice was given of his intention,
as provided in the articles of copartnership, to ask a dissolu-
tion, but without regard to the agreement, complainant in-
vokes the general powers of a court of chancery.
It is not set forth in the bill, that defendant is wanting in
capacity, or that he has been guilty of embezzlement or any
other act affecting his integrity of character. Among the
caues alleged for a dissolution of the copartnership is, the
plaster of Paris dies, formerly owned by the defendant, were
put in as capital at a sum greatly in excess of the real value.
Conceding the fact, we do not understand it would constitute
any ground for canceling the partnership contract. On the
dissolution of the copartnership, by lapse of time or otherwise,
equities between the parties arising out of this cause, could
be adjusted. But upon the principal fact, as to the value of
the dies, the evidence is quite conflicting, and if trying the case
as an original question, we would be at a loss to determine
with which party is a preponderance of the testimony. Cer-
tainly there is no decided preponderance in favor of com-
plainant.
VVith regard to the overcharge on the work for Oxley & Co.
for work done under a special contract for that company it is
hardly of sufficient importance to deserve much consideration.
It was ornamental work of elaborate design, to be used on the
State House and as to the actual cost of the material and
labor, persons skilled in that department of labor differ widely
in their estimates. It may or it may not have been an over-
charge. There is nothing that shows defendant acted cor-
ruptly in the matter. The differences in regard to the -price
charged were afterward adjusted with the parties in interest,
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In the articles of copartnership it was provided what causes 
should operate as a dissolution: First, death of either party; 
and second, "incapacity, embezzlement or gross neglect or 
misconduct of either party." On account of the latter causes 
either party could have the firm dissolved by giving thirty 
days' notice to the other party, of such intention, stating in 
such notice his grounds and reasons for so doing. After the 
lapse of a little over two years complainant filed this bill for 
a dissolution of the copartnership, for an account and for an 
injunction restraining defendant from interfering with the 
affairs of the company. No notice was given of his intention, 
as provided in the articles of copartnership, to ask a dissolu-
tion, but without regard to the agreement, complainant in-
vokes the general powers of a court of chancery. 
It is not set forth in the bill, that defendant is wanting in 
capacity, or that he has been guilty of embezzlement or any 
other act affecting bis integrity of character. Among the 
causes alleged for a dissolution of the copartnership is, the 
plaster of Paris dies, formerly owned by the defendant, were 
. put in as capital at a sum greatly in excess of the real value. 
Conceding the fact, we do not understand it would constitute 
any ground for canceling the partnership contract. On the 
dissolution of the copartnership, by lapse of time or otherwise, 
equities between the parties arising out of this cause, could 
be adjusfrd. But upon the principal fact, as to the value of 
the dies, the evidence is quite conflicting, and if trying the case 
as an original question, we would be at a loss to determine 
with which party is a preponderance of the testimony. Cer-
tainly there is no decided preponderance in favor of com-
plainant. 
With regard to the overc·barge on the work for Oxley & Co. 
for work done under a special contract for that company it is 
hardly of sufficient importance to deserve much consideration. 
It was ornamental work of elaborate design, to be used on the 
State House and as to the actual cost of the material and 
labor, persons lilkilled in that department of labor differ widely 
in their estimates. It may or it may not have been an over-
charge. There is nothing that shows defendant acted cor-
ruptly in ithe matter. The difference-s in regard to the price 
charged were aftierward adjusted with the parties in interest1 
and no harm came to complainant. 
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Another cause of complaint is, the prosperity of the firm
was impaired by the personal bearing of defendant toward
customers. If the inventory taken of the assets of the firm anywhere near correct, it cannot be the prosperity of the con-
cern was in any great degree affected by the conduct of de
fendant, whatever it may have been. An unusual measure of
success seems to have attended their affairs. In the brief
period the firm had been doing business, according to the testi-
mony, th-e assets of the company had more than doubled, with-
out contracting any considerable amount of -indebtedness.
The charge is, defendant had an irascible temper, was in-
solent in his department, or, as one of the witnesses expressed
it, was “high and mighty with customers.” Evidence intro-
duced shows that, while defendant was disagreeable, and
perhaps wanting in courtesy to some, with others he was
always pleasant and affable. It is shown that for some time
before and after the formation of the copartnership, the
social relations of the partners were of the most friendly
character. The causes that interrupted those relations were
not more serious -in their nature than the annoyances that
often attend the transaction of any business. We find no well
considered case going to the extent that such defect as indi-
cated in the character of one partner would justify a dissolu-
tion of the copartnership contract. Should such a rule be
adopted it is apprehended, on account of the infirmities of
character, no asociation of persons for the transaction of
business would endure for any great length of time.
As was said by this court in Cash vs. Earnshaw, 66 Ill. 402,
it is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner,
a court of equity, at the instance of another, will dissolve the
partnership and close up the affairs of the company. The/
court will require a strong case to be made, and it is laid down
as a general principle, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to
declare a separation between partners for trifling causes or
temporary grievances, involving no permanent mischiefs.
That defcndant’s conduct toward some of the customers of the
firm is subject to severe criticism admits of no doubt, but that
i-t worked any permanent misc-hief to the partnership interests
is not established by any evidence in the case.
The debatable point in the case is, as to the personal rela-
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Another cause of complaint is, the prosperity of the firm 
was impaired by the personal bearing of defendant toward 
customers. If the inventory taken of the assets of the firm ~ 
anywhere near rorreet, it cannot be the prosperity of the con-
cern was in any great degree atf ected by the oonduct of de-
f endant, whatever it may have been. An unusual measure of 
success seems to h'ave attendoo their affail"s. In the brief 
period the firm had been doing business, according to the testi-
mony, the asset.'4 of the company ·had more than doubled, with-
out contra"Cting any considera;ble amount of indebtedness. 
The char~e is, defendant had an irascible temper, was in-
solent in his department, or, as one of the witnesses expressed 
it, was "high and migllty with customers.'' Evidence intro-
duced shows that~ while d(•fendant was disagreeable, and 
perhaps wanting in courtesy to some, with others he was 
always pleasant and atl'able. It is shown that for some time 
before and after the formation of the copartnership, the 
social relations of the partners were of the most friendly 
·character. The causes that interrupted those relations were 
not more serious in their nature than ·the annoyances that 
often attend the transacUon of ;a,ny business. We find no well 
considered cµse going to the extent that such defect as indi-
cated in the character of one partner would justifJ a dissolu-
tion of the copartnership contract. Should such a rule be 
adopted it is apprehended, on account of the infirmities of 
character, no association of persons for the tl"ansaction of 
business would endure for any great length of time . 
.As was said by this court in Cash vs. Ea.nzsliaw, 66 Ill. 402, 
it is not for every act of misconduct on the part of one partner, 
a court of equity, at the instance of another, will dissolve the 
partnership and close up the affairs of the company. Thi° 
court will require a strong case to be made, and it is laid down 
as a general principle, a court of equity bas no jurisdiction to 
declare a separation between partners for trifling causes or 
tempomry grievances, involving no permanent mischiefs. 
That defendant's conduct toward some <>f the customers of the 
firm is subject to severe criticism admits of no doubt, but that 
it worked any permanent misc-llief to the partnership interests 
is not established by any evidence in the case. 
The debatahle point in the case is, as to the personal rela-
tions between the partners, and whether the hostile relationa 
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existing are justly attributable to the unreasonable conduct
of defendant. This is always a difficult question, and cases
differ so essentially in their constituent elements, that we
find no accurate and distinct definiti-ons on this branch of the
law. That such embittered relations may exist as would
render it impracticable to'conduct the business, and justify
a decree dissolving the partnership, admits of no discussion, on
principle as well as upon authority. Permanent mischiefs
would be the result that could only be avoided by a severance
of the partnership relations. But that is not the case here.
Under the copartnership articles defendant had the principal
control of the affairs of the company. Complainant was not
obliged to give any more personal attention to the business than
he chose to bestow. Defendant was a skilled workman in their
business, and complainant was not. This fact was well under-
stood and canvassed before the partnership was formed.
Although the social relations between the partners were not
what they ought to have been it is not perceived how the ex-
isting ill-fceling could seriously impair the prosperity or
interfere with the management of the firm affairs. By positive
agreement the business was under the principal control of
defendant, and, notwithstanding the want of cordiality, it
might be carried on with equal success. _
ln all the cases _we have examined, where the partnership
has been dissolved on account of the unfriendly relations be-
tween the partners, it has generally been at the instance of a
party who was not himself at fault, and where the estrange-
ment was such as would prevent the successful management
of the business. IA party who is the author of the ill-feeling
between himself and partners ought not to be permitted to
make the relation he has induced the ground of a dissolution
of the partnership. His conduct may have been taken with a
view to that very result, and it would be inequitable to allow
him advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow
one partner, at his election, to put an end to his own deliberate
contract, when the other had been guilty of no wrongful a-ct or
omission of duty. The results flowing from the premature
dissolution of a partnership might be most disastrous to a
partner who had embarked his capital in the enterprise.
Complainant’s conduct in relation to the affairs of the com-
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existing are justly attributable to the unreasonable conduct 
of .defendant. '!'his is alwa.)'S a difficult question, and cases 
differ so essentially in their constituent elements, that we 
find no accurate and distinct definiti-ons on this branch of the 
Jaw. That such embittered relations may exist as would 
render it impracticable to 'conduct the business, and justify 
a decree dissolving the partnership, admits of no discussion, on 
principle as well as upon authority. Permanent mischiefs 
wonld be the rt"'snlt that could only be avoided by a severance 
of the partnership relations. But that is not the case here. 
Cnder the copartnership articles defendant had the principal 
control of the affairs of the company. Complainant was not 
obliged to give any more personal attentiontothe business than 
he C'bose to b£'stow. Defendant was a skilled workman in their 
husinPss, and romplainant was not. This fact was weJI under-
~tood and canva!'iwd before the partnership was formed. 
~\It hough the social relationR between the partners were not 
what thfl'~' ou~ht to have been it is not perceived how the ex-
isting ilJ·f Peling could seriously impair the prosperity or 
intc.•rfere with the management of the firm affairs. By positive 
agrpement the business wa.s under the principal C·Ontrol of 
defendant, ::rnd, notwithstanding the want of cord'iality, it 
might be carried on with equal success. 
In all the cnseR ~e luwe examined, where the partnership 
has bet"'n disRolved on account of the unfriendly rplations be-
tween the partners, it has generally bt•en at the instance of a 
party who was not himself at fault, and where the estrange-
mt-nt was sueh as would pr('vent the succPssfnl managC>ment 
of the business. rA part.)' who is the author of the ill-feeling 
betwe<'n himself and partnPrs on~ht not to bP permiUt>d to 
make the relation he has induced the ground of a dissolution 
of thl' partn('t·ship. His condnrt ma.'' havl' be<:>n takl'n with a 
view to that ver~' rPsnlt, and it would be inequitable to allo-w 
him advantage from his own wrongful acts. It would allow 
one partner, at his election, t·o put an Pnd to his own deliberate 
contract, when the Mher lnd been guilt.'· of no wrongful a.ct or 
omission of duty. The results flowing from the prematur«~ 
dissolution of a partnership might be most disastrous to a 
partner who had embarked hi!-~ rnpital in the enterprise. 
Complainant's conduct in rt>lation to the affairs of the com-
pany is not altogethPr bh1ml'll'ss, and it may be, defendant's 
47 
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conduct, to which exceptions are taken, was induced, in some
measure, by his own action. Principally, it seems, the ill-feel-
ing between the partners was engendered by the employment
of a nephew of complainant as a traveling salesman for the
house. It was done against the wishes of defendant, and
proved, as he anticipated, unprofitable. This young man had
before been discharged from the service of the firm on account
of his incapacity, and the last employment seems to have been
because complainant became responsible for his successful
management. A loss ensued, and it was in regard to the
salary and traveling expenses of this salesman the parties
disagreed. Evidence ofl'ered tends to show complainant was
in the wrong; but, however, that may have been, it ought not
to have affected, permanently the social relations of the
partners. c
We have given this case a most careful consideration, and
we can see nothing that would prevent, amomg reason-able men,
a harmonious cooperation between the partners, so far as any
is necessary to a profitable prosecution of the common business
of the firm, and hence, no reason i perceived for dissolving the
partnership.
The decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction
will be aflirmed.
Decree aflirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn , § 256.
See also New vs. Wright, ante, p. 263.
_i_i_.__i_
AUSTIN vs. HOLLAND.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1877.
69 N. Y. 571, 25 Am. Rep. 246.
Action on promissory note made in firm name of Dillon,
Beebe & Co. to order of Horace Loveland. Defendant Holland
answered that he was not a member of the firm. Defendants
















































































































































870 CASES OB .PARTNERSHIP. 
conduct, to which exceptions are taken, was induced, in some 
measure, by bis own action. Principally, it seems, the ill-feel-
ing between the partners was engendered by the employment 
of a nephew of complainant as a traveling salesman for the 
house. It was done against the wishes of defendant, and 
proved, as he anticipated, unprofitable. This young man bad 
before been discharged from the service of the firm on account 
of his incapacity, and the last employment seems to have been 
because complainant became responsible for his successful 
management. A loss ensued, and it was in regard to the 
salary and traveling expenses of this salesman the parties 
disagreed. Evidence offered tends to show complainant was 
in the wrong; but, however, that may have been, it ought not 
to have affected, permanently the social relations of the 
partners. 
We have given this case a most careful consideration, and 
we can see nothing that would preve111t, amoog reasonable men, 
a harmoniouR co-operation between the partners, so far as any 
is necessary to a profitable prosecution of the commol). business 
of the firm, and hence, no reason is perceived for dissolving the 
partnership. 
The decree dismissing the bill and dissolving the injunction 
will be affirmed. 
Decree afiirmed. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn , § 2j8. 
See also New vs, Wl'ight, ante, p. 2G3. 
AUSTIN vs. HOLLAND. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1817. 
69 N. Y. 571, 25 Am. Rep. 246. 
Action on promissory note made in firm name of Dillon, 
Beebe & Co. to order of Horace Loveland. Defendant Holland 
answered that he was not a member of the firm. Defendants 
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the note. The facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for
plaintitf on verdict was afiirmed at general term of the
supreme court, and defendant appealed.
Esck Oowen, for defendant.
Mart-in I._Tou:nsend, for plaintifl’. .
Asnnmws, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the firm of
Dillon, Beebe _& Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of
the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent
engagements made by his former copartner in the firm name,
with those who had previous dealings with the firm, and who
entered into the new transaction without no-tice of the change
in the partnership. In Vernon vs. The Manhattan Co., 22 Wend.
(N. Y.) 190, the chancellor said: “The word ‘dealing’ is merely
used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who
is entitled to actual notice of the dissolution must be one who
has had business relations with the firm, by which a credit
is raised upon the faith of the copartnership,” and this -state-
ment of the chancellor is recited with approval by DENIO, J.,
in Clapp vs. Rog/ers, 12 N. Y. 286.
There does not seem to be any reason for distinguishing the
case of an agent who is in the employment of the firm at the
time of the dissolution, and who thereafter, without notice
of the dissolution, continues under the same apparent employ-
ment, from that of a person who has had mercantile trans-
actions and relations with the firm, as a vendor or otherwise.
In each case the credit is presumed to have been given origi-
nally upon the responsibility of the individual members of the
partnership, and justice requires as much in the one case as
the other that all the members should be bound so long as the
partnership may be supposed to exist. Watson on Part. 384.
The principal question in this case is, whether Loveland had
notice of the dissolution of the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co.,
which occurred March 29, 1869, prior to August 31, 1869, when
the note upon which the action was brought was made. The
firm was engaged in the business of the purchase, shipment
and sale of lumber, and its principal ofiice was at Toledo, in
the state of Ohio. The plaintitf was employed to purchase
lumber in the western states and in Canada, and resided at
















































































































































AUSTIN VS. HOLLA.SD. 371 
the note. The facts appear in the opinion. Judgment for 
plaintiff on verdict was affirmed at general term of the 
supreme court, and defendant appealed. 
Eaek Cowen, for defendant. 
Mai-Un I .. Tou;nscnd, for plaintiff. 
ANonmws, J. The plaintiff was a dealer with the flrm of 
Dillon, Beebe & Co., so as to entitle him to the protection of 
the rule which makes a retiring partner liable for subsequent 
engagements made by his former copartner in the firm name, 
with those who had previous dealings with the firm, and who 
entered into the new transaction without notice of the change 
in the partnership. In T ernon vs. The Manhattan Co., 22 Wend. 
(N. Y.) mo, the cbanceJlor said: "The word 'dealing' is mel'ely 
used as a general term to convey the idea that the person who 
is entitled to actual notice of the dissolution must be one who 
has had business relations with the firm, by which a credit 
is raised upon tf.1~ faith of the copartner.ship," and this ·state-
ment of the chancellor is recited with approval by DE'.'110, J., 
in Clapp vs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 286. 
There does not seem to be any reason for distinguishing the 
case of an agent who is in the employment of the firm at the 
time of the dissolution, and who thereafter, without notice 
of the dissolution, continues under the same apparent employ-
ment, from that of a person who has had mercantile trans-
actions and relations with the firm, as a vendor or otherwise. 
In each case tbe credit is presumed to have been given origi-
nally upon the responsibility of the individual members of the 
partnership, and justice requires as much in the one case as 
the other that nil the members should be bound so Jong as the 
partnership may be supposed to exist. Watson on Part. 384. 
The principal question in this case is, whether Loveland had 
notice of the dissolution of the firm of DiJlon, Beebe & Co., 
which occurred :March 29, 1869, prior to August 31, 1869, when 
the note upon which the action was brought was made. The 
firm was eng-aged in the business of the purchase, shipment 
and sale of lumber, and its principal office was at Toledo, in 
the state of Obio. The plaintiff was employed to purchase 
lumber in the western states and in Canada, and resided at 
Detroit. Notice of the dissolution was published in the news-
/
/
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papers at Toledo, and a copy was mailed to the plaintifi,
addressed to him at Detroit.
I Loveland, on his direct examination, testified positively that
he never received a notice. On his cross-examination, he
stated that he had no recollection of receiving or seeing the
notice, and that, if he had seen it, he thought he should have
remembered it. The judge submitted it to the jury to find
_whether the plaintiff received the notice. The defendant’s
counsel excepted to the submission of the question to the jury
on the ground that the jury would not be justified in finding
from the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive the notice,
and upon the further ground that it was immaterial whether
he received it or not; that the mailing of the notice was all
that the defendant was required to do to protect him from
liability for the subsequent services of the plaintiff.
The publication of notice of the dissolution of a par_tner-
ship in a newspaper at the place where the business was car-
ried on is notice to all persons who had not had prior dealings
with the firm; and, if thereafter one of the partners enters into
a contract in the firm name with a new customer or dealer, the
other partners will not be bound. The rule is different in
respect to persons who have dealt with the firm before the
dissolution. The rule in such cases in this state require that.
to relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in
the partnership name, notice of the dissolution must be
‘brought home to the person giving credit to the partnership.
If, in any way, by actual notice served, or by seeing the publi-
cation of the dissolution, or by information derived from third
persons, the part_v, at the time of the dealing, is made aware
of the fact that the partnership has been dissolved, the con-
tract will not bind the firm. It is sufficient to exempt the firm
from liability that the person so contracting with a partner in
the firm name knew or had reason to believe that the partner-
ship had been dissolved, but this must appear and be found by
the jury, or else the contract will be treated as the contract
of the partnership: Ifelclmm vs. Clark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5
Am. I)ec. 197; Grurcs rs. .l[crr_1/, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 701; 16 Am. Dec.
471; Vernon rs. .lI(1nhuttan (7-0., 17 “lend. (N. Y.) 52-l; 22 Id.
183; Nat. _I.’l.'. rs. Norton, 1 Ilill (N. Y.), 572; Codclington vs.
Hunt, 6 Id. 50.3; (‘lnpp rs. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 287; City Bank vs.
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papers at Toledo, and a copy was mailed to th~ plaintiff, 
·addressed to him at Detroit. 
1 Loveland, on his direct examination, testified positively that 
he never receh·ed a notice. On bis cross-examination, he 
stated that he had no recollection of receiving or seeing the 
notice, and that, if he had seen it, he thought he should have 
remembered it. The judge submitted it to the jury to find 
.whether the plaintiff received the notice. The defendant's 
counsel excepted to the submission of the question to the jury 
on the ground that the jury would not be justified in finding 
from the evidence that the plaintiff did not receive the notice, 
and upon the further ground that it was immaterial whether 
he received it or not; that the mailing of the notice was all 
that the defendant was required to do to protect him from 
liability for the subsequc>nt services of the plaintiff. 
The publication of notice of the dissolution of a pai:tner-
ship in a newspaper at the place where the business was car-
ried on is notice to all persons who had not had prior dealing-8 
with the firm; and, if thereafter one of the partners enters into 
a contract in the firm name with a new customer or dealer, the 
other partners will not be bound. The rule is different in 
respect to persons who have dealt with the firm before the 
dissolution. The rule in such cases in this state requires that, 
to relieve a retiring partner from subsequent transactions in 
the partnership name, notire of the dissolution must be 
brought home to the person giving credit to the partnership. 
If, in any way, by actual notice se1·,·ed, or by seeing the publi-
cation of the dissolution, or by information derived from third 
persons, the part~·, at the time of the dealing, is made aware 
of the fad that the partnership lms bt>en dissolved, the con-
tract will not bind the firm. It is suflicient to exempt the firm 
from liability that the person so contracting with n partner in 
the finn name knew or had reason to beli<'Ye that the partner-
ship had bt·en dis:';oked, but this must appPar and be found by 
the jur.r, or else Olc> contract will be trPah•d as the contra('t 
of the partll(•rship: l\ct<'lwm vs. Clark, G Johns. (N. Y.) 144; 5 
Am. DN·. l!l7; Grarr.'I r.'I . .lfrrry, G Cow.~· Y.) 701; Hi Am. De<'. 
471; Vernon r.'l .. lla11l111ttan Co .• 17 'YC'nd. (N. Y.) 524; !!2 Id. 
18:1; Nat .. t:/;. r.~. Norton, 1 IIill (X. Y.), 572; Coddington vs. 
Hunt, G Id. ri!lj; Clapp n~. Rogers, 12 N. Y. 287; City Rank 1'S. 
JfcCllesney, ~O Id. ~4::!; Rank of Commonu:calth t•s. Mudgett, 44 
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Id. 514; Tan Eps vs. Dillage, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; Mechanics‘
Bank vs. Livingston, 33 Id. 458._ In Vernon vs. The Manhattan
Co., the chancellor says: "But to exempt the copartners from
liability (on a contract with a previous dealer with the firm),
the jury must be satisfied that the person with whom the new
debt was contracted either had actual notice that the copart-
nership was dissolved, or that facts had actually come to his
knowledge sufficient to create a belief that such was the fact.”
The same rule is recognized in the other cases cited, and by
elementary writers: 3 Kent’s Com. 607; Story on Part. sec.
161; Coll. on Part. sec. 533; Lindley on Part. 337. Lindley
says: “Those who have dealt with the firm before a change
took place, are entitled to assume, until they have notice to the
contrary, that no change has occurred. ' ' If notice, in
point of fact, can be established, it matters not by what means,
for it has never been held that any particular formality must
be observed.” In this case, the jury have found that the plain-
tiff did not receive the notice sent by mail, and had no infor-
mation of the dissolution of the firm of ‘Dillon, Beebe & Co.
prior to the transaction in question. The mailing of notice
properly directed to the party to be charged raises a
presumption of notice in fact, for it is presumed that letters
sent by post to a party, at his residence, are received by him
in due course. Best on Presumptions, sec. 403. But this is a
presumption of fact,-and not of law, and may be repelled by
proof; and, if the receipt of the letter in this case was dis-
proved, then the defendant failed to show the actual notice
required in order to exempt him from responsibility, and the
question whether the letter was received was, we think upon
the evidence, for the jury. The learned counsel for the defend-
ant has not referred us to any case which decides tlh-ast the
mailingof a notice of dissolution is in law equivalent to actual
notice, and exempts a retiring partner from liability to prior
dealers on subsequent engagements in the firm name. Notice
by mail of the dishonor of commercial paper is in most cases
suflicient by the law merchant to charge an indorser. It is a
part of the contract that notice may be given in this way, and
it is not material in fixing the liability of the indorser whether
he receives it or not.
But we think the rule requiring actual notice of the disso-
















































































































































At"sTIN vs. Hou,Axn. 373 
Id. 514; Tan Eps vs. Dillage, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; Mechanics' 
Banl~ t'S. Livingston, 33 Id. 458 . . In f'ernon vs. The Jianltattan 
Co., the chancellor says: "But to exempt the copartners from 
liability (on a contract with a previous dealer with the firm), 
the jury must be satisfied that the person with whom the new 
debt was contracted either bad actual notice that the copart-
nership was dissolved, or that facts had actually come to his 
knowledge sufficient to create a belief that such was the fact." 
The same rule is recognized in the other cases cited, and by 
elementary writers: 3 Kent's Com. G07; Story on Part. sec. 
161; Coll. on Part. sec. 5:~3; Lindley on Part. 337. Lindley 
says: "Those who have dealt with the firm before a change 
took place, are entitled to assume, until they have notice to the 
contrary, that no change bas occurred. * * If notice, in 
point of fact, can be established, it matters not by what means, 
for it has never brrn held that any particular formality must 
be obsel'Ved." In this case, the jury have found thnt the plain-
tiff did not receive the notiee sent by mail, and had no infor-
mation of tlw dissolution of the firm of Dillon, Beebe & Co. 
prior to the transal'tion in question. The mailing of notice 
p1·operly directed to the party to be oharged raises a 
presumption of notice in fact, for it is presnm<>d that IPtters 
sent by post to a pa·rty, at his residence, are received by him 
in due course. Brst on Presumptions, sPc. 403. But this is a 
presumption of fact, ,and not of law, and may be repelled by 
proof; and, if the receipt of the letter in this case was dis-
proved, then the clefendnnt failed to show the actual notice 
requi1·ed in order to exempt him from responsibility, and the 
question whether the letter was received was, we think upon 
the evidence, for the jury. 'l'he learned counsel for the defend-
:ant ·has no:t reft>rred us to any case whid1 decide:s tJrnt the 
mailing' of a notice of dissolution is in law equivalent to actual 
notice, and exempts a 1·etiring partner from liability to prior 
dealers on su l>sequent engagements in the firm name. Notice 
by mail of the dishonor of <'Ornrnereial paper is in most cases 
sufficient by the law merehnnt to charge an indorser. It is a 
part of the contract that notice may be given in this way, and 
it is not material in fixing the liability of the indorser whether 
be receh'es it or not. 
But we think the rule requiring actual notice of the disso-
lution of a partnership to prior dealers is a part of the law of 
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this state, and should not be departed from. It may subject
parties in some cases to inconvenience, but the principle upon
which the rule proceeds is that, when one of two parties is to
sustain injury from the giving of credit, the one who originally
induced it should bear the loss, rather than the one who, with-
out notice of the change, relied upon the continued existence
of the partnership: Story on Part. sec. 160; \Yat. on Part. 384.
The judgment of the general term should be affirmed.
All concur, except MILLER, J., not voting.
Judgment affirmed.
Nom: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 202, and notes.
‘\-
I . , g~ ‘ _______
' ~.@,1"“”
' J2!‘ ' DICKINSON vs. mcxmsos.
, ’ J : own of Appeals of Virginia, 1874.
25 Gratt. 321.
Action by Henry Dickinson against Henry J. Dickinson,
Stephen Banner and George Banner, late partners under the
firm namel6i"H/. Co., to recover upon a promissory
note signed in that name, and dated March 9, 1860. Stephen
and George Banner defended on the ground that they did not
sign or authorize the note and were not members of the firm
of H. J. Dickinson & Co., at the date of the n-ote.
Judgment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.
Burns, f-or appellant.
Gilmore, for the appellees.
STAPLES, J. (After stating the facts.)
The main question before us arises upon the plaintiffs first
bill of execeptions, and is presented in the sixth assignment
of error. '1‘.his alleged error is in an instruction given to the
jury on motion of the defendants. This instruction declares
substantially that if the defendants, as early as some day in
the month of March, 1859, dissolved, by mutual consent, the
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this state, and should n<>t be departed from. It may subject 
pa1·ties in some cases to inconvenience, but the principle upon 
which the rule proceeds is that, when one of two parties is to 
sustain injury from the giving of credit, the one who originally 
induced it should bear the loss, rather than the one who, with-
out notice of the change, relied upon the continued existence 
of the partnership: Story on Part. sec. 160; Wat. on Part. 384:. 
The judgment of the general term should be affirmed. 
All concur, except MILLER, J ., not voting. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NOTB: See lleohem'a Elem. of Partn., § 262, and notel. 
' r • 
)v 
DICKINSON vs. DICKINSON. 
'.-i 
Court of Appeala of Virginia, 1814 • 
2~ Gratt. 821. 
Acti'O'Il by Hen.ry Dickinson against Henry J. Dickinson, 
Stephen Banner and George B:mner, late partners under the 
firm name~& Co., to rec<>ver upon a promissory 
note signed in that name, and dated March 9, 1860. Stephen 
and George Banner defended on the ground that they did not 
sign or authorize the ·note and were not members of the firm 
of H. J. Dickin90n & Co., at the date of the n-ote. 
Judgment for defendants and plain.fit? appeals. 
Bums, for appellant. 
G-i.lniore, for the appellees. 
STAPLES, J. (After stating the facts.) 
The main question before us arises upon the plaintiff's first 
bill of execeptions, and is presented in the sixth assignment 
of error. T.his alleged error is in an instruction gh-en to the 
jury on motiO'Il of the defendants. This instruction declares 
substantially it.hat if the defendants, as early as some day in 
the month of :March, 1859, dissolved, by mutual consent, the 
partnership previously thereto existing between them, then 
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neither partner had thereafter authority to create any new
obligation, or execute a note therefor in the name of the firm,
binding upon the other partners, unless the new obligation was
created in the usual course of the partnership business t-o a
person who -had no notice or knowledge of the dissolution of
the partnership. And if the jury should believe from the evi-
dence, that as early as the spring of 1859 the defendants ceased
to buy and sell goods, their storehouse was closed up, H. J.
Dickinson, the active partner of the firm, had moved away
from the storehouse, and had engaged in another employment;
that the storehouse remained closed u-p until the note in con-
troversy was execut-ed, and was then still closed up; that
nothing prior t-o the execution of the note was done in the
business of the partnership after the -h-ou\se was closed, in the
spring of 1859, except wh-at w-as d-one by the active partner,
H. J. Dickinson, in settling u-p the business, and tiizrat all these
facts were known to the plaintiff at the time t-he note in con-
troversy was executed, on the 19th of March, 1860, then these
fiarcts are tsuflicient to cha-rge the plaintiff with knowledge of
tihe dissolution, and the‘jury should consider him as having
such kinovwledge.
The manifest error in this instruction is in assuming t»h-at
the facts therein mentioned, if brought home to the plaintiff,
were sufficient of -themselves to charge -him with actual knowl-
edge -of the dissolution of the partnership, whether in fact -he
had or had not such knowledge.
It seems that the defendants did not give notice, public or
private, of tlhe dissolu-txion; they did n-ot notify their custom-
ers of the fact; they did not even take the trouble to publish
or post it at their place of business. At least the instruction
does not assume that either of these acts was done by the de
fendants; but it does assume that, in the absence of
each and all of them, certain other acts constituted
notice which the plaintiff was not permitted to con-
may be suflicient to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff
was informed of the dissolution of the partnership; but cer-
tainly they do not constitute notice; they are ~not sufficient as
a matter of law, to charge the plaintiff wit-h such notice. Each
trovert. Now these facts, as stated in the instruction,\
and all of them may have been known to him, an-d still the
















































































































































Drcxnreow vs. DrcXINSON. 875 . 
neither partner had thereafter :authority to create any new 
obligation, or execute a note therefor in the name of the firm, 
binding upon the other partners, unless the new obligation was 
created in the usual course of the partnership business ro a 
person w1ho ·had ·no notice or knowledge -0f the di-ssoluUon of 
the partnership. And if the jury should believe from the ev~­
denoce, that as early .as the spring of 1859 the defe'Ddants ceased 
to buy and se11 goods, their storehouse was closed up, H. J. 
Dickinson, the active partner of the firm, had moved aiway 
from the .storehouse, and had engaged in another employment; 
that the storehiouse remained clooed up until the n•ote in con-
troversy was executed, and w1:is then still closed up; that 
nothing prio.r to the execu1:Lo.n of the nlC>te was done in the 
business of the partnership after the •house was cl<>Sed, in the 
epring of 1859, except what was done by the a.ctive pa.rtner, 
H.J. Dickinson, in settling up nhe bu·siness, and t1:~ra.t all these 
facts were known to the plaintiff at the time the note in con-
troversy was executed, on the 19th of March, 1860, then these 
~acts are sufficient to c.ha.rge the plaintiff with knowledge of 
the dissolution, and t1he 'jury should consider him as having 
such km·orwledge. 
The ma.nif est err.or in this instruction is in assuming that 
the facts therein mentioned, if ·brought home t-0 the plaintiff, 
were sufficient .of themselves to charge ·him with actual kn•owl-
f'dge of the dissolution of the partnership, whether in fact be 
had or had not such knowledge. 
It seems that the defendants did not give notice, public or 
private, of the di·ssolution; they did nQt notify their custoon-
ers of the flact; t·hey did not even take the trouble to publish 
or post it .at their plaee of business. At lea.st the instrucUO'll 
does not assume that either of these acts was done by the de 
fendants; but it does assume that, in the absence of 
each and all of them, certain other acts coostituted 
notice which the plaintiff was not permitted to con· 
trovert. Now these facts, as stated in the instructio~ 
may be sufficient to satisfy a jury that the plaintiff 
was i.nf.ormed of the dissolution of the partnership; but cer-
tainly it.hey do not constitute nootice; they are not sufficient a.a 
a matter of law, to charge the plaintiff wit·h suo:1 notice. Eacli. 
and all of them may have been knCJ1wn 1:0 him, and still the 
plaintiff may n'Ot have had such knowledge or information in 
3'26 Cases on PA RTNERSHIP.
regard to the dissolution as would invalidate t-he note in his
possession.
The instructi-on was therefore a manifest invasion of the
province of the jury, and as such was clearly erroneous. The
learned counsel insists, however, that no injustice was done
the plaintilf, because the question of notice is not involved in
the inquiry. His proposition is, -that one partner cannot, by a
new contract entered int-o after the dissolution, impose any
new obligation upon his copartners with-out some special
authority for that purpose. The note in controversy having
been executed after the partnership was disso-lved, was not
binding upon the partners who did not unite in its execution,
although the creditor may have h-ad no notice of such dissolu-
ti-on. The plaintiff could not, therefore, have been prejudiced
"by anything in the instruction upon the -subject of n-otiice, how-
ever erroneous it may have been.
If the learned coun-sel’s premises are correct, his conclusion
is undoubtedly correct also. But are his premises correct?
T'he only au'th~orit_v he cites to sustain his position is that of
Parker vs. Cousins, 2 Gratt. (Va..) 372, 44 Am. Dec. 388. That
case does, unquestionably, aflirm the general proposition that
one partner cannot, after the dissolution, create a. binding obli-
gation upon t-he firm without some special authority for that
purpose; but this decisi-on was made upon a state of facts
which showed that the person dealing with the partner was
informed of the dissolution at the time of the renewal of the
note.
The principle is well established that, if a partner contracts
in the name of the firm with a third person after the partner-
ship is dissolved, but that fact is not made public, or known
by such third person, the law considers the contraict a-s being
made with the firm and upon their credit. The rule upon this
subject is thus laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 213:
“So if a. partnership is dissolved, or one of the kn-olwn mem-
bers retires from the firm, until the dissolution or retirement
is duly notified, the power of each to bind the rest remains in
full force; although as between themselves, a dissolution or
retirement is a revocation of the authority of ea-ch to ac-it for
the other. Thus, if a known partner retires (which is in fact
a dissolution), and no notice is give-n, he will be liable to be
















































































































































S~6 0.ASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
regard to the dissolution a.s would invalidate the note in his 
po-ssession. 
·The instrucHon was therefore a manifest invasion of the 
province of the jury, and as su•ch was clearly erroneous. The 
leamed counsel insists, however, that no injustice was done 
the plaintiff, becuuse the questi-on of notice is not inrolved in 
the inquiry. His proposition is, that one partner cannot, by a 
new oontraet entered into aftl"r the dissolurf:ion, impose any 
new obligation upon his copartners with•Dut some special 
authority for that purpose. The note in oontroversy having 
been executed after the p1rtnership was disso.Jved, was n<>t 
binding upQon the partners who did n.ot unite in its execuUoo, 
although the creditor may have had no notice of such dissolu-
ti()n. 'rhe plaintiff could n-0t, therefore, have been prejud-iced 
by anything in the instruction upo.n the ·subject of n-ot:dce, •hlQIW-
ever erroneou'8 it may have been. 
If the learned counsel's premises are eoorrect, bis oondusion 
fs undoubtedly correct also. But ara his premises correct? 
The -011ly auth-ority be cites to sustain h.is positiooi is tb::it of 
Parker vs. Cousins, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 372, 44 Am. Dec. 388. That 
case does, anquestionably, affirm the general propositi001 that 
one partner cannot, after the dissolution, create a binding -obli-
gation upon the firm without some special authority for th11t 
purpose; but this decisi·on wia.s made upon a state of faicts 
which showed that the person dealing with the partner was 
informed of the dissolution at the time of the renewal of the 
note. 
The prindple is well established tha.t, if a partner contracts 
in the name <>f the firm with a third person after the partner-
ship is dissolved, but that fact is n()t mad-e public, or known 
by such third persion, flhe law considers the contmct R•S being 
made with 1:111e firm and upon their credit. The rule upon this 
subject is thus laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 213: 
"So if .a. partnership is dissolved, or one Qf the kn-01Wn mem-
bers retires from the firm, until the dissolution or retirement 
is duly notified, the power of each ro bind the rest remains in 
full foror; although as betweec themselve'S, a dissolution or· 
retirement is a. re,·ocMion -0f the authority of e-a:ch to act for 
the other. Thus, if a known partner retires (which is in fa.ct 
a dissolution), and no notice is given, he wlll be liable to b~ 
sued in respect of a promissory note made -since his retirement 
DICKINSON vs. DICKINSON. 377
by his l-ate partner, even though the plaintiff had no dealings
with the firm before the making of the note. And in deter-
mining which was first in point of time, t-o wit: notice of the
dissolution or the making o-f the note, effect must be given
to the presumption that the instrument was made and issued
-on the day it bears date, unless some reason to the contrary
can be shown.”
In Kctcham vs. Clark, 6 John. (N. Y.) 144, 5 Am. Dec. 197,
the draft was accepted in the name-of the firm after the disso-
lution. It was held that both partners were bound by the
acceptance, there being no evidence of any public notice of the
dissolution of the partnership, nor any special notice of its dis-
solution to the party dealing with the firm.
It is useless to multiply citations upon the po-int. The
authorities are believed to be almost uniform in support of
the proposition. National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 572;
Story on Partnership, secs. 160, 161, 334, 336.
In regard to notice of di-ssoluti-on, a disttincti-on Ihas been
justly made between persons who -have 'had previous dealings
with the firm, and those who have -had no such dealings. As-
to the former, it -has been universally held that actual notice
is indispensable. It must n-ot be inferred, however, that
special notice must be given to each customer. If actual
knowledge of the dissolution is brought home to the party, he
will be concluded, although no notice whatever may
have been given. Whether in such case the evidence
is sutiici-ent to justify the inference of actual knowl-
edge, is a question of fact for the consideration of a jury,
under the supervision -of tlhe court. I rby vs. Vining, 2 M-cCord,
(S. Car.) 379; Ooddington vs. Hunt, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) 595; Collyer
on Partnership, sec. 332.
It may be proper to add, that these rules apply only to cases
where the di-ssolu-ti~o-n is by act of the parties. It is well set-
tled that, upon the death or bankruptcy of a partner, notice
of the dissolution to third persons is not necessary. The rea-
son see-ms to be, that in those oases the dissolution is by opera-
Horn of law. It would be the height of injustice to allow the
acts -of the other partners to bind the estates of persons who
are incapable of acting themselves, or of continuing an author-
ity for that purpose.

















































































































































DICKINSON VS. DICKINSON. 377 
by his late partner, even though the plaintiff had no dealings 
with the firm before the making of the note. And in deter-
mining which was first in point of time, to wit: notice of the 
dissolution or the making of the note, effect must be given 
to the presumption that the in-strument was made and issued 
()n the day it bears date, unless soone reason to the contrary 
can be shown." 
In Ketcham vs. Clark, 6 John. (N. Y.) 144, 5 Am. Dec. 197, 
the draft w;a.s accepted in the name·<>f the firm after the disso-
lution. It was held that both partners were bound by the 
acceptance, there being no evidence of any public notice of the 
dissolution of the partnership, nor· any special notice of its dis-
solution to the party dealing with the firm. 
It is useless ro multiply citati-0.ns upon the point. The 
authorities are believed to be almost uniform in support of 
the proposition. National Bank vs. Norton, 1 Hill, (N. Y.) 572;. 
Story on Partner·s·hip, secs. 160, 161, 334, 336. 
In regard to notice of diseoluti·on, a distfocUon 'has been 
justly made between persons who ·have 1had previous dealings 
with the firm, and th·m1e who .have had no su•c'h dealingis. As 
t-0 the former, it ·ha·s been unin~1·sally held that actual notice 
is indispensable. It must n·ot be inferred, ho0owever, that 
special notice must be given to each clLStomer. If actual 
kn0owledge of the dissolution is brought home to the party, he 
will be concluded, although no notice whatever may 
have been given. 'Vhether in such case the evidence 
is sufficient to justify the inference of actual knowl-
edge, is a question o·f fact for the consideratiOtll of a jury'" 
under the supervision ·of t1he court. Irby vs. Yining, 2 McCord, 
(S. Car.) 379; Coddington vs. Hunt, 6 Hi~l, (N. Y.) 595; Collyer 
on Partnership, sec. 332. 
It may be proper ro add, that these rules apply only to cases 
where t11e dissolnHon is by act of the parties. It is well set-
tled that, upon the death or bankruptcy of a partner, notice 
of the dissolution to third persons is not necessary. The rea-
SO'Il seems to be, that in those 01se:s the diss·olntion is by opera-
1iolll o.f law. It would be the height of injustice to allow t11e 
acts of the other partners to bind the estates of persons who 
are incapable of acting themselves, or of -continuing an author-
ity f-0r that purpose. 
It foUows, from what ·has been said, tha.t the circuit court 
48 
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erred in giving the instruction set out in the plaintifi’s first
bill of exceptiorns. This view renders it unnecessary to c-on-
sider particularly the instruction asked for by the plaintiflf and
refused by the court, which is set out in the seoond bill of
excc-pti-ons. ' ' '
For the error already mentioned, t-he judgment of the cir-
cuit court must -be reversed, and the cause remanded to be
proceeded - with in accord;;1nce with the views herein
announced.
Judgment reversed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn.. §§ 259, 271, 272.
MILMO NATIONAL BANK vs. BERGSTROM.
Court of Civil Appeals of Tamas, 1892.
1 Tex. Civ. App. 151, 20 S. W. Rep. 836. .
This suit was brought by appellant against A. N. Cartel‘ and
Louis Bergstrom, as partners under the firm name and style
of A. N. Carter, seeking to recover judgment for the sum of
$5,216.91 on account of moneys loaned and advanced to said
firm. Appellee Bergstrom denied the partnership, and that he
was indebted to appellant. Judgment below was rendered in
favor of appellant against Carter, and that _it take nothing
against appellee Bergstrom. From this judgment, appellant
prosecutes this appeal. .
The evidence shows that Carter and Bergstrom,_in€eptcm~
ber, 1881, entered into a copartnership for one year for the
purpose of dealing in hides, wool, and produce. In October,
1881, the account sued on was opened with appellant by
Carter, for the purpose of obtaining advances to be usedfin
carrying on the business of the firm. Carter was the busipcss
manager of the firm at Laredo, and continued to obtain money
from the bank until in the spring of 1883, when the account
sued on was closed. It appears from the evidence that, at the
time the account with appellant was opened, Carter informed
the officers of the appellant bank that Bergstrom was a part-
















































































































































3~8 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
el"l'ed in giving the instruction set out in the plaintiff's first 
bill of excepticms. This view renders it unnecessary to con-
sider particularly the instruction a.sked for by the plaintiff and 
refused by the court, which is set out in the seoond bill of 
e:xce·pti-ons. • • • 
For the error already mentioned, t;~e judgment of the cir-
<-"llit court must •be rever-sed, and the cau.se remanded to be 
proceeded · with in accordlnce with :the views herein 
a.nnounced. 
Judgment reversed. 
NoT.B: See lfeobem•a Elem. of Partn., §§ 259, 271, 278. 
!IILMO NATIONAL BANK vs. BERGSTROM. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Tea:as, 189! • 
1 Tex. Civ. App. list, 20 S. W. Rep. 836. • 
This suit was brought by appeilant against A. N. Carte.rand 
Louis Bergstrom, as partners under the'firm name and style 
of A. N. Carter~ seeking to recover judgment for the sum of 
$5,216.91 on account <>f moneys loaned and advanced to said 
firm. Appellee Bergstrom denied the partnership, and that he 
was indebted to appellant. Judgment below was rendered in 
fa,·or of appellant against Carter, and that jt take nothing 
against appellee Bergstrom. From this judgment, appellant 
prosecutes this appeal. • . 
The evidence shows that Carter and Bergstrom,_in4'eptem-
ber, 1881, entered into a copartnership for one year for the 
purpose of dealing in hides, wool, and produce. In Oc~ober, 
1881, the account sued on was opened with appellant by 
Carter, for the purpose of obtaining advances to be used'!n 
carrying on tlie business of the firm. Carter was the busjpess 
manager of the firm at Laredo, and continued to obtain money 
from the bank until in the spring of 1883, when the account 
fmed on was closed. It appears from the evidence that, at the 
time the account with appellant was opened, Carter informed 
the officers of the appellant bank that Bergstrom was a part· 
ner in the firm of A. N. C!!.rter, and upon the faith of this 
Munro NATIONAL BANK vs. Bznosraon. 379
information the advances were made. It was contended by-
appellant that, at the beginning of the dealings between it and
Carter, Bergstrom was actually a partner with Carter, and
that credit was extended upon the faith that he was such
partner, and, although he may have ceased to be a partner
after September, 1882,—the time when the contract of part-
nership terminated,—he is liable to appellant because it had
no notice of the dissolution, fr of the contract of partnership,
until after the account was closed, in 1883. Upon the other
hand, it was contended by Bergstrom that although he was a
partner for one year from September, 1881, at that time the
firm was dissolved, and that he is not bound by the statements
made by Carter during the year that he, Bergstrom, was a
partner; that he was a secret or dormant partner of the firm,
and; being such, he was not required to give notice of his dis-
solution with the firm and is not bound or liable to appellant.
The seventh paragraph of the charge of the court is as follows:
“If, however, you believe from the evidence that said firm of
A. N. Cawer ceased to exist on the 23d day of September, 1882,
and that plaintiff had no knowledge, directly or indirectly,
that Louis Bergstrom continued as a partner of said firm of A.
N. Carter, and if you,believe, further, from the evidence, that
said Bergstrom did no act, directly or indirectly, to lead plain-
titf or his agents to believe that said firm of A. N. Carter was
continued, and that the plaintiff had his dealings with A. N.
Carter in his individual capacity, then and in that event the
defendant Bergstrom is not liable for any dealings had
‘between the plaintiff and the said A. N. Carter so made with
said Carter in his individual capacity.” This charge is assigned
as erroii
J. O. Nicholson and S. M. Ellis, for appellant.
Upson cfi Bergstrom, for appellees.
ihsnnn, O. J. (After stating the facts.) When credit is
extended to a firm upon the assumption that certain persons
comprise the membership, and such assumption in point of
fact is correct, the members of such firm are liable to the cred-
itors for future dealings with the firm until notice of dissolu-
tion.is given to the creditor. Under such state of facts the
creditors will not be afiected by a dissolution or charge in the
















































































































































MILllO NATIONAL Il.A.NX VS. IlERGSTROlC. 379 
information the advances were made. It was contended by. 
appellant that, at the beginning of the dealings between it and. 
Carter, Bergstrom was actually a partner with Carter, and 
that credit was extended upon the faith that he was such 
partner, and, although he may have ceased to be a partner 
after September, 1882,-the time when the contract of part-
nership terminated,-he is liable to appellant because it had 
no notice of the dissolution, t of the contract of partnership, 
until after the account was closed, in 1883. Upon the other 
hand, it was contended by Bergstr-0m that although he was a 
partner for one year from September, 1881, at that time the 
firm was dissolved, and that he is not bound by the statements 
made by Carter during the year that he, Bergstrom, was a 
partner; that he was a secret or dormant partner of the firm, 
and; being such, he was not required to give notice of bis dis-
solution with the firm and is not bound or liable to appellant: 
The seventh paragraph of the cbnrge-0f the court is as follows: 
"If, however, you believe from the evidence that said firm of 
A. N. Cajer ceased to exist on the 23d day of September, 1882, 
and that plaintiff had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, 
that Louis Bergstrom continued as a partner of said firm of A. 
• N. Caner, and if youJ>elieve, further, from the evidence, that 
said Bergstrom did no act, directly or indirectly, to lead plain.-
tiff or his agents to believe that said firm of A. N. Carter was 
continued, and that the plaintiff had his dealingtt ·with A. N. 
Carter in bis individual capacity, then and in that event the 
defendant Bergstrom is not liable for any dealings had 
"between the plaintiff and the said A. N. Carter so made with 
said Carter in his individual capacity." This charge is assigned 
ae.erro~ 
J. O. Nicholson and 8. M. Ellis, for appellant. 
Upson & Ber~strom, for appellees. 
l1sBER,. C. J. (.After stating the facts.) When credit is 
exte!lded to a firm upon the assumption that certain persons 
comprise the membership, and such assumption in point of 
fact is correct, the members of such firm are liable to the cred-
itors for future dealings with the firm until notice of dissolu-
tion .is given to the creditor. Under such state of facts the 
cred-itors will not be affected by n dissolution <>r cha~e in the 
firm until notice be given or knowledge of such fact has been 
• 
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brought home to them, and the burden of proving such notice
or knowledge rests upon the partner claiming such exemp-
tion. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1117, 1118; 2 Bates, Partn.
§§ 611-613. This rule of law does not apply to partners who
are regarded in law as dormant or secret partners, for no
credit is extended upon the faith of their membership, and
they, in retiring from the firm, are not required to give notice
of such fact. The uncontradicted evidence in the record is
that Carter notified the appellant, at the time that the account
was opened, that Bergstrom was a partner of the firm. Such
in fact was his relationship to the firm at that time. W'e
think this information given to appellant is sufficient to
make Bergstrom known to appellant as a member of the firm,
and as to appellant he cannot claim that he was a dormant
partner. If it be true that Bergstrom was a member of- the
firm at the time appellant received information of that fact,
it makes no difference from what source received, the effect
is to make his connection with the firm known to appel-
lant, and, as to it, he cannot claim that he is a dormant part-
ner. 1 Bates, Partn. §§ 151, 153; 2 Bates, Partn. §§ 608-623;
17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1119-1123. Under these rules of
law it was error to give the charge complained of," and for this
reason we reverse and remand the case. " ' '
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brought home to them, and the burden of proving such notice 
or knowledge rests upon the partner claiming such exemp-
tion. 17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1117, 1118; 2 Bates, Partn. 
§§ 611-613. This rule of law does not apply to partners who 
are regarded in law as dormant or secret partners, for no 
credit is extended upon the faith of their membership, and 
they, in retiring from the firm, are not required to give notice 
of such fact. The uncontradicted evidence in the record is 
that Carter notified the appellant, at the time that the account 
was opened, that Bergstrom wa.s a partner of the firm. Such 
in fact was his relationsMp to the firm at that time. We 
think this information given to appellant is sufficient to 
make Bergstrom known to appellant as~ member of the firm, 
nnd as to appellant be cannot claim that be was a dormant 
partner. If it be true that Bergstrom was a member of- the 
fii'm at the time appellant received information of that fact, 
it makes no diiff erence from what source received, ~be effect 
is to make his ic001necti-0n with the firm Im.own to a.ppel-
lant, an:d, as to it, he cannot claim that he is a dormant part-
ner. 1 Dates, Partn. §§ 151, 153; 2 Bates, Partn. §§ 608-62a; 
17 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1119-1123. Under these rules of 
law it was error to give the charge oomplained of; and for this 
reason we reverse and remand the case. • • • 
Non: See Meohem's Elem. of Partn., § 265 . 
• 
XIII.
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION.
(See also the cases-in Subd. XII, ante; also Shattuck vs. Chandler, ante, p.
296; Hess vs. Lowrey, p. 330; Shanks vs. Klein, p. 164.)
IIAYYKINS vs. CAPRON.
Supreme Court of Rhoda Island, 1892.
17 R. I. 679, 24 Atl. Rep. 466.
Defendants petition for a new trial.
This was an action of trover brought by the plaintifi, who
was sole surviving partner of a copartnership known as
James A. Capron & Co., against the defendant for the con-
version, after Capron’s death, of certain personalty of the firm.
The defendant was executrix and sole legatee of Capron. This
action was brought in the court of_comm0n pleas, and the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the de-
fendant filed this petition, alleging that the presiding justice
erred in his instructions to the jury.
Stephen A. Cooke, Jun., and Louis L. Angell, for plaintifl’.
Samuel W. K. Allen ,for defendant.
Pnn Cunmu. Wehaether the relation between copartners
with reference to their ownership of the partnership assets is
more analog-ou.-s to a tenancy in common or to a joint teiuancy,
we need not decide. In either case, a sole surviving partner is
entitled at law to the possession of the assets of the firm until
its affairs are settled, as well against the representatives of the
deceaed to whom he is ultimately liable to account, as against
strangers. 17 Amer & Eng. Encyc. of Law, 1161; Parsons on

















































































































































OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION. 
(See also the cases· in Subd. XII, ante; also Shattuck vs. Chandler, ante, p. 
206; Hua va. Lowrey, p. 830; Shanks vs. Klein, p. 16-1.) 
IIA ~~KINS vs. CAPRON. 
Supreme Court of Rhode I sland1 1892. 
17 R. I. 6i9, 24 Atl. Rep. 466. 
Defendnnta pet\tion for a new trial. 
This was an action of trover brought by the plnintifl, who 
wns sole snr\·iving partner of a copartnership known as 
James A. Capron & Co., against the defendant for the con-
iversion, af.te-r Capron's death, of certain personalty of the firm. 
The defendant was executrix nnd sole legatee of Capron. This 
action was brought in the court of. common pleas, and the 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon the de-
fendant filed this petition, alleging that the presiding justice 
(>rred in his instructions to the jury. 
Step11en A. Cooke, Jun., and Louis L. Angell, for plaintiff. 
Samuel W. K. Allen ,for defendant. 
PER CumAM. Whether the relation between CO'partnera 
with r<'fer<'nce to their owneri.;ihip of the pnrtnership assets is 
more 1analog.ous t1> a tenancy in common or to a joint teinancy, 
we nred not decide. In either case, a sole surviving partner is 
entitled at law to the possE>ssion of tbe assets of the finn until 
its affairs arc settled, as WPII against the representatives of the 
dccensed to whom he is ultimately liable to account, as against 
strangers. 17 Amc>r & Eng. Encyc. of I~aw, 11Gl; Parsons on 
Partnership, 4;)8, 2 Lu wson, High ts, Rem(•dies, and Practicet 
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1256. Trover is a proper remedy for a refusal of such posses-
sion. The court properly construed the articles of agreement
in question, and instructed the jury to consider them as a
whole in deciding the question of fraud.
The cause of action in this case, the conversion of thegoods
occurred after the death of the late partn_er.J It was an injury
to the right of possession of the plaintifl',' not to the joint pos-
session of the plaintifl’ and his late copartner. Hence the
plaintiff properly sued in his own name. Smith v. Barrow, 2
Term Rep. 47 6, 478. The amendment allowed him to add to
his name the words “surviving partner,” etc., which were an
unnecessary but harmless description of the way he claimed to
have acquired title to the goods. " ‘ '
The motion for a new trial must be denied and dismissed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 268.
VALENTINE vs. YVYSOR.
Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890.
123 Ind. 47, 23 N. E. Rep. 1076, '7 L. R. A. 788.
This suit was instituted by Emily E. Valentine, Martha M.
Little, Parmelia R. Gilbert, Mary E. \/Vood, and Florence T.
Horne, the children and -heirs a.t law of John Jack, late of
Delaware county, deceased, against Jacob H. Wysor. John
Jack, father of the plaintiffs below, died testate in the month
of October, 1859. At and before that date, he was in partner-
ship with the defendant, Jacob H. TVys-or, the two composing
the firm of \Vysor & Jack. The testator was also a member of
the firm of Wysor, Jack & Kline, which was composed of the
abovenamed Jacob H. \Vysor, John Jack, and \Villiam B.
Kline. This last-named firm was engaged in the milling busi-
ness, and owned a flouring-mill, together with 65 acres of land
adjacent; each member being the owner of an undivided one-
third of the business and property. The business of the firm of
VVysor, Jack & Kline was in no way connected with that of
Wysor&Jack; the last-named firm being the owner of 380 acres
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1256. Trover is a proper remedy for a refusal of such posses-
sion. The conrt properly <'Onstrued the articles of agreement 
in question, and instructed the jury to consider them as a 
whole in deciding the question of fraud. 
The cause of action in this case, the conversion of the .goods 
·occurred after the death of the late partn.er.J It was an injury 
to the right of possession of the plaintiff, not to the joint pos-
session of the plaintiff and his late copartner. Bence the 
plaintiff properly sued in his own name. Sm.ith v. Barrow, 2 
. Term Ilep. 476, 4i8. The amendment aJlowed him to add to 
his name the words "surviving partner/' etc., which were an 
unnecessary but harmless description of the way he claimed to 
have acquired title to the goo.ds. * * * 
The motion for a new trial must be denied and dismissed. 
Nom: See Mechem'e El~m. of Partn., § 2G8. 
VALENTINE vs. WYSOR. 
· Supreme Court of Indiana, 1890. 
123 Ind. 47, 2S N. E. Rep. 1076, 7 LR. A. 788. 
This suit was instituted by Emily E. Valentine, Martha M. 
Little, Parmelia R. Gilbert, Mary E. 'Vood, and Florence T. 
Borne, the children and ·heirs at law of John Jack, late of 
Delaware county, deceased, against Jacob B. Wysor. John 
Jack, father of the plaintiffs below, died testate in the month 
of October, 1859. At and before that date, he was in partner-
ship with the defendant, Ja1cob H. Wysor, the two composing 
the firm of 'Vysor & Jack. The testator was also a member of 
the firm of Wysor, Jack & Kline, which was composed of the 
above-named Jacob B. Wysor, John Jack, and 'Villiam B. 
Kline. This last-named firm was e'Ilgaged in the milling busi-
ness, and <>wned a flouring-mill, together with 65 acres of land 
adjacent; each member being the owner of an undivided one. 
third of the business and p.-operty. The business of the firm of 
Wysor, Jack & Kline was in no way connected with that of 
Wysor&Jack; the last-named firm being the owner of 380 acres 
of land, which constituted part of the firm assets, in which each 
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partner had an equal interest. The character of the business of
Wysor & Jack does not distinctly appear, but the land owned
by them is treated by both parties as partnership property. By
the first, second, and third clauses of his will, the testator
appointed executors to carry the will into execution, made pro-
vision for his wife by giving her a life-estate in his real estate,
and expressed a desire that she should be admitted into the
firm, and continue the business as a partner with \Vysor and
Kline, his former associates in the milling business. The
fourth and fifth clauses of his will read as follows: (‘(4) I will
and direct that my said executors, and, in case of the death or
failure to serve of either, the survivor of them, shall adjust,
settle, and compromise any and all debts, claims, or demands
due to or from me according to the best of their or his judg-
ment, without any further authority from any court or jurisdic-
tion whatever; and, further, that they shall make settlement
with my said partners, and each of them, of the partnership
aflairs, and of the profits heretofore arising therefrom,
together with any matters of dealing between myself and them,
or either of them, in manner according to his or their judgment,
without any further authority from any court whatever. (5) l
do further will and direct that my said executors, or, in case of
the failure, from any cause, of either to serve. then the remain-
ing executor, shall sell and convey so much of my personal or
real estate, at either public or private sale, with or without
appraisement, on such terms, at such place, and in such man-
ner, as to him or them shall seem best, as may be necessary to
pay and satisfy all my just debts, reserving, however. to my
said wife the title and possession of the house and grounds
where I now live; otherwise, selling such parcels, the sale of
which will least injure the remainder.” As to the remainder
of his property, after the termination of the life-estate of the
\vidow, the testator died intestate. After the testator died,
Wysor, as surviving partner of the firm of YVysor & Jack, and
Wysor & Kline, as surviving partners of Wysor, Jack & Kline.
continued in possession of the property of their respective
firms until June 25, 1866, when the executors of the last will of
John Jack, assuming to act under the provisions of the fourth
and fifth clauses of the will, above set out, made a settlement,
and entered into an agreement with the defendant, \V_vsor,
















































































































































V ALENTIN'B VS. WYSOR. as:f 
partner bad an equal interest. The character of the business of 
Wysor & Jack does not distinctly appear, but the land owned 
hy them is trea'ted by both parties as partnership property. Hy 
the first, second, and third clauses of his will, the testator 
nppointed executors to carry the will into execution, made pro-
vision for his wife by gh·ing her a life-estate in his real estate, 
nnd expressed a desire that ehe should be admitted into the 
firm, and continue the business as a partner with Wysor and 
Kline, his former associates in the milling business. The 
fourth and fifth clauses of bis will read as follows: ~'(4) I will 
and direct that my said executors, and, in case of the death or 
failure to serve of either, the survivor of them, shall adjust, 
settle, and compromise any and all d<>bts, claims, or demands 
due to or from me according to the best of their or bis judg-
ment, without any further authority from any court or jurisdic-
tion whuteyer: and, further, that they shall make settlement 
with my said partners, and each of them, of the partnership 
affairs, and of the profits heretofore arising therefrom, 
together with any matters of dealing between myself and them, 
or (lither of them, in manner according to his or their judgment, 
without any furthc-r anthority from any court whatever. (5) 1 
do further will and direct that my said executors, or, in case of 
the failure, from any cause, of either to serve. thc>n the remain· 
ing exec•1tor, shall sell ancl convey so much of my personal or 
real estate, at either pnblic or private sale, with or without 
apprnisement, on such tem1s, nt such pla<·e, and in such mun· 
ner, as to him or them shall seem best, ns may be necessary to 
pay and satisfy all my just debts, reserving~ bowe,·e1\ to my 
said wife tht> title and po8session of the house and grounds 
where I now live; otherwise, selling such parcels~ the sale of 
which will least injure the remainder." As to the remainder 
of bis property, after the termination of the life-estate or the 
widow, the teRtator died intestate. After the testator died, 
Wysor, as ~nrviving partn('r of the firm of "Wysor & Jack, and 
Wysor & Kline, as surviving partners of 'Vysor, Jack & Kline. 
<·ontinued in possession of the property of their respective 
firms until June 25, lS6li1 when the executors of the last will of 
John ,Jack, assuming to act under the provisions of the fourth 
and fifth clauses of the will, above set out, made a settlement, 
and entered into an agreement with the defendant, \Vysor, 
whereby, in consideration that the latter agreed to pay the in-
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debtedness of the firm of Wysor & Jack, and certain debts due
from the testator to Wysor, and also to pay his share of all the
unpaid indebtedness of Wysor, Jack & Kline, and all other
indebtedness of the testator, including the cost of administra-
tion, and, in addition, convey certain property to the widow,
and secure to her one-third interest in the property of \Vys0r,
Jack & Kline, free from any debts, the executors and wvidow
agreed to convey to the defendant, \V_vsor, all the interest of
the testator, excepting certain designated parcels, in the real
estate owned by the firm of Wysor & Jack. Th-is agreement
was consummated, and conveyances were made, accordingly,
by the widow and executors, in June, 1866; and it is charged
that the defendant claims, in virtue of these conveyances, to be
the sole owner of the property, and denies the title of the
plaintiffs. These conveyances stood without question until
in February, 1380, when this suit was instituted.
Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.
O. T. Boaz, W. W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellants.
William Brotherton and C’. E’. Shipley, for appellee. I,
Mrrcnnnn, J. (After stating the facts.) It does not appear
from the complaint that there was any disparity between
-the value of tihe property conveyed -and the amount of debts
assumed, or that the debts have not been paid according
to the agreement, or that there was any fraud or collusion
between the surviving partner and the executors, or that the
latter were in any way overreached. It is claimed, however,
that the power of sale contained in the will did not extend
to the partnership real estate, except that specifically men-
tioned therein; that, if it did, it only authorized the execu-
tors to sell the tcstator’s interest in so much thereof as
remained after full payment of the partnership debts. More
over, it is claimed that, even if the executors had authority to
sell, the transaction, as disclosed by the complaint, was not a
sale, within the meaning of the language employed in the will,
and that because the sale was made by the executors without
having given notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, and
without having included the value of the real estate in the
bond given by them when they qualified, the conveyance was
invalid and void. It is claimed, too, that Wysor, being the
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debtedneeA of the firm of Wysor & Jack, and certain debts dne 
from the testator to Wysor, and also to pay his share of all the 
unpaid inclebtedness of \Vysor, Jack & Kline, and all other 
indebtedness of the testator, including the cost of adminiEatra-
tion, and, in addition, convey certain property to the widow, 
mid secure to her one-third interest in the property of \-'Vysor, 
Jack & Kline, free from any debts, the executors and widow 
~grc~d to convey to the defendant, 'Vysor, all the interest of 
the testator, excepting certain designated parcels, in the real 
estate owned by the firm of 'Vysor & Jack. This agreement 
was consummated, and conveyances were made, accordingly, 
by the widow and executors, in June, 1866; and it is charged 
that the defendant claims, in virtue of these conveyances, to be 
the 8-0le owner of the property, and denies the title of the 
plaintiffs. These conveyances stood without question until 
in February, 1880, when this suit was instituted. 
Defendant obtained judgment. Plaintiffs appeal. 
0. T. Boaz, W.W. Herod and F. Winter, for appellants. 
William Brotherton and 0. E. Shipley, for appellee. 
MITCHELL, J. (After stating tbe facts.) It does not appear 
from the complaint that there was any disparity between 
·the v.alue of the property conveyed and the ammmt of debts 
assumed, or that the debts have not been paid according 
to the agreement, or that there was any friud or c~llusion 
between the surviving partner and the executors, or that the 
latter were in any way overreached. It is claimed, however, 
that the power of sale contained in the will did not extend 
to the partnership real est:lte, except that specifically men-
tioned therein; that, if it did, it only authorized the execu-
tors to sell the tC'stator's interest in so much thereof as 
remained after full payment of the partnership debts. More· 
over, it is claimed that, even if the executors had authority to 
sell, the transaction, as disclosed by the complaint, was not a 
sale, within the meaning of the language employed in the will, 
and that because the sale was made by the executors without 
having given notice of the time, place, and terms of sale, and 
without having Included tlle value of the real estate in the 
bond given by them when they qualified, the conveyance was 
invalid and void. It is claimed, too, that Wysor, being the 
surviving partner of the firm of "'ysor & Jack, was a trustee 
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of the partnership property, under a duty to the heirs and
creditors, and that he was therefore incompetent to purchase
and receive a conveyance from the executors. For all these
reasons, it is urged that the conveya-nce is illegal, and ought to
be set aside, and that an accounting of the affairs of the firm
of Wysor & Jack should be had; the appellants alleging their
readiness to pay whatever may be found due the defendant,
W§*sor. .
\Vhile it is undoubtedly true, as a general rule, that an action
to compel a surviving partner to account can only be main-
tained by the personal representative of the deceased partner,
yet circumstances may appear which create an exception to
the general rule, and make it proper that a court of equity
should entertain an action on behalf of the heirs. Where it is
shown that there is a collusion between the surviving partner
and the executor, the latter refusing to compel an accounting
by the former, or where there has ‘been uch dealing between
the two as renders it probable that the executor will not make
a bona fide effort to secure an accounting, or other like circum-
stances appear, it has been held that the heirs may maintain
the action. In t-he absence of special circumstances, heirs have
no locus standi against the surviving partner. 2 Lindl. Partn.
494; Harrison vs. Righter, 11 N. J. Eq. 389; Hyer vs. Burdett, 1
Edw. Ch. 325. '
Assuming, without deciding, that the facts, as pleaded in
the present .case, make it apparent that the executors have
placed themselves in such an attitude towards the surviving
partner, and the transaction sought to be set aside, as to bring
the case within the exception, it becomes pertinent to inquire
whether or not the appella‘nts,.as heirs, show any interest in
the property of the late firm of \Vysor & Jack upon which to
predicate an action. If the executors had no power under the
will to sell and convey, or the surviving partner was incompe-
tent to purchase, or receive a'conveyance, or if, for any of the
other reasons urged, the transaction between the executors
and the surviving partner was illegal, and the conveyance void,
then the property remained in the possession, and under the
qualified ownership, of the surviving partner, unaffected by
what transpired. It is familiar law that a surviving partner
has the right to the control and possession of the property of

















































































































































VALENTINB VS. WYSOB. 
of the partnership property, under a duty to the heirs and 
creditors, and that he was therefore incompetent to purchase 
nnd receive a conveyance from the executors. For all these 
,reasons, it is urged that the conveya,nce is illegal, and ought to 
be set aside, and that an accounting of tbe affairs of the fl.rm 
of Wysor & Jack should be had; the appellants alleging their 
readiness to pay whatever may be found due the defendant, 
Wysor. 
\Vhile it is undoubtedly true, as a general role, that an action 
to compel a surviving partner to account can only be main-
tained by the personal representative of the deceased partner, 
,yet circumstances may appear which create an exception to 
the general rule, and make it proper that a court of equity 
11bould entertain an action on behalf of the heirs. Where it is 
shown that there is a collusion between tlle surviving pal"tner 
and the executor, the latter refusing to compel an accounting 
by the former, or where there •has 'been such dealing between 
· the two as renders it probable that the executor will not make 
·a bona fide effort to secure an accounting, or other like circum· 
stances appear, it has been held that the heirs may maintain 
the action. In t·be absence of special circumstances, heirs have 
no locus standi against the surviving partner. 2 Lindi. Partn. 
494; Harrison -i:s. Righter, 11 N. J. Eq. 389; Hyer vs. Burdett, 1 
Edw. Ch. 325. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the facts, as pleaded in 
the present case, make it apparent that the executors have 
placed themselves in such an attitude towards the surviving 
partner, and the transaction sought to be set aside, as to bring 
the case within the exception, it becomes pertinent to inquire 
whether or not the appellants, .as heiI'S, show any interest in 
the property of the late fl.rm of 'Vysor & Jack upon which to 
predicate an nction. If the executors bad no power under the 
will to sell nnd convey, or the surviving partner was incompe-
tent to purchase, or receive a·conveyance, or if, for any of the 
other reasons urged, the transaction between the executors 
and the surviving partner was illegal, and the conveyance void, 
then the property remained in the possession, and under the 
qualified ownership, of the surviving partner, unaffected by 
what transpired. It is familiar law that a surviving partner 
bas the right to the control and possession of the property of 
the firm, and that be mav dispose of it in order fo adjust the 
"!) 
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partnership accounts, and he is only liable to the representa-
tives of the deceased partner for what remains in his hands
after the partnership affairs are settled; and there is nothing
more thoroughly settled in the law of partnership than that the
rights of the heirs of a deceased partner are subject to the
adjustment of all claims between the partners, and attach only
to the surplus which remains when the partnership debts are
all paid, and the afiairs of the firm wound up. Until all the
debts are paid, the rights of the heirs do not attach. Grissom
vs. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. Rep. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 742, and
cases cited; Wall-ing, vs. Burgess, 122 Ind. 299, 22 N. E. Rep.
419; Deetcr vs. Sellers, 102 Ind. 458, 1 N. E. Rep. 854. The heirs
of a deceased partner have no interest, as such, in t-he property
of the firm. Their only remedy is to compel the surviving part-
ner to account for t-he surplus after the settlement of all the
partnership liabilities; and, ordinarily, a court of equity will
not entertain jurisdiction of the afiairs of a partnership until
by its decree a final adjustment of the business can be effected.
Thompson vs. Lowe, 111 Ind. 272, 12 N. E. Rep. 47 6, and cases
cited; Scott vs. Searls, 5 Smedes & M. 25; Rossum vs. Sinker, 12
Cent. Law J. 205, and note. Now, while it appears that the
deceased partner was indebted to the firm, and that the firm
was indebted on partnership account, and that the surviving
partner agreed, in co-nsideration of the conveyance which is
assailed, to pay these and other debts for which the testa~tor’s
estate was liable, and while it may be inferred from the facts
alleged in the complaint that the surviving partner has paid
all the debts of the firm except what remains'due to himself
on the partnership ac-count, it nowhere appears but -that the
entire interest of the deceased partner would be absorbed in
the adjustment of the partnership account with the surviving
partner. Having averred facts from which the inference arises
that the surviving partner has paid all the partnership debts,
and that the estate of the deceased partner is indebted to him,
it is essential to the right of the heirs to call him to account
that they make it appear that he has in his hands partner-
ship property in excess of the amount required to reimburse
himself. The averments in the complaint wholly fail to do
this, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that the
complainants fail to show such an interest in the property
as entitles them to invoke the aid of a court of equity. This
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partnership accounts, and be is only liable to the representa-
tives of the deceased partner for what remains in his hands 
after the partnership affairs are settled; and ~here is nothing 
more thoroughly settled in the law of partnership than that the 
rights of the heirs of a deceased partner are subject to the 
adjustment of all claims between the partners, and attach only 
to the surplus which remains when the partnership debts are 
all paid, and the affairs of tlie firm wound up. Until all the 
debts are paid, the rights of the heirs d<> no.t attach. Grissom 
1'8. Moore, 106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. Rep. 629, 55 Am. Rep. 742, and 
cases cited; Walling. vs. Burgess, 122 Ind. 2H9, 22 N. E. RPp. 
419; Deeter vs. Sellers, 102 Ind. 458, 1 N. E. Rep. 854. The heirs 
o0f a deceased partner have no interest, as such, in t·he property 
of the firm. Their only remedy is to compel the surviving part-
ner to a.ec:ount for the surplus a.fiter the settlement of all the 
partnership liabilities; and, ordinarily, a court of equity will 
not entertain jurisdiction of the affairs of a p1rtnersbip until 
by its decree a final adjustment of the business can be effected. 
Thompson vs. Lowe, 111 Ind. 272, 12 N. E. Rep. 476, and cases 
cited; Scott vs. Searls, 5 Smedes & M. 25; Rossum vs. Sinker, 12 
Cent. Law J. 205, and note. Now, while it .appears that the 
deceased partner was indebted to the firm, and that the firm 
was indebted on partnership account, and that the surviving 
partner agreed, in co·nsideration of the conveyance which is 
assailed, to pay these and other debts for which the testator's 
estate was liable, and while it may be inferred from the facts 
alleged in the complaint that the surviving partner bas paid 
all the debts of the firm except what remains' due to himself 
.on the partnership ac·oount, it D()Where a·ppeal'S but that the 
entire interest <>f the deceased partner would be ia.bsorbed in 
the adjustment of the partnership account with the surviv-ing 
partner. Having averred facts from whfoh the inference arises 
that the surviving partner has paid all the partnership debts, 
and that the estate of the deceased partner is indebted to him, 
it is essential to the right of the heirs to call him to account 
that they make it appear that he has in his hands partner· 
ship property in excess of the amount required to reimburse 
himself. The averments in the complaint wholly fail to do 
this, and the conclusion is therefore unavoidable that the 
complainants fail to show such an interest in the property 
as entitles them to invoke the aid of a court of equity. This 
5 l-- e ~ T ‘i"§ —i——
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<-onelusion necessarily follows from the application of the rule
that a surviving partner is entitled to the custody and man-
agement of the assets, unless it be shown that he is committing
waste, or otherwise mismanaging the affairs of the firm, and
is only liable to the heirs or representatives of the deceased
partner for what remains after everything is settled up. Rays
vs. Vilas, 18 Wis. 179; Shanks vs. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, ante p. 164;
Anderson vs. Aclccrman, A88 Ind. 481; Gobble vs. Tomlinstm, 50
Ind. 550.
If, however, it were conceded that it appeared that the part-
nership assets exceeded in value the amount necessary to
adjust the partnership account, it would by no means follow
that the appellants could maintain this action. It appears
that," more than 14 years before the commencement of this
action, the executors of the deceased partner, on the one hand,
acting under the authority conferred by the will, and the sur-
viving partner, on the other, consummated a final settlement
and adjustment of the partnership account of Wysor & Jack.
The powers conferred by the will are broad and comprehensive,
and include the power to settle, adjust, and compromise all
debts owing by the testator and to make settlements with his
former partners, and each of them, without any authority from
any court, and to sell and convey, either at public or private
sale, with or without appraisement, any or all of the testator’s
real estate, on such terms as to them should seem best, in order
to pay and satisfy debts against his esta-te. It thus plainly
appears that it was the purpose of the testator to invest his
executors with power to make compromises and settlements
at their discretion, and to sell and convey his real and personal
estate according to their best judgment. The statute in force
at the time the sale was made provided, in effect, that, where
lands were directed to be sold by a will, the sale, as to giving
notice,conveying, taking notes, and mortgages, return and con-
firmation, should be conducted as sales by an administrator
for the payment of debts, “unless, by the terms of the will, dif-
ferent directions are given; but no petition or notice of the
filing thereof shall be required.” 2 Rev. St. 1876, p. 530. As
was, in effect, said in M unson vs. Cole, 98 Ind. 502, the land was
not directed to be sold by the will. That was left to the discre-
tion of the executors. But, if it had been, the executors were
















































































































































V ALENTINB VB. WYSOB. 387 
<'onclusion nE'Ceesarily follows from the application of the rule/ 
that a surviving partner is entitled to the custody and man-
agement of the assets, unless it be shown that be is committing 
waste, or otherwise mismanaging the affairs of the firm, and 
ts· only liable to the heirs or representatives of the deceased 
partner for what remains after everything is settled up. Roys 
'18. Vilas, 18 Wis. 179; Shanks vs. Klein, 104 U. S. 18, ante p. 164; 
Anderson vB. Ackerman, 88 Ind. 481; Oobble vs. Tomlinson, 50 
Ind. 550. 
If, however, it were conceded that it appeared that the part-
nership assets exceeded in value the amount necessary to 
adjust the partnership account, it would by no means follow 
that the appellants could maintain this action. It appears 
that; more than 14 years before the commencement of thht 
action, the executors of the deceased partner, on the one hand, 
acting under the authority conferred by the will, and the sar. 
viving partner, on the other, consummated a final settlement 
and adjustment of the partnership account e>f Wysor & Jack. 
The powers conferred by the will are broad and comprehensive, 
and include the power to settle, adjust, and compromise all 
debts owing by the testator and to make settlements with his 
former partners, and each of them, without any authority from 
any court, and to sell and convey, either at public or private 
sale, with or without appraisement, any or all of the testator's 
real estate, on such terms as to them should seem best, in order 
to pay and satisfy debts against his estate. It thus plainly 
appears that it was the purpose of the testator to invest his 
·executors with power to make compromises and settlements 
, at their discretion, and to sell and convey his real and personal 
. estate according to their best judgment. The statute in force 
. at the time the sale was made provided, in effect, that, where 
lands were directed to be sold by a will, the sale, ~s to giving 
notice, conveying, taking notes, ·and mortgages, return and con-
ftrmation, should be conducted as sales by an administra.tor 
for the payment of debts, "unless, by the terms of the will, dif-
ferent directions are given; but no petition or notice of the 
filing thereof shall be required." 2 Rev. St. 1876, p. 530. As 
was, in effect, said in Munson t:s. Oole, 98 Ind. 502, the land was 
not directed to be sold by the will. That was left to the discre-
tion of the executors. But, if it had been, the executors were 
authorized to sell at their own discretion. upon such terms as 
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they might think best; and the authority thus conferred neces-
arily operated as “different directions” from those prescribed
by the statute. The conveyance was not, therefore, invalid
because the terms of the statute were not observed, or on
accounrt of any defect in the power of the executors.
This brings us to inquire whether the surviving partner oc-
cupied such a relation to the property, and to those concerned,
as to disqualify him from purchasing the interest from the
executors of the deceased partner. It is not to be doubted
that a surviving partner is regarded as a trustee, primarily for
the creditors of the firm, and, secondarily for the heirs or per-
sonal representatives of the deceased partner in all that
remains, or fairly ought to remain, after adjusting the partner-
ship account. Accordingly, it has been correctly laid down
that “the surviving partners are held strictly as trustees, and
their conduct in discharging their trust is carefully looked
after, by the courts of equity. Thus, like other trustees, they
cannot sell the property of the firm, and buy it themselves;
nor, as the converse of this, can they buy from themselves
property for the firm. Their trust being to wind up the con-
cern, their powcrs are commensurate with the trust. " ' ‘
Their trust is to wind up the concern in the best manner for all
interested, and therefore without unnecessary delay.” Pars.
Partn. 442; Case vs. Abecl, 1 Paige 393; Sigourncy vs. Mu-rm,
7 Conn. 11; Jones vs. Dca-ter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 45.9.
Being in a sense a trustee, the surviving partner cannot, of
course, speculate upon the property which the law commits to
his custody, solely for his own advantage, in disregard of the
interests of his ccstuisque trust; and, if he makes profits out
of the trust property, in the course of the adjustment of the
affairs of the partnership, he is held to account to those inter-
ested for their share. He cannot purchase the trust property
from himself, no matter whether the attempt be made by
means of a public or private sale. This is so, not only because
his duty as seller, and his in-terest as purchaser, are in irrecon-
cilable conflict, but for the more cogent reason that it is indis-
pensable to everylcgal contract of sale and purchase that there
be two contracting parties competent to enter into a binding
engagement with each other. Hence, an attempt by a. trustee
who holds property in trust, whether he be surviving partner,
















































































































































388 CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
they mig·ht think best; and the authority t:ius conferred neces-
sarily operated as "different directions" from those prescribed · 
by the statute. The conveyance was not, therefore, invalid 
because the terms of the. statute were not observed, or on 
accouDlt of any defect in the power of the executors. 
This brings us to inquire whether the surviving partner oc-
cupied such a relation to the property, and to those concerned, 
as to disqualify him from purchasing the interest from tbt~ 
executors of the deceased partner. It is not to be doubted 
that a surviving partner is regarded as a trustee, primarily for 
the creditors of the firm, and, secondarily for the heirs or per-
sonal representatives of the deceased partner in all that 
remains, or fairly ought to remain, after adjusting the partner-
ship account. Accordingly, it has been correctly laid do.wn 
that "the surviving partners are held strictly as trustees, and 
their conduct in discharging their trust is carefully looked 
after, by the courts of equity. Thus, like other trustees, they 
cannot sell the property of the firm, and buy it themselves; 
nor, as the oonverse of this, can they buy from themselves 
property for the• firm. Their trust being to wind up the con. 
cern, their powc"'rs are commensurate with the trust. • • • 
Their trust is to wind up the concern in the best manner for all 
interested, and therefore without unnecessary delay." Pars. 
Partn. 442; Case vs. A~becl, 1 Paige 393; Sigourney vs. Munn, 
7 Conn. 11; Jon~s vs. Dexter, 130 Mass. 380, 39 Am. Rep. 459. 
Being in a sense a trm1ter, the surviYing partner C'annot, of 
"COurse, speculate upon the property wl1ich the law commits to 
his custody, solely for bis own advantage, in disregard of the 
interests of his ccstuisque trust;· and, if he makes profits out 
of the trust property, in the course of the adjustment of the 
affairs of the partnership, be is held to account to those inter-
ested for thrir share. Ile cannot purchase tbe trust property 
from himself, no matter whether the attempt be made by 
means of a public or prh·ate sale. This is so, not only because 
his duty as seller, and bis interest as purchaser, nre in irrecon-
cilable conflict, but for the more cogent reason that it is indis-
Jlensable to every legal contract of sale and purchase that there 
be two contraeting partiPs competent to enter into a binding 
engagement with each other. Hence, an attempt by a trustee 
who holds property in trust, whether he be survivin_r partner, 
administrator, or whatever his designation, to sell the trust 
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estate to himself, is everywhere held to be void. Martin vs.
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; 74 Am. Dec. 209; Hunsucke-r vs. Smith,
49 Ind. 11S; Murphy vs. Teter, 56 Ind. 545; Rochester vs. Lever-
ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203; Nelson vs. H ayner, 66 Ill. 487.
In the case of a sale thus made or attempted, it can well be said,
it is of no avail to show that the trustee acted in good faith.
Such transactions are poisonous in their tendencies, and viola-
tions of the principles of public policy. They are declared
void, not for the purpose of aflording a remedy against actual
mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong. Potter cs.
Smith, 36 Ind. 231 ; Morgan rs. Wattles, 69 Ind. 261. These prin-
ciples do not apply or control in the case of a sale made by the
personal representative of a deceased partner to a surviving‘
partner. No good reason can be suggested why a survivingi
partner should be held legally incompetent and absolutely,
disqualified from becoming the purchaser of the interest of \
his deceased partner in the partnership business from his prop-
erly authorized legal representative, while very many reasons
occur why such transactions, fairly entered into, should not
only be upheld, but encouraged. In addition, the adjudge<1(i
cases firmly support the right to make such sales. Brawn vs.
Slee, 103 U. S. 828; Baird vs. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 524, 31 Am.
Dec. 399; Chambers vs. Howell, 11 Beav. 6; Rays vs. Vilas, supra.
In Kimball vs. I/incoln, 99 Ill. 578, after reiterating the rule
that a. surviving partner could not become a purchaser of the
firm property at his own sale, nor from a co-trustee, the court
said: “But the reason that would forbid a transaction of this
character has no application to a case where asurviving part-
ner purchases property from the executor or administrator of
the deceased partner, and hence the rule which would govern
the one case cannot control the other.” See Lu-dl0w’s Heirs vs.
C'ooper’s 1)evisces, 4 Ohio St. 1. It has thus been seen that the
executors had plenary power to make settlements of the part-
nership account, and to sell and convey the real and peronal
estate of the testator at their discretion, and that the surviving
partner was competent to negotiate a settlement of the atfairs
of the firm, and to purchase the interest of his deceased partner.
It is contended, however, that the power which the will con-
ferred upon the executors was a power to sell the real or per-
sonal estate of the testator, and that the power thus conferred
was not well executed by the conveyance of the testator‘s inter-
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estate to himself, is e\·erywhere held to be void. Martin vs. 
Wyncoop, 12 Ind. 266; 74 Am. Dec. 209; Hunsucker vs. Smith, 
49 Ind. 118; Murphy vs. Teter, 56 Ind. 545; Rochester VB. Lever-
ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4: N. E. Rep. 203; Nelson t:s. Hayner, 66 Ill. 487. 
In the case of a saJe thus made or attempted, it can well be said, 
it is of no aYail to show that the trustee acted in good faith. 
Such transactions are poisonous in their tendencies, and viola· 
tions of the principles of public policy. They are declared 
Yoid, not for the purpose of affording a remedy against actual 
mischief, but to prevent the possibility of wrong. Potter t:B. 
Smith, 36 Ind. 231; Morgan 1:s. WattleR, 69 Ind. 261. These prin· 
ciples d-0 not apply or control in the case of a sale made by the 
personal representative of a deceased partnPr to a surviving 
partner. No good reason can be suggested why a surviving'1 
partner should be held legally incompetent and absolutelyl 
disqualified from becoming the purchaser of the interest of\ 
bis deceased partner in the partnership business from his prop-
erJy authorized legal representative, while vecy many reasons 
occur why such transactions, fairly entered into, should not 
only be upheld, but encouraged. In addition, the adjudge~(· • 
cases firmly support the right to make such sales. Brown t71J 
S'lee, 103 U.S. 828; Baird VB. Baird, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 524, 31 Am. 
Dec. 399; Chambers t'B. Hou:ell, 11 Beav. 6; Rays vs. Vilas, supra. 
In Kimball i·s. Lincoln, 99 111. 578, after reiterating the rule 
that a surviving partner could not become a purc·haser of th~ 
firm property at bis own sale, nor from a co-trustee, the court 
said: "But the reason that would forbid a transaction of thi~ 
character has no application to a case where a _surviving part-
ner purchases property from the executor or administrator of 
the deceased partner, and hence the rule which would govern 
the one case cannot control the other." See Ludloto's Heirs vs. 
Cooper's Dedsccs, 4 Ohio St. 1. It bas thus been seen that the 
E>Xecutors had plenary power to make settlements of the part-
nership account, and to sell and convey the real and personal 
estate of the testator at their discretion, and that the surviving 
partner was competent to nP~otiate a settlement of the affairs 
of the firm, and to purchase the interest of his df>ceased partner. 
It is contended, however, that the power which the will con-
ferred upon the executors was a power to sell the real or per· 
sonal estate of the testator, and that the power thus conferrt>d 
was not well executed by the conveyancE> of the testator's inter-
est in the real estate of the firm in consideration of the agree-
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ment to pay debts, as already indicated. The argument is that
the agreement between the executors and the surviving part-
ner was the same, in legal effect, as an exchange of property,
and that a power to sell does not authorize an exchange. Rus-
sell vs. Russell, 36 N. Y. 581; 93 Am. Dec. 540; Taylor vs. Gallo-
way, 1 Ohio, 232, 13 Am. Dec. 605; Rinyyold vs. Ringgold, 1 Har.
& G. 11, 18 Am. l)ec. 250; King vs. Whiton, 15 Wis. 684; Cleve-
larid vs. Bank, 16 Ohio St. 236, 88 Am. Dec. 445. Conccding
that the proposition above stated is correct as a general rule, it
cannot be made available in the appellant’s behalf, for two
reasons: (1) The power conferred upon the executor compre-
hended much more than a mere naked authority to sell and
convey the testator’s real estate. They were especially invested
with power to make settlement with the partners of the tes-
tator, and with each of them, of all matters pertaining to the
partnership business, and to adjust, settle, and compromise all
debts, claims or demands against the estate of the testator,
according to their best judgment; and, in addition to the fore-
going power, they were authorized, at their discretion, to sell
and convey the testator’s real estate. Regarding the partner-
ship assets, although consisting of lands, as personalty, and
the power conferred by the fourth clause of the will to make a
settlement of the partnership affairs invested the executors
with ample authority, in case it became expedient or necessary,
in the course of the settlement, to transfer property to the sur-
viving partner to make such transfer. Ludlow’s Heirs vs.
('ooper’s Derisces, supra. Moreover, the power contained in the
fifth clause must be construed in connection with the duties
imposed upon the executors by the fourth clause of the will.
It will be observed that the executors are directed to sell and
convey so much of the testator’s real estate as they shall deem
necessary to pay and satisfy his debts. Construing both
clauses of the will together, it becomes apparent that the execu-
tors had authority to make any proper settlement which, in
their discretion, seemed fit and best. (2) A settlement and
final accounting with the surviving partner of the partnership
matters having been actually consummated by the executors
who were duly empowered, to that end, a court of equity will
not disturb the settlement so made until it is impeached as
fraudulent or unfair, or unless collusion between the executors
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ment to pay debta, as already indicated. The argument is that 
the agreement between the executors and the surviving part-
ner wae the eame, in legal effect, as an exchange of property, 
and that a power to sell does not authorize an exchange. Rus-
aell vs. Russell, 3G N. Y. 581; 93 Am. Dec. 540; Taylor vs. Gallo-
way, 1 Ohio, 232, 13 Am. Dec. 605; Ringgold vs. Ringgold, 1 Har.· 
& G. 11, 18 Am. Dec. 250; King vs. Whiton, 15 Wis. 684; Cleve-
land vs. Bank, 1G Ohio St. 2!~6, 88 Am. Dec. 445. Conceding 
that the proposition above stated is correct as a general rule, it 
cann()t be made available in the appellant's behalf, for two 
reasons: (1) The power conferred upon the executors compre-
hended much more than a mere naked authority to sell and 
convey the testator's real estate. They were especially invested 
with pown to make settlement with the• partners of the tes-
tator, and with each of them, of all matters pertaining to the 
partnership business, and to adjust, settle, and compromi!::e all 
debts, claims or demands against tlie estate of the testator, 
acc01·ding to their best judgment; and, in addition to the fore· 
going power, t11ey were authorized, at their discretion, to sell 
and convey the testator's real estate. Regarding the partner-
ship assets, although consisting of lands, as personalty, and 
the power conferred by the fourth clause of the will to make a 
settlement of the partnership affairs invested the executors 
with ample authority, in case it became expedient or necessary, 
in the colll'~e of the settlement, to transfer property to the sur-
viving })'J.t·tner to make such transfer. Ludlow's Heirs vs. 
Cooper's Derisccs, supm. Moreover, the power contained in th€' 
fifth clause must be construed in connection with the duties 
imposed upon the executors by the fourth clause of the will. 
It will be observed that the executo~ are directed to sell and 
convey so much of the testator's real estate as they shall deem 
necessary to pay and satisfy bis debts. Construing both 
clauses of the will together, it becomes apparent that the execu-
tors had authority to make any proper settlement which, in 
their discretion, seemed fit and best. (2) A settlement and 
final accounting with the surviYing partner of the partnership 
matters having been actually consummated by the executors 
who were duly empowered, to that end, a court of equity will 
not disturb the settlement so made until it is impeached as 
fraudulent or unfair, or unless collusion between the executors 
and surviving partner is shown. Nothing less than fraud or 
C
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collusion will invalidate an arrangement between an executor
and a surviving partner, whereby the latter became the pur-
chaser of the deceased partner’s share. Travis vs. Milne, 9
Hare, 141; Davies vs. Davies, 2 Keen 534; Chambers vs. Howell,
supra; Stainton vs. Carron Co., 18 Beav. 146; Smith vs. Everett,
27 Beav. 446; 2 Lind. Partn. (Rapalje’-s Ed.) 487. As has been
seen, there is no pretense of any fraud or oollus-i-on in the
-present case.
Finally, after the settlement and accounting between the
executors and the surviving partner has been had, and the
account closed, as appears to have been the fact in the present
case, a court of equity will not, after this long acquiescence,
unexplained by circumstances, decree the opening up of the
account, even though it appeared that the settlement had been
irregularly made. It is the settled doctrine of courts of equity
that unexplained delay in the prosecution of a right, until it
becomes stale, constitutes such laches as forbids the interfer-
ence of the court. Smith vs. Thompson, 7 Grat. 112, 54 Amer.
Dec. 126, and note; Hough vs. Coughlan, 41 Ill. 131; 2 Story,
liq. J ur. § 1520. Here, as we have seen, there is an unexplained
delay of 14 years. The statute of limitations would have
barred an action between the partners themselves in case the
settlements had been made by them. After this lapse of time
a presumption of innocence and fair dealing arises, and
removes every inference or imputation of bad faith from the
transaction, and the settlement must repose as the parties
made it. Prcvost vs. Gratz, 6 \Vheat. 481; Rochester vs. Levc~r~
ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
NOTE: See Mechem‘s Elem. of Partn., §§ 268, 309.
JONES vs. YVALKER
Supreme Court of the United States, 1880.
103 U. S. 444, 26 L. Ed. 404.
_ W. H. Walker, who was a large dealer in liquors, in partner-
















































































































































JONES VS. WALKBB. 301 
collusion will invalidate an arrangement between an executor 
and a surviving partner, whereby the latter became the pur· 
chaser of the deceased partner's share. Travis vs. Milne, 9 
Hare, 141; Davie.& vs. Davies, 2 Keen 534; Chambers vs. Howell, 
supra; Stainton -rs. Carron Co., 18 Beav. 146; Smitli vs. Everett, 
27 Beav. 446; 2 Lind. Partn. (Rapalje'·s Ed.) 487. As has been 
seen, there is no pretense of any fruud or oolltl.S'l·on i.n the 
present case. 
Finally, after the settlement and accounting between the 
executors and the surviving partner has been had, and the 
nccount closed, as appears to have been the fact in the present 
<·ase, a court of equity will not, after this long acquiescence, 
unexplained by circumstances, decree the opening up of the 
uccount, even though it appeared that the settlement had been 
irregularly made. It is the settled doctrine of courts of equity 
that unexplained delay in the prosecution of a right, until it 
becomes stale, constitutes such laches as forbids the interfer· 
cnce of the court. Smith vs. Thompson, 7 Grat. 112, 54 Amer. 
Dec. 126, and note; Hough 't;S. Coughlan, 41 Ill. 131; 2 Story, 
El]. Jnr.§ 1520. Here, as we have seen, there is an unexplained 
delay of 14 years. The statute of limitations would have 
barred an action between the partners themselves in case the 
settlements had been made by them. After this lapse of time 
a presumption of innocence and fair dealing arises, and 
removes every inference or imputation of bad faith from the 
transaction, and the settlement must repose as the parties 
made it. Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 \Vheat. 481; Rochester vs. Lever-
ing, 104 Ind. 562, 4 N. E. Rep. 203. 
The judgment is affirmed, with costs. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 268, 809. 
JONES vs. WALKER 
Supnmc Court of tlie United Statea, 1880. 
103 U. 8. 444, 26 L. Ed. 404. 
-W. H. Walker, who wns a large dealer in liquors, in partner-
~hip with bis son Frederick, made his will in July, 1S70. One 
392 Cases on PARTNERSHIP.
of the clauses of the will provided for the continuance of the
partnership and the conduct of this business after his death.
It is in this language:
“It is my wish that my son Frederick carry on the business
of W. H. Walker & Co. in that name and style, and in my
storehouse where it is now carried on, giving him power to
change the place, until my youngest child living to be twenty-
one years of age arrives at that age, or for a shorter time, if he
does not find it profitable. To that end all my capital and
interest in said concern shall be continued therein, and shall
be chargeable for its debts and liabilities; but my other prop-
erty shall not be so chargeable while Frederick carries on said
business; my share shall pay the salary of an eflicient man to
aid him therein or he shall have compensation for his services
as to and from my share. Agents and employés of the con-
cern are to be paid by it. Frederick is not to be charged with
$5,000 advanced by me to him on his coming of age, and he is
to have the privilege to purchase, at a fair valuation and upon
reasonable time, such portion of my share in said concern and
its good will as will make his share equal to one-half. What
he may so pay is to be divided as profits of the concern. While
my storehouse is occupied by the concern it shall pay rent
therefor. The profits of said concern, which shall be ascer-
tained and declared in the first of January after my death,
and annually thereafter, shall be divided between my wife and
children, or their descendants, and others. As my personalty
is’ to be divided among them when my youngest child living
to be twenty-one years of age arrives at that age, or at the
death of my son Frederick before that time, or when he dis-
continues the business, my interest in the concern and its
good will slhall be sold as my executors may direct, and the
proceeds divided, as the profits thereof are to be divided, with
an obligation, if possible, that the business may be carried on
under the old name and style.”
The tcstator died in 1872, and the business was conducted
as directed in the will until February 27, 1877, when the firm,
on the petition of its members, was declared bankrupt by the
proper court. - \
' The appellant Jones was made assignee, and very shortly
afterwardfiled the bill in the present case against the devi-
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of the clauses of the 1Vill provided for the continuance of the 
partnership and the conduct of this busineSll after his death. 
It is in this language: 
"It is my wish that my son Frederick carry on the bnsineSB 
of W. H. \Valker & Co. in that name and style, and in my 
storehouse where it is n-0w carried on, giving him power to 
change the place, until my youngest child living to be twenty-
one years of age arrives at that age, or for a shorter Ume, if he 
does not find it profitable. To that end all my capital and 
interest in said concern shall be continued therein, and shall 
be chargea,ble for its debts and liabilities; but my other pr<>p· 
erty shall not be so chargeable while Frederick carries on said 
business; my share shall pay the salary of an efficient man to 
aid him therein or he shall h~ve compensation for his services 
aa to and from my share. Agents and employee of the con-
cern are to be paid by it. Frederick is not to be charged with 
f5,000 advanced by me to him on his coming of age, and he is 
to have the privilege to purchase, at a fair valuation and upon 
reasonable time, such portion of my share in said concern and 
its good will as will make his share equal to one-half. ·what 
he may so pay is to be divided as profits of the concern. While 
my storehouse is occupied by the concern it shall pay rent 
therefor. The profits of said concern, which shall be ascer· 
tained and declared in the first of January after my death, 
and annually thereafter, shall be divided between my wife and 
children, or their descendants, and others. As my personalty 
is to be divided among them when my youngest child living 
to be twenty-one years of age arrives at that age, or at the 
death of my son Prederick before that time, or when he dis-
continues the business, my interest in the concern and its 
good will s:Jmll be sold as my executors may direct, n:nd the 
proceeds divided, as the profits thereof are to be divided, with 
an obligation, if possible, that the business may be carried on 
under the old name and style." 
The testator died in 1872, and the business was conducted 
as directed in the will until February 27, 1877, when the firm, 
on the petition of its members, was declared bankrupt by the 
proper court. ' 
The appellant ,Jones was made assignee, and very shortly 
afterward · filed the bill in the present case against the devi-
seee of W. H. \Valker's will. 
\
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Martin Bijur and W. 0. Dodd, for appellant.
John M. Brown, comtra.
MILLER, J. (After stating the facts as above.) The object
of the bill is twofold, namely, to subject the property of the
deceased, which had not been embarked in the partnership
enterprise, in the hands of the devisees, to the payment of the
partnership debts, and to recover from the defendants money
which they had received as dividends out of the profits of the
business after the death of the testator.
In the recent case of Smith vs. Ayre, 101 U. S. 320, the
legal principle lying at the foundation of the first of these
grounds of relief was fully discussed and determined. It was
there held that a testator might authorize the continuance of a.
partnership, in which he was engaged at the time of his death,
without subjecting any more of his property to the vicissitudes
of the business than what was then embarked in it, and that,
unless he had expressly placed the whole, or some other part of
his estate, under the operation of the partnership, it would not
be presumed that he had so intended. See also Burwell vs.
Manderille, 2 How. (U. S.) 560; Ea: parts Garland, 10 V es. Jr.
110. In the case before us the testator declares, in express
terms, that his capital and interest in said concern shall be
continued therein, and shall be chargeable for its debts and
liabilities; but his other property shall not be so chargeable.
We see no reason in the present ease for departing from
the principle adopted in Smith vs. A3/re, after much considera-
tion.
If dividends of profits out of the partnership business were
honestly and fairly made, and when paid did not diminish the
capital, nor withdraw what was necessary to pay the indebt-
edness of the concern, we see no reason why the persons receiv-
ing them should now be called on to refund them.
The will of the testator has a clause authorizing these divi-
dends. The partnership had a long time to run and a. large
part of his capital was engaged in the business. There were
children to be reared and educated, and it would have been
very unreasonable that all the profits should be continually
converted into capital, and that neither these children, nor
Frederick, the other partner, should be permitted to receive
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HILLER1 J. (After stating the facts as above.) The object 
of the bill is twofold, namely, to subject the property of the 
deceased, which bad not been embarked in the partnership 
enterprise, in the hands of the devisees, to the payment of the 
partnership debts, and to recover from the defendants money 
which they had received as dividends out of the profits of the 
business alter the death of the testator. 
In the recent case -0f Smith vs. Ayre, 101 U. S. 320, the 
legal principle lying at the foundation of the first of these 
grounds of relief was fully discussed and determined. rt was 
there held that a testator might authorize the continuance of a. 
partnership, in which he was engaged at the time of bis death, 
without subjecting any more of bis property to the vicissitudes 
of the business than what was then embarked in it, and that, 
unless he had expressly placed the whole, or some other part of 
his estate, under the operation of the partnership, it would ne>t 
be presumed that be bad so intended. See also Burwell vs. 
Mandeville, 2 How. (U. S.) 560; E[IJ parte Garland, 10 Ves. Jr. 
110. In the case before us the testator declares, in express 
terms, that bis capital and interest in said concern shall be 
continued therein, and shall be chargeable for its debts and 
liabilities; but his other property shall not be so chargeable. 
We see D() 1·eason in the present case for departing from 
the priDJciple ado1Jted in Smith vs. A11re, after much oonsidera-
tion. 
If dividends of profits out of the partnership business were 
honestly and fairly made, and when paid did not diminish the 
capital, nor withdraw what was necessary to pay the indebt· 
edness of the concern, we see no reason why the persons receiv-
ing them should ne>w be called on to refund them. 
The will of the testator bas a clause authorizing these divi· 
dends. The partnership had a long time to run and a large 
part of his capital was engaged in the business. There were 
children to be reared and educated, and it would have been 
very unreasonable that all the profits should be continually 
converted into capital, and that neither these children, nor 
Frederick, the other partner, should be permitted to receive 
dividends of profits, except on the condition of a liability to 
60 . 
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that extent for any future transactions of the partnership
through a period of fifteen or twenty years.
If these dividends -had not been declared in good faith, nor
really earned, if they had diminished the capital, or if, when
they were made, debts existed which would have been left
without means of payment, the persons sharing in the divi-
dends would probably have been liable to these creditors to
the extent of the money so received.
But we are satisfied that none of these conditions existed.
The case is mainly one of fact, and the testimony is very
full. We do not think its discussion here profitable or useful.
We are satisfied that at the time the last dividend was made
the capital of the company was undiminished, and the firm
amply able to pay its debts. Its misfortunes followed after
this.
It very fully appears that the insolvency was brought about
by accommodation indorsements for others, made after the
last dividend was paid; thart the firm, but for this, would have
remained solvent, and that, in regard to this, none of the
defendants were to blame except Frederick, who, being a full
partner, is liable personally for all the debts of the firm.
An important matter in the case is a stipulation of the
parties to the suit that all the debts owing by the firm were
1'01liZI‘£lCt€d subsequently to the declaration and payment of all
the dividends, and none of the debts of the firm were in exist-
ence at the time these profits were declared and paid.
No creditor whose debt was in existence when these divi-
dends were made was injured. All the debts then existing
have been paid. What right had subsequent creditors to re-
claim these dividends, who had no interest in the matter
when they were paid? These defendants, except Frederick,
were not partners. Their money was in the concern, and they
received dividends instead of interest.
We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud or intentional
wrong.
Decree atiirmed.
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• 
that extent for any future transactions of the partnership 
through a period of fifteen or twenty years. 
If these dividends ·had not been declared in good faith, nor 
really earned, if they had diminished the capital, or if, when 
they were made, debts existed which would have been left 
without means of payment, the persons sharing in the divi-
dends would probably have been liable to these creditors to 
the extent of the money so received . 
.But we are satisfied that none of these conditions existed. 
The case is mainly one of fact, and the testimony is vecy 
full. We do not think its discussion here profitable or useful. 
\Ve are satisfied that at the time the last dividend was made 
the capital of the company was undiminished, and the firm 
amply able to pay its debts. Its misfortunes followed after 
this. 
It very fully appea.rs that the insolvency was brought about 
by accommodation indorsements for others, made after the 
last dividend was paid; thart the firm, but for this, would have 
rPmained solvent, and that, in regard to this, none of the 
defendants were to blame except Frederick, who, being a full 
' partner, is liable personally for all the debts of the firm. 
An important matter in the case is a stipulation of the 
parties to the suit that all the debts owing by the firm were 
t·ontracted subsequently to the declaration and payment of all 
the dividends, and none of the debts of the firm were in exist· 
t>nce at the time these profits were declared and paid. 
No creditor whose debt was in existence when these divi-
dends were made was injured. All the debts then existing 
have been paid. What ri~ht bad subsequent credit<>rs to re-
daim these dividends, who had no interest in the matter 
when they were paid? These defendants, except Frederick, 
were not partners. Their money was in the concern, and they 
received dividends instead of interest. 
We repeat that there is no evidence of fraud or intentional 
wrong. 
Decree affirmed. 
NoTB: See Mechem'e Elem. of Partn., § 2C9. 
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DOGGETT vs. DILL.
Supreme Court of Illinois, 1884.
_ 108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565.
William E. Doggett died on the 3d of April}, 1876, testate,
and Kate E. Doggett, appellant, who was named as executrix.
qualified as such in the probate court of Cook county. Dog-
gett, at the time of his death, and for many years before, was
a member of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills. In 1871, T.
U. H. and Lucy \V. Smixth executed their two promissory notes
for certain sums of money, payable to Charles H. Dill. The
two notes, on the date of their execution, were guaranteed by
Doggett, Barrett & Hills, the firm name to the guarantee being
executed by Doggett. N-0 effort was made by Dill to collect
the amount due on the notes from the firm assets, or from
surviving members of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills,
but after the death of Doggett he presented his claim to the
probate court, to be allowed against the estate of the deceased.
The probate court, upon the evidence introduced, allowed the
claim, and the executrix appealed to the circuit court where
a second trial was had resulting in a judgment against the
estate. An ap-peal was then taken to the appellate court,
where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and
this record is brought here by the executrix for the purpose of
reversing the judgment of the appellate court.
Stiles and Lewis and R. W. Pike, for appellant.
Dexter, Herrick d5 Allen, for appellee.
Cmuc, J. (After stating the facts as above), proceeded:
It is insisted by appellant that a partnership demand can-
not be allowed against the individual estate of a deceased part-
ner until the legal remedy against t-he partnership assets and
surviving partners has been exhausted.
In Mason vs. Tifl’a-ny, 45 Ill. 392, which was a proceeding in
chancery, by a creditor of a firm, to enforce payment of a firm
debt against the estate of Tifiany, a deceased member of the
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DOGGETT vs. DILL. 
Supreme Court of Illinoi8, 1884. 
108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 5G5. 
395 
. 
William E. Doggett died on the 3d <>f Aprilj, 1876, testate, 
and Kate E. Doggett, appe11ant, who was named as executrix~ 
qualified as such in the probate court of Cook county. Dog- . 
gett, at the time of his deatll, and for many years before, was 
a member of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills. In 1871, T. 
C. H. and Lucy W. Sm\th executed their two promissory not-a 
for certain sums of money, payable to Charles H. Dill. The 
two notes, on the date of their execution, were gu1ranteed by 
Doggett, Barrett & Hills, the firm name to the guarantee being 
executed by Doggett. No effort was made by Dill to collect 
the amount due on the notes from the firm assets, or from 
surviYing members of the firm of Doggett, Barrett & Hills, 
but after the death of Doggett he presented his claim to the 
probate court, to be allowed against the estate of the deceased. 
The probate court, upon the evidence introduced, allowed the 
claim, and the executrix appealed to the circuit court where 
a second tI·ial was. bad resulting in a judgment against the 
t>state. An appeal was then taken to the appellate court, 
where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed, and 
this record is brought here by the executrix for the purpose of 
reversing the judgment of the appellate court. 
Stiles and Lewis and R. W. Pike, for appellant. 
Deztcr, Herrick & Allen, for appellee. 
CnAIG, J. (After stating the facts as above), proceeded: 
It is insisted by appellant that a partnership demand can-
not be allowed against the individual estate of a deceased part-
ner until the legal remedy against the partnership assets and 
surviving partners has been exhausted. 
In Mason vs. Tiffany, 45 Ill. 392, which was a proceeding in 
chancery, by a creditor of a firm, to enforce payment of a firm 
debt against the estate of Tiffany, a decpasPd member of th£> 
firm, it was held, that every partnership de-bt being joint and 
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several, it follows necessarily, that resort may be had, in the
first instance, for the debt, to the surviving partners, or to the
assets of the deceased partner. In the decision of the case it
-is said: “If it was a fact that the surviving partners remained
solvent for a long time before the assignment, and the assigned
assets were suflicient to pay this claim, still these did not
require the complainant to press his claim against them, the
estate of the deceased partner being equally a fund on which he
had a right to rely.” This case seems to establish the doctrine,
in plain words, that a creditor, in equity, has the right, where
he holds a claim against a firm, one mem-ber of which -has died,
to proceed against the estate of the deceased member or the
surviving partners, as he may elect.
In Silucrman vs. Chase, 90 Ill. 37, the same question arose,
and following the doctrine of the ease last cited, it was said:
“A partnership debt is joint and several, and the creditor has
the right to elect whether he will proceed against the assets
in the hands of the surviving partner or against the estate of
the deceased partner, as h-eld by this court in Mason vs. Tiffany,
45 Ill. 392. Nor will the laches of the creditor in following
the assets of the firm preclude a recovery. The creditor has
the right to proceed against the estate at any time before the
statute of limitations has run, and a failure to pursue the
partnership assets cannot be relied upon as a defense when
suit is brought against the estate.”
These two cases would seem to be conclusive of the ques-
tion presented, so far, at least, as this court is concerned, as
they, in terms, decide the same question involved in the record
before us, and it would not be deemed necessary to say any-
thing more on the question were it not for the fact that it is
claimed that these cases are in conflict with prior decisions of
this court, and the doctrine therein announced is not sound,
and in harmony with the current of authority on the subject.
We have therefore concluded to briefly refer to some of the
authorities which have a bearing on the question, with the
view of showing that the decisions of this court are fully sus-
tained by the weight of authority.
Story on Partners-hip, Sec. 362, says: “The doctrine for-
merly held upon this subject seems to have been, that the joint
creditors had no claim whatsoever in equity against the estate
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several, it follows necessarily, thflt resort may be had, in the 
ftrst instance, for the debt, to the surviving partners, or to the 
s.ssets of the deceased partner. In the decision of the case it 
is said: "If it was a fact that the surviving partners remained 
solvent for a long time before the assignment, and the assigned 
assets were sufficient to pay this claim, still these did not 
require the complainant to press his claim against them, the 
estate of the deceased pa.rtner being equally a fund on which he 
bad a right to rely." This case seems to establish the doctrine, 
in plain words, that a creditor, in equity, bas the right, where 
he holds a claim against a firm, one member of which ·has died, 
to proceed against the estate of the deceased me.mber or the 
surviving partners, as he may elect. 
In Silverman "'· Cliaae, 90 Ill. 37, the same question arose, 
and following the doctrine of the case last cited, it was said: 
"A partnership debt is joint and .several, and the creditor has 
the right to elect whether he will ·proceed against the assets 
in the hands of the surviving partner or against the estate of 
the deceased partner, as held by this court in Ma8on vs. Tiffany, 
45 Ill. 392. Nor will the laches of the creditor in following 
the assets o't the ftrm preclude a recovery. The creditor haM 
tbe right to proceed against the estate at any time before the 
statute of limitations has run, and a failure to pursue the 
partnership assets cannot be relied upon as a. defense when 
soit is brought against the estate." 
These two cases would seem to be conclusive of the ques· 
tion presented, so far, at least, as this court is concerned, as 
they, in terms, decide the same question involved in the record 
before us, and it would not be deemed necessary to say any· 
thing more on the question were it not for the fact that it is 
claimed that these cases are in conflict with prior decisi001s of 
this court, and the doctrine therein announced is not ~ound, 
and in harmony with the current of authority on the subject. • 
We have therefore concluded to briefly refer to some of the 
authorities which haye a bearing on the question, with the 
view of showing that the decisions of this court are fully sus-
tained by the weight of authority. 
Story on Partnerlii·hip, Sec. 362, says: "The doctrine for· 
merly held upon this subject seems to have been, that the joint 
creditors bad no claim whatsoever in equity against the estate 
of the deceased partner, except when the surviving partners 
Dooosn vs. Dun. 897
were at the time, or subsequently became insolvent or bank-
rupt. But that doctrine has been since overturned, and it is
now held, that in equity all partnership debts are to be deemed
joint and several, and consequently the joint creditors have,
in all cases, the right to proceed at law against the survivors,
and an electionalso to proceed in equity against the estate
of a deceased partnerfwhetiher the survivors be insolvent or
bankrupt or not.” The same doctrine, but in ditferent lan-
guage, is declared by Story in his work on Equity Jurispru-
deuce, Sec. V676.
Collyer on Partnership, Sec. 580, declares the law in the
following language: “It is now established beyond contro-
versy, that in the consideration of courts of equity a partner-
ship debt is several as well as joint, and that upon the death
of a. partner a joint creditor has a right in equity to proceed
immediately against the representative of the deceased part-
ner for payment out of his separate estate, without reference
to the question whether the joint estate -be solvent or insol-
vent, or to the state of accounts amongst the pa.rtners.”
Dixon on Partnership, 113, says: “When a liability exists
the creditor may, at his option, either pursue his legal remedy
against the survivor, or resort in equity to tihe estate of the
deceased-, and this altogether without regard to the state of
the accounts between the partners themselves, or to the ability
of the survivor to pay.”
Lindley on Partnership, 1053, says: “Whatever doubt there
may formerly have been upon the subject, it was clearly settled
before the judicature acts, that a creditor of the firm could
proceed against -the estate of t-he deceased partner without
first having recourse to the su1'v'ivin~g,' partners, and without
reference to the state of the accounts between them and the
deceased.” See also Pars. Mere. Law, 102; Adams Eq. 173;
Smith Mere. Law, '48; 3 Kent Com. 63, 64, and note.
From the citations made, it would seem that the l-aw, as
declared in Mason vs. Tifiany, and Silvcrman vs. Chase, supra,
is fully sustained, at least by text-writers of high authority
both in this country and in England. But it will not be nec-
sary to rely alone on the text-books for a solution of the ques-
tion. as the decisions in England and in many of the states are
in harmony with the rule declared in the text-books. In Eng-
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were at the time, or subsequently became insolvent or bank-
rupt. But that doctrine has been since overturned, and it is 
now held, that in equity all partnership debts are to be deemed 
joint and several, and consequently the joint creditors have, 
in all cases, the right to proceed at law against the survivors, 
and an election also to proceed in equity against the estate 
of a deceased partner,· whetlher the survivors be insolvent or 
bankrupt or not." The same doctrine, but in different lan-
guage, is declarC'd by Story in his work on Equity Jurispru-
dence, Sec. 676. 
Collyer on Partnership, Sec. 580, declares the law in the 
following language: "It is now established beyond contro-
versy, that in the consideration of courts of equity a partner-
ship debt is several as well as joint, and that upon the death 
of a partner a joint creditor has a right in equity to proceed 
immediately against the representative of the deceased part-
ner for payment out of his Be'J)arate estate, without reference 
to the question whether the joint estate ·be solvent or insol-
vent, or to the state of accounts amongst the partners." 
Dixon on 1•artnership, 113, says: "When a liability exista 
the creditor may, at his option, either pursue his legal remedy 
against the survivor, or resort in equity to tihe estate of the 
deceased) and this altoget·her without regard to the state of 
the accounts ·between the partners themselves, or to the ability 
of the survivor to pay." 
Lindley on Partnership, 1053, says: "Whatever doubt there 
may formerly have been upo:n the subject, it was clearly settled 
before the judicature acts, that a creditor of the firm could 
proceed against the estate of the deceased partner without 
first having recom·se to the surviving partners, nnd without 
r<'forPnce to thr fltatP of the acr.onnts b~tween them and the 
deceased.'' See also Pars. !\lerc. Law, UI:.?; .\dams Eq. 173:· 
Hmith Mere. Law, 48; :3 Kent Com. 63, 64, and note. 
From the citations made, it would seem that the law, as 
declared in Ma.~an vs. Tiffany, and Silverman t•s. Chase, supra, 
is fully sustained, at least by text-writers of high authority 
both in this country and in England. But it will not be nec-
sary to rely alone on the text-books for a solution of the ques-
tion, ns the decisions in Engl:md and in many of the states are 
In harmony with the rule declared in the text-books. In Eng-
land, as early as 1816, in Devayncs vs. Noble, 1 Mer. 52!>, it was 
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decided, that in equity partnership debts are joint and several,
and a creditor holding a firm debt could resort to the estate
of the deceased partner for payment, without showing the
insolvency of the survivor. The rule adopted in the case cited
was subsequently adhered to and followed in Wilkinson rs.
Henderson, 1 M. & K. 582, and since the decision of these cases
the doctrine there announced has been regarded as the settled
law of England. In Nelson vs. Hill, 5 How. 127, the supreme
court of the United States held that the creditor of a partner-
ship may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving
partner, or go in the first instance into equity against the rep-
resentatives of the deceased partner—that it was not neces-
sary to exhaust his remedy at law against the surviving part-
ner before proceeding in equity against the estate. In sup-
port of the rule announced, Story on Partnership, Sec. 362,
note 3, is cited. In a later case (Lewis vs. United States, 92 U.
S. 622), Nelson vs. Hill is cited with approval. In Camp vs.
Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321, the supreme court of
Connecticut, in an able opinion, adopt the rule of the courts
of England. In Weaver vs. Thornburg, 15 Ind. 124, the ques-
tion arose, and the supreme court of that state adopt the rule
in the language of Story on Partnership, cited supra, and this
decision was followed in a number of subsequent cases. Dean
vs. Phillips, 17 Ind. 406; Hardy rs. Overman, 36 Id._ 549. In
Freeman vs. Stuart, 41 Miss. 141, the question arose, and the
supreme court of that state held, in equity all partnership
debts are joint and several, and a creditor has the right to
proceed in law against the survivor, and an election also to
proceed against the separate estate of the deceased partner,
whether the survivor be solvent or not. See also Irby vs.
Graham, 46 Miss. 428, where the English rule is fully approved.
The same doctrine has been adopted in Vermont, in Washbum
vs. Bank of Bellows Falls, 19 Vt. 278. In Tennessee, in
Saunders vs. Wilder, 2 Head 579. In Arkansas, in McLain
vs. Carson, 4 Ark.'164, 37 Am. Dec. 777. In New Jersey, in
W-i-sham vs. Lippincott, 1 Stockt. Eq. 353. In Alabama, in Travis
vs. Tartt, 8 Ala. 577. In Florida, in F-illyau cs. Laverty, 3 Fla.
72. In Texas, in Gaul -vs. Reed, 24 Texas 46, 76 Am. Dec. 94.
In New Hampshire, in Bowker vs. Smith, 48 N. H. 111, 2 Am.
Rep. 189. In New York and Georgia a contrary rule has been
adopted, as will be found in the following cases: Lamenas rs.
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decided, that in equity partnership debts are joint and several, 
. and a creditor holding a firm debt could resort to the estate 
of tbe deceased partner for payment, without sh<>wing the 
, insolvency of the survivor. The rule adopted in the case cited 
. was subsequently ad·hered to and followed in Wilkinson t 'B. 
, Henderson, 1 M. & K. 582, and since the decision of these cases 
·the doctrine there announced has been regarded as the settled 
law of England. In Nelson vs. Hill, 5 How. 127, the supreme 
court of the United States held that the creditor of a partner-
ship may, at his option, proceed at law against the surviving 
, partner, -0r go in the first instance into equity against the rep-
resentatives of the deceased partner-that it was not neces-
sary to exhaust his remedy at law ag.1inst the surviving part-
. ner before p1·oceeding in equity against the estate~ In sup-
port of the rule announced, Story on Partne·rship, Sec. 362, 
note 3, is cited. In a later case (Lewis n. United States, 92 U. 
S. 622), Nelson t:s. Hill is cited with approval. In Camp vs. 
Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321, the supreme court of 
Connecticut, in an abie oPfnion, adopt the rule of the courts 
·of England. In Weaver vs. Thqrnburg, 15 Ind. 124, the ques-
tion arose, and the supreme court of that state adopt the rule 
in the language of Story on Partnership, cited suvra, and this 
decision was followed in a number of subsequent cases. Dean 
vs. Phillips, 17 Ind. 40G; Hardy rs. Overman, 36 Id . . 549. In 
Freeman vs. Stuart, 41 Miss. 141, the question arose, and the 
supreme court of that state held, in equity all partnership 
debts are joint and several, and a creditor bas the right to 
proceed in law against the survivor, and an election also to 
proceed against the separate estate of the deceased partner, 
whether the survivor be f!olvent or not. See also Irby vs. 
Graham, 4G Miss. 428, where the English rule is fully approved. 
The same doctrine has been adopted in Vermont, in Wasl1burn 
vs. Bank of Bcllmc's Palls, 19 Vt. 278. In Tennessee, in 
Sa-unders t'S. Wil<ler, 2 llea.d 579. In Arkansas, in McLain 
t:B. Oarson, 4 Ark. 1G4, a7 Am. Dec. 777. In New Jersey, in 
Wisl1am t~s. Lippincott, 1 Stockt. Eq. 353. In Alabama, in Tra·vis 
V8. 1'artt, 8 Ala. 577. Jn Florida, in F-illyaii n. Laverty, 3 Fla. 
72. In Texns, in Gattt vs. Reed, 24 Texas 46, 7G Am. Dec. 94. 
In New Hampshire, in Bowker vs. Smith, 48 N. II. 111, 2 Am. 
Rep. 189. In New York and Georgia a contrary rule bas been 
adopted, aa will be found in the following cases: Lam.enas t'B. 
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Trustees, 11 Paige 80; Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Bennett
vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213. Upon an examination of the New
York eases, it a.ppears that the rulethere adopted was sup-
posed to be predicated on the old English cases, and when
the courts of England esta.blished the doctrine which is laid
down as the law in Devaynes vs. Noble, and Wilkinson vs. Hen-
derson, supra, the New York courts refused to follow the Eng-
lish rule, but adhered to what was supposed to be the law in
England as declared in that court prior to that time. Georgia
seems to follow the New York rule. In a late case in
Wisconsin (Sherman vs. Kreul, 42 W'is. 33), the supreme
court say: “We are disposed to adopt the New York
rule, that in order to recover against the administrators
the plaintiff should allege and show that the surviving
partner is insolvent.” It is also claimed by appellant
that the New York rule has been adopted in North and South
Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania; but without stopping to
determine precisely what the rule of the courts of these states
may be, we are satisfied that the decided weight of authority
is in harmony with the rule adopted in this state, and we are
not inclined to change the rule heretofore adopted in this state,
and follow the doctrine established by the courts of New York
and Georgia, although we fully recognize the great ability of
those courts.
It is also claimed that Silvcrman vs. Chase is in conflict with
Molina Water Power and Manufacturing Co. rs. Webster, 26 Ill.
233, and Pahlman vs. Graves, Id. 405. This position is, in our
judgment, based upon a misapprehension o-f those cases. In
those cases there was a controversy between the partnership
and individual creditors, and the principle of marshalling
assets was applied, as it should have been. Where there are
individual creditors, and partnership creditors, there is no
doubt in regard to the law that all individual creditors have
a prior claim against the individual assets, and partnership
creditors have a prior claim against firm assets, and an individ-
ual creditor would have the right to insist that no part of the
separate assets should be taken and applied in payment of firm
debts until all separate debts had been paid in full. This
familiar rule was applied in the two cases referred to, and also
in the case of Ladd vs. Griswold, 4 Gilm. 25, 46 Am. Dec. 443.
















































































































































DOGGETT vs. DILL. 399 
Trustees, 11 Paige 80; Voorhis vs. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354; Bennetl 
vs. Woolfolk, 15 Ga. 213. Upon an examination of the New 
York cases, it a.ppears that the rule. ihere adopted was sup-
posed to be predicated on the old English cases, and when 
the courts of England established the doctrine which is laid 
down as the law in Devaynes vs. Noble, and WUkinson vs. Hen-
derson, supra, the New York courts refused to follow the Eng-
lish rule, but adhered to what was supposed to be the law in 
England as declared in that court prior to that time. Georgia 
seems to follow the New York rule. In a late case in 
Wisconsin (Slie1·man vs. Kreul, 42 '\Vis. 33), the supreme 
court say: "\Ve are disposed to adopt the New York 
rule, that in order to recover aga.inst the administrators 
the plaintiff should allege and show that the surviving 
partner is insolvent." It is also claimed by appellant 
that the New York rule bas been ad-opted in North and South 
Carolina, Ohio and Pennsylvania; but without stopping to 
determine precisely what the rule of the courts of these states 
may be, we are satisfied that the decided weight of auth-ority 
is in harmony with the rule ad-0pted in this state, and we are 
not inclined to change the rule heretofore adopted in this state, 
and follow the doctrine established by the courts of New York 
and Georgia, although we fully recognize the great ability of 
those courts. 
It is also claimed that Silverman 1'8. Chase is in conflict with 
Moline Water Power and Manufacturing Co. vs. Webster, 26 Ill. 
233, and l'ahlman vs. G1·aves, Id. 405. This position is, in our 
judgment, based upon a misapprehension of those cases. In 
those cases there was a controversy between the partnership 
and individual creditors, and the principle of marshalling 
assets was applied, as it should have been. Where there are 
individual creditors, and partnership creditors, there is no 
dQubt in regard to the law that all individual creditors have 
a prior claim against the individual assets, and partnership 
creditors have a prior claim against firm assets, and an individ-
ual creditor would have the right to insist thrut no part of the 
separate assets should be taken and applied in payment of firm 
debts until nll separate debts ha.d been paid in full. Thi8 
familiar rule was applied in the two cases referred to, and also 
in the case of Ladd vs. Griswold, 4 Gilm. 25, 46 Am. Dee. 44:.J. 
But there is no contest between the individual and partner-
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ship creditors -here, and hence the doctrine of marshalling
assets does not apply. In this case no claims had been pre-
sented or allowed against the estate, of any character, except
the one in controversy, and no individual creditor is resisting
the allowance of the claim.
But independent of the authorities, we are satisfied that the
rule, holding the estate of a deceased partner primarily liable
in equity, is sound in principle. Doggett, in his lifetime, was
individually liable for this debt, and if he had been sued, and
a judgment obtained against him, any of his individual prop
erty would have been liable to be taken and sold in satisfaction
of the debt. It is true, if he had been sued at law in his life-
time, it would ha.ve been necessary to join his partners as
defendants in the action; but after judgment, it was not neces-
sary to exhaust the partnership assets before individual prop
erty could be taken, but the creditor could resort to such prop
erty in the first instance, if he saw proper. Did the death of
Doggett in any manner change the liability which existed on
this contract before his death? “Ye think not. The liability
continued as before, but the remedy to enfore that lia.bility was
changed from a court of law to a court exercising equitable
powers. Before his death the liability could only be enforced
by a joint action against Doggett and his partners; after his
death the liability continued, but could only be enforced in the
probate court, which in the allowance of claims exercises
equitable powers. The death of a debtor may extinguish a.
legal remedy on a joint contract, but we are not aware that it
has ever been held that the death of a debtor could extinguish
the debt or discharge the estate-of the deceased.
In conclusion, we are satisfied, under ‘the facts as disclosed
by this record, appellee’s claim was a proper one to be allowed
against the estate of the deceased, and that it was properly
allowed by the probate court.
The judgment of the appellate court will therefore be
atiirmed.
Judgment aflirmed.
\VALK1~:n, J. If the doctrine of this opinion is to be applied
in cases where there are individual creditors of the deceased
partner, I dissent.
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ship creditors •here, and hence the doctrine of marshalling 
assets does not apply. In this case no claims had been pre-
sented or allowed against the estate, of any character, except 
the one in controversy, and oo individual creditor is resisting 
the allowance of the claim. 
But independent of the authorities,. we aire satisfied that the 
rule, holding the estate of a deceased partner primarily liable 
in equity, is sound in principle. Doggett, in his lifetime, was 
individua11y liable for this debt, and if he bad been sued, and 
a judgment obtained against him, any of his individua.l prop-
erty would have been liable to be taken and sold in satisfaction 
of the debt. It is true, if be had been sued a..t law in his life-
time, it would have been necessary to join bis partners a.a 
defendants in the a.ction; but after judgment, it was not neces-
sary to exhaust the partnership a.ssets. before individual pr<>p-
erty could be taken, but the creditor could resort to such prop-
erty in the fii'st instance, if be saw proper. Did the death ot 
Doggett in any manner change the liability which existed on 
this contract before his death? "\Ve think not. The liabilit7 
continued as before, but the remedy to enfore that liability was 
changed from a court of law to a court exercising equitable 
powers. Before his death the liability could only be enforced 
by a joint action against Doggett and his partners; after hia 
death the liability continued, but could only be enforced in the 
probate court, which in the allowance of claims exercises 
equLtable powers. The death of a debtoir may extinguish a 
. legal remedy on a joint contract, but we are not aware that it . 
bas ever been held that the death of a debtor could extinguish 
the debt or discharge the estate·of the deceased. 
In conclusion, we are satisfied, under 'the facts as disclosed 
by this record, appellee's claim was a proper one to be allowed 
against the estate of the deceased, and that it was properl1 
allowed by the probate court. 
The judgment of the appellate court will therefore be 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
\VALKER, J. If the doctrine of this opini()n is to be applied 
in cases whel'e there are individual creditors of the deceased 
partner, I dissent. 
NOTE: For other cues upon thls question eee Mechem'e Elem. of 
Pnrtn., i 271>. 
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1
LINDNER vs. ADAMS COUNTY BANK.
Supreme Court of N obrasko, 1896.
8- Neb.;—i 5, as N. W. Rep. 102a
The Adams County Bank brought this action against Abra)-
ham Loeb and wife, Lindner, the administrator, Rosa Hirsch,
the widow, and Benjamin and Jacob Hirsch, the heirs, of Sam-
uel Hirsch, deceased, to foreclose a mortgage executed by Loeb
and Samuel Hirsch in favor of the bank. The case proceeded
to foreclosure and sale, and a.fter satisfying the bank’s debt
there remained a larger surplus, one-half of which was after-
wards, by the court, ordered paid to the guardian of the heirs
of Samuel Hirsch. The present controversy relates to the dis-
position of the remainder of the surplus, it being claimed on
one hand by an assignee of Loeb, and on the other hand by the
administrator of Hirsch. The district court made an order
directing its payment to William Kerr, the assignee of Loeb.
This order was made on consideration of the application and
the record in the case, without evidence; and the question pre-
sented for review is substantially, therefore, whether the
administrator’s application, taken in connection with facts
established by the record, was suflicient, if the allegations con-.
tained in the application were true, to entitle him to the unpaid
surplus. The application alleges, in brief, that Loeb and
Samuel Hirsch were, in the latter’s lifetime, partners, and that
the real estate sold under the decree of foreclosure was part-
nership property; that, after the death of Hirsch, Loeb col-.
lected the rents and profits of the real estate, and continued
to carry on the business and collect debts due the partnership,
but failed to pay the debts of the partnership, and had refused
to apply moneys coming into his hands for the purpose of
discharging such debts, but had converted the partnership
property to his own use; that the partnership owned property
largely in excess of its liabilities; that Loeb is insolvent; that,
on an accounting between Loeb and Hirsch’s administrator,
Loeb would be indebted to the latter in at‘ least $3,000. Lind-

















































































































































LINDNER vs. AD.A.llS ·COUNTY BAN)[. 
LINDNER vs. ADAMS COUNTY BANK. 
Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1896. 
'I?- Neb~68 N. W. Rep. 1028. 
(()i 
The Ailams Connty Bank brought this action against Abl"D(-
hnm Loeb and wife, Lindner, the administrator, Rosa Hirsch, 
the widow, and Benjamin and .Jacob Hirsch, the heirs, of Sam. 
nel Ilirsch, deceased, to foreclose a mortgage executed by Loeb 
:md Samuel Hi11sch in favor of the bank. The case proceeded 
to foreclosure and sale, and after satisfying the bank's debt 
there remained a larger surplus, one-half of which was after-
wards, by the court, ordered paid to the guar(lia.n of the heirs 
of Samuel Hirsch. The present controversy relates to the di&-
position of the remainder of the surplus, it being claimell on 
one hand by an assignee of Loeb, and on the other hand by the 
administrator of Hirsch. The district court made an order 
directing its payment to William Kerr, the assignee of Loeb. 
This order was made on consideration of the application and 
the record in the case, without evidence; and the question pre-
sented for review is substantially, therefore, whet1her the 
administrator's application, taken in connection with facts 
established by the record, was sufficient, if the allegations con-. 
tained in the application were true, to entitle him to the unpaid 
surplus. The application alleges, in brief, that Loeb and 
Samuel Hirsch were, in the latter's lifetime, partners, and that 
the real estate sold under the decree of foreclosure was part-
nership property; that, after the death of Hirsch, Loeb col-. 
lected the rents and profits of the real estate, and continued 
to carry on the business and collect debts due th'e partnership, 
but failed to pay the debts of the partnership, and had refused 
to apply moneys coming into his hands for the purpose of 
discharging such debts, but bad converted the partnemhip 
property to his own use; that the partnership owned property 
. largely in excess of its liabilities; that Loeb is insolvent; that, 
on an accounting between Loeb and Hirsch's administratot1 
Loeb would be indebted to the latter in at least $3,000. Lind· 
ner brings error. 
[11 
402 Ussss on Purrxi-ziasnir.
W. S. Morlan and J. E. Kelley, for plaintiff in error.
Oapps (E Stevens, for defendants in error.
Invmn, O. (After stating the facts.) In the briefs many
questions are discussed with regard to the rights of surviving
partners, and the propriety of an examination into their trans-
actions, and an accounting, in a proceeding of this character.
We think, however, a single principle controls the decision of
the case. The assignment of the surplus arising from the sale
from Loeb to Kerr was__made before the sale was confirmed.
It recites a consideration of $1,250 paid by Kerr to Loeb. Its
legal effect was as an assignment oi! a chbse in a.ction belong-
ing to a partnership, by the surviving partner, to a stranger.
Neither by any averment in the administrators application for
the surplus, nor elsewhere in the record, is the bona /ides or
consideration of this assignment attacked. On the dissolution
of a partnership by the.death of one of the partners, the part-
nership property vests in the survivor, in trust, it is true, for
the settlement and winding up of the partnership business,
but nevertheless with power of disposition for that purpose;
and the surviving partner may, in such case, convey or trans-
fer the property to a stranger, who will take title by virtue of
such conveyance or transfer. Fitzpatrick vs. Flamw-yan, 106
U. S. 648, 1 Sup. Ct. 369. Not only may tangible property be
so transferred by a surviving partner,but also choses in action.
Johnson 1:0. Berlizlzeirner, 84 Ill. 54, 25 Am. Rep. 427; Rays vs.
Vilas, 18 W’ is. 169; Daby rs. Eriesson, 45 N. Y. 786; Bohler vs.
Tappan, 1 Fed. 469. It follows from this principle that the
assignment by Loeb, the surviving partner, to Kerr, of any
surplus that might remain after satisfying the decree in favor
of the bank (such assignment being unimpeached) operated to
transfer the right of the partnership to such fund to Kerr,
and it remained no longer a partnership asset. So that the
question as to whether, in the absence of such an assignment,
an accounting might be had in this action between the surviv-
ing partner and the personal representative of the deceased
partner, and the surplus distributed in accordance with the
result of such accounting, is not material to the present case.
A case much in po-int is Willson vs. Nicholson, 61 Ind. 241. That
was an action on a promissory note made to a partnership,



















































































































































OASES ON PARTNERSDIP. 
W. 8. Morlan and J.E. Kelley, for plaintiff in error. 
Capps & Stevens, for defendants in error. 
IRVINE, C. (After stating the facts.) In the briefs mnny 
questions are discussed with regard to the rights of surviving 
partners, and the propriety of an examination into their trans-
actions, and an accounting, in a proceeding of this chara'Ctcr. 
We think, however, a single principle controls the decision of 
the case. The assignment of the surplus arising from the s<lle 
from Loeb. to Kerr was made bHore the sale was confirm~d. ,_ 
It recites a considera'!;ion of fl,250 paid by Kerr to Loeb. Ita 
legal efl'ect was as a'n assigTrment o~ a clWS& in action belong-
ing to a partnership, by the surviving partner, to a stranger. 
Neither by any averment in the administrator's application for 
the surplus, nor elsewhere in the record, is the bona. fides or 
consideration of this assignment attacked. On the dissolution 
of a partnership by the.death of one of the partners, the part-
nership property vests in th.e survivor, in trust, it is true, for 
the settlement and winding up of the partnership business, 
bot nevertheless with power of disposition for that purpose; 
and the surviving partner may, in such case, convey or trans-
fer the property to a stranger, who will take title by virtue of 
such conveyance or transfer. Fitzpatrick t:8. Flannct.yan, 106 
U. S. 648, 1 Sup. Ct. 369. No.t only may tangible property be 
so transferred by a surviving partner, but also choses in action. 
Johnson t:.'/. Berlizllcimer, 84 Ill. 54, 25 Am. Rep. 427; Roys vB. 
Vilas, 18 \Vis. 1G9; Daby ti8. Ericsson, 45 N. Y. 786; Bohler VB. 
Tappan, 1 Fed. 469. It follows from this principle that the 
assignment by Loeb, the surviving partner, to Kerr, of any 
•urplus that might remain after safisfying the decree in favor 
of the bank (such assignment being unimpeached) operated to 
transfer the right of the partnership to such fund to Kerr, 
and it remained no longer a partnership asset. So that the 
question a.s to whether, in the a.bsence of such an assignment, 
an accounting might be bad in this action between the surviv-
ing partner and the personal representative of the deceased 
partner, and the surplus distributed in accordance with the 
result of such accounting, is not material to the present case. 
A case much in point is Willson V8. Niclwlson, 61 Ind. 241. That 
was an action on a promissory note made to a partnership, 
which had been assigned by delivery to the plaintiff by the sur-
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viving partner. Certain creditors of the partnership had filed
counter claims, alleging insolvency of the firm and of all its
members, and that the note in suit constituted the firm’s only
assets, and that the plaintifif had purchased it with full knowl-
edge of the facts. They prayed that the proceeds of the
instrument should be applied to the payment of their claims.
The supreme court affirmed the action of the trial court in
striking out the counter claims, on the ground that the surviv-
ing partner succeeded to the assets, and had the right to dis-
pose thereof, and that, in theabsence of any allegation to the
contrary, it would be presumed that the assignment to the
plaintiff was bona /idc, ‘and for a.‘ valuable consideration.
Afiirmed.
NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 270. V
Compare with Durant vs. Pierson, next: following.
DU RANT vs. PIERSON.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1891.
124 N. Y. 444, 20 N. E. Rep. 1095, 21 Am. St. Rep. 088.
This action was brought to set aside an assignment made
by the defendant, Henry R. Pierson, as survivor of the late
firm of Henry R. Pierson & Son, to the defendant Robert C.
Pruyn, for the benefit of creditors, upon the ground that it was
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the firm, for the
reason that it directed the payment to the National Commer-
cial Bank of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars.
The referee has found as facts that Henry R. Pierson, the
elder, died on the first day of January, 1890, leaving the
defendant Henry R. Pierson, his son, as the sole surviving
member of the firm; -that the firm kept an account with the
National Commercial Bank of Albany in the name of Henry R.
Pierson & Son, which was open and unsettled upon the books
of the bank on the ninth day of January, 1890, at which time
the defendant Pierson made application to the bank for the
loan of $15,000; that upon making such loan there was credited
















































































































































DURANT VS. PIERSON. 403 
. viving partner. .Certain creditors of the partnership had :flied 
counter claims, alleging insolvency of the firm and of all its 
members, and that the note in suit constituted the firm's only 
assets, and that the plaintiff had purchased it with full knowl-
edge of the facts. They praye~ that the proceeds of the 
instrument should be applied to the payment of their claims. 
Tlle supreme court aftirme<l the acti<>n of the trial court in 
striking out the counter claims, on the ground that the surviv-
ing partner succeeded to the assets, and bad the right to dis-
pose thereof, and that, in the 'absence of any allegation to the 
contrary, it would pe presumed that the n.ssignment to the 
plaintiff was bona fide, knd for · a · valuable consideration. 
Affirmed. 
NOTE: See 11Pchem's Elem. of Partn., § 270. 
Cumpare wiUl Durant v1. Pierson, next following. 
DURANT vs. PIERSO~. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1891. 
12t N. Y. 44t, 2o·N. E. Rep. 1093, 21 Am. St. Rep. 686. 
This action was brought to set aside an assignment made 
by the defendant, Henry R. Pierson, as survivor of the late 
firm of Henry R. Pierson & Son, to the defendant Robert C. 
Pruyn, for the benefit of creditors, upon the ground that it was 
fraudulent and void as against the creditors of the fl.rm, for the 
reason that it directed the payment to the National C<>mmer-
cial Bank of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars. 
The referee bas found as facts that Henry R. Pierson, the 
elder, died on the first day of January, 1890, leaving the 
defendant Henry R. Pierson, his son, as the sole surviving 
member of the firm; .that the firm kept an account with the 
National Commercial Bank of Albany in the name of Henry R. 
Pierson & Son, which was open and unsettled upon the book& 
of the bank on the ninth day of January, 1890, at which time 
the defendant Pierson made application to the bank for the 
loon of f15,000; that upon making such Joan there was C'reditcd 
upon the books of the bank to the firm the sum so loaned, and 
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a note was given therefor, payable on demand, signed in the
name of the firm by Henry R. Pierson, survivor; that $10,150
thereof was subsequently drawn out of the bank by the checks
of the defendant Ilenry R. Pierson, signed by him as survivor,
and the same was applied and used in the payment of the debts
of the firm. The referee further found as facts that the pur-
pose of said defendant Henry R. Pierson in applying for and
obtaining such loan was to procure money with which to pay
the obligations of the firm which had matured or were about to
mature, and that the bank understood such to be the purpose
of the loan at the time of making the same; that the firm was
in fact insolvent on the first day of January, 1890, at the time
of the decease of the elder Pierson, but that such fact was not
known to either the defendant Pierson or to the National Com-
mercial Bank at the time the loan was made. He further
found as a fa.ct that in inserting in the assignment the direc-
tion to pay the National Commercial Bank of Albany from
the firm property the amount of the note, the defendant,
Pierson acted with intent to hinder, delay and defraud
the creditors of the firm, but that at the time of making such
assignment the defendant Pierson believed that such note
was a firm obligation, or an obligation which was legally
enforceable against the property and assets of the firm, and
that he therefore was not morally changeable with wrong in
directing its payment out of the property of the firm; that the
appropriation by him of the money borrowed of the bank to
the payment of the firm deb-ts created a claim in his favor
against the estate which before the assignment could have
been properly paid out of the firm's assets. As a conclusion
of law, he found that the debt created by the loan by the
National Commercial Bank was the individual debt of the
defendant Pierson, and not that of the firm; that the assign.
ment was consequently fraudulent as to the plaintilf, and
directed judgment accordingly.
Marcus T. Hun, for appellants Pruyn and Pierson.
Abraham Lansing, for the National Bank of Albany, appel-
lant.
' George L. Stcadman, for the respondent.
Harem", J. (After stating the facts as above.) If the debt
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n note was given therefor, ~yable on demand, signed in. the 
name of the firm by Henry R. Pierson, survivor; that fl0,150 
thereof was subsequently drawn out of the bank by the checks 
of the defendant Henry R. Pierson, signed by him as survivor, 
nnd the same was applied and used in the payment of the debts 
of the firm. The referee further found as facts that the pur· 
pose of said defendant Henry R. Pierson in a.pp lying for and 
obtaining such loan was to procure money with which to pay 
the obligations of the firm whiC'h had matured or were about to 
mature, and that the bank understood such to be the purpose 
c1f the loan at the time of making the same; that the firm waa 
in fact insolvent on the first day of January, 1890, at the time 
of the decease of the elder Pierson, but that such fact W?S not 
known to either the defendant Pierson or to the National Com-
mercial Bank at the time the loan was made. He further 
found as a fa.ct that in inserting in the assignment the direc-
tion to pay the National Commercial Bank of Albany from 
the firm property the amount of the note, the defendant, 
Pierson acted with intent to hinder, delay and defraud 
the creditors of the firm, but that at the time c1f making su<ili 
rssignment the defendant Pierson believed that such note 
was a firm obligation, or an obligation which was legally 
enforceable against the property and assets of the firm, and 
that he therefore was not morally chargeable with wrong in 
directing its payment out of the property of the firm; that the 
nppropriation by him of the money borrowed of the bank to 
the payment of the firm debts created a claim in bis favor 
against the estate which before the assignment could have 
heen properly paid out of the firm's assets. As a conclusion 
of law, he found that the debt created by the loan by the 
National Commercial Bank was the individual debt of the 
defendant Pierson, and not that <!f the firm; that the assign· 
ment was consequently fraudulent as to the plaintiff, and 
directed judgment accordingly. 
Marcus T. Hun., for appellants Pruyn and Pierson. 
Abrallam Lansing, for the National Bank of Albany, appel· 
lant. 
· Geo1·ge L. Steadman, for the respondent. 
HAIGHT, J. (After stating the facts as above.) If the debt 
created by the loan be tlw individual liability of the survivori 
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and one that the firm ought not to pay, and the firm be insol.-
vent, the survivor had no right in his assignment to direct its
payment out of the firm’s assets, and by so doing the assign-
ment was rendered fraudulent as to the creditors of the firm.
Wilson vs. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Mcnagh vs. Wh-itwell, 52 N.
Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683; Second National Bank of Oswego vs.
Bu-rt, 93 N. Y. 233-245; Bulger vs. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459-465.
It thus becomes important to determine whether the loan
contracted by the survivor became a firm obligation for the
payment of which its assets may justly be applied. As we
have seen, the note given upon procuring such loan bore the
name of the firm and that of Henry R. Pierson as survivor,
but at the time this note was given it was known to all of the
parties concerned that the senior member of the firm had
died.
The death of a partner puts an end to the copartnership,
and there is no longer any power or authority of the surviving
partners to carry on for the future a partnership trade or
business, or to engage in new transactions, contract, or lia-
bilities on account thereof. Story on Part., sec. 342, 343; Hall
vs. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160-170; Farr vs. Merrill, 53 Hun (N. Y.)
31-35.
It is thus apparent that whilst the note in form would
appear to create an obligation of the firm, it is at law unavail-
able as such, for the reason that there was no power in the
survivor to make it. But it does not follow but tha.t it is a.
claim which ought, in justice and equity, to be paid out of the
firn1’s assets. If it is, the preference in the assignment would
not be void, for the law will not declare fraudulent that which
equity adjudges right and proper. Denton vs. Merrill, 43 Hun
(N. Y.) 224-229.
\Ve must therefore consider whether there are equities
which will support the claim of the bank to be paid out of such
assets. It is apparent that the money borrowed from the
bank by the survivor was for the purpose of paying the credi-
tors of the firm the claims then matured and pressing. The
amount of the loan was credited upon the open account of
the firm with the bank, and subsequently ten thousand dollars
thereof, or thereabouts, were drawn out by the survivor upon
his check, and used in the payment of the liabilities of the firm.
















































































































































DURANT VS. PIERSON .. 4011 
and one that the firm ought not to pay, and the firm be lnsol~ 
vent, the survivor had no right in his assignment to direct its 
, payment oat of the firm's assets, and by so doing the assign-
ment was rendered fraudulent as to the creditors of the firm. 
Wilson VB. Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Menagh vs. Whitwell, 52 N. 
Y. 146, 11 Am. Rep. 683; Second National Bank of Oswego vs. 
B11-rt, 93 N. Y. 233-245; Bulger vs. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459-465. 
It thus becomes important to determine whether the loan 
contracted by the survivor became a firm obligation for the 
payment of which its assets may justly be applied. As we 
have seen, the note given upon procuring sueh loan bore the 
name of the firm and that of Henry R. Pierson as survivo1·, 
but at the time this note was given it was known to all of the 
parties concerned that the senior member of the firm had 
died. 
The death of a partner puts an end to the copartnership, 
and there is no longer any power or authority of the surviving 
partners to carry on for the future a partnership trade or 
business, or to engage in new transactions, contracts, or lia. 
bilities on account thereof. Story on Part., sec. 342, 343; Hall 
vs. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160-170; Fa1·r VB. Morrill, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 
31-35. 
It is thus apparent that whilst the note in form would 
appear to create an obligation of the firm, it is at law unavail-
able as such, for the reason that there was no power in the 
survivor to make it. But it does not follow but that it is a. 
claim which ought, in justice and equity, to be paid out of the 
firm's assets. If it is, the preference in the asf!tignment would 
not be void, for the law will not declare fraudulent that which 
equity adjudges right and proper. Denton vs. Merrill, 43 Ilun 
(N. Y.) 224-229. 
We must therefore consider whether there are equities 
which will support the claim of the bank to be paid out of such 
assets. It is apparent that the money borrowed from the 
bank by the survivor was for the purpose of paying the credi-
tors o.f the firm the claims then matured and pressing. The 
amount of the loan was credited upon the open account of 
the firm with the bank, and subsequently ten thousand dollars 
thereof, or thereabouts, were drawn oat by the survivor upon 
bis check, and used in the payment of the liabilities of the firm. 
At the ti.me this loan was made, it was not supposed by the oftl-
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cers of the bank,'o1' the surviving partner, that the firm was
insolvent, and no question is made but that both parties acted
in good faith. The question is therefore presented whether a
surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the
express purpose of paying the debts of his firm, and by so
applying the money borrowed create an equity for the satis~
faction of which the assets of the firm may properly be
devoted. As we have seen, the survivorbecame entitled to the
assets, which he had the right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of,
in order to pay the debts and close up the affairs of the copart~
nership. If he had the power to sell or mortgage, it would
seem to follow that he had the power to borrow and pledge
the assets for the repayment of the loan, and the amount bor-
rowed having been faithfully applied in liquidation of the debts
of the copartnership, equity will recognize the justness of the
claim of the party making the loan. Caes may a-rise where
the exercise of such authority may be highly expedient, if not
necessary, for the preservation of the rights of creditors and
persons interested in the distribution of the assets of the firm;
as, for instance, creditors may by levy expose the assets to a
forced public sale under circumstances which would work
great sacrifice to the estate. In case a survivor should be
insolvent, he might be able to raise money by a pledge to repay
out of the partnership assets when he could not obtain it upon
his own credit. We do not see that harm could result to the
other creditors by permitting this to be done; for it would
not increase the obligations of the firm nor lessen their share
in the distribution of the assets in case the firm be insolvent.
It is not questioned but that the survivor had the right to turn
out as a security or pledge the assets of the firm in payment
for the money received by him. He could have sold the assets
and repaid the money loaned at any time before executing the
assignment, and without taint of fraud. It is not apparent
how the rights of the parties are changed and the act of the
survivor made fraudulent by doing that in the assignment
which he had the right to do immediately before executing it.
The precise question involved in this case does not appear
to have been passed upon in any reported case, so far as we
have been able to discover,_ except in Hag/mes vs. Brooks, 8 Civ.
Proc. Rep. 106-113, where an assignment was made for the
benefit of creditors by a surviving partner. In that case, as
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cers of the bank,· or the surviving partner, that the ftrm W88 
insolvent, and no question is made but that both parties acted 
in good faith. The question is therefore presented whether a 
surviving partner may in good faith borrow money for the 
express purpose of paying the debts of his firm, and by so 
applying the money borrowed create an equity for the satis-
faction of which the assets of the firm may properly be 
devoted. As we~ have seen, the sul'Vivor became entitled to the 
essets, which he had the right to sell, mortgage, and dispose of, 
in order to pay the dPbts and close up the affairs of the c<>part· 
nership. If he had the power to sell or mortgage, it would 
seem to follow that he had the power to borrow and pledge 
the assets for the repayment of the loan, and the amount bor-
rowed having been faithfully applied in liquidation of the debts 
of the copartnership, equity wHl recognize the justness of the 
claim of the party making the loan. Cases may a·rise where 
the exercise of such authority may be highly expedient, if n<>t 
necessary, for the preservation of the rights of creditors and 
persons interested in the distribution of the assets of the firm; 
as, for instance, creditors may by levy expose the assets to a 
forced public sale under circumstances. which would work 
great sacrifice to the estate. In case a survivor should be 
insoh·ent, be might be able to raise money by a pledge to repa, 
out of the partnership assets when be could not obtain it upon 
hie own credit. We do not see that harm could result to the 
other creditors by permitting this to be done; for it would 
not increase the obliga tione o_f the firm nor lessen their share 
in the distribution of the assets in case the ftrm be insolvent. 
It is not questioned but that the survivor had the right to turn 
out as a security or pledge the assets of the firm in payment 
for the money received by him. He oould have sold the assets 
uud repaid the money loaned at any time before executing the 
assignment, and without taint of fraud. It is not apparent 
how the rights of the parties are changed and the act of the 
Hurvivor made fraudulent by doing that in the assignment 
which he had the right to do immediately before executing it 
The precise question involved in this case does not appear 
to have been passed upon in any reported case, so far as we 
ha.ve been able to discoYer,_ except in Haynes vs. Brooks, 8 Civ. 
rroc. Rep. 106-113, where an assignment was made for the 
benefit of creditors by a surviving partner. In that case, as 
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in this, the creditors had loaned money to the surviving part-
ner to pay a note of the firm. VAN Vonsr, J., in commenting
upon the transaction, said: “If a firm obligation was retired
by the use of the money loaned or advanced by Brown & Co.,
the surviving partner would have been entitled to be repaid
out of the firm property. As the moneys of Brown & Co. in
fact paid a firm obligation, I see no objection in the subroga-
tion of them in equity to the rights of the surviving partner, or
to the regarding of them as entitled to be repaid out of the firm
assets. That works injustice tono one.” The learned judge
concluded by ordering the complain-t dismissed, thereby sus~
taining the validity of the assignment. This case was aflirmed
in the general term, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 528, and in this court in
116 N. Y. 487. This question, however, was not considered
in either of the appellate courts.
In Matter of the Estate of Davis and Dcsauque, 5 Whart.
(Pa.) 530, 34 Am. Dec. 574, it was held that after the dissolu-
tion of a copartnership the partner authorized to settle the
estate may borrow money on the credit of the firm for the
purpose of paying its debts, and if the credit be given in good
faith, though with a knowledge of the dissolution, and the
money borrowed be faithfully applied in liquidation of the
debts of the partnership, the creditor has a claim against the
firm assets, and is not to be considered as a creditor m-erely of
the partner borrowing.
In the -case of Prudhomme vs. Henry, 5 La. Ann. 700, it was
held that where a liquidating partner, after dissolution, has
lborrowed money to pay the debts of the firm, the partnership
is liable as far as the evidence shows that the money was used
for the benefit of the firm.
In the last two cases the partnerships were not insolvent,
and the question arose as between the partners. The courts,
however, recognized the claim of the lenders as one which
ought to be paid by the partnership.
In the case under consideration, it is true that the part-
nership is insolvent, and the question arises as between the
bank and creditors of the partnership, but the creditors have
not been harmed or prejudiced by the action of the bank in
loaning the money to the survivor, for the assets were
increased in value to the amount of the loan, and the money
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in this, the creditors had loaned mO'ney to the surviving part-
ner to pay a note of the firm. VAN VoRsT, J., in commenting 
upon the transaction, said: "If a :firm obligation was retired 
by the use o.f the money loaned o.r advanced by Brown & Co., 
the surviving partner would have been entitled to be repaid 
out of the firm property. As the moneys of Brown & Co. in 
fact paid a firm obligation, I see no. objection in the subroga-
tion of them in equity to the rights of the surviving partner, or 
to the regarding of them as entitled to be repaid out of the firm 
assets. That wo.rks injustice to · no one." The learned judge 
concluded by ordering the complaint dismissed, thereby sus. 
taining the validity of the assignment. This case was affirmed 
in the general term, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 528, and in this court in 
116 N. Y. 487. This question, however, was not considered 
in either of the appellate courts. 
In Matter of the Estate of Dav-is an.a Desauque, 5 Whart. 
(Pa.) 530, 34 Am. Dec. 574, it was held that after the dissolu-
tion of a copartnership the partner authorized to settle the 
estate may borrow money on the credit of the firm for the 
purpose of paying its debts, and if the credit be given in good 
faith, though with a knowledge of the dissolution, a.nd the 
money borrowed be faithfully appJ.ied in liquidation of the 
debts of the partnership, the creditor bas a claim against the 
firm assets, and is nat: to be considered as a creditor merely of 
the partner borrowing. 
In the -case of Prudhomme vs. Henry, 5 La. Ann. 700, it was 
held that where a liquidating partner, after dissolution, has 
cborrowed money to pay the debts <Yf the firm, the pal'ltnership 
is liable as far as the evidence shows that the money was used 
for the benefit of the firm. 
In the last two cases the partnerships were not insolvent, 
and the question arose as between the partners. The courts, 
however, recognized the claim of the lenders as one which 
ought to be paid by the partnership. 
In the case under consideration, it is true that the part-
nership is insolvent, and the question arises as between the 
bank and creditors of the partnership, but the creditors have 
not been harmed or prejudiced by the action of the bank fn 
loaning the money to the survivor, for the assets were 
increased in value to the amount of the loan, and the money 
·drawn out of the bank was applied in extinguishment of the 
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claims of the creditors, thus reducing to that extent the lia-
bilities of the firm. _
When a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner,
the survivor is entitled to the possession and control of the
joint pro-perty for the purpose of closing its business, and to
that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled
principles of the law of partnership, administer the affairs of
the firm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition
of the property, make provision for meeting its obligations.
He may, for th-at purpose, borrow money, and give a valid
pledge of the copartnership property for its repayment. Wil-
liams vs. Whcdon, 109 N. Y. 333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Emerson
vs. Senter, 118 U. S. 3-8; Fltepatriclc vs. Flannaga-n, 106 U. S.
648; Butehart vs. Dresser, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 542, 10 Hare 453;
In re Clough, Bradford Commercial Banking Co. vs. Cure, L. R.
31 Ch. Div. 326.
In Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119-124, Mr. Justice Srnose,
in commenting upo-n the rights of partners in a suit involving
the marshalling of the assets, says: “The right of each part-
ner extends only to the share of what may remain after pay-
ment of the debts 0-f the firm and a settlement of its accounts.
Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right
to .have the partnership property applied to the payment of
the partnership debts in preference to those of any individual
partner. This is an equity that partners have as between
themselves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the bene-
fit of the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have the
privilege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien,
to have the debts due to them paid out of the asset.s of a. firm
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its
several members. This equity is a derivative one. It is not
held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a sub-
rogation to the equity of the individual partner, to be made
effective only through him. Hence if he is not in a condition
to enforce it, the creditors of the firm cannot be: Rice vs.
Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of York County
Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446.
“But so lo-ng as the equity of the partner remains in him, so
long as he retains an interest in the firm assets as partner,
a court of equity will allow the creditors of the firm to avail
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claims of the creditors, thus reducing to that extent the lia, 
bilities of the firm. 
\Vhen a partnership is dissolved by the death of a partner, 
:the survivor is entitled to the possession and control of the 
joinrt: pro·perty for the purpose of closing its business, and to 
that end and for that purpose he may, according to the settled 
principles of the law of partnership, administer the affairs of 
the firm, and by sale, mortgage, or other reasonable disposition 
of the property, make provision for meeiting its obligations. 
He may, for that purpose, borrow money, and give a valid 
pledge of the copartnership property for its repayment. Wil-
iiams i;s. Whedon, 109 :N. Y. 333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460; Emerson 
fiB. Senter, 118 U. S. 3-8; Fitzpatrick vs. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 
64:8; Butcha1't vs. Dresser, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 542, 10 Hare 453; 
In re Clough, Bradford Commercial Banking Co. VB. Cure, L. B. 
31 Ch. Div. 326. 
In Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119-124, Mr. Justice STRONG, 
fn commentin~ upoon the rights of partners in a suit involving 
the marshalling of the assets, says: "The right of each part-
ner extends only to the share of what may remain after pay-
ment of the debts of the firm and a settlement of its accounts. 
Growing out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right 
. to have the partnership property applied to the payment of 
the partnership debts in preference to those of any individual 
partner. This is an equity that partners have as between 
themselves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the bene-
fit of the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have the 
privilege or preft'rence, sometimes l?osely denominated a lien, 
to have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm 
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its 
~everal members. This equity is a de.rivative one. It is not 
held or enforceable in their own right. It is practically a sub· 
rogation to the equity of the individual partner, to be made 
effective only through him. Hence if he is not in a condition 
to enforce it, the creditors of the firm cannot be: Rice vs. 
Barnard, 20 Vt. 47!l, 50 Am. Dec. 54; Appeal of York County 
Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. 
"But so long as the equity of the partner remains in him, so 
long as he retains an interest in the firm assets as partner, 
a court of equity will allow the creditors of the firm to avail. 
themselves of his equity and enforce through it the applica· 
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tion of those assets primarily to the payment of the debts due
them, whenever t-he property comes under its administration.”
In the case of Saunders rs. Reilly, 105 N. Y. 12, 59 Am. Rep.
472, it was held that a mere general creditor of a firm having
no execution or attachment has no lien whatever upon its per-
sonal assets; that while firm creditors are entitled to a prefer-~
ence over creditors of the individual members of the firm in
the payment of their debts out of the assets, in the course of
liquidation, their equity is not held or enforceable in their own
right, but it is a derivative one, practically a subrogation of
the equity of each individual partner to have the firm assets
applied primarily to the payment of its debts, and where no
such equity exists in favor of any member of the firm, the firm
creditors have none, and therefore where a judgment is recov-
ered againt all the members of a firm upon a joint obligation,
but not an indebtedness of the firm, the firm property may be
levied upon and sold on execution issued on the judgment;
See also Dimon vs. H azard, 32 N. Y. 65; Stanton vs. Westover,
101 N. Y. 265; Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 46;
Brown vs. H igginbotham, 5 Leigh, (Va.) 583, 27 Am. Dec. 618;
Peyton vs. Stratton, 7 Gratt, (Va) 380; Stebbins vs. Willard, 53
Vt. 665.
It appears to us that the conclusion is warranted from t-he
authorities referred to that where a person in good fatth loans
money to a surviving partner, and where the money is faith-
fully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities
of the firm, the -claim becomes one which in equity should be
paid out of the asset of the firm; and in an accounting
between the survivor with the personal representative of the
deceased partner, equity will recognize the right olf the sur-
viving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied
by him repaid out of the assets of the firm, -and an amgnment
so directing is not fraudulent. ’
Attention is called to the fact that the deceased partner
left a will making his surviv-or his sole devisee and lcgatee,
and it is claimed that he left no individual debts. If this were
so, it is not apparent that it would aficct the equities of the
bank, but the evidence is silent upon the question as to
whether or not the deceased left individual debts. The referee



















































































































































DURANT vs. Pn:BisoN'. • 409 
tion of those assets primarily to the payment of the debts due 
them, whenever the property comes under its administration." 
In the case of Saunders t·s. ReUly, 105 N. Y. 12, 59 Am. Rep. 
4:72, it was held that a mere genernl creditor of a firm having 
no execution or attachment has no lien whatever upon its per-
sonal assets; that while firm creditors are entitled to a prefer. 
ence over creditors of the individual members of the finn in 
the payment of their debts out of the assets, in the course of 
liquidation, their equity is not held or enforceable in their own 
right, but it is a derivative one, practically a subrogation of 
the equity of each individual partner to have the firm assets 
applied primarily to the payment of its debts, and where oo 
such equity exists in favor of any member of the firm, the firm 
creditors have none, and therefore where a judgmenrt is recov-
ered against all the members of a firm upon a joint obligation, 
but not an indebtedness of the firm, the firm property may be 
levied upon and sold on execution issued on the judgment 
See also Dimon t'8. Hazard, 32 N. Y. 65; Stanton vs. Westover, 
101 N. Y. 26u; Kirb11 vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) Ch. 46; 
Brown vs. Higginbotham, 5 Leigh, (Va.) 583, 27 Am. Dec. 618; 
Peyton vs. Stratton, 7 Grat~. (Va) 380; Stebbins vs. Willard, 53 
Vt. 665. 
It appears to us that the .conclusion is warranted from the 
authorities referred to that where a person in good fa/th loans 
money to a surviving partner, and where the money is faith-
fully applied by such partner in satisfaction of the liabilities 
of the firm, the 1:laim becomes one which in equity should be 
paid out of the assets of the firm; and in an accounting 
between the sur·viyor with the personal representative of the 
deceased p1artner, equity will recognize the right oif the sur-
viving partner to have the money so borrowed and applied 
by him repaid out of the assets of the ftrm, and an assignment 
so directing is not fraudulent. 
Attention is called to the fact that the deceased partn~r 
left a will making his survivor his sole devisee and legatee, 
and it is claimed that he left no individual debts. If this were 
so, it is not apparent that it would aff~ct the equities of the 
bank, but the evidence is silent up<m the question as to 
whether or not the deceased left individual debts. The referee 
refused to so find, and we cannot assume that there were 
none. 
62 
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It may also be claimed tha.t, the firm being insolvent, the
survivor has no equities to which the bank can be subrogated,
for the reason that he is liable individually for the payment of
the firm debts. But the bank is not asking for any relief by
way of subrogation; it is only defending the provision, already
made for it in the assignment, from the claim of fraud. Even
though both the firm and the survivor were insolvent, the sur-
vivor still had the right to have his contract recognized, and
to say which of the creditors should be paid first, and to so
provide in his assignment. Williams vs. Whedon, 109 N. Y.
333, 4 Am. St. Rep. 460.
It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a. new
trial granted, with costs to abide the final award of oosts.
Vmzx, J., dissents, upon the ground that the note preferred
in the assignment as a firm debt was simply an individual debt
of the surviving partner, who, as he did not bind the firm in
creating the debt, could bind neither it nor its property by
directing payment out of the firm assets.
Judgment reversed.
NOTE: See l\Iechem‘s Elem. of Partn.. § 268.
Compare also with cases in Subd. XV, post.
IIUMPHRIES vs. CHASTAIN.
Supreme Cou-rtof Georgia, 1848.
5 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Dec. 247.
Assumpsit on a note indorsed in the firm name of Chastain
& Harvey, the indorsement having been made by Harvey (now
insolvent), without the authority of C‘-hastain, after the disso
lution of the firm. Evidence, oflered to show that the indorse-
ment was in payment of a previous debt of the firm, having
been rejected, the plaintiff, after judgment against him,
brought error on that ground.
Lyon, for the plaintiff in error.
Strosicr, for the defendant in error.
















































































































































410 CASES 01' p A.llTllEBSIIIP. 
It may also be claimed that, the firm being insolvent, tbe 
survivor has no equities to which the bank can be subrogated, 
for the reason that be is liable individually for the payment of 
the firm debts. But the bank is not asking for any relief by 
way of subrogation; it is only defending the provision; already 
made for it in the assignment, from the claim of fraud. Even 
though both the firm and the survivor were insolveut, the sur-
vivor still bad the right to have his contract recognized, and 
to say which of the creditors should be paid first, arid to eo 
provide in bis assignment. WiUia1na va: Whedon, 109 N. Y. 
333, 4 Am. St. Rep .• GO. 
It follows that the judgment should be reversed, and a new 
trial granted, with costs to abide the final award of oosts. 
VANX, J., dissents, upon the ground that the note preferred 
in the assignment as a firm debt was simply an individual debt 
of the surviving partner, who, as he did not bind the firm In 
creating the debt, could bind neither it nor its property by 
directing payment out of the firm assets. 
Judgment reversed. 
NoTE: See Mechem"s Elem. of Partn .. § 2GS. 
Compare aLw with ca:ses in Subd. XV, post. 
HUMPHRIES vs. CHASTAIN. 
Supreme Court of Georgia~ 1848. 
6 Ga. 166, 48 Am. Deo. 247. 
Assumpsit on a note indorsed in the firm name of Cha.stain 
& Harvey, the indorsement having been made by Ha~vey (now 
Insolvent), without the authority of Cha.stain, after the disso-
lution of the firm. Evidence, offered to show that the indorse-
ment was in payment of a previous debt of the firm, having 
been rejected, the plaintiff, after judgment against him, 
brought error on that ground. 
Lyon, for the plaintiff in error. 
Strozier, for the defendant in error. 
VAN KI-IUBEN vs. PARMELEE. 411
\VARNER, J. The question made by the record in this case
is, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the copartner-
ship, can bind his copartner by a new contract, for the pay-
ment of a pre-existing copartnership debt.
' That after t-he dissolution of a copartnership, one copartner
cannot bind the other by indorsing a note in the copartnership
name, is, we think, well settled, both upon principle and
authority; and that the note so indorsed, is in payment of a
debt due by the copartnership, makes no difference. Lyon on
Part. 274; Sanford rs. lllickles, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Haekley vs.
Patrick, 3 Id. 536; Foltz vs. Pourie, 2 Desau. Eq. 40. In Bell vs.
Morrison, 1 Peters (U. S.) 352, it was held that a dissolution of
a copartnership puts an end to the authority of one partner
to bind the other; it operates as a revocation of all power to
create new contracts; and the court below did not err in reject-
ing the testimony offered, and ruling that Chastain was nort
bound by the iudorsement made by Harvey, in the name of the
partnership, after its dissolution.
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed.
NOTE: See l\Iechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 271, 272.
VAN KEUREN vs. PARMELEE.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1849.
2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322.
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, in favor of
the plaintiff, in assumpsit on a promissory note. The plea
was the tatute of limitations, and the only questi_on was,
whether, under the facts stated in the opinion by Bnoxsox, J.,
the apparent bar of the statute had been removed as against
all the makers, by a new promise ma.de by one only.
0'. W. Swift and H. Swift, for appellants, the makers not
parties to the new promise.
Dodge cfi Campbell, for the respondent, the holder of the note.
Bnoxsox, J. The question is on the statute of limitations;


















































































































































v AN KEG.REI vs. p AltllELEE. 
'VARNER, J. The question made by the record in this case 
Is, whether one partner, after the dissolution of the copartner-
ehip, can bind his copar.tner by a new contract, for the pay-
ment of a pre-existing copartnership debt. 
· That after the dissolution of a copartnership, one copartner I 
cannot bind the other by indorsing a note in the copa.rtnership . 
name, is, we think, well settled, both upon principle and 
authority; and that the note so indorsed, is in payment of a 
debt due by the copartnership, makes n<> difference. Lyon on 
Part. 274; Sanford i:s. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 224; Hackley va. · 
Patrick, 3 Id. 536; Foltz vs. Pourie, 2 Desau. Eq. 40. In Bell va. 
Morrison, 1 Peters (U.S.) 352, it was held that a dissolution of 
a copartnership puts a.n end to the authority of one partner 
to bind the other; it operates a.s a revocation of all power to 
create new contracts; and the court below did not err in reject-
ing the testimony offered, and ruling that Chastain wns nM 
bound by the iudorsement made by narvey, in the name of the 
partner1Jhip, after its dissolution. 
Let the judgment of the court below be affirmed. 
NOTE: Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §~ 271, 272. 
V.\N KEUREN vs. PARMELEE. 
Court of Appeals of New York, 1849. 
2 N. Y. 523, 61 Am. Dec. 822. 
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, in favor of 
the plaintiff, in assumpsit on a promissory note. The plea 
was the statute of limitations, and the only questjon was, 
whether, under the facts stated in the opinion by Bno~so:s, J,, • 
the apparent bar of the statute bad been removed ns against 
all the makers, by a new promise made by one only. 
O. W. Stcift and H . Swift, for appellants, the makers not 
parties to the new promise. 
Dodge c£ Campbell, for the respondent, the holder of the note. 
BnoNso~, J. The question is on the statute of limitations; 
and the case is shortly this: The plaintiff sues on a note ma.de 
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by three partners, on the first day of May, 1831, and payable
immediately. The partnership was dissolved in the spring of
I832; the suit was commenced in July, 1847, more than six-
teen years after the cause of action had accrued; and the jury
find a promise by “John Van Keuren, one of the defendants,”
within six years before the action brought, but they find no
promise by either of the other defendants. The new promise
by John Van Keuren was made more than nine years after
the partnership was dissolved, and more than four years after
an action upon the note had been barred by the statute of
Iimitatio-ns. It cannot but strike every one with some degree
of astonishment that the promise of one, made at such a time,
and under such circumstances, should bind all of the defend-
ants. But still the question must be considered upon author-
ity; and if the rule has been so settled, it must be followed,
whatever we may think of it as an original proposition.
» Before looking at the cases, I will inquire, for a moment,
h-ow the matter stands upon principle. And "however much it
may be out of the "ordinary course, I will begin by referring to
the statute. The words are: “The following actions [includ-
ing assumpsit] shall be commenced within six years next after
the cause of such action accrued, and not after.” 2 R. S. 295,
sec. 18. If the plaintiff sues on the note, “the cause of action
accrued” more than sixteen years before the suit was com-
menced, and of course the action is barred. There is but one
possible mode of escaping this difliculty, and that is by saying
that the plaintiff does not sue upon the note, but upon the new
promise; treating it as a new contract, springing out of, and
supported by, the original consideration. That will do very
well where the original promise was made by one, or if
by more than one, where all join in making the new
contract. But in this case, the new contract was made
by only one of the three original debtors; and the
question is, what binds the other two? As they did not
contract for themselves, it is not their agreement, unless
John Van Keuren, who made the new promise, had authority
to contract for them. The only authority claimed for him is,
that he had before been the partner of the other two. This
leads to an inquiry concerning the principle on which each
partner can bind all his associates. And it is generally agreed
















































































































































412 0-'.SES ON p .A.RTNERSHIP. 
by three partners, on the first day of :May, 1831, ·and payabl~ 
immediately. The partnersllip was dissolved in the spring of 
1832; the suit was commenced in July, 1847, more than six-
teen years after the cause of action had accrued; and the jury 
fi.nd a promise by "John Van Keuren, one of the defendants," 
within six years before the action brought, but they find no 
promise by either of the other defendants. The new promise 
by John Yan Keuren was made m<>re than nine years after 
the partnersbip was dissolved, and more than four years after 
an nction upon the note had been barred by the statute of 
limitations. It cannot but strike every one with some degree 
of astonishment that the promise of one, made at s_uch a time, 
and under such circumstances, should bind all of the defend-
ants. But still the question must be considered upon author-
ity; and if the rule has been so settled, it must be followed, 
whatever we may think of it as an original proposition. 
Before looking at the cases, I will inquire, for a moment, 
bow the matter stands upon principle. And however much it 
may be out of the -ordinary course, 1 will begin by ref erring to 
the statute. The words are: "The foJl()wing actions [in~lud­
iiig assumpsit] shall be commenced within six years next after 
the cause of such action accrued, and n()t after." 2 R. S. 295, 
sec. 18. If t11e plaintiff sues on the ne>te, "the cause of action 
accrued'' more than sixteen years before the suit was com· 
menced, and of course the action is barred. 'fhere is but one 
possible mode of escaping this difficulty, and that is by saying 
that the plaintiff does not sue upon the note, but upon the new 
promise; treating it as a new contract, springing out of, and 
supported by, the original consideration. That will do very 
well where the original promise was made by one, or if 
by more than one, where all join in making the new 
contract. But in this case, the new contract was made 
by only one of the three original d<>btors; and the 
question is, what binds the other two? As they did not 
contract for themselves, it is not their agreement, unless 
John Yan KeurPn, who made the new promist>, had authority 
to contract for them. The only authority claimt'<l for him is, 
that be bad before been the partner of the othPr two. This 
·leads to an inquiry concerning the principle on which each 
partner can bind all his associates. Aud it is g-t>nerally agreed 
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within the scope of the partnership, is deemed to be the author~
ized agent of all his fellows. The authority is presumed from
the nature and necessity of the case; for without it, third per-
sons would not be safe in dealing with one of the associates,
and the business of the partnership could not be carried on
with success. Now, how long does this presumed agency con-
tinue? Clearly, no longer that the necessity for it exists; and
for most purposes, the necessity ceases with the termination of
the partnership. When that is dissolved, there is no l-onger
any ground for presuming an agency, except as to such things
as are indispensable in winding up the concerns of the com-
pany. If there be no agreement to the contrary, it may be
presumed that each partner still has authority to dispose of
the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay debts,
and give proper acquittances. But there is no ground what-
ever for presuming a power to make new promises or engage-
ments in the na.me of the firm, even though they only change,
without increasing the prior obligations of the partners. iVe
shall presently see, upon authority, that they have no such
power. -
In reference to the statute of. limitations, a distinction has
sometimes been taken between a new promise ma.de before the
statute has run, and one made after the parties have been
exonerated by the lapse of time. That would sustain the defense
in this case, for the statute had run upon the claim long before
the new promise was made. But the defense may be rested
upon the still broader ground, that the dissolution of the part-
nership was a revocation of the agency, and the power of the
partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from
that moment.
The statute of 21 James I, c. 16, which limited actions on
promises to six years, was not very well received by the legal
pl'0f6SSl0I1;_ and although the ea.rly decisions under it are not
open to much observation, it was not long before the courts
began to regard the statute with disfavor, and to resort to the
,most ubtle constructions for the purpose of restricting its
influence. There was a period when one who was spoken to on
the subject of an old debt could not well give a civil answer,
without saying enough to take the case out of the statute. At
Ia later period, and since the commencement of the present cen-
















































































































































V.UlT KEUBEN vs. PARllBLEB. 
within the scope of the partnership, is deem~ to betbe auth~r. 
ized agent of all his fellows. The authority is presumed from 
the nature and necessity of the case; f<>r without it, third per-
sons would not be safe in dealing with one of the associates, 
and the business of the partnership could not be carried on 
with success. Now, how long does this presumed agency con-
tinue? Clearly, no longer that the necessity for it exists; and 
for most purp<>Ses, the necessity ceases with the termination o-f 
the partnership. When that is dissolved, there is no longer 
any ground for presuming an agency, except as to such tJbings 
~s are indispensable in winding u.p the ooneerna of the co-m~ 
pany. If there be no agreement to the contrary, it may be 
presumed that each partner still bas authority to dispose of 
the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay debts, 
end give proper acquittances. But there is no ground wha~­
ever for presuming a power to make new promises or engage-
ments in the name of the firm, even though they only change, 
without increasing the prior obligations of the partners . . We 
shall presently see, upon authority, tha1: they have no such 
power. 
In reference to the statute of limitations, a distinction bas 
sometimes been taken between a new promise ma.de b~f ore the 
statute bas run, and one made after the parties have been 
exonerated by the la;pseof time. That would sustain the defense 
in this case, for the statute had run. upon the claim long before 
the new promise was made. But the defense may be rested 
upon the still brooder ground, that the dissolution of the part-
nerNhip was a revocation of the agency, a.nd the power of the 
partners to bind each other by new engagements ceased from 
that moment. 
The statute of 21 James I, c. 16, which limited actions on 
promises to six years, was not yery wen received by the legal 
profession; · and although the early decisions under it are not 
open to much observation, it was not long bef~re the courts 
began to regard the statute with disfavor, and to reso.rt to the 
.most subtle constructions for the purpose of restricting its 
influence. There was a pPriod when one who was 8poken. to on 
the subject of an old debt could not well give a civil answer, 
without saying enough to take the case out of the statute. At 
·a later period, and since the commencement of the present ce~­
:tury, the conrls began to regard this as a beneficial etutut~ 
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statute of repose—and commenced the difiicult task of retrac-
ing their steps. But there were many obstacles in the way of
the backward movement, and the legislature, both here and in
England, took up the matter, and went beyond the old statute,
by requiring the new promise or acknowledgment to be in
writing. In consequence of the early departure from prin-
ciple in the construction of the statute, the different views
which prevailed at different periods, and the unequal pace of
the courts in attempting to get back on to solid ground, the
books are full of conflicting decisions; and any attempt to
reconcile them would be a. useless waste of time. I shall
not, therefore, go into a general review of the cases.
The leading case on this question in England is Whitco-mb
vs. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, where Lord MANSFIELD and his asso-
ciates held, that part payment, witl1i_1Ls,ix..years, by one of four
joint and several makers of a promissory note, took the case
out 0-f the statute of limitations as to all of the makers. Thatt
case is distinguishable from the one before us in two particu-
lars. First, it does not appear in that case that the action was
barred pri-or to the payment, while here the statute bar was
complete long before the new promise was made. Second,
t-hat was the case of a payment, which has been deemed much
safer ground to go upon than a new promise or acknowledg-
ment. Lord TE1~:'rEnnnx’s act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, which requires
a writing in the case of a new promise or acknowledgment,
leaves the effeort of a payment untouched; and such, in sub
stance, is the provision in our recent code. Stat. 1849, p. 638.
sec. 110. In Wyatt vs. Hudson, 8 Bing. 309, Tmnan, C. J., said:
“The payment of principal or interest stands on a different
footing from the making of promises, which are often rash
or ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without
deliberation, and payment is an unequivocal act, so little liable
to misconstruction as not to be open to the objection of an
ordinary acknowledgment.” There is force in these remarks.
But I do not intend to lay much stress upon the distinctions
between that case and the one at bar. Lord l\fAi\'sr1m.n made
no distinction between the influence of a payment and a prom-
ise, and if his reasoning is sound, it reaches this ease. His
words are, “payment by one is payment for all, the one acting
virtually as agent for the rest, and in the same manner, an
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statute of repose--.'.and ·commenced the difficult task of retrac-
ing their steps. Bot there were many obstacles in the way of 
the baekward movement, and the legislature, both here and in 
England, took o.p the matter, and went beyond the old statute, 
by requiring the new promise ()(' acknowledgment to be in 
writing. In consequence of the early departure from prin· 
ciple in the oonstructi-0n of the sta:tute, the different views 
which prevailed at different perio.ds, and the unequal pace of 
the cou.rts in attempting to get back on to solid ground, the 
books are full of conflicting decisions; and any attempt to 
reconcile them would be a us<>less waste of time. I shall 
not, therefore, go into a general review of' the cases. 
The leading case on this question in England is Whitcomb 
1'B. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652, where Lord MAXSFIELD and his asso-
cjates held, that pa.rt payment, within sjqears, by one of fow-
joint and seveml makers of a promissory note, took the case 
out of the statute of limihltions as to all of the makers. Thart 
case is distinguisha~le from the one before us in two particu-
lars. First, it does not appear in that case that the action was 
barred prior to the payment, while here the statute bar was 
complete long before the new promise was made~ Second, 
t•hat was the case of a payment, which has been deemed much 
safer ground to go upon than a new promise or acknowledg-
ment. I ... ord TE:-1'.TERDEx's act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, which requires 
a writing in the case of a new promise or acknowledgment, 
leaves the effect of a payment untouched; and such, in sub-
stance, is the provision in our recent code. Stat. 1849, p. 638. 
sec. 110. In Wyatt tis. Hodson, 8 Bing. 309, T1:sDAL, C. J., said: 
"The payment of principal or interest stands on a different 
footing from the making of promises, which are often rash 
or ill interpreted, while money is not usually paid without 
deliberation, and payment is an unequivocal a.ct, so little liable 
to misconstruction as not to be open t-0 the objection of an 
ol"dinary acknowledgment." There is force in these remarks. 
But I do not intend to lay much stress upon the distinctions 
between that case and the one at bar. Lord l\IAI'\s1nEr.o made 
no distinction betw(>{'n the influence of a payment and a prom· 
ise, and if his reasoning is sound, it reaches this case. His 
words are, "payment by one is payment for all, the one acting 
virtually as agent for the rest, and in the same manner, an 
admission by one is an admission by all, and the law raises 
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the promise to pay, when the debt is admitted to be due.”
Nothing but the great name of Lord Ms1\'sru-11.1) could have
given currency to this reasoning. It is plain enough that
“payment by one is payment for all,” so far as rela.tes to the
satisfaction of the debt, but that fact neither shows, nor has
it any tendency to show, a new promise or acknowledgment
by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an
admission that the debt is due; and like any other admission,
it can only affect the party who makes it, unless he has
authority to speak for others, as well as himself. A join/t
debtor has no such authority. It cannot be justly inferred
from the relation which he sustains to the other joint debt-
ors; and though he may conclude himself by an admission,
he cannot conclude them. His lordship, after saying that “pay-
ment by one is payment for all,” adds, “the one acting virtually
as agent for the rest.” If the meaning be, that there is such
an agency as will make the payment by one inure to the bene~
fit of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enough, but
it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning
be, that one join-t debtor is the agent of the others for the pur-
pose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming
the very point to be proved, and the assumption had neither
authority nor argument to support it. There is no-thing in
the relation of joint debtors from which such an agency can
be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie which links
them together, and from the nature of the case, payment of
the debt is the only thing which one has authority to do for
all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been
made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed
at that time to get around the statute of limitations. It was
in direct conflict with Bland vs. Haselrig,2 Vent. 151,which was
decided ninety years before, when the statute was in better
repute; and which is an authority in point, against the judg-
ment under review. The case was this: in assumpsit against
four,’ the statute of limitations was pleaded, and the verdict
was, that one of the defendants promised within six years,
but the others did not. Upon this verdict, judgment was ren-
dered for the defendants. The case of Whiteomb vs. Whiting,
2 Doug. 652, has been several times questioned in England,
and in Atkins rs. Tredgold, 2 Barn. & Cress. 23, t-he court seem-ed
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the promise to pay, when the debt i.s admitted to be doe." 
Nothing bot the great name of Lord MANSFIELD could have 
given curren.cy to this reasoning. It is plain enough that 
"payment by one is payment for all," so far as relates to the 
eatisfaction of the debt, but that fa.ct neither shows, nor has 
it any tendency fo show, a new promise or acknowledgment 
,. by the other joint debtors. Payment is nothing more than an 
admission that the debt is due; and like any other admission, 
it can only affect tlte party who makes it, unless he has 
authority to speak for others, as well as himself. A joirut 
debtor has no such authority. It cannot be justly inferred 
from the relation which he sustains to the other joint debt· 
ors; and though he may conclude himself by an admission, 
he cannot conclude them. His lordship, after saying that "pay· 
ment by one is payment for all," adds, "the one acting virtually 
as agent for the rest." If the meaning be, that tihere is such 
an agency as will make the payment by one inure to the bene-
fit of all the joint debtors, the reasoning is well enough, but 
it proves nothing on the point in controversy. If the meaning 
be, that one joint debtor is the agent of the others for the pur-
pose of making admissions to bind them, that was assuming 
the very point to be proved, and the assumption had neither 
authority nor argument to support it. There is nothing in 
the relation· of joint debtors from which such an agency can 
be inferred. A joint obligation is the only tie which links 
them toge.ther, and from the nature of the case, payment of 
the debt is the only thing which one has authority to do for 
all. I am persuaded that such a decision would not have been 
made had it not been for the strong disposition which prevailed 
at that time to get around the statute of limitations. It wa~ 
ln direct conflict with Bland vs. Hasclrig,2 Vent. 151, which was 
decided ninety years before, when the statute was in better 
repu.te; and which is an authority in point, against the judg-
ment under review. The case was this: in assumpsit against 
tour,· the statute of limitations was pleaded, and the verdict 
was, that one of the defendants promised within six years, 
but the others did not. Upon this verdict, judgment was ren-
dered for the defendants. The case of Whitcomb t:B. Wliiti11!1, 
2 Doug. 652, has been several times questioned in England, 
and in Atkins vs. Trcdgold, 2 Barn. & Cress. 23, t·he court seemed 
mnch disposed to disregard it. But the authority of a 
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great name has proven more than a. match for common sense;
and the decision in Douglas is now regarded as good law in
England. Perh_a-m vs. Raynal, 2 Bing. 306; Pritchard vs. Draper,
1 Russ. & M. 191. But it is not so in this country. Although
the case in Douglas has been followed in some of the states,
it has been questioned in others; and in several of the states,
and by ~the supreme court of the United States, it has been
wholly disregarded. I shall hereafter have occasion to refer
to some of the oases.
I will now inquire how the question stands in this state. It
first ca-me up in Smith vs. I/udlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, nearly
forty years ago, when the statute of limitations was in bad
repute, and when few men ventured to think for themselves
after Lord Mmsrlann had spoken. The court said, that where
the original debt was proved, the confession of one partner,
though made after thedissolution of the partnership, would
bind the other, so as to prevent him fro-m availing ‘himself of
"the statute of limitations. This was said on the authority of
;Whitcomb vs. Whiting, already mentioned, and Jackson vs. Fair-
bank, 2 H. Black. 340, which was decided on t-he authority of
the same case, though it went a more extravagant length.
Of the case in Douglas I have already spoken; and of the case
in Blackstone it is enough to say that it has been condemned
in England, Brandram vs. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Ald. 463; and
-overruled in this state; Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.)
266, 291. I may add, that what was said in Smith vs. Ludlow,
about binding one partner by the confession of the other,
made after the partnership had been dissolved, was not neces-
sary to the decision of the cause; for there had been con-
fessions by both of the partners, which the court held sufficient
to take the case out of the statute, without making the
admission of one evidence against the other. Still, on the
authority of this case, and those in Douglas and Blackstone,
it was decided in Johnson vs. Beardslce, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 3, that
the promise of one joint debtor was suflicient to take the case
out of the statute. And in Patterson vs. Ohoatc, 7 Wend (N. Y_.)
441, it was held, that although one partner can not after a dis-
solution bind the other by a new contract, yet his acknowledg-
ment of a previous debt due from the partnership will bind
the other partner, so far as to prevent him from availing him-
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great name bas proven more than e. match for common sense; 
and the decision in Douglas is now rega·rded as good 18.w in 
England. Perlt.am vs. Raynal, 2 Iling. 306; Pritchard vs. Draper, 
· 1 Russ. & M. 191. But it is not so in this country. Although 
the case in Douglas bas been followed in s<>me of the states, 
it has been questioned in others; and in several of the states, 
and by ·the supreme court of the United States, it bas been• 
wholly disreg-.irded. I shall hereafter have occasion to refer 
to some of the oases. 
I will now inquire how the question stands in this state. It 
first ca.me up in Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267, nearly 
forty years ago, when the statute of limitations was in bad 
repute, and when few men ventured to think for themselves 
after Lord MANS.FIELD had spoken. The court said, that where 
·the original debt was proved, the confession of one partner, 
though made after the dissolution of the partnership, wc:>nld 
bind the oth~r, so as to prevent him from availing himself of 
the statute of limitations. This was said on the authority of 
:Whitcomb vs. Whiting, already mentioned, and Jackson vs. Fair· 
bank, 2 H. Black. 340, which was decided on the alllth<>rity of 
the same case, though it went a more extravagant length. 
Of the case in Douglas I have already spoken; and of the case 
in Blackstone it is enough to say that it bas been condemned 
in England, Rrandram vs. Wharton, 1 Barn. & Aid. 463; and 
·overruled in this state; Roosevelt vs. ,lf ark, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 
'.266, 291. I may add, that what was said in Smith t'S. Ludlow, 
about binding one partner by the confession of the other, 
made after the partnership had been dissolved, was not neces-
sary to the decision of the cause; for there ha.d been con-
fessions by both of the partners, which the court held sufficient 
to take the case out of the statute, without making the 
admission of one evidence against the other. Still, on the 
authority of this case, and those in Douglas and Blackstone, 
it wa.s decided in Johnson '!:S. Beardslee, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 3, that 
the promise of one joint debtor was sufficient to take the case 
out of the statute. And in Patterson vs. Choate, 7 Wend (N. Y.) 
441, it was held, that although one partner can not after a die:-
eolution bind the othe1· by a new contract, yet his aclmowledg-
ment of a previous debt due from the partnership will bind 
the 01ther partner, so far as to prevent him from availing him, 
self of the statute of limitations. This doctrine has been men-
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tioned on other occasions: Hopkins rs. Banks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.)
653; Roosevelt vs. Marla, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 291; Dean vs.
Hezc-it, 5 \Vend. (N. Y.), 262; but there -are, I believe, no other
decisions in this state to the like effect. In Patterson vs. Choate,
the six years had run, and the bar was complete before the
acknowledgment was made. No one, I venture to say, who
does not go upon the ground that the statute of limitations
ought not to be inforeed, can assign a solid reason for the
distinction between contracting a new debt against a former
partner, and making an acknowledgment which shall charge
him with that which, though once a debt, has ceased to be so
by the operation of law. I agree with the late Chief Justice
SPENCER, in Sands vs. Gelston, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 519, that “the
statute of limitations is the law of the land; ” and that in point
of principle “there is no substantial difference between a debt
barred by the statute of limitations and the debt for the pay-
ment of which the debtor has been exonera.ted by a discharge
under a bankrupt or insolvent act.” Still, if there was n-0
counterbalance in the adjudications of our own courts, I
should feel bound to follow the two or three cases which sup-
port the plaintiff’s claim, and leave reforms to the legislature.
But those cases conflict, in principle, with many other deci-
sions in this state, and cannot be supported.
5 Although the rule is different in England in relation to
admissions concerning partnership transactions, Wood vs.
Braddiek, 1 Taunt. 104, it has been settled by a series of adjudi-
cations in this state that the authority of partners to bind
each other by any undertaking or admission, even though it
relate to partnership transactions, ceases with the partner-
ship. In Hackley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, a.lthough
it was mentioned in the notice of dissolution that Hastie, one
of the partners, would adjust the unsettled business of the
partnership, it was held that his subsequent admission of a
balance due from the firm to the plaintiffs on account would
not bind his copartner. The court said it was “a clear
case. After a dissolution of a copartnership the power
of one party to bind the. other wholly ceases. There is
no reason why his acknowledgment of an account should
bind his copartners, any more than his giving a promissory
note in the name of the firm or any other act.” This doctrine
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tioned on other occasions: Hopkins cs. Banks, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 
.653; Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 291; Dean vs. 
Hew·it, 5 'Vend. (N. Y.), 262; but there .are, I believe, no other 
decisions in this state to the like effecit. In Patterson vs. Choate, 
the six years had run, and the bar was complete before the 
acknowledgment was made. No one, I venture to say, who 
does not go upon the ground that the statute of limitations 
ought not to be in forced, can assign a solid reason for the 
distinction between contracting a new debt against a former 
partner, and making an ackn-0wledgmeut which shall charge 
him with that which, though once a debt, has cea:sed to be so 
by the operation of law. I agree with the late Chief Justice 
SrE!\CEn, in Sa11ds vs. Gelston, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 519, that "the 
8tatute of limitations is the law of the land;" and .that in point 
of principle "there is no substantial difference between a debt 
barred by the statute of limitations and the debt for the pay-
ment of which the debtor bas been exonerated by a discharge 
under a bankrupt or insolvent act." Still, if there was no 
counterbalance in tlie adjudicati-Ons of our own courts, I 
should feel bound to follow the two or three cases which sup-
port the plaintiff's elaim, and leave reforms to the legislature. 
But those cases conflict, in principle, with many other deci-
sions in this state, and cannot be supported. 
Although the rule is different in England in relation oo 
admissions concerning partnership transactions, Wood vs. 
Braddick, 1 Taunt. 104, it has beep settled by a series of adjudi-
cations in this state that the authority of partners to bind 
each other by any undertaking or admission, even though it 
rela:te t-0 partnership transactions, ceases with the partner-
ship. In Hackle1J 1iS. Patrick, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 536, a.lthough 
it was mentioned in the notice of dissolution that Hastie, one 
of the partners, would adjust itbe unsettled business of the 
partnership, it wa!'I held that his subsequent admission of a 
balance due from the firm to the plaintiffs on account would 
not bind his copartner. The court said it was "a clear 
case. After a dissolution of a copartnership the power 
of one party to bind the . other wholly ceases. There is 
no reMon why his acknowledgment of an account should 
bind his copartners, any more than his giving a promissory 
note in the name of the firm or any other acit." This doctrine 
was reasserted and applied in Sanford vs. Mickles, 4 Johns. (N. 
53 
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Y.) 224, where it was held that a partner to whom authority
had been given on the dissolution to collect and pay debts,
could no-t indorse a promissory note belonging to the firm
so as to pass the title to the indorsee. See Yale vs. Eamcs,
1 Met. (Mass) 486. In Walden vs. She-rburne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.)
409, it was again decided that the admission by one of the part-
ners, after a dissolution, of a balance aga.inst the firm, did not
bind the other partner. And where the notice of dissolution
stated that the business would be settled by one of the part-
ners, who was duly authorized to sign the name of the firm
for that purpose, it was held that such partner could not renew
ta. note previously given by the firm, and which was running
in the bank at the time of the dissolution. National Bank vs.
Norton, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 57 2. Mitchell rs. Ostrom, 2 Id. 520, asserts
the same general doctrine. And in Baker vs. Stackpoole, 9
Cow. 420, 18 Am. Dec. 508, the rule that one partner, after a
dissolution, cannot bind his fellows by an admission relating to
partnership transactions, was sanctioned by the unanimous
judgment of the court for the correction of errors.
Enough ha, I think, been said to justify the remark, that
I the two or three cases on which the plaintiff relies cannot be
supported. They conflict in principle with a series of decisions
spreading over a period of forty yca.rs, and including a deter-
mination of the court of last resort. -
But this is not all. Since the supreme court first fell into
rthe error of following Whitcomb vs. Whiting, the course of
decision upon the statute of limitations has undergone a great
change in this country, and particularly in this state. At the
former period, the statute amounted to little more, in judicial
construction, than a ground for presuming the debt paid,
which might be rebutted by the mere admission that such was
‘ not the fact. But the law is not so now. There must be a
promise, a new contract, though founded on the original con-
‘, sideration, to take a case out of the statute. If the promise is
l not express, the case must be such that it can be fairly implied.
There must, at the least, be a plain admission that the debt is
due, and that the party is willing to pay it. Allen vs. Webster,
15 \Vend. (N. Y.) 284; Stafford vs. Richardson, Id. 302; Bell rs.
‘Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 362. It is the new promise and not
the mere acknowledgment that revives the debt and takes it
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Y.) 2,24, where it was held that a partner to whom authority 
had been given on the dissolution to collect and pay debts, 
oould not indorse a promissory note belonging to the firm 
so as to pass the title to the indorsee. See Yale vs. Eames, 
1 .Met. (Mass.) 486. In Walden vs. Sherburne, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 
409, it was again decided that the admission by one of the part-
ners, after a dissolution, of a balance against the firm, did not 
bind the <Yther partner. And where the notice of dissolution 
stated that the business would be settled by one of the part-
ners, who was duly authorized to sign the name of the firm 
for that purpose, it was held that such partner could not renew 
·a note previously given by the firm, and which was running 
·in the bank at the time of the dissolution. National Bank vs. 
Norton, 1 llill (N. Y.) 57~. Mitchell i:s. Ostrom, 2 Id. 5~0, asserts 
the same general doctrine. And in Baker fiB. Stackpoole, 9 
Cow. 420, 18 Am. Dec. 508, the rule that one partner, after a 
dissolution, cannot bind his fellows by an admission relating to 
partnership transactions, wru1 sanctioned by the unanimous 
judgment of the oonrt for the correction of errors. 
Enough has, I think, been said to justify the remark, that 
the two or three cases on which the plaintiff relies cann<>t be 
supported. They conflict in principle with a serie8 of decisions 
spreading over a period of forty years, and in.eluding a deter-
mination of the court of last resort. 
But this is not all. Since the supreme court first fell into 
ithe error of following Wltitcomb vs. lVltiting, the course of 
decision upon the statute of limitations bas undergone a great 
-change in this country, and particularly in this state. At the 
former period, the statute amounted to little more, in judicial 
construotion, than a ground for presuming the debt paid, 
which might be rebutted by the me1·e admission that such was 
- not the fact. But the law is not so now. There must be a 
promise, a new contract, though founded on the original con-
. sideration, to take a case out of the statute. If the promise is 
r not express, the case must be such that it can be fairly implied. There must, at the least, be a plain admission that the debt is due, and that the party is willing to pay it. Allen vs. Webster, 
15 \Vend. (N. Y.) 284; Stafford fiB. Richanlson, Id. 302; Bell vs. 
-Morrison, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 362. It is the new promise and not 
the mere acknowledgment that revives the debt and takes it 
out of the statute. Roosevelt vs. Mark, 6 Johns (N. Y.) Ch. 290. 
l
|
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This doctrine is sustained by many decisions in other states,
but I do not think it necessary to cite them.
The case of Whitcomb vs. Whiting has, to a limited extent,
been followed in Massachusetts: Cady vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick.
400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge vs. Gray, 14 Id. 55, 25 Am. Dec.
358; Sigourney vs. Drury, Id. 387, 391, 392; Final vs. Burrill, 16
Id. 401. In Connecticut: Bond vs. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336; Goit
vs. Tracy, 8 Id. 268; Austin vs. Bostwicl-a, 9 Id. 496; Clark vs.
Sigourncy, 17 Id. 511, 20 Am. Dec. 110. In Maine: Parker vs.
Merrill, 6 Greenl. 41; Pike vs. Warren, 15 Me. 390; Dins-more vs.
Dinsmore, 21 Id. 433; Shepley vs. Waterhouse, 22 Id. 497; and in
Vermont: Joslgn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Whcelock vs. Doolittle,
18 Id. -140. But I think that the judgment under review would
not be upheld in either of those states.
In North Carolina it has been held that the acknowledg-
ment of the -debt by one partner, though after the dissolution,
will prevent the operation of the statute. Mclntirc vs. Oliver,
2 Hawks 209, 11 Am. Dec. 760. And the same has been
decided in Georgia, providing the new promise is made before
the action is barred, but not when the new pro-mise is made
afterwards, as it was in the case before us. Brewster vs.
Hardeman, Dudley 138. It has been decided by -the court of
appeals in South Carolina, that a promise by one partner,
made after the dissolution, and after the statute had run, will
not charge the other partner. Steele vs. Jennings, 1 McMull.
297. In the Ewetcr Bank vs. Sullivan, 6 N. H. 124, the authority
of Whitcomb vs. Whiting was wholly denied, and the court held
that a payment by one of the joint makers of a promissory
note did not take the case out of the statute as to the other.
In Alabama, a promise by the principal debtor will not revive
the demand against a co-debtor, who is a surety. Lowther vs.
Chappel, 8 Ala. 353, 42 Am. Dec. 643. In Tennessee, a promise
by one partner after the dissolution of the partnership, to pay a
note made by the firm, does not take the case out of the statute
of limitations as to the other partner. Belotc’s Ea.-’rs vs.
Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Muse vs. Donelson, 2 Humph. 166, 36 Am.
Dec. 309. This is also the rule in Pennsylvania. Levy vs.
Cadet, 17 Serg. & R. 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight vs. Craig-
head, 1 Pen. & ‘V. 135. It is also held in Indiana, that the
power of one partner to bind the other by the admission of a.
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This doctrine is sustained by many decisions in other states, 
but I do not think it necessary to cite them. 
The case o.f Whitcomb vs. Whiting bas, to a limited extent, 
been followed in Massachusetts: Cady t:B. Slwplterd, 11 Pick. 
400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Bridge vs. Gray, 14 Id. 55, 25 Am. Dec. 
358; Sigourney t'B. Drury, Id. 387, 3Ut, 3!):!; Viual vs. Burtill, 16 
Id. 401. In Connecticut: Bond VB. Lathrop, 4 Conn. 336; Coit 
vs. Tracy, 8 Id. 268; Austin VB. Bostwick, 9 Id. 4tlG; Olm·k vs. 
S·igourney, 17 Id. 511, 20 Am. Dec. 110. In Maine: Parker vs. 
Merrill, 6 Greenl. 41; l'i.ke vs. Warren, 15 Me. 390; Dinsmore n. 
Dinsmore, 21 Id. 433; Shepley vs. Waterhouse, 22 Id. 497; and in 
Vermont: Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 3u3; Wheelock vs. Doolittle, 
18 Id. 440. But I think that the judgment under review would 
not be upheld in either of those states. 
In North Carolina it bas been held that the ackno-wledg-
ment of the debt by one partner, though after the dissolution, 
will prevent the operation of the statute. Mcintire vs. Olfocr, 
2 Hawks 209, 11 Am. Dec. 760. And the same has been 
decided in Georgia, providing the new promise is made before 
the action is barred, but not when. the new promise is made 
afterwards, as it was in the case before us. Brewster vs~ 
Hardeman, Dudlt>y 138. It has been decided by .fhe court of 
appeals in South Carolina, that a promise by one partner, 
made after the dissolution, and after the statute had run, will 
not charge the other partner. Steele vs. Jennings, 1 Mc:Mull. 
297. In the Exeter Bank vs. Sttllit;an., 6 N. H. 124, the authority 
of Whitcomb 1;s. Whiting was wholly denied, and the court held 
that a payment by one of the joiµt makers of a promissory 
note did not take the case out of the statute as to the other. 
In Alabama, a promise by the principal debtor will not revive 
the demand against a co-debtor, who is a surety. Lowther vs. 
r Chappel, 8 A la. 353, 4.2 Am. Dec. 64ft In Tennessee, a promise 
by one partner after the dissolution of the parf:nership, to pay a 
note made by the firm, does not take the case out of the statute : 
of limitartions as to the other partner. Belotc's E:c'rs vs. · 
Wynne, 7 Yerg. 534; Jf1ise vs. Donelson, 2 Ilumph. 166, 36 Am .. 
Dec. 309. This is also the rule in Pennsylvania. Levy vs. 
Cadet, 17 Serg. & R. 126, 17 Am. Dec. 650; Searight vs. Craig-
head, 1 Pen. & ,V. 135. It is also held in Indiana, that the 
• power of one partner to bind the other by the admission of a 
debt ceases with the partnership. Yandes t1B. Lefavour, 2 
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Blackf. 371. And in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, the supreme
court of the United States followed the decisions in Kentucky,
and held that the dissolution of the partnership p-ut an end to
the authority of the partners to bind each other by any new
engagement, and consequently that the acknowledgment of a
debt by one partner, after the dissolution, would not take the
case out of the statute of limitations. The elaborate argument
of Mr. Justice Sronv, who delivered the opinion of the court,
covers the whole field of discussion, and stands on principles,
which, though they may be disregarded, cannot be over-
thrown. -
I have not stopped to inquire whether the statute operates
upon the debt or the remedy, for though this might be a point
to be considered in a court of conscience, it is of no practical
importance in a court of law. \Ve are not dealing with moral,
but with legal obligations, and it is idle to talk of_a debt where
there is no legal obligation to pay it.
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and
that judgment should be rendered for the defendants on the
verdict.
Jnwn'r'r, C. J., also delivered a written opinion in favor of
reversal.
And thereupon the judgment of the supreme court was
reversed, and judgment awarded for the defendants on the
special verdict.
NOTE: Compare with the two eases following. See also a, valuable note
to the above casein 51 Am. Dec. 330. Three several views are represented
in the cases. One—that of the reasoning in the principal case-—that one
partner cannot after dissolution bind the others by a new promise; another
—tha.t of the following case—-that he may do so if the statutory period has
not yet elapsed; and a third-—hehl in a. few cases—that he may bind the
others notwithst tnding the operation of the statute. as in Wheelock vs.
Doolittle, 18 Vt. 440, 46 Am. Dec. 163. The last view held at one time in
North Carolina has there been changed by statute. See Parsons on Part-
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Blackf. 371. And in Bell vs. Morri8on, 1 Pet. 351, the supreme 
court of the United States followed the decisions in Kentucky, 
and held that the dissolution of the partnership put an end to 
the authority of the partners to bind each other by any new 
engagement, and consequently that the acknowledgment of a 
debt by one partner, after the dissolution, would not take the 
case out of the statute of limitatio.ns. The elaborate argument 
of Mr. Justice STORY, w.ho delivered the opinion of the court, 
covers the whole field of discussion, and stands on principles, 
which, though they may be disregarded, cannot be over-
thrown .. 
I have not stopped to inquire whether the statute operates 
upon the debt or the remedy, for though this might be a point 
to be considered in a court of .conscience, it is of no practical 
importance in a court of law. \Ve are not dealing with moral, 
but with legal obli~ations, and it is idle to talk of_a debt where 
there is no legal obligation to pay it. 
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and 
that judgment should be rendered for the defendants on the 
verdict. 
JEWETT, C. J., also delivered a written opinion in favor of 
reversal. 
And thereupon the judgment of the sup~me court was 
reversed, and judgment awarded for the defendants on the 
spe~ial verdict. 
Non: Compare with the two oases following. See also a valuable note 
to the above case in In Am. Dec. 830. 'Ihree several views are represented 
in the cases. One-that of the reasoniog in the principal case-that one 
partner cannot after dissolution bind the others by a new promise; another 
-that of the following case-that he may do so it the statutory period has 
n•>t yet elapsed; and a third-held in a few cas?S-that h9 may bind the 
others notwithshndiog the operation of the statute, as. in Wheelock va. 
Doolittle, 18 Vt. 440, 46 Am. Deo. 163. The last view held at one time in 
North Carolina. has there been changpd by statute. See Par11ona on Part-
nel'8hip, 4th Ed p. tall, where the authorities are collected. 
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PENNOYER vs. DAVID. t
Supreme Court of Michigan, 1860.
8 Mich. 407.
This action was brought against James I. David and James
Campbell, as survivors, etc., of Daniel C. Vreeland, who
together, during the summer of 1855, constituted aipartner-
ship, which was dissolved by the death of Vreeland, in Novem-
ber of that year. A
The declaration was upon an account stated, to prove which
“plaintiff ofiered evidence that in December, 1855, after the
dissolution of the firm by the death of Vreeland, defendant
Cam-pbell accounted with plaintiff, and admitted that there
was a final balance of $507 due the plaintiff. Various items
entered into -this account on both sides, spreading over t-he
time from May to DQC€IH|b€P§ some of them on both sides being
items that accrued after the death of Vreeland. The defend-
ant objected to the evidence,” and thereupon the circuit judge
reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:
1st. Can one partner, after the dissolution of the copart-
nership, bind the surviving copartner by his admissions?
2d. Is the admission, by a surviving partner, of a balance in
an account, of which some items accrued after the dissolution,
evidence of an account stated against a surviving copartner,
who has neither before nor sinceisuch settlement authorized
or confirmed the same?
J. M. Howard, for plaintiflf.
Hand (6 Hall, for defendants.
CHRISTIANCY, J. In reply to the first question propounded,
we think it is well -settled, both upon principle and authority,
that one partner, after dissolution of the firm, cannot, by his
admission or contract, create a new partnership liability, nor,
for a like reason, can he, b_y his admission, revive a claim
against the firm which has been barred by the statute of limi-
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PENNOYER vs. DAVID. 
Supreme Court of Mfoltigan, 1860. 
8 Mich. 407. 
This action was brought against James I. David and James. 
Campbell, as survivors, etc., of Daniel C. Vreeland, who 
together, during the summer of 1855, constituted a partner-
ship, which was dissolved by the death of Vreeland, in Novem-
ber of that year. 
The declara.tion was upon an account stated, to prove which 
"plaintiff offered evidence that in December, 1855, after the 
dissolution of the firm by the death of Vreeland, defenda.n·t ~ 
Campbell accounted with plaintiff, and admitted that there 
was a final balance of $507 due the plaintiff. Various items 
en.tered into this account on both sides, sprea:ding over the 
time from May to December; some of them on both sides being 
items that accrued after the death of Vreeland. The defend-
ant objected to the evidence," and thereupon the circuit judge 
reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions: 
1st. Can one partner, after the dissolution of the copa.rt-
nership, bind the surviving copartner by his admissions? 
2d. Is the admission, by a surviving partner, of a balance in 
an account, of which some items accrued after the dissolution, 
evidence of an account stated against a surviving copartner, 
who bas neither before nor since such settlement authorized 
or confirmed the same? 
J.M. Howard, for plaintiff. 
Hand & Hall, for defendants. 
CHRISTIANCY, J. In reply to the first question propounded, 
we think it is well ·Settled, both upon principle and authority, 
that one partner, after dissolution of the firm, cannot, by his , 
admission or contract, create a new partnership liability, nor, 
for a like reason, can he, ~y his admission, revive a claim 
against the firm which has been barred by the statute of limi-
tati<>ns, since this is equivalent to a new contract. 
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On the other hand, with the exception of claims barred by
the statute of limitations, and others coming within a similar
reason, we think it equally clear in principle, that the admis-
sion of one partner, made after such dissolution having refer-
ence to previous actual partnership dealings or transactions,
stands upon the same ground, and is evidence against the firm
in like manner as if made before such dissolution. The disso-
lution cannot destroy the joint liability of the partners, no-r
alter their relations to third persons in respect to contracts
made or transactions which occurred before the dissolution.
The dissolution operates upon future, not upon past trans-
actions. As to persons whose claims have been contracted on
the credit of the firm, the partnership, for all substantial pur-
po-ses, continues till such claims have been satisfied. And
persons who have had dealings with the firm during its con-
tinuance, are, as to all matters touching such dealings,
entitled to the same benefit from the admissions of a single
partner, whether made before or afte.r the dissolution, unless
shown to be false or fraudulent in fact. See Wood vs. Brad-
dir-lc, 1 Taunt. 103; Lacy vs. Mc-Neale, 4 D. & R. 7; Cady vs.
S'hopa~rd, 11 Pick. (Mass) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Vina! vs. B-ur-
rill, 16 Pick. (Mass) 401;"Coll. on Part. (Perkins Ed. of 1848)
sec. 546 and cases cited; Story on Part. sec. 328; see also Mann
vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246, where the principles upon which such
a-dmissions are receivable are very clearly and ably presented.
Bu-t it is objected that the power of a single partner, in such
case, to make an admission of a previousl_v existing liability,
involves the power of creating a new liability where there had
been no previous dealings with the firm, and no such prior lia-
Ibility existed in fact. It was doubtless this supposed difl‘l-
culty which led the courts of New York, and a few others
which have followed their authority, to take the broad ground
excluding such admissions altogether. But the rule which
entirely excludes such admissions leads to another incon-
sislcncy, n-o less obvious than that which is sought to be
avoided by it. Thus, the same courts which deny all power of
one partner, after dissolution, to bind his former partners by
the admission of a previous liability, yet hold that he may liqui-
date a previous account (McPherson vs. Rathbone, 11 Wend. [N.
Y.] 96, 99), and that “if there be no agreement to the contrary,
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On the other hand, with the exception of claims barred by 
the statute of limitations, and others coming within a similar 
reason, we think it equally clear in principlt', that the admis-
sion of one partner, made after such dissolution having refer-
ence to previous actual partnership dealings or transactions, 
i;tnnds upon the same ground, and is evidence against the firm 
in like manner as if made before such dissolution. The disso-
lution cannot destroy the joint liability of the partners, nor 
a.lter their relations to third persons in respect to contracts 
made or transactions which occurred before the dissolution. 
/ The dis~wlution operates upon future, not upon past trans-
/ aotions. As to pel'sons whose claims have been contracted on 
the credit of the fil'm, the partnership, for all substantial pur-
poses, eontinu<>s ti11 such claims have been satisfied. And 
persons who have had dealings with the firm during its con-
tinuance, are, as to all matters touching such dealings, 
entitled to the same benefit from the admissions of a single 
partner, whether made before or after the dissolution, unleS!I 
Rhown to be false or fraudulent in fact. S<>e Wood vs. Bmd-
dirlc, 1 Taunt. 103; Lacy vs. McNcale, 4 D. & R. 7; Cady vs. 
F~hepa-rd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Vinal vs. Bur-
1'ill, 16 Piek. (Mass.) 401; ··con. on Part. (Perkins Ed. of 1848) 
Rec. 546 and cases cited; Story on Part. sec. 328; see also Mann 
vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 24:6, where the piinciples upon which such 
ndmissions are receivable are very clearly and ably presented. 
But it is objected that the power of a single partner, in such 
ca~, to make nn admission of a previously existing lia.bility, 
involws the powPr of creating a new liability where there had 
been no prt>vious dealings with the firm, and no such prior lia-
r bility exist<•d in fact. It was doubtless this supposed diffi-
culty _whi<'h lrd the courts of New York, and a few others 
whie.h have followed their autho1·ity, to take the broad ground 
excluding such admissions altogether. But the rule which 
entirely excludes such admissions leads to another incon-
si~teney, no less obvious than that which is sought to be 
avoided by it. Thus, the same courts which deny all power of 
one partner, after diE\solution, to bind his former partners by 
the admission of a previous liability, yet hold that he may liqui-
da 1-e a previous account (.lfcPTierson vs. Rathbone, 11 Wend. [N. 
Y.] 96, 99), and that "if there be no agreement to the contrary, 
It may be presumed that each pnrtner still has authority to 
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dispose of the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay
debts, and to give proper acquittances” (per Bnossos, J., in
Van Kcurcn vs. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322, ante
p. 411).
Now the power to liquidate a previous account against the
firm, to adjust and pay debts, and to give acquittan-ces, would
seem necessarily to involve, if not to rest upon, the power to‘
make an admission of the correctness of the account liqui-
dated, and the amount of the debt paid or adjusted. And
where (as is generally the case) there -are mutual accounts in
favor of and against the firm, the power to adjust, and to give a
valid acquittance or receipt for the amount found due the firm,
necessarily, we think, rests upon the power t state an account,
and to admit the claims against the firm. ilf he has power
to state an account, and to agree upon a balance when that bal-
ance is in favor of the firm, upon the same principle he must
have the like power when the balance happens to be against
it. \Without the power to admit a previous liability against
the rm, we can see no principle on which a receipt or acquit-
tance, in such case, could be admissible evidence against the
firm.
But the admission by a single partner, after dissolution, of
a pre-existing partnership liability, must be confined to cases
where there have been, in fact, previous partnership dealings
with the plaintifl’, or s-ome transaction of the firm out of which
a liability to the plaintiff might have originated; and the fact
that there have been such dealings, or such transactions, must
be shown by some general evidence at least, outside of the
admission itself, otherwise the objection that the power to
admit a previous liability involves the power to create a new
one, would be insurmountable. But if such evidence be given,
it lays a proper foundation for the admission, as it brings the
subject matter within. the power of a single partner to make
an admission in respect to a liability which may have grown
out of such previous dealings or transactions, an-d the balance
that may have resulted therefrom. The admission is thus
shown to have reference to transactions which took place dur-
ing the existence of the firm, and as to which the dissolution
could not alter the relations of the parties. YVe think this
very clear in principle, though we have been referred to no
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:(lispose of the partnership property, to collect, adjust, and pay: 
debts, and to give proper acquittances" (per BRONSON, J., in 
Van Keuren vs. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 523, 51 Am. Dec. 322, anto 
,p. 411}. 
Now the power to liquidate a previous account against the 
drm, to adjust and pay debts, and to give acquittan-ces, would 
seem necessarily to involve, if not to rest upon, the power to ... 
make an admission of the correctness of the account liqui· 
dated, and the amount of the debt paid or adjusted. And 
where (as is generally the case) there are mutual accounts in 
favor of and against the firm, the power to adjust, and to give a 
valid acquittance or receipt for the amount found due the firm, 
necessarily, we think, rests upon the power t~ state an account, 
and to admit the claims against the firm. \If he has power 
to state an account, and to agree upon a balance when that bal-
ance is in favo1· of the firm, upon the same principle he must 
have the like power when the balance happens to be against 
it. \Without the power to admit a previous liability again~t 
the ftrm, we can see no principle on which a receipt or acquit-
. tance, in such case, could be admissible evidence against the 
.firm. 
But the admission by a single partner, after dissolution, of 
la pre-existing partnership liability, must be confined to cases where there have been, in fact, previous partnership dealings 
with the plaintiff, or some transaction of the firm out of which 
a liability to the plaintiff might have originated; and the f.act 
that there have been such dealings, or such tra.n.snctions, must 
be shown by some general evidence at leiu1t, outside of the 
admission itself, otherwise the objection that the power to 
admit a previous liability involves the power to create a new 
one, would be insurmountable. But if such evidence be given, 
it lays a proper foundation for the admission, as it brings the 
subject matter within the power O·f a single partner to make 
an admission in respect to a liability which may have grown 
out of such previous dealings or transartions, and the balance 
that may have resulted therefrom. The admission is thus 
Rhown to have reference to trnnsuctions which took place dur-
ing the existence of the firm, and as to which the dissolution 
oould not alter the relations of the parties. We think this 
very clear in principle, though we have been referred to no 
authorities, and none have come under our observation, 
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directly in point for a case like the present. See, however, for
an analogous rule, 3 Kent Com. (3d Ed.) 50, and cases there
cited, especially Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. 267, and Cody vs.
Shepard, above cited.
In the case before us, there does not appear to have been any
evidence, aside from the admission of one of the surviving
partners, tending to show any partnership dealing or trans-
action with the plaintiff during the existence of the firm. The
first question propounded must therefore, as it applies to the
present case, be answered in the negative. This, in our view,
disposes of the case, and the second question propounded
becomes abstract or hypothetical, and requires no answer.
The other justices concurred.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., Q 272.
FEIGLEY vs. WHITAKER.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1872.
22 Ohio St. 606, 10 Am. Rep. 778.
Action by Whitaker against Feigley, as the survivor of Feig-
ley & Davis, to recover for money loaned. On the trial, in the
court of common pleas, the plaintiff offered testimony tending
to prove that, in the year 1865, the firm of Feigley & Davis
was doing business as merchants and produce dealers at New
Lexington, Ohio; that the business of the firm was under the
general management and control of James E. Davis, one of
the members of the firm; that the defendant, the other member.
resided at Cincinnati, and occasionally visited their place of
business; that, during the summer of 1865, the plaintiff was
engaged in buying wool at said town; that he kept his wool
money on deposit with Feigley & Davis, and took in -the wool
purchased by him at their store, where the money was paid to
the plainti£f’s customers by Davis, who also adjusted their
accounts; that plaintiff purchased wool on commission for
Cone & Rickley, of Columbus, and that the firm of Feigley &
Davis received a portion of his commission for their services
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directly in poont for a case like the present. See, however, for 
an analogous rule, 3 Kent Com. (3d Ed.) 50, and cases there 
cited, especially Smith vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. 267, and Cady os. 
Shepard, above cited. 
In the case before us, there does not appear to have been any 
evidence, aside from the admission of one of the surviving 
partners, tending to show any partnership dealing or trans-
action with the plaintiff during the existence of the fl.rm. The 
first question propounded must therefore, as it a.pplies to the 
present case, be answered in the negative. This, in our view, 
dispotJes of the case, and the second question propounded 
becomes abstract or hypothetical, and requires no answer. 
The other justices concurred. 
NOTB: See M:echem's Elem. of Parto., f 272. 
FEIGLEY vs. WHITAKER. 
Supreme Court of Ollio, 1872. 
22 Ohio St. 606, 10 Am. Rep. 778. 
Action by Whitaker against Feigley, as the survivor of Feig-
ley & Davis, to recover for money loaned. On the trial, in the 
court of common pleas, the plaintiff offered testimony tending 
to prove that, in the y.ear 1865, the firm of Feigley & Davis 
was doing business as merchants and p1·oduce dealers at New 
Lexington, Ohio; that the business of the firm was under the 
general management and co.ntrol of James E. Davis, one of 
the members of the firm; that the defendant, the othei~ member, 
resided at Cincinnati, and occasionally visited their place of 
business; that, during the summer of 1865, the plaintiff was 
engaged in buying wool at said town; that he kept his wool 
money on dPposit with Feigley & Davis, and took in the wool 
purchased by him at th<"ir store, where the money was paid to 
the plaintiff's customers by Davis, wh-0 also adjusted their 
accounts; th.at plaintiff purchased wool on commission for 
Cone & Rickley, of Columbus, and that the flrm of Feiglry & 
Davis received a portion of his commission for their services 
and the use of room; that the firm of Feigley & Davis was 
,
I
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dissolved in September, 1865, and that plaintiff, about the same
time, quit the purchasing of wool; that the firm of Feigley &
Davis was succeeded by the firm of Feigley, Davis & Co., com-
posed of the partners of the old firm and one Perry A. Eding-
ton; that the new firgu continued the same business, and was
under the charge of avis. No settlement was shown to have
been made, between the plaintiff and Feigley & Davis, before
the dissolution of the firm. Davis died in August, 1866. The
plaintiff also offered testimony to show that after the dissolu-
tion of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and both before and after
the death of Davis, he had in possession a statement, in the
handwriting of Davis, as follows:
“February 15, 1866. Feigley & Davis, to J . C. Whitaker. Dr.
To wool money, $200.”
T-0 the introduction of the testimony touching this state-
ment, the defendant excepted. No testimony was offered by
the "defendant.
Thereupon, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury,
that if they should find that Whitaker did have in his posses-
sion a paper writing in these words: “February 15, 1866.
Feigley & Davis, to John G. Whitaker. Dr. To wool money,
$200,” which was written by Davis, after the firm of Feigley &.
Davis had been dissolved by the introduction of Edington, a
new member, the same cannot be regarded, and it is not evi-
dence to be considered by the jury of an indebtedness to Whita-
ker and against Feigley, which charge the court refused to
give, but did charge that it was competent, but not conclusive,
to charge the other party; and further asked the court to
charge the jury “that if they should find that after the disso-
lution of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and Feigley no longer a
mem-ber of Ithe firm, Davis made any acknowledgments, or
admissions or statements, of an indebtedness of the late firm to
the plaintiff, the evidence could not be regarded by them, as a
late partner cannot bind the old members of the firm by any
admissions after the dissolution,” which the court refused to
charge. but did charge that the same was competent, but not
conclusive.
The bill of exceptions also showed that, -after verdict, the
defendant moved for a. new trial, upon the ground, among
others, that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that
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dissolved in September, 1865, and that plaintiff, about the same 
time, quit the purchasing of wool; that the firm of Feigley & 
Davis was succeeded by the firm of Feigley, Davis & Co., com-
posed of the partners of the old firm and one Perry A. Eding· 
ton; that the new filpl continued the same business, and was 
under the charge of :fiavis. No settlement was shown to have 
been made, betw~n the plaintiff and Feigley & Davis, before 
the dissolution of the firm. Davis died in August, 1866. The 
plaintiff also offered testimony to s.h<>w that after the dissolu· 
tion of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and both before and after 
the death of Davis, he· had in possession a statement, in the 
handwriting of DaYis, as follows: 
"February 15, 1866. Feigley & Davis, to J.C. Whitaker. Dr. 
To wool money, f~OO." 
To the introduction of the testimony touching this state-
ment, the defendant excepted. No testimony was offered by 
the ·defendant. 
Thereupon, the defendant asked the court to charge the jury, 
that if they should find that 'Vhitaker did have in bis posses-
sion a paper writing in these words: "February 15, 1866. 
Feigley & Davis, to JQbn C. 'Whitaker. :Or. To wool money, 
f200," which was written by Davis, after the firm of Feigley & 
Davis had been dissolved by the introduction of Edington, a 
new member, the same cannot be regarded, and it is not evi-
dence to be considered by the jury of an indebtedness to Whita. 
ker and against Feigley, which charge the court refused to 
give, but did charge that it was competent, but not conclusive, 
to charge the other party; and further asked the court to 
charge the jury "that if they should find that after the disso-
lution of the firm of Feigley & Davis, and Feigley no longer a 
member of •the firm, Davis made any acknowledgments, or 
admissions or statements, of an indebtedness of the late firm to 
the plaintiff, the evidence could not be regarded by them, aS' a 
late partner cannot bind the old members of the firm by any ; 
admissions after the dissolution," which the court refused to 
charge~ but did charge that the same was competent, but not 
conclusive. 
The bill -0f exceptions olso i:rhowed t,hat, .after verdict, the 
defendant moved for a. new trial, upon the ground, among 
others, that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that 
said paper writing "was not evidence of an indebtedness of 
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said firm to VVhitaker, even if in the handwriting of one of the
firm; and in charging that the same was an item of evidence
to go to the jury, to be considered by them, and upon which
they might render a verdict or not, according as they might
be of opinion that said pa-per writing was suificient or insufii-
cient, in connection with other testimony upon which to found
a verdict in favor of, or against, the plaintiif.”
Kelly ¢€ Marsh, for plaintiff in error.
I/1/man J. Jackson, for defendants in error.
Mclnvsmn, J. (After stating the above facts continues.)
The rulings of the court below must be reviewed in the light
of the whole case, as developed in the record. The principal
question thus presented is, whether or not the admission of a
partner, made while engaged in the adjustment of unsettled
partnership business, but after the dissolution of the firm, can
be used as evidence to charge the other partners in relation to
such business?
Reported eases upon this subject are in conflict with a
majority, perhaps, apparently in support of the negative of
the proposition. But when considered in the light of what
we conceive to be the true rule, the weight of authority, we
think, is in favor of the afiirmative.
It cannot be disputed that the implied authority of a general
partner to bind his copartners to any new engagement, con-
tract, or promise, although within the scope of the partner-
ship business, is absolutely revoked by the dissolution of the
partnership.
But it is nevertheless true, when not otherwise agreed upon,
that an implied authority continues in each partner after the
dissolution to act for himself and his copartners in the matter
of winding up and adjusting the business of the firm; and while
acting within the scope of such limited authority, we can see
no reason why the several member of the firm should not be
bound by the acts and admissions of each other, as in other
cases of agency. The maxim, qui facit per alium facit per se,
should apply in its full force.
D-ou'bts may often arise in particular cases as to whet-her
or not a particular act or admission falls within or without the
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said firm to "\Vhitaker, even if in the handwriting of one of the 
firm; and in charging that the same was an item of evidence 
to go to the jury, to be considered by them, and upon which 
they might render a verdict or not, according as they might 
be of opinion that said pa.per writing was sufficient or insuffi-
cient, in connection with other testimony upon which to found 
a verdict in favor of, or against, the plaintiff." 
Kelly & .tf arsh, for plaintiff in error. 
LtJman J. Jackson, for defendants in error. 
MclLvAuna, J. (After stating the above facts continues.) 
The rulings of the court below must be reviewed in the light 
of the whole case, as developed in the record. The principal 
question thus presented is, whether or not the admission of a 
partner, made while engaged in the adjustment of unsettled 
partnership business, but after the dissolution of the firm, can 
be used as evidence to charge the other paI"tners in relation to 
snch business? 
Reported cases upon this subject are in conflict with a 
majority, perhaps, a.pparently in support of the negative of 
the proposition. But when considered in the· light of what 
we conceive to be the true rule, the weight of authority, we 
think, is in favor of the affirmative. 
It cannot be disputed that the implied authority of a general 
partner to bind his copartners to any new engagement, con-
tract, or promise, although within the scope of the partner-
ship business, is absolutely revoked by the dissolution of the 
partnership. 
Bu.tit is nevertheless true, when not otherwise agreed upon, 
that an implied autho1ity continues in each partner after the 
dissolution to act for himself and his copartners in the matter .. 
of winding up and adjusting the business of the firm; and while 
acting within the scope of such limited authority, we can see 
no reason why the several members of the :firm should not be 
hound by the acts and admissions of each other, as in other 
cases of agency. The maxim, qui facit per aTium faci.t per 8e, 
·flhould apply in its full force. 
Doubts may oftt>n arise in particular cases 8:8 to whether 
or not a particular act or admission falls within or without the 
i;.cope of such limited authority. But it is quite clear to our 
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minds that the settlement of mutual accounts, pre-exi-sting
between the firm and its customers, and the adjustment and
ascertainment of balances on claims and demands in favor of
and against the firm, are within the scope of such agency.
We do not think that a paper writing, made by a partner
after dissolution of his firm, and purporting to be a statement
of accounts between the firm and a stranger, or of a balance
due him, would alone constitute even pri-ma facie proof of
indebtedness against the other partners. But with proof
aliundc that an account was current between such persons and
the firm before and at the time of its dissolution, such state-
ment would be admissible as tending to prove the state of
accounts between them at the date of the dissolution. Or, if
proof be made of certain dealings between the firm and a third
person, unsettled at the time of the dissolution, then an act or
admission made by a partner after the dissolution, if made in
the matter of adjusting such business, is competent to be given
in evidence for the purpose of proving a claim founded on such
dealings, against all the partners.
In Wood vs. Braddick, 1 Taunton 103, MANSFIELD, C. J., said:
“Clearly the admission of one partner, made after the partner-
ship had ceased, is not evidence to charge the other in any
transaction which has occurred since their separation; but the
power of partners, with respect to rights created pending the
partnership, remains after the dissolution. Since it is clear
that one partner can bind the other during all the partnership,
upon what principle is it that from the moment when it is dis-
solved, his account of their joint contracts should cease to be
evidence?” And Hnarn, J., said: “ls it not a clear proposition
that when a partnership is dissolved, it is not dissolved, with
regard to things past, but only with regard to things future?”
Though it is not necessary in thiggcase to approve, to the full
extent, the doctrine of Wood vs. raddick, it is nevertheless
true that the rule of that case is fully approved by all the
English common law decisions, and is adhered to in many
American cases. See Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Parker vs.
Merrill,’ 6 Greenl. (Me.) 41; Mann vs. Locke, 11 N. H. 246; Cady
vs. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass) 400, 22 Am. Dec. 379; Gay cs.
Bowen, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 100; Brewster vs. Herdeman, Dudley (Ga.)
138; Wilton vs. .11 cNeile, 4 Dowl. 8: Ry. 7; Pritchard rs. Draper,
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minds that the settlement of mutual accounts, pre-existing 
between the firm and its customers, and the adjustment and 
ascertainment of balances on claims and demands in favor fYf 
and against the firm, are within the scope of such agency. 
We do not thin.k that a paper writing, made by a partner 
after dissolution of his firm, and purporting to be a statement 
· of accounts between the firm and a stranger, or of a balance 
· due him, would aloue constitute even prima facie proof of 
indebtednefJs against the other partnel'S. But with proof 
aJiundc that an account was current between such persc>ns iand 
the firm before and at the time of its dis.solution, such state-
ment would be admissible as tending to prove the state of 
accounts between them at the date of the dissolution. Or, if 
proof be made of certain dealings between the .firm and a third · 
person, unsettled at the time of the dissolution, then an act or 
admission made by a partner after the dissolution, if made in 
the matter of adjusting such business, is competent to be given 
in evidence for the purpose of proving a claim founded on such 
dealings, against all the partners. 
In Wood vs. Braddick, 1 Taunton 103, MA~SFIELD, C. J., said: 
"Clearly the admission of one partner, made after the partner-
ship had ceased, is not evidence to cha.rge the other in any 
transaction which ·has occurred since their separation; but the 
power of partne~s, with respect to rights created pending the 
partnership, remains after the dissolution. Since it is clear 
that one partner can bind the other during all the partnership, 
upon what principle is it that from the moment when it is dis-
solved, bis account of their joint contracts should cease to be 
evidence?" And HEATH, J., said: "ls it not a clear proposition 
that when a partnership is dissolvf'd, it is not dissolved, with 
regard to things past, but only with regard to things future?" 
Though it is not necessary in thiJ case to approve, to the full 
extent, the doctrine of Wood vs. Bra<ldick, it is nevertheless 
true that the rule of that case is fully approved by all the 
English common law decisions, and is adhered to in many 
American cases. See Joslyn vs. Smith, 13 Vt. 353; Parker vs. 
Merrili,' 6 Greenl. (Me.) 41; Mann vs. f,ockc, 11 N. H. 246; Cad11 
'18. Shepherd, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 400, 22 Am. Dec. ~79; Gay vs. 
Bowen, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 100; Breicster vs. Herdeman, Dudley (Ga.) 
138; Wilton vs . . Jf cNeile, 4 Dowl. & Ry. 7; Pritcltanl t'8. Draper, 
1 RuSB. & My. 191; Whitcomb tis. Whiting, 2 Doug. 652; Jack-
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son vs. Fairbank, 2 H. Bl. 340; Shelton vs. Cooke, 3 Munf. (Va.)
191; Simpson vs. Geddes, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 533. See, also, Smith
vs. Ludlow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267; Bridge rs. Gray, 14 Pick.
~(Mass.) 55, 25 Am. Dec. 358; and Haclcley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns.
(N. Y.) 536.
It must be admitted, however, that the broad doctrine of
Wood vs. Braddick has been disapproved in many American
cases, especially by the courts of New York, Kentucky, Illi-
nois, Indiana and Missouri; and also by the supreme court of
the United States in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. But it will
be observed that no well considered case, either in England or
America, has denied that, in the absence of express stipula-
tion to the contrary, an implied authority after dissolution is
continued in the several partners to wind up the unsettled
affairs of the partnership.
In Bell vs. Morrison, it is expressly declared that “each part-
ner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his contract in
the partnership business; but he cannot bind it by any con-
tract beyond those limits. A dissolution, however, puts an
end to the authority. By force of its terms it operates as a
revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right
of the partner can extend no further than to settle the part-
nership concerns already existing, and to distribute the
remaining funds. Even this right may be qualified and re-
strained by the express delegation of the whole authority to
one of the partners.”
This case (Bell vs. Morrison), is much relied on as an author-
ity against the power of a partner, after dissolution of the
firm, to bind his copartners, by his act or admission, in any
transaction whatever. The question decided arose on a plea
of the statute of limitations, and we think the doctrine of the
case is by no means as broad as that contended for. Justice
S'ronY, in delivering the opinion said: “The question is not
as to the authority of a partner, after dissolution, to adjust
an admitted and subsisting debt (we mean, admitted by the
whole partnership, or unbarred by the statute); but whether
he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of
time, revive it as against all the partners, without any new
authority communicated for that purpose. We think the
proper resolution of this point depends upon another; that
is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a mere
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.on vs. Fairbank, 2 H. BI. 340; Shelton vs. Cocke, 3 Monf. (Va.) 
191; Simpson 1'8. Geddes, 2 Bay (S. Car.) 533. See, also, Smith 
OB. Lwllow, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 267; Br·idge vs. Gray, 14: Pick. 
'(Mass.) 55, 25 Am. Dec. 358; and Hackley vs. Patrick, 3 Johns. 
(N. Y.) 536. 
It must be admitted, however, that the broad doctrine of 
Wood vr. Braddick has been disapproved in many American 
cases, especially by the ooorts of New York, Kentucky, Illi-
nois, Indiana and Missouri; and also by the supreme court of 
the United States in Bell vs. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351. But it will 
be observed that no well considered case, either in England or 
America, has denied that, in the absence of express stipula-
tion to the contrary, an implied authority after dissolution iR 
continued in the several partners to wind up the unsettled. 
affairs of the partnership. 
In Bell vs. Morrison, it is expressly declared that "each part-
ner may, therefore, bind the partnership by his c<>ntract in 
the partnership business; but he cannot bind it by any con-
tract beyond those limits. A dissolution, however, puts an 
end to the authority. By force of its terms it operates as a 
revocation of all power to create new contracts, and the right 
of the partner can extend no further than to settle the part-
nership concerns already existing, and to distribute the 
remaining funds. Even this right may be qualified and re-
strained by the express delegation of the whole authority to 
one of the partners." 
This case (Bell vs. Morrison), is much relied on as an author-
ity against the power of a partner, after dissolution of the 
firm, to bind his copartners, by his act or admission, in any 
transaction whatever. The question decided arose on a plea 
of the statute of limitations, and we think the doctrine of the 
case is by no means as broad as that contended for. Justice 
STORY, in delivering the opinion said: "The question is not 
as to the authority of a partner, after dissolution, to adjust 
an .admitted and subsisting debt (we mean, admitted by the 
whole partnership, or unbarred by the statute); but whether 
he can, by his sole act, after the action is barred by lapse of 
time, revive it as against all the partners, without any new 
authority communicated for that purpose. \Ve think the 
proper resolution of this point depends upon another; that 
is, whether the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a mere 
conti~uation of the original promis~, or a new contract spring-
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ing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We
think it is the latter.” And again, he says: “The light in
which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after
a disolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause
of action against the other partners, except by a new author-
ity communicated to him for that purpose. ' “ ‘ When
the statute of limitations has once run against a debt,
the cause of action against the partnership is gone.
The acknoivledgment, if it is to operate at all, is to create
a new (nus-e of action, to revive a debt which is extinct.”
There is nothing in this decision that conflicts with the rule
we have stated. And it may be said that most of the cases
relied upon as supporting a contrary doctrine arose in the
same way, and were decided upon the principle that an
acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, barred by statute
of limitations, does not revive the old debt, but creates a new
one; and hence it is, that we stated above that the decided
weight of authority is, that a partner, after dissolution, to the
extent that is necessary to settle pre-existing claims against
the firm, may so exercise his authority as to bind all the part-
ners; but never, without new authority from them, can he
create a new cause of action against them.
The court in Palmer vs. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. De-c.
271, held that the dissolution of a partnership worked an abso-
lute revocation of all implied authority in either of the part-
ners to bind the other to new engagements or promises, made
with persons having notice of the dissolution, although spring-
ing out of, and founded upon, the indebtedness of the firm;
and in Myers vs. Standish, 11 Ohio St., 29, it was held, that
under an averment of due demand and notice of the dishonor
of a bill of exchange, drawn by a firm, the declarations of
one of the partners made after dissolution (no notice, however,
of the dissolution -having been given to the payees), showing
an acknowledgment of liability thereon, and a promise to pay
the amount of the bill, were admissible in an action against
the other parties. But in each of these cases the doctrine is
distinctly afiirmed, that while the dissolution revokes the im-
plied authority of each partner to incur new obligations for
his fellows, it leaves upon each the duty, and continues to each
the right of doing whatever is necessary to collect the claims
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ing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. We 
think it is the latter." And again, he says: "The light in 
which we are disposed to consider this question is, that after 
a dissolution of a partnership no partner can create a cause 
of action against the other partners, except by a new author-
ity communicated to him for that purpose. • • • w·hen 
the statute of limitati.ons has once run against a debt, 
the cause of action against the partnership is gonb. 
The ·acknowledgment, if it is to operate at all, is t<> create 
a new muse of action, to revive a debt whi"h is extinct." 
There is nothing in this decision that conflicts with the rule 
we have stated. And it may be said that most of the cases 
relied upon as supporting a contrary doctrine arose in the 
same way, and were decided upon the principle that an 
.acknowledgment or promise to pay a debt, barred by statute 
of limitations, does not revive the old debt, bnt creates a new 
one; and hence it is, that we stated above that the decided 
weight of authority is, that a partner, after dissolution, to the · 
extent that is necessary to settle pre-existing claims agai~t 
the firm, may so exercise his authority as to bind all the part-
ners; but never, without new authority from them, can he 
create a new cause of action against them. 
The court in Palmer vs. Dodge, 4 Ohio St. 21, 62 Am. Dec. 
271, held that the dissolution of a partnership worked an abso-
lute revocation of all implied authority in either of the part-
ners to bind the other to ncto engagements or prQmises, made 
with persons having notice of the dissolution, although spring-
ing out of, and founded upon, the indebtedness of the firm; 
·and in Myers i:s. Rtandish, 11 Ohio St., 29, it was held, that 
under an averment of due demand and notice of the dishonor 
of a bill of exchange, drawn by a firm, the declarations of 
one of the partners made after dissolution (no notice, however, 
of the di1:1solution having been given to the payees), showing 
an acknowledgment of liability thereon, and a promise to pay 
the amount of the bill, were admissible in an action against 
the other parties. But in each of these cases the doctrine is 
distinctly affirmed, that while the dissolution revokes the im-
plied authority of each partner to incur new obligations for 
his fellows, it leaves upon eaoh the duty, and continues to each 
the right of doing whatever is necessary to collect the claims 
due the partnership, and to adjust, settle, and pay its d~bts. 
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And it is said in Palmer vs. Dodge, that “this right of each of
the partners to participate in the settlement of its co-ncerns,
can not be interfered with by his copartners without subject-
ing them to the controlling power of a court of equity.”
The ascertainment of the amount due to or from the part-
nership, on account of unsettled transactions, is a necessary
step in the winding up of its afiairs, and within the authority
vested by implication in each partner after dissolution.
\Ve are, therefore, of opinion that the testimony objected to
by the plaintiff in error was competent, and that the jury, hav-
ing found from other testimony in the case, that, at the date
of the dissolution of the firm of Feigley vs. Davis, there were
unsettled dealings between the plaintilf and the firm, and that
the paper referred to was made by Davis upon the settlement
of such dealings, were authorized to find the amount due the
plaintifi thereon from the admission of Davis so made.
It may be proper to add that the proof in this case did not
strictly conform to the allegations in the petition, but as no
objection has been made upon the ground of variance, we do
not deem it our duty to consider that question.
Judgment afiirmed.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 272.
Compare with the two eases preceding. There is much conflict of au-
thorily in the United Slates re>pecting the rule of Wood vs. Bracldick,
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And it is said in Palmer vs. Dodge, that "this right of each of 
the partners to participate in the settlement of its concerns, 
can not be interfered with by his copartners without subject-
ing them to the controlling power of a court of equity." 
The ascertainment of the amount due to or from the part-
nership, on account of unsettled transactions, is a necessary 
step in the winding up of its affairs, and within the authority 
vested by implication in each partner after dissolution. 
"' e are, therefore, of opinion that the testimony objected to 
by the plaintiff in error was competent, and that the jury, hav-
ing found from other testimony in the case, that, at the date 
of the dissolution of the tlrm of Feigley vs. Davis, there were 
unsettled dealings between the plaintiff and the tlrm, and that 
the paper referred to was made by Davis upon the settlement 
of such dealings, were authorized to find the amount due the 
plaintiff thereon from the admission of Davis so made. 
It may be proper to add that the proof in this case did not 
strictly conform to the allegations in the petition, but as no 
objection has been made upon the ground of variance, we do 
not deem it our duty to consider that question. 
Judgment affirmed. 
NOTE: See MPchem's Elem. cit Partn., § 272. 
Compare with the two C'ase& pn>cPding. There is much conflict of au-
thori1y in the Cnited StateR reo-pPcting the rule of lt"uod t:s. Braddick, 
8Pe the authoritit!s collecteJ in Parsons on Pal"tner;;hip, (th EJ., pp. 162. 
168. 
XIVI
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTNERS AT DISSO~
LUTION RESPECTING PAYMENT OF DEBTS.
SMITH vs. SHELDON.
Supreme Uourt of Ancmgan, 1876.
85 Mich. 42, 24 Am. Rep. 529. _
Action by Sheldon against Smith and others, on a partner-
ship indebtedness. Prior to June, 1867, Eld-ad Smith, Isaac
Place and Francis B. Owen were partners in trade under the
firmname of Place, Smith& Owen, and as such became in-
debted to defendants in error in the sum of nine hundred and
sixty-nine dollars on book account. '
In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual
consent, Place purchasing the assets of his co-partners and
agreeing to pay off the partnership liabilities, including that
to the defendants in error. On the second day of the following
month Place informed the defendants in error of this arrange-
ment, and that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabili-
ties of the firm, and they, without the consent or knowledge of
Smith and Owen, took from Place a note for the amount of
the firm indebtedness to them, payable at one day, with ten
per centum interest. They did n_ot agree to receive this note
ig payment of the partnership indebtedness, but they kept it
and continued their dealings with Place, who made payments
npon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the
interest. Place, in 1872. became insolvent and made an assign-
-ment, and Smith was then called upon to make payment of the
lnote. This was the first notice he had that he wasdooked to
for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit was

















































































































































AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PARTNERS AT DISSO-
LUTION :dESPECTING PAY.MEN'f OF DEBTS. 
S!\IITH vs. SHELDON. 
Supreme vourt of M ic1iigan, 1876. 
S:S Mich. 42, 24 Am . .Kep. b2V. 
Action by Sheldon against Smith and others, on a partner-
ship indebtedness. Prior to June, 1867, Eld01d Smith, I.sane . 
Place and Francis B. Owen were partners in trade under the 
firm. name of Place, Smith.& Owen, and as such became in-
debted to defendants in error in the sum of nine hundred and 
six.ty-nine dollars on book account. 
In the month mentioned the firm was dissolved by mutual 
consent, Place purchasing the a8sets of his co-partners and 
agreeing to pay off the partnership liabjlities, including that 
to the defendants in error. On the second day of the following 
month Place informed. the defendants in error of this an·ange-
ment, and that he had taken the assets and assumed the liabili-
ties of the firm, and they, without the consent or knowledge of 
Smith and Owen, took from Place a note for the amount of 
the fi1•m indebtedness to them, payable at one day, with ten 
per centum interest. 'l!!ey qid n,ot ngl'ee t<> l'ec.eive this note 
in paymeut of the partnership indebtedness, but they kept it 
~d c~ntinued their dealings with Pla~e, who made payments 
·npon it. The payments, however, did not keep down the 
,interest. Place, in 1872, became insolvent and made an assign-
·ment, and Smith was then called upon to make payment of the 
inote. This was the first notice he had that he was-looked to 
1for payment. On his declining to make payment, suit was 
brought on the original indebtedness and judgment recovered. 
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G. ¢£ W. M. Draper, and C. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
Mecldaugh ¢fi- Driggs, for defendant in error.
Coomav, O. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon
the above stated facts. The position taken by the plaintiffs
below was, that as they had ‘never received payment of their
bill for merchandise they were entitled to recover it of those
who made the debt, the giving of the note which still remained
unpaid being immaterial. On behalf of Smith it was con-
tended that, by the agreement between Place and his copart»
ners, the latter, as between the three, became the principal
debtor, and that from the time when the creditors were ju-
formed of this arrangement they were bound to regard Place
as the principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sureties, and
that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the
injury of the sureties would have the eifect to release them
from liability. And it is further contended that the taking of
the note from Place, and thereby giving him time, however
short, was in law presumptively injurious.
Upon this state of facts the following questions have been
argued in this court:
1. Was the note given by Place in the copartnership name
for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the disso-
lution, binding upon Smith and Owen?
2. If Smith and Owen were not bound by the note, were they
entitled to the rights of sureties? And,
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith
and Owen from their former liability?
On the first point it" is argued in support of the judgment
that when a partnership is dissolved the partner who is in-
trusted with the settlement of the concern should be held to
have implied authority to give notes in settlement. On the
other hand, it is insisted that in ' law he has no such
authority, and that if he assumes, as was done in this case,
to give a note in the partnership name, it will in law be his,
individual note only. l ‘ '
VVhatever might be the case if the obligation which
was given had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount
due, in the form of a due-bill or I. O. U., we are satisfied that
there is no good reason for recognizing in the partner who is
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0. & W. M. Draper, and 0. I. Walker, for plaintiff in error. 
Meddaugh & Driggs, for defendant in error. 
Coor,EY, C. J. The legal questions in this case arise upon 
the above stated facts. The position taken by the plaintiffs 
below was, that as they had 'never received payment of their 
bill for merchandise they were entitled to recover it of those 
• who made tb.e debt, the giving of the note which still remained 
· unpaid being immaterial. On behalf of Smith it was con-
tended that, by the agreement between Place and his copart-
ners, the latter, as between the three, became the principal 
debtor, nnd that from the time when the creditors were ,in-
formed of this arrangement they were bound to regard Place 
as the principal debtor and Smith and Owen as sureties, and 
that any dealing of the creditors with the principal to the 
injury of the sureties would have the effect to release them 
from liability. And it is further contended that the taking of 
the note from Plac~, and thereby giving him time, however 
short, was in law preimm·ptively injurious. · 
{;pon this state of facts the following questions have been 
argued in this court: 
1. \Yas the note given by Place in the copartnership name 
for the copartnership indebtedness, but given after the disso-
lution, binding upon Smith and Owen? 
2. If Smifh and Owen were not bound by the note, were they 
entitled to the rights of sureties? And, 
3. Did the taking of the note given by Place discharge Smith 
. and Owen from their former liability? 
On the first point it" is argued in support of the judgment 
that when a partnership is dissolved the partner who is in· 
trusted with the settlement of the concern should be held to 
have implied autholity to give notes in settlement. On the 
-ot·her hand, it is insisted that in · law he has no such 
authority, and that if he assumes, as )Vas done in this case; 
·to give a note in the partnership name, it will in law be hiJt 
:individual note only. . · 
'\Vbatever might be the case if the obligation which 
was given had been a mere acknowledgment of the amount 
due, in the form of a due-bill or I. 0. U., we are satisfied that 
there is flo good reason for recognizing in the partner who is 
to adjust the business of the concern any implied authority t~ 
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execute such a note as was given in this case. This note was
something more than a mere acknowledgment of indebted-
ness; and it bore interest at a large rate. It was in every
respect a new contract. The liability of the parties upon their
indebtedness would be increased by it if valid, and their rights
might be seriously compromised by the execution of paper pay-
able at a considerable time in the future if the partner in-
trusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized
to make new contracts.
It was assumed in F.<tEM. Bank vs.Kercheval, 2 Mich. 506-
51!), that the law was well settled that no such implied author-
ity existed, and we are not aware that this has before been
questioned in this state. See Pennoyer vs. David, 8 Mich. 407
(a1nte,p. 421). \Ve think it much safer to require express
authority when such obligations are contemplated, than to
leave one party at liberty to execute at discretion new con-
tracts of this nature, which may postpone for an indefinite
period t-he settlement of their concerns, when a settlement is
the very purpose for which he is to act at all.
For a determination of the question whether Smith and
Owen were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only nec-
essary to point out the relative position of the several parties
as regards the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement,
had agreed to pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith
and Owen, he was legally bound to do so. But Smith and
Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and
the latter might look to all three together. Had they done so
and made collections from Smith and Owen, these parties
would have been entitled to demand indemnity from Place.
This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative rights
and obligations of all.
Now a surety, as we understand it, i a person who, being
liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it
is enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other per-
son, who ought himself to have made payment or performed
before the surety wa compelled to do so. It is immaterial in
what form the relation of principal and surety is established,
or whether the creditor is or is not contracted with in the two
capacities, as is often the case when notes are given or bonds
taken} the relation is fixed by the arrangement and equities
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execute such a note as was given in this case. This note was 
something more than a mere acknowledgment of indebted-
ness; and it bore interest at a large rate. It was in every 
respect a new contract. The liability of the parties upon their 
indebtedness would be increased by it if valid, and their rights 
might be seriously compromised by the execution of paper pay-
able at a considerable time in the future if the partner in-
trusted with the adjustment of their concerns were authorized 
to make new contracts. 
It was assumed in F. & M. Bank vs. Kerche1ial, 2 Mich. 506-
51!), that the Jaw was well settled that no such implied author-
ity existed, and we are not aware that this has before been 
questioned in this state. See Pennoyer vs. David, 8 MiC'h. 407 
(Ohl.te, p. 421). 'Ve think it much safer to require express 
authority when such obligations are contempla.ted, than to . 
leave one party at liberty to execute at discretion new con-
tracts <>f this nature, which m:iy postpone for an indefinite 
period t·he settlement of their concerns, when a settlement is 
the very purpose for which he is to act at all. 
For a determination of the question whether "'mith and 
Owen were entitled to the rights of sureties, it seems only nec-
t"ssary to point out the relath·e position of the several parties 
as regards the partnership debt. Place, by the arrangement, 
had agreed to pay this debt, and as between himself and Smith 
and Owen, he was legally bound to do so. But Sntith· and 
Owen were also liable to the creditors equally with Place, and 
the latter might look to all three together. Had they done so 
and made collections from Smith and Owen, these paM:ieR 
would have been entitled to demand indemnity from Place. 
This we believe to be a correct statement of the relative rights 
and obligations of all. 
Now a surety, as we understand it, is a person who, being 
liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is entitled, if it , 
is enforced against him, to be indemnified by 1rnme other per-
son, who ought himself to have made payment or performed 
before the surety was compelled to do so. It is immaterial in· 
what form the relation of principal and surety is established, 
or whether the credito1· is or is not contracted with in the two 
capacities, as is often the case when notes are given or bonds 
taken~ the relation is fixed by the arrangement and equities 
between the dPbtors or obligors, and may be known to the 
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creditor, or wholly unknown. If it is unknown to th-im, 'his
rights are in no manner atfected by it; but if he knows that
one party is surety merely, it is only just to require of him
that in any subsequent action he may take regarding the debt,
he shall not lose sight of the surety’s equities.
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the lat-
ter was principal debtor after the dissolution of the copartner-
ship seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of
Place to pay this debt and save them from being called upon
for the amount. But if the creditors having the right to pro-
ceed against them all, should take steps for that purpose, the
duty of Place to indemnify, and the right of Smith and Owen
to demand indemnity, were clear. Every element of surety-
ship is here present, as much as if, in contracting an original
indebtedness, the, contract itself had been made to show on
its fa-ce that one of the obligors was surety merely. As
already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or
whether the creditor is or is not a party to the arrangement
which establishes it.
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the
right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities
of sureties. The cases which have held that retiring partners
thus situated are to be treated as sureties merely have at-
tempted no change in the law, but areientirely in harmony
with older authorities which have only applied the like prin-
ciple to different states of facts, where the relative position
of the parties as regards the debt was precisely the same. We
do not regard them as working any innovation whatever. The
cases we particularly refer to are Oakelcy vs. Pashellcr, 4 Cl.
& Fin. 207; lVilson vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60; and Millerrl
vs. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402.
And it follows as a necessary result from what has been
stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrange-
ment made by the creditors with Place. They took his note
on time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal
debtor, and without the consent or knowledge of the sureties.
They thereby endangered the security of the sureties, and as
the event has proved, indulged Place until the security became
of no value. True, they gave but very short time in the first
instance; but, as was remarked by the vice-chancellor in Wil-
son vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cuts. 60, 71, “the length of time
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creditor, or wh-0lly unknown. If it is unknown to 'him, 1his 
rights are in no manner affected by it; but if he knows that 
ooe party is surety merely, it is only just to require of him 
that in any subsequent action he may take regarding the debt, 
he shall not lose sight of the surety's equities. 
That Smith and Owen were sureties for Place, and the lat-
ter was principal debtor after the dissolution of the copartner-
ship seems to us unquestionable. It was then the duty of 
Place to pay this debt and save them from being called upon 
for the amount. But if the creditors having the right to pro-
ceed against them all, should take steps for that purpose, the 
duty of Place to indemnify, and the right of Smith and Owen 
to demand indemnity, were clear. Every element of surety-
ship is here present, as much as if, in contracting an original 
indebtedness, the contract itself bad been made to show on 
its face that one of the obligors was surety merely. As 
already stated, it is immaterial how the fact is established, or 
whether the creditor is or is not a parts to the arrangement 
which establishes it. 
This view of the position of the parties indicates clearly the 
right of Smith and Owen to the ordinary rights and equities 
of sureties. Tb.e cases which have held that retiring partners 
thus situated are to be treated as sure.ties merely have at-
tempted no change in the law, but are entirely in harmony 
with older authorities which have only applied the like prin-
ciple to different states of facts, where the relative position 
of the parties as regards the debt was precisely the same. We 
do not regard them a.s working any innovation whatever. The 
•" cases we particularly refer to are Oakelcy vs. l'ashellcr, 4 Cl. 
& Fin. 207; Wilson. vs. Lloyd, L. R., 16 Eq. Cas. 60; and Millerd 
t:s. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402. 
And it follows as n necessary result from what has been 
stated, that Smith and Owen were discharged by the arrange-
ment made by the creditors with Place. They took his note 
on time, with knowledge that Place had become the principal 
debtor, and without the consent or knowledge of the sureties. 
They thneby endangerPd the !wrnrity of the suretie8, and as 
the event has proved, indulged Place until the security became 
<>f no value. True, they gave but very short time in the first 
instance; but, as was remarked by the vice-chancellor in Wil-
son vs. Lloyd, IJ. R., 16 Eq. O:is. 60, 7l, "the length of time 
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makes no kind of difference.” The time was the same in Fel-
lows vs. Prentiss, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 512, 45 Am. Dec. 284, w-here
the surety was also held discharged. And see Okie vs. Spencer,
2 Whart. (Pa.) 253, 30 Am. Dec. 251. But that indulgence
beyond the time fixed was contemplated when the note was
given is manifest from the fact that it was made payable with
interest. In a legal point of view this would be immaterial,
but it has a bearing on the equities, and it shows that the
creditors received or bargained for a consideration for the very
indulgence which was granted, and which ended in the insol-
vency of Place. When they thus bargained for an advantage
which the sureties are not to share with them, it is neither
right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the
risks. This is the legal view of such a transaction, and in
most cases it works substantial justice.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs and a new ‘trial
ordered.
The other justices concurred.
Judgment reversed. '
NOTE: For other cases to the same effect, see Mechem's Elem. of Partn. ,
§ 275.
Compare Barnes vs. Buyers, following.
._~
BARNES vs. BOYERS.
Supreme Court of West Virginia, 1890.
, 84 W. Va. 303, 12 S. E. Rep. 708.
Action of debt by Barnes against Boyers and Harden as
partner. Plea of payment, and also a special plea that Boyers
& Harden had dissolved partnership; that on such dissolution
Harden had assumed and agreed to pay all the debts of the late
firm, and, among others, the one sued upon; that after the
claim had become due and while Harden was solvent, Boyers
in pursuance of the statute had expressly requested the‘
plaintiff to sue Harden for the claim; that plaintiff had
neglected to do so; and that Harden had since become insolv-
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makes no kind of difference." The time was the same in Fel· 
lows vs. Prentiss, 3 Denio (N. Y.), 512, 45 Am. Dec. 284, where 
the surety was also held discharged. And see Okie vs. Spencer, 
2 Whairt. (Pa.) 253, 30 Am. Dec. 251. But that indulgence 
beyond the time fixed was contemplated when the note was 
given is manifest from the fact that it was made payable with 
interest. In a legal point of view this would be immaterial, 
but it has a bear:ing on the equities, and it shows that the 
crroitors received or bargained for a conside1\1 tion fo1• the very 
indulgence which was granted, and which ended in th~ insol-
vency of Place. \Vhen they thus bargained for an advantage 
which the snreti£lR are not to share with them, it is ne-ither 
right nor lawful for them to turn over to the sureties all the 
risks. This is t4e leg:il view of such a transaction, and in 
most ca~es it works substantial justice. 
The judgment must be reversed, with costs and a new .trial 
order~d. 
The other justices concurred. 
Judgment reversed. 
Nom: For other oases to the same effect, see Mechem·a Elem. of Partn., 
§ 275. 
Compare Barnes va. Boyers, following. 
BARNES vs. BOYERS. 
Supreme Court of West Virginia, 1890. 
84 W. Va. SOS, 12 S. E. Rep. 708. 
Action of debt by Barnes against Boyers and Harden as 
partners. Plea of payment, and also a special plea that Boyers 
& Harden had dissolved partnership; that cm such dissolution 
Harden bad assumed and agreed to pay all the debts of the late 
firm, and, among others, the one sued upon; that after the 
claim bad become due and while Harden was solvent, Boye~ 
in pursuance of the statute 'had expres-sly requested the-. 
plaintiff to sue Harden for the claim; that plaintiff bad 
neglected to do so;_ and that Harden had since become insolv-
ent. The statutes of the State provided that a surety might 
436 Casss on Pasrssssarr
request the creditor to sue the principal debtor, and that if the
creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time he should
thereby forfeit his claim against the surety, but against the
principal debtor the creditor’s rights remained unimpaired.
Code of W. Va. Ch. 101, §§ 1, 2.
Judgment for plaintiff and Boyers appealed.
J. A. Haggcrty, for Boyers.
U. N. A-rnctt, Jr., and W. S. Hag/moind, for plaintiff.
Lucas, J. (After referring to a defect in the notice and
request served by Boyers, under the statute, upon the plaintifli)
But, independently of this defect, it will be observed that all
the rights and remedies against the principal debtor are care-
fully guarded in these sections, and are to remain unimpaired.
And the question is whether both partners did not remain
bound to the creditors of the firm as principals notwithstand-
ing the dissolution and agreement whereby, as between them-
selves, one of them became primarily liable, alnd the other took
the position of his security. It is not in the power of joint
debtors to change their relations to a. common creditor, with-
out his consent, and the plea d-oes not allege that the plaintiflf
was ever consulted or ever consented to any such arrangement.
In fac-t, he ignored the notices which were served upon him,
as I think he had a right to do.
The case of Johnson vs. Young, 20 W. Va., 614, which has been
cited in support of a contrary doctrine, goes no further in the
syllabus than to decide that Where one of two partners pur-
chases the interest of the‘ other in the partnership property,
and assumes an-d agrees to pay the partnership debts, as to
such debts the -former becomes in equity the principle debtor,
and the latter a surety. This annunciation must be taken in
connection with the application to the actual facts of that
case, which did not, in any manner, inv-olve the question we
are now discussing, as to whether the copartners can, by any
private arrangement between themselves, change their rela-
ti-ons, as principals, to the common creditor. It is true there
are some expressions in the opinion (see Id. 657), which inti-
mate such seeming concurrence in the doctrine contended for
by the plaintiff in error; but, on the other -hand, there is
quoted, with approval, an extract from Bucha-na/n vs. Clark, 10


















































































































































436 CASES ON P~RTNEKSHIP 
request the creditor to sue the principal debtor, and that if the 
creditor failed to do so within a reasonable time be should 
thereby forfeit his claim against the surety, but against the 
principal debtor the creditor's rights remained unimpaired. 
Cod-e of W. Va. Ch. 101, §§ 1, 2. 
Judgment for plaintiff and Boyers appealed. 
J. A. Haggerty, for Boyers. 
U. N. Arnett, Jr., and W. S. Haymond, for plaintiff. 
LucAs, J. (After referring to a defect in the notice and 
request served by Boyers, under the statute, upon the plaintiff.) 
But, independently of this defect, it will be observed that all 
the rights and remedies against the principal debt-Or are care· 
fully guarded in these sections, and are to remain unimpaired. 
And the question is whether both partners did not remain 
bound to the creditors of the firm as principals notwithstand-
ing the ~issolution and agreement whereby, as between them· 
selves, one of them became primarily lia.ble, and th.e other took 
the position of bis security. H Ls not in the power of joint 
debtors to change their relations to a common creditor, with-
out his consent, and the plea d-0es not allege that the plaintiff 
was ever consulted or ever consented to any such arrangemeD't. 
In fact, he ignored tbe notices which were served upon him, 
as I think he had a right to do. 
The case of Johnson vs. Young, 20 W. Va., 614, which has been 
cited in support of a contrary doctrine, goes no further in the 
syllabus than to decide that where one of two partners pur-
C'ha-ses the intere&t <>f the· other in the partnership property, 
and assumes and agrees to pay the partnerE1hip debts, as to 
such debts the former becomes in equity the principle debtor, 
and the latter a surety. Thii:i •annunciation must be taken in 
connection with the a.pplication to the oactual facts of that 
case, which did not, in any manner, inv·olve the question we 
are now discussing, as to whether the copartners can, by any 
prh"ate arrangement between themselves, change their rela· 
tions, as principals, to the common creditor. It is true there 
are some expressions in the opinion (see Id. 657), which inti· 
mate such :.;;erming concurrenl'e in the doctrine contended for 
by the plaintiff in error; but, on the other ih.and, there is 
quoted, with approval, an extract from Bu.chana.n t:B. Clark, 10 
Gratt. (Va.) 164, which states the corre_;S.,doctrine in terse and 
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'0
unambiguous language, as follows: “As between the partners
and -the creditor, they were all equally bound; and no under-
standing and agreement between themselves could change
that relation so as to impair his rights.”
'1‘-his is the doctrine of the early text-books, and it is the
later English, doctrine. Story lays it down thus: “In the
first place, the dissolution of a partnership, w.hether it be by
the voluntary act or will of the parties, or by the retirement
of a partner, or by mere afflux of time, will not in any manner
change the rights of third persons as to any past contract-s and
transactions with or on account of thefirm; but their obliga-
tion and eflicacy and validity will remain the same, and be
bin-ding upon t-he partnership in the same manner as if no
dissolution had taken place.” See Story, Partn., sec. 334.
Thus he states the general rule; and upon this particular
illustration which we are now considering he is no less em-
phatic. “It frequently happens that, upon the retirement of
one partner, the remaining partners undertake t-o pay the
debt, and to secure the credits of the firm. This is a mere
matter of private arrangement and agreement between the
‘partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary t'he rights
“of the existing creditors of the firm. But in all cases of this
sort it may be stated as a general doctrine that, if the arrange-
-ment is made known to a creditor, and he assents t-o it, -and
by his subsequent acts or conduct or binding contract he
agrees to consider the remaining partners as h-is exclusive
debtors, he may lose all right and claims against the retiring
partner, especially if the retiring partner will sustain a preju-
dice, and the creditor will -receive a benefit, from such acts,
con-duct, or contract.” Id. sec. 158.
S0, also, Collyer says: “O-f course, any arrangement be-
"tween the partners themselves can -n-ot limit or prevent their
ordinary responsibilities to third persons, unless the latter
assent to such arangement.” I Colly. Partn. c. 17, sec. 407.
Again he says: “In order that one liability may be replaced
by another, by agreement, it is essential that the person in
whom the correlative right resides should be a party to the
agreement, or should alt all events show by so-me act of his
own that he accedes to the substitution. If A, being indebted
Jto B, transfers his liability to C, and B does not assent to the
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' unambiguous language, as foll<>ws: "As between t'he partnel'B 
end the ereditor, they were all equally bound; and no under-
standing and .agreement between themselves could chunge 
that relation so as to impair his rights." 
This is the doctrine of the early <text-books, and it is the 
later English. d·octrine. Story lays it down thus: "In the 
first place, the dissolution <1f a partnership, w.hether it be by 
the voluntary act or will of the parties, or by the retirement 
of a partner, or by mere affiux of time, will not in any manner 
• change the rights of third persons as to any past contracts and 
transactions with or on account of the firm; but their obliga-
tion and efficacy and validity will remain the same, and be 
binding upon t·he partnership in the same maJiner 1:is if no 
disS-Olution had taken place." See Story, Partn., sec. 334. 
'fhns be states the general rule; and upon this particular 
illustration which we are now considering he is no less em-
phatic. "It frequently happens that, upon the retirement of 
one partner, the remaining partners undertake to pay the 
debt, and to secure thP. credits of the firm. This i.s a mere 
matter Qf private arrangement and agreement between the 
partners, and can in no respect be admitted to vary the rights 
~of the existing creditors of the firm. But in all cases of this 
sort it may be stated as a gen~ral doctrine that, if the arronge-
·ment is made known to a creditor, and be _assents to it, a.nd 
by his subsequent acts or conduct or binding contract ·he 
agrees to consider the remaining partners as his exclusive 
dehtors, he may lose all right and claims against the retiring 
partner, egpecially if the retiring pa.rtner will sustain a prdu-
dice, and the creditor will receive a benefit, from such acts, 
conduct, or oontroct." Id. sec. 158. 
So, also, Collyer says: "Of e-0urse, any arrang~ment be-
·1:ween the partners themselves can not limit or prevent their 
ordinary responsibilities to third persons, unless the latter 
assent to such arangement." I Colly. I\utn. c. 17, sec. 407. 
Again he says: "In ordt>r that one liability may be replaced 
by another, by agre:.'ment, it is es8Pnlial that the person in 
whom the correlative right resides should be a party to the 
agreement, or should ait ail events show by some act of his 
own that he accedes to the substitution. If A, being indebted 
:t-o B, transfers Ms liability to C, and B does not ass-ent to the 
transfer, his rights ars wholly unaffected; he will neit'her 
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acquire any right against C, nor lose his former right against
A. As regards B, the agreement between A and C is -res inter
alias acta, and it does not in any way benefit or prejudice him.
But if B assents to the arrangement come to between A and
C, and adopts C as his debtor instead of A, then A’s liability
to B is at a-n end, and B must look for payment to C, and to
him alone. To apply this to cases of partnership, let it be sup-
posed that a firm of three mem-bers, A, B, and C, is indebted to
D; that A retires, and B and C-, either alone or together with
a new partner, E, take upon themselves the liabilities of the
old firm. D’s right t-0 obtain payment from A, and B, and C is
not affected by the above arrangement, and A does not cease
to be liable to him for the debt in question.” 2 Colly. Partn.
c. 24, sec. 596.
Mr. Parsons is, if possible, still more emphatic. He says:
“No dissolution of any kind affects the rights of third parties
who have had dealings with the partnership without their con-
sent. '1‘his is a universal rule, without any exception what-
ever. Undoubtedly the partners may agree -as they please
about their joint property, and all the parts of it, and so they
may about their joint -obligations; and all such agreements
are valid, so far as they do not atfect the rights of strangers,
tbn-t where they do, they are wholly void. Thus three partners
may agree today to dissolve and to divide all_ the property in
a certain way, specifying that one shall have this, another
'th.a.t, and the third that thing. Or they make such an agree-
ment about some one or more things, and not about all. And
these agreements determine the property in these things
effectually as to the partners themselves. But they are all
responsible in solido for the debts due by t-he firm, and all the
joint property of the firm is just as liable for the joint debts
after such division or settlements among themselves as it was
before. So, too, it is very common for the partners to agree,
not only that one of them may settle and wind up the partner-
ship concern, but that one or more shall wind it up, and for
that purpose shall have in full property all the goods or funds
and business, -or -a certain part of them, and shall pay all the
debts, and this he undertakes to do. Such an agreement is so
far binding on the partners that, if either of the others is
obliged to pay a debt thus assumed by a partner, the partner
paying may have his action for the money against the partner
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acquire anJ right against C, nor lose his former right against 
A. As regards B, th~ agreement between A and C is 1·es inter 
alios acta, and it does not in any way benefit -or prejudice him. 
But if B assents to the arrangement come to between A and 
C, and adopts C as his debtor instead of A, then A's liability 
to B is at a-n end, and B must look for p1yment to C, and to 
him alone. 'l'o appJy this to cases of partners11ip, let it be sup-
posed that a firm of thl"'ee members, A, B, and C, b~ indebted to 
D; that A retit·es, and B and C, either alone or together wHb 
a new partner, E, take upon themselves the lia.bilities of the 1 
old firm. D's right to obtain p·ayment from A, and B, and C is 
not affected by the above arrangement, a·nd A d-0::>-s not cease 
to be liable to him for the debt in qu·estion." 2 CoJly. Partn. 
c. 24, sec. 59G. 
Mr. Parsons is, if possiblP~ stm more emphatic. He s'.lys: 
"No dissoJution of any kind aff2cts the rights of third partil·s 
who have bad dealings with tbe partnership without their con-
sent. 'l'his is a universal rule, without any exception what-
ever. Undoubtedly the partners may agre2 •i.1S they please 
about their joint p1•operty, and all the parts of it, and so tlwy 
may about their joint -0b1igations; and alJ such agreemc•nts 
are valid, so far as they do not affect the rights of strangers, 
but whe1•e they do, they are who11y void. Thus three partners 
may agree today to dissolve ana to divide an the property in 
n cc>rtnin way, specifying that one shaJI have this, another 
th:tt, and the third that thing. Or they make such an agree-
nwnt about some one or more things, and not about all. And 
these agreements determine the prope1·ty in tl1ese things 
effectually as to the partners tbemsel ves. Rut they are aIJ 
·responsible in solido for the debts due by the firm, and all the 
joint property of the firm is just as liable for the joint debts 
after such division or settlements among themselves as it was 
before. Ho, too, it is very common for the partn::>rs to agree, 
not only that one of them may settle and wind up tlle partner-
ship concern, but that one 01· more sba)] wind it up, and for 
1hat purpose shaJl have in full property an the goods or funds 
and busin<.>ss, ·or a certain part of them, and shall pay nIJ the 
d<~bts, and this be undert:akes to do. Such an agreement is so 
far binding on the partners that, if either of the others is 
obliged to pay a debt thus assumed by a partner, t•he partner 
pnying may h'.lve his action for the money against the partrn•r 
who undertook to pay; but, so far as the Cl'editors are con-
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cerned, all the partners remain just asresponsible to all the
creditors after such an agreement as they were before.” Pars.
Partn. (3d Ed.) 428.
I t is very true that, notwithstanding the unanimity of the
text-books upon this subject, -some very respectable decisions
are t-o be found, both in England and in the United States,
which hold otherwise, and decide that, when once the retiring
partner has brought to the notice of a creditor the fact that
the remaining member has received all the assets and under-
tak-en t~o pay the debts, such creditor is bound to recognize the
new relation of principal and surety existing by operation of
law; and if requested by the retiring partner to collect his
claims, and he refuses or neglects so to do, if at the time of
the request the principal was solvent and able to pay, but
thereafter becomes insolvent, -the retiring partner is dis-
charged. Perhaps the leading American case which thus holds
is Colgrzwe vs. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. That ca-se
is fortified by, if not found-ed directly upon, the English case
of Oakclcy vs. Pashcller, 10 Bligh. (N. S.) 548, in which the opin-
ion was delivered by Lord Lyndhurst. But this case (0aIcclcy
vs. Pashellcr), has been much shaken, if not entirely overruled,
by the more recent English decisions. According to the state-
ment of the case in the recent and able work on Partnership
by Mr. Bates, that case (Oakcley vs. Pashcller), is the very reverse.
of Miller vs. Miller. decided by this court in 1875, and reported
in 8 W. Va. 542, and the latter case is binding upon us, while
the old English case (1836), would only be persuasive. The
wh-ole array of authorities, both English and American, upon
both sides of the question, are collated by Mr. Bates, who
himself evidently inclines to t.he sounder opinion, supported,
as it is, as I have shown, by all of the older text writers. 1
Bates, Partn. secs. 533, 534.
Having concluded, for the reasons stated, that the special
plea was bad, the circuit court erred in not sustaining the
demurrer to it, but did not err in rejecting all the evidence
tending to support it, and the judgment must therefore be
aflirmed.
Aflirmed.
NOTE: Compare with the preceding case—-Smith vs. Sheldon. See also
the note to that case. To the s me ell"e;:Z’as Barnes vs. Buyers, isSl1f1p-
leigh Hardware Co. vs. Wells,§l Tex. , 37 S. \V. Rep. 411 (denying
Smith vx. Sheldon).
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cerned, all the partnel"S remain just as.responsible to all the 
creditors art.~r such 1ln agreement as they were before." Pars. 
P•Jrtn. (3d Ed.) 428. 
It is very tme that, notwithstanding the unanimity of the 
text-books upon this subject, .some very re~pectable de-cisi-ons 
are to be fouud, both in England and in the United States, 
which hold otherwise, and decide that, when once the retiring 
partner •bas brought to the notice of a creditor the fact tbiat 
the remaining member hJ.s reeeived all the assets and under-
taken to pay tbe dt.>bts, such creditor is bound to recognize the 
new relation of principal and sur~t.v existing by operation of 
law; nnd if requested by the retiring partner to collect his 
claims, and he refuses or neglects so to do, if at the time of 
the request tbe principal Wai! soh·ent and a.ble to pay, but , 
thereafter becomes ins-oh·ent, the retiring partner is dis-
charged. Pe1·baps the leading American case which thus holds 
is Ool!Jrot'e vs. Tallman, 61 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. That case 
is fortified by, if not found·Pd directly upon, the English case 
of Oakcfo.11 i:s. Pasltcllcr, 10 Bligh. (N. S.) 548, in which the opin-
ion was delivered by Lord Lyndhurst. But this case (Oakeley 
tiB. Pasltcllcr), hJs been much shaken, if not en ti rely overruled, 
by the more r~cent English dr-cisions. According to the state-
ment of the case in the recent and able work 0on Partnership 
by l\lr. Bates, that case (Oakelcy vs. Pashcller), is the very reverse 
of MWer i:s. Miller. de-cided by this court in 1875, and reported 
in 8 \V. Va. 542, and the latter case is binding upon us, while 
the old English case (183G), would only be per.suasive. The 
wkole array of autho1·ities, both En~lish and American, upon 
both sides of the question, are collated by l\Ir. Bates, who 
.him~elf (•vicl<.•nt l,v inelinPs to the sounder opinion, supported, 
as it is, as I have shown, by all of the older text writers. 1 
Bates, Partn. se-cs. 533, 5:34. 
Having C'OncludPd, fot• the reasons stated, that the special 
plea was bad, the circuit court erred in not sustJining the 
demurrer to it, but did not err in rejecting all the evid•ence 
tenrting- to .support it, ancl the judgment must thc-refore be 
affirmed. 
Aftirmed. 
NOTE: Compare with th~ prPC(>rting case-Smith"·'· Shelrlon. SPP nleo 
the note to that c11se. To the is~e t;II~F,t..S.!I Bal'fl.NI V!I. B1111ertf, i~ Slu1p-
leigl1 Hardii-nre Co. vs. Wells, T Tex. UI, 37 S. \V . .Ht>p. 411 (cfonyiug 
Smith v11. Shd,fo11). 
Compare witll Colgrove t:B. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95, 23 Am. Rep. 90. 
g xv. J




Supreme Court of the United States, 1878.
93 U. S. 119, 2') L. Ed. 370.
Action in equity brought July 10, 1869, by Case, as receiver
of the First Nation-al Bank of New Orleans, against Beaure-
gard, May, Graham, Binder, Bonneval, Hernandez, the New
Orleans & Carrollton R. R. 00., and the Fourth National Bank
of New York, to recover a debt of $237,000, which he claimed
was due from, and had been contracted by, Beauregard, May
and Graham as copartners; and to have certain transfers of
partnersliip property set aside -and the property subjected to
the payment of the debt.‘ He claimed that the First National
Bank, being creditor of the firm, had a lien upon the partner-
ship property and priority in payment out of the firm assets;
that the firm and the individual partners were insolvent; and
thwt the deeds referred to in the opinion were in fraud of the
rights of the Bank and should -be set aside.
Complain-ant’s bill was dismissed below and he appeals.
\
J. D. Rouse and Chas. Oasc, for appellant.
John A. Campbell and H. C‘. Miller, for appellee.
Asst. Atty. Gen’l. Smith, for the United States.
Mr. Justice Srnoxo delivered the opinion of the court. The
object of this bill is to follow and subject to the payment
‘For other aspects of the same controversy, see Bank vs. (Jarrolltmi

















































































































































APPLICATION OF ASSETS TO CLAIMS OF 
CR.EDITORS. 
CASE vs. BEAUREGARD.· 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1818. 
9:J U. S. 119, 2:> L. Ed. 870. 
Action in equity brought July 10, 1869, by Case, as receiver 
of the First National Bnnk of New Orleans, against Beaure-
gard, May, Graham, Binder, Bonneval, Hernandez, the New 
Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., and the Fourth National Bank 
of New York, to recover a debt of $237,000, which he claimed 
wa.s due from, and ·had been contracted by, Beauregard, May 
and Gra·ham as copartners; and to have certain transfers of 
p1.rtnership property set aside and the property -subjected to 
the payment of the debt.1 He claimed that the First National 
Bank, being creditor of the firm, ·bad a lien upon the partner-
ship property and priority in payment out of the firm assets; 
that the firm and the individual partners were insolvent; and 
thwt the deeds referred to in the opinion were in fr.a.ad of the 
rights of the Bank and should be set aside. 
Complninant's bill was dismissed ·below and he appeals. 
J. D. Rouse and Clras. Case, for appellant. 
John A. Campbell a.nd H. C. Miller, for appellee. 
A.sst. Atty. Gen'l. Smith, for the United States. 
Mr. Justice STRO~G doelivered the opinion of the court. The 
object of this bill is to follow and subject to the payment 
1 For other aspects of the same controversy, see Bank vs. C:url'olltoa 
Railroad, ante, p. 147. 
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of a partnership debt property which formerly belonged to the
partnership, but which, before the bill was filed, had been
“transferred to the defendants. There is little if any contro-
versy respecting the f-acts, and little in regard to the princi-
ples of equity invoked by the complainant. The important
question is whether those principles are applicable to the facts
of the case. '
No doubt the effects of a partnership belong to it as long as
it continues in existence, and not to the individuals who
compose it. (The right of each partner extends only to a.
share of what may remain after the payment of the debits
of the firm and the settlement of its accounts. Growing
out of this right, or rather included in it, is the right to
have the partnership property applied to the payment of the
partnership debts in preference to those of any individual part-
ner. This is an equity the partners ‘have as between them-
selves, and in certain circumstances it inures to the benefit of
the credit-ors of the firm. The latter are said to have a privi-
lege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien, to
have the debts due to t-hem paid out of the assets of a firm
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its
several members. Their equity, however, is a derivative one.
It is not held or enforceable in their own right. It is practi-
cally a subrogation to the -equity of the individual partner, t-o
be made effective only through him. Hence, if he is not in
a condition to enforce it, the creditors of the firm ca-nnot be.
Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54. Appeal ofthe
York County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. But so long as the equity
of the partner remains in him, so long as he retains an interest
in the firm assets, as a partner, a court of equity will allow
the creditors of the lirm to avail themselves of his equity, and
enforce, through it, the application of those assets primarily
to payment of the debts due them, whenever the property
comes under its administration.)
It is indispensable, ‘however, to isulch relief, when tihe credit-
ors are, as in the present case, simple-contract creditors, that
the partnership property should be within the control of the
court and in the course of administration, brought there by
the bankruptcy of the firm, or by an assignment, or by the crea-
tion of a trust in some mode. This is because neither the part-



























































































































































CASE VS. BEAUREGARD. 441 
of a partnel"S'hip debt property which formerly belonged t-0 the • 
partnership, but which, before the bill wa.s filed, had been 
transferred to the defendants. There is little if any contro-
n·rsy res-pecting the facts, and little in regard to the princi-
ples <>f· equity invoked by the complainant. The important 
question is whether those principles are applicable to tihe facts 
<Jf the case. · 
No doubt the effects of a partnership bel<>ng to it as long as • 
it oontinues in existence, and not to the individuals who 
c'Omp<>Se it. f The right (}f e11ch partner extends only to a 
shar8 of what may remain after the payment of the debts 
of the firm and the settlement of its accounts. Growing 
out of this right, or ra1her included in it, is the right to 
have the partnership property applied to the payment of the 1 
• ! 
partnership debts in pr~ference to those of any individual 1nrt- / 
ner. This is an equity 1he partners ·have as between them- , 
selves, and in certain circumstances it inures to t·he benefit of I 
the creditors of the firm. The latter are said to have a privi-
1 
lege or preference, sometimes loosely denominated a lien, to • ' 
• I ·have the debts due to them paid out of the assets of a firm I 
in course of liquidation, to the exclusion of the creditors of its 
several members. Their equity, however, is a derivative one. 
It is not held or enforceable in their own right. It is practi-
cally a subrogation to ·the equity of the individual partner, to 
be made effective only through him. H{'nce, if he is not in 
a condition to enforce it, the creditors of the firm cannot be. 
Rice vs. Barnard, 20 Vt. 479, 50 Am. Dec. 54. Appeal of the 
Y.01·k County Bank, 32 Pa. St. 446. But so long as the equity 
&f the partner remains in him, so long as be reta.ins an interest 
in t.he firm assets, as a partner, a court of equity will a·llow 
the creditors of the ilrm to avail themselves of his equity, and 
enforce, through it, the application of those a.ssets primarily 
to payment of the debts due them, whenever the property 
comes under its administration.) 
It is indispensable, however, to •suich relief, when t1he credit· I 
ors are, as in the pl'esent case, simple-contl'act creditors, that 
the partnership property shou1d be within the control of the ·• 
coul't and in the course of administration, bl"ought there by 
the bankruptcy of the firm, or by an assignment, or by the crea-
ti-0n of a trust in some mode. This is because neither the part- -
ners nor the joint creditors have any specific lien, nor is there 1 
56 
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l
any trust that can be enforced until the property h-as passed
in custodiam lcgis. Other property can be followed only after
a judgment at law has been obtained and an execution has
proved fruitless.
S0, if before the interposition of the court is asked the prop-
erty has ceased to belong to the partnership, if by a bona fide
transfer it -has become the several property either of one
partner or of a third person, the equities of the partners are
extinguished, and consequently the derivative equities of the
creditors are at an end. I-t is, therefore, always essential to
any preferential right of the creditors that t-here shall be
property owned by the partnership when the claim for prefer-
ence is so-ught to be enforced. Thus, in Ea: parte Rufii-n (6 Ves.
119), where from a partnership of two persons one retired.
assigning the pa.rtnersl1ip property to the other, and taking a
bond for the value and a covenant of indemnity against d-ebts,
it was ruled by Lord Ennozv t-hm-t the joint creditors h-ad no
equity attaching upon partnership effects, even remaining in
specie. A-nd su-ch -has been the rule generally accepted ever
since, with the single qualification that the assignment of the
retiring partner is not mala fide. Kimball vs. Thompson, 13
Metc. (Mass) 283; Allen vs. The Centre Valley Company, 21 Conn.
130, 54 Am. Dec. 333; Ladd rs. G~ri-swold, 9 Ill. 25, 46 Am. Dec.
443; Smith rs. Edwards, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. Dec. 71;
Robb vs. Mudgc, 14 Gray (Mass) 534; Baker’s Appeal, 21 Pa. St.
76; Sigler vs. Ii'noa.- County Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; W-ilcoav vs.
Kellogg, 11 Ohio 394.
The joint estate is converted into the separate estate of the
assignee by force of the contract of assignment. And it makes
n-o difference whether the retiring partner sells to the other
partner or to a third person, or whether the sale is mad-e by
him or under a judgment against him. In either case his
equity is gone. These principles are settled by very abundant
autliorities. It remains, therefore, only to consid-er whether, in
view of the rules thus settled and of the facts of this case, the
complainant, through any one of the partners, "has a right to
follow the specific property which formerly belonged to the
partnership, and compel its application to the paym-en-t of the
debt due from the firm to the bank of which he is the receiver.
The -partnership, while it was in existence, was composed of
















































































































































CA.SES ON p A.RTNERSHIP. 
any trust that can be enforced until the property baa passed 
in custodiani. legis. Other property can be followed only after 
a judgment at law has ·been obtained and an executfon bu 
proved fruitless. 
r 
So, if before the interposition of the court is a.sked the pr<>p-
erty has ceased to belong to the p1rtnl'r&h.ip, if by a bona {Uk 
tran.sf er it has become the several property either of one 
1 partner or of a third person, the equities of the partners a.re 
! extinguishl'd, and C'onsequently the derivative equities of the 
I creditors are at an end. It is, therefore, always essentill to 
I any preferential right of the creditor.a that there shall be 
· J property owned by the partnership when the clajm for prefer-
ence is sought to be enforced. Thus, in Ex parte Ruffin (6 Ves. 
llll), where from a partnersl1ip of two persons one retired, 
assigning the partnership property to the other, and taking a 
bond for the value and a covenant of ind·enmity against debts, 
it was ruled by Lord ELDON thu.t the joint creditors bad n•o 
equity attilching upcm partnership effects, ev.en remaining in 
specie. And such ·has been the rule generally a:ccepted ever 
sinee, with the singl~ qualification that the assignment of th£' 
retiring partner is not mala fide. l{imball vs. Thompson, 13 
Mete. (Mass.) 283; A.lien t:s. The Centre l1alley Company, 21 Conn. 
130, 54 Am. Dec. :l33; Ladd 1·s. Gris1cold, 9 Ill. 25, 46 Am. Dec. 
443; Smith t'S. Edtcards, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 106, 46 Am. Dec. 71; 
Robb t'S. Mudge, 14 Gray (Mass.) 5:J4; Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 
76; Sigler vs. K11o:r Oount.l/ Bank, 8 Ohio St. 511; Wilct>.J) vs. 
/(cllogg, 11 .Ohio 3!l4. 
'l"he joint estate is converted into the separate estate of the 
assignee by fo1·ce of the contl'act of assignment. And it m:.lke,s 
n-o differenre whether the retiring partner sells to the otiber 
partnn or to a third person, or whether the sale is mad·e by 
him or under a judgm<>nt a~ainst him. In either ca.se bis 
\ equity is gone. These principles are settled by very abundant 
authorities. It remains, therefore, only to consid·er whether, in 
view of the rules thus settled and of the facts of this case, th~ 
oomplainant, through any one of the partners; bas a right to 
f.ollow the specific property which formerly belon~ to the 
partnership, and compel its application to the pay1neut of the 
debt due from the firm to the bank of which he is the receiver. 
1'lH' partnerl.'"lhip, while it wa.s in existence, wa.s composed of 
three pers()ns, May, Graham, and Beauregard, but it bad 
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ceased to exist before this suit was commenced. It was en-
tirely insolvent, and all the partnership etfects -had been trans-
ferred to others for valuable considerations. None of the
property was ever within the jurisdiction of the court for
administration.
On the 8th of May, 1867, Graham, one of the partners,
assigned all his right and interest in any property and elfects
of the partnership, and whatever he might be entitled to under
the articles thereof, together with all debts due to him from
the partnership or -any member thereof, to the Fourth National
Bank of the city of New York. By subsequent assignments
made on the 14th and 16th of May, 1869, May, the sec-ond part-
ner, transferred all his interest in the partnership property to
the United States, and by the same instrument transferred to
the United States, by virtue of a power of attorney which he
held, t-he interest of Graham. On the 21st of August, 1867, the
United States sold and transferred their interest obtained
from May and Graham in all the partnership property, includ-
ing real estate, t-o Alexander Bonneval, Joseph Hernandez,
and George Binder. On the 15th of October next following, an
act of fusion was executed between the New Orleans and Oar-
rollton Railroad Company, Beauregard, Bonneval, Hernandez,
and Binder, by which the rights of all the parties became
vested in the railroad company, subject to the debts and lia-
bilities of t-h-e company, whether due or claimed from the
lessee or the stockholders.
The efiect of these transfers and act of fusion was very
clearly to convert the partnership property into property held
in severalty, or, -at least, to terminate the equity of any part-
ner to require the application thereof to the payment of the
joint debts. Hence if, as we have seen, the equity of the part-
nerhip creditors can be worked out only through the equity of
the partners, there was no such equity of t-he partners, or any
one of them, as is now claimed, in 1869, when this bill w-as filed.
No one of the partners could then insist that the property
should be applied first -to the satisfaction of the joint debts,
f-or his interest in the partnership and its assets had ceased.
Baker’s Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 823. That was ~a ca-se where a firm
had consisted of five brothers. Two of them withdrew, dispos-
ing of their interest in the partnership estate and eifects to the
















































































































































. CASE TS. BE.U:REGARD. 
teased to exist before this suit was commenced. It was en-
tirely insoh'ent, and all the partnership effects ·had been tran1-
ft>rred to f)thers for valuable considerations. None of the 
property was ever within the jurisdic.tion of the court for 
administrn ti on. 
On the 8th or May, 1867~ Graham, one of the partners, 
assigned all his right and interest in any property and effects 
()f the partnership, and whatever he might be entitled to under • 
the articlf's thereof, t·ogether with all de'bt.s due to him from 
the partnership-or ·any member thereof, to the Foorth National 
Bank ()f the city of New York. By subsequent assignments 
m:i.de on the 14th and 16th of :May, 18G9, May, rtlle second part-
ner, transferred all bis interest in the partnership pToperty to ' 
the United States, and by the same instrument trausferred to 
the United States, by virtue <>fa power of attorney whieh he 
held, the interest of Graham. On the 21st of August, 1867, the 
United States sold and transferred their interest obtained 
from May and Graham in all the partnership property, includ-
ing real estate,. to Alexander Bonneva.l, Joaeph Hernandez, 
and George Binder. On the 15th of Octobel.· next following, ·an 
act of fusi-0n was executed bE-tween the New Orleans and Car-
rollton Uailroad Company, Beauregard, B<>nneval, Hernandez, 
and Binder, by which the rights of a.II the parties became 
vested in the raill'oad company, subject to the debts and lia-
bilities -of the company, whether due or claimed fr<>m the 
lessee or the stockholders. 
'l'he effE'ct of thE>se transfers and act of fusion was very 
clearly to convert the partnership property into property h~ld 
in severalty, or, 0at least, to terminate the equity of any part- -
ner to require the application thereof to the payment of the 
joint debts. Hrnce if, as we have seen, the equity of the part-
nership creditors can be worked out only through the equity of 
the par.tners, there was n'O such equity of the partners, or any 
one of thejn, as is now claimed, in 1869, when this bill wa.s tiled. 
No one of the partners could then insist that the property 
should be oapplied firm :to the satisfaction of the joint del>ts, 
f.or his interest in the partnerghip and its a.ssets had ceased. 
Baker's Appeal, 21 Pa. St. 8:?3. That was a case where a firm 
had consisted of ft-ve brothers. Two of them withd1-ew, dispos-
ing of their interest in the partn-ership estate and effects to the 
ather three, the latter agreeing to pay the debts of the firm. 
444 Gases on PARTNERSHIP.
Some time after, one of the remaining three sold his interest
in the partnership property to one of the remaining two part-
ners. The two remaining, after contracting debts, made an
assignment of their partnership property to pay the debts of
the last firm composed of the two; and it was held that the
creditors off the first two firms had no right to claim any por-
tion of the fund last assigned, and that it was distributable
exclusively among the creditors of the last firm. So in llIcNutt
vs. Strayhorn (39 Id. 269), it was ruled that though the general
rule is that the equities of the creditors are to be worked out
through the equities -of the partners, yet where the property
is parted with by sale severlally made, and neither partner has
dominion or possession, there is nothing through which the
equities of the creditors can work, and, therefore, there is no
ease fo-r the application of the rule. See, also, Coover-’s
Appeal, 29 Pa. st. 9, 70 Am. Dec. 149.u1nless the-refo-re, the
conveyances of the partners in this case and the act of fusion
were fraudulent, the bank of which the complainant is receiver
has no claims u-pon the property now held by the New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Company, arising out of t.-he facts that
i-t is a creditor of the partnership, and was such -a creditor
when the property belonged to the firm».
The bill, it is true, charges that the several transfers of the
partners were illegal and fraudulent, witlrout specifying
wherein the fraud consisted. The charge seem-s to be only a
legal oonclusio-n from the fact that some of the transfers were
made for the payment of the private debts of the assigrrors,
Oon-ceding such to -have been the case, it was a fraud up-on the
other partners, if a fraud at all, rather th|.1'n upon the joint
credit~ors,—a fraud which those partners could waive, an-d
which was subsequently waived by the act of fu-si-on; Besides,
that act made provisicln for some of the debts of the pa'rt;ner-
ship. And it has been ruled that wih-ere one of two partners,
with the consent of the other, sells and conveys one-half of
the eflects -of the firm to a third person, and the other partner
afterwards sells and conveys the other half to the same per-
son, sac-h sale and conveyances are not prima facie void, as
again-st creditors -of the firm, but are prima facie valid against
all the world, and can be set aside by the creditors of the firm
only by proof that the transactions were fraudulent as against

















































































































































CA.SES ON P ARTN'ERSHIP. 
Some time after, -one ()f the remaining three &old his interest 
is the partnership property to <me of the remaining two part-
ners. The two remaining, after contracting debts, made an 
assignment .of their part:rn.ership property to pay the debts of 
the last fl.rm comp0sed of the tw-0; a.nd it was held that the 
creditors <Jf the first two firms bad no right to claim any por-
tion of the fund last assigned, and th:lt 'it was distributable 
exclusively among the credit-0rs <>f the last firm. So in McNutt 
f18. Strayhorn (39 Id. 269), it was ruled that though the general 
rule is that the equities <>f the c-redit:iors are ro be worked out 
thr<>ugb the equities •e>f the partners, yet where the property 
is parted with by sale sevemlly made, and :neither partner has 
dominion or possession, there is nO'thi·ng thl'ough w·hfoh the 
equities o.f the creditors can work, and, the-refore, there ts noo 
case for the a.pplication of the rule. See, also, Coover's 
App.eal, 29 Pa. St. 9, 70 Am. Dec. 149-1.!nless therefore, the 
conveyances of the partners in this case ~md the act of fusion 
were fraudulent, the bank of which the complainant is receiver 
h:as no claims upon the property now held by the New Orleans 
and Carrollton Railroad Company, arising out of the facts that 
it is a creditor of the partnership, and was such a crediti0r 
when the property belonged to t>he firm~ 
The bill, it is true, charges that the several transfers of the 
partners were illegal and fraudulent, without specifying 
wherein the fraud coosisted. Tihe charge seems to be only a 
legal oonclosion foom the fact that some t()f the tranosfe11s were 
made for the payment of th~ private debts of the assignors• 
• Oonceding such to .have been the case, it was a fraud upoin the 
other partners, if a fraud at all, rather thlm upQn the joint 
creditori:;,-a fraud which those partners could waive, and 
which was subsequently waived by the act 1of fusion, Besides, 
that act made provi·si<Jin for some of the debts of the pa1rtner-
ebip. And it has been ruled that w1here one of two partners, 
with the consent of the other, sells and conveys one-half of 
the effects o()f the firm t<> a third person, an-cl the other pa.rtner 
afterwards sells and conveys the otiher half to the 11ame per-
soo, such sale :and conveyances are not prima facie void, as 
against creditors of the firm, but are prim.a facie valid against 
all the world, and can be set aside by the creditors of the firm 
only by proof that tbe transactions wel'e fraudulent as aguinst 
them. Kimball vs. Thompson, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 283; Flack va. 
Cass vs. Bmunnoann. 4.-15
(Yharron, 29 Md. 311. A similar doctrine is asserted in some
of the other cases we have cited; and see 21 Conn. 130. In
the present case we find no such proof. We discover nothing to
impeach. the bona fides of the transaction, by which the prop-
erty became vested in the railroad company.
Thus far we have considered the case without reference to
the provisions of the Louisiana Code, upon which the appel-
lant relies. Art. 2823 of the Code is as follows: “The part-
nership property is liable to the credito-rs of the partnership
in preference -to those -of the individuial partner.” ‘Ye do not
perceive'that this provision differs materially from -the genem-l
rule of equity we have stated. It creates no specific lien upon
partnership property, w-hich continues after -the property has
ceased to belong t-0 the partnership. It does n-ot forbid bona
fide conversion by t-he partners of the joint property into right
in several-ty, held by third persons. It relates to partnership
property alone, and gives I11 rule for mla rshalling such property
between creditors. Ooncede that it gives to joint creditors a
privilege while the property belongs to the partnership, -there
is n-0 subject upon which it can act when the joint ownership
of the partners has ceased. Art. 3244 of the Code declares
that privileges become extinct “by the extinction of the thing
subject to the privilege.”
What we have said is sufficient for a determination of the
case. If it be urged, as was ibarely intimated during the argu-
ment, that the property sought to be followed belongs in
equity to the bank, or is clothed with a trust for the bank,
-because it was purcha.sed with the br.'1.nk’s money, the answer
is plain. There is no satisfactory evidence -that it was t-huts
purchased. It cannot be identified as the subject to the acqui-
sition of which money belonging to the bank was applied.
The bank has, therefore, no specific claim upon the property,
nor is there any trust which a count of equity can enforce;
and it was well said by the circuit justice, that, without some
constituted trust or lien, “a creditor h:-is only the right to
prosecute his cl-aim in the ordinary courts -of law, and have it
adjudicated before die can pursue the property of his debtor
by a direct proceeding” in equity.
Decree affirmed.
















































































































































CA.SE vs. BEAUREGARD. 
Cha1·ron, 29 Md. 311. A similar d-0ctrine is asserted in so.me 
of the other cases we have cited; and see 21 Conn. 130. Iin 
the pre.sent case we find no such proof. We discover nothing to 
impeach. the bona fides of the transaction, by which the pl"oip-
er.ty became vested in the railroad oe>mpany. 
Thus far we have considered the case without reference to 
the provisions of the Louisiana Code, upon which the appel-
lant relies. Art. 2823 of the Code is as f.ollows: "The part· 
nership property i-s liable t-0 the credito-rs of the partnel'ship 
in preference .to those -of the individual partner." We do n'<Jt · 
• perceive that this provision differs materially from the genem·l 
rule of equity we have stated. It creates no specific lien upoin 
partnership property, which continues after the property bas 
ceased to belong to the partnership. It does uot f.orbid bona 
fide oonversion by the partners of the joint property inro rights 
in severalty, held by third persons. It relates to pa.I"tnership 
property alcme, and· give-s ia rule for miarshallfog such property 
between creditors. Concede that it gives to joint creditors a 
privilege while the property belongs t<> the 'Partnership, .there 
-is n<> subject upon which it can act whein the joint ownership 
-0f the partn~rs has ceased. Art. 3244 of the Code dedaree 
tha.t privileges become extinct "by the extinction of the thing 
~object to the privilege." 
'Vhat we have -said is sufficient for a determin·aticm of the 
caise. If it be urged, as was ·barely intimated during the argu-
ment, that the proper(Y. sought to be followed belo·ngs in . 
equity to the bank, or is dotbed with a trust for ihe bank, 
hec·anse it was purcha.sed with the ba:nk's money, the an.swe_r 
is plain. There is no satisfact:ory evide-nce that it was thus 
pure-based. It cannot be idootified as the subject to the 1:i1cqui-
silion of which money belonging to the hank was applied. 
The bank has, therefore, no specific claim upon the pl'operty, 
nor is there any trust which a court of equity can enforce; 
and it was well said by the cireuit justice, that, without some 
constituted trust -or lien, "a creditor bas only the right to 
prosecute his cla.im in the -ordinary courts 'Of law, and have it 
:1<1judic-ated before 1he can pnrsue the property of his d·ebtor 
hy a direct proceeding" in equity. 
Decree affirmed. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 289. 
446 V Ossns ox PARTNERSHIP.
ARNOLD vs. HAGERMAN. / '
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1889.
45 N. J. Eq. 186, 17 Atl. Rep. ea, 14 Am. st. Rep. 712'
On_July 17, 1883, John C. Farr, having a lumber business at
Hoboken and a manufacturing business at Asbury Park,
formed a partnership as to the latter business with J. H.
Hagerman and J. S. Fielder, under the firm name of J. C. Farr
& Co. Hagerman and Fielder gave Farr their note for the
interests they acquired in the Asbury Park business. On
October 29, 1883, the new firm was embarrassed financially and
dissolved. Hage-rman and Fielder assigned to Farr all their
interests in the business, and Farr returned their notes and
agreed to pa-y t-he debts. On November 30, 1883, Farr assigned
all his property, under the statute, to Arnold, for the benefit
of creditors. ln -the early part of 1884, the Second National
Bank of Red Bank obtained judgments against the members
of ;t-he firm of J. C. Farr & 00., for debts due from that firm,
and caused executions to be levied on what had been the prop-
erty of that firm. The bank afterwards filed a bill to set
aside the transfers from Hagerman and Fielder to Farr, -and
the assignment of Farr to Arnold on the ground th-it they
were fraudulent as against the creditors of J. C. Farr & Co.
The court below held the transfers by Hagerman and Fielder
to Farr to be void. V
Appeal.
Gilbert Collins, for appellant.
A. G. Hartshorne, for Hagerman and Fielder.
J. 0'. Applegatc and F. W. Hope, for the Bank.
DIXON, J. (After disposing of other matters.) In equity a
partnersh-ipis for some purposes deemed a single entity. Thus,
when the property involved in the business of a partnership
is to be arpplied by a court of equity t-0 the payment of debts,
that property is treated a-s belonging, not to the persons com-
posing the firm, -bu-t to a distinct debtor, the partnership, and

















































































































































446 UA.SES ON PARTNEUSIIIP. 
ARNOLD vs. HAGERMAN. 
J 
Oottrt of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, 1889. 
43 N. J . Eq. 186, 17 Atl. Rep. 93, 14 Am. St. Rep. 71r 
On. July 17, 1883, John C. Farr, having a lumber busines-s at 
H~boken and a m:rnufaoturing business at Asbury Park, 
formed a partnership as to the latter business wil.h J. H. 
Hagerman and J. S. Fielder, under the firm name of J.C. Farr 
& Co. Hagerma.n and :Fielder gave I•'arr theil· note for t·he 
intere.sts they acquired in the Asbury Park busi·ness. On 
Octo-ber 29, 188.1, the new firm was embarrassed financially and 
dissolved. Hagerman and Field-er assigned to Farr all their 
interests in the .business, and Farr returned their notes and 
agreed to p1.y the debts. On November 30, 1883, Farr assigned 
all his property, und<!r the statute, to Arnold, for the benefit 
of creditors. ln the early part of 1884, the Second National 
Dank -of Red Bank obtained judgments against the members 
of the firm of J. C. Parr & Co., for debts due from that firm, 
and caused executions to be levied on what h:td been the prop-
erty of that firm. The bank afterwards filed a bi11 to set 
aside tbe transfers fr.om Hagerman and "Fielder to Farr, and 
the assignment ()f Farr to Arnold on the ground tb1 t tbej· 
we1-e fraudulent as against the creditors of J. C. Farr & Co. 
The court below held the transfers by Hagerman and Fielder 
to Farr to be void. 
Appeal. 
Gilbert Collins, for appellant. 
A.. 0. Hartsliorne, for Hagerman 1and Fielder. 
J. 0. Applegate a.nd F. W. Hope, for the Bank. 
D1xoN, J. (After disposing of other matters.) In equi~y a · 
partnership is for some purposes deemed a sing-le entity. TL us, 
when t1he pmperty involved in tlie business of a partnership . 
is t-0 be applied by a court of equity to the payment of debts, 
that property is treated .ais belonging, not to the persons com-
posing the firm, ·but to a distinct d-ebtor, the partnership, and , 
is U'Sed first to liquidate the deb-ts co·ntracted in the business : 
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of that debtor, and only the surplus, if any, is surrendered to
the individual partners. This equitable practice rests upon
the presumed intention of the partners themselves, and hence
is primarily considered as their equitable right against eao
other. (Yonsequen-tly, since the decision of Lord Ennox in
parts Ruflin, 6 Ves. 119, it has been generally held that t
partners could put an end to this right, and that if, by their
agreement, the partnership is dissolved, and its property is
assigned to one of their number, or to a stranger, as his own,
without reservation of -the right, the right -to have piart-nez-ship
debts paid out of that property is extinct. Growing out cl
this right of partners has arisen a corresponding equity in
partnership creditors to have their debts first satisfied out of
the firm property, which is now deemed a substantial element
of their demands. Generally it may be said that this equity
of creditors continues only so long a the right of the partners
against each- other subsists, and perishes when that termi-
nates; but this is not universally true, for this equity may
survive the right to which, ordinarily, it is attached. In this
respect it resembles the claim which the general creditors of
an individual -have upon his property. It is neither an estate
nor a lien. It is, ordinarily, but a right by lawful procedure
to acquire alien during the ownership of the debtor; yet, under
certain circumstances, that lien may be acquired after the
debtor’-s -ownership has ended. This results from the provis-
ions of the ancient statute for the prevention ’of frauds and
perjuries, by force of which, when a person has alienated his
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors,
the rights of those creditors remain as if no alicnati-on had
taken place, except against the claims of bona /idc purchasers,
for good consideration, without notice. Equity applies this
statute to :1 partnership, its property and creditors, just as it
would in case of an individual, and t-herefore, while generally
it is true that a partnership may defeat the equity of its credit-
ors by the alienation of its ‘property and consequent extin-
guis-hment of the right of its partners inter scsc, yet, if the
alienation be effected with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
the firm creditors by defeating their equity, the claims of
creditors will be unimpaired, and t-he property will be treated
as partnership assets, unless it shall have passed into -the

















































































































































ARNOLD VS. IlAGER:UAN. 4.{7 
of toot debtor, and only tbe surplus, if any, is surrendered to 
the individaal partners. This equitable practice rests upon 
the presumed intenUon of the partneTs themselves, mid .hence 
Ml p.rimiarily C'Onsidered as thefr equibble right again.st eac 
other. 0onsequen.tly, since the decision of Lord ELDO~ in 
parte Ruffen, 6 Ves. 119, it has been generally held that t 
partners could put an end to this right, and that if, by their 
agreement, the partnership is dissolved, and its property is 
assigned to <>ne -0f their number, or to a stranger, a.s his o.wn, 
without reservation of the right, the right to have partnership 
del>ts paid 'Out of that property is extinct. Growing out d/f 
this right of partners has arisen a correspo;ziding equity in 
partnership creditors to have their debts first satisfied out of 
the firm property, which is now deemed a substantial element 
of their demands. Generally it may be said that rthis equity 
of creditor,s continues only so long as the right of the partn·ers 
against each other subsists, and perishes when that termi-
D'ates; but this is not unive:rs:illy true, for this equity m:ay 
eurvive the right to which, ordinarily, it is attached. In this 
respe'Ct it resembles the claim which the general creditors o.f 
an individual ·have upon his property. It is neither an eistate 
ll'Or a lien. It is, ordinarily, but a right by lawful pr·ocedure 
to acquire a lien during the ownersllip of the debtor; yet, under 
certain circum.st:mces, that lien may be acquired after the 
debtor'·s ownership has ended. This results from tlJ.e provis- '1 
ions of the ancient sta:tute for the prev~ntion 'of frauds and I 
,crjuries, by f-Orce of which, wbPn a person has alienated his ( 
property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, 1 
tl:e rights of those credi~-ors remain as if no alienation had 
taken place, except against the claims of bona fide purchasers, 
f-or g()od consideration, without notice. Equity applies this 
statute to a partnership, its propt-rty and creditors, just as it 
wo·uld in case <>fan individual, and therefore, while generally 
it is true that a partnership may defeat the equity <>fits credit-
-0rs by the alienation of its property and consequent extin-
guishment <>f the right of its partners inter scsc, yet, if the 
alienation be effected with intent to hinder, delay, or de fraud 
the firm cred'it.ors by defeating their equity, the claims of 
creditors will be unimpaired, a.nd the property will be treated 
as partnership a•ssets, unless it shall have passed into the 
·hands of those whom the statute protect& This doctrine ·ha1s 
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repeatedly been recognized in the cou-rt.s of New Jersey. Thus,
in Matlaclc vs. James, 13 N. J. Eq. 126, two members of a firm
consisting of four persons conveyed their undivided half of
and, held for partnership purposes, to an outsider, in payment
their individual debt to him. Ghancellor GREEN, finding
at the conveyance was designed to defeat -the equitable
claim of pzrrtnerslnip creditors, adjudged it void, and applied
the wh-ole proceeds of the land to paying t-hose creditors. In
Bank vs. Spraguc, 21 N. J. Eq. 530, 544, Mr. Justice VAN
SYCKLE, speaking for this court, plainly intimated an opinion
‘(the case not calling for a decision on the po-int) that an insol-
vent firm could not defeat this equity of partnership creditors
by giving to credit-ors of the individual members a prior lien
on partnership property, and referred to Chnicellor WAL-
won'rn’s opinion in Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. C11. 47, 49
Am. Dec. 160, as supporting that doctrine by sound reasoning.
The language of the chancellor thus approved was: “The
copartners certainly h-ave the right to dissolve the partnership,
and divide the property of the firm between them, provided
there is no intention of delaying or hindering their creditors
in the collection of debts. ' " ' The case would have
been entirely different if copartners, who were insolvent, and
mnazble to pay the debts of tlhe firm, eitilrer out of their copart-
nership elfecrts oir of their ind-ividuial property, had made an
assignment of the property of bo-th to pay the Pindivi-dual debt
of one of the copartners only; for an insolvent copartner, who
was unable to pity the debts which the firm owed, would be
guilty of a fraud upon the joint credit.-ors if -he autzlrorized his
share of the property of the firm to be applied to the -payment
of a debt for which neait-her he nor his property was l"ia~ble at
law or in equity.” So, in Van Dorcn vs. Sticklc, 24 N. J . Eq.
331, affirmed by this court, 27 N. J. Eq. 498, i-t was declared
that ta voluntary transfer by a firm of notes own-ed by the pa.rt-
nership to the wife of one of the partners was fraudulent as
to partnership creditors, and th-e notes in the hands of the
wife were decreed to be pa.rtners~hip assets. To the like effect
is the language of Mr. Justice Dnrum, delivering the opinion
of this court in Clements rs. Jcssup, 36 N. J . Eq. 569: j“Part-
nership creditors, in equity, have an inherent priority of claim
upon partnership property over individual creditors, and a
















































































































































. 448 CASES ON P4BTNBRSIIIP • 
repeatedly been recognized in the c-0urls -of New Jersey. Thus, 
in Matlack va. James, 13 N. J. Eq. 1~6, two memibers of a firm 
consisting of four persons conveyed their undivided half of 
and, held for partnership purp-0ses, to an outsider, in payment 
their individual debt to him. ChanceHor GREEN, tin-ding 
at the c-0nveyance was designed ro defeat .the equitable 
claim of pa:rtnership creditors, adjudged it void, and applied 
the whole proceeds of the la.nd to paying thO"Se creditors. In 
.Bank vs. Sprague, 21 N. J. Eq. 53(), 544, Mr. Justice VA..~ 
SYCKLE, speaking for this court, plainly intimated an opinion 
lthe case not calling for a decision on the p<>int) th1.t an insol-
vent firm oould n<>t defeat this equity of partnership creditors 
by giving to credit•ors <>f the individual members a prior lien 
~n partnership property, and referred to Ch:mcellor WAL-
WORTH's opinion in Kirby va. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 47, 49 
Am. Dec. 160, as supporting that doctrine by sound reasoning. 
The l·anguage of the chanceUor thus approved wa·s: "The 
oopartners certainly have the rig-ht to dissolve the partnership, 
and divide the property of the firm between them, provid-ed 
t·here is n-0 tntention of delaying or ·hindering their creditors 
in the collectfon of debts. • • • The case would b1ve 
been entire]y different if copa-rtners, who we.re im:•olvent, and 
Uilla:ble to pay the debt.s o-f tihe firm, either ()lllt <>f their copa.rt-
nership effeots or of their ind·ividuial pr-0perty, had made an 
assignment -Of the property Qf ooth to pay the 1ndividua.l debt 
of one af the copart.ners <>'Illy; for an insolvent ropoa.rtner, who 
wa1s u.nabJe ro pl~ the debts which th'e firm owed, would be 
guilty of a fraud upon the j-oint creditors if ohe authiorized his 
share of the property of the firm t<> be applied to the ·payme.nt 
of a debt for which- neif.her be n<0r his property was li.abJe at 
la.w or in equity." So, in Van Doren vs. Stickle, 24 N. J. Eq. 
331, affirmed by this court, 27 N. J. Eq. 498, i-t was declared 
that ·a voluntary trans·fer by a firm of notes owned by the pa.rt-
_nership to the wife of one of the pa.rtners was frauduJent as 
to pa.rtnership creditors, a.nd the notes in t11e hands of the 
wife were decreed to be pa.rtnership assets. To the Jike effect 
is the language of Mr. Justice DEPUE, delivering the ·opinion 
of this court in Clements i·s. Jessup, 36 N. J. Eq. 569: ]"Part-
nership creditors, in equity, have an inherent priority of claim 
upon partnership property over individu.:il creditors, and a 
transfer· of partnership property by -0ne partner, with the 
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consent of the other partners, or by all the partners, to pay
individual debts, ls fraudulent and void as to firm creditors,
unless the firm was then solvent, and had -suflioient property
remaining to pay the partnership de.bts.” '
The case before us comes clearly within the reach of this
principle. At the time -of the transfer by Hagerman and
Fielder to Farr theinisolvency of each of these persons, and
of the firm of J. C. Farr & Co., was patent to them all, and,
indeed, was the moving cause of the -transfer. They all knew
that, in the condition of affairs then existing, none of them
could meert maturing obligations, and it was in the hope of
facilitating an extensi-ocn or compromise with creditors that
the tra-n-sfer was mla-de. The transfer embraced all the part-
nership property. If valid in all respects, it appropriated the
shares of Hagerman and Fielder to the puym-ent of the debts
of Farr, for which those shares were previously not liable,
and left Hagerman and Fielder with-out any -property what-
ever, as we gather from the testimony, toupay -their debts.
Inevitably, therefore, by defeating the equi-ty -of the partner-
ship oreditors, it would hinder them in the collection of their
just claims. It is a reasonable inference that these partners
intended this mavnifest effect of their act, Ian-d consequently
the assignment by Hagerman and Fielder to Farr must,
according to the terms of the statute, be deemed void as
against the partner-sl1i‘p creditors. Not only upon ~t-he ground
of a common intent to hinder partnership creditors, thus
inferred from the knowledge which all parties must have had
of the necessary consequences of the -t-ransfer itself, ‘but also
upon the ground that the transfer was made with-out valuable
consi~d~eration,—was voluntary in the legal sen.se,—it should
be decreed invalid against the -partnership creditors, all of
whose debts were the-n in existence. Huston rs. C'a.stnc-r, 31
N. J. Eq. 697. Tihe consideration nominally given by Farr to
Hagerm-an and Fielder was the surrender of -their notes and
his c-oven-ant to indemnify them against firm creditors. But
according to the testimony those notes were payable on-ly on-t
of -the profit accruing to Hagerman arn-d Fielder from the
firm of J . G. Farr & Co., and as that firm h-ad fa.iled, and was
dissolved without realizing any profits, the notes had become
absolutely valueless. Farr’s eovcnanit to indemnify does not
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oonsent of the other partners, or by all the pactners, t.o pay 
individual debts, ls fraudulent and v-0id a.s to firm creditors, 
unless the firm was then 801vent, iamd h·ad ·sufficient propert7 
remaining to pay the partnership d·ebts." 
The case before us comes clearly within the reac-h of thiB 
principle. At the time of the transfer by Hagerman and 
Fielder to Farr thie·inMlvency of each of these p2rsons, and 
of the firm of J. C. Farr & Co., was patent t-0 them all, and, 
indeed, was the moving cause of the transfer. Tiley all knew 
that, in the condition of affair.a then existing, none of them 
could meet matming obligations, and it was in the ho:pe of 
facilitating an extension or compromise wi·th crediuors th1t 
the transfer was ma.de. The transfer emrbr.aced all the pa.rt-
ne1·ship property. If v·alid in all res·pects, it app11e>priated the 
shares of Hagerman and Fielder to the p:iymfint of the debts 
of Farr, for which th.ose shares were previously not liable, 
a.nd left Hagerman and Fielder withiout any property what-
ever, as we gather from the testimony, t.o. ·pay their debts. 
Inevitably, therefore, by defeating tl1e equHy •O'f tih2 p:l.,bner-
ship creditors, it w'-Ould hinder tihem in the collection of their 
just claims. It is a i·ro•sonable inference that these partners I 
mt~nd-ed this manife~t eff("Ct .of their a.eot, 'Rnd consequently \ 
the assignment by Hagerman and Fielder to Fa:rr must, 
acoording to the tP.rms of the statute, be d·eemed void aa 
against the partne·r.ship creditors. Not only upon the gronnd 
of a common intent to hinder pa.rtnership oreditors, thu.:; 
inferred from the knowledge which all parties must hoave had 
of the necessary consequences of the ·transfer itself, ·but also 
upon the ground that the transfer was made wi.t::1Qut V.lluable 
cmnsideration,-was voluntary in the legal sense,-it should 
be decreed invalid against the ·partnership cred.ito.rs, all of 
whose dr1bts wc>re tht'-n in existence. Haston vs. Castner, 31 
N. J. Eq. 697. T;hp co.nsid('!ration niominally given by Farr lflo 
Hagerman urnd Fidder was the surrende:r of their notes and 
his coven·ant to indemnify t11em against firm creditors. But 
according to tihe testimony those nlO'te.s were payable only -Oll't 
of •the profits accruing to Hagenuan and Pielder from the 
firm of J. C. Farr & Co., and as that firm had failed, ;a.nd was 
dissolved without realizing any profits, the notes :had become 
absolutely valueless. Farr's oov('na.Illt to indemnify does not 
constitute a valuable consideration, sinoc he may be relfoved 
57 
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L
therefrom on the total failure of the transfer for which it
was made. 2 P-om. Eq. Jur. §§ 751, 969; notes to Basset vs.
Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Gas. Eq. 82; Haugh-wout vs. Murphy, 22 N. J.
Eq. 531. It thus appearing that, notwithstanding this
transfer, all the rights and remedies of the creditors of
J. G. Farr & Co. remained against the firm property in
in the hands of Farr, we are brought to. consider the assign-
ment to Arnold for the benefit of Farr’s creditors. \Vith
respect to this assignment, t-he following propositions may,
I think, be mainitainedz First, -that the credit-ors of J . C. Farr
& Co. are included among its beneficiaries; second, that it con-
veyed, not only the property of Farr as an individual, but also
that which had been the property of J. C. Farr & 00.; third,
that it conveyed this latter property subject to the equity of
the creditors of that firm; and, fourth, that, so construed, the
assignment cannot be succesfully impeached by the com-
plainant.
The first proposition is unquestionable. The creditors of J.
C. Farr & Co. were all creditors of Farr, for whose benefit
flhe assignment was expressly made.
In considering the second proposition, it must be remem-
bered that at the time of this transfer Farr was in reality the
owner of the property previously belonging to J. C. Farr &
Co. He had become so. by the conveyance from ‘his partners,
which then nobody had disputed, so that the assignment to
Arnold of all the property owned by Farr included in its terms
the firm property. This was made still clearer by the inven-
tory annexed, which specified in det-ail the property at Asbury
Park. Even if the transfer from Hagerman and Fielder to
Farr be disregarded, still it will appear that the assignment
to Arnold included the property of J. C. Farr & Co.; for, in
view of the fact that it purported to convey such property,
the conduct of Hagerm-an and Fielder precludes their denial
of its efiiciency. They bot-h knew that Farr was about to
assign the firm property to Arnold; they both, with-out objec-
tion, delivered over that property to Arnold in pursuance of
Farr’s assignment; they both took part in t-he management
of that property un~der,Arnold as assignee; and neitiher of
them raised any question as to Arnold’s title until after -credit-
ors of J. G. Farr & Co. had proved their debts under the
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therefrom on the total failure of the transfer for which it 
was made. 2 Porn. Eq. Jur. §§ 751, 969; nMes to Basset vs. 
-Nosworthy, 2 Lead. Oas. Eq. 82; Haughwout vs. Mm·phy, 22 N. J. 
Eq. 531. It thus appearing that, notwit~standing this 
transfer, all the rights and remedies -0f the creditors of 
J. C. Farr & Co. remained against cthe fl.rm property in 
in the bands of Farr, we are brought to. consider the assign· 
ment ·t-0 Arnold for the benefit of. Fa.rr's credit-Ors. With 
respect to this assignment, the following proposi.ti·ons may, 
I think, be maintained: First, ·that the creditors of J.C. Fa1~r 
& Co. are included among its beneficiaries; second, that it con· 
veyed, not only the prop~rty of Farr as an individual, but also 
that which ·had been the property of J. C. Far.r & Oo.; third, 
tha.t it conveyed this latter property subject to thP PQuity of 
the creditors -0f that fl.rm; and, fou1·th, that, so con..Q,trued, the 
_assignment cannot be successfully impeached by the oom· 
plainant. 
The :first proposition is unquestionable. T·he creditors of J. 
C. Farr & Co. were all creditC>rs of Farr, for whose benefit 
t!he assignment was expressly made. 
In considering the second proposition, it must be remem· 
bered that at the time <>f this tronsfer Farr WtlS in reality the 
owner af the property ·previously belonging to J. C. Farr & 
Co. He had become so. by the conveyan-oe from 'his partnerH, 
whioh then nobod;; had disputed, so t"aat the assignment to 
Arnold -0f :ill the property ownoPofl by Fa.rr included in its terms 
the :firm property. This was made still clea.rer by tb:e inveJi· 
tory annexed, whiC'h specified in detail the property a:t A·sbury 
Park. Even if the transfer from Hagerman and Fielder .tu 
Farr be d-Isregarded, still it will appear that the assignment 
to A,imold included the proiwrty of J. C. Farr & Co.; for, in 
view -0f 1:.he fact that it purported to CO'llvey sueh prroperty, 
the conduct -of Hagerman ~·rnd Fielder precludes their denial 
of its efficiency. They both knew that Farr was about to 
assign the firm property to Arnold; th<3y both, with-out objec-
tion, delivered over that property to Arnold in pnr.suanee of 
Farr's a'Ssignment; they both took part in the management 
-of that property under Arnold as assignee; and neitJher of 
them raised any question as to Arnold's title until after ·credit· 
ors of J. C. Farr & Co. had proved their debts under the 
·assignment. Whether, in these circumstances, we look for a 
3
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ratification by Hagermian and Fielder of the -transfer of firm-
property by Farr as their partner and agent, or for a. transfer
directly by the joint act of all the partners, or for an estoppel
preventing Ilagerman and Fielder from denying that the
assignment conveyed the effects inventoried and delivered,-
in any view the property of J. C. Farr & Co. passed to the
assignee. '
Touching the third proposition, that this property was con-
veyed su'bject to the equity of the firm creditors, it would be
beyond cavil, had t-he assignment show-n upon its face a con-
veyance of the property of Farr, and also of J. C. Farr & Co.,
for the benefit of creditors. As was said by Chief Justice
HOBNBLOWER,_ in Scull vs. Alter, 16 N. J. Law, 147: “If it is
an assignment, not only of the partnership efl"ects and property
of the firm, bu.t also an individual and several assignment by
the members of their respective and separate estates, then it
must be treated as such. The estates and debts must be mar-
shalled; the partnership effects applied in the first instance
to the partnership debts; the effects of each member applied
in the first instance -to the payment of -his separate debts.”
See, also, Garretson vs. Brown, 26 N. J. Law, 425, 435. But
as this assignment speaks of all the property embraced in it
as belonging to Farr alone, a d-ilferent view might be taken of
it. Usually, indeed, courts have held that an assignee for the
benefit of creditors is not a purchaser for value, but takes the
property subject to all equities that would have been valid
against tlhe assignor. Notes to Basset rs. N0su:orth_1/, 2 Lead.
Gas. Eq. 87. Many of the decisions to this eifect, however.
have gone upon la theory that debts proved u-nder the assign-
ment are n-ot extinguished except so far as they are paid by
dividends, or tlra-t a pre-existing debt is not a valuable con-
sideration for a conveyance; and as neither of these it-heories is
tenu-ble in New Jersey, th-ere may be found suflicient reasons
for holding, in this state, that a cred-it-or proving under an
assignment should be regarded in equity as favorably a a
purchaser for value, although, in Vandoren vs. Todd. 3 N. J.
Eq. 397, -the opposite doctrine prevailed.
But conceding to the assignee and to the individual credit-
ors of Farr, who have proved their debts, the rights of pur-
chasers for value, they still are b-ound by the equity of the
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ratification by Hagerman .and Fielder <>f the transfer of firm 
property by Farr as their partner and agent, or for ·a transfer 
directly by the j.oint act of all the paMn€rs, or for Hu -:!Stoppel 
preventing Hagerman and l<'ielder from denying that the 
a.ssignment conveyed the effects inventoried and delivered,-
in any view the property '-Of J. C. Farr & Co. passed t-0 the 
assignee. 
j '!'ouching the third proposition, that this property was coo· 
veyed subject to the equity of the firm creditors, it would be 
beyond cavil, bad the assignment shown upon its face a con-
veyance -0f the property of Farr, .and also of J. C. Farr & Co., 
f-or the benefit of creditors. As was said by Chief Justice 
HORNBLOWER, in Scull vs. Alter, 16 N. J. Law, 147: "If it is 
an assignment, not only of tbe partnersllip effects and property 
of the firm, but also an individual and several assignment by 
the members of their respective and sep1rate estates, t•ben it 
mwrt be treated as such. The estates and d·ebts must be mar-
shalled; the partnership effects applied in the first instance 
to rthe partners.hip debts; the effects of each member applied 
in the first instance to the payment of ·bis Eepar:ate debts." 
See, also, Garretson vs. Broirm, 26 N. J. Law, 425, 435. But 
as 1his assignment speaks of all the property embraced in it 
as belonging to Farr alone, a dHf erent view might be taken of 
it. Usually, indeed, courts ha.ve held tha0t an assignee for the 
benefit of credit<>rs is not a pureha.ser for value, but takes the 
property subject to all equities that would have been V'alid 
against t:ihe assign.or. N<>teis to Basset t:s. Nos10or·tl1y, 2 Lead. 
Oul5. Eq. 87. Many <>! t•he decisions to this effect, however. 
bave g.one upon a theory that debts pr.ov<'d under ithe .asfrign-
ment are n<>t ex•tinguished except so far as they are paid by 
dividends, or tha.t a pr~xistb1g debt is not a valuable c.ooi-
sideration for a conveyance; and as neither of these theories is 
ten•:i·ble in New Jersey, there may be found Ruffici<>™ reaso.ns 
for bolding, in this state, that a credH'Or proving un-deT an 
assignment should be N>garded in equity as favora:bly as a 
pnrobaser f.or value, alth01Ug.b, in Vand-0ren vs. Todd. 3 N. J. 
Eq. 397, .the opposite doctrine preva-iled. 
But conoeeding to the aRs.ignee and to the individ'Ual credit-
ors of Farr, who have proved their debts, the rights of pur-
chasers fo.r value, they still are b<>und by the equity of the 
firm creditors, for they had n-0tice 0-f that equity. "The rule," 
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says Prof. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. J ur. § 7 53), “is universal and
elementary that if a purchaser in any f-orm receives notice of
prior adverse rigihts in and to the same subject-matter, before
he [has completely acquired or perfec his own irnterests
under the purchase, his posivti~a fide purchaser is
thereby destroyed, even though e may have paid a valuable
consideration.” That Arnold, before the assignment, and all
the personal creditors of Farr before they proved their claims,
were notified tlnat the Asbury Park property ha-d belonged
-to J. C. Farr & 00., and had been transferred to Farr when
that firm -and all its members were insolvent, is fully estab-
]-ished -by the evidence in the cause. This notice before -the
assignment was acquired by Arnold from conversations with
Fa-rr, and -by Arnold and m-any, if not ull, of Farr’s individual
creditors, th-rough inquiries made by Eat-on and Lawson, va.
comm-ittee appointed by the creditors to investigate the affairs
of Farr arnd J . O. Farr & O0. After the assignment, but before
any debts were proved, -such not-ice was still more definitely
communicated to all of Farr’s creditors, through the report
of their committee, in which the assets and liabilities of Farr
and of J. G. Farr & Co., respectively, are distinctly stated.
'Dhis report also plainly indicates an understanding or expecta-
tion that the property assigned would be marshalled between
-the creditors of Fa-rr and the credit-ors of the firm. It was
made Jamuary 19, 1884, while the first claim proved was pre~
sented to the assignee January 28, 1884. Fuller notice than
this report contained of the equity of the firm creditors could
l1I0t well be given.‘ Hence those creditors are still entitled to




debts, in preference to the debts of Farr’s in-dividual creditors.
The fourth proposition denies -the right of the 0_(L1'Il‘Ql2"l.l.I18_11l
to impeach this assignment. The assignment was in the form
sanctioned by our statute. It was for the benefit of all credit-
ors who were entitled to any share in the property assigned;
it created n-0 preferences; an-d it provided for no delay beyond
what was necessary for the execu-tio-n of the trust which it
properly declared. Although such assignments do hinder
creditors from obtaining -that priority of lien which otherwise
their vigilance might secure, yet they are not on that account
within the meaning and scope of the statute which avoids
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Bays Prof. Pomeroy (2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 753), "is univenal and 
elem<'ntary that if a pur("baser in any form receives n'O'tice of 
prior adverse rigihts in and to the same .subject-matter, before 
he 1hoas completely acquired or~rlec hls own i1J1terests 
under the purchase, bis posiUon on.a fide purchaser is 
thereby destroyed, even though e may have paid a valuable 
oonsideratio.n." That Arnold, before the assignment, and all 
the personal credito1·s of Farr before they proved their claims, 
were uotified t:11:it the Asbury Park pr.operty had belonged 
.t.o J. C. Farr & Co., and ·had been transferred to Farr when 
that firm and all its members were insolvent, is fully estab-
Mshed 1by the evidence in the cause. 'Dhis ·notice before the 
assignment was acquired by Arnold from conversations with 
Farr, and ·by Arnold and many, if not iall, of Farr's individual 
creditors, through inquiries made by Eaton and Lawson, a 
oommittee a.ppointed by the creditors to investigate the affairs 
of Farr rund J.C. Farr & Co. After tthe assignment, but before 
any debts were proved, -such nl()Hce was still more .definitely 
oommmlicated to all of Farr's creditoi,s, tb1~ough the report 
of their oommittee, in which the assets and liabilities -0f Farr 
and of J. C. Farr & Co., respectively, are distin'Ctly stated. 
'11liis report also plainly indicates an understanding or expecta-
tiooi that the p1·operty assigned would be marS'halled between · 
;the creditors of Fa.rr and tthe creditoors of the firm. It was 
made Jrunuary 19, 1884, while the first claim proved wasp.re-
sell'ted fo the assignee January 28, 1884. Fuller n.otice than 
this report oonfained of the equity of the firm creditors could 
\.. 
I not well be given: Hence th<>se creditors are still entitled to have the partnership property a.pplied to the payment of their , 
d·ebts, in preference to the debts of Farr's individual creditors. (, 1 L 
'l'he fourth pr-0position denies .the right of the complainant Z V ~'-?! 
~ to impeach t·his assignment. T·he assignment was in tbe fo~ --
sanctioned by our statute. It was for the benefit of all credit-
ors who WP.re entitlc>d to any ·share in the property assigned; 
H created no preferences; and it pr:ovided for no del.ay beyond 
what was n(•·eessary for the exc>cntio·n of the trust which it ' 
properly d<>"Clared. Altb-011g:h suC"b assignments d-0 hinder 
creditiors from obtaining that priority 'Of lien which otherwise 
their vigilance might secure, yet they are not on that account 
within the meaning and scope of the statute whicf1 avoids 
transfers to defraud creditors. 2 P-0m. Eq. Jur. § 994, note. 
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The assignment was perfected before the entry of complain-
ant’s judgments, and, as it operated to divest the legal title
of the debtors, the complainant’s executions did n-ot become a.
lien 'D'ie assignment as we construe it placed all the credit-
- ‘ ' > 1
ors of the same class um equal foo-ting, and in such cases
equality 1s equity. Consequently both m law and 111 equity, the
complainant is bound. .
The conclusion of the matter is that the property of Farr
and the property of J . C. Farr & Co. should be marshalled be-
tween -the creditors of those two debtors, respectively. ' ‘ '
Let the decree appealed from be reversed, and a decree be
entered in accordance with these views.
Unanimously reversed.
NOTE: See Mecliem’s Elem. of Partn., § 288.
~ 1
HAGE vs. CAMPBELL.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891.
78 Wis. 572, 47 N. ¥V. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422.
Action for conversion of goods. Plaintiff claimed the goods ,
under a chattel mortgage given by the firm of Hage Bros.
Defendant, as sheriff, had levied upon the goods at the suit of
unsecured creditors of the firm. Other facts are stated in the
opinion. Plaintiff had judgment below and defendant appeals.
R. S. Reid, for appellant.
W. Goss, for respondent.
Com-1, C. J . The plaintiffs right to recover the value of the
goods in controversy depends entirely upon the validity of a.
chattel mortgage given to him by the Hage Bros., dated May
3, 1886. If that mortgage is valid, as against the creditors of
the firm, the judgment is correct. The objection taken to this ,-
mortgage is that it was not given to secure the payment of a
.p£lI'tI1€I‘Shlp debt, and is therefore void as to the firm creditors.
We think the jury must have found, under the charge of the
















































































































































HA.GB vs. CAHPBELL. 
The assignment WaB perfected •before the entry of oomplain-
ant's judgments, and, as it <>perated to divest i 1he le_gal title 
<>f the debtors, the complainant's executicms did not beoome a 
lien. 'D:1e assignment, as we oonstrue it, placed all the credit-
ors of the same class u~n .. :n· equal footing, and in such .~s 
equality is equity. Co~~~tly both in law and in equity, the 
compla.inant is bound. 
The conclusion o-f the maHer is that the property of Farr 
·and the property <>f J. C. Farr & Co. should be marshalled be-
tween .the creditors -0f th<>se two de-btors, resp€ctively. • • • 
Let the decree ap1>ealed from be reversed, and a decree be 
entered in accordainc..-.e with these views. 
U n-animously reversed. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 283. 
HAGE vs. CAMPBELL. 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891. 
78 Wis. 572, 47 N. W. Rep. 179, 23 Am. St. Rep. 422. 
Action for conversion of goods. Plaintiff claimed the goods 1 
nnder a chattel mortgage given by the firm of Hage Bros. 
Defendant, as sheriff, had levied upon the goods at the suit of 
unsecured creditors of the firm. Other facts are stated in the 
opinion. Plaintiff had judgment below and defendant appeals. 
R. S. Reid, for appellant. 
W. Goss, for respondent. 
COLE, C. J. The plaintiff's right to recover the value of the 
goods in controversy depends entirely upon the validity of a 
<·hattel mortgage given to him by the Hage Bros., dated May 
~. 1886. If that mortgage is valid, as against the creditors of 
the firm, the judgment is correct. The objection taken to this . 
mortgage is that it was not given to secure the payment of a 
.partnership debt, and is therefore void as to the firm creditors. 
"\Ve think the jury must ha.Ye found, under the charge of the 
court, that the mortgage was given to secure the bona fik 
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\ 0
indebtedness of the firm, and that there was no fraudulent
intent in giving it. That there was evidence tending to estab-
lish these facts cannot be successfully denied if the plaintiffs
testimony is to be believed; for he testified, in substance, that
he loaned Iver Hage $600 in June, 1884, and that before Christ-
mas, 1885, he loaned both Iver and Torger $200 more. In
June, 1884, Iver and one Canudson were in partnership, and
the plaintiff said the $600, which he loaned Iver Hage, was
used by them to purchase goods for the firm. It docs not
clearly appear that Iver made the loan of $600 for the firm of
Hage & Canudson, though probably the loan inured to the
benefit of the firm. The plaintiff does say that Canudson had
nothing to do in borrowing the $600 from him, by which he
means, as we understand his testimony, that Canudson did
not act in the matter. This, of course, might be true, and
still it might be the fact that Iver acted for the firm in making
the loan. It satisfactorily appears that the firm had the bene
fit of the loan, and that the money was a-pplied to purchase
goods for the firm. But, it is said, non consta-t, but this $600
was Iver’s contribution to the capital stock of the partnership.
But the matter, as to whether this debt was one that the firm
was liable to pay, does not rest upon the facts above stated.
Itappears that, in the spring or summer of 1885, Torger Hage
purchased the interest of Canudson in the firm, and that then
he and Iver both promised to pay the plaintiff the $600 loan.
Now, if it be assumed that the $600 was originally loaned to
Iver, and that it was his individual debt, yet as the money had
been used to purchase goods for the firm, could not the part-
ners, when the new firm was organized, assume this debt and
bind the firm to pay it? There is nothing to show ‘that the
firm was insolvent at this time, and we suppose it might bind
the firm to pay the individual debt of one of the partners. TVe
do not understand that such an application of the assets, or
such a liability assumed, would be a fraud upon partnership
creditors, if the firm was -solvent and able to pay its other debts
at the time. The learned circuit court distinctly charged that,-
if the debt was the individual debt of Iver Hage, it must have
been assumed by the partnership so as to become a firm liabil-
ity, in order to sustain the mortgage which was subsequently
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indebtedness of the firm, and that there was no fraudulent 
intent in giving it. That there was evidence tending to estab-
lish these facts cannot be successfully denied if the plaintiff's 
testimony is to be believed; for he testified, in substance, that 
he loaned Iver Hage fGOO in June, 1884, and that before Ohrist-
mas, 1885, -he loaned both h'er and Torger f200 more. In 
June, 18&4, Iver and one Canudson were in partnership, and 
the plaintiff said the $600, which he loaned Iver Hage, was 
used by them to pm·chase goods for the firm. It does not 
clearly appear that Iver made the loan of $600 for the firm of 
Hage & Canudson, though probably the loan inured to the 
benefit of the firm. The pJaintiff does say that Canudson had 
nothing to do in borrowing the $600 from him, by which he 
, means, as we understand his testimony, that Canudson did 
hot act in the matter. Thls, of course, might be true, and 
still it might be the fact that Iver acted for the firm in making 
the loan. It satisfactorily appears that the firm had the bene-
1 fit of the loan, and that the money was a·pplied to -purchase 
goods for the firm. But, it is said, non constat, but this f600 
was Iver's contribution to the capital stock of the partnership. 
But the matter, as to whether this debt was one that the firm 
was liable to pay, does not rest upon the facts above stated. 
It-appears that, in the spring or summer of 1885, Torger Hage 
purchased the interest of Canudson in the firm, and that then 
, . he and Iver both promised to pay the plaintiff the $600 loan. 
Now, if it be assumed that the $600 was originally loaned to 
Iver, and that it was his individual debt, yet as the money bad 
·been used to purchase goods for the firm, could not the part-
ners, when the new firm was organized, assume this debt and 
bind the firm to pay it? There is nothing to show "tbn.t the 
firm was insolvent at this time, and we suppose it might bind 
the firm to pay the individual debt of one of the partners. ~Ve 
do not understand that such an application of the assets, or 
such a liability assumed, would be a fraud upon partnership 
creditors, if the firm was .solvent and able to pay its ot·h·er debts 
at the time. The learned circuit court distinctly charged that,. 
if the debt was the individual debt of Iver Hage, it must have 
been assumed by the partnership so as to become a firm liabil-
ity, in order to sustain the mortgage which was subsequently 
given. But, that n solvent firm might assume the individual 
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debt of one of the partners, and agree to pay it out of the part-
nership property, and give a valid mortgage on its stock for
that purpose, providing the transaction was free from fraud,
is clear. So that, if, at the time the new firm was organized,
the debt became the partnership liability by the firm’s assum-
ing it and agreeingto pay it, then the claifn stood upon the
same footing as any other firm debt. This is not the la.nguage
of the charge but is its meaning, and the sense in which the
jury must naturally have understood it. It seems to us the
court was right in this view of the law. There can be no doubt
that the jury were satisfied, from the evidence, that, when
the new firm was organized, this $600 loan was assumed by the
firm and became the partnership debt of Hage Bros.; and it is
not claimed that the firm was insolvent at that time. glf the
firm was insoluent, it could not assume the individual ebt of‘,
a partner, and secure its payment by a mortgage upon the
partnership property, as such an act would be in fraud of the
partnership creditors, who had the right to be first paid, and
so the jury were instructed. ) ,
As to the $200 which the plaintifi ‘loaned Hage Bros. about
a month before Christmas, in 1885, there can be no question
but that it was a‘ partnership debt. ‘ It is argued that, if the
$600 loan had in fact become a partnership debt, the books of
Hage Bros. should have shown a credit for tha.t amount in
favor of the plaintifi’, or that a note or some security should
have been given to the plaintiif as evidence of the firm liability.
Correct business methods would doubtless have required some
entry of the transaction upon the books of the firm, but the
business seems to have been done very loosely, the parties
having confidence in each other, and trusting to the oral agree-
ment. It does not appear that there was an entry made of
the $200 on the firm books, or any note given for it, though,
unquestionably, it was a loan to the firm of Hage Bros. The
court instructed the jury that the facts that the books of Hage
Bros. did not show a credit in favor of the plaintiff foir his
money loa-ned, and that no note was given nor security taken,
nor agreement made as to when the money was to be repaid,
were circumstances to be weighed when considering the credi-
bility of the plaintiff’s testimony. These were proper matters
to be considered in determining the question as to whether the
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debt of one of the partners, and agree to pay it out of the part-
nership property, and give a valid mortgage on its stock for 
that purpose, providing the transaction was free from fraud, 
is clear. So that, if, at the time the new firm was organized, 
the debt became the partnership liability by the firm's assum-
ing it and agreeing· to pay it, then the claim stood upon the 
same footing as any other firm debt. This is not the language 
of the charge but is its meaning, and the sense in which the 
jury must naturally have understood it. It seems to ns the 
<·ourt was right in this view of the law. There can be no doubt 
that the jury were satisfied, from the evidence, that, when 
the new firm was organized, this $600 loan was assumed by the 
firm· and bec-.ime the partnership debt of Hage Bros.; and it is 
not claimed that the firm was insolvent at that time. (If the 
firm was insol'4ent, it could not assume the individual "aebt of J . 
a partner, and secure its payment by a mO'rtgage upon the 
partnership property, as such an act would be in fraud of the 
partnership creditors, wh-0 had the right to be first paid, and 
so the jury were instructed. ) 
As to the $200 which the plaintiff loaned Hage Bros. about 
n. month before Christmas, in 1885, there can be no question # 
but that it was a· partnership debt. · It is aI"gued that, if the 
'GOO loan bad in fact become a partneI"ship debt, the books of 
Hage Bros. should have shown a credit for that amount in ' 
fuvor of the plaintiff, or that a note or some secuI"ity should 
have been given to the plaintiff as evidence of the firm liability. 
Correct business methods would doubtless have required some 
entry of the transaction upon the books of the firm, but the 
business seems to have been done very loosely, the parties 
having coofidence in each other, and trusting to the oral agree-
ment. It does not appear that th.era was an entry made of 
the $200 on the firm books, or any note given for it, though, 
unquestionably, it was a loan to the firm of Hage Bros. The 
court instructed the jury that the facts that the books of Hage , 
Bros. did not show a credit in favor of the plaintiff for his 
money loaned, and that no note wRs given nor security ta.ken, 
n~r agreement made as to when the money was to be repaid, 
were circumstances to be weighed when considering the credi-
bility of the plaintiff's testimony. These were proper matters 
to be considered in determining the question as to whether the 
debt was a valid partnership liability, or whether the chattel 
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mortgage was given for any fraudulent purpose. The mort-
gage was given, as we have said, on the 3d of May, 1886. At
that time the firm of Hage Bros. was embarrassed and in fail-
ing circumstanees. But the mortgage was given by one part-
ner, in the absence of the other partner, to secure a.n existing
firm liability. Could not such a security be given to secure
an honest brma fide debt, where there was no intent to cover
up property for the benefit of Hage Bros., or to defraud their
other creditors? We suppose the plaintiif had the right to
take the mortgage and secure himself, even though the other
creditors might suffer by his doing so. One creditor has the
right to induce a failing debtor to pay or secure his debt, and
the fact that this might lessen the ability of the debtor to pay
other creditors does not necessarily avoid the payment or
invalidate the security. The mortgage was given to secure
the payment of $910.61, the amount of the firm debt, and the
property mortgaged was not worth much more than that sum.
There is an objection that the property was not sutfieiently
described in the mortgage, but we think the objection is not
well taken: The schedule referred to, and attaohed to the
mortgage, clearly identifies and describes the property
embraced in the instrument. It does describe the articles in
the “show cases” with sufiicient fullness to indicate what prop-
erty was in-tended to be covered by the mortgage. The mort-
gage was given by Torger Hage on behalf of the firm, in the
absence and without the knowledge of the other partner, Iver
Hage, who was absent in Dakota. We suppose one partner
may, without the consent of his copartner, being absent, pay
a debt or execute a mortgage in the name of the firm upon
partnership property, to secure a firm debt. The power of
each partner to bind the firm fairly extends to such a trans-
action, unless restricted by the articles of copartnership, and
it does not appear that there was any such restriction on the
power of the partner in this case. It was clearly within the
scope of the implied authority of Torger to execute the mort-
gage, as much as selling the goods or collecting the debts due
the firm. This proposition seems too plain to require discus-
sion. The mortgagee, deeming himself insecure, took posses-
sion at onoe of the mortgaged property, as he had the right to
do, and employed Torger, as agent or clerk, to sell the goods
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mortgage was given for any fraudulf'nt purpose. The mort-
gage was given, as we have said, on the 3d of May, 1886. At 
that time the firm of Hage Bros. was embarrassed and in fail-
ing ckcumstanc-es. But the mortgage was given by one part-
ner, in the absence of the other partner, to secure an existing 
firm lia.bility. Could not such a security be given to secure 
an h-0nest bona fide debt, where the1·e was no inten.t to cover 
up property for the benefit of Hage Bros., or to defl"'J.ud their 
other creditors'! "'e suppose the plaintiff had the right to 
, take the mortgage and secure himself, e\·en though the other 
creditors might suffer by his doing so. One creditor has the 
right to induce a failing debtor to pay or secure his debt, and 
the fact that this might lessen the ability of the debtor to pay 
other creditors does not necessarily aYoid the payment or 
invalidate the security. The mortgage was given to secure 
the payment of $910.61, the amount of the firm debt, and the 
property mortgaged was not wol'th much more than that sum. 
There is an objection that the propc>rty was not sufficiently 
descl"ibed in the mortgage, but we think the objection is not 
well taken: The scbedule referred to, and attached to the 
mortgage, clearly identifies and describes the property 
embraced in the instrument. It does describe the articles in 
the "show cases" with sufficient fullness to indicate what prop-
erty was in.tended to be covered by the mortgage. The mort-
gage was given by Torger Hage on behalf of the firm, in the 
absence and without the knowledge of the other partner, Iver 
Hage, who was absent in Dakota. ·we suppose one purt-ner 
may, without the conS<.'nt of his copartner, being absent, pa.Y 
a debt or execute a mortgage in the name of the firm upon 
partnership property, to secure a firm debt. The power of 
each pal'tner to bind the firm fairly extends to such a trans-
actiO'Il, unless restricted by the artides of copartnership, and 
it does not a.ppear that there was any such restriction on the 
power of the partner in this case. It was clearly within the 
scope of the implied authority of Torgn to execute the mort-
gage, as much as sernng the goods or collecting the debts due 
the firm. This proposition seems too plain to require discus-
sion. The mortgagee, de<>ming himself insecure, took posses-
sion at once of the mortgaged property, as he had the right to 
do, and employed Torger, as agent or clerk, to sell the goods 
and pay over the proceeds to him, to be applied upon the mort-
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gage debt. There is no legal objection to such an arrange-
ment. It certainly did not create any secret trust, as counsel
suggests. The plaintiff might employ the mortgagor to sell the
goods for him and pay over the proceeds of all sales madel
The action is for a wrongful conversion of the goods, alleged
in the complaint to be of the value of $1,147.41. The defend-
ant, as sherifl', seized the goods under attachments issued in
favor of the creditors of the firm of Hage Bros. In the answer
the defendant denies that the goods were “of any other or
greater value than $917.63.” This, fairly construed, must be
deemed to refer to the mortgaged property mentioned in the
complaint. A point is made that the value of the property
was not proven on the trial. It certainly appears that the
property did not exceed the amount due upon the note and
mortgage, and, in view of the admission in the answer as to
the value, we think no further proof as to that fact was neces-
sary. The recovery was less than the value stated in the
answer and the interest thereon, to the commencement of the
action. This disposes of all the material questions. The ease
seems to have been fairly submitted, under proper instructions
as to the law for the guidance of the jury, and the judgment of
the circuit court must be afiirmed.
None: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 28a '
J .__.i_____
GODDARD-PECK GROCERY CO. vs. McCUNE.
Supreme Court of Missouri, 1893.
122 Mo. 426, 25 S. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681.
This case was certified to the supreme court from the St.
Louis court of appeals for the reason that one of the judges of
that court was of the opinion that the decision filed in that
r'0l1I't was in conflict with the decision in the case of Sexton vs.
lnderson, 95 Mo. 373, 8 S. \V. 564. The opinion of the oourt
of appeals is reported in 47 M0. App. 307. The statem-ent of
'l‘no1ursoN, J ., of said court, is as follows: “John McCune pre-
sented for allowance against the assigned estate of the part-
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gage debt. There is no lPgal objection to such an arrange-
ment. It certainly did not create any secret trust, as counsel 
suggests. The plaintiff might employ the mortgagor to sell the 
goods for him and pay over the proceeds of all sales ma.de~ 
The action is for a wrongful conversion of the g-0ods, alleged 
in the complaint to be of the value of $1,147.41. The defend-
ant, BJ!! sheriff, sf.>ized the goods under a tta.chments issued in 
favor of the creditors of the firm of Hage Bros. In the answer 
the defendant denies that the goods were "of any other or 
greater value than $917.63." This, fairly C()ll)strued, must be 
deemed to ref er to the mortgaged property mentioned in the 
complaint. A point is made that the value of the property 
was not proven on the trial. It certainly appears that the 
property did not exceed the amount due upon the note and 
mortgage, and, in view of the admission in ~he answer as t<> 
the value, we think no further proof as to that fact was neces-
sary. The recovery was less than the value stated in the 
answer and the interest thereon, to the commencement of the 
action. This disposes of all the material questions. The case 
Meems to have been fairly submitted, under proper instructions 
as to the law for the guidance of the jury, and the judgment of . 
the circuit court must be affirm€d. 
NOTB: See Mechem•a Elem. of Partn., § 288. 
J 
GODDARD-PECK GROCERY CO. vs. McCUNE. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, 1893. 
122 Mo. 426, 27i S. W. Rep. 904, 29 L. R. A. 681. 
This case was certified to the supreme court from ·the St. 
fJouis court of appeals for the reason that one of the judges of 
that court was of the opinion that the decision filed in that 
c·onrt was in conflict with the decision in the case of Se:cton vs . 
. lnderson, 95 Mo. 37::l, 8 S. \V. 564. The opinion of the court 
of appeals is reported in 47 Mo. App. 307. The statement of 
THOllPSON, J., of said court, is as follows: "John McCune pre-
sented for all<>wance againi;t the aRsigned estate of the part-
nership firm of Edwards & \Vigbrinton a promissory note, 
58 
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made by said firm on the first day of July, 1880, for $2,000,
payable one day after date, to his order, and bearing interest
from date at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Calvin Wig-
ginton also presented a note of the same date and tenor for
the sum of $1,926. The assignee allowed both of these notes,
and certain other creditors of the firm appealed to the circuit
court. The circuit court disallowed the notes, and from its
judgment disallowing the notes in favor of l\IcCune this appeal
is prosecuted. The case was, by consent of parties, submitted
to the court without a jury, and no declaration of law was
asked or given. It appeared in evidence that the partnership
firm of Edwards & \Vigginton was founded in March, 1880,
and made an assignment for the benefit of its creditors in
July, 1800. The business was a retail grocery store. The
basis of the business was a stock in trade owned by the appel-
lant, McCune, which 1\IcCune sold to Edwards in 1887 for
$2,600. When Edwards took ¥Vigginton in as a partner, in
March, 1889, the stock was invoiced at between $3,300 and
$3,400. They were to be equal partners, and the arrangement
was such that Wigginton purchased a half interest in the stock
in trade and business for $1,626, and then each partner put
into the business in cash the sum of $300. The indebtedness
of Edwards to McCune was originally evidenced by three
unsecured promissory notes, maturing, respectively, in six,
twelve, and eighteen months from date. Edwards had bor-
rowed other money of McCune, and had made such payments
that on the 1st of July, 1880, the indebtedness of Edwards to
McCune stood at $2,000. The $1,926 that \Vigginton put into
the _firm, as above stated, was entirely borrowed from his
father, Calvin Wigginton. Of this $900 was a note, due one
day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent
per annum; $500 was a like note, and the rest was not evi-
denced by any note. Thus it was that the interest of each
partner consisted entirely of borrowed capital; that Edwards
still owed this claimant, l\lcCune, $2,000 for his interest in the
partnership capital and buiness; and that Wigginton, for his
interest therein, owed his father $1,926. \\'e proceed on the
view that what each partner had thus severally borrowed to
purchase his interest in the business was an individual, and
not a partnership debt. The firm seems to have lost money
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made by said firm on the first day of July, 1889, for ,2,000, 
payable one day after date, to bis order, and bearing interest 
from date at the rate of eight per cent per annum. Calvin Wig-
ginton also presented a note of the same date and tenor for 
the sum of ,1,926. The assignee allowed both of these notes, 
and certain other creditors of the firm appealed to the circuit 
court. The circuit court disallowed the notes, and from its 
judgment disallowing the notes in favor of McCune this appeal 
ls prosecuted. The case was, by consent of parties, submitted 
to the court without a jury, and no declaration of law was 
asked or given. It appeared in evidence that the partnership 
firm of Edwards & Wigginton was founded in March, 1880, 
and made an assignment for the benefit of its creditoM in 
July, 18!)0. The business was a retail grocery store. The 
basis of the business was a stock in trade owned by the appel-
lant, McCune, which McCune sold to Edwards in 1887 for 
$2,600. When Edwards took \Vigginto.n in as a partner, in 
March, 1889, the stock was invoiced at between '3,300 and 
'3,400. They were to be equal partners, and the arrangement 
was such that Wigginton purchased a half interest in the stock 
in trade and business for fl,626, and then each partner put 
into the bpsi11ess in cash the sum of '300. The indebtedness 
of Edwards to McCune was originally evidenced by three 
unsecured promissory notes, maturing, respectively, in six, 
twelve, and eighteen months from date. Edwards bad bor-
rowed other mooey o.f McCune, and had made such payments 
that on the 1st of July, 1889, the indebtedness of Edwards to 
McCune stood at $2,000. The $1,926 that '\Vigginton put into 
the _ti.rm, as above stated, was entirely borrowed from his 
father, Calvin '\Vigginton. Of this $900 was a note, due one 
day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent 
per annum; $500 was a like note, and the rest was not evi-
denced by any note. Thus it was that the interest of each 
partner consisted entirely of borrowed capital; that Edwards 
still owed this claimant, McCune, $2,000 for his interest in the 
partnership capital and business; and that Wigginton, for his 
interest therein, owed his father $1,92G. We proceed on thf' 
view that what each partner had thus severally borrowed to 
purcha.se bis interest in the business was an individual, and 
not a partnership debt. The firm seems to have lost money 
almost from the start, and :McCu'lle, becoming uneasy, 
• 
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requested Edwards to take up the individual notes of Edwards,
held by McCuue, withlthe note of the firm. At the same time
Wigginton, Sr., thought that if McCune was going to have
firm paper for the individual note of Edwards, he, Wigginton,
ought to have firm paper for what was due him from his son,
as already stated. It was accordingly arranged between the
partners, an-d these individual creditors, respectively, that the
two creditors should have firm papers; and on the first day
of July, 1889, the firm executed its note to McCune in settle-
ment of the individual notes of Edwards, and also its note to
Wigginton, Sr., in settlement of the individual debt of Wig-
ginton, Jr., to him. The testimony leaves no room to doubt
that this was done in contemplation of a possible suspension,
and the avowed purpose of it was to put these individual credit-
ors, in the event of a suspension, on an ‘even footing with firm
creditors. Edwards testified: ‘It was this way: I had a
great deal of sickness, and had lost on grain I had bought, and
McCune insisted on some plan of securing him. He was will-
ing to aid us tide over our difiieulties, if in any way to make
himself afe,—to take joint note for the firm’s note. I spoke
to iVigginton, my partner, about it. He at the same time
owed his father a like amount, or very near it. He insisted
that he would want to secure his father as well as John
McCune, so we mutually agreed to give them the firm’s note for
the amount of each claim. Both of these notes were given at
the same time!‘ Further on Edwards testified: ‘We gave a.
firm note, so that, in case of death or failure, they would share
and fare like our other creditors.’ On the same point the
other partner testified: ‘We saw the business was losing
money; saw no prospect of times getting better, owing to the
competition on each side of us; and we did not care to favor
one person and not others. \Ve wanted to treat everybody
alike.’ When the firm failed, some six months later, its liabili-
ties, including these notes, footed up to about $5,600. Its
assets were invcntoried at $3,149.95, but the assignee realized
only the sum of $770 from the sale of the entire stock of goods
under order of the court at public auction, and had succeeded
in collecting only $70 of the $626 due the firm from its custom-
ers. Of these liabilities about $1,500 were due to merchants
from whom it had bought goods.”
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requested Edwards to take up the individual notes of Edwards, 
held by McCune, with ,the note of the firm. At the same time 
'Wigg-inton, Sr., thong-ht that if McCune was going to have 
firm paper for the individual note of Edwards, he, Wigginton, 
ought to have ft.rm paper for what was due him fr<>m bis son, 
as already stated. It was accordingly arranged between the 
partners, and these individual creditors, respectively, that the 
two creditm-s should have firm papers; and on the first day 
of July, 1889, the firm executed its note to McCune in settle-
ment of the individual notes of Edwards, and also its note to 
\Vigginton, Sr., in settlement of the individual debt of \Vig-
ginton, Jr., to him. The testimony leaves no room to doubt 
tha·t this was done in contemplation of a possible suspension, 
and the avowed purpose of it was to put these individual credit-
ol."9, in the event of a suspension, on an ·even footing with firm 
creditors. Edwards testified: 'It was this way: I had a 
greait deal of sickness, and had lost on gr;iin I had bought, and 
McCune insisted on some plan of securing him. He was will-
ing to aid us tide over our difficulties, if in any way to make 
himself safe,-to take joint note for the firm's note. I spoke 
to Wigginton, my partner, about it. He at the same time 
owed his fath.er a like amount, or very near it. He insisted 
that he would want to secure his father as well as John 
McCune, so we mutually agreed to giv~ them the firm's note for 
the amount of each claim. Both of these notes were given at 
the same time.' , Further on Edwards testified: '\Ve gave a 
• firm note, so that, in case of death or failure, they would share 
and fare like our other creditors.' On the same point the 
other partner testified: '\Ve saw the business was losing 
mqney; saw no prospect of times getting better, owing to the 
competition on each side of u.s; and we did n<>t care to favor 
one person and not others. We wanted to treat everybody 
alike.' When the firm failed, some six months later, its liabili-
ties, including these notes, footed up to about f5,GOO. Its 
assets were inventoried at $3,140.95, but the assigne~ rPa.lized 
only the sum of $770 from the sale of the entire stock of goods 
under order of the court at public auction, and had succeeded 
in collecting only $70 of the $626 due the firm from its custom~ 
ers. Of these liabilities about fl,500 were due to merchants 
from whom it had bought goods." 
Fagg & Ball, for appellant. 
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J. D. Hostetter, E. W. Major and Eben Richards, for respond-
eat.
Buncnss, J. (After stating the facts.) 1. No principle of
law is better settled than that, in the administration of an
insolvent partnership estate, the assets of the firm'must be
applied to the satisfaction of the firm creditors to the exclusion
of the creditors of the individual partners. H undley vs. Farris,
103 Mo. 78, 15 S. W. 312; Bank vs. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 148, 10 S.
W. 884, and cases cited in each. The principle we think equally
well settled by the more recent decisions of this court,as well as
by the weight of judicial authority in other jurisdictions, that
the assets of an insolvent firm, before dissolution, may, with the
consent of all the partners, be applied to the satisfaction of all
the individual debts of the members of the firm, when done in
good faith. Sea-ton vs. Anderson, 95 Mo. 380, 8 S. W. 564; Rey-
burn vs. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592, and cases cited in
each; Seger vs. Thomas, 107 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 33. As Phelps vs.
McNeely, 66 M0. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 398,is in conflict with the cases‘
last cited and the great weight of authority, it should not be
followed, and is overruled. Jones vs. Lush, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 356;
George vs. Wamsley, 64 Iowa 175, 20 N. W. 1;‘ Schaefier vs.
Fithian, 17 Ind. 463; Kirby vs. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 46, 49
Am. Dcc. 160; Kennedy vs. Bank, 23 Hun, 494; In re Kahley, 2
Biss. 383, Fed. Cas. No. 7,593; Warren vs. F'arm-er, 100 Ind. 593;
Trentman vs. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443; Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U.
S. 119; Purple vs. Farrlngton, 119 Ind. 164, 21 N. E. 543; Pep-
per vs. Peck, 17 R. I. 55, 20 Atl. 16; Anderson vs. Norton, 15 Lea
14; Haiskamp vs. Wagon Co., 121 U. S. 310, 7 Sup. Ct. 899; Goflin
vs. Day, 34 Fed. 687. In the case at bar the firm notes were
given in satisfaction of individual debts long prior to the disso-
lution of the partnership, and that transaction cannot be
declared fraudulent at law on the ground simply that the firm
was at the time insolvent, or was made so by the act of making
these notes.
2. If the partners composing the firm of Edwards & Wiggin-
ton had by agreement, in good faith, mortgaged or assigned all
the assets of the firm, for the purpose of securing or paying the
debts owing by them individually to McGune and Wigginton,
respectively, though with the intention of giving them a pref-
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J. D. Hostetter, E. W. Major and Eben Richards, for respond-
t>nt. 
BURGESS, J. (After stating the facts.) 1. No principle of 
law is better settled than tba t, in the administration of an 
insolvent partnership estate, the assets of the firm· must be 
applied to the satisfaction of the firm creditors to the exclusion 
of the creditors of the individual partners. Hundley vs. Farris, 
103 l!o. i8, 15 8. W. 312; Bank v8. Brenneisen, 97 Mo. 148, 10 S. 
\V. 884, and cases cited in each. The principle we think equally 
well settled by the more recent decisions of this court, as well as 
by the weight of judicial authority in other jurisdictions, that 
the assets of an insolvent firm, before dissolution, may, with the 
consent of all the partners, be applied to the satisfaction of all 
t.he individual debts of the members of the firm, when done in 
good faith. Se:cton v8. Anderson, 95 Mo. 380, 8 8. ·w. 564; Rey-
burn vs. Mitchell, 106 Mo. 365, 16 S. W. 592, and cases cited in 
each; Seger vs. Thomas, 107 Mo. 635, 18 S. W. 33. As Phelps vs. 
McNeely, 66 Mo. 555, 27 Am. Rep. 398, is in conftict with the cases 
last cited and the great weight of authority, it should not be 
followed, a·nd is overruled. JoMs vs. Lusk, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 356; 
George vs. Wamsley, 64 Iowa 175, 20 N. W. 1; · Schaeffer vs. 
Ji'ithian, 17 Ind. 463; Kirby v.'1. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. Cb. 46, 49 
Am. Dec. 160; Kennedy vs. Bank, 23 Hun, 494; In re Kaliley, 2 
Biss. 383, Fed. Ca.s. No. 7,593; Warren t'S. Farmer, 100 Ind. 593; 
Trentman vs. Swai·tzell, 85 Ind. 443; Case vs. Beauregard, 99 U. 
S. 119; P1trp'le vs. Farrington, 119 Ind. 164, 21 N. E. 543; Pep· 
per vs. Peele, 17 R. I. 55, 20 Atl. 16; Anderson vs. Norton, 15 Lea 
14; Huiskam.p vs. Wagon Co., 121 U.S. 310, 7 Sup. Ot. 899; Coffin. 
vs. Day, 34 Fed. 687. In the case at bar the firm notes were 
given in satisfaction oo individual debts long prior to the disso· 
lutioo of the partnership, and that transaction cannot be 
declaTed fraudulent a.t la.won the ground simply that the firm 
was at the time insolvent, or was made so by the a:ct of making 
these notes. 
2. If the partners composing the firm of Edwards & Wiggin-
ton had by agreement, in good faith, mortgaged or assigned all 
the assets of the firm, for the purpose of securing or paying the 
debts owing by them individually to McCune and Wigginton, 
respectively, though with the intention of giving them a pref-
erence (\"Pr the firm creditors, the transaction could not be 
Ganoasn-Pscx Gaocsnr Co. vs. MCCUNE. -161'
impeached. If, on the other hand, they had given these individ-
ual creditors a mortgage on the firm property, and to secure
their individual debts, with the understanding that they should
continue in possession of the property, and sell and dispose of
it in the usual course of business, the mortgage would have
been fraudulent and void as to the other creditors. The object
in giving these notes in the name of the firm to McCune and
VVigginton was not to give them a preference over the part-
nership creditors, but was to put them all on an equal footing,
so that they might share alike in the distributiorn of the firm’s
assets in case of the firm’s assignment. So long as a firm
exists, it has the same right to dispose of the firm assets that an
individual has of his own property, providing always that such
disposition is bona fidc; but, if no lien has_ been created by it
on its firm assets, and the firm assigns, as in the case at bar,
then the firm creditors must be first paid. That the debts of
McCune and Wiggin-ton, when first created, were the individual
debts of the members of the firm of McCune & Wigginto-n,
seems clear. “\Vhere there is a separate loan of money to one
of several joint adventurers for the purpose of founding a part-
nership or joint adventure, the firm, when formed, will not be
liable for the advance, for the case is not distinguishable
from one where several persons are to con-tribute their
separate proportions of money towards a common fund
for joint purposes, and each is to borrow and does bor-
row his own share upon his own separate ac-count and
credit. In short, in all cases of this sort, in order to bind the
firm, the intended partner must either have had an original
authority to purchase goods or borrow money upon the joint
account, and have exercised that authority by a purchase or
loan on their account ; and not on his own exclu-
sive credit, or the transaction must have been sub-
sequently ratified and adopted by the firm as one for
which they were originally liable, or for which they now
elect to give their joint security.” Story, Partn. § 148. See,
also, Donally vs. Ryan, 41 Pa. St. 306; Wild rs. Erath, 27 La.
Ann. 171. The doctrine that firm assets must be first appplied
to the payment o-f the firm’s debts is a principle of administra-
tion adopted by the courts when from any cause they are called
upon to wind up the firm business, and find that the members
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impeached. If, on the other hand, they had given these individ-
ual creditors a mortgage on the firm property, and t-0 secure 
their individual debts, with the understanding that they should 
continue in possession of the property, and sell and dispose of 
it in the usual course of business, the mortgage would have 
been fraudulent and void as to the other creditors. The object 
in giving these nt>tes in the name of the firm to McCune and 
Wigginton was not to give them a preference over the part-
nership creditors, but wa.s to put them all on an equal footing. 
so that they might share alike in the distributicm of the firm's 
assets in case of the firm's assignment. So long as a firm 
exists, it has the same right to dispose of the firm assets that an 
individual bas of his own property, providing always that such 
disposition is bona fide; but, if no lien has. been created by it 
on its firm assets, and the firm assigns, as in the case at bar, 
then the firm creditors must be first paid. That the debts of 
McCune antl \Vigginfon, w-hen first created, were the individua:l 
debts of the members of the firm of McCune & Wigginton, 
seems clear. "Where there is a separate loan of money to one 
of several joint adventurers for the purpose of founding a part-
nership or joint adventure, the firm, when formed, will not be 
liable for the a:dvance, for the case is not distinguishable 
from -0ne where several persons are to contribute their 
separate propo1·tions of money towards a common fund 
for join1: purposes, and each is to borrow and does bor-
row hie own share upon his own separate acoount and 
credit. In short, in all cases of this sort, in order to bind the 
firm, the intended partner must either have bad an origin.al 
authority to purchase goods or borrow money upon the joint 
:i0<'ount, and have exercised that authority by a purchase or 
loan on their account ; and not on his own exclu-
sive credit, or the transaction must have been sub-
sequently ratified and adopted by the firm as one for 
which they were originally liable, or for which they norw 
elect to give their joint security." Story, Partn. § 148. See, 
also, Donally vs. Ryan, 41 Pa. St. 306; Wild tis. Erath, 27 La. 
Ann. 171. The doctrine that firm assets must be first appplied 
to the payment of the firm's debts is a principle of administra-
tion adopted by the courts when from any ca.use they are called 
npon to wind up the firm business, and find that the members 
have made no disposition or charge upon its assets. This is 
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accomplished by marshalling the assets, by ap-plying the part-
nership property to the partnership debts. The right of the
firm creditors “is worked out through the partners,” the mean-
ing of which is that they may demand the primary application
of the firm assets to the payment of their debts. Schmidlapp rs.
C’-urric, 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530. As the right of the firm
creditors is “worked out through the partners,” it neo-
essarily follows that whatever the firm, with the con-
senrt of all its members, does in good faith with
the partnership property, is binding upon them. If, then,
the firm had the right to assume, by and with the con-sent of
-both of its members, the individual debts due by them respect-
ively to McCune and Wigginton, when this was done, and they
gave the firm notes, and thereby assumed their payment, they
became firm debts, and should share pro rat-a in the distribu-
tion of the proceeds arising from the sale of the partnership
assets with the other firm creditors. This is said to be the con-
version of debts, so that, if they were separate debts of the re-
spective partners,they become, by the consent of the memhersnf
the firm, the join-t debts of all the partners, and will thereafter
be treated as such. Story, Partn. §§ 368, 369; Ea: parts Pecle, 6
Ves. 601; Ex parte Jackson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131; Sicgcl vs. Ohidsey, 28
Pa. St. 279. That the firm had the right to assume the individ-
ual debts of its members and thereby convert them into debts
of the firm, in the absence of fraud, and that the individual
indebtedness was sufiicien-t consideration for such promise by
the firm, the authorities abundantly show. Siegel vs. Clzidsey,
supra; Case vs. Ellis (Ind. App.) 30 N. E. 907. From these con-
siderations we are of the opinion the judgment of the court of
appeals should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that
court, with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit
court, and remand the cause for a new trial in conformity with
the opinion of this court. It is so ordered.
All concur.


















































































































































CA.SES ON PARTN'EilSIIIP. 
accomplished by marshalling the assets, by ap·plying the part-
nership property to the partnership debts. The right of the 
firm creditors "is worked <>1,lt through the partners," the mean-
ing "Of which is that they may demand the primary application · 
of the firm assets to the payment of their debts. Schmidlapp t;8. 
Currie, 55 Miss. 597, 30 Am. Rep. 530. As the right of the firm 
creditors is "worked out through the partners," it nec-
eSStlrily follows that whatever the firm, with the COD· 
sen.it of all its members, d0€9 in good faith with 
the partnership property, is bindin~ upon them. If, theu, 
the firm had the right to assume, by and with the con.sent of 
bath of its members, the individual debts due by them respect-
ively to McCune and Wigginton, when this was done, and they 
gave the firm notes, and thereby assumed their payment, they 
became firm debts, and should share pro rata in the distribu-
tioo of the proct>eds arising from the sale of the partnership 
assets with the oither firm creditors. This is said to be the COD· 
version en debts, so th.at, if they were separate debts of the re-
. epective partners, they become, by the consent of the mc-mue:·soi' 
the firm, the joint debts of all the partners, and will thereafter 
be treated as such. Story, Partn. §§ 368, 369; E:c pa-rte Peele, 6 
Ves. 601; E:r pm·te Ja-ckson, 1 Ves. Jr. 131; Siegel t:s. Ohidsey, !:!8 
Pa. St. 279. That the firm had the right to assume the indiYid-
nal debts of its membeors and thereby convert them into debts 
of the firm, in the a.bsence of fraud, and that the individual 
indebtedness was sufficient consideration for such promise by 
the firm, the authorities abundantly show. Siegel vs. Cltidsc!t, 
81tpra; Gase vs. Ellis (Ind. App.) 30 N. E. 907. Fr001 these con-
sidera•tions we are of the <>pinion the judgment of the court of 
nppeals should be reversed, and the cause remanded to that 
court, with directions to reverse the judgment o·f the circuit 
court, and remand the oouse for a new trial in conformity with 
the opinion of this oourt. It is so ordered. 
All concur. 
NOTE: Bee Mechem's Elem. of Partn., § 288, and cases there cited. 
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f RODGERS vs. MERANDA.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 1857.
7 Ohio St. 180. '
The original proceeding was a petition for an order of dis-
tribution of the separate or individual assets of an insolvent
debtor, as between separate and partnership creditors.
It appears from the record, that about the 13th of June,
1854, Peter Murray, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment
of all his estate, real and personal, to the plaintifi, in trust for
the payment of his individual creditors, in proportion to the
amount of their respective demands. Though possessed of a
large and valu-able estate, it had been found insutlicien-t to pay
his separate debts and liabilities, in full. At the date of his
failure and assignment, he was a partner with John W. Dever,
in a mercantile firm, under the name and style of Dever &
Murray; which firm had also become insolvent, and likewise
Dever; and the firm had made an assignment of the partner-
ship properly and assets, about the same time, to John Mer-
and-a., one of the defendants, in trust for the payment of the
joint debts or liabilities of the firm.
In this condition of affairs, the partnership credito-is,
although they had filed their claims with the assignee of the
firm for their distributive shares out of the partnership pI'0'p-
erty, claimed the right to be admitted to a participation in the
dividends of the separate estate of Murray, pari passu with
his individual creditors; while the latter denied the right, and
insisted that his separate estate shall be applied to the satis-
faction of his individual debts in preference to his partnership
debts.
It appeared further, that Murray, besides advancing his part
of the capital of the firm, also loaned money to the firm to a
large amount, for which he held the obligation of the firm,
which obligation, by the assignment of Murray, came into
the hand-s of the plaintiff, who presented the same to the
assignee of the firm, and claimed to have the same paid out of
the as-sets of the firm, part passu with the other partnership
debts. The other creditors resisted this, and plaintiff asked an


















































































































































- RODGERS vs. MERANDA.. 
RODG ERB vs. MERAND.-\.. 
Bu.preme Court of Ohio, 1851. 
7 Ohio St. 180. 
The or1gin-a1 proceeding was a petition for a.n order of dis-
tribution of the separate or indiviqnal assets of an in.solvent , 
debtor, as between separate and partnership creditors. 
It appears from the record, that about the 13th of June, 
1854, Peter Murray, an insolvent debtor, made an assignment • 
of all 11is estate, real and perS()nal, to the plaintiff, in trust for 
the payment of hi.s individual creditors, in proportion to the 
amount of their respective demands. Though possessed of a 
large and vnlu·able estate, it bad been found insufficient to pay 
his separate debts and lia.bilitie13, in full. At the date of his 
failure a:nd assignment, he was a partner with John W. Dever, 
_in a mercantile firm, under the name and style of Dever & 
Murray; which firm bad also become insolvent, and likewise 
Dever; and the firm had made an assignment of the partner-
ship property and assets, about the same time, to John Mer-
anda., one of the defendants, in trust for the payment of the 
joint debts or liabilities of the firm. 
In this condition of affairs, the pa;rtnersbip credifors, 
_ although they had filed their claims with the a8Sig'nee of the , 
firm for their distributive shares out of the partnership prop-
erty, claimed the right to be admitted to a participation in thf& 
dividends of the separate l'1iitate of Murray, pari passu with 
bis individual creditors; while the latter denied the right, an.d 
insisted that his separate eBtate shall be applied to the satis- · 
faction of his individual debts in preference to his partnership 
. debts. 
... 
It appeared further, that Murray, besides advancing his part 
of the capital of the firm, also loaned money to the firm to a 
large amount, for which be held the obligation of the ftrm, 
Which obligation, by the assignment of Murray, came into · 
the hands of the plaintiff, who presented the eame to the 
assignee of the firm, and claimed to have the same paid out of 
the assets of the firm, pari passu with the other partnership 
debts. The other creditors res1sted this, and plaintiff asked an 
order of distribution to that effect out of partnersb..ip assets. 
464 Casas ox PARTNERSHIP.
Defendants demurred to the petition. The court below sus-
tained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defend-
ants. And thi petition in error is filed to review and reverse
that judgment.
W. White and S. (E R. Mason, for plaintiff.
Anthony <£ Goodc, for defendant Meranda.
Gonovcr d2 Graighead, for defendants Tracy, Irwin & Co.
BARTLEY, C. J. Two questions are presented for determinw
tion in this case. The first is, whether in the distribution of
the assets of insolvent partners, where there are both indi-
vidual and partnership as-sets, the individual creditors of a
partner are entitled to be first paid out of the individual effects
of their debtor, before the partnership creditors are entitled to
any dis-tributio-n therefrom. It is well settled that, in the dis-
tribution of the assets of insolventpartners, the partnership
creditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership effects;
so that the partnership debts must be settled before any divi-
sion of the partnership funds can be made amon-g the indi-
vidual creditors of the several partners. This is incident to
the nature of partnership property. It is the right of a part-
ner to havethe partnership property applied to the purposes
of the firm; and the separate interest of each partner in the
partnership property is ‘his share of the surplus after the pay-
ment of the partnership debts. And this rule, which gives the
partnership creditors a preference in the partnership effects,
would seem to produce, in equity, a; corres-ponding and cor-
relative rule, giving a preference to the individual creditors of
a partner in his separate property-; so that partnership credit-
ors can, in equity, only look to the surplus of the separate prop-
erty of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts;
and, on the other hand, the individual creditors of a partner
can, in like manner, only claim distribution from the debtor’s
interest in the surplus o-f the joint fund, after the satisfaction
of the partnership creditors, The correctness of this rule, how-
ever, has been much controverted; and there has not been
always a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for it
by those courts which have adhered t-o it. By some, it has been
said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations
















































































































































CA.SES ON .P A.ILTNEllSHIP. 
Defendants demurred to the petition. The court below sus-
tained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the defend-
ant..9. And this petition in error is filed to review and reverse 
that judgment. 
W. White and 8. & R. Uason, for plaintiff. 
Anthony & Goode, for defendant Meranda. 
Conover & Craighead, for defendants Tracy, Irwin & Co. 
BARTLEY, C. J. Two questions are presented for determinar 
tion in this case. The first is, whether in the distribution of 
the assets of insolvent partners, where there are both indi-
vidual and partnership assets, the individual creditors ()f a 
1 partner are entitled to be first paid out of the individual effects 
of their debtor, before the partnership creditors are entitled to 
any distribution therefrom. It is well settled that, in the di.8-
tributio.n of the assets of insolven.t· partners, the partnership 
, -0reditors are entitled to a priority in the partnership effects; 
so that the partnership debts must be settled before any divi-
sion of the partnership funds can be made among the indi-
vidual creditors of the several partners. Thi-s is incident to 
the nature of partnership property. It is the right of a part-
ner to have the partnership property applied to .the purpoees 
of the firm; and th~ separate interest of eaoh partner in the 
partnership property is his share of the surplus after the pay-
ment of the partnership debts. And this rule, whiob gives the 
partnership creditors a preference in the pa.rtnership effects, 
would seem to produce, in equity, a corresponding and cor-
relative rule, giving a preference to the individual creditors of 
a partner in his separate property-; so that partnership credit-
ors can, in equit11, only look to the surplus of the separate prop-
erty of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts; 
and, on the other band, the individual creditors of a partner-
can, in like manner, only claim distribution from the debtor's 
interest in the surplus o·f the joint fund, after the satisfactioa 
of the partnership creditors~ The correctness of this rule, how-
ever, has been much controverted; and there has not been 
always a perfect concurrence in the reasons assigned for it 
by those courts which have adh~red to it. By some, it has been 
said to be an arbitrary rule, established from considerations 
of convenience; by others, that it rests on the basis that a 
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primary liability attaches to the fund on which the credit was
given—-that in contracts with a partnership, credit is given on
the supposed responsibility of the firm; while in contracts with
a partner as an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed on
his separate responsibility: 3 Kent Com. 65. And again, others
have assigned as a reason for the rule that the joint estate is
supposed to be benefited to the extent of every credit which is
given to the firm, and that the separate estate is, in like manner,
presumed to be enlarged by the debts contracted by the individ-
ual partner; and that there is consequently a clear equity in
confining the creditors, as to preferences, to each estate respect-
ively, which has been thus benefited by their transactions;
.lIcC-‘ulloh rs. Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill (Md) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271.
But these reasons are not entirely satisfactory. So important a
rule must have a better foundation to‘ stand upon than mere
considerations of convenience; and practically it is undenia-
ble that those who give credit to a partnership look to the indi-
vidual responsibility of the partners, a well as that of the
‘firm; and also, those who contract with a partner in his sep-
arate capacity, place reliance on his various resources or
means, whether individual or joint. And inasmuch as indi-
vidual debts are often contracted to raise means which are put
into the business of a partnership, and also partnership effects
often withdrawn from the firm and appropriated to the sepa-
Izrte use of the partners, it cannot be practically true that the
separate estate has been benefited to the extent of every credit
given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate has
retained from the separate estate of each partner the benefit
of every credit given to the firm. Unsa'tisfactoryTeasons may
weaken confidence in a rule which is well founded.
What then is the true foundation of the rule which gives
the individual creditor a preference over the partnership cred-
itor, in the distribution of the separate estate of a partner?
To say that it is a rule of general equity, ais has been some-
times said, is not a satisfactory solution of the difliculty; for
the very question is, whether it be a rule of equity or not. In
the distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality is equity;
and to say that the rule which gives the individual creditor a
preference over the partnership creditor in the separate estate
of a partner is a rule of equality, does not still rid the subject

















































































































































RODGERS VS. MERANDA. 465 
primary liability attaches to the fund on which the credit was 
given-that in ce>ntraots with a partnership, credit is given on 
the supposed responsibility of the firm; while in ce>ntracts with 
a partner as an individual, reliance is supposed to be placed e>n 
his separate responsibility: 3 Kent Com. 65 • .And again, others 
I 
have assigned as a reason for the rule that the je>int e.state is 
supposed to be benefited to the extent of every credit which is 
given to the firm, and that the separate estate is, in like manner, 
presumed to be enlarged by the debts contracted by the individ-
ual partner; and that there is consequently a clear equity in 
<-:onfining the creditors, as to preferences, to each estate respeot· 
b·ely, which has been thus benefited by their transactions; 
JleCulloh iw. Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271. 
But these reasons are not entirPly satisfactory. So important a 
rule mus't have a better foundation to· stand upon than mere 
considerations of convenience; and practically it is undenia. 
ble tha.t those who ~ive credH to a partnership look to the indi-
vidual responsibility of the partners, as well as that of the 
_firm; and also, those who contract with a partner in his sep-
amte capacit,v, pla<'.e reliance on his various resources or 
means, whPtht•r individual or joint. And inasmuch as indi-
vidual rl<'bts are often contracted to raise means wllich are put 
into the business of a partne1·ship, and also partnership effects 
often withdrawn from the firm and approp1·iated to the sepa-
ra'te use of the part1wrs, it cannot be practically true that the 
separate estate has been brnefitrd to the extent of en>ry credit 
given to each individual partner, nor that the joint estate bas 
retained from tlw sPparate estate of each partner the benefit 
of every credit given to the firm. Unsatisfactory""l·easons may 
weaken confidence in a rule which is well founded. 
What then is the true foundn tion of the rule which gives 
the individual Cl'Pditor a prl'f Pl'l'\llte Over the partJH~l'sbip cred-
itor, in the distl'ibution of the separate estate of a partner? 
To say that it is a rule of g<"neml equity, ais has been some-
times said, is not a satisfactory solution of the .difficulty; for 
the very question is, whether it be a rule of equity or not. In 
the distribution of the assets of insolvents, equality is equity; 
and to eay that the rule which gives the individual creditor a 
preference e>ver the partnership creditor in the separate estate 
of a partner is a rule of equality, doe.snot ·still rid the subject 
of difficulty. }~or leaving the rule to stand, which gives the 
ti9 
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preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property,
and perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors,
is, perhaps, rarely attainable. That it is, however, more equal
and just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised,
consistently with the preference to the partnership creditors in
the joinit estate. cannot be successfully controverted. It orig-
inated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership
creditors in the joint estate, and for the purposes of justice,
became necessary as a correlative rule. \Vith whart semblance
of equity could one class of creditors, in preference to the rest,
be exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, and, concur-
rently with the rest, entitled to the separate estate of each part-
ner? The joint creditors are no more meritorious than the sepa-
ra.te creditors; and it frequently happens, that -the separate
debts are oontra.cted to raise means to carry on the partnership
business. Independent of this rule, the joint creditors have,as a
general thing, a great advantage over the separate creditors.
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, they
take their distributive share in the surplus of the separate
estate of each of the several partners, after the payment of the
separate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity, that where
one creditor is in asituation to have two or more distinct secur-
ities or funds to rely on, the court will not allow him, neglect-
ing his other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the
prejudice of those who have a claim upon that, and no other to
depend on. And besides the advantage which the joint credit-
ors have, arising from the fact that the partnership fund is
usually much the largest, as men in trade, in a great majority
of cases, embark their all, or the chief part of their property, in
it; and besides their distributive rights in the urplus of the
separate estate of the other partners, the joint creditors have a
degree of security for their debt and facilities for recovering
them, which the separate creditors have not; they can sell both
the joint and the separate estate on an execution, while the
separate creditor can sell only the separate property and the
interest in the joint efi’ec-ts that may remain to the partners,
after the accounts of the debts aznd effects of the firm are taken,
as between the firm and its creditors, and also as be-
tween the partners themselves. With all these advan-
tages in favor of partnership creditors, it would be grossly in-

















































































































































4:66 CASES ON p .A.RTNERSHlP. 
preference to the joint creditors in the partnership property, 
# and perfect equality between the joint and individual creditors, 
is, perhaps, rarely attainable. That it is, however, more equal 
and just, as a general rule, than any other which can be devised, 
consilrtently with the preference to the partnership creditors in 
the joinit estate, cannot be successfully controverted. It orig-
inated as a consequence of the rule of priority of partnership 
creditors in the joint estate, and for the purposes of justice, 
became necessary as a correlative rule. \Vith what semblance 
of equity could one class of creditors, in preference to the rest, 
be exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, and, coucur~ 
rently wi.th the rest, entitled to the separate estate of each part-
ner? The joint creditol'6 are no more meritorious than the sepa-
/ rate creditors; and it frequently happens, that the separate 
debts are contracted to rajse means to carry 001 the partnership 
business. Independent of this rule, the joint creditors have,as a 
general rthing, a great advantage over the separate creditors. 
Besides being exclusively entitled to the partnership fund, they 
take their distributive share in the surplus of the separate 
' etitate of eaclt of the several pm·tners, alter the payment of the 
separate creditors of each. It is a rule of equity, that where 
one creditor is in a situation to have two or more distinct secur· 
ities or funds to rely on, the court will not allow him, neglect-
in~ J1is other funds, to attach himself to one of the funds to the 
prejudice of tho~e who have a claim upon that, and no other to 
df:'pend on. And lx:sides the advantage which the joint credit-
ors have, arising from the fact that the partnership fond is 
usually much the larg<•st, a1il men in trade, in a great majority 
of cases, embark their all, or the chief part of their property, in 
it; and besides their distributive rights in the surplus of the 
separate estate of the other partners, the joint creditors have a 
degree O'f security for their debts and facilities for recovering 
1hem, which the separate creditors have not; they can sell both 
the joint and the separate estate o.n an execution, while the 
separate creditor can sell only the separate property and the 
interest in the joint effects that may remain to the partners, 
after the a.ccounts of the debts and effects of the firm are taken, 
as between the firm and its creditors, and also as be-
tween the partners themselves. With all these advan-
tages in favor of partnership creditors, it would be grossly in-
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and then a concurrent right with individual creditors to an
equal distribution in the separate estate of each partner.
VVhat equality and justice is there in allowing partnership
creditors, who have been paid eighty per cent on their debts,
out of the joint fund, to come in pa-ri pa-ssu with the individual
creditors of one of the partners, whose separarte property will
not pay twenty per cent to his separate creditors? How could
that be said to be an equal distribution of the assets of insolv-
ents among their creditors? It is true that an occasional case
may arise where the join-t effects are proportionably less than
the separate assets of an insolvent -partner. But, as a general
thing, a very decided advantage is given to thepartnership
creditors, notwithstanding this preference of the individual
creditors in the separate property. And that advantage, arising
out of the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoidable.
Some general rule is necessary; and that must rest on the basis
of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the
joint effects, and their further right to some claim in the sep-
ararte property of each of the several partners. The preference,
therefore, of the individual creditors of a partner in the distri-
bution of his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity,
from the preference of partnership creditors in the partnership
funds, and their advantages in having different funds to resort
to, while the individual creditors have but the one.
It has been argued that partnership contract-s are several
as well as joint, and consequently have an equal legal
right with separate creditors upon the individual prop-
erty of a partner. But the right of partn-ership creditors
against the separate property of individual partners in
proceedings at law, is not in controversy. The question
here relates to the relative equitable rights of two classes
of creditors in the distribution of the estates of insolv-
ents. Much of the confusion upon this subject has prob-
ably arisen from confounding the abstract rights of creditors in
proceedings at larw, with their relative rights to an equitable
adjustment in m-arshalling_ the assets of insolvents in chancery.
The rule here adopted appears to have been followed in
Engl-and for near a century and a half. We find it distinctly
recognized in the case of Em parte Orowder, 2 Vernon 706, de-
cided in 1715. And i-n Ea: partc Cook, 2 Peere YVill'inms 500,
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and then a concurrent right with individual creditors to an 
t>qual distribution in the separate estate of each partner. 
What equality and justice is there in allowing paritnership 
creditors, who have been paid eighty per cent on their debts, 
out of the joint fund, to come in pari passu with the individual 
creditors of one of the partners, whose separarte property will 
not pay twenty per cent to his separate creditors? How could 
that be said to be an equal distribution of the assets of insolv-
ents among their c·reditors? It is true that an occasional case 
may arise where the joint effects are proportionably less than 
the separate assets of an insolvent ·partner. But, as a general 
tbing, a very decided advantage is given to the · partnership 
creditors, notwithstanding thHi preference of the individual 
credifors in the separate property. And that advantage, arising 
out of. the nature of a partnership contract, is unavoidable. 
Arone general rule is necessary; and that muin rest on the basis 
of the unalterable preference of the partnership creditors in the , 
joint effects, and their further right to S()me claim in the sep-
amte property of each of the several partners. The preference, 
therefore, of the individual creditors of. a partner in the distri-
buti-On of. his separate estate, results, as a principle of equity, 
from the preference of partnership creditors in the partnership ., 
funds, and their advantages i-n having different funds to resort 
to, while the individual creditors have but the one. 
It has been argued that pa.rtnerS'hip contracts are several 
es well as joint, and consequently have an equal legal 
right with separate creditors upon the individual prop-
erty of e. partner. But the right <>f partnership creditors 
against the seJ)'arate property elf individual p:utners it1 
proceedings at la.w, is not in controversy. The question 
·hf>re relates to the relative equitable riglita of two classes 
of credit-0rs in the distribution of the estates of insolv-
ents. Much of tbe confusion upon this subject bas prob-
ably arisen from confounding the abstract rights of creditors in . 
proceedings at law, with their relative rights to an equitable 
adjustment in marshalling the assets of in.solvents in chancery. 
The rule here ad<>pted appea1•s to have been followed in 
EngJ.a.nd for near a century and a half. We find it distinctly 
recognized in tbe case of Ex parte Orou;der, 2 Vernon 706, de-
cided in 1715. And in Ex parte Cook, 2 Peere WiUi.llms 500, 
Lord ChancellO'r KING declared it settled as a rule of conven-
$68 Cssss on PARTNERSHIP.
jen-ce in bankruptcy that joint creditors should be first paid out
of the partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the
separate estate of each partner; and if there be a surplus of the
joint estate after paying the join-t creditors, the share of each
partner should be distributed to his separate creditors; and if,
on t-he other hand, there should be a surplus of the separate
estate of a partner after the satisfaction of his individual cred-
itors, it ‘should be applied to any deficiency of -the joint funds
in the satisfaction of the partnership debts. Lord HARD\VICKE
followed the same rule, in Em parte Hunter, 1 Atkins 228. But
it appears that in Ea: pa-rte Hodgson, 2 Bro. ch. c., decided in
1785, Lord Tnunnow made an innovation on the rule in bank-
ruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between joint
ajnd separate creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the
bankrupt’s estate, and his moiety of the joint estate; and that
the joint creditors ought to come in part pa-ssu with the sepa-
rate creditors. This ruling of Lord Tmmnow appears to have
had reference to proceedings at law, and in bankruptcy, for it is
said that, consistently therewith, it was competenrt for the
assignees to confine the joint creditors, where there was a joint
estate, to that fund exclusively, by filing a bill in equity against
the other partners, and obtaining an injunlction on the order
in bankruptcy. But how far this innovation went, in practice,
to affect the ultimate righ.t-s of the parties, is wholly imma-
terial, inasmuch as Lord Louonnonouon, in Ea: parte Elton, 3
Ves. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which previously
prevailed, holding thait the rule introduced by the case of Hodg-
son was inconvenient, inasmuch as every order which he
passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a‘ dividend out of
the separate estate of a partner, would give rise to a bill in
equity, on the part of the separate creditors, to restrain the
order, and secure the application of the separate estate to the
saitisfaction of the separate debts; and although it was ad-
judged that a joint creditor might prove his claim under a sep-
ararte commission, yet he could not receive any dividend there-
from, until the amount of his distribution in the joint fund
could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors
satisfied. And the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in this case,
puts an end to the assertion, which has been sometimes made,
that this rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy.
















































































































































CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
;ience in bankruptcy that joint creditors should be first paid out 
of the partnership estate, and the separate creditors out of the 
separate estate of ea'Ch partner; and if there be a surplus of the 
joint estate after paying the joint creditors, the share of each 
partner should be distributed to his separate creditors; and if, 
o-n the <>ther hand, there should be a surplus of the separate 
estate of a partner after the satisfaction of his individual cred-
itors, it 'should be a·pplied to any dPficiency oif the j<>int fonds 
in the saUsfaction of the partnership debts. Lord HARDWICKB 
followed the same rule, in Ex parte Hunter, 1 Atkins 228. But 
it appears that in E:D parte Hodgson, 2 Bro. ch. c., decided in 
1185, Lord THURLOW made an innovation on the rule in oonk-
ruptcy, declaring that there was no distinction between joint 
~nd separa..te creditors; that they ought to be paid out of the 
bankrupt's estate, and his moiety <>f the joint estate; and that 
the joint creditors ought to oome in pari passu with the sepa-
rate creditors. This ruling of J,,ord THURLOW appears to have 
had reference to proceedings at law, and in bankruptcy, for it is 
~aid that, consistently therewith, it was coimpeterut for the 
assignees to confine the joint creditora, where there was a joint 
~state, to that fund exclusively, by filing a bill in equity against 
the other partners, and obtaining an injunction on the order 
in bankruptcy. But how far this innovation went, in practice, 
to affect the ultimate right·s o.f the parties, is wholly imma-
terial, irnasmuch as Lord LouaHnonouan, in Ea: parte Elton, 3 
Ves. Jr. 238, in the year 1796, restored the rule which previously 
prevailed, holding thrut the rule introduced by the case of Hodg-
son W18S inconvenient, im1smuch as every order which he 
passed in bankruptcy, giving a joint creditor a· dividend out of 
the separttte estate of a partner, would give rise to a bill in 
equity, on the part of the separate creditoNJ, to restrafa the 
order, and secure the application of the separate estate to the 
srutisfaction of the separate debts; and although it was ad-
judged that a joint creditor might prove his claim under a sep-
iiract:e commission, yet he could not receive any dividend there-
from, until the amount of his distribution in the joint fund 
could be ascertained, and the claims of the separate creditors 
satisfied. And the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, in this case, 
puts an end to the assertion, which has been sometimes made, 
that this rule was peculiar to proceedings in bankruptcy. 
Touching this, he said: "If it stands as a rule of law. we must 
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consider, what I have always understood to be settled by a vast
variety of cases, not only in bankruptcy, but -upon general equity,
that the joint estate is applicable to partnership debts, and the
separate estate to the separate debts.” Again, in speaking of
the inconvenience of Lord T1=nmLow’s rule, he said, “What I
order here to-day, sitting in bankruptcy, I shall forbid tomor-
row, sitting in chancery; for it is quite of course to stop the
dividend on a bill filed. The plain rule of distribution is that each
estate shall bear its own debts. The equity is so plain, that it is of
course upon a bill filed.”
Lord Ennon, with some characteristic doubts and misgiv-
ings, consistently followed this rule of his immediate prede-
cessor: Gray vs. Chiswcll, 9 Ves. 118; Dutton vs. Morrison, 17
Ves. 194, 207. And it has ever since remained the settled larw
of England, applicable, not simply to proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, but as a general rule of equity, in the distribustion of the
assets of insolvents. -
The supposition that this rule arose from any provision of
the statutes concerning bankruptcy, in England, is a mistake;
it was long and well settled as a rule of equity, before any
statute was enacted touching this subject. It does not appear
to have been sanctioned by any positive enactment until the
statute of 6 Geo. IV, c. 16, § 16.
It is not a little remarkable that this rule of equity, so long
settled and acted on in England, should have encountered so
much opposition as it has in the courts of the several states in
this country.
In Pennsylvania the rule was discarded, by a majority of the
court, in the case of Bell rs. Newman, 5 Serg. & R. 78, decided
in 1819. And the rule adopted in that case was that where a
surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and also to indi-
vidual creditors, and leaving joint assets and also separate
assets, the separate creditors should receive as much out of the
separate property as the joint creditors could receive from the
separate portion or share of such partner in the joint property;
and th-at, then, the balance of the separate property should be
divided pro rata among both classes of creditors. This was
placed partly on the ground of equity, and partly on the ground
of a statute directing equality of distribution of the assets of
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consider, what I have always understood to be settled by a vast 
variety of cases, not only in bankruptcy, but ·upon general equity, 
that the joint estate is applicable to partnership debts, and the 
separate estate to the separate debts." Again, in speaking of 
the inconvenience of Lord TnuRLow's rule, be said, "What I 
order here to-day, sitting in bankruptcy, I shall forbid tomor-
row, sitting in chancery; for it is quite of course to l!ltop the 
dividend on a bill filed. The plain rul.e of distribution is that each 
estate shall bear its own debts. Tlie equity is so plain, tllat it is of 
course upon a bill filed." 
Lord Er.uos, with some characteristic doubts and misgiv-
ings, consistently followed this rule of his immediate pred~ 
cessor: G ra11 1:8. Chiswell, 9 Ves. 118; D1ttton vs. Morrison, 17 
Ves. 194, 20_7. And it bas ever since remained the settled laiw 
of England, applicable, not simply to proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, but a.s a general rule of equity, in the distribwtion of the 
assets of insolvents. 
The supposition that this rule arose from any provision of 
the statutes concerning bankruptcy, in England, is a mistake; 
it was long and well settlc>d as a rule of equity, before any 
statute was enacted touching this subject. It does not appear 
to have been sanctioned by any positive enactment until the 
statute of 6 Geo. JV, c. 16, § 16. 
It is not a little remarkable that thls rule of equity, so long 
settled and acted on in England, should have encountered so 
much opposition as it has in the courts of the several states in 
this country. 
In Pennsylvania the rule was discarded, by a majority of the -
court, in the case of Bell rs. Ne1oman, 5 Serg. & R. 78, decided 
in 1819. And the rule adopted in that case was that where a 
surviving partner dies indebted to partnership and alS-O to indi-
vidual creditors, and leaving joint assets and also separate 
assets, the separate creditors should receive as much out of the 
separate property as the joint creditors could receive from the 
separate portion or share of such partner in the joint proi}erty; 
and that, then, the balance of the separate property should be 
divided pro rata among both classes of creditoM. This wu 
placed partly on the ground of equity, and partly on the ground 
of a statute directing equality of distribution of the aBSets ot 
deceued persons. Judge GIBSON. however, dissented, insisting 
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forcibly on the rule adopted in England, as a general principle
founded in equity.
And it has been insisted that this case did not strictly fall
within the application of the principle, inasmuch as the estate
to be distributed in that case was the estate of a surviving
partner, against which the claims of the joint creditors were as
pu-rely legal as those of the separate creditors. And Chief
Justice TILGHMAN remarked, in the opinion in the case, that
“no rule was intended to be laid down which may afiect cases
differently circumstanced.”
The case of Sperry’s Estate, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 347, did not
directly afl’eot the question, inasmuch as it came fully within
the exception, that where there is no joint fund, and no solvent
partner, -the separate and joint creditors should be paid ratably
out of the separate estate. The question was again brought to
the attention of the court in that state, in Walker vs. Eyth, 25
Pa. St. 216, where the court express the opinion that it is a rule
of equity “that, where there a.re partnership and separate
creditors, each estate should be applied exclusively to the pay-
ment of its own creditors, the joint estate to the joint creditors,
and the separate estate to the separate creditors.” But the
question was not directly decided, the decision of the case being
put upon another ground. So that the general principle, in a
case proper for its applicati-on, is said to remain still an open
question in Pennsylvania: 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 483.
In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case
of -M0rris’s Adm'1' vs. Morri-s’s Adm’r, 4 Grattan 293, and was
elaborately discussed on both sides, but the court was equally
divided on the question of the adoption of the rule as a
general rule of equity, and the decision of the case was put on
other grounds.
In New Jersey, in the case of Wisham vs. Lippincott, 19 N. J .
Eq. 353, the rule was doubted as a. general princirfe. of equity,
although not decided.
In Vermont, in the case of Bardwell vs. Perry, 19 Vt. 292, 47
Am. Dec. 687, the rule was discarded as a principle of equity,
with this qualification, that the separate creditors could require,
in equity, that the joint creditors should first exhaust the part-
nership funds, before coming in with the separate creditors of
a partner for a pro ra-ta distribution out of his separate estate.
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forcibly on the rule adopted in England, as a general principle 
founded in equity. 
And it bas been insisted that this case did not strictly fall 
within the applioation of the principle, inasmuch as the e!Jtate 
to be distributed in that case was the estate of a surviving 
partner, against which the claims of the joint creditors were as 
purely legal as tho8e <Jf the separate creditors. And Chief 
Justice Tu,GHMAN remarked, in the opinion in the case, that 
"no rule was intended to be laid dQwn which may atfect cases 
differently circumstanced." 
The case of Sperry's Estate, 1 Ashmead (Pa.) 347, did not 
directly affeot the question, inasmuch as it came fully within 
the excepti()n, that where there is no joint fund, and no 90lvent 
partner, the separate and joint creditors should be paid ratably 
out of the separaite estate. The question was again brought tQ 
the attention of the court in that state, in Walker vs. Eyth, 25 
Pa. St. ~16, whe1'<? the court express the opinion that it is a rule 
of equity "that, where there are partnership and separate 
creditiors, each estate should be applied exclusively to the pay· 
ment of its own creditor.a, the joint estate to the joint creditors, 
and the separate estate to the separate creditors." But the 
q uesti.on was n<>t directly decided, the decision of the case being 
p111t upon another ground. So that the general prineiple, in a 
case proper for its application, is said to remain still an open 
question in Pennsylvania: 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 483. 
In Virginia the question was presented in 1848, in the case 
of ·Morris's Adm.'1· vs. Morris's Adm'r, 4 Grattan 293, and was 
elaborately discussed on both sides, but the court was equally 
divided on the question of the adoption of the rule as a 
general rule of equity, and the decision of the case was put on 
othn grounds. 
In New Jersey, in itbe case of Wisham 1'8. Lippincott, 19 N. J. 
Eq. 353, the rule was doubted as a general princir> of equity, 
although not decided. 
In Vermont, in the case of Bardwell vs. Perry, 19 Vt. 292, 47 
Am. Dec. 687, the rule was disoa.rded as a principle of equity, 
with this qualification, that the separate creditors could require, 
·in equity, that the joint creditors should first exhaust the part· 
nel"Ship funds, before coming in with the separate creditors of 
·a partner for a pro ra.ta distribut.ion out of bis separate estate. 
It does not appear that the doctrine of the English oonrts on 
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this subject was ever adopted as a rule of equity by the courts
in Massachusetts; but it is said that a statwte was enacted in
that state, in 1838, providing, as a rule for the distribution of,
insolvents’ estates, that the net proceeds of the separate estate
shall go to the separate creditors, and that of the partnership
estate to the joint creditors.
The rule appears to have been discarded in Connecticut, in
the case of Camp vs. Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; and
also in Mississippi, in the ease of Dahlgren vs. Duncan, 7 Sm. &
M. 280; but adopted in Alabama in Bridge vs. McCullough, 27
Ala. 661.
In New York it ha-s been -adjudged that “the rule of equity
was uniform and stringent, that the partnership property of a
firm shall all be applied to -the partnership debts to the exclu-
sion of the creditors of the individual members of the firm;
and that the creditors of the latter a-re to be first paid out of the
separate effects of'their debtor, before the partnership cred-
itors can claim anything therefrom ;” Jackson vs. Cornell, 1
Sandf. Ch. 348. The history of the English rule was somewhat
reviewed by Chancellor KENT, in Murray vs. Jlurraiy, 5 John.
(N. Y.) Ch. 60, and, upon full consideration, adopted as a rule
of equity, by Chancellor Wsnworrrn, in Wilder vs. Keelcr, 3
Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec. 781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige
19, 29 Am. l)ec. 738; Hutchinson vs. Smith, 7 Ib. 26.
The same doctrine was adopted by Chancellor Dnsaussnnn,
in South Carolina, as early as 1811, in Woddrop vs. Ward, 3
Des. Eq. 203; and also by the Supreme Court of New Hamp
shire, in J arr-is vs. Brooks, 23 N. H. 136.
Tl‘-he subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, in M c0ulloh vs, Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill 96, 18 Am.
Dec. 271, wherein it was settled in that State that in equity the
individual creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference
over the joint creditors in the distribution of the separate
estate of their debtor.
And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Court
of the United States, on full consideration, in Murrill vs. Neill,
8 How. 414. And it has been liavid do-wn generally by the ele-
mentary writers, both in England and in this country, as a set-
tled rule of equity.
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this subject was ever adopted as a rule of equity by the courts 
in Massachusetts; but it is said that a statulte was enacted in 
that state, in 1838, providing, as a rule for the distribution ~ 
insolrnnts' estates, that the net proceeds of the separate eetate 
shall go to the separate creditors, and that of the partnership 
estate fo the joint creditors. 
The rule appears to have been discarded in Conneotiout, in 
the case of Camp vs. Grant, 21 Conn. 41, 54 Am. Dec. 321; and 
also in l!ississippi, in the case of Dahlgren vs. Duncan, 7 Sm. & 
M. 280; but adopted in Alabama in Bridge vs. McCullough, 21 
Ala. 661. 
In New York it has been adjudged that ''the rule of equity 
was uniform and stl'ingent, that the partnership property of a 
ftrm shall all be applied to ·the pa11nersbip debts to the exclu-
sion of the creditors of_ the individual members of the firm; 
and that the creditors of the latter are to be first paid out of the 
separate effects of'their debtor, before the partnership cred· 
itors can claim anything therefrom;" Jackson vs. Cornell, 1 
8andf. Ch. 348. The history of the English rule was somewhat 
reviewed by Chancellor KENT, in Mtwray vs. Murray, 5 John. 
(N. Y.) Ch. 60, and, upon full oonsideration, adopted as a rule 
of equity, by Chancellor WALWORTH, in Wilder vs. Keeler, 3 
Pa!ge (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec. 781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige 
19, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Hutchinson vs. SmUh, 1 lb. 26. 
The s1mw doctrine was adopted by Chancellor DEsAussunE, 
in South Caro.Jina, as early as 1811, in Woddrop vs. Ward, 3 
Des. Eq. 203; and also by the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, in Jarvis vs. Brooks, 23 X. H. 136. 
'!Tue subject was very fully reviewed in the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, in McCulloh vs, Dashiell, 1 Harr. & Gill 96, 18 Am. 
Dec. 271, wherein it was settled in that State that in equity the 
individual creditors of a partner were entitled to a preference 
over the join'1: crediitor:s in the distribution of the separate 
estate of their debtor. 
And the same doctrine was settled by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, on full consideration, in Murrill vs. Neill, 
8 How. 414. And it has been ladd down generally by the ele-
menta·ry writers, both in England and in t'his oountry, as a set-
tled rule of equity. 
Story in his work on Partner.ship, ch.15, § § 365 and 366, says: 
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“This principle of equity jurisprudence, that the joint cred-
itors shall be entitled to a priority of payment out of the joint
efiects, and the separate creditors to a like priority out of the
separate effects, before the other class of creditors shall be en-
titled to any portion of the surplus, is not, perhaps, under all
its aspects, so purely artificial, as it has sometimes been sug-
gested to be; at least, it been has often relied upon, as the
dictate of natural justice.”
It is true, the'sa.me aurthor, in § 377, of his same work,
qualifies this opinion as follows:
“ ‘This rule, although now firmly established,’ ‘stands as
muoh, if not more, upon the general ground of authority, and
the maxim, stare decisis, than upon the ground of any equitable
reasoning,’ and further, t-hat ‘After the repearted doubts which
have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent
judges, it is not, perhaps, too much to say that it rests on a
foundartion as questionable and as unsatisfactory as any rule
in the whole system of our jurisprudence.’ ” And he adds:
“Such as it is, however, it is for the public repose thaat i-t
should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to substitute any
other rule, which would uniformly work with perfect equality and
equity in the mass of intricate transactions connected with com-
mercial operations.” .
Kent, in his C-omimentarie, 3 vol., 65, says: “The
joint creditors have the Primary claim upon the joint
fund in the distribution of the assets of bankrupts or insolvent
partners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before
any division of the funds takes place. So far as partner-
ship p.roperty has been acquired by means of partnership debts,
those debts have, in equity, a priority of claim to be discharged;
and the separate creditors are only entitled in equity to seek
payment from the surplus of the joint fund after satisfaction of
the joint debts. The equity of the rule, on the other hand, equally
requires that the joint creditors should only look to the surplus of
the separate estates of the partners, after payment of the separate
debts. It was a principle of the Roman law, and it has been
acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England,
and the United States, -that partnership debts must be paid out
of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out of
the private and sepurate estate of the individual partner. If
















































































































































. 472 CASES ON PA.RTNERSHI'P • 
"This principle of equity jurisprndence, that the joint cred-
itors shall be entitled to a priority of payment out of the joint 
effects, and the separate creditors to a like priority out of the 
separate effects, before the other class of creditors shall be en-
titled to any portion of the surplus, is not, perhaps, under all 
its aspects, so 1>urely artificial, as it bas S<>metimes been sug-
gested to be; at least, it been has often relied upon, as the 
dictate o.f natuml justice." 
It is true, the· same allltbor, in § 377, of h,is same work, 
qualifies this opinion as follows: 
"'This rule, although now firmly established,' 'stands as 
much, if not more, upon the general ground o.f authority, and 
the maxim, stare decisis, than upon the ground of any equitable 
.reasoning,' and further, that 'After the repeaited doubts which 
have been expressed upon the subject by the most eminent 
judges, it is not, perhaps, too much to say that it rests on a 
foundaition as que>stionable and as unsatisfacto.ry as any rnle 
hi the whole system of our jurisprudence.'" And he adds: 
"Such as it is, however, it is for the public repose thait it 
should be left undisturbed, as it may not be easy to stibstitute any 
other rule, which would uniformly work with perfect equality and 
equity in the mass of intricate trawmctions connected with com· 
mercial opera1tions." . 
Kent, in bis Commentaries, 8 vol., 65, says: "The 
joint creditors ·ba.ve the primary claim upon the joint 
fnnd in the distribution of the assets of bankrupts or insofrent 
partners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before 
any division of the funds takes place. So far as partner-
ship property has been acquired by means of partnership debts, 
those debts have, in equity, a pI"iority of claim to be discharged; 
and the sepnraite cI"editors are only entitled in equity to seek 
payment from the surplus of the joint fund after saitisfaction of 
the joint debts. The equity of the rule, on the other hand, equally 
requires that tl11e joint creditors should only look to the surplm of 
the separate estates of the partners, after payment of the separate 
debts. It was a principle of the Roman law, and it has be~n 
acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England, 
and the United States, that partnership debts must be paid out 
of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out of 
the ·private and sepurate estate of the individual partner. If 
the par.tnership creditors cannot obtain payment out of. the 
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partnership estate, they cannot in equity resort to the private
and separate estate, until private and eparate creditors are
satisfied; nor have the creditors of the individual partners any
claim upon the partnership property, until all the partnership
creditors are satisfied.” ,
It is argued, however, that this doctrine was overruled in
Ohio, in the case of G'r0svenm' vs. Austin, 6 Ohio Rep. 104, 25
Am. Dec. 743. It is true, that the reasoning of the court in the
opinion is to that efiect; but the case decided falls within one
of the acknowledged exceptions to the rule. Where the part-
nership has become insolvent, and there are n.o partnership
assets for distribution. and no living solvemt partner, it has
been uniformly conceded that the principle of the rule does not
apply. The case of Groin-enor vs. Austin was a bill in equity by
the creditors of the firm of Seymour Austin & Galvin Austin,
for a. distributive share with the individual creditors of Sey-
mour Austin out of the asets of -his separate estate in the
hands of his administrator. There were no partnership assets,
and both parties had died insolvent. This was not a case,
thereforevfor the application of the principle Sunder considera-
tion, and Judge LANE, in delivering the opinion, says, as to
this rule: “This Court are -of opinion, that if any such rule
exist, it must have been of frequent application, and thus have
become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the
books, except the one in 9 Vesey, and the South Carolina case,
that touches such a doctrine, unless cases founded on the stat-
utes of bankruptcy. A claim so novel in a case necessarily of
such common occurrence, must be listened to with caution
amounting t-o jealousy,” etc. Touching the subject of this obiter
opinion, the following remarks o-f the Supreme Uourt of the
United States, in M urrill vs. Neill, supra, are in point:
“The rule in equity governing the administration of insolvent
partnerships is one of familiar acceptation and practice; it is
one which will be found to have been in practice in this country
from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been
generally, if not universally, received. This rule, with one or
two eccentric variations in the English practice which may be
noted hereafter, is believed to be identical with that prevailing
in England, and is this: that partnership creditors shall, in the
first instance, be satisfied from the partnership estate; and sep-

















































































































































RODGERS VS. MERANDA.. 4-73 
partnership estate, they cannM in equity resort to the private 
and separate eetait:e, until private and separate creditors are 
sartisfied; nor have the creditors of the individual partners any 
claim upon the partnersb1p property, until all the partnership 
creditors are satisfied." 
It is aTgued, however, that 1:.bh1 doctrine was overruled in 
Ohio, in the case of Grost'enor vs . .Austin, 6 Ohio Rep. 104, 25 
Am. Dec. 743. It is true, that the rea.soning of the oourt in the 
opinion is to that effect; but the case decided falls within one 
of the acknmvledged exceptioDB to the rule. Where the part· . 
nership has become insolvent, and there are no partnership 
assets for distribution. and no living solvewt partner, it has 
been uniformly conceded that the principle of the rule does not 
apply. The ca.se of Grosrenor vs . .Austin was a bill in equity by 
the creditors of the firm of Seymour Austin & CalviD: Austin, 
for a di•stributive share with the individual creditors of Sey-
mour Austin out of the assets of ·his separate estate in the 
hands of his administrator. There were no partnership ~ts, 
and both parties had died insolvent. This was oot a case, 
therefore ,for the application of the principle under considera-
tie>n, a.nd\ Judge LANE, '{n delivering the e>pinion, eays, as to 
this rule: "This Court are of opinion, that if iany such rule 
exist, it must have been <?f frequent application, and thus have 
become familiar to the profession. Yet no case is found in the 
books, except the one in 9 Vesey, and the South Carolina case, 
that touches such a doctrine, unless cases founded on the stat-
utes of bankruptcy. A claim so novel in a case necessarily 0;f 
such common occurrence, must be liB'tened to with caution 
amounting to jealousy," etc. Touching the subject of this obiter 
opinion, the following remarks o-f the Supreme Oourt of the 
United States, in Murrill vs. Neill, supra, are in point: 
"The rule in equity governing the administration of insolvent 
partnerships is one of familiar acceptation and practice; it is 
one which will be found to have been in practice in this country 
from the beginning of our judicial history, and to have been 
generally, if not universally, received. This rule, with one or 
two eccentric variations in the English pra.ctice which may be 
noted hereafter, is believed to be identical with that prevailing 
in England, and is this: that partnership credite>rs shall, in the 
first instance, be Bfttisfied from the partnership estate; and sep-
arate or private creditors of tbe individual partnen1 from the 
60 
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separate and private estate of the partners with whom they
have made private and individual contracts; and that the pri-
vate and individual property of the partners shall not be ap-
plied in extinguishment of partnership debts, until the separate
and individual creditors of the respective partners shall be
paid. The reason and foundation of this rule, or its equality
and fairness, the court is not called on to justify. \Yere these
less obvious than they are, it were enough to show the early
adoption and general prevalence of this rule, to stay the hand
of innovation at this day; at least, under any motive less strong
than the most urgent propriety.”
It has been argued that the statute in this State, relative to
the equal distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and
also the statute providing that all assignments of property in
contemplation of insolvency, giving preferences to creditors,
had established, in this State, a policy inconsistent with the
ru.le in question. These statutes were certainly never intended
to have such an efl'ect. The equality required by them is
subordinate to the- settled equities and priorities of difierent
grades and classes of creditors. It was manifestly not the de~
sign of these statutes to change the nature of partnership con-
tI‘€llOtS, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in
the distribution of the partnership assets. And as this was
mot done, the rule of equality adopted in equity, requires the
corresponding preference to be given. to the individual credit-
ors of each partner in his separate estate.
The remaining matter for determination, in this case,
involves the inquiry, whether, in case of an indebtedness for
money lent to the partnership by a partner who afterward
becomes insolvent, -the separate creditors of the latter shall be
entitled therefor to a pro rata distribution with the partnership
creditors, out of the joint fund. It is claimed that -the liability
of the firm to a partner for money loaned is a partnership
debt, and that the individual creditors of that partner a-re, in
equity, entitled to an equal distribution therefor, out of the
partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed that
as each partner is individually liable for the debts of the firm,
and as no partner can be allowed to participate with his own
creditors in the distribution of a fund, the separate creditors
of a partner, as they can only claim through the rights of
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separate and private estate of the partners with whom they 
have made private and individual contracts; and that the pri-
vate and individual property of the pa-rtners shall not be ap-
plied in extingui.shment of partnership debits, until the separate 
and individual creditors of the respective partners shall be 
paid. The reason aDd foundation of this rule, or its equality 
and fairness, the court is not called on to justify. Were these 
leas obvious than they are, it were enough to show the early 
adoption and general prevalence of this rule, to stay the hand 
of innovation at this day; at least, under any motive less strong 
than the most urgent propriety." 
It bas been argued that the statute in this State, relative to 
the equal distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and 
also 1Jhe statute providing that all assignments of property in 
contemplation of insolvency, giYing preferences to creditors, 
had es.tablished, in this State, a policy inconsistent with the 
1·ule in question. These statutes were certainly never intended 
to have such an effect. The equality required by them is 
subordinate to the· settled equities and priorities of different 
grades and classes of creditors. It was manifestly not the de-
sign of these statutes to change the nature of partnership con-
tracts, and abrogate the preference of partnership creditors in 
the distribution of the partnership assets. And as this was 
D10t done, the rule of equality adopted in equity, requires the 
corresponding preference to be given to the individual credit-
ors of each partner in his iwparate estate. 
The remaining mattRr for determination, in this case, 
involves the inquiry, whethc>r, in case of an indebtedness for 
money lent to the partnership by a partner who afterward 
.becomes insolvent, the separate creditors of the latter shall be 
ent1tled therefor to a p1·0 rata distribution with the partnership 
creditors, out of the joint fund. It is claimed that the liability 
of the firm t-0 a partner for money loaned is a partnership 
debt, and that the individual crc>ditors of that partner are, in 
equity, entitled to an equal distribnti-00 therefor, out of the 
partnership property. On the other hand, it is claimed that 
as each partner is individua1ly liable for the debts of the firm, 
and as no partner can be allow,ed to participate with his own 
creditors in 1:he distribution of a fund, the sepa·rate creditors 
of a partner, as they can only claim through the rights of 
their dc>btor, cannot be allowed such pa.rticipation with the 
joint creditors. 
Rooanns vs. MERANDA. 475
It was at one time -held to be the law, on the authority of
adjudications by Lord T.u.1so'r and Lord HARDWICKE, that if a
partner has loaned money to the partnership, or the partner-,
ship has loaned money to the separate estate of one of the
partners, according to the equitable rule of distribution of the
assets after insolvency, in -the former case, the separate credit-
ors of the partner would be entitled to an equal share out of
the joint assets to the extenrt of the debt created for the money
lent; and that, in the latter case, the partnership creditors
would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of the
individual estate of the partner: Em parte H unter, 1 Atk. 223;
Story on Part., § 390. But this doctrine has long since been
overruled; and the contrary appears now to be well settled.
In Ea: parts Lodge, 1 V es. Jr. 166, Lord Tnonnow held that
the assignees on behalf of the joint estate could not be entitled
to distribution out of the separate estate of Lodge, for money
which he had abstracted from the partnership, unless he had
taken it with a fraudulent intent to augment his separate
estate. And in Ea; parts Harris, 2 Ves. and Beam. 210, 212,
Lord ELDON said: “There has long been an end of the law
which prevailed in the time of Lord Hnnnwxoxn, whose opinion
appears to have been that if the joint estate lent money t-0 the
separate estate of one partner, or if one partner lent to the joint
estate, proof might be made by the one or the other, in each
case. That has been put an end to, among other principles,
upon this certainly, that a partner cannot come in competition
with separate creditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate
with the joint creditors. The consequence is, that if one pa.rt-
ner lends £1,000 to the partnership, and they become in-solvent
in a week, he cannot be a creditor of the partnership, though
the money was supplied to the join-t estate; so, if the partner-
ship lends to an individual partner, there can be no proof for
the joint again-st the separate estate; that is, in each case no
proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partners
may certainly have the right against each other.”
This doctrine proceeds upon the principle that, in the dis-
tribution of the assets of insolvents, the equities of the credit-
o'rs, whether joint or separate, must be w-orked out through
the medium of the partners; that creditors can only step into
the shoes of their immediate debtors in reaching their efiects
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It was at one time held to be the law, on the authority of 
adjudicatious by Lord TALBOT and Lord HARDWICKE, that if a 
partner has loaned money to the partnership, or the partner-, 
ship has loaned money to the separate estate of one of the 
pa.Nners, according ro the equitable rule of distribution &f the 
assets after insolvency, in the former case, the separate credit-
ors of the partner would be entitled to an equal share out of 
the joint assets to the exterut of the debt created for the money 
lent; and that, in the latter case, the partnership creditors 
would be entitled to payment to the same extent, out of the 
individual estate of the partner: EiC parte H-unter, 1 Atk. 223; 
St.ory on Part., § 390. But this doctrine has long since been 
overruled; and the contrary appears now to be well settled. 
In E:c parre Lodge, 1 Ves. Jr. 166, Lo-rd THURLOW held that 
the assignees on behalf of the joint esta~ could not be entitled 
to distribution out of the separate estate of Lodge, for money 
which he had abstraded from the partnership, unless he had 
taken it with a fraudulent intent to augment bis separate 
estate. And in E3J parte Harris, 2 Ves. and Beam. 210, 212, 
Lord ELDON said: "There has long been an end of the law 
which prevailed in the time of Lord HARDWICKE, whose opinion 
appears to have been that if the joint estate lent money to the 
separate estate of one partner, or if one partner lent to the joint ,, 
estate, proof might be made by the one or the other, in ea.ch 
case. That has been put an end to, among other pr'inciples, 
upon this certainly, that a partner cannot come in competition 
with separate crPditors of his own, nor as to the joint estate 
with the joint creditors. The consequence is, that if one part-
ner lends £1,000 to the partnership, and they become insolvent 
in a week, he cannot be a creditor of the partnership, though 
the money was supplied to the joint estate; so, if the partner-
ship lendoS to an individua·l partner, there can be n.o proof for 
the joint against the sepa1·ate estate; that is, in each case no 
proof to affect the creditors, though the individual partners 
may certainly have the right against each other." 
This doctrine proceeds upon the principle that, in the dis-
tribution of the asset·s of insolvents, the equities of the credit-
OTs, whether joint or separate, must be worked out through 
the medium of the partners; tha;t creditors can only step into 
the shoes of their immediate debtors in reaching their effects 
where there are conflicting claims; alld that, inasmuch as an 
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individual partner could not himself come in and compete
with the partnership creditors, who are in fact his own credit-
ors, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice
those who were not only creditors of the partnership but also
of himself; therefo-re the separate creditors of a partner could
not enforce any claim to a distributive share o-f the joint effects
against the partnership creditors, which could not have been
enforced by the partner himself for his own benefit. Story on
Partnership, § 390. The rule, however, that these several
funds are to be thus administered as they stood at the time of
the insolvency, is to be received with this important limita-
tion, that it does not apply in case, either where the effects
obtained, creating the debt, were taken from the separate
estate to augment the joint estate, or from the joint estarte to
augment the separate estate, fraudulently, or under circum~
stances from which fraud may be inferred, or under which it
would be implied.
In the case before us, however, it is not pretended that the
firm obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly.
The separate creditors of Murray, therefore, are not, on
account of this claim for money lent by Murray to the firm,
entitled to participate with the partnership creditors in the dis-
tribution of the joint effects. '
Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and ordered that
the separate effects of Peter Murray be distributed pro rata
first among his individual creditors, before any application
thereof be made to the payment of the partnership debts of
Dover & Murray; and that the partnership effects be applied
first to the payment of the partnership debts, irrespective of
the claim of the partner, Peter Murray, for money loaned by
him to the firm.
All of the other justices concurred.
No'rE: See Mechem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 293, et seq.
Compare with the cases following.
See also, 2 Bates on Partn. , § 825, where this case is referred to as the lead-
in g case, setting forth the reasons assigned for the various rulings. See also
the note to McCulIoh vs. Dashiell, 18 Am. Dec. 280, where Rodgers vs.
















































































































































476 OASES ON P .A.RTNBRSHIP. 
individual partner oould no1 himself come in and compete 
with the partnership creditors, who are in fact his own oredllt-
ors, in the distribution of the fund, and thereby prejudice 
those who were not only creditors of the partnerehip but e.lso 
Ott himself; therefore the separate creditors of a partner could 
not enforce any claim to a distributive share of the joint effects 
against the partnership creditors, which could not have been 
enforced by the partner himself for his own benefit. Story on 
Partnership, § 390. The rule, however, ithat these- several 
funds are to be thus administered as they stood at the time of 
the insolvency, is to be received with this important limita-
tion, that i.t does not apply in case, either where the effects 
obtained, creating the debt, were taken from the separate 
estate to augment the joint estwte, or from the joint estwte to 
augment the separate estate, fraudulently, or under circum· 
stances from Wthich fraud may be inferred, or under which it 
would be implied. 
In the case before us, .however, it is not pretended thwt the 
firm obtained the borrowed money from Murray improperly. 
The separate creditors of Murray, therefore, are not, on 
account of this claim for money lent by Murray to the ft.rm, 
entitled fo participate with the partnership creditors in the dis-
tribution of the joint effects. 
Judgment of the common pleas reversed; and OTdered that 
the separate effects of Peter Murray be distributed pro rata 
first among bis individual creditors, before any application 
thereof be made to the payment of the partnership debts ()f 
Dev~r & Murray; and that the partnership effects be applied 
first to the payment of the partnership debts, irrespective of 
1:he claim of the partner, Peter Murray, for money loaned by 
him to the firm. 
All of the other justices concurred. 
NOTE: See Mecbem's Elem. of Partn., §§ 293, et seq. 
Oompare with the CIW".S following. 
See also, 2 Bates on Partn., § 825, where this case is referred to as the lead- · 
Ing case, setting forth the reasons assigned for the various rulings. See also 
the note to Mcculloh va. Dashi~l. 18 Am. Dec. 280. where Rodger• iia. 
M.,-and.a, and many other cases are referred to. 
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BLAIR vs. BLACK.
Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1889.
a1 s. Car. 346, 9 s. E. Rep. 1033, 17 Am. sc. Rep. so.
Action to set aside an assignment fo r i rs azgivoig E:
because of references. Decree below for and -
' P
ants appeal?
On January 29, 1889, James W. Black and Jacob K. Car-
penter, of the old mercantile firm of Black & Carpenter, and
also of its successor, Black, Carpenter & Davies, made an as-
signment of both their individual and partnership property for
the payment of their debts to John G. Black, as assignee and
trustee. J . L._ Davies, one of the latter firm, did not sign the
original deed of assignment, being absent at the time it was
executed, but ratified it some days later, and indeed executed
another deed, conforming substantially to the first. The
assignment provided that the property and assets of the indi-
vidual members of the respective firms should be first applied
to the payment of the individual debts of the members of the
firm, a-nd that the property and assets of the firms, respectively,
should be first applied to the debts of the partnership, and that
-if a surplus should remain after paying the debts of the one
class, then such surplus should be paid to debts of the other
class, and so reciprocally of the other class. The assignment
also provided that, if there should not be suflicient funds to
pay the debts, the assignee should pay them ratably, or such
as should, with 30 days from the date of the assignment, agree
to accept the terms of it, and to release the parties from all
liability on their debts and claims, etc. The cases stated above
were instituted by creditors of the respective firms for the
purpose of setting aside the deed of assignment, and, being
identical in object and purpose, were consolidated and heard
together.
O. E‘. Spencer and W. B. M cCaw, for appellants.
H art cé H art, for appellees. r
McG0wAN, J. Several grounds were urged sufficient, as
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BLAIR vs. BLACK. 
Supreme Court of South Oarnlina, 1889. 
81 S. Car. 846, 9 S. E. Rep. 1038, 17 Am. St. Rep. 80. 
Action to set aside an ·assignment f~r~if'lrs a~Y919~.ti 
because of preferences. Decree below for _ diL and 
ae+.& appeal1 
On January 29, 1889, James W. Black and Jacob K. Car· 
penter, of the old mercantile firm of Black & Carpenter, and 
e.lso of its -successor, Black, Carpenter & Davies, mane an as· 
eignment of both their individual and partnership property for 
the payment of their debts to John G. Black, as assignee and 
trustee. J. L .. Davies, one o1 the latter firm, did not sign the 
original deed of assignment, being absent at the time it was 
executed, but ratified it some days later, and indeed executed 
another deed, conforming substantially to the first. The 
assignment provided that the property and assets of the indi· 
vidual members of the respective firms should be first applied 
to the payment of the individual debts of the members of the 
firm, and that t:he property and assets of the firms, respectively, 
ehonld be first applied to the debts of the partnership, and that 
if a surplus should remain after paying the debts of the one 
class, then such surplus should be paid to debts of the other 
class, and so reciprocally of the other class. The assignment 
also provided that, if there should not be sufficient funds to 
pay the debts, the assignee should pay them rafably, or such 
as should, with 30 days from the date of the assignment, agree 
to accept the terms of it, and to release the parties from all 
liability on their debts and claims, etc. The cases stated above 
were instituted by creditors of the respective firms for the 
purpose of setting aside the deed <>f assignment, and, being 
identical in object and pul'p()Se, were consolidated and heard 
together. 
O. E. Spencer and W. B. McOaw, for appellants. 
Hart & Ha,rt, for appellees. 
McGOWAN, J. Several grounds were urged sufficient, as 
alleged, to set aside the assignment, and subject the property · 
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-to the claim of creditors according to law, but, from the view
which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider any
of the objections except the one chiefly relied on by the assail-
ing creditors, viz., that in violation of section 2014 of the gen-
eral statutes, which denounces assignments giving preferences
as “absolutely void,” this assignment gives undue and illegal
preference to individual over copartnership creditors, in
excluding the partnership creditors, after exhausting the part-
nership assets, from coming in and participating with the indi-
vidual creditors in the individual property of the members of
the different firms; the proposition relied on being that, under
the law of this state, the individual creditors are not entitled to
be paid first out of the individual property, but have only an
equity to require that the partnership creditor should exhaust
the assets of the firm, and, after that is applied, they are then
entitled, as to any balance due them, to share equally and
ratably with the individual creditors in the individual assets.
While, on the other hand, in support of the assignment, it is
urged that the rule is that the joint debts are primarily pay-
able out of the joint effects, and are entitled to a preference
over separate debts; and so, in the converse case, the sepa-
rate debts are primarily payable out of the separate effects, and
as to that possess a like preference, and the surplus only, after
satisfying such priorities, can be reached by the other class of
creditors, so that really the only question involved is one purely
of law. \Vhat was the law of this state upon the subject when
the assignment was executed? ‘
The cause ea.me on to be heard by Judge Knnsnaw, who,
making a full and interesting review of the authorities both in
the English and American courts, in la-w and in equity, held
that the question as to priority of the individual over the part-
nership creditors in the individual property of the members
of the firm was till an open question in this state, and “fur-
thermore that the departure from this settled rule of adminis-
tration of partnership assets, where there are individual claims
and individual property, is wholly founded upon the case of
Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dud. (S. Car.) Eq. 110, and that wholly upon
a total misconception of the English cases cited to support it.
VVith great deference to the opinions of the eminent jurists
whose decisions are here reviewed, I am impelled to the con-
















































































































































478 CA.SES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
to the claim of creditors according to law, but, from the view 
which the court takes, it will not be necessary to consider any 
of the objections except the one chiefly relied on by the assail-
ing creditors, viz., that in violation of section 2014 of the gen-
eral statutes, which denounces assignments giving preferences 
ns "absplutely void," this assignment gives undue and illegal 
preference to individual over copartnership creditors, in 
excluding the partners·bip creditors, after exhausting the part-
nership assets, fro~ coming in and participating with the indi-
vidual creditors in the individual property of the members ot 
the different firms; the proposition relied on being that, under 
the law of this state, the individual creditors are not entitled te 
be paid first out of the individual property, but have only an 
equity to require that the partnership creditor should exhaust 
the assets of the firm, and, after that is applied, they are then 
e-ntitled, as to any balance due them, to share equally and 
ratably with the individual creditors in the individual assets. 
While, on the other hand, in support of the assignment, it is 
urged that the rule i.s that the joint debts are primarily pay· 
able out of the joint effects, and are entitled to a preference 
over separate debts; and so, in the oonverse case, the sepa.· 
rate debts are primarily payable out of the separate effects, and 
as to that possess a like preference, and the surplus only, after 
satisfying sn<'h priorities, can be reached by the other class of 
creditors, so that really the only question involved is one purely 
of law. 'Vhat was the law of this state upon the subject when 
• the assignment was executed? 
The cause ca.me on to be beard by Judge KERSHAW, who, 
making a full and interesting review of the authorities both in 
the English and American oourts, in law and in equity, held 
that the question as to priority of t·he individual over the part-
nership creditors in the individual property of the members 
of the firm was still an open question in this state, and "fur-
thermore t'hat the departure from this settled rule of adminis-
tration of partnership assets, where there a·re individual claims 
and individual property, is wholly founded upon the case of 
Wardlaw vs. Gray, Dud. (S. Car.) Eq. 110, and that wholly upon 
a total misconception of the English cases cited to support it. 
'\\"'ith great deference to the opinions of the eminent jurists 
wh,lse decisious are here reviewed, I a.m impelled to the oon-
clu.sion that in the case under consideration the individual 
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property is first applicable to the individual debts, and that the
provisions upon that subject in the assignment are in strict
conformity to the established rule, and therefore constitute no
improper preference,”—a.nd dismissed the complaints. From
this decree the plaintiff’s partnership creditors appeal to this
court upon the ground, inter alia, that it was error of la.w to
hold “that, as between the partnership creditors of a firm and
the individual creditors of its members, the individual assets
are first liable to individual debts before any application
thereof may be made to partnership debts, and for not holding"_
that if, after applying partnership assets to partnership debts,
any portion of such debts should remain unsatisfied, such por-
tion hould come in ratably with the individual debts of the
several members as against their individual assets,” etc.
The question is certainly an important one, which in the
affairs of business life may arise daily, and it should be,
if it has not already been, clearly and fully settled, so that all
may know what the law is to which their actions should be
conformed. It is true that there has been much discussion and
some difference of opinion on the subject involved, not, as it
seems to us, arising so much from the inherent difiiculty of
the subject, as from an artificial rule originally adopted in the
English bankrupt courts, mainly, as it would seem, on account
of its simplicity and convenience of application, vi1.., that part-
nership creditors are entitled to partnership property, and e
com-crso, individual creditors are entitled to individual prop-
ei-ty,—»a rule of which Judge S'rom' says: “It is not too much
to say that it rests on a foundation as questionable and unsat-
isfactory as any rule in the whole system of our jurisprudence.”
Story, Partn. 577. As we understand it, no rule upon the sub-
ject has ever been declared by positive statute, either in
England or America; but whatever rule there may be has
grown up entirely from the dicta of elementary writers and
adjudications of the courts supposed to be founded on some
principle. But so far as concerns this “rule of reciprocity,”
as it is sometimes called, it does not seem to us to have been
based upon any principle or general equities of the parties.
All agree that the partnership creditors have an equity to
exhaust the partnership assets, for the double reason that they
have two funds, and the individual members have no interest
















































































































































Bu.IR · vs. BLACK. 479 
property is first applicable to the individual debts, and that t~e 
provisions upon that subject in the assignment are in strict 
conformity to the established rule, and therefore constitute no 
improper preference,"-and dismissed the complaints. From 
this decree the plaintiff's partnerehip creditors a.ppeaJ to this 
conn upon the ground, inter alia, that it wM error of law to 
h-0ld ''that, as between the partnership creditors of a :ft.rm and 
the individual creditors of its members, the individual a88€'ts 
are first liable to individual debts before any application 
thereof may be made to partnership debts, and for not holding+-
fhat if, after applying partnership assets to partnership debts, 
any portion of such debts should remain unS1atisfied, such po-r-
tion should come in ratably with the individual debts of the 
several members as against their individual assets," etc. 
The question is certainly an important one, which in the 
a1fairs of business life may arise daily, and it S'hould be, 
if it has not already been, clearly and fully settled, eo that all 
may know what the law is to which their actions should be 
conformed. It is true that there has been much discussion and 
some difference of opinion on the subject involved, not, as it 
seems to us, arising so much from the inherent difficulty cd 
the subject, as from an artificial rule originally adopted in the 
English bankrupt courts, mainly, as it would seem, on account 
of its simplicity and convenience of application, viz., that part-
nership creditors are entitled to partnership property, and 6 
convcrao, individual creditors are entitled to individual prop-
erty,~ rule of which Judge STORY says: "It is not too much 
to say that it rests on a foundatfon as questionable and unsat-
isfactory as any rule in the whole system of our jurisprudence." 
Story, Partn. 577. As we understand it, no rule upon the sub-
ject haiS eve1· been declared by positive statute, either in 
England or America; but whatever rule there may be has 
grown up entirely from the dicta of elementary writers and 
adjudications of the courts supposed to be founded on some 
principle. But so far as concerns this "rule of reciprocity," 
as it is sometimes called, it does not seem to us to have been 
based upon any principle or general equities at the parties. 
All agree that the partnership creditors have an equity to 
exhaust the partnership assets, for the double reason that they 
have two funds, and the individual members have no interest 
until t'he partnership is settled. But the same cannot be said 
43° Casss ox Psarmsnsnxr. -
of the individual creditors. They are not creditors of the firm
at all, but only of their individual debtor, whose individual
property, including his clear share of the firm, is liable for all
his debts alike, both partnership and individual. It strikes us
that there is nothing in the relations or the equities of the
respective classes to authorize or justify the application of the
convenient Procrustean rule of “reciprocity.” But it is
argued that the circuit decree is in conformity with the English
rule, and we should follow it, without regard to its reason or
equity, and disregard our own cases, which have made a depart-
ure from it, for the sole reason that it was error to make that
departure, and it should be corrected by returning to the rule.
Without going back to ascertain what is the precise rule
adopted in the English courts of bankruptcy and chancery,
it is quite clear that, as far back as the case of Wardlaw rs.
Gray (1837), cited in the circuit decree, the doctrine was
announced in this state “th-at a partnership creditor has the
right to resort either to the partnership property or to the sep-
arate property of the parties; but, as a party having two funds,
he may be compelled by the separate creditors of one of the
pa-rtners to exhaust the partnership property before he pro-
ceeds against that of an individual partner,” etc. YVhether
this decision did or did not run counter to what is said to be
the English rule upon the subject, it is quite as clear that it
has never been expressly overruled; but on the contrary has
been recognized and followed, and at the time of the execution
of the assignment under consideration was, as we think, the
law of the state. In (Iowan rs. Tzmno, Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. Cas.
369 (1832), it was held that, “though partnership effects should
be first applied to partnership debts, yet, after these are
exhausted, a judgment against the partners as such binds the
separate estate of each partner from its date.” In Fleming
vs. Billings, 9 Rich. Eq. 149 (1856), it was held that “copartner-
ship creditors are first to he paid out of the copa rtnership fund,
and if that prove insufficient then they are to come in with the
private creditors [respect being had to liens], as against the
individual property of the copartners.” In Gadsden vs. Carson,
Id. 252, 77 Am. Dec. 207 (1857), it was held that “the individual
creditors of a partner have not such exclusive right to be paid
out of his individual property as to render fraudulent an
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of the individual creditors. They are not creditors of the firm 
at all, but only of their individual debtor, whose individual 
property, including his clear share of the firm, is liable for all 
his debts alike, both partnership and individual. It strikes us 
that there is nothing in the relations or the equities of the· 
respective classes to authorize or justify the application of the 
oonvenient Procrustean rule of "reciprocity." But it is 
'argued that the circuit decree is in conformity with the English 
rule, and we should follow it, without regard to its reason oo-
equity, and disregard our own oases, which have made a depart-
ure from it, for the sole reason that it was error to make that 
departure, and it should be corrected by returning to the rule. 
Without going back to ascertain what is the precise rule 
adopted in the English courts of bankruptcy and chancery, 
it is quite clear that, as far back as the case of Wardlaw t·s. 
Gray (18.37), cited in the circuit decree, the doctrine waa 
announced in this state "that a partnership creditor has the 
right to resort either to the partnership property or to the sep-
arate property of the parties; but, as a party having two funds, 
he may be compelled by the separate creditors of one of the 
pa•rtners to exhaust the partnership property before he pro-
ceeds against thnt of an individual partner)' etc. "rbether 
this decision did or did not run counter to what is said to be 
the English rule upon the subject, it is quite as clear that it 
bas never been exprPssly overruled; but on the contrary has 
been recognizro and followed, and at the time of the execution 
of the assignment under c-on~icl(•ratio-n was, as we think, the 
law of the state. In Oo1rnn rs. 7'unno, Rich. (S. Car.) Eq. Ca.s. 
369 (18il2), it was held that. "though partnership effects should 
be first applied to partnership debts, yet, after these are 
exhausted, a judgment against the partners as such binds the 
separate <'Statt• of each partner from its date." In Fleming 
vs. Billin,qs, U Rich. Eq. 14!1 (ll-t5G), it wa.l'I held that "copartner-
ship creditors are first to hf' pa.id out of the copartnership fund, 
and if that prove insufficient then they are to come in with the 
private creditors [r<'spect being had to liens], as against the 
individual property of the ropartne1'S." In Gadsden i·s. Carso11, 
Id. 252, 77 Am. Der. 207 (18i'J7), it was held that "the individual 
creditors of a partner haw not sueh exclusive right to be paid 
out of his individual lll'OJ>t'rty as to render fraudulent an 
assignment of it fo1· the benefit of the c1·editors of the firm. 
\ 
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Partnership creditors having two funds to which they can re
sort, and individual creditors of the partners having but one,——
rthe private property of the debtor, including any balance which
may remain to him from the firm, after its affairs are settled,-
such individual creditors have an equity to compel the partner-
ship creditors to resort first to the partnership assets; but,
after they are exhausted, the partnership creditors have as
good right to be paid out of the private property of a partner
as his individual creditors,” etc. In this case Chancellor
JOHNSTON remarked that it “was in conformity to Wm-dlaw
vs. Gm-_1/, with which we see no reason to be dissatisfied.” In
Wilson vs. McOmmell, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857), it was held that
“where a copartner, having a separate estate, dies, the copart-
nership creditors have the right first to exhaust the copart-
ship estate, and, if that proves insuflicient to pay their
demands, then they are to be paid from the separate estate of
the copartners, pro rata with his separate creditors.” In
Adickes vs. Lowry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880), it is true that an intima-
tion is given that the question might be still open, but that
was not intended to decide anything. The remark was: “But,
even if this were so, there .would still remain the very impor-
tant and interesting question whether the separate creditors of
Bratton would not have in equity a preference over the part-
nership creditors t'o the separate assets of Bratton, etc. But
inasmuch as this question was not raised in the court below,
and has not been argued here, we do not propose to enter upon
its consideration now,” etc. In Hutzler vs. Ph-illips, 26 S. C.
136, 1 S. E. Rep. 5012, 4 Am. St. Rep. 687 (1886), it was held
“that partnership creditors, after exhausting partnership
assets, are entitled to share the separate property of the part-
ners pro Tatar with unsecured individual creditors.” The chief
justice reviewed all the authorities, saying, among other
things: “\Ve think the true doctrine is as stated by the circuit
judge with respect to the right o-f the separate creditors, if any
equity exists in his behalf, such as two funds " “ ' to
throw the copartnership creditors on the partnership assets in
the first instance; but, after the partnership assets ‘have been
fully and fa.irly exhausted, to come in pro rata with the sepa-
rate creditor. This seems to be the weight of -authority with
us. Besides a debt contracted by a copartnership is not only
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Pa.Itnership creditors having tw<> funds to which they can re-
sort, and individual credit-Ors of the partners having but one,-
the private property -of the debtor, including any balance which 
may remain to him from the firm, after its affairs are settled,-
such individual creditors have an equity to compel the partner-
ship creditors to reBOrt first to the partnership assets; but, 
after they are exhausted, the partnership creditors have as 
good right to be paid out of the private property of a partner 
as his individual creditors," etc. In this case Chancell<>r 
JOHNSTON remarked that it "was in conformity to Wardlaw 
vs. Gray, with which we see no reason to be dissatisfied." In 
Wilson vs. McConnell, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857), it was held that 
"where a copartner, having a separate estate, dies, the copart-
nership creditors have the right first to exhaust the ·copart-
ship estate, and, if that proves insufficient to pay their 
demands, then they are to be paid from the .separate estate of 
the copartners, pro rata with his separate creditors." In 
Adickes vs. L01vry, 15 S. C. 128 (1880), it is true that an intima-
tion is given that the question might be still open, but that 
was not ~ntended to decide anything. The remark was: "But', 
eYen if this were so, there .would st.ill remain the very impor-
tant a.nd intc>rf'sting question whether the separate creditors of 
Bratton would not have in equity a preference over the part-
nership creditors t'o the sc-part~te assets of Bratton, etc. But 
inasmuch as this qut>stion was not raised in the court below, 
and has not hN•n arg1wd hc>re, we do not propose to enter upon 
its oonRideration now," etc. Jn Hutzler t 1s. Phillips, 26 S. C. 
136, 1 S. :E. Rep. 50:!, 4 Am. St. Rep. G87 (188H), it was held 
"that partnersllip creditors, after exhausting partnership 
assets, are entitlPd to share the separate property of the part-
ners pro rata with unsecured individual creditors." The chief 
justice reviewed all th~ a11tho1·ities, saying, among other 
things: "\Ve think the true dodrine is as stated by the circuit 
judge with respP-ct to the right nf the separate creditors, if auy 
equity exists in his h('ha lf, sneh a.s two funds * * * to 
tb1·ow the copartnership crPditors on the partnership assets in 
the first instance; but, after the partnership assets ·have been 
fully and fairly exhausfrd, to come in pro rata with the sepa-
.rate creditor. This seems to be the weight of authority with 
us. Besides a d<>bt eontradt>d by a copartnership is not only 
a debt of the firm, but a debt, in substance, of each individual 
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member of the firm, and the property of the firm and of each
member is liable for it. But the property of the firm is not
liable for the separate debt of a member; only the interest of
the member is liable, which is nothing until the firm debts are
paid,” etc. XV e think this case finally settled the law in this
state. But, as if to put the matter beyond all dispute, the
very last work, upon the subject of pa.rtnership, published this
year (1889), expressly approves and cites from this case, as con-
taining the proper exposition of the law upon the subject, both
on principle and authority. The author says: “The insolvent,
by ‘his inability to meet his liabilities. is not the less, but all
the more, a debtor. He owes to his creditors, not the property
itself, nor any other asset, but merely the price of the property.
The debt is personal, without any lien or preference for its pay-
ment out of the debtor’s estate. The individual partner is, how-
ever, not less liable for a firm debt than is the firm itself. The
several liability of -the partners is no less a constituent of the
partnership obligation ‘than is their joint obligation. Both
spring from the root of partnership. The joint creditors, there-
fore, are entitled at law to share the separate estate of a part-
ner with his individual creditors,” etc. See Pars. Partn. § 108;
citing Hutzler vs. Phillips, and other cases.
We have not the least idea that the parties intended to do
arnythingwrong,but the assignment was not in conformitywith
the law as we understand it, and had the effect of creating
preferences not allowed by law. The judgment of this court
is that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and the
oases remanded to the circuit court for such further proceed-
ings as the parties may be advised, in accordance with the con-
clusions herein announced.
Smrsorz, C. J., and Mclvsn, J., concur.
NOTE: See Mecl1em’s Elem. of Partn., § 294, and cases citt d.
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member of the firm, and the propert,Y of t'he firm and of ea.ch 
member is liable for it. But the property of the :firm is not 
liable for the separate debt of a member; only the interest of 
the member is liable, which is nothing until the firm debts are 
paid," etc. "'e think this case :finally settled the law in this 
state. But, as if to put the matter beyond all dispute, t'he 
very last work, upon the subject of partnership, published this 
year (1889), expressly approves and cites from this case, as con-
taining the proper exposition of the law upon the subject, both 
on principle and auth<>rity. The author says: "The insolvent, 
by ·bis inability to meet bis liabilities, is not the less, but all 
the more, a debtor. He owes to his creditors, not the property 
itself, nor any other asset, but merely the price of the property. 
The debt is personal, without any lien or preference for its pay-
ment out of the debtor's estate. The individual pa-rtner is, how-
ever, not less liable for a firm debt than is the firm itself. Th~ 
several liability of the partners is no less a constituent of the 
partnership obligation 'than is their joint obligation. Borh 
spring from the root of partnership. The joint creditors, there-
fore, are entitled at law to share the separate estate of a part-
ner with his individual creditors,'' etc. See Pars. Partn. § 108; 
citing Hutz1Rlr vs. Phillips, and other cases. 
We have not the least idea that the parties intended to do 
arnythingwrong, but the a&Signment was not in c-0nformitywith 
the law as we understand it, and had the effect of creating 
prefereuc-es not allowed by law. The judgment of this court 
is that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed, and the 
cases rema.nded to the circuit oourt for such further proceed-
ings as the parties may be ad vised, in a'Ccordance with the con-
clusions herein announced. 
SIMPSON, C. J., and l\IclvER, J., concur. 
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HARRIS vs. PEABODY.
Supreme Court of Maine, 1881.
73 Me. 262.
Bill in equity.
Royal \Villiams and James A. Norton, copartners under the
firm name of Williams & Norton, upon their own petition, we're
individuallyand as copartners dulyadjudged insolvent debtors.
The assets of the partnership, amounting to one dollar and
nineteen cents only, were absorbed by the expenses of selling
the same. Norton’s individual estate had no assets, while Wil-
ilams’, after deducting legal costs and charges, amounted to
eleven hundred and seventy-seven dollars and thirty-six cents.
Against -the partnership estate, claims amounting to more
than twenty-two hundred dollars were proved; against Wil-
liams‘ individual estate eleven hundred and thirty-three dollars
a.nd sixty-seven cents; and against Norton’s, no claims.
Before the court of insolvency the parrtnership creditors
claimed a pro ram dividend from the separate estate of Wil-
liams pari passu with his individual creditors; but the judge
denied the claim and decreed that the assignees should distrib-
ute those asserts among the individual creditors. Thercupon
the complainants brought this bill (claimed by them to be
authorized by the insolvent statute of 1878, c. 74, sec. 11, as
amended by stat. 1879, c. 154, sec. 3), somewhat in the nature
of an appeal from the decree of the judge of insolvency; and
the parties have brought the case before us on an agreed state
men-t, reserving the question of jurisdiction of this court, which
is expressly raised.
William L. Putnam, for the plaintifl's. _
George C. Hopkins, Charles P. Mattocks, and Strout té Holmes
and E. P. Payson, for different defendants.
Vmon\', J. (After disposing of the question of jurisdiction,
continues.) 2. The next question is, was the decree of the
court of insolvency correct in ordering a distribution of Wil-




















































































































































Bill in equity. 
HARRIS VS. PEABODY. 
HARRIS vs. PEABODY. 
Supreme Court of M ai.ne1 1881. 
78 Me. 262. 
Royal 'Villiams and James A. Norton, copartners under the 
ftrm name of Williams & Norton, upon their own petition, were ' 
individually and as oopartners duly adjudged insolvent debtors. 
The assets of the partnership, amounting to one dollar and 
nineteen cents only, were absorbed by the expenses of selling / 
the same. Norton's individual estate bad no assets, whlle Wil-
ilams', after deducting legal costs and charges, amounted to · 
eleven hundred and seventy-seven dollars and thirty-six cents. 
Against .the partnership estate, cl.ajms amounrting to more 
than twenty-tw-0 hundred dollars we.re proved; against Wil- ' 
Iiams' individual estate eleven hundred and thirty-three dollars 
and sixty-seven cents; and against Norton's, no claims. 
Before the court of ineolvenicy the parlnershlp creditol"B 
claimed a pro rata dividend from the separate estate of Wil-
liams pari passu with hls individual creditors; but the judge 
denied the claim and decreed itbait the assignees should distrib-
ute those assets among the individual creditors. Thereupon 
the complainants brought this bill (claimed by them to :t>e 
authorized by the inStOlvent &tatute of 1878, c. 74, sec. 11, as 
amended by stat. 1879, c. 154, sec. 3), somewhat in the nature 
of an appeal from the decree of the judge o<f insolvency; and 
the parties have brought t·he case before us on an agreed state-
ment, reserving the question of jurisdiction of this court, which 
is expressly raised. 
WilUam L. Putnam, for the plaintiffs. 
George C. Hopkins, Charks P. Mattocks, and Strout & Holmes 
and E. P. Payson, for different defendants. 
VIRGIN, J. (After disposing of the question of jurisdiction, 
continues.) 2. The next question is, was the decree of the 
court of insolvency correct in ordering a distribution of Wil-
lia.ms' individual assets among his separu.te credit-Ors, t-0 the 
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exclusion of the complainants, the creditors of the firm. The
respondents rely upon the provisions of sec. 54, stat. 1878, c. 74,
and certain cases cited of their brief.
It is familiar history that as early as 1715, Lord Oh. HAR-
COURT laid down a the rule of administering the joint and sep-
arate estates in bankruptcy, that the joint estate shall be
applied in payment of the partnership debts, and the separate
estate, of the separate debts, a-ny surplus of either estate
being carried over to the other. Ea: parte Crow-der, 2 Vern. 706.
This doctrine was followed by Lord Ch. Kn\'o., in Ea: parte Cook,
2 P. VVms. 500. But it -seems tilrat this rule was departed from
by Lord Trwnnow, who let in creditors of the firm concurrently
with the separate creditors, upon the separate estate, upon the
ground that they were equally credlitors of the firm and of the
partners. Ea: pa-rte Oobham, 1 Brow~n’s Ch. 576; Em parte Hodg-
son, 2 Bro-wn’s Ch. 5; Er parte Page, 2 Bro-w'n’s Oh. 119. The
former rule was restored, however, by Lord LOUGHBOROUGH
(Ea: parte Elton, 3 Ves, 239;E.r parte Abell, 4 Ves 837), confirmed
by Lord ELDON; (E:/v parte Clay, 6 Vesey 813; Em parte To/itt, 16
Ves. 193), and it has been the prevailing general rule ever since
tin England. Lindl. Part. (3d. En. ed.) 1201; Robs. Bank. 584;
Golly. Part. (Perkin-s’ ed.) 775-6; Lodge vs. Pritcharrl, 1 De G. G.
axnd S. 609; and in this country as well. Among the numerous
cases, see Wilder cs. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec.
781; Payne vs. Matthews, 6 Paige 1.9, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Murray
vs. Murray, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) Oh. 60; 3 Kent, 64, 65; Story Partn.
secs. 376-378. In re Marwick, 2 Ware 233 ; Pars. Partn. 480, et
seq. and notes. This rule was also adopted in the U. S. Bank-
rupt Law, 1841 (5 U. S. stat. 440, 448. sec. 14); U. S. Bankrupt
Law, 1867 (sec. 36, R. S., U. S. sec. 5121); in the Insolvent Laws
of Massachusetts (1838, sec. 21), and in the Insolvent Laws of
this state, stat. 187 8, c. 74, sec. 54. Jarvis vs. Brooks, 23 N. H.
136.
This rule applies to the estates as they exist when the parties
are declared bankrupt or in-solvent. and not before; for the
creditors of the firm have no lien upon its property which can
prevent the partners from bona fide changing its character
and converting it into the separate estate of one of them prior
thereto. Em partc Ru/fin. 6 Ves. 119; Case rs. Beauregard, 99
U. S. 119 (ante p. 440); Robb rs. Jlfudge, 14 Gray (Mass) 534.
The reasons assigned for giving the partnership creditors the
















































































































































CASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
exclusion of the complainants, the creditors of the firm. The 
respondents rely upon the provisions of sec. 54, stat. 1878, c. 74, 
and certain cases cited of their brief. 
It is familiar history tha.t as early as 1715, Lord Ch. HAR-
COURT laid down as the rule of admin.istering the joirut and sep-
arate estates in bankruptcy, that the joint estate shell be 
applied in payment of the partnership debts, tmd the separate 
estate, of the separate debts, any surplus of either estate 
being carried over to the other. EJJ pa rte Crowder, 2 Vern. 706. 
This doctrine was followed by Lord Cb. KING, in Ea: parte Cook, 
2 P. Wms. 500. But it seems fuat this rule was departed from 
by Lord THURLOW, who let in creditors of the firm concurrently 
with the separate creditors, upon the separate estate, upon the 
ground thrut they were equally credlitors of the firm and of the 
partners. E:c pa1·t.e Cobham, 1 Brown's Ch. 576; Eic parte Hodg-
son, 2 Brow.n's Ch. 5; Ea; parte Page, 2 Brown's Ch. 119. The 
former rule was restored, however, by L<>rd LouGHBOROUGH 
(E:c parte Elton, 3 Ves, 289; E:c parte Abell, 4 Ves 887), confirmed 
by Lord ELDON; (E{J) parte Clay, 6 Vesey 813; E;c parte Tatitt, 16 
Ves. 193), amd it has been the prevailing general rule ever since 
li.n Englrand. Lindl. Part. (3d. En. ed.) 1201; Robs. Bank. 584; 
Colly. Part. (Perkins' ed.) 775-6; Lodge li8. Pritchard, 1 De G. G. 
wnd S. 609; and in this country as well. Among the numerous 
cases, see Wilder t'S. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 167, 23 Am. Dec. 
781; Payne vs. Matt1ze1cs, 6 Paige l.9, 29 Am. Dec. 738; Murra.y 
vs. Murray, 5 J.ohns. (N. Y.) Ch. 60; 3 Kent, 64, 65; Story Partn. 
secs. 376-378. In re Ma.rtcick, 2 \Vare 233 ; Pars. P1artn. 480, et 
Beq. and notes. This rule was also adopted in the U. S. Bank-
rupt Law, 1841 (5 V. S. stat. 440, 448, sec. 14); U. S. Bankrupt 
Law, 1867 (sec. 36, R. S., U.S. sec. 5121); in the Insolvent Laws 
of Massa0husetts (1838, sec. 21), and in the Insolvent Laws of 
this state, stat. 1878, c. 7 4, sec. 54. J ari~is vs. Brooks, 23 N. H. 
136. 
This rule applies to the est.ates as they exist when the parties 
are declared bankrupt or insolvent. and not before; for the 
creditors of the firm have no lien upon its property which can 
prevent the pa1'tners from bona fide ch:m~ing its character 
and converting it into the st>parate estate of one of them prior 
ithereto. Em partc Ruffen, 6 Ves. 119; Case i·s. Beauregm·d, 99 
U.S. 119 (ante p. 440); Robb t\~. Jlu(Tf/C, 14 Gray (Mass.) 534. 
The reasons nssignPd for gh•ing the partnership creditors the 
• preference owr the joint estate in bankruptcy have been vari-
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ous. But the view generally, taken founds it not upon any lien
or superior claim which they primarily have, but upon a
privilege or preference sometimes denominated a lien derived _
from the equitable right which each partner, who being liable
for all the partnership debts and whose interest in its property
being simply his share of the residue after payment of its debts
and settlements" of its accounts, consequently has that the
partnership property shall go to pay its debt in preference
to those of any individual partner. Case vs. Beauregard, supra;
Johnson vs. Hersey, 70 Maine 74, 35 Am. Rep. 303; Washburn vs.
Bellows Falls Bank, 19 Vt. 286, 288. It has also been said that
this priority in joint assets and equality in the separate are
founded on the fact that the partnership creditors trusted each
and all the partners, while the separate creditor trusted butt
one; and that natural justice warrants the marshalling of the
assets so as to give the former the preference. Brock vs. Bate-
man, 25 Ohio St. 609. That it is familiar law that a creditor of
a partnership, having recovered a judgment against it, may
saitisfy his execution against partnership property or against
the individual property of any of the partners (Juche-ro vs.
Arley, 5 Crunch (U. S.) 34, 40; Egery vs. Howard, 64 Maine 68,
73; Washburn rs. Bellows Falls Bank, supra), and in the case of
intervening insolvency, having two funds, from which to sat-
isfy his claim, the principle familiar in marshalling assets or
securities comes in and compels him to exhaust the fund to
which he has the exclusive right before he be allowed to com-
pete with a creditor who has a claim only on one of the funds.
E1: parte Elton-, 3 Ves. 240; 1 Story Eq. sec. 558. Lord Justice
TURNER said: “This rule may perhaps proceed upon this: that
the joint estate is clearly liable both at law and in equity for
the join-t debts, at lafw, by reason of the survivorship, and in
equity by virtue of the rights of the partners, inter so, to have
it so applied; and that the separate estate is as clearly liable,
both at law and in equity, for the separate debts; and that the
carrying over the surplus of the one estate to the other,
although it may not strictly work out the right, may afford
the best means of adjusting the complications which arise
from t-he joint estate being liable for the separate debts only
so far as the interest of the partners from whom the debts
may be due may extend, and from the separate estate, if
















































































































































HA.RRIS vs. PEABODY. ~85 
one. But the view generally, taken founds it not upon any lien 
or superior claim which they primarily have, but upon a 
privilege or preference sometimes denominated a lien derived .. 
from the equitable right which each partner, who being liable 
for all the partnership debts and whose interest in its property 
being simply bis share of the residue after payment of its debts 
and settlements of its accounts, conf!e<JU€'11tly bas tiha.t the 
partnership property shall go to pay its debts in preference 
to those of a.ny individual pa11ner. Case ·1,s. Beaureganl, Stl.pra; 
Johnson vs. Hersey, 70 Maine 74, 35 Am. Rep. 303; Washburn vs. 
Bellows Falls Banlc, 19 Yt. 286, 288. It bas also been said that 
this priority in joint assets and equality in the separate are 
founded on the fact that the partnel'8hip creditors trusted each 
and all the partners, while the separate creditor trusted buit 
one; and that n.atm"dl justice warrants the marshalling of the 
assets so ns to give the former the preference. Brock vs. Bate-
man, 25 Ohio ~t. 60!l. That it is familiar law that a credi•tor of 
a pa11nership, having recovpred a judgment against it, may 
saitisfy his execution against partnership property 00" against 
the individual property of any of the partners (Juc1icro vs. 
A.xley, 5 Cran'<'l1 (U. S.) 34, 40; Egery vs. Howard, 64 Maine 68, 
7:~; Washburn rs. Bcll<>ws Falls Bank, .itupra)~ and in the case of 
intervening insolvency, having two funds, from which to sat-
isfy his claim, the principle familiar in marshalling assc•ts or 
securities oomes in and compels him to exhaust the fund to 
which he IJas the exclush·e right before he be allowed to com-
pete with a creditor who has a claim only on one of the funds. 
E.r. parfe Elton, 3 Ves. !!40; i Story Eq. Sf'<'. 558. Lord J nstice 
TuR:\'ER said: "This rule may perhaps proceed upon this: that 
the joint estate is clearl,v liable botlJ at Ia.w and in equity for 
the joint debts, at htw, by rpason of the survivorship, and in 
e11uity by viI1ue of the rightH of the partners, inter sr, to have 
it so applied; and that the sc•parate estate is as clearly liable, 
both at law and in equit~·, for the SPparate debts; and that the 
carrying over the surplus of the one estate to the other, 
although it may not stri«tly work out the rights, may afford 
the best mean.s of adjusting the complications which arise 
from the joint estate being liable for the separate dt>bts only 
so far as the interest of the partners from whom the debts 
may be due may ext1md, and from the separate estates, if 
taken for the joint df'bts, having recourse over against the 
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joint estates, and which arise also from the equities between
the parties.” Lodge vs. Pritcha-rd, supra. Prof. Parsons sug-
gests the ground that a partnership is a distinct entity, con-
tracting its own debts, having its own creditors, and possess-
ing its own property applicable to its debts. That when it
has ceased to exist, it is resolved into its elements, and the
relations between its members and creditors arise. If the joint
debts have been pa.id, the former partners sha.re the remaining
property. If the joint funds are not suflicient to pay its debts,
they who were its members become the debtors of the joint
creditors. Pars. Part. 346-7.
The rule th-at each estate is to beapplied to its own debts,
and the surplus of each to the creditors remaining of the other,
is applicable only to the facrts upon which it is predicated, i. e.,
when there is joint estate, and all the partners are insolvent.
Buit if there is no available joint estate and no solvent partner,
then the creditors oft-he partnership have no exclusive fund to
exhaust, but may share concurrently with the separate credit-
ors the separate estate. Ea: parts Hayden, 1 Brown’.s Ch. 454,
and notes in Perkins’ ed. 398; Colly. P-art. sec. 926; Lindl. Part.
1234; Story Part. sec. 380; Pars. Part. 482. In some of the
cases this is called an exception to the rule. Professor Par-
sons says that “instead of being an exception it is a case that
falls without the rule.” Others say that it is a part of the
rule. Judge Dnumrosn, after stating what he deno-mina-tes
“the well established rule upon the subject,” says: “It is
partly on the ground that, although it is a debt of the firm,
it is still a debt against each individual member of it, fo-r the
satisfaction of which the property of each is responsible; and
that being the -only source to resort to for the payment of the
debt of the firm, it should be appropriated as well to pay the
debts due from the firm as fro1n the individual members.” In
re Knight, 8 N. B. R. 436, 438. The same doctrine prevails in
all the federal district courts. In re Marwick, 2 Ware 233;
Bump, Bankruptcy (9th ed.) 771, and cases there cited. Such,
evidently, is the opinion of Mr. Justice CLIFFORD. Amsink vs.
Bean, 11 N. B. Reg. 495; S. C. 22 \Vall. (U. S.) 395, and the cases
of Ea: parte Leland, which he cites there.
We are aware that this question has been decided otherwise
in Massachusetts (Howe vs. Lawrence, 9 Cush. (Mas-s.) 553, 57
















































































































































486 CASBS ON PARTNERSHIP. 
joint estates, and whioh arise also from the equitieir between 
the parties." Lodge vs. Pritchard, supra. Prof. Parsons sug-
gESts the ground that a partnership is a distinct entity, con-
tracting its own debts, having its own creditors, and poss-ese-
ing its own property applicable to its debts. That when it 
has ceased to exhrt, it is resolved into its elements, and the 
relations between its members aud credit<>rs airise. If the joint 
debts have been paid, the former partners share the remaining 
property. If the joint funds are not sufficient to pay its debts, 
they who were its members become the debtors of the joint 
creditors. Pars. Part. 346-7. 
The rule that eaoh estate is. to bl applied to its own debb't, 
and the surplus of eaoh to the creditors remaining of the other, 
is applicable only to the facts upon which it is predicated, i. e., 
when there is joint estate, and all t·he partners are insolvent. 
Buit if there is no available joint estate and no eolvent partner, 
, then the creditors of the partnership have no exclusive fund to 
exhaust, but may share corncurrently with the separate credit-
ors the. separate estate. E:JJ parf-e Heyden, 1 Brown's Ch. 454, 
and notes in Perkins' ed. 398; Colly. Part. sec. 926; Lindi. Part. 
0 1234:; Story Part. sec. 380; Pars. Pact. 482. In some of the 
cases this is called an exception to the rule. Professor Par-
sons says that ''instead of being an exception it is a case that · 
falls without the rule." Others say that it is a part of the 
rule. Judge Dnu:m1miD, after stating what he denominatee 
''tlle well established rule upon the subject," says: "I:t is 
pa:rtly e>n the ground that, although it is a debt of the firm, 
it is still a debt against each individual member of it, for the 
satisfaction of which the property of each is responsible; and . 
that being the .only source to resort to for the payment of the 
debt of the firm, it should be appropriated as well to pay the 
debts due from the firm as from ihe individual members." In 
re Knight, 8 N. B. R. 4:JG, 438. The same doctrine prevails in 
all the federal district courts. In re Marwick, 2 'Vare 233; 
Bump, Bankruptcy (9th ed.) 771, and cases there cited. Such, 
evidently, is the opinion of l\Ir. Justice CLIFJ..'ORD. Am.sink vs. 
Bean, 11 N. B. Reg. 495; S. C. 22 'Vall. (U.S.) 393, and the oases 
of Erc parte Leland, which he cites there. 
We are aware that this question has been decided otherwise 
in Massachusetts (Howe vs. Lawrence, 9 Cush. (:Mass.) 553, 57 
Am. Dec. 68, and Som. P. Works vs. Minot, 10 Cush. 592); but 
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the answer of Judge Dnuuxuom) is more satisfactory to our
minds. In re Knight, supra. Neither does the dictum of
Mr. Justice Ihmrnn outweigh the great weight of current
authority. See also Rodgers vs. llleranda, 7 Ohio St. 179 (ante
p. 463; Brock vs. Ba,teman§25 Ohio St. 609. It seems there were
some join-t assets, though not enough to pay the costs of sell-
ing; and hence (in the language of the sta-tute) no “net pro-
ceeds.” In such case, there should be considered no joint
assets. Though when there are any available joint assets, how-
ever small in value, the rule is applicable. Lindl. P-artn. 1235;
Colly. Partn. sec. 926; Story Partn. sec. 380, says they must be
enough to be “available.” The question is -thoroughly exam-
ined in In re McE1ccn, 12 N. B. R. 11. As recently as December,
1880, the question came before Judge Cnoarn (S; D. N. Y.),
who said: “It is, however, unnecessary to go into this ques-
tion, because in a recent decision, which is conclusive on this
court, -the right of firm creditors to share paw’. pa-ssu with indi-
vidual creditors in the individual estate has been recognized
and enforced, w‘here the firm, as well as the individual part-
ners, had been adjudicated, and'the firm assets were not more
than suflicient to pay the costs and expenses properly charge-
able to the firm estate. In re Slocum, D. C. Vt. Oct. 4, 1879;
S. C. aftirmed on review, by Bnwrcrwonn, O. J., December 13,
1830.” I n re Litchfield, 5 Fed. Rep. 47, 50.
Decree reversed. Decree that the partnership creditors of
\Villiams & Norton are entitled to dividends from the assets of
the etate of Royal .Williams, part passu with his separate
creditors.
V\’aL'ro1\', Bumows, Lusnv and S\'Mo.\'ns, J.J., concurred.
APPLETON, C. J ., did not concur.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., § 295, and cases there cited.
MEECH vs. ALLEN.
Court of Appeals of New York, 1858.
17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Dec. 465.
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a com-
















































































































































MEECH VS. ALLEN. 487 
the answer of Judge DRUMMOND is more satisfactory to our 
minds. In re Knight, supra. Neither does the dictum of 
Mr. Justice DANIEL outweigh the great weight of current 
authority. See also Rodgers vs. Meran.da, 7 Ohio St. 179 (ante 
p. 463; Brock vs. Bateman)25 Ohio St. 609. It seems there were 
some joint assets, thoug;h not enough to pay the coets of sell- • 
ing; and hen-re (in the language of the statute) no "net pro-
ceeds." In such case, there should be considered no joint 
assets. Th<>ugh when there are any available joint assets, how-
ever small in value, the rule is applicable. Lindi. Pa.ctn. 1235; 
Colly. Partn. sec. 926; Story Partn. sec. 380, says they mUBt be 
enough to be "available." The question is thoroughly exam-
ined in In re McEu:rm, 12 N. B. R.11. As recently as December, 
1880, the question came before Judge CnoA'l'E (S·. D. N. Y.), 
who SB;id: "It is, however, unnecessary to go into this ques-
tion, because in a recent decision, which is conclusive on this 
court, the right of firm creditors to Bhare pari passu with indi-
vidual creditol"8 in the individual estate lias been recogbized 
and enif orced, Where the firm, as well as the individual part-
ners, had been adjudicated, and 'the firm assets were not more 
-.ban sufficient to pay the costs and expenses properly charge-
able to the firm estate. In re Sloc1tm, D. C. Vt. Oct. 4, 1879; 
S. C. affirmed on review, by BLATCHFORD, C. J., December 13, 
1880." In re Litchfield, 5 Fed. Rep. 47, 50. 
Decree reversed. Decree that the partnership creditors of 
Williams & Norton are entitled to dividends from the assets <>f 
the estate of Royal .Williams, pari passu with his separate 
creditors. 
"'ALTON, BAnnows, LIBBY and SYMONDS, J.J., concurred. 
APPLETON, C. J., did not concur. 
NOTE: See Mechem's Elem. ot Partn., ~ 293, and cases there cited. 
MEECH vs. ALLEN. 
-Court of Appools of New York, 1858. 
17 N. Y. 300, 72 Am. Deo. 465. 
Appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a com-
plaint ·seeking to establi.sh a prior judgment lien. The judg-
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meat for which plai»ntifl’s claimed priority was recovered in
1847 against E. P. Taylor, upon his individual debt. The judg-
ment for which defendants claimed priority was recovered in
1842 against Taylor individually and as surviving partner, and
was founded upon an indebtedness of his late firm. Bo-th judg-
ments were docketed in Erie county, wherein Taylor owned
real property in his individual right. In 1850 executions on
both judgments were issued to the sheriff of Erie county, and
he proceeded to make sale of this real property. At the sale
the plaintiffs gave no-tice of their claim that -their judgment, by
reason of its being founded on Taylor-Ts individual debt, and
being therefore a lien on his individual property, had a prefer-
ence, so fiar as the property offered for sale was concerned, over
the other though earlier judgment founded on a. partnership
debt. Taylor owned no other individual property available to
plaintiffs, bu-t there was partnership property available t-o the
other judgment creditors. .The sheriff refused to recognize this
claim, and sold the property to the defendant. The plaintiifs
then brought this suit to establish the priority claimed by
them; but the supreme court sustained defendanrt’s demurrer
to the complaint. _
S. G. H (wen, for the appellants.
O. Tucker, for the respondent. I
Snnnxcs, J . It is a settled rule of equity that as between the
joint and separate creditors ovf partners the partnership prop-
erty is to be first applied to the payment of the partnership
debts, and the separate property of the individual pa-rtners to
the payment of their separate debts; and that neither class of‘
creditors can claim anything from the fund which belongs pri-
marily to the opposite class, until all the claims of the latter are
satisfied. This, however, is a rule which prevails in courts of
equity in the distributio-n of equitable assets only. \Th0se
courts -have never assumed to exercise -the power of setting
aside, o-r in any way interfering with, an absolute right of
priority obtained at law. In regard to all such cases the rule is,
Equitas sequitur lcgem, 1 Stor_v’s Eq. J ur., § 553.
In Wilder vs. Keelcr, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 171, 23 Am. Dec. 781,
Chancellor WALWOR'PH says: “Equitable rules are adopted by
this court in the administration of legal assets, except so far
















































































































































CA.Sll~ ON PABTJUBSHIP. 
me0;t for which plai·ntiffs claimed priority was recovered in 
1847 against E. P. Taylor, upon his individual debt. The judg-
ment for whic'h defendants claimed priority was recovered in 
1842 against Taylor individually and as surviving partner, and 
was founded upon an indebtedness of his late firm. Both judg· 
ments were dQcketed in E.rie county, wherein Taylm.• owned 
real property in his individual right. In 1850 executions on 
both judgments were issued to the tiheriff of Erie county, and 
he proceeded to make sale of this real property. At the sale 
the plain.tiffs gave notice -0f their claim that .their judgment, by 
reuon of its being founded <>n T.aylor'e individual debt, and 
being therefore a lien 001 his individual property, had a prefer-
ence, so tlar as the property offered for sale was concerned, over 
the other though earlier judgment founded on a partnership 
debt. Taylor owned n.o other individual property available to 
pla.intiffs, but there was pa0rtnerehip p·ropecty available to the 
other judgment creditors. . The sheriff ref used to recognize this 
claim, and sold the property to the defendant. 'rb.e plain:tiffs 
then brought this suit to establish the priority claimed by 
them; but the supreme court sustained defendant's demurrer 
to the oompla.int. 
S. G. Haven, for the a.ppellante. 
0. Tucker, for the ref!pondent. 
SEr,DEN, J. It is a settled rule of equity t'hat as between the 
joint and separate creditors of partners t·he partnership prop-
erty ie to be first applied to tbe payment of the partnership 
debts, and the separa.te property of the individual pa·rtners to 
the payment of their separate debts; and that neither class of· 
creditors can claim anything from the fund which belongs pri· 
marily to the opposite class, until all the claims of the latter are 
satisfied. This, however, is a rule which prevails in oourts of 
equity in the distribution of equitable a.ssets only. \Those 
c-0urts have never assumed to exercise the power of setting 
aside, or in any way interfering with, an -absolute right of 
priority obtained at law. In regard to all surh cases the rule is, 
Equitas sequitur lt'yern, 1 Stor~r·s Eq. Jur., § 553. 
In Wilder vs. Keeler, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 171, 23 Am. Dec. 781, 
Chancellor WALWORTH says: "Equit:able rules are adopted by 
this court in the administration of legal assets, except so far 
as the law has given an absolute preference to one class of cred-
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itors over another.” So in flhe case of Acerill vs. Loucka, 6
Barb. (N. Y.) 470, Paton, P. J., says: “Courts of equity, in the
administration of assets, follow the rules of law in regard to
legal assets, and recognize and enforce all antecedent liens,
claims, and charges existing upon the property, according to
their priorities.” This is also conceded in the case of McCulloh
cs. Dashiell, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271, where the
whole doctrine of t-he distribution in equity of the joint and sep-
arate property of partners is very elaborately examined.
ARCHER, J., by whom the opinion of the court was delivered,
there says: “At law the joint creditors may pursue both the
joint and separate estate to the extent of each, for the satis-
faction of their joint demands, which are at law considered
joint and several, without the possibility of the interposition of
any restraining power of a court of equity.” But especially
must it be beyond the power of such courts to interfere, where
an absolute right of legal priority is given by force of a positive
statute, as in case of -a judgment. Chancellor Wanyvonrn, in
Mower vs. Kip, 6 Paige (N. Y.) 88, 29 Am. Dec. 748, says: “The
rule of this court is to give effect to the lien of a judgment upon
a legal ti-tie, so far as it can be enforced by execuition at larw.”
As there is no doubt that at law the judgment for a pa.rt~ne-r-
ship debt attaches and becomes a lien upon the real estate of
each of the partners, with the same effect as if such judgment
were for the separate debt of such partner, it is obvious, from
the preceding authorities, -that the theory upon which the com-
plaint in this case was drawn is erroneous. The principle that
the separate property of an individual partner is to be first ap-
plied to the payment of his separate debts has, as we have seen,
never been held to give priority, as to such property, t-o a sub-'
sequent judgment for an individual over a prior judgment for
a partnership debt. It is true that courts of equity will some-
times give to a mere equitable lien, which is prior in point of
time, a preference over a subsequent judgment; but this will
be done only where such prior lien is specific in its character,
as in the case of White cs. Carpenter, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 219. The
mere general equity of the separate creditors to have their
debts first paid out of t-he individual property of the partners
does not amount to a lien at all, much‘less a lien of the kind


















































































































































MEECH VS. ALLEN. 489 
itore over a.nother." So in the case of Averill tJB. Loucks, 6 
Barb. (N. Y.) 470, PAIGE, P. J., says: "Courts of equity, in the 
administra1:fon of assets, follow the rules of law in regard to 
legal assets, and recognize and enforce all antecedent liens, 
claims. and charges existing upon the property, according to 
their priorities." This is also conceded in the case <JI! ·McOulloh 
1'B. Dashiell, 1 Har. & G. (Md.) 96, 18 Am. Dec. 271, where the 
whole doctrine of the distribution in equity of the joint and sep-
arate property of partners is very elaborately em.mined. 
ARCHER, J., by whom the opinion of the court was delivered, 
,there says: "At law the joint creditors may pursue both the 
joint and separa1te estate to the extent of each, for the se:tls-
faction of their joint demands, which are at law considered 
joint and severa:l, without the possibility of the interposition of 
any restraining power of a court of equity.'' But especially 
must it be beyond the power of such courts to interfere, where 
an aibsolute right of legal priority is given by force of a poeitive 
statute, as in case of a judgment. Chancellor WALWORTH, in 
Mo1.cer t:B. K-ip, 6 P.aige (N. Y.) 88, 29 Am. Dec. 748, says: "The 
rule of this court is to give effect to the lien of a judgment upon 
a legal title, so far as it can be enJorced by execUJtion at la:w." 
As there is no doubt that at la.w the judgmeut for a partne.r-
ehip debt attaches and becomes a lien upon the real esro.te of 
each of the partners, with tf:he same effect as if such judgment 
were for the separate debt of such partner, tt is obvious, fr-0'm 
the preceding authorities, .th3t the theory upon whioh the com-
plaint in this case was drawn is erroneous. The principle that 
the separate property of an individual partner is to be first ap-
plied to the paynu•nt of his sPparatedebts lms, as we have seen, 
never been lwld to give priority, as to such property, to a su~ 
sequent judgment for an individuail over a prior judgmenrt: for 
a partnership debt. It is true that courts of equity will some--
times give to a mere equitable lien, whkh is prior in point of 
time, a preferc>nce over a subsPquent judgmenit; but this will 
be done only where such prior lien is specific in its chairacter, 
as in the case of White t:s. Carpenter, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 219. The 
mere general equity of the separate creditors to have t:beir 
debts first paid out of the individual property of the partn~rs 
does not amount to a lien at all, mueh 'less a lien of the kind 
necessary to give it a preference over a jndgmenrt: for a partner-
ship debt. 
62 
490 Casns ox PARTNERSHIP.
The plaintiffs cannot, under the averments in the complaint,
avail themselva of that principle of equity which ena.bles a
creditor having a lien upon one fund only to compel a creditor
who has a lien not merely on the same fund, but also upon
another, to resort first to the latter, to the end that both may
be paid. If the complaint had averred that there was sufli-
cient partnership property, upon which the defendant’s judg-
ment was a lien, to satisfy such judgment, it is possible thart,
under the principle referred to, the plaintifis might have been
entitled to some relief; and in that event it would not have
been a valid objection to the complaint that it did not ask for
the relief appropriate to the case. But the averment in the
complaint is simply that there is suificient estate of the
deceased partner, Hiram Pratt, to satisfy the defendant’s judg-
ment.
This averment brings the case directly within the doctrine
laid down by Lord Enoon in Ea: parte Kendall, 17 Ves. 520. He
says: “If A has a right to go upon two funds, and B upon one,
having both the same debtor, A shall take payment from that
fund to which he can resort exclusively, that by those means
of distribution both may be paid. That takes place where
both are creditors of the same person, and have dem-ands
against funds the property of the sa.me person. But it was
never said that if I have a demand against A and B, a creditor
of B sh-all compel me to go against A without more, as if B
himself could insist that A ought to pay in the first in-stance
as in the ordinary case of drawer and acceptor, or principal
and surety, to the intent that all obligations arising out of
these -complicated relations may be saxtisfied. But if I have a
demand against both, the creditors of B have no right to com-
pel me to seek payment from A, if not f-ou-nded in some equity,
giving to B the right for his own sake to compel me to seek pay-
ment from A.”
The point has also been expressly decided in this state in
the case of Dorr rs. Shaw, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Oh. 17. The only
difference in principle between that case and this is that there
it did not appear that the joint debtors were partners. This,
however, is a difference which operates against the claim of
the plaintiffs -here. \Vhere two individuals, not partners, are
jointly indebted, it might seem to be just to presume thart
















































































































































CASES ON' PART.N.ERSHIP. 
The plaintiffs cann<>t, under the averments in the complaint, 
avail themselves of that principle of equity which enables a 
creditor having a lien upon ooe fund only to compel a creditor 
who has a lien not merely on the same fund, but also upon 
another, to ~rt first to the latter, to the end that both may 
be paid. If the complaint had averred that there was suffi-
cient partnel"Sbip property, upon w1hich the defendant's judg-
ment was a lien, to satisfy such judgment, it is possible thait, 
under the pri_nciple refer1·ed to, the plaintiffs might 1have been 
en.titled to some relief; and in that evelllt it would not have 
been a valid objection to the oomplaint that it did not ask for 
the relief appropriate to the case. But the averment in the 
C()mplain.t is simply 'Nlat there is sufficient estate of the 
deceased partner, Hiram Pratt, to satisfy the defendant's judg-
ment. 
This averment brings the case directly within the doctrine 
laid down by Lord ELDON in Ea: parte Kendall, 17 Vee. 520. He 
says: "If A has a right to go upon two funds, and B upon one, 
having both the same debtor, A shall take payment from that 
fund to which he can resort exclusively, thBJt by those means 
of distribution both may be paid. That fakes place Where 
both are creditors of the same person, and have demands 
aga.inst funds the property o-f the same person. But it was 
never said that if I have a demand against A and B, a creditor 
of B shall compel me to g<> against A with'C>ut mo~, as if B 
himself could insist that A ought to pay in the first instance 
BJJ in the ordiuary ca.se of drawer and aeceptor, or principal 
and surety, to the intent that all obligations arising out of 
these .complicated relations may be srut:isfied. But if I have a 
demand against both, the creditors of Il have no right to com-
pel me to seek payment from A, if not founded in 8'0me equity, 
giving to B the l'ight for his own sake to compel me to seek pay-
ment from A." 
The point lrnR also been expr<'Rsly decided in tlhis state in 
the ease <>f Dorr n. Shaw, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 17. The only 
difference in principle between that case n.nd this is thait there 
it did not appear that the joint debtors were partners. This, 
J10wever, is a difference which operates agafost the claim of 
the plaintiffs ·here. 'Vhere two individuals, n.ot partners, are 
jointl.v indebted, it might sc>em to be just to presume thait 
(•:tch owed one-half o-f the debt, and to fhat extent, therefore, 
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there might be an equity in favor of the one owing an indi-
vidual debt to have so much of the joint debt paid by his
codeb-tor. But in regard to partners, it is now well settled,
upon an analogous question, that no such presumption can be
indulged. Formerly a judgment creditor of one of two part-
ners might levy his execution upon property belonging to the
firm, and upon the presumption that the interests of the part-
ners were equal, might proceed to sell and appropriate one-half
of the avails to the satisfaction of his debt. This, howevecr,
was long since overruled.
In the case of D-utton vs. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193, Lord ELDON,
in discussing this question, says: “It may be represented that
the world cannot know what is the distinct interest of each
(11. e., each partner), and therefore it is better that the apparent
interest of each should be considered as his actual interest
But courts of equity have long held otherwise.” He then lays
down the rule ever since acted upon, that the creditor in such
a case must wait until the partnership accounts are settled
before he can claim anything from the partnership property.
The principle here asserted by Lord Ennox is directly appli-
cable to the present case. It is, that no inference can be safely
drawn from the mere external relations of partners to the
world as to the situation of their affairs inter se, and that in all
judicial proceedings involving the latter an investigation is
first to be made; and such is the variety and frequent com-
plexity of partnership dealings that any other rule would
obviously lead to gross injustice. It is impossible, therefore, in
this case to assume, without any averments on the subject in
the complaint, that the estate of the deceased partner Pratt
ought, in equity, to pay any portion of the defendant’s judg-
ment. Hence, upon the principles laid down by Lord ELDON,
and universally acted upon by courts of equity, the complaint
is clearly insufficient.
The judgment of the supreme court, therefore, should be
afllrmed, with costs.
All the judges concurred. ~
Judgment afiirmed.


















































































































































MEEOH VS. ALLEN. 491 
there might be an equity in favor of the one owing an indi-
vidual debt to have 80 much of tbe joint debt paid by his 
oodebtor. But in reg·ard. fo partners, it is now well settled, 
upon an aniafogous question, that no such presnmptio.n can be 
indulged. Formerly a judgmeDJt creditor <>f one of two part-
ners might levy his execution upon property belonging to the 
firm, and upon the presumption that the interests of the part-
ners were equal, might proceed to sell and appropriate one-half 
ol the avails to the satisfaction of his debt. Tb.is, h<>wever, 
was long since overruled. 
In the case of Dutton vs .. Morrison, 17 Ves. 193, Lord ELDON, 
in discussing this question, says: "It may be represented thart: 
the w<>rld cannot know what is the distinct interest of each 
(i.e., each partner), and therefore it is better that the apparenrt 
interest of each should be considered as ibis actual interelJt. 
But oourts of equity have long held otherwise." He then lays 
down the rule ever since acted upon, that the creditor in such 
a case mulrt wait until the partnership accounts are settled 
before he can claim anything from the partnership property. 
The principle here asserted by Lord ELDON is directly a.ppli-
cable to the present case. It is, that no inference can be sa:fely 
drawn from the mere ex~nal relations of partners to the 
world as to the situation of their affairs inter se, and that in all 
judicial proceedings inv-0lving the latter an investiga•tion is 
first to be made; and suach is the variety and frequent oom-
plexity of partnership dealings that any other rule would 
obviously lead to gross injustice. It is impossible, therefore, in 
this case to assume, without any averments on the subjeot: in 
the complaint, that the eSltate of the deceased partner Pratt 
ought, in equity, to pay any portion of the defendant's judg-
ment. Hence, upon the principles laid down by Lord ELDON, 
and universally ncted upon by courts of equity, the complaint 
is clearly insuJlicient. 
The judgment of the supreme court, therefore, should be 
affirmed, wi tb costs. 
All the judges concurred. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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XVI.
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS BETWEEN PARTNERS.
W HITCOMB vs. CONVERSE.
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1875.
119 Mass. as, 20 Am. Rep. 311.
Bill in equity by Whitoomb, a partner in the la-te firm of
Converse, \Vhitcomb & Co., against Converse, Stan-ton and
Bladgen, the other partners, to compel contribution to make
good the losses of t*he firm. The firm was organized January
2, 1871, to continue one year under articles which provided that
Converse was to contribute $25,000, receive 75$ thereon, give
such time to the bu-siness as he was able, and receive one-
fourth of the net profits; Whitcomb was to contribute $50,000,
have 7% interest, give all his time and take one-fourth of the net
profits; Blagden and Stanton were each to contribute all his
time and receive one-fourth of the net profits. Whiteomb put
in $25,000 of the agreed $50,000. The partnership was dissolved
by mutual consent March 9, 1871, and \Vhitcomb was author-
ized to close up the business. He did so and claimed a loss to
the firm was shown of $25,000, for which he claims contribu-
tion. Blagden is insolvent and unable to pay any part of the
loss. Stanton brought -the bulk of the business to the firm,
and he contended that he was not liable to make good any of
the losses, and, if liable, was not liable to make good afl of the
amount which Blagden ought to make good. Cause reserved
for opinion of supreme court.
C’. T. Russell, for plaintifl.


























































































































































DISTRIBU'fION OF ASSETS BETWEEN PARTNERS. 
WHITCOMB vs. CONVERSE • 
.Supreme OO'Urt of Massachusetts, 1875. 
119 Maas. 8&, 20Am. Rep. 811. 
Bill in equity by Whitcomb, a partner in the late firm of 
, Converse, \Vhitcomb & Co., against Converse, Stan.ton and 
Bladgen, the other partners, to compel oontribution to make 
good the losses of ttie firm. The firm was organized January 
2, 1871, to continue one year under articles which prov~ded tha.t 
Converse was to contribute '25,000, receive 7% thereon, give 
such time to the business as he was able, and receive one-
fourth of the net profits; \Vhitcomb ~as to contribute '50,000, 
have 7% interest, give all his time and take one-foul"th of the net 
profits; Blagden and Stanton were each to contribute all his 
time and receive one-fourth of the net profits. Whitcomb put 
in $25,000 of the agreed $50,000. The partnership was dissolved 
by mutual consent March 9, 1871, and \Yhitcomb was author-
ized to close up the business. He did l!IO and claimed a loss to 
the firm was shown of $25,000, for which he claims contribu-
tion. Blagden is insolvent and unable to pay any part of the 
loss. Stanton brought the bulk of the business to the firm, 
and he contended that be was not liable to make good any of 
, the losses, and, if lia.ble, was not liable to make good a_!f of the 
amount whkh Blag-den ought to make good. Cause reserved 
for opinion of sup~me oourt. 
0. T. Russell, for plaintiff. 
G. 0. Shattuck and 0. W. Holmes, Jr., for Stanton. 
Wnrrconn vs. Gosvnnsn. 493
GRAY, C. J. In the absence of controlling agreement, part-
ners must bear the losses in the same proportion as the profits
of the partnership, even if one contributes the whole capital,
and the other nothing but his labor or services: 3 Kent’s Com.
28, 29. \Vhether a loss of capital is a partnership loss, to be
borne byvall the partners, depends upon the nature and extent
of the contract of partnership.
I1’, as is not unfrequently the case in a partnership for a
single adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed by
one partner, and the partnership is in the profits and losses
only, the capital remains the property of the individual partner
to whom it originally belonged, any los-s or destruction of it
falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes the prop-
erty of the partnership, the partnership owes him nothing in
consideration thereof. Story on Partn. _§§ 27 , 29; Heron vs. Hall,
1 B. Monr. (Ky.) 159, 35 Am. Dec. 178.
But where, as is usual in an ordinary mercantile partnership,
a. partnership is created not merely in profits and losses, but in
the property itself, the property is transferred from the original
owners to the partnership, and becomes the joint property of
the latter; a corresponding obligation arises on the part of the
partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals who
originally contributed it; such payment cannot indeed be de-
manded during the continuance of the partnership, nor are the
contributors, in the absence of agreement or-usage, entitled to
interest, but if the assets of the partnership, upon a final settle-
ment, are insuflicient to satisfy this obligation, all the partners
must bear it in the same proportion as other debts -of the part-
nership. Julio vs. I nyalls, 1 Allen (Mass) 41; Bradbury] vs.
Smith, 21 Me. 117; Barfield vs. Loughborough, L. R. 8 Ch. 1; In re
Anglesea Colliery Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 379, 387, s. c. L. R. 1 Ch. A-p.
555; Nowell vs. Nowell, L. R. 7 Eq. 538; In re Hodges Distillery
Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 51; 1 Lindley on Partn. (3 Ed.) 696, 827, 828.
Only two cases were cited in the learned argument f_or the
defendant Stanton, in which opinions inconsistent with this
view have been expressed. The one is Ercrly vs. Durborow, 1
Leg. Gaz. Rep. 127, a nisi prius decision, with no reference to
authorities except an early edition of Lindley on Partnership,
which has been corrected by the learned author, ubi supra, con-
forrnably to the adjudged cases. The other is Cameron vs.


























































































































































WBITOO.HB VS. CONVERSE. 493 
GRAY, C. J. In the absence of controlling agreement, part-
ners m~st bear the lOBBeB in the same proportion as the proflts .. 
of the partnership, even if one contributes the whole capital, 
and the other nothing but his labor or services: 3 Kent's Com. 
28, 29. Whether a loes of capital is a partnership loss, to be • 
borne by all the partners, depends upon the nature and extent 
of the contract of partnership. 
If, as is not unfrequently the case in a partnership for a 
aingle adventure, the mere use of the capital is contributed by 
one .partner, and the partnership is in the profits and losses "' 
only, the capital remains the property of the individual partner 
.to whom it originally belonged, any loss or destruction of it 
falls upon him as the owner, and, as it never becomes the prop-
erty of the partnership, the partnership owes him nothing in 
consideration thereof. Story on Partn . .§§ 27, 29; Heron vs. Hall, 
1 B. Moor. (Ky.) 159, 35 Am. Dec.178. 
But where, as is usual in an ()rdinary mercantile partnership, 
a partnership is created not merely in profits and losses, but in 
the property itself, the property is transferred from the original _ 
owners to the partnerahip, and becomes the joint property of 
the la:tter; a corresponding obligation arises on the part of the 
partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals who • 
originally contributed i,t; such payment cannot indeed be de-
manded during the continuance of the partnership, nor are the 
contributors, in the absence of agreement or·usage, entitled to 
interest, but if the assets of tl1e partnership, upon a final settle· 
ment, are insufficient to satisfy this obligation, all the partners 
mul!Jt bear it in the same proportion as other debts of the part-
nership. Julio vs. Ingalls, 1 Allen (Mass.) 41; Bmdbury vs. 
8mit11, 21Me.117; Barfield vs. Lougllborough, L. R. 8 Ch. 1; In re 
A.nglesea Colliery Co., L. R. 2 Eq. 379, 387, s. c. L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 
555; Nowell rs. Kmcrll, L. R. 7 Eq. 5!~8; In re Hodges Distillery 
Co., L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 51; 1 Lindley on P.artn. (3 Ed.) 696, 827, 828. 
Only two cases were cited in the learned argument (or the 
defendant Stanton, in which opinions inconsistent with this 
view have been expressed. The one is Ei:erly vs. Durborow, 1 
J..ieg. Gaz. Rep. 127, a nisi prius decision, with no reference to 
authorities except an early edition of Lindley on Partnership, 
which has been corrected by the learned author, ubi supra, con-
formably to the adjudged cases. The other is Cameron vs. 
llotson, 10 Rich. (8. Cnr.) Eq. 64. Thnt was a bill in equity to 
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settle the afiairs of a partnership, to which Cameron had con-
tributed labor and Watson capital. The master, to whom the
case was referred, allowed the claim of Watson for so much
of the capital as he had not withdrawn during the continuance
of the pa.rtnership, but disallowed his claim for interest there-
on; pp. 68, 73. Cameron excepted to the allowance of Watson’s
claim for capital, and Watson excepted to the disallowance of
interest. The chancellor, before whom the exceptions were
heard in the first instance, overruled the exception of Cameron,
and also that of V\'a.tson as regarded interest before the dissolu-
tion of the partnership, but su-stained it 0 far as to allow ‘him
interest after the dissolution, pp. 80-90, 95, 96. The court of
appeals, although in one part of it-s opinion appearing to dis-
oountenance \Vatson’s claim for capital, ended by confirming
the master’s report in every particular, pp. 103, 107, 108. So
that the final judgment, while it disallowed Wa-tson’s claim
for interest, established his claim for capital, and was in exact
accordance with our conclusion.
In the case at bar, the partnership was not for a single enter-
prise, but for the transaction of a commission business in New
York and Boston for a year. Converse and Whitcomb cou-
tributed the whole capital in unequal proportions. Converse
was to contribute “su-ch time as he may be able to give”; and
Whitconib and the other two partners, Blagden and Stanton,
were each “to contribute all his time to the business.” Those
partners who contributed the capital did not contribute merely
the use thereof, but the capital itself, and were by the express
agreement to receive interest thereon at rates specified in the
articles of co-partnership. The partners were by agreement to
receive each one-fourth of the net profits, and by implication of
law must share the losses in the same proportion. The capital
contributed became the property o-f the partnership; and the
partnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to
Whitcoinb and Converse respectively for the amount of capital
paid in by them.
Blagden, one of rthe partners, being insolvent and unable to
discharge any part of the obligation, it must rest in equity upon
the three solvent partners in equal proportions. Whit-man vs.
Porter, 107 Mass. 522; 1 Lindley on Partn. 789, 790.
Decree for the plaintifi accordingly.
NOTE: See Mechem’s Elem. of Partn., §§ 305, 308.
















































































































































OASES ON PARTNERSHIP. 
eettle the affairs of a partnership, to which Cameron had con· 
tributed labor and Watson capital. The master, to whom the 
case was referred, allowed the claim of Watson for 'so much 
of the capital a.s he had not withdrawn during the continuance 
of the partnership, but disallowed his claim for interest there· 
on; pp. 68, 73. Cameron excepted to the allowance of Watson's 
claim for capital, and Watson excepted to the disallowance of 
interest. The chancellor, before whom the exceptions were 
heard in the first instance, overruled the exception of Oameron, 
and also that of Watson as regarded interest before the dissolu-
tion <>f the partnership, but sustafaed it so far as to allow 'him 
interest after the di880lution, pp. 80-90, 95, 96. The court of 
appeals, although in one part of its opinion appearing to dis-
oountenance Watson's claim f<>r ca.pital, ended by confirming 
the ma-ster's report in every pa:N:icular, pp. 103, 107, 108. So 
that the final judgment, while it disallowed Watson's claim 
fc>r interest, established his claim for capital, and was in exact 
acoordance with our conclusi-0n. 
In the case at bar, the partnership wa.s not for a single enter-
prise, but for the .transaction of a commission business in New 
York and Boston for a year. Converse and Whitcomb con-
tributed the whole capital in unequal proportions. Converse 
was to contribute "such time as he may be able to give"; and 
' Whitcomb and ·the other two partners, Blagden and Stanton, 
were ea.ch "to contribute all his time to the business." Those 
partners who contributed the capital did not contribute merely 
the use thereof, but the capital itself, and were by the express 
agreement to receive interest thereon at rates specified in the 
artioles of copa.ctnership. The partners were by agreement to 
receive each one-fourth of the net profits, and by implication of 
law must share the losses in the same proportion. The capital 
eontributed became the property of the partnership; and ithe 
partnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to 
Whitcomb and Converse respectively for the amount of capital 
,paid in by them. 
Blagden, one of itbe partners, being insolvent and unable to 
discharge any part of the obligation, it must rest in equity upon 
the three solvent partners in equal proportions. Wliit·man v1. 
Perter, 107 Mase. 522; 1 Lindley on Partn. 789, 790. 
Decree for ·the plaintiff accordingly. 
NOTE: See Hechem's Elem. of Partn., ~§ 805, 808. 
Compare with the following case. 
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SHEA vs. DONAHUE.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1885. -
15 Lea, 160, 54 Am. Rep. 407.
Bill for partnership accounting between Shea and Donahue.
They became partners under written agreement for one year
“as merchants in making, buying and selling all kinds of tin-
ware, stoves, pumps, etc.” “And to constitute a fund for the
purpose Timothy Shea has paid in as stock one thousand dol-
lars, which will constitute a common stock, to be used and em-
ployed between us in buying goods, wares and merchandise.
John Donahue being a practical workman and having consid-
erable experience in the above named business, it is agreed tihat
he will give the business his entire personal attention and the
benefit of hisexperience, to place again-st the cash furnished by
said Shea. We are to bear the expenses and losses jointly and
share the profits equally. The capital stock is n-ot to be with-
drawn by either party until the end of the term, but to be em-
ployed as capital unless otherwise mutually agreed between
us in writing.” The business was in fact carried on for about
three years. Upon the settlement, Donahue claimed to be en-
titled to one-half of the capital advanced by Shea. The chan-
cellor decided against Donahue, and he appealed. ,
J. W. Green, for complainant.
H. H. Taylor, for defendant. '
Goormn, J . (After stating the facts.) The contention of the
defendant is, that by the terms of the agreement he was en-
titled art the end of one year to an equal share of the profits
of the business, and to one-half of the capital advanced by h-is
partner, and this, although it goes without saying he would
retain all his practical experience which was to be placed
against the cash furnished by his partner. But the agreement
is that the partners are only to “share the profits equally,” not
the profits and the capital. And the profits of any business are
only what remains after deducting debts and expenses, and the
















































































































































SHEA. vs. DONA.HUR. 
SHEA ve. DONAHUE. 
Supreme Oourt of Tennessee, 1885. 
15 Lea, 160, M Am. Rep. 407. 
495 
Bill for partnership accounting between Shea and Dona.hue. 
'!'hey became partnem under written agreemen,t for one year 
"as merchants in making, buying and selling all kinds of tin-
ware, stoves, pumps, etc." "And to constitute a fund for the 
purpose Timothy Shea has pa.id in as stock one th-0usand dol-
lars, which will constitute a common stock, t-0 be used and em-
ployed between us in bl?ying good.ii, wares and merchandise. 
John Donahue being a practica:l workm1Ul and having con.sid-
erable experience in the a.hove named business, it is agreed that 
he will give the business his entire personal attention and the 
benefit of his·experience, to place ag-a.inet the cash furnished by 
said Shea. We a:re t-0 bear the expenses and losses jointly and 
sha.re the profits equally. The capital stock is not to be with-
dTawn by either party until the end of the term, but to be em-
ployed ae capital unless otherwise mutually agreed between 
us in writing." The business was in fact carried on for aoou.t 
three yeaTs. Upon the settlement, Donahue claimed to be en-
titled ro one-half of the capital advanced by Shea. The chan-
cellor decided against Donahue, and he appealed. 
J. W. Green., for complainant. 
H. H. Taylor, for defendant. 
COOPER, J. (After stating the facts.) The contention of the 
.defendant is, that by the terms of the agreement he was .en-
titled art the end of one year to an equal share of the profits 
of the business, and to <me-half <>f the capital advanced by his 
partner, and this, although it goes without saying he would 
, retain all hie practical ex.perience which was to be placed 
against the cash furnished by his partner. But the agreement 
is that the partners are only to "share the profits equally," not 
the profits and the capital. And the profits O'f any business are 
only whait remains after deducting debts ana expenses, and the 
capital paid in. Lindley on Partn. 791, 806. The provision that 
496 Gasns on PARTNERSHIP.
the capital stock shall constitute a common stock to be used in
buying the materials and wares of their trade, merely desig-
nates the mode in which ist is agreed that the capital shall be
invested. And the further provision that the capital stock
shall not be withdrawn by either party until the end of the
term, was only intended to restrain the partners from drawing
funds from the business so as to trench upon the capital while
the partnership continued. There is nothing in the article of
agreement to take -the case out of the ordinary one of a partner-
ship in profit and loss u-pon unequal capitals.
Of course the articles of a partnership may expressly provide
for an equal division of the assets, upon a dissolution, notwith-
standing an unequal advance of capital by the respective part-
ners. The same result may follow a continu-ous course of deal-
ing upon a ba'sis'which implies such equal division. For if
there is no evidence from which any different conclusion as to
what was agreed can be drawn, t-he shares of all the partners
will be adjudged equal, upon the favorite maxim of chancery,
that equality is equity. But, as Mr. Lindley tells us, the rule
is when the partners have advanced unequal capitals, and have
agreed to share profits and losses equally, with-out more, that
each partner is entitled to his advance before division, and a
deficiency in the capital must be treated like any other loss,
and borne equally by the partners. Lindley Partn. 807.
The only authorities adduced by the lea.rned counsel of the
defendant, in support of his contention in this case, a.re to the
effect that property brought into the partnership business by
the members of the firm, or bought with capital advanced, be-
comes partnership property, and may be disposed of as such by
one of the partners un-der his general powers as a member of
the firm. And so it does beyond all question, for the very
object of contributing capital, either in property or money, is‘
to secure a partnership stock for the purpose of carrying on the
common business. But this fact has nothing to do with the
settlement between the partners of their accounts at the end of
the partnership. “By the capital of a partnership,” says Mr.
Lindley, “is meant the aggregate of the sums contributed by
its members for the purpose of commencing or carrying on the
partnership business. The capital of a partnership is not
therefore the same as its property; the capital is a sum fixed by

















































































































































496 CASES O.N p ARTNERSHIP. 
the capital stock shall constitute a common stock to be used in 
buying the materials and· wares of their trade, merely desig-
nates the mode in whio.h irt: is agreed that the capital shall be 
invested. And the further provision that the capital stock 
shall not be withdrawn by either party until the end of the 
term, was only intended to restrain the partners from drawing 
funds from the business so ail to trench upon the capital while 
the partnership continued. There is nothing in the article of 
ag.reement ·to take the case ou:t f!f the ordinary one of a pam:ner-
ship in profit and loss upon unequal capitals. 
Of course the articles of a partnership may expressly provide 
f<>r an equal division oft~ assets, upon a dissolution, notwith-
standing an unequal advance of capital by the respective part-
ners. The same result may follow a oontinuous course of deal-
ing upon a ba'Eri.s which implies such equal division. For if 
there is no evidence from which any different conclusion as to 
what was agreed can be drawn, t·he shareti of all the partners 
will be adjudged equal, upon the favorite maxim of chancery, 
tbat equality is equity. But, as Mr. Liudley tells us, the rule 
is when the pal'ltners have advanced unequal capitals, and have 
agreed to share profits and losses equally, without more, that 
eaoh partner is entitled t-0 bis advance before division, a.nd a 
deficiency in the capital must be treated like any other loss, 
and borne equally by the partners. Lindley Partn. 807. 
'!'he only authorities adduced by the learned counsel of the 
defendant, in support of his oontention in this case, a.re to the 
effect that property br-0ugbt into the partnership business by 
the members of the firm, or bought with capita.I advanced, be-
comes pa.1•tnership property, and may be disposed of as suoh by 
one of the partners under hls general powers a.s a member of 
the firm. And so it does beyond all question, for the very 
object of oonrtributing ca.pita.I, either in property or money, is· 
to secure a partnership stock for the purpose of ca.rrying on the 
common business. But this faot has nothing to do with the 
settlement between the pa1'i:ners of their accounts at the end of 
the partnership. "By the capital of a partnership," says l\Ir. 
Lindley, "is meant the aggrPgate of the sums contributed by 
its members for the purpose of commencing or carr;ring on the 
partnership business. The capital of a partnership is not 
the1·efo.re the same as its propPrty; the eapital is a sum fixed by 
the agreements of the par·tners, whilst the actual assets of the 
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firm vary from day to day, and include everything belonging to
the firm and having any money value. Moreover, the capital
of each partner is not necessarily the amount due to him from
the firm; for not only may he owe tlhe firm money, so that less
than his capital is due to him, but the firm may owe him money
in addition to his capital, e. g., for money loaned. The amount
of each partner’s capital ought therefore always to be accurate-
ly stated, in order to avoid disputes upon a final adjustment of
accounts; and this is more important where the capitals of the
partners are unequal, for if there is no evidence as to the
amounts contributed by them, the shares of rthe whole assets
will be treated as equal.” Lindley Partn. 610. [1 Ewe]l’s Lind-
ley, 2d Am. Ed. 320.] The same author adds in another place:
“\Vhen it is said that the shares of partners are prima facile
equal, although their capitals are unequal, what is meant is
that the losses of capital, like other losses, must be shared
equally, bu-t it is not meant that on a final settlement of ac-
counits capitals contributed unequally are to be treated as an
aggregate fund which ought to be divided between tlhe part-
ners in equal shares.” Lindley, Partn. 67. On the contra.ry, in
his chapter devoted to partnership accounts [2 Lindley, Parrtn.
2d Am. Ed. 402], he expressly tells us that the assets of a part-
nership should be a.pplied as follows:
“1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to non-part
ners. v
“2. In paying to each partner ratably what is due from the
firm to him for advances as distinguished from capital.
“3. In paying to each partner rartably what is due from the
firm to him in respect of capital.
“4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible as
profit between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary
can be shown.”
In accordance with tlhese principles, the following decision
has been made by the supreme court of New York in a case
cited in a note to page 610 of Lindley on Partnership: “W-here
by the terms of the agreement the defendant furnished the cap-
ital stock, and the plainititf contributed his skill and services,
and the profits of the copartnership were to be equally divided,
the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the capital stock on a
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firm vary from diay to day, and include everything belonging to 
the tlrm and having any money value. Moreover, the capital 
of ea.eh partner is not necessarily the amount due to him from 
the tlrm; f o.r not only may he owe the firm money, so that less 
than his capital is due to him, but the firm may owe him money 
· in addition to his capital, e. g., for money loaned. The amounrt 
of ea.ch partner's oa.pital ought therefore always to be accurate· 
ly stated, in order it:o avoid disputes upon a final 8.djustment of 
accounts; a.nd this is more important where the ca.pi tills of the 
partners are unequal, for if t!here is n-0 evideD'ce a.s to the 
amounts contributed by them, the shares of ithe whole assets 
will be treated as equal." Lindley Partn. 610. [1 Ewell's Lind· 
ley, 2d Am. Ed. 320.] The same author adds in .another place: 
"When it is eaid that t'he &hares of partneM are prim.a facie 
equal, although their capitals are unequal, what is meant is 
that the loeses of capit!a.l, like other losses, muErt be shared 
equally, but it is n.ot meant that on a final settlement of ac-
counrt:s ca.pitals contributed unequally are fo be treated ea an 
aggregate fund whi~ ought to be divided between the part-
nel'8 in equal shares." Lindley, Partn. 67. On the contrary, in 
bis chapter devoted to partnership accounts (2 Lindley, Partn. 
2d Am. Ed. 402), he expressly tells us that the 8.88ets of a pa.l"f:· 
nership should be applied a.s follows: 
"1. In paying the debts and liabilities of the firm to non-part-
ners. • 
"2. In paying fo each partner ratably what is due from the 
flrm to him for advanees as distinguished from capital. 
"3. In paying to each partner rart:ably what is due from the 
firm to him in respect of oapital. 
"4. The ultimate residue, if any, will then be divisible aa 
profit between the partners in equal shares, unless the contrary 
can be shown." 
In accordance with these principles, the following decision 
has been made by the supreme oourt of New Y <>rk in a case 
cited in a note to page 610 of Lindley on Partnership: "W·here 
by the terme of tlle agreement the defendant furnished the cap· 
it.al etock, a.nd the plaintiff oontributed his skill and services, 
and the protlts of the oopa.rtnersbip were to be equally divided, 
the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the capital stock on a 
settlement of the affairs of the partnership. He ·has oo interest 
63 
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in any part of the capital excepting so far as in the progress of
the business the same may have been converted into profits.”
Conroy vs. Campbell, 13 Jones & Sp. 326. The case, it will be
noticed, is exactly in point. And to the same efleot in principle
are Whitcomb vs. Converse, 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311, ante
p.492; Knight vs. Ogden, 2 Tenn.Oh. 473, and Shepherd, Em parte,
3 Tenn. Ch. 189. No ease ‘has been found to the contrary.
Ohancellor’s decree aflirmed.



















































































































































4:98 0.ASJIS O.V p .A.RTNBRSBIP. 
in any part of the capital excepting so far as in the progre9B of 
the business the same may have been converted into profits." 
Oon.rQ1J vs. Oampbell, 13 Jones & Sp. 326. The case, it will be 
ooticed, is exactly in point. And to the same effect in principle 
a.re Whitcomb vs. Converae, 119 Mass. 38, 20 Am. Rep. 311, ante 
p.li92; Knight v8. Ogden, 2 Tenn.Oh. '73, and 8'hepher4, E111 parle, 
3 Tenn. Cb. 189. No CB8e 'has been found to the cont.rar1. 
Ohancell-0r's decree aftlrmed. 
NOTE: See :Mechem'& Elem. of P&rtn., §§ 800-808. 
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ACCOUNT,
duty of partner to account for clandestine profits: Latta vs. Kil-
bourn, 212.
ACCOUNTING,
between partners: See Ac'r1oNs BETWEEN Panrnnnsz CAPITAL.
between partners and creditors; See APPLICATION OF ASSETS. -
of illegal transactions: Woodworth vs. Bennett,_ 25; Craft vs. Ho-
Conoughy, 30.
reopening, after long time: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382.
ACCOUNTS,
duty of partner to keep: Webb vs. F01-dyce, 228.
ACCOUNT STATED,
action between partners upon: Wycofl’ vs. Parnell, 238.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT,
See STATUTE or LIMITATIONS.
ACTIONS,
nonjoinder of partner as party: Cleveland vs. Woodward, 318.
ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS,
1. AT LAW, when can be maintained: Wycofl‘ vs. Purnell, 238; Bullard
vs. Kinney, 240; Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242; Beede vs. Fraser, 246.
ondorsee of note given by firm to partner may sue firm: Carpenter
vs. Greenop, 242.
firm can not sue other firm having common partner: Beede vs. Fraser,
246.
for failure to launch firm as agreed: Hill vs. Palmer, 249.
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 251.
2. IN EQUITY, for accounting and settlement: Spear vs. Newall, 257;
Pirtle vs. Penn, 259; New vs. Wright, 263.
ADMISSIONS.
of a partner, when bind the firm: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
tobar operation of statute of limitations: See STATUTE or Luan-
TIONS.
ADVERTISEMENT,
See N01-1cE or Dissonnrros.
AGENCY,


















































































































































duty of partner t.o account for clandestine profits: Latta w. KU-
boum, 212. 
AOOOUNTING, 
between partnen: See AC'TIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS; CA.PIT.AL. 
between ]>artnen and creditors; See APPLICATION OF AssETS. • 
of illegal tranaactiona: Woodioorth VB. Benmtt,. 25; Oro.ft w. JLo-
Oonough'll, 80. 
reopeninJ[, after long time: Valentine VB. W'llBOr, 882. 
ACCOUNTS, 
duty of partner t.o keep: Webb w. Fordy~, 228. 
ACCOUNT STATED, 
action between partners upon: Wgco§ w. Purnell, 288. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT, 
Bee 8TATUTB Oll' LDIITATION& 
ACTIONS, 
nonjoinder of partner as party: Cleveland w. Woodward, 818. 
ACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERS, 
1. AT LAW, when can be maintained: Wyoof!vB. Purnell, 288; Bullard 
v1. Kinne.11, 240; Carpenter va. Gnenop, 242; Bude"'· JiraNr, .246. 
endorsee of note given by firm to partner may aue firm: Carpenter 
VI. Green.op, 242. 
firm can not aue other firm having common partner: Bude VB. Ff'GM,1', 
246. 
for failure t.o launch firm as agreed: Hill va. Palmer, 249, 
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley va. Smith, 251, 
2. IN EQUITY, for accounting and settlemt'nt: Spear "'· N6VWU, 1!671 
Pirtle v1. Penn, 269; New w. Wright, 268. 
ADMISSIONS, 
of a partner, when bind the firm: Swut VB. Wood, l'TO. 
t.o bar operation of ttatute of limitations: See Sr.a.TUTS o• lixrrA· 
TIONB. 
ADVERTISEMENT, 
See NoTIO& OJ' Dls8o1A1TIO•. 
AGENCY, 
u test of parin.enhip: Ooa: va. Hie~, 'rO, et -.q. 
,.. 
600 Immx.
AGENT, (See Powaas or Pswmsss; LIABILITY’).
partner as agent of firm: Chester vs. DlCk€T8OTl., 20; Sweet vs. Wood,
270, et seq.; Pith-in vs. Benfer, 313, et seq.; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee,
411, et seq.
APPLICATION OF ASSETS,
to claims of firm creditors: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.
Hagerman, 446; Huge vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery Co. vs. McCune,
457; Rodgers vs. Meranda, 463; Blair vs. Black, 477; Harris vs. Pea-
body, 488.
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP,
duty of partner not to violate: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs.
- Leeka, 232.
ASSETS,
See FIRM NAME; Goon WILL; REAL Esnrn. -
ASSIGNEE, _
of partner cannot sue firm, when: Bullard vs. Kinney, 240.
of note, may sue firm, when: Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242.
of bankrupt partner, suit by: Halsey vs. Norton, 353.
ASSIGNMENT,
when valid as to firm creditors: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446.
as assets, by surviving partner: Linder vs. Bank. 401.
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.
power of partner to make: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296.
by surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson, 403.
ASSOCIATIONS,
if not for pecuniary gain, not partnerships: Queen vs. Robson, 1; Burt
vs. Lathrop, 4. . _
ASSUMPTION OF DEBT,
of partner by firm: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery Co. vs. McO'une,
457.
BANKRUPTCY,
distribution of assets, upon: See APPLICATION O1!‘ ASSETS,
dissolves firm: Halsey vs. -Norton, 353.
BILLS AND NOTES: See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
power of partner to make: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
BOND,
power of one partner to execute: Fox vs. Norton, 295.
BORROW,
power of surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson,, 408.
BUYING GOODS,
powers of partner as to: Boardman vs. Adams, 277; Porter vs. Curry,
281; Johnston vs. Dutton, 304.
CAPITAL,
contributions to, what may be: Griflith vs. Bufium, 315; Whitcomb
vs. Converse, 492; Shea vs. Donahue, 495.



















































































































































A.GENT, (See POWERS OF P.A.RTNEBS; LliBILITY). 
partner 88 agent of firm: Cheater vs. Dickerson, 20; Swut "1. Wood, 
270, et~.; Pitkin vs. Benfer, 818, et ~.q.; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee, 
411, et seq_. 
APPLICATION OF ASSETS, 
to claims of firm creditors: Case VI. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vi. 
Hagerman, 446; Hage vs. Campbell, 4l')8; Grocery Co. vs. McCune, 
457; Rodgers VB. Meranda, 468; Blair VB. Black, 477; Harri& VI. Pea-
'body, 488. 
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP, 
duty of partner not to violate: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden 111. 
Leeka, 282. 
ASSETS, 
See FIR.JI NAJB; Goon WILL; REAL F.8TATB. 
ASSIGNEE, 
of partner cannot sue firm, when: Bullard vs. Kinney, 240. 
of note, may sue firm, when: Carpenter vs. Greenop, 242. 
of bankrupt paftner, suit by: Hallley vs. Norton, 8l')3, 
ASSIGNMENT, 
when valid 88 to firm creditors: Arnold"'· Hagerman, 446. 
as assets, by surviving partner: Linder vs. Bank. 401. 
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS, 
power of partner to make: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296. 
by surviving partner: Durant VB. Pieraon, 408. 
ASSOCIATIONS, 
if not for pecuniary gain, not partnerships: Queen VB. Robson, 1; Burt 
vs. Lathrop, 4. 
ASSUMPTION OF DEBT, 
of partner by firm: Hage w. Campbell, 458; Grocery Co. vs. McOu~ 
~7. 
BANKRUPrCY, 
distribution of &BBets, upon: See APPLICATION OF AsSETB. 
dissolves firm: Halsey vs •. Norton, 858. 
BILLS AND NOTES: See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUKENTB. 
power of partner to make: Peaae vs. Cole, 282. 
BOND, 
pow"r of one partner to execute: Fo;r: vs. Norton, 295. 
BORROW, 
power of surviving partner: Durant vs. Pierson,, 408. 
BUYING GOODS, 
powers of partner 88 to: Boardman VB. Adams, 277; Porter 111. °"""• 
281; Johnston va. Dutton, 804. 
CAPITAL, 
contributions to, what may be: Griffith va. Buffum, 815; Whitcomb 
vs. Converse, 492; Shea vs. Donahue, 495. 





how divided on dissolution: Id.
losses of, how made good: Id.
CARE,
degree of, required between partners: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,
not a partnership: Queen vs. Robson, 1.
CLANDESTINE PROFITS,
made by partner inure to firm, when: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
COLLECTION, ‘
power of partner as to means of: Clarke vs. Wallace, 301.
COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP: See Tnsmse FIRM.
p0\vers of partners in: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST,
as test; of partnership: Spaulding vs. Stubbings. 117; Magovern vs.
Robertson, 122; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139. ‘
COMPENSATION,
for extra services, partners no implied right to: Lindsey vs. Shana-
han, 231.
COMPETITION,
when partner hot to trade in competition with his firm: Latta vs.
Kilbourn, 212.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT,
power of partner to make: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294.
CONSULT,
duty of partner to consult with copartner: Yorks vs. Tozer, 230,
CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIP,
does not constitute one: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors vs. Nixon-Jones
Co., 53; Kerriclc vs. Stevens, 55; Duryea vs. Whitcomb, 57; Grifllth
vs. Bufium, 315.
CONTINUING BUSINESS.
by surviving partner underwill: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382; Jones vs,
Walker. 391.
CONTRIBUTION,
right of partners to: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330; McFadden vs. Leeka, 232,
CONVERSION,
of firm into individual property: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446; Case ‘Us,
Beauregard, 440.
of individual into firm liability: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Grocery C0.
vs. McCune, 457.
CORPORATION,
may not enter into partnership: Whittenton Mills vs. Upton, 44.
CORPORATION—DEFECTIVE,



















































































































































how divided on dissolution: IcJ. 
losses of. how made good: JcJ. 
CARE, 
degree of, required between partners: Inttleg va. Shire, 222. 
CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION. 
not a partnership: Queen va. Robson, 1. 
CLANDESTINE PROFITS, 
made by partner inure to firm, when: Latta va. Kilboum, 219. 
COLLECTION, 
power of partner as to means of: Clarke VB. Wallace, 801. 
COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIP: See TRADING Fnul. 
powers of partners in: Pease va. Cole, 282. 
COMMUNITY OF INTERES'i, 
as test of partnership: Spaulding va. Stubl>inga. 117; Magovern aa. 
Robertson, 122; Morgan vs. Farrel, 189. 
COMPENSATION, 
for extra services, partnen no implied right to: Lindsey vs. Stra.n~ 
han, 231. 
COMPETITION, 
when partner bot to trade in competition with his firm: Latta"'• 
Kilbourn, 212. 
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT, 
power of partner to make: Morgan va. Richardson, 294. 
CONSULT, 
duty of partner to consult with copartner: Yorks va. Tozer, 230. 
CONTEMPLATED PARTNERSHIP, 
does not constitute one: Atkins va. Hunt, 49; Sailors va. Ni:ron-Jonea 
Co., 58; Kerrick vs. Stevena, 55; Duryea va. Whitcomb, 57; Grijftth 
t.'B. Buffum, 315. 
CONTDTUING BUSINESS, 
by surviving partner under'will: Valentine VB. Wyaor, 882; Jonea'va. 
Walker, 391. 
CONTRIBUTION, 
right of partners to: Hua va. Lowrey, 380; McFadden va. Luka, 282. 
CONVERSION, 
of firm into individual property: Arnold va. Hagerman, 446; Caae VB. 
Beauregard, 440. 
of individual into firm liability: Hage vs. Campbell, 453; Gro~ Co. 
va. McCune, 457. 
CORPORATION, 
may not enter into partnership: Whittenton Milla va. Upton, 44. 
CORPORATION-DEFECTIVE, 




carrying on business of debtor, whether partners: Cow vs. Hickman,
70.
CREDITORS OF FIRM, (See APPLICATION or Assars.)
rights of, in partnership assets: Durant vs. Pierson, 403 et seq.
DAMAGES,
from partner for violating articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley vs. Smith, 251.
DEATH OF PARTNER,
dissolves partnership: Hoard vs. Clam. 350; Imley vs. Shire, 222.
effect upon actions: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.
DECEASED PARTNER,
liability of his estate for partnership debts: Doggett vs. Dill, 395.
DECLARATIONS,
of partner when bind firm: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
DE FACTO CORPORATION,
what necessary to constitute: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan vs.
Noerenberg, 13.
DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATION,
when members of liable as partners: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan
vs. Noerenberg, 13; Kaiser vs. Bank, 16. _
DILIGENCE.
required between partners: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
DISPUTES,
between partners, dissolution for, when: Howell vs. Harvey, 854.
Gerard vs. Gateau, 366.
DISSOLUTION,
by'death: Hoard vs. Clam, sso. ‘
by bankruptcy: Halsey vs. Norton, 353.
power of one partner as to: Johnston vs. Dutton, 804; Solomon vs.
Kirkwood, 361.
what will justify in equity: Howell vs. Harvey, 354; New -vs.
Wright, 263; Gerard vs. Gateau, 866.
reasonable notice of : Id.
action in equity for: New vs. Wright, 263.
notice of, how given: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361; Austin vs. Hol-
land, 870: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.
effect upon liabilities of all partners: Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.
efiect on powers of partners: Durant vs. Pierson, 408; Humphries vs.
Chastain, 410; VanKeuren vs. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David,
421; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424.
action for wrongfully causing: Bagley vs. Smith, 251; Howell vs. Har-
vey, 354.
DORMANT PARTNER, (See Unmscnossn PARTNER).
liability of: Pitkin vs. Benfer, 313; Griflith vs. Bufium, 315; Chester
vs. Dickerson, 20.


















































































































































carrying on buainesa of debtor, whether partners: Co:r: "'·Hickman, 
70. 
CREDITORS OF FIRM, (See APPLICATION OF AssETS.) 
rights of, in p&rtnership assets: Durant"'· Pier8on, 403 et aeq. 
DAM.AGES, 
from partner for violating articles: Murphy '18, Cr~fta, 227. 
for dissolving contrary to agreement: Bagley"'· Smith, 251. 
DEA.TH OF PARTNER, 
diSBOlves partnership: Hoard vs. Clum. 350; Inile11 vs. Shire, 222. 
effect upon actions: Hua vs. Lowrey, 830. 
DECEASED PARTNER, 
liability of his estate for partnership debts: Doggett vs. Dill, 395. 
DECLARATIONS, 
of partner when bind firm: Sweet V8. Wood, 270. 
DE FACTO CORPORATION, 
what necessary to constitute: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan ve. 
Noerenberg, 18. 
DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATION, 
when members of liable as partners: Eaton vs. Walker, 8; Finnegan 
vs. Noerenberg, 13; Kaiser V8. Bank, 16. 
DILIGENCE, 
required between partners: Inaley V8. Shi1'e, 222. 
DISPUTES, 
between partners, dissolution for, when: Howell v.s. Harve1J, SM. 
Gerard vs. Gateau, 366. 
DISSOLUTION, 
byd~ath: Hoard vs. Clum, 850. 
by bankruptcy: Halsey vs. Norton, 858. 
power of one partner aa to: .Iohnaton '18. Dutton, 804; Solomon va. 
Kirkwood, 861. 
what will justify in equity: Howell ve. Harvey, 85•; New vs, 
Wright, 268; Gerard V8. Gateau, 866. 
reasonable notice of: .Jd. 
aotion in equity for: New vs. Wright, 263. 
notice of, how given: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, SIU; Amtin ve. Hol-
land, 870; Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374. 
effect upon liabilities of all partners: BarnM vs. Boyers, 485. 
effect on powers of partners: Durant V8. Pierson, 403; Huniphriea V8. 
Chastain, 410; VanKeuren '18. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David, 
,21; Feigley VB. Whitaker, 424. 
action for wrongfully causing: Bagley vs. Smith, 251; Howell vs. Har-
vey, 854. 
DORMANT PARTNER, (See UNDISCLOSED PARTNER). 
liability of: Pitkin '18. Benfer, 818; Griffith "'· Buflum. 815; Cli.uter 
vs. Dick~son, 20. 
notice of retirement of: Bank"'· Bergstrom, 878. 
INDEX. 503
DOWEB,
in partnership realty: Robinson Bank vs. Miller, 155; Paige vs. Paige.
170.
DUTY OF PARTNERS,
to act in good faith: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
to be diligent: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
not to violate articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.
to keep accounts: Webb vs. Fordyce, 228.
to consult with copartners: Yorks vs. Tozer, 230.
ENTITY,
firm as: Arnold vs. Hagerman, 446.
EQUITY,
actions in: See ACTIONS.
dissolution in: See DISSOLUTION.
distribution of assets in: See APPLICATION or Assam.
ESTOPPEL, (See Honnmo OUT).
to deny partnership: Fletcher vs. Pullen, 134; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139,
EVIDENCE.
what admissible to prove partnership: Jacobs vs. Shorey, 131; Fletcher
vs. Pullen, 134.
EXECUTOR, (See SURVIVING PARTNER).
of deceased partner, continuing business creates new firm: Insley vs.
Shire, 222.
rights against surviving partner: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382.
EXPRESS PROMISE,
when necessary to sustain action between partners: Wycofi vs, Pu;-.
nell, 238 and note.
EXTRA COMPENSATION,
for extra services, partner cannot claim: Lindsey vs. Stranahan, 231.
FALSE IBIPRISONMENT,
by one partner, when binds firm: Rosenkrans vs. Barker, 835,
FIDELITY,
duty of partner to his firm: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
FIDUCIARY RELA1 ION,
between partners: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
FIRM CREDITORS.
rights of, in firm property: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.
Hagerman, 446; Grocery C0. vs. McC'une, 457; Rodgers vs. Meranda,
463; Blair vs. Black, 477; Harrie vs. Peabody, 483; Meech vs. Allen,
457.
FIRM NAME. I
rights respecting: Williams vs. Farrand,174: Snyder Mfg. C0, vs,
Snyder, 192.
FRAUD, (See TORT).



















































































































































in partnenhip realty: Rob&naoR. Ban'lo va. Miller, 155; Paige va. Paige. 
170. 
DUTY OF PARTNERS, 
to act in good faith: Latta""· Kilbourn, 212. 
to be diligent: Insley vs. Shire, 222. 
not to violat.e articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227. 
to keep accounts: Webb vs. Fordyce, 228. 
to consult with copartners: Yorks vs. Tozer, 280. 
ENTITY, 
firm as: Arnold vir. Hagerman, 446. 
EQUITY, 
actions in: s00 ACTIONS. 
dissolution in: See DISSOLUTION. 
distribution of assets in: See APPLICATION 011' ASSETS. 
F.sTOPPEL, (See HOLDING OUT). 
to deny partnership: Fletcher vs. Pullen, 134; Morgan va. Farrel, 189. 
EVIDENCE, 
what admissible to prove partnership: Jacobs v•. Shorey, 181; Fletcher 
VB. Pullen, 134. 
EXECUTOR, (See SURVIVING PARTNER). 
of deceased partner, continuing business creat.es new firm: Insley vs. 
Shire, 222. 
rights against surviving partner: Valentine VB. Wysor, 882. 
EXPRF.88 PROMISE, 
when necessary to sustain action between partners: Wycoff ""· Pur-
nell, 238 and note. 
EXTRA COMPENSATION, 
for extra services, partner cannot claim: Lindsey vir. Stranahan, 281. 
FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 
by one partner, when binds ftrm: Rosenkrans VB. Barker, 835. 
FIDELITY, 
duty of partner to his firm: Latta VB. Kilbourn, 212. 
FIDUCIARY RELA 1 ION, 
between partner": Latta 1."B. Kilbourn, 212. 
FIRM CREDITORS, 
rights of, in firm proporty: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; AMtold vir. 
Hagerman, 446; Grocery Co. v.9. 1~IcCuue, 457; Rudgers vs. Meranda, 
.(63; Blair VB. Black, 477; Harris VB. Peabod11, 483; J[eech vs. Allen, 
·b7. 
FIRM NAME. 
rights respecting: Williams vs. Parrand, 174: Snuder lt{fg. Oo. " 8, 
Snyder, 192. 
JfRAtTD, (See TORT). 
of one partner binds firm, when: Chester va. Dickeriron, .20; JCU'.obs 
vs. Shorey, 181. 
504 Innnx.
FUTURE PARTNERSHIP, '
when become operative: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors vs. Nixon-Jomc
Co., 53; Kerrick vs. Stevens, 55.
GOOD FAITH,
duty of partners to each other: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212; Insley vs.
Shire, 222.
GOOD WILL,
what. constitutes and how protected: Williams vs. Farrand, 174; Sny-
der Mfg. Co. vs. Snyder, 192; Trcgo vs. Hunt, 199.
GROSS PROCEEDS, .
sharing of, as test of partnership: Beecher vs. Bush, 86; Harvey rs.
Childs, 97; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.
HEIRS,
rights against surviving partner: Valentine vs. VVy-801', 882.
HIRING OF PROPERTY,
by one partner: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
HOLDING OUT, (See Fs'r0PPsL).
liability as partner by: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125; Fletcher vs. Pullen,
184; Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.
HOTEL,
lessor of hotel, whether partner with proprietor: Beecher vs. Bush, 86.
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
as partners: Artman vs. Ferguson, 37; Suau vs. Cafe, 40.
ILLEGALITY, (See Punrosss or PARTNERSHIP).
of purpose of partnership: Woodworth vs. Bennett, 25; Craft vs.
McConoughy, 30.
INFANT, _
rights and liabilities as partner: Adams vs. Beall, 83.
INDEMNITY, '
. duty of partner to indemnify copartner for losses caused by former‘s
violation of articles: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227.
partner cannot claim, for unauthorized acts: McFadden vs. Leeka,
232.
INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP,
cannot exist: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361.
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS, (See APPLICATION or Asssrs).
prior claim of individual creditors in: Rodgers rs. Meranda, 463;
Blair cs. Black, 477.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY,
of each partner for whole debt: Haralson vs. Campbell, 840; Mason
vs. Eldred, 343; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341.
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY,
of partner may be taken for firm debt: Haralson vs. Campbell, 840.
INDORSEMENT,
implied power of partner to indorse: Clarke vs. Wallace, 301.


















































































































































when become operative: ,Atkin.a va. Hunt, 49; Sailors"'· Nizon-Jonc • 
Co., 68; Kerrick '''· Stet-en3, 65. 
GOOD FAITH, 
duty of partners t.o each other: Latta w. Kilboum, 212; Inalq "'· 
Shire, 222. 
GOOD WILL, 
what constitutes and how prot.eoted: Williama 111. Farrand, 174; Sny-
der Mfg. Co. VB. Snyder, 192; Trego 11B. Hunt, 199. 
GROSS PROCEEDS, 
sharing of, as test of partnership: Bucher w. Bush, 86; Harvey t·s. 
Childa, 97; Morgan vs. Farrel, 189. 
HEIRS, 
rights against surviving partner: Valentine ""' Wy1or, 883. 
HIRING OF PROPERTY, 
by one partner: Sweet vs. Wood, 270. 
HOLDING OUT, (See FsTOPPEL), 
liability 88 partner by: Burnett "'· Snyder, 125; FldcMr- VI. Pullen~ 
184; Morgan v1. Farrel, 189. 
HOTEL, 
Jeesor of hot.el, whether partner with proprietor: BucMr w. Btuh, 86. 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
as partners: Artman vs. Fergu1on, 87; Suau VB. Caf!e, 40. 
ILLEGALITY, ( ~ PuRPOSES OF PARTNERSHIP). 
of purpose of partnership: Woodworth vs. Bennett, 25; Craft t•t. 
McConoughy, 80. 
INFANT, 
rights and liabilities 88 partner: Adam.t v1. Beall, 83. 
INDEMSITY, 
duty of partner t.o indemnify copartner for loeees caused by former'& 
violation of articles: Murphy v1. Crafts, 227. 
part•1er cannot claim, for unauthorized acts: McFadden v1. Leeka, 
232. 
INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP, 
cannot exist: Solomon v1. Kirkwood, 861. 
INDIVIDUAL ASSETS, (See APPLICATION OF ASSETS). 
prior claim of individual creditors in: Rodger1 t'B. Meranda, 468;. 
Blair i·s. Black, 477. 
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY, 
of each partner for whole debt: Haralson 111. Campbell, 840; Ma80tt 
t•• Eldred, 848; Oil Co. 11s. Hubbell, 841. 
INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY, 
of partner may be taken for firm debt: Haralson v1. Campbell, 840. 
INDORSEMENT, 
implied power of partner t.o indone: Clarke v1. Wallace, 301. 
after dissolution: Humphries t•s. Cha1tain, 410. 
INDEX. 505
INJUNCTION,
to restrain use of firm name: See FIRM N AME.
to protect good will: See G001) WILL.
INSOLVENCY,
distribution of assets upon: See APPLICATION or Asssrs.
INTENTION,
to become partners, how far efiective: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49; Sailors rs.
Nixon-Jones Co., 53; Kerrick vs. Stevens, 55; Du:-yea vs. Whitcomb,
57.
J OINDER,
of partners as partia: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.
JOINT CREDITORS,
rights of a firm assets: See APPLICATION or Ass:-:'rs.
JOINT OBLIGATION,
of individual partners when a partnership one: Berkshire Co. vs.
Juillard, 319.
JOINT PURCHASERS,
for resale, whether partners: Coope vs. Eyre, 64; Harvey vs. Childs,
97; Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117.
JOINT AND SEVERAL,
partnership debts are in equity: Doggett vs. Dill, 395.
not at law: Mason vs. Eldred, 343.
JUDGMENT,
against partners, in what form; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341.
merges obligations, when: Mason vs. Eldred, 343.
confession of. by one partner: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294.
LAND, (See REAL ESTATE).
partnerships to deal in: Chester vs. Dickerson, 20.
may be created by parol: Id.
LIABILITY, (See PowERs or PARTNERS; NEGLIGENCE; Tom).
of partners is joint: Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341; Mason vs. Eldred, 343.
of firm, for acts of partner: Sweet vs. Wood 270, et seq.; Pith-in vs.
Benfer, 318, et seq.
LIEN,
of firm creditors on firm assets: Case vs. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vs.
Hagerman, 446, et seq.
LOAN,
whether constitutes partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Harvey rs.
Childs, 97; Meehan vs. Valentine, 103; lVaverly Bank vs. Hall, 113;
, Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117.
MAJORITY,
power of; Johnston vs. Dutton, 304; Leavitt vs. Peck, 808; Wipper-
man vs. Stacy, 309; Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
by one partner binds firm, when: Rosenkrans vs. Barker, B35.
MALPRACTICE,



















































































































































to restrain use of firm name: See FIRM NAK& 
to protect good will: See GooD WILL, 
INSOLVENCY, 
distribution of asset.a upon: See APPLICATION OJ' ASSRTB. 
INTENTION, 
60§ 
to become partners, bow far effective: .Atlcim va. Hunt, 49; Sailor• t·a. 
NiJ:on-Jonea Co., 53; Kerrick VB. Stevena, 65; Duryea VB. Whitcomb, 
~7. 
JO IND ER, 
of partners as parties: Hus vs. Lowrey, 880. 
JOINT CREDITORS, 
rights of a firm asset.a: See APPLICATION OB' ASSETS. 
JOINT OBLIGATION, 
of individual partnera when a partnership one: Berkshi~ Co. v•. 
Juillard, 319. 
JOINT PURCHASERS, 
for resale, whether partners: Coope vs. Eyre, 64; Harveu v.s. Childs, 
97; Spaulding vs. StubbingB, 117. 
JOINT AND SEVERAL, 
partnership debts are in equity: Doggett vs. Dill, 895. 
not at law: Mason VB. Eldred, 343. 
JUDGMENT, 
against partners, in what form; Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 841. 
merges obligations, when: Mason vs. Eldred, 348, 
confession et, by one partner: Morgan VB, Richardson, 294. 
LAND, (See REAL ESTATE), 
partnerships to deal in: Chester vs. Dickeraon, 20. 
may be created by parol: Id. 
LIABILITY, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS; NEGLIGENCE; TORT). 
of partners is joint: Oil Co. vs. Hubbell, 341; Mason VB. Eldred, 848. 
of firm, for acts of partner: Sweet vs. Wood 270, et seq.,· Pitlcin vs. 
Benfer, 318, et seq. 
LIEN, 
of firm creditors on firm asset.a: Case w. Beauregard, 440; Arnold vr. 
Hagerman, 446, et seq. 
LOAN, 
whether constitutes partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Han:ey 1·s~ 
Childs, 97; ~Ieehan t"s. Valentine, 103; Waverly Bank i·s. Hall, 113; 
Spaulding vs. Stubbings, 117. 
MAJORITY, 
power of; Johnston vs. Dutton, 804; Leavitt vs. Peck, 808; Wipper· 
man vs. Stacy, 309; Latta vs, Kilbourn, 212. 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 
by one partner binds firm, when: Rosenkram w. Barker, 835, 
MALPRACTICE, 




as partners: Artman vs. Ferguson, 37: Suau vs. Cafe, 40.
MARSH ALLING,
of assets: See APPLICATION or Asssrs.
on what principle: Rodgers vs. Meranda, 463.
MERGER,
of partnership debt; in judgment: Mason vs. Eldred, 348.
MINORITY, (See MAJORITY).
MISCONDUCT, °
of partner, when justifies dissolution: New vs. lVn'ght, 203; Howell
vs. Harvey, 354; Gerard vs. Gateau, 366.
MISMANAGEMENT,
liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
MORTGAGE.
implied power of one partner to make: Hage vs. Campbell, 453.
N IME, (See FIRM NAME).
in what name firm bound: Berkshire Co. vs. Juillard, 319; Hastings
Nat. Bank vs. Hibbard, 322.
two firms of same name, which bound: Hastings Bank vs. Hibbard,
822.
NEGLIGENCE,
of one partner, liability, of firm for; Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.
liability of partner to partner, for: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
NEGOTIA BLE INSTRUMENTS,
power of partner to make: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
NET PROCEEDS.
sharing in. as test of partnership: Morgan vs. Farrel, 139.
NEW CONTRACT,
partner no power to make after dissolution: Humphries vs. Chastain,
410; Van Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411; Pennoyer vs. David, 421; Feigley
vs, Whitaker, 424.
NEW PROMISE, (See S'm'ro'rs: or Liurmrioss).
N DN-JOINDER,
of partners: Cleveland vs. Woodward, 818.
)1 )N-TRADING FIRM,
power of partner in, to make negotiable paper: Peass vs. Cole, 282.
NOTICE.
by one partner that he will not be bound by contemplated acts of
another: Johnston vs. Dutton, 304; Leavitt vs. Peck, 308; Wipper-
man vs. Stacy, 309.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION.
what sufiicient: Solomon vs. Kirkwood, 361; Austin vs. Holland, 870;
Dickinson -us. Dickinson, 374.
so whom required: Austin vs. Holland, 870; Dickinson vs. Dickinson,
374.


















































































































































as partners: Artman w. Ferguacm, 87: Suau oa. CaJfe, 4.0. 
IU.RSHALLING, 
of asaeta: See APPLICATION OJ' ASSETS. 
on what principle: Rod.aer• w. Meranda, .(81. 
MERGER, 
of partnenhip debt in judgment: Jlcuon va. Eldred, 84.8. 
llINORITY, (See MA.JoRITY). 
lrlISCONDUCT, 
of partner, when justifies dissolution: New w. Wright, 268; Howell 
va. Hart'ey, 854; Gerard va. Gateau, 866. 
MISMANAGEMENT, 
liability of partner t.o partner, for: Inalq va. Shire, 222. 
HORTGAGE, 
implied power of one partner t.o make: Hage w. Oamp'bell, 458. 
N _\.ME, (See Fmx N.AJ(E). 
in what name firm bound: Berkahire Oo. w. Juillard, 819; Haatinga 
Nat. Bank va. Hibbard, 822. 
two firms of eame name, whioh bound: Hasting• Bank w. Hibbard, 
822. 
NEGLIGENCE, 
of one partner, liability, of firm for; Hua va. LotDrtJJ, 830. 
liability of partner t.o partner, for : Ina~ vs. Shire, 222. 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 
power of partner to make: Peaae va. Ook, 282. 
NET PROCEEDS, 
sharing in. as teat of pa.rtnenhip: Morgan w. Farrel, 189. 
NEW CONTRACT, 
partner no power t.o make after dissolution: Humphriu va. Oha.Btain, 
.flO; Van Keuren va. Parmelee, 411: Pennouer w. David, '21; Feigley 
w. Whitaker, 424. 
NEW PROMISE, (See STA.TUTE OF LillITATIONS). 
NJN-JOINDER, 
of partners: Oleveland o& Woodward, 818. 
)I )N-TRA.DING FIRM, 
power of partner in, t.o make negotiable paper: Pean va. Ook, 282; 
NOTICE, 
by one partner that he will not be bound by contemplated act.9 of 
another: Johnston n. Dutton, 804; Leavitt va. Peck, 808; Wipper-
man"'· Stacy, 809. 
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION, 
what sufficient: Solomon"'· Kirkwood; 861; Amt£n va. Holland, 870; 
Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374. 
t.o whom required: Au.tin va. Holland, 870; Dicki11aon v•. Didnntan, 
:JR 
effect of not gh'iq: Dickinaon w. Dickinaon, 874. 
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Norton or D1ss0LU'r10N—Continued.
burden of proving: Bank vs. Bergsirom, 378.
by dormant partner: Id.
NOVATION, '
necessary to discharge retiring partner: Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.
PARTNER,
who may be: S6e_INFAN'1‘; Msmunn Woman; CORPORATION.
powers of: See Pownss or PARTNERS.
liability of: See LIABILITY.
duties of: DUTY OF PARTNERS.
PARTNERSHIP,
what constitutes: Queen vs. Robson, 1, et seq.
burden of proving: Dunham vs. Loveroclc, 6.
for what purpose may be organized: Chester vs. Dickerson, 20, et seq.
who may organize: Adams vs. Beall, 33, et seq.
construction of contracts for: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49, et seq.
what contracts create: Grace vs. Smith, 61, et seq.
interest in property of: Bank vs. Carrollton Railroad, 147, et seq.
firm name and good will of: Williams vs. Farrand, 174, et seq.
rights and duties of members of : Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212, et seq.
actions between members of: Wycofl’ vs. Parnell, 238, et seq.
powers of partners: Sweet vs. Wood, 270, et seq.
liability of firm: Pitkin vs. Benfer, 313, et seq.
nature and extent of partner‘s liability: Haralson vs. Campbell, 340,
et seq.
dissolution of: Hoard vs. Clum, 850, et seq.
consequences of dissolution of :- Hawkins vs. Capron, 381, ct seq.
distribution of assets of, on dissolution: Case vs. Beauregard, 440,
ct seq.
capital of, how distributed between partners: Whitcomb vs. Converse,
492, et seq.
PARTNERSHIP AT WILL,
right to dissolve: Howell vs. Harvey, 354: Solomon vs. Kirkwood,
361.
PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTION,
what is: Berkshire Co. vs. Juillard. 819.
PART PAYMENT,
See STATUTE or LIMITATIONS.
POWERS OF PARTNERS.
to make admissions: Sweet vs. Wood, 2'70.
to hire property: Sweet vs. Wood, 270.
to subscribe for stock: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 272.
to engage in other business: Banner Tobacco Co. vs. Jenison, 271.
to execute negotiable instruments: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
to confess judgment: Ilforgan vs. Richardson, 294.
to execute sealed instrumentp: Foa: vs. Norton. 295.
to make assignment for creditors: Shattuck vs. Chandler, 296.
to sell property: Lowman vs. Sheets, 300.

















































































































































NOTICE OF Dis.SOLUTION-Continued. 
burden of proving: Bank vs. Bergstrom, 878. 
by dormant partner: Id. 
NOVATION, 
necessary to discharl(e retiring partner: Barnu v1. B07/tf'8, 481S, 
PARTNER, 
who may be: Bee.INFANT; MARRIED WOMEN; CORPORATION. 
powers of: &e POWERS 011' p ARTNE&S. 
liability of: See LIABILITY. 
duties of: DUTY OF PARTNEBS. 
PARTNERSHIP, 
what constitutes: Queen vs . .RobBOn, 1, et aeq. 
burden of proving: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6. 
for what purpose may be organized: Oh.ester"'· Dickeraon, 20, et aeq. 
who may organize: Adams vs. Beall, 83, et seq. 
construction of contract.a for: Atkins vs. Hunt, 49, et seq. 
what contract.a create: Grace v8. Smith, 61, et 1eq. 
interest in property of: Bank'"· Carrollton Railroad, 147, et seq. 
firm name and good will of: Williams vs. Farrand, 174, et 11eq. 
right.a and duties of members of: Latta VB. Kilbourn, 212, et seq. 
actions between members of: WycoJ! VB. Purnell, 288, et 11eq. 
powers of partners: Sweet vs. Wood, 270, et seq. 
liability of firm: Pitkin 11s. Benfer, 818, et seq. 
nature and extent of partner's liability: Haralaon va. Campbell, 840, 
et seq. 
diBBOlution of: Hoard vs. Clum. 800, et aeq. 
consequences of dissolution of:· Hawkins 11B. Capron, 881, et aeq. 
distribution of asset.a of, on dissolution: Case va. Beauregard, 440, 
ct seq. 
capital of, how distributed between partners: Whitcomb va. Oonverae, 
492, et seq. 
PARTNERSHIP AT WILL. 
right to di880lve: Howell VB. HaMJeU, BM: Solomon w. Kirkwood, 
861. 
PARTNERSHIP TRANSACTION, 
what is: Berkshire Co. vs, Juillar<l, 819. 
PART PAYMENT, 
Bee STATUTE 011' LIJrllTATIONB. 
POWERS OF PARTNERS, 
to make admissions: Sweet vs. Wood, 270. 
to hire property: Sweet vs. Wood, 270. 
to subscribe for stock: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 27!. · 
to engage in other business: BanMr Tobacco Co. vs. Jeii-iMm, 2'14. 
to execute ne1r;otiable instrument.a: P.eaae va. Cole, 282. 
to confess judgment: Morgan vs. Richardson, 294. 
to execute aealed in1trument,: Fo~ vs. Norton. 295, 
to make assignment ror creifitors: Shattuck w. Chandler, 200. 
to sell property: Lowman vs. Sheeta, 800. 
to bind firm aa 1urety for third peraon:i: Clarke va. Wallooe, 801. 
508 ‘ Inmzx.
Pownns or PARTNERs—Continued.
to mortgage firm property: Hage vs. Campbell. 453.
to enlarge scope of business: Boardman vs. Adams. 277.
by ratification: Banner Tobacco Co. vs. Jenison, 274.
right of partner to limit. by previous dissent: Johnston vs. Dutton,
804: Leavitt vs. Peck, 308; H"1'ppcrman vs. Stacy, 309
after dissolution to make note: Dickinson vs. Dickinson, 374.
after dissolution, to make admissions or promises: Van Keuren vs.
Parmelee, 411, et seq.
after dissolution, to endorse paper: Humphries vs. Chastain, 410.
to prevent operation of statute of limitations: Van Keuren vs.Parmelee,
411; Feigley 18. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,
relation of, as test of partnership: Cos: vs. Hickman, 70; Beecher vs.
Bush, 86; Harvey vs. Childs, 97; Meehan vs. Valentine, 103.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY,
relation between retiring and other partner who assumes firm debts:
Smith vs. Sheldon, 431; Barnes vs. Boyers, 435.
PRIORITY,
in distribution of assets: See APPLICATION or Assnrs; INDIVIDUAL
Asssrs.
PROFITS, (See Cnssnssrms Pnorrrs).
sharing of, as test of partnership: See SHARING PROFITS.
PROMISSORY NOTE, (See NEGOTIABLE Issrnumnsrs).
PROPRIETARY INTEREST, (See Comwmrv or Iurnnnsr).
as test of partnership: Magovern vs. Robertson, 122: Spaulding vs.
Stubbings, 117.
PURCHASE, (See BUYING).
by one partner binds firm, when: ‘ Griffith vs. Bujfum, 815.
RATIFICATION, (See Pownss or Psnrsnns).
by other partners of act of one partner: Banner Tobaco Co. vs. Jeni-
son, 274; Porter vs. Curry, 281.
REAL ESTATE.
when deemed assets: Robinson Bank vs. Miller, 155; Paige vs. Paige,
170; Shanks vs. Klein, 164.
power of one partner as to: Shanks vs. Klein, 164.
when deemed personalty: Shanks vs. Klein, 164.
RECEIVER,
in actions for dissolution; New vs. Wright, 263.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, (See ILLEGAL-ITY).
partnership to efiect: Craft vs. McC'onoughy, 30.
REVOCATION,
by one partner of authority of the other: Johnston vs. Dutton, 304;
Lga1;ift1?8. Peck, 308; Wipperman vs. Stacy, 309.
of partner’s power by dissolution: Humph-ries vs. Chastain, 410; Van
Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411.
RIVALRY,

















































































































































POWER8 OJ' PARTNERS-Continued. 
to mortpge firm property: H~ vs. Campbell. 458. 
to enlarge soope of business: Boardman w. Adams. 277. 
by ratification: Banner Tobacco Co. t:B. Jenison, 274. 
right of partner to limit. by previous dissent: Johnston va. I?uffon, 
804: Leavitt va. Peck, 808; W(pperman tP. Stacy, 809 
after dissolution to make note: Dickinson 111. Dickinson, 87-'. 
after dissolution, to make admissions or promises: Van Keunm "'· 
Parmelee, 411, et aeq. 
after dissolution, to endorse paper: Humphries vs. Chastain, .(10. 
to prevent operation of statute of limitatioui<: Van Keuren va.Parmelea. 
411; Feigley u. Whituker, 424; Pemwyer VB. Dai,-id, 421. 
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 
relation of, as test of partnership: Co:c tis. Hickman, 70; Beecher tis. 
Bush, 86; Harvey va. Chil~, 97; Meehan VB. Valentine, 108. 
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY, 
relation between retiring and other partner who assumes firm debts: 
Smith t.•s. Sheldon, 481; Barnea VB. Boyer•, 4M. 
PRIORITY, 
in distribution of a11eta: See APPLICATION 01' ASSETS; llmIVIDl7AL 
ASSETS. 
PROFITS, (See CLANDESTINE PROFITS). 
sharing of, as test of partnership: See SHARING PROFITS. 
PROMISSORY NOTE, (See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUHKNTS), 
PROPRIETARY INTEREST, (See ColUIUNITY OF INTEREST). 
as test of partnership: Magovern vs. Ro'bertaon, 122: Spaulding vs. 
Stubbing•, 117. 
PURCHASK, (See Bu'YING). 
by one partner binds firm, when: · ·GritfUh va. Bujfum, 8115. 
RATIFICATION, (See POWERS OF PARTNERS). 
by other partners of act of one partner: Banner Tobaoo Co. "'· Jeni-
son, 274; Porter vB. Curry, 281. 
REAL ESTATE, 
when deemed assets: Robinson Bank vs. Mt1ler, 155; Paige w. Paige, 
170; Shan1c8 t'B. Klein, 164. 
power of one partner as to: Shank• vs. Klein, 164. 
when deemed perBOnalty: Shan1c8 vs. Klein, 164. 
RECEIVER, 
in actions for dissolution; New vs. Wright, 268. 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, (See ILLEGALITY). 
partnership to e~ect: Craft"'· McConoughy, 80. 
REVOCATION, 
by one partner of authority of the other: Johnston "'· Dutton, 804; 
Leavitt tis. Peck, 808; Wipperman vs. Stacy, 809. 
of partner's power by diBSOlution: Humphriea vs. Chastain, 410; Van 
Keuren vs. Parmelee, 411. 
RIVALRY, 
not to be, between partner and his firm: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212. 
Ixnnx. 509'
SALE, (See Pownas or Paarxnas).
implied power of partners to make: Lowman vs. Sheets, 300.
SALE OF BUSINESS.
effect upon firm name: See FIRM NAME.
efiect upon good will: See G001) WILL.
SCOPE, ,
duty of each partner to keep within: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212; Murphy
vs. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.
not to be enlarged without consent: McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.
may be enlarged by consent: Boardman vs. Adams, 277.
what not sufficient to enlarge: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212.
firm not entitled to profits of one partner in dealings outside: Latta
vs. Kilbourn, 212.
SEALED INSTRUMENTS, ‘ »
execution by one partner: Fox vs. Norton, 295.
SECRET PARTNER, (See Doamsnr PARTNER).
what constitutes: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Jacobs vs. Shorey, 181.
SEPARATE ESTATE,
of partner how applied: See APPLICATION or Assnrs.
SHARE OF PARTNER.
what constitutes: Bank 'vs. Railroad, 147; Staats vs. Bristow, 152;
Sindelare vs. Walker, 154.
how ascertained: Id.
SHARING PROFITS.
as a test of partnership: Grace vs. Smith, 61; Ooope vs. Eyre, 64;
Waugh vs. Carver, 67; Coa: vs. Hickman, 70: Jacobs vs. Show-ey, 131.
SOLICITING CUSTOMERS,
of old firm: See Goon WILL
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
not usually granted of partnership agreements: Bunk vs. Smith, 266.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
whether will prevent parol partnership to deal in land: Chester vs.
Dickerson, 20.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
power of partner after dissolution, to remove bar of: Van Keuren vs.
Pa-rrnelee, 411; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421.
STIPULATIONS, (See ARTICLES or PARTNERSHIP).
between partners, duty of partner to observe: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227;
McFadden vs. Leeka, 232.
SUBPARTNERSHIP,
l rights and liability of subpartner: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125.
SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK.
partner's power to make: Barnard vs. Plank Road Co., 272.
SUITS, (See Acrross.)
SURETY, (See PRINCIPAL AND Snmvrr).
implied power of partner to bind firm as: Clarke vs. II/allace, 801.
when retiring partner is, as to other who assumes debts: Smith vs.

















































































































































SALE, (See POWERS OJ' PARTNERS). 
implied power of p&rtnen to make: Lowman vs. Sheets, 800. 
SALE OF BUSINESS, 
effect upon firm name: See FIRM NA:an. 
effect upon good will: See GooD WILL. 
SCOPE, • 
duty of each partner to keep within: Latta v1. Kilbourn, 212; Murph1J 
w. Crafts, 227; McFadden vs. Lteka, 232. 
not to be enlarKE!d without consent: McFadden vs. Luka, 232. 
may be enlarged by consent: Boardman vs. Adams, 277. 
what not sufficient to enlarge: Latta vs. Kilbourn, 212. 
firm not entitled to profits of one partner in dealings outaide: Latta 
w. Kilbourn, 212. 
SEALED INSTRUMENTS, 
execution by one partner: Fo:r: vs. Norton, 29:;. 
SECRET PARTNER, (See DORMANT PARTNER). 
what constitutes: Grace v1, Smith, 61; Jacobi vs. S'A'>rey, 131. 
SEPARATE ESTATE, 
of partner bow applied: See APPLICATION OF ASSETS. 
SHARE OF PARTNER, 
what constitutes: Bank ·vs. Railroad, 147; Staats vs. Bristoio, 11S2s 
Sindelare vs. Walker, 154. 
how B11Certained: Id. 
SHA.RING PROFITS, 
as a t.est of partnership: Gra~ va. Smith, 61; Ooope va. Eyre, 64; 
Waugh vs. Carver, 67; Coa: va. Hickman, 70; Jaooba va. Shorey, 181. 
SOLICITING CUSTOMERS, 
of old firm: See GooD WILL. 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 
not usually gr11-nt.ed of partnel'Bhip agTeement.a: Buck vs. Smith, 266. 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 
whether will prevent pa.rol partnership to deal in land: Chester v'-
])ickeraon, 20. 
BT A TUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
power of partner after dissolution, to remove bar of: Van Keuren vs. 
Parmelu, 411; Feigley vs. Whitaker, 424; Pennoyer vs. David, 421. 
STIPULATIONS, (See ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP). 
between partners, duty of partner to observe: Murphy vs. Crafts, 227; 
McFadden vs. Luka, 282. 
SUBPARTNERSHIP, 
· right.a and liability of subpartner: Burnett vs. Snyder, 125. 
SUBSCRIPTION FOR STOCK, 
partner's power to make: Barnard tJB. Plank Road Oo., 272. 
SUITS, (See ACTIONS.) 
SURETY I (See PRINCIP .&.L A.ND SURETY). 
implied power of partner to bind firm as: Clarke vs. Wa~, 801. 
when retiring partner is, as to . other who B88umee debts: Smith 111. 
Sheldon, 481; Barnes vs. Bo11ers, 43li. 
610 INDEX.
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS,
after death of one partner: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330.
SURVIVING PARTNER,
right to possession of assets: Hawkins vs. Capron, 381; Valentine vs.
lVys0r, 352.
right and powers of: Valentine vs. Wysor, 382; Linder vs. Bank,
401; Durant vs. Pierson, 403.
as a. trustee: Id.
liability of, for firm debts: Doggett vs. Dill. 395.
power of, to dispose of assets: Linder vs. Bank, 401.
to borrow money: Durant vs. Pierson. 403.
power to dispose of firm real estate: Shanks cs. Klein, 164.
liability of, for mismanagement: Insley vs. Shire, 222.
TENANTS IN COMMON,
not partners: Dunham vs. Loverock, 6.
TORT,
of one _pa.rtner binds firm, when: Hess vs. Lowrey, 330; Rosenkrans
vs. Barker, 335.
TRADING FIRM,
power of partner in, to make bills or notes: Pease vs. Cole, 282.
TROVER,
\ by surviving partner for possession of assets: Hawkins vs. Capron,
381.
TRUST FUNDS,
when firm liable for: Englar vs. Ofiutt, 328.
UNDISCLOSED PARTNER, (See Donussr Psnrsms).

















































































































































8URVIV AL OF ACTIONS, 
aftier death of one partner: Heas t1& Lou!rq, 830. 
SURVIVING PARTNER, 
right to poese88ion of a.eta: Ha10kin1 v1. Capron, 881; Vaz-tine w. 
Wyaor, &52. 
ri&ht and powers of: Vakntine 1.11. Wy.sor, 882; Linder w. Bau, 
401; Du.rant v•. Piera<m, 408. 
aa a trustee: Id. 
liability of, for firm debt.a: Doggett VB. Dill, 895. 
power of, to dispoee of aaset.a: Linder vs. Bank, (01. 
to borrow money: Du.rant v1. Pieraon, 403. 
power to diapoee of firm real estate: Shanka v•. Klein, 16'. 
liability of, for mismanagement: Insley va. Shire, 222. 
TENANTS IN COM.MON, 
not partner&: Dunham w. Low:rock, 6. 
TORT, 
of one _partner bind8 firm, when: HeaB va. Lowrey, 880; ~ 
VB. Barker, 885. 
TRADING FIRM, 
power of partner in, to make bills or note&: Peaae va. Cole, .288. 
TBOVER, 
· ~ by surviving partner for poaM!llllion of .-a.: Hawkin.1 w. Capron, 
881. 
TRUST FUNDS, 
when firm liable for: Englar w. O§utt, 828, 
UNDISCLOSED PARTNER, (See DoRllANT P .ARTNBR). 
liability of: G1·i.Jlth va. Bu§um, BUS; Clcwlantl w. Wood...-d, 818. 
